Originally published by the National Defense University Press, March 1998
布拉西出版社第一版，1998年7月
First Brassey’s edition, July 1998
编辑部地址： Editorial Offices: |
订单部门： Order Department: |
由美国 Potomac Books, Inc.（前身为 Brassey's, Inc.）出版。
Published in the United States by Potomac Books, Inc. (formerly Brassey’s, Inc.).
美国国会图书馆出版物数据
Collins, John M.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Collins, John M.
面向专业人士和公众的军事地理 / 约翰·M·柯林斯
著，页数：厘米。
原出版地：华盛顿特区：美国国防大学，1998年。
含索引。ISBN
1-57488-180-9
1. 军事地理。I. 标题
UA990.C554 1998
355.4'7--dc21
Military Geography for professionals and the public / John M. Collins
p. cm.
Originally published: Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1998.
Includes index.
ISBN 1-57488-180-9
1. Military geography. I. Title
UA990.C554 1998
355.4’7--dc21
98-24963
CIP
98-24963
CIP
加拿大印刷
PRINTED IN CANADA
国家战略研究所（INSS）是国防大学（NDU）的重要组成部分，在国防大学校长的领导下运作。它为国防部长、参谋长联席会议主席和联合司令部进行战略研究；支持国防大学学术项目的国家战略组成部分；并与其他政府机构和更广泛的国家安全界进行交流。
The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a major component of the National Defense University (NDU), which operates under the supervision of the President of NDU. It conducts strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and unified commanders in chief; supports national strategic components of NDU academic programs; and provides outreach to other governmental agencies and the broader national security community.
国家安全研究所出版局通过国防大学出版社出版有关国家安全战略、国防政策和国家军事战略的书籍、专著、报告和专题论文，这些出版物反映了国防大学的研究和学术成果。此外，出版局还负责制作《国家安全研究所战略评估》和其他经国防大学校长批准的作品，以及为校长出版的专业军事期刊《联合部队季刊》。
The Publication Directorate of INSS publishes books, monographs, reports, and occasional papers on national security strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy through NDU Press that reflect the output of NDU research and academic programs. In addition, it produces the INSS Strategic Assessment and other work approved by the President of NDU, as well as Joint Force Quarterly, a professional military journal published for the Chairman.
本文所表达或暗示的观点、结论和建议仅代表作者个人意见，并不一定代表美国国防大学、国防部或任何其他美国政府机构的立场。本文已获准公开发布，发行不受限制。
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.
本书部分内容可未经许可引用或转载，但须注明标准出处。NDU出版社欢迎提供转载或评论样书。
Portions of this book may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints or reviews.
内容
CONTENTS
PREFACE by John W. Vessey, Jr.
Representative Naval Ramifications
Climatology for Military Strategists
Meteorology for Military Operators
Space Compared with Land and Sea
Region I: Aerospace Interfaces
Region II: Circumterrestrial Space
Tips for Military Space Planners
8. NATURAL RESOURCES AND RAW MATERIALS
Conventional Urban Bombardment
Urban Centers and Nuclear Strategy
13. FORTRESSES AND FIELD FORTIFICATIONS
Fortifications in the Nuclear Age
Citadels Versus CW and BW Weapons
PART THREE:
POLITICAL-MILITARY GEOGRAPHY
14. MILITARY SERVICE PREDILECTIONS
16. MILITARY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY
Regional Areas of Responsibility
Selection of the Lodgment Area
Description of the Lodgment Area
Assessments of the Lodgment Area
Effects on Allied Courses of Action
Logistical Limitations Within Vietnam
Logistical Shortcomings Inside Laos
APPENDIX A: Acronyms and Abbreviations
APPENDIX B: Glossary of Geographical Terms
APPENDIX C: A Basic Geographic Library
1. Land Forms Displayed Schematically
4. Line-of-Sight and High-Angle Trajectories
5. Selected Stream Characteristics
6. Water Tables, Aquifers, and Wells
8. Lunar and Solar Influences on Tides
9. Ocean Wave Motions and Measurements
10. Conditions Conducive to Surf
13. Effects of Wave Action on Ship Stability
14. Land and Sea Breeze Regimes
16. Cloud Ceilings Related to Terrain
18. Nuclear Fallout Related to Wind
19. Conditions Conducive to Avalanches
20. Typical Coastal Topography
21. Shallow Water Antisubmarine Warfare Suites
23. Gravity Versus Space Vehicle Velocity
24. Earthly and Lunar Gravity Wells
25. Electromagnetic Pulse Propagation
26. U.S. and Soviet Mineral and Metal Imports
28. Present and Projected World Populations
30. Three Layers of Urban Obstacles
31. Highway and Byway Attributes
33. Bridge Superstructures and Substructures
34. Traditional Rail Yard Facilities
35. Airfield Construction Stages
36. Typical Naval Port Facilities
37. Wharf and Pier Configurations
38. Offensive Force Boundaries
39. Exits Inland from Omaha Beach
40. Monsoonal Regimes at Tchepone, Khe Sanh, and Da Nang
1. Selected Russian Naval Bases
2. Bottlenecks That Inhibit the Russian Navy
9. Crucial Naval Choke Points During the Cold War
10. Beaches and Approaches at Inchon
11. Regional Climates Depicted
13. Iceberg Routes to the North Atlantic
15. The Arctic Ocean and Peripheral Seas
20. The Kokoda Trail and Shaggy Ridge
21. The Pripet Swamp and Its Offshoots
22. The Mekong Delta and Rung Sat Special Zone
25. Japanese Territorial Holdings in 1942
26. Saudi Arabian Oil Fields and Facilities
28. The Trans-Siberian Railroad and Baikal-Amur Magistral
29. U.S. and Soviet Space Launch Sites and Control Centers
30. Earth Support Satellite Orbits
31. Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS)
32. U.S. Cold War Arctic Outposts (1960s)
33. U.S. Cold War Bases in Great Britain (1979)
34. U.S. Cold War Bases in France (1966)
35. U.S. Cold War Bases in West Germany (1979)
36. U.S. Cold War Bases in Iberia (1979)
37. U.S. Cold War Bases in Italy (1979)
38. U.S. Cold War Bases in Greece and Turkey (1979)
39. U.S. Cold War Bases in the Philippines (1979)
40. U.S. Cold War Bases in Japan and Korea (1979)
41. The World According to Mackinder (1904 and 1919)
42. U.S. and Allied Encirclement of the Soviet Union
43. De Seversky’s View of the Globe
44. Soviet Buffers in Central Europe
47. Territorial Claims in Antarctica
49. Boundary Disputes in Jammu and Kashmir
50. U.S. Cold War Areas of Responsibility
51. NATO’s Basic Areas of Responsibility
52. AFCENT Areas of Responsibility
53. Pacific Ocean Area and Southwest Pacific Area
54. Amphibious Boundaries at Tarawa
55. Route Packages in North Vietnam
57. Potential Lodgments in Western Europe
58. Natural Regions in Northwestern Normandy
59. Drainage Patterns in Northwestern Normandy
60. Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno, and Sword Beaches
61. Cross-Channel Routes from England to Normandy
62. U.S. Expeditionary Airfields in Manche and Calvados
64. The Laotian Panhandle at Midpoint
65. Monsoonal Regimes in South Vietnam and Laos
66. OPLAN El Paso’s Tactical Area of Responsibility
67. Supply Requirements Associated with OPLAN El Paso
3. Selected Soil Characteristics
4. Beaufort Wind Scale Related to Sea States
5. Beaufort Scale Related to Surface Winds Ashore
6. Militarily Important Temperature Statistics
10. Regional Climates Described
11. One Dozen Militarily Useful Minerals and Metals
12. Crude Oil Producers and Proven Reserves
13. 第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战中的军人死亡和失踪人数
13. Military Dead and Missing, World Wars I and II
14. Causes of U.S. Wartime Casualties
15. Representative Racial, Ethnic, and Tribal Relationships
16. Ten Leading Languages (1990s)
17. Linguistic Clutter in the Caucasus
18. Principal Religions and Selected Denominations
19. Variable Town and City Components
20. Present and Projected Megalopoli
21. U.S. Military Aircraft Runway Length Calculations
22. Advantages Available from the Panama Canal
23. U.S. Cold War Collective Security Pacts
24. Typical Trouble Spots, Mid-1990s
26. Selected Climatic Statistics for Manche and Calvados
27. Populated Places in Manche and Calvados
28. U.S. Expeditionary Airfields in Manche and Calvados
29. Transportation on the Ho Chi Minh Trail
31. OPLAN El Paso Road Opening Schedules
32. Schedules for Dual-Laning Route 9 in Laos
Amphibious Troops Cross a Coral Reef
Switchback Curves on the Burma Road
Wicked Weather at Changjin Reservoir
Rough Weather vs. Resupply at Sea
Submarine Surfaces Through Arctic Ice
“Follow the Leader” Through Antarctic Ice
Frozen Salt Spray on an Icebreaker
Water Distribution in the Desert
Oil Fires in the Kuwaiti Desert
Transferring Supplies over Perilous Routes
Rock Quarries Facilitate Military Construction
The Consequences of Urban Combat
The Banghiang River at Tchepone
Mulberry “A” Before and After Demolishment
前言
FOREWORD
本书堪称目前最全面的军事地理学著作。作者对“地理”一词进行了全面而精辟的诠释，不仅涵盖了地貌，更囊括了生活在这片土地上、改造土地、并受其塑造的人类。他将我们所处的自然世界的几乎所有方面与军事领域的各种活动联系起来，从解读战术地图到在地球某个偏远角落开展大规模战役，无所不包。他考察了各种地理环境下的军事行动，同时兼顾了各个层面不断变化的战略、战术和技术。书中引用了大量贯穿历史的实例，使内容更加丰富翔实。最后，他以简洁明了的语言写作，力求让尽可能多的读者都能理解本书的内容。
This book will arguably become the most comprehensive treatment of military geography in print. The author presents a sweeping, sophisticated interpretation of the term “geography,” covering not just the lay of the land, but the human beings who live on the land, change it, and are shaped by it. He relates virtually every aspect of the physical world we live in to every imaginable endeavor in the military realm, from reading a tactical map to conducting a major campaign in some far-flung corner of the Earth. He considers military operations in every geographical environment, while taking into account ever-changing strategies, tactics, and technologies on all levels. He enriches his text with many practical examples that span recorded history. Finally, he writes in plain, direct language to reach the widest possible audience.
约翰·柯林斯在其漫长而卓越的军旅生涯和学术生涯早期，便注意到军事地理学科领域缺乏系统性的研究成果。因此，他对这一领域产生了浓厚的兴趣，并持续了四十余年，积累了大量相关资料。最终，他获得了在国防大学从事军事地理研究和写作的机会，并以访问学者的身份在那里工作了两年。在此期间，他不仅运用了自身丰富的资料和经验，还广泛汲取了众多对军事地理各个方面都颇有见地的专家意见。
The dearth of consolidated studies on the discipline of military geography came to John Collins’ attention early in his long and distinguished career as a soldier and scholar. Thus he began and kept up an interest in the subject for more than 40 years, amassing voluminous files on the subject. Finally afforded the opportunity to research and write on his avocation at the National Defense University, he spent 2 years as a Visiting Fellow, tapping not only his own wealth of data and experience but a wide variety of well-informed opinions on every facet of military geography.
这部著作是约翰·柯林斯毕生心血的结晶，填补了专业和技术文献领域的空白。美国国防大学非常荣幸能接待约翰·柯林斯并出版他的这部作品。据我们所知，没有任何其他书籍能如此巧妙而全面地将军事艺术与地理学相结合。这部著作注定会在未来数年内实现其既定目标：为学生提供教科书，为军事专业人员提供手册，并为所有感兴趣的普通读者提供启发性的概览。
The resultant volume, the culmination of a life-long career, fills a gap in the professional and technical literature. The National Defense University is pleased to have hosted John Collins and to publish his work. No other book, to our knowledge, marries military art with that of the geographer so deftly and completely. The volume seems destined to meet its stated purposes for years to come, namely, to provide a textbook for students, a handbook for military professionals, and an enlightening survey for any appreciative lay reader.
RICHARD A. CHILCOAT
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
President, National Defense University
前言
PREFACE
1997年春季，美国一家主流新闻杂志刊登了一篇关于新技术对国防影响的文章。文章指出，“在未来的战争中，知识可能比地形更重要”，但地理因素对军事行动、战争和安全的影响依然巨大，正如其在历史上一直发挥的作用一样。古今伟大的统帅都明白，地形、天气和气候不仅影响战略，还影响作战计划和支援计划。事实上，历史上不乏因忽视地理因素而付出惨痛代价的例子。
A major American news magazine in the spring of 1997 included an article about the effects of new technology on national defense. It observed that “In future wars, knowledge may be more important than terrain,” but geography still exerts enormous influence on military operations, war, and security as it has throughout history. Great commanders, past and present, understand that topography, weather, and climate not only affect strategies but battle and support plans. History in fact is replete with enormous penalties incurred by those who paid too little attention to geographic factors.
在“信息时代”，军事指挥官无疑会更快地获取数据，从而比他们的前辈更了解战场形势。信息技术或许能帮助军事策划者和作战人员更好地理解地理因素——甚至可能驳斥克劳塞维茨“大多数情报都是错误的”这一论断——但他关于这一主题的其他论述很可能依然适用：“地理环境和地形特征与战争有着密切且始终存在的关系。它们对战争的进程、计划和执行都具有决定性的影响。”
Military commanders in the “Information Age” will surely receive data more rapidly and consequently know more than their predecessors about battlefield situations. Information technologies may help military planners and operators better understand geographic factors— they may even disprove Clausewitz’s contention that “most intelligence is false”—but other words he wrote on that subject are likely to endure: “geography and the character of the ground bear a close and ever-present relation to warfare. They have a decisive influence on the engagement, both as to its course and to its planning and execution.”
地理因素在我服役期间无处不在：1942-43年，我作为一名士兵在突尼斯沙漠作战；1943-45年，我作为一名初级军官在意大利山区作战；多年后（1966-67年），我作为一名营长，在地形迥异的越南C区丛林作战。这些经历对我而言意义非凡，它与我和战友们的身心健康息息相关；它影响着我们的伤亡率，而且往往比我们所面对的敌人更具挑战性。我常常思考，我们究竟是地理环境的“受害者”，还是上级指挥部对地理环境的过度重视的“受害者”。
Geographic influences were omnipresent during my service as an enlisted soldier in the Tunisian desert fighting of 1942-43, as a junior officer in the Italian mountains 1943-45, and many years later (1966-67) as a battalion commander in the totally different terrain of the War Zone C jungles in Vietnam. Those experiences, which were very personal, had a great deal to do with the health and comfort of my comrades and myself; they affected our casualty rates and often posed more formidable challenges than the enemies we faced. I often wondered if we were “victims” of geography or “victims” of the higher command’s appreciation for geography.
早年从地理学的“实战经验”中汲取的教训，在我后来担任更重要的职务，负责在各种不同的地理环境下规划和指挥军事行动时，发挥了重要作用。这些经历包括：1972-73年在老挝担任新晋准将；1976-79年担任驻韩联合国军司令；以及最终担任参谋长联席会议主席。尽管如此，我和我的参谋人员仍然需要大量的工作和学习，才能将地理因素对陆、海、空作战的影响有效地整合起来。尽管我们尽了最大努力，但我相信，许多执行我们计划的陆军、海军、空军、海军陆战队和海岸警卫队官兵，有时也会像我多年前那样，感到自己“受制于”地理因素，或者因为我们对地理认识不足而“吃亏”。
Those early lessons from geography’s “school of hard knocks” were helpful later, when I held positions of greater authority for planning and directing military operations in widely varied geographic circumstances, first as a new brigadier in Laos in 1972-73, then as Commander of the United Nations Command in Korea, 1976-79, and finally as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A lot of work and study nevertheless was required by me and my staff officers before we could satisfactorily integrate geography’s influence on land, sea, and air operations. Despite our efforts, I suspect that many of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen who implemented our plans sometimes felt “victimized” by geography or our lack of appreciation for it, just as I felt so many years earlier.
美国武装部队过去和将来都会致力于在各种地理环境下执行各种类型的军事行动。无论是作战、预防战争还是维和行动，他们都必须做好准备，在任何被派往的地方都能出色地完成任务——而且往往是在接到紧急通知后才被派往。本书《面向专业人士和公众的军事地理》是一本以简洁明了的方式编写的教科书和手册。本书以通俗易懂的方式将相关因素联系起来，既能让普通读者理解，也能让各军种的专业人员掌握，堪称地理与军事关系领域难得一见的佳作。它应当成为各级政策制定者、军事规划人员、指挥官和参谋人员的必读书目。同时，对于政治领袖、教育工作者、新闻媒体从业人员以及关心时事的公民而言，本书在“信息时代”也极具参考价值。我真希望过去55年里，我的背包里一直装着这本书。
The Armed Forces of the United States have been, and will continue to be, committed to every conceivable type of military operation in every conceivable geographic environment. Whether for war-fighting, war-preventing, or peacekeeping operations, they must prepare to excel wherever they are sent—all too commonly on short notice. Military Geography for Professionals and the Public, a textbook and handbook written in simple, straightforward terms that tie relevant factors together in a fashion understandable to lay readers as well as the uniformed professionals of all military services, is a rare, if not unique, survey of relationships between geography and military affairs. It ought to be required reading for policymakers, military planners, commanders, and staff officers at all levels. It also will be a very useful reference for political leaders, educators, members of the news media, and concerned citizens in the “Information age.” I wish it had been in my knapsack for the past 55 years.
约翰·W·维西，小约翰
，美国陆军上将（退役）
，曾任参谋长联席会议主席（1982-1985年）
JOHN W. VESSEY, JR.
General, U.S. Army (Ret.)
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1982-1985
致谢
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
这本书是我献给美国军事教育体系的一份遗产。自1942年以来，它为我提供了莫大的帮助，从基础课程到陆军指挥与参谋学院、武装部队参谋学院、武装部队工业学院，再到国家战争学院，它一路陪伴我成长。55年来，它帮助我拓展了职业视野，自1996年1月3日退休以来，也一直让我保持着稳定的工作。
This book is my legacy to the U.S. military education system that has done so much for me since 1942, from basic courses through the Army Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the National War College. It helped me expand my professional horizons for 55 years and has kept me gainfully employed since retirement on January 3, 1996.
时任参谋长联席会议主席的约翰·M·沙利卡什维利将军为我在国防大学安排了一个职位，那里是研究和撰写军事地理或其他与军事专业相关主题书籍的理想场所。此后，我结识了许多拥有丰富实践经验和不同观点的“铁杆”人士，他们解答了我无数次的临时信息请求，帮助我克服了思维障碍，并在写作初期逐章严格审阅了我的初稿。
General John M. Shalikashvili, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, arranged a perch for me at National Defense University (NDU), the perfect place to research and write a book about military geography or any other subject related to the profession of arms. “Hard core” contacts with extensive practical experience and assorted persuasions thereafter answered countless spot requests for information, helped me overcome mental blocks, and rigorously reviewed the first draft chapter-by-chapter during the gestation period.
在这方面，两位退役陆军四星上将值得特别一提：弗雷德里克·J·克罗森将军指出了在每章末尾添加“要点”的必要性；美国中央司令部首任司令罗伯特·C·金斯顿将军则成为了世界上级别最高的研究助理。美国空军退役中将威廉·H·金恩则负责删减有关军事空战的部分内容。
Two retired Army four-star generals merit special mention in that regard: General Frederick J. Kroesen identified the need for “Key Points” at the end of each chapter; General Robert C. Kingston, the first Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command, became the world’s highest ranking research assistant. Lieutenant General William H. Ginn, Jr., U.S. Air Force (Ret), scrubbed bits about military air operations.
陆军上校詹姆斯·H·库尔茨和海军上校约翰·W·麦吉尔弗雷，这两位都曾是联合参谋部战略计划与政策局（J-5）的部门主管，他们提供了大量关于几乎所有主题的事实、观点、轶事和资料。比尔·艾伦上校代表美国陆军战争学院发言。退役陆军少将约翰·默里是一位毕生致力于交通运输的专家，他和美国陆军运输司令部（AMTRAC）副总工程师赫伯·朗赫尔特则加深了我对交通运输线路的理解。海军海洋学家埃德·惠特曼博士在他的专业领域给予了我很多帮助。当时在空军负责计划和作战的副参谋长办公室工作的“韦斯蒂”·韦斯滕霍夫上校、贝塔克公司的斯科特·克雷拉、退役陆军上校切斯特·B·麦科伊德（我以前在第82空降师的上司）以及专攻军事地理的帕特里克·奥沙利文教授，也都让我受益匪浅。我的儿子肖恩·凯文也是如此，他在麻省理工学院获得的航空航天工程博士学位为第 7 章（内部和外部空间）奠定了基础。
Army Colonel James H. Kurtz and Navy Captain John W. McGillvray, both former division chiefs in the Joint Staff’s Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), furnished a landslide of facts, opinions, anecdotes, and source materials on almost every subject. Colonel Bill Allen represented the U.S. Army War College. Retired Army Major General John Murray, a life-long transportation specialist, and Herb Longhelt, Deputy Chief Engineer for AMTRAC, sharpened my views about lines of communication. Dr. Ed Whitman, who works for the Oceanographer of the Navy, helped a whole lot within his field. Colonel “Westy” Westenhoff, then assigned to the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Scot Crerar at Betac Corporation, retired Army Colonel Chester B. McCoid (my boss long ago in the 82nd Airborne Division), and Patrick O’Sullivan, a professor who emphasizes military geography, likewise made me think. So did my son Sean Kevin, whose doctorate in aeronautical and astronautical engineering from Massachusetts Institute of Technology underpinned much of Chapter 7 (Inner and Outer Space).
埃德·布鲁纳、史蒂夫·鲍曼、鲍勃·戈尔迪奇、克莱德·马克和乔治·西尔，他们都是国会研究服务处（CRS）的前同事，从始至终都贡献了广博而深入的知识。其他拥有专业知识的前CRS同事包括：鲍勃·班伯格（石油）；玛乔丽·布朗（海洋法）；雷·科普森（非洲）；里奇·克罗宁和芭芭拉·勒波尔（印度和巴基斯坦）；艾达·尤斯蒂斯（法律事务）；苏珊·弗莱彻（环境问题）；里克·格林伍德（矿产和金属）；迪克·格里梅特（美国海外基地）；黛安·伦纳克和芭芭拉·亨尼克斯（发现者）。（无法找到））；Shirley Kan（中国）；Julie Kim（前华沙条约组织国家和前南斯拉夫）；Jon Medalia（战略核能力）；Al Prados（中东）；Rinn-Sup Shinn（韩国）；Stan Sloan（北约）；Marsha Smith（太空）；Bob Sutter 和 Kerry Dumbaugh（东亚）。
Ed Bruner, Steve Bowman, Bob Goldich, Clyde Mark, and George Siehl, all former colleagues from the Congressional Research Service (CRS), brought broad, in-depth knowledge to bear from start to finish. Other former CRS colleagues with specialized expertise included Bob Bamberger (petroleum); Marjorie Browne (law of the sea); Ray Copson (Africa); Rich Cronin and Barbara LePoer (India and Pakistan); Ida Eustis (legal matters); Susan Fletcher (environmental problems); Rick Greenwood (minerals and metals); Dick Grimmett (U.S. overseas bases); Dianne Rennack and Barbara Hennix (finders of the unfindable); Shirley Kan (China); Julie Kim (former Warsaw Pact countries and former Yugoslavia); Jon Medalia (strategic nuclear capabilities); Al Prados (Middle East); Rinn-Sup Shinn (Korea); Stan Sloan (NATO); Marsha Smith (space); Bob Sutter and Kerry Dumbaugh (East Asia).
1967-1968 年，美国陆军越南战役计划小组的九名成员煞费苦心地整理出了第 19 章（埃尔帕索行动计划）的资料：陆军中校多米尼克·卡内斯特拉（副组长）、罗伯特·杜瓦尔（陆军航空兵）、罗伯特·鲁夫斯沃尔德（工程兵，1967 年 12 月在一次空中侦察任务中负伤）、大卫·哈奇森（他的继任者）和里德·舒尔茨（作战）；陆军少校伯特·埃斯沃西（情报）和乔治·皮茨（陆路运输）；空军少校约翰·波勒（气象）和爱德华·里德（战术空运）。
Nine members of the Campaign Planning Group, U.S. Army Vietnam in 1967-1968 painstakingly pieced together input for Chapter 19 (Operation Plan El Paso): Army Lieutenant Colonels Dominic Canestra, the Deputy Chief; Robert Duvall (Army aviation), Robert Rufsvold, who was wounded in action on an aerial reconnaissance mission during December 1967 (engineering); David Hutchison, his replacement; and Reed Schultz (operations); Army Majors Bert Esworthy (intelligence) and George Pitts (land transportation); Air Force Majors John Pohle (weather) and Edward Reed (tactical airlift).
美国国防大学图书馆的参考咨询人员提供了无与伦比的帮助。他们知识渊博，而且总是放下手头的工作来提供帮助。因此，我衷心感谢馆长Sarah Mikel、研究与信息服务部主任Ann Parham、Robert Adamshick、Bonnie Dziedzic（她提供了很多地图方面的帮助）、Jeanmarie Faison、Howard Hume（他经常在工作日早上6点前接待我）、Jane Johnson、Benard Strong、Bruce Thornlow（他经常在周六早上提供帮助）以及Carolyn Turner。
The National Defense University library reference staff provided peerless support. None could have been more knowledgeable; all repeatedly stopped whatever they were doing to help. I therefore owe great gratitude to Sarah Mikel, the Director, Ann Parham, Chief of the Research and Information Services Division, Robert Adamshick, Bonnie Dziedzic (who helped a lot with maps), Jeanmarie Faison, Howard Hume (who met me many weekday mornings before 0600), Jane Johnson, Benard Strong, Bruce Thornlow (who assisted on many Saturday mornings), and Carolyn Turner.
美国国民警卫队上校、NDU基金会主席詹姆斯·V·杜加尔和美国陆军退役上校（已退休）及其执行主任托马斯·E·加拉格尔出色地管理了史密斯·理查森基金会捐赠的资金，用于将草图地图和图表在艺术服务公司（Art Services, Inc.）转化为专业产品。安迪·亨斯特里特在该公司熟练地处理了所有需求。联合部队季刊（Joint Force Quarterly）的制作协调员吉姆·彼得斯帮助我收集了合适的照片。美国海军学院的弗雷德·雷恩博和负责美国陆军军事历史研究所的汤姆·沃斯勒上校也提供了帮助。弗雷德·基利确保了《面向专业人士和公众的军事地理》一书从一开始就得到高度重视。他的继任者、出版主任罗伯特·A·西拉诺完成了该项目并策划了书籍的出版。乔治·梅尔茨和NDU出版社的全体员工在编辑过程的各个阶段都做出了贡献。
Colonel James V. Dugar, ANG, President of the NDU Foundation, and Colonel Thomas E. Gallagher, USA (Ret.), his Executive Director, admirably administered funds that the Smith Richardson Foundation donated to convert draft maps and figures into professional products at Art Services, Inc., where Andy Hemstreet skillfully responded to all requests. Jim Peters, who is Production Coordinator for Joint Force Quarterly, helped me assemble suitable photographs. So did Fred Rainbow at the U.S. Naval Institute and Colonel Tom Vossler, who oversees the U.S. Army Military History Institute. Fred Kiley ensured that Military Geography for Professionals and the Public enjoyed a high priority at the outset. Robert A. Silano, his successor as Director of Publications, brought the project to completion and planned the book’s launch. George Maerz and the entire staff of NDU Press contributed at various stages to the editorial process.
我的贤惠妻子斯威夫特，在我苦苦挣扎完成这个项目期间，包揽了柯林斯家所有的行政、后勤和财务工作。没有她的帮助，这个项目根本不可能完成。最后，我终于认出了自己右手的食指，它的指甲在我还没敲完所有草稿之前就深深地扎进了手腕，因为我对电脑一窍不通，只能用“一指禅”的方式打字。
Swift, my versatile bride, performed every administrative, logistical, and fiscal task for the Collins household while I struggled to finish this project, which never would have reached fruition without her help. Finally, I recognize the index finger of my right hand, the nail of which was driven into my wrist before it finished hunt-and-peck typing the entire draft, because I was quite unfamiliar with any computer.
约翰·M·柯林斯
，弗吉尼亚州亚历山大市，
1998年3月
JOHN M. COLLINS
Alexandria, Virginia
March 1998
作者引言
AUTHOR’S INTRODUCTION
当帝国总参谋长写道他“从未有时间研究军事地理的细节”时……这就好比皇家外科医学院院长说他从未有时间研究解剖学或进行任何解剖一样。
When a Chief of the Imperial General Staff wrote that he had “never had time to study the details of military [geography]”. . . it was as if the President of the Royal College of Surgeons said he never had time to study anatomy, or do any dissection.
BH 利德尔·哈特
论战争
B. H. Liddell Hart
Thoughts on War
没有任何学者曾教导过波斯君主居鲁士、冈比西斯、大流士和薛西斯军事地理，而他们却建立了世界上第一个幅员辽阔的帝国，到公元前480年，其疆域从印度河一直延伸到爱琴海。少年亚历山大在亚里士多德门下学习了很多，150年后他征服了更大的领土，但军事地理并非他老师的强项。成吉思汗在公元13世纪横扫欧亚大陆，创造了仅凭武力征服领土的纪录，而他的马鞍袋里却没有任何军事地理书籍。
NO SAVANT EVER TAUGHT MILITARY GEOGRAPHY TO PERSIAN MONARCHS CYRUS, CAMBYSES, DARIUS, AND Xerxes, who assembled the world’s first sprawling empire that by 480 B. C. stretched from the Indus River to the Aegean Sea. Teenage Alexander learned a lot at Aristotle’s knee before he conquered even larger territories 150 years later, but military geography was not one of his tutor’s strong points. Ghenghis Khan, who ran roughshod across Eurasia in the 13th century A. D., established the record for seizing real estate by force of arms without resort to any book about military geography in his saddlebags.
然而，现代战争极其复杂，各级指挥官都必须持续有效地利用地理因素，才能取得决定性优势。不幸的是，大多数陆军、海军、空军和海军陆战队士兵只能在惨痛的实战中汲取经验教训，因为很少有学校或学院开设军事地理课程，更没有院校授予相关学位，教材很少强调基础知识，而且大多数军种手册都过于狭隘。西点军校编纂的四卷本军事地理书目，厚达4英寸，共1059页，收录数千条引文，虽然涵盖范围广泛，但对大多数军人、他们的文职主管、关心此事的公民以及新闻媒体成员来说，实用性却很有限，因为他们中的许多人难以获取书中引用的资料，而其他人则忙于其他事务，无暇顾及。
Modern warfare, however, is so complex that commanders at every level must consistently manipulate geographic influences advantageously to gain a decisive edge. Most soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines unfortunately learn painful lessons mainly from the school of hard knocks, because few schools and colleges conduct courses in military geography, none confers a degree, instructional materials seldom emphasize fundamentals, and most service manuals have tunnel vision. The four-volume bibliography compiled at West Point, which is 4 inches thick and totals several thousand citations on 1,059 pages, addresses an admirable scope but is minimally useful to most uniformed practitioners of military art, their civilian supervisors, concerned citizens, and members of the news media, because many of them lack easy access to the sources cited while others are too busy to bother.
当我开始撰写这本书时，我在五角大楼和国会的联系人都感到困惑，因为他们从未听说过“军事地理学”这门学科。这种反应并不令人意外；毕竟，美国地理学家协会的成员在1996年4月举行的第92届年会上，就成立军事地理学专业组一事进行了激烈的辩论。这本旨在填补空白的综合指南有三重目的：
My contacts in the Pentagon and Congress were bemused when I began to write this book, because they had never heard of a discipline called “military geography.” That reaction came as no surprise; after all, members of the Association of American Geographers at their 92nd annual meeting in April 1996 debated heatedly before they finally decided to establish a military geography specialty group. This consolidated guide, designed to fill undesirable gaps, has a threefold purpose:
• 提供一本用于学术用途的教科书
• To provide a textbook for academic use
• 为政治军事专业人员提供一本使用手册
• To provide a handbook for use by political-military professionals
• 提高公众对地理对军事事务影响的认识。
• To enhance public appreciation for the impact of geography on military affairs.
第一部分和第二部分均为入门读物，从军事视角探讨了自然地理和人文地理。第三部分深入研究了政治军事地理对部队角色和任务、冲突的地理根源以及影响军事责任区的复杂因素的影响。第四部分介绍了将地理因素与合理的军事行动方案联系起来的分析技巧，并通过两个截然不同的案例研究将这些原则付诸实践——一个案例研究侧重于地理因素对作战行动的影响，另一个案例研究则侧重于后勤保障。每章结尾都总结了要点，并在最后的反思中强化了这些要点，使其与久经考验的战争原则相联系。
Parts One and Two, both of which are primers, view physical and cultural geography from military perspectives. Part Three probes the influence of political-military geography on service roles and missions, geographic causes of conflict, and complex factors that affect military areas of responsibility. Part Four describes analytical techniques that relate geography to sensible courses of military action, then puts principles into practice with two dissimilar case studies—one emphasizes geographic influences on combat operations, while the other stresses logistics. Each chapter terminates with key points, which final reflections reinforce and relate to time-tested Principles of War.
本书从不试图引导读者思考，而是用通俗易懂的语言，不拘泥于技术细节，直接阐述事实（无论是1917年率领部队穿越弗兰德斯战场的英国陆军元帅道格拉斯·黑格爵士，还是他的下士们，都丝毫不关心帕斯尚尔山脊究竟是地壳运动还是冰川沉积的产物）。简洁的历史实例以及技术发展趋势的潜在影响，有助于阐明地理与军事事务之间过去、现在和未来的联系。每章末尾的注释鼓励读者对感兴趣的主题进行更广泛、更深入的研究。书中配有大量地图和图表，但读者仍建议手边备一本世界地图册。
The text at no time tells readers what to think. It simply tells them how, in jargon-free terms that disregard technical details (neither British Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig nor corporals who led his squads through Flanders fields in 1917 cared a whit whether Passchendaele Ridge was a product of tectonic upheaval or glacial depositions). Concise historical examples and the probable influence of technological trends help illuminate past, present, and future relationships between geography and military affairs. Notes at the end of each chapter encourage students of the subject to pursue topics of particular interest in greater breadth and depth. Maps and figures are plentiful throughout, but readers nevertheless should keep a world atlas handy.
《面向专业人士和公众的军事地理》一书从战略、作战和战术层面探讨了各种形式的战争和所有军事部门，其目标读者既包括美国本土读者，也包括海外读者，因此其论述通常采用通用术语。因此，无论未来十年这个动荡的世界将发生怎样的政治、军事、经济、社会、科学、技术和其他方面的变化，本书的内容在21世纪末都应与21世纪初一样适用。
Military Geography for Professionals and the Public, which considers every form of warfare and every military service at strategic, operational, and tactical levels, is intended for audiences abroad as well as in the United States, and therefore is generally couched in generic terms. Consequently, its contents should be almost as sound at the end of the 21st century as at the beginning, regardless of political, military, economic, social, scientific, technological, and other changes in this volatile world that inevitably will occur during the next ten decades.
1. 概述
1. OVERVIEW
当我做出决定或采纳某种方案时，都是在研究了所有相关因素之后才做出的。地理、部落结构、宗教、社会习俗、语言、欲望、标准——所有这些都在我的考虑范围之内。
When I took a decision, or adopted an alternative, it was after studying every relevant. . . factor. Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards—all were at my finger-ends.
TE Lawrence
致 BH Liddell Hart 的信，1933 年 6 月
T. E. Lawrence
Letter to B.H. Liddell Hart, June 1933
《韦氏第三版新国际词典》将地理学定义为“一门研究地球及其生命的科学；尤其描述陆地、海洋、空气以及动植物的分布，包括人类及其产业，并探讨这些不同要素之间的相互关系。”下一版词典可能会增加相关内容。因此，地理学涵盖了从农学到动物学的一系列自然科学和社会科学。简而言之，它描述了特定地点和时间的环境状况。
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY DEFINES GEOGRAPHY AS “A SCIENCE THAT DEALS WITH the Earth and its life; especially the description of land, sea, air, and the distribution of plant and animal life including man and his industries with reference to the mutual relations of these diverse elements.” The next edition likely will add space to the list. Geography consequently embraces a spectrum of physical and social sciences from agronomy to zoology. In simple terms, it describes what the environment is like at any given place and time.
军事考量
MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS
军事地理学是上述广泛领域内的几个分支之一，它着重研究自然和文化环境对全球、区域和地方层面各类政治军事政策、计划、方案和作战/支援行动的影响。表1中列出的关键因素直接（有时甚至是决定性地）影响着军事活动的方方面面：战略、战术和理论；指挥、控制和组织结构；陆海空天军的最佳组合；情报收集；目标定位；研发；武器、装备和服装的采购和分配；以及后勤、维护、建设、医疗保障、教育和训练。1
Military geography, one of several subsets within those broad confines, concentrates on the influence of physical and cultural environments over political-military policies, plans, programs, and combat/support operations of all types in global, regional, and local contexts. Key factors displayed in table 1 directly (sometimes decisively) affect the full range of military activities: strategies, tactics, and doctrines; command, control, and organizational structures; the optimum mix of land, sea, air, and space forces; intelligence collection; targeting; research and development; the procurement and allocation of weapons, equipment, and clothing; plus supply, maintenance, construction, medical support, education, and training.1
物理因素
PHYSICAL FACTORS
空间关系可以说是所有地理因素中最基本的，它涉及陆地的位置、大小和形状，以及水域的存在和分布。相对位置和交通方式决定了任意两点之间的运输时间。总长度、宽度和面积决定了军事重要区域内可用机动空间的大小以及关键点的相对安全性或脆弱性。
Spatial relationships, arguably the most fundamental of all geographic factors, concern the location, size, and shape of land areas, together with the presence and configuration of intervening waters. Relative positions and modes of transportation determine transit times between any two sites. Total length, width, and area determine the amount of maneuver room available and the relative security or vulnerability of key points within any piece of militarily important property.
地形地貌构成了陆地军事行动的舞台。地形、水系、地质和土壤都是相关的重要议题。高级战略家、飞行员和宇航员看到的是山脉和山谷、高原和低地平原。而前线士兵，他们他们关注细节而非宏观图景，拥有截然不同的视角——小丘、沟壑、河岸和河谷在透视缩短的视角下显得格外巨大。比尔·莫尔丁在他的《前线》一书中对此描述得最为精辟：坐在弹坑里的“狗脸威利”对乔说：“见鬼，这难道不是世界上最重要的坑吗？我可是身处其中。”2
Land forms constitute the stage whereon military pageants play ashore. Relief, drainage patterns, geology, and soils are pertinent topics. High-level strategists, airmen, and astronauts see mountains and valleys, plateaus and lowland plains. Frontline soldiers, who deal with details instead of big pictures, have vastly different viewpoints—hummocks, gullies, river banks and bottoms loom large from their foreshortened perspectives. Bill Mauldin put it best in his book Up Front when dogface Willie sitting in a shell crater said to Joe, “Th’ hell this ain’t the most important hole in th’ world. I’m in it.”2
自然植被的分布差异很大，从郁郁葱葱到几乎寸草不生都有。无树苔原、覆盖西伯利亚大部分地区的针叶林泰加林、热带雨林、象草、灌木丛和仙人掌构成了截然不同的军事环境。博纳维尔盐滩和奥克弗诺基沼泽地都基本呈水平状，但前者寸草不生，后者则植被茂盛。撒哈拉沙漠除了零星分布的绿洲外，几乎寸草不生，与缅甸阿拉干山脉茂密的森林截然不同。在阿拉干山脉，树木的高度和间距、树干直径、枝干密度、树叶以及腐殖质（地面上的腐烂物质）都是重要的军事考量因素。
Natural vegetation varies from lush to nearly nonexistent. Treeless tundra, the coniferous taiga that blankets much of Siberia, tropical rain forests, elephant grass, scrub, and cacti create drastically different military environments. Bonneville’s salt encrusted flats and Okefenokee Swamp both are basically horizontal, but the former is bare while the latter is luxuriant. The Sahara Desert, sere except for widely scattered oases, bears scant resemblance to the densely wooded Arakan Range in Burma, where the height and spacing of trees, trunk diameters, stem densities, foliage, and duff (rotting materials on the floor) are cogent military considerations.
航海家们理所当然地认为，海洋的重要性几乎怎么强调都不为过，因为水覆盖了地球表面近四分之三的面积——仅太平洋的面积就超过了所有大陆和岛屿的总和。以加勒比海、里海和地中海为代表的海洋和大型湖泊，分隔或分割了主要的陆地板块。波浪、潮汐、洋流、水温和盐度等因素，在世界各地都限制了水面舰艇和潜艇的航行选择。海峡、水道、暗礁和其他地形特征，也同样限制了沿海地区的航行。
Mariners properly contend that the importance of oceans is almost impossible to overstate, since water covers almost three-fourths of the Earth’s surface—the Pacific Ocean alone exceeds the area of all continents and islands combined. Seas and large lakes, typified by the Caribbean, Caspian, and Mediterranean, separate or subdivide major land masses. Waves, tides, currents, water temperatures, and salinity everywhere limit options open to surface ships and submarines. Straits, channels, reefs, and other topographical features do likewise along littorals.
地球大气层笼罩着所有在空中、陆地和海上作战的武装力量。气温、降水（包括雨、冰雹、冰、雨夹雪或雪）、风、相对湿度以及昼夜交替都至关重要，因为它们会极大地影响和平时期和作战行动的时机、进行和后勤保障。忽视这些因素将招致严厉的惩罚。历史上曾多次出现军队深陷泥潭，泥浆没过摩天轮；舰队像不幸的西班牙无敌舰队一样被狂风吹离航线；轰炸机如同笨鸟一般，因狂风或浓雾而无法飞行。
Earth’s atmosphere envelops armed forces everywhere aloft, ashore, and afloat. Temperatures, precipitation in the form of rain, hail, ice, sleet, or snow, winds, and relative humidity, along with daylight and darkness, command close attention because they strongly affect the timing, conduct, and support of peacetime and combat operations. Stiff penalties accompany failure to heed their implications. History has repeatedly witnessed armies mired in mud axle-deep to a ferris wheel, fleets blown off course like the ill-fated Spanish Armada, and bombers as flightless as goonie birds, grounded by gales or fog.
内太空和外太空与陆地、海洋和天空一起，构成了第四种独特的地理介质。迄今为止，只有极小一部分被用于军事目的，但在相对较短的时间内，针对更远区域开展各种富有想象力的军事行动是完全可以想象的。
Inner and outer space constitutes a fourth distinctive geographic medium, along with land, sea, and air. Only a tiny fraction thus far has been exploited for military purposes, but operations farther afield for many imaginative purposes are conceivable within a relatively short time frame.
文化因素
CULTURAL FACTORS
出于政治军事原因，人口是文化考量中最重要的因素之一。人口普查统计数据揭示了人口规模、分布、年龄组、男女比例以及城乡人口密度。其他具有重要军事意义的特征包括本土智慧、语言、方言、识字率、习俗、信仰、爱国主义、对“外来者”的态度（冷漠、尊重、怨恨、敌意）、纪律、士气、性情（被动或主动）以及地方性疾病的流行情况。两千年前，维吉尔在他的《牧歌》第七首中用这样一句话强调了求胜的意志：“狼从不关心羊有多少。”
People top the list of cultural considerations that deserve close attention for political-military reasons. Census statistics reveal population size, distribution, age groups, the percentage of males compared with females, and urban versus rural densities. Other militarily important characteristics include native intelligence, languages, dialects, literacy, customs, beliefs, patriotism, attitudes toward “outsiders” (indifference, respect, resentment, hostility), discipline, morale, temperament (passive or aggressive), and the prevalence of endemic diseases. Virgil singled out the will to win with these words in his Eclogues VII 2,000 years ago: “It never troubles the wolf how many the sheep be.”
种族、民族、部落和宗教群体之间的关系值得特别关注，因为疏离往往会导致武装冲突。一些文化象征，例如圣地、国家公墓、其他神圣场所，甚至整座城市，都具有巨大的心理意义。北约中央集团军群的一位前司令曾多次告诫下属：“如果我们明天与华沙条约组织开战，就不能让第一天的头条新闻是‘纽伦堡陷落’，因为这将对盟军士气造成毁灭性的打击。”
Relations among racial, ethnic, tribal, and religious groups merit special attention, because alienation often leads to armed conflict. Immense psychological significance attends some cultural icons, such as shrines, national cemeteries, other hallowed ground, even entire cities. A former Commanding General of NATO’s Central Army Group repeatedly told his subordinates, “If we go to war against the Warsaw Pact tomorrow we can’t allow the first day’s headline to read ’Nürnberg Falls,’ because the blow to allied morale would be devastating.”
自然资源、土地利用和工业是作战能力和盟友及敌人持久力的基石，对国家安全至关重要。粮食是不可或缺的基础，其次是原材料和将其转化为可用产品的设施。基本要素包括（但不限于）农业、畜牧业和渔业；矿产和金属；石油、电力和核能；水资源；制造工厂；以及石材、砖块、混凝土、木材和其他建筑必需品。如今，只有少数国家拥有强大的军事实力所需的经济潜力。没有哪个国家能够完全自给自足，因此，外部资源的获取以及对这些资源的控制程度在地理上至关重要。
Natural resources, land use, and industries, which underpin combat capabilities and the staying power of friends as well as foes, contribute essentially to national security. Food is the irreducible foundation, followed by raw materials and facilities for converting them to usable goods. Basic ingredients feature, but by no means are confined to, agriculture, animal husbandry, and fisheries; minerals and metals; petroleum, electrical, and nuclear power; water supplies; manufacturing plants; stone, brick, concrete, lumber, and other construction staples. Only a few nations now possess the economic potential for great military power. None is wholly self-sufficient, thus external sources of sustenance and degrees of control over them are geographically consequential.
交通网络能够加快或阻碍政治家和军事指挥官在洲际、区域或地方范围内调动武装力量的能力。道路、铁路、内河航道、机场和海港，若位置便利且组合得当，便能使所需规模和类型的部队从远距离集结地迅速抵达目标区域，并进行有效机动。阻碍上述能力的陆路、海路和空路都会增加任务完成的成本，包括时间、生命和金钱的消耗。严重的缺陷甚至可能导致必要的军事行动无法实施，正如人们常说的，“你从这里到那里去不了”。
Transportation networks expedite or impede abilities of statesmen and military commanders to employ armed forces intercontinentally, regionally, or locally. Roads, railways, inland waterways, airfields, and seaports, conveniently located in proper combinations, enable formations of requisite size and type to reach objective areas promptly from distant staging bases, then maneuver effectively. Land, sea, and air lanes that hamper abilities to do so raise the cost of mission accomplishment in terms of time, lives, and money expended. Severe deficiencies may even render requisite military actions infeasible because, as wags are wont to say, “You can’t get there from here.”
电信系统（包括无线电、电视、电话、电报、空间通信卫星、互联网和海底电缆）促进了单军种、联合部队和多国部队的协同作战。因此，外国军事和民用固定设施的类型、属性和地理分布，对于希望利用这些资源并阻止敌方获取的指挥官和参谋人员来说至关重要。中心机房、变电站、传输线路、中继器、转接点、备用线路、冗余功能、电源和维护设施都是他们重点关注的对象。
Telecommunication systems (radio, television, telephone, telegraph, space communication satellites, the internet, and submarine cables) facilitate integrated action by uniservice, joint, and multinational armed forces. The type, attributes, and geographic distribution of military and civilian fixed-plant facilities in foreign countries accordingly interest commanders and staffs who hope to use those assets and deny them to enemies. Central offices, substations, transmission lines, repeaters, transfer points, alternative routings, redundant capabilities, power sources, and maintenance installations are prime concerns.
地区特色
REGIONAL QUIRKS
地球和太空中的地理区域是相对同质的区域，包含独特的地形、气候、植被和文化特征（或缺乏文化特征），这些特征共同作用，产生影响。对军事政策、计划、方案和行动的影响相对一致。目前有几种分类系统相互竞争。一种侧重于地表形态，例如丘陵或水平、光滑或锯齿状，以及陆地或海底。其他分类系统则根据气候类型进行划分：北极、亚北极、温带和热带，或寒湿、寒干、热湿、热干，每种气候类型都对应着独特的动植物群。3
Geographic regions on Earth and in space are reasonably homogeneous areas containing distinctive topography, climate, vegetation, and cultural features (or lack thereof) that exert relatively uniform effects on military policies, plans, programs, and operations. Several classification systems are in competition. One accentuates surface configurations that may be hilly or horizontal, smooth or serrated, on land or under the sea. Others attach climatic labels: arctic, subarctic, temperate, and tropical or cold-wet, cold-dry, hot-wet, hot-dry, each accompanied by distinctive fauna and flora.3
适宜军事行动的地理区域有时呈垂直堆叠状。公元前218年冬季临近，汉尼拔的军队和象队从高卢前往意大利，途中翻越阿尔卑斯山。他们先是穿越低海拔的耕地，然后攀登落叶林、常绿林带、林线以上的草甸，最后抵达裸露的岩石地带。气温梯度与山坡一样陡峭：山脚下气候温和，但在海拔3050米（10000英尺）的特拉韦塞特山口却异常寒冷，狂风呼啸，积雪深厚。由于没有适应高海拔，整个队伍在接近山顶时，想必都因稀薄的空气而气喘吁吁。4.航天器乘组人员在飞越对流层、平流层、中间层、热层和外逸层的过程中，会熟悉五个上下堆叠的地理区域，最终到达地球上方约 60 英里（95 公里）的环地球空间，在那里空气动力阻力和摩擦热的影响会大大降低。5
Geographic regions suitable for military operations sometimes are stacked vertically. Hannibal’s army and elephant train traversed cultivated fields at low elevations before they climbed through deciduous forests, a band of evergreens, meadows above the tree line, and expanses of bare rock when they navigated the Alps en route from Gaul to Italia as winter approached in 218 B.C. Temperature gradients were as steep as the slopes, mild near the base but frigid in the Col de la Traversette Pass at 10,000 feet (3,050 meters), where winds were wild and snow already lay deep. The entire entourage, being unacclimated, must have gasped for breath from exertions in thin air near the top.4 Spacecraft crews become familiar with five geographic regions stacked one above the other as they fly through the troposphere, stratosphere, mesosphere, thermosphere, and exosphere en route to circumterrestrial space about 60 miles (95 kilometers) above Earth, where aerodynamic drag and frictional heat lose most of their significance.5
专门为特定环境作战而准备的武装部队，通常在完成耗时耗资的转型之前，在其他环境中作战效率较低。他们必须熟悉新的地形、气候条件和社会体系，调整作战战术，然后根据实际情况调整武器、装备、服装和补给。例如，为热带雨林作战而优化的部队，需要做好应对高温、高湿、水蛭和昆虫的准备。如果部队未能采取适当的预防措施，脱水和热带疾病造成的伤亡可能比敌方弹药造成的伤亡更大。维护不善的武器会因生锈和发霉而发生故障。轻便制服的步兵比坦克和卡车更为重要，空中侦察受到严格限制，小规模作战单位占据主导地位。相比之下，为寒冷气候而优化的部队则需要白色派克大衣、手套和保暖靴；带衬里的睡袋；滑雪板、雪鞋、雪地摩托和雪橇；带炉灶的帐篷；防冻剂；低粘度润滑油；高热量的热餐；以及再培训。6
Armed forces expressly prepared for employment in any given environment normally function less well elsewhere until they complete time-consuming and costly transitions. They must become familiar with new topography, climatic conditions, and social systems, modify their techniques, then tailor weapons, equipment, clothing, and supplies to suit the situation. Formations optimized for warfare in rain forests prepare to cope with heat, humidity, leaches, and insects. Dehydration and tropical diseases may cause more casualties than enemy ammunition if troops fail to take proper precautions. Poorly maintained weapons malfunction from rust and molds. Foot soldiers in lightweight uniforms that blend well with surroundings take precedence over tanks and trucks, aerial reconnaissance is severely restricted, small unit tactics predominate. Formations optimized for cold climes in contrast require white parkas, mittens, and insulated boots; lined sleeping bags; skis, snowshoes, snowmobiles, and sleds; tents with stoves; antifreezes; low-viscosity lubricants; hot meals with high caloric contents; and retraining.6
为应对“蓝水”战争做好充分准备的海军必须调整其在大陆架的作战方式，因为敌方无论在陆地还是海上都能利用飞机和反舰导弹飞行时间短的优势，在极短的预警时间内发动攻击。水雷、小型潜艇和蛙人也是潜在的威胁。沿岸海域的机动空间通常有限。能够在近岸水域有效工作的传感器和通信系统必须作为补充或替代那些专为深海、海面或海域设计的系统。在民用和军用空中及海上交通交错的区域，区分敌我构成了一项复杂的挑战。7
Navies fully prepared for “blue water” warfare must modify modi operandi along continental shelves, where adversaries ashore as well as afloat can take advantage of short flight times for aircraft and antiship missiles to strike with minimum warning. Mines, minisubmarines, and “frogmen” are other potential menaces. Maneuver room along littorals is often limited. Sensors and communication systems able to work effectively in coastal waters must supplement or replace those designed for use in, on, or over deep seas. Differentiation of friends from foes poses complex problems where civilian and military air and sea traffic mingle.7
军事区域和政治边界很少重合。因此，大多数国家都包含两个或多个地理区域，这使得计划、准备和作战变得更加复杂。越南并非到处都是丛林和沼泽；例如，波来古高原就非常适合装甲部队作战。奥地利也并非全是高山地区。文化因素常常会在地形和气候条件相近的地区内部造成重要的军事差异。沙特阿拉伯在一个几乎空无一人的国土上，却拥有着城市绿洲。那里到处都很干旱，除了红海沿岸的山脉外，只有少数几个突出的地貌特征。
Military regions and political boundaries seldom coincide. Most nations consequently contain two or more geographic subdivisions that complicate planning, preparations, and operations. Jungles and swamps by no means blanket Vietnam; the Pleiku Plateau, for example, is made to order for armor. Austria is by no means all alpine. Cultural factors often introduce militarily important inconsistencies within regions that are topographically and climatically coherent. Saudi Arabia harbors urban oases in an otherwise nearly empty nation that is everywhere arid and displays only a handful of prominent physiographic features other than mountains along the Red Sea coast.
可避免的滥用行为
AVOIDABLE ABUSES
政策制定者、战略家和战术家如果忽视许多地理因素会随季节、周期或随机变化而波动这一事实，就可能遭遇意想不到的麻烦。核战争，无论多么克制，都能瞬间将城市战场夷为平地；昼夜交替会改变无线电传播特性；太阳黑子活动会周期性地造成高频信号中断。越共的藏身之处在落叶剂降低隐蔽性后，其效用大打折扣。冰雪能将无法通行的水域变成交通要道（火车曾在冬季穿越波罗的海的部分海域），冰冻的沼泽地也欢迎车辆通行。南北走向的部队往往会发现自己身处与东西走向部队截然不同的地形环境中，而防御转为进攻的策略转变，也可能导致原本的防御屏障变成新的障碍。毫无预警的洪水会令最周密的计划也付之东流。1995年12月，驻波斯尼亚的美国陆军工兵就深有体会。当时，由于融雪导致萨瓦河水位暴涨，他们搭建一座浮桥的时间比预期晚了一周。不断上涨的河水淹没了附近的帐篷营地，营地里驻扎着等待从克罗地亚渡河进入波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那的士兵。伤亡仅限于潮湿和严寒天气造成的，但这仅仅是因为当时的战术形势相对有利。8
Policymakers, strategists, and tacticians can expect unpleasant surprises whenever they overlook the fact that many geographic factors fluctuate in response to seasonal, cyclical, or random change. Nuclear combat, however restrained, could instantaneously turn urban battlefields into rubble, transitions from night to day alter radio propagation characteristics, and sunspots periodically cause high frequency blackouts. Viet Cong sanctuaries lost much of their utility when defoliants reduced concealment. Ice transforms unbridgeable bodies of water into arterial highways (trains have crossed bits of the Baltic Sea in wintertime), and wheels are welcome in frozen fens. Forces oriented north to south often find themselves in topographically different worlds than those facing east to west, while switches from defense to attack may cause obstacles to loom where protective barriers stood before. Streams that flood without warning can frustrate even the best laid plans, as U.S. Army engineers in Bosnia discovered in December 1995, when it took a week longer than anticipated to build a pontoon bridge over the raging Sava River, suddenly swollen by melting snow. Rising waters inundated adjacent tent cities occupied by troops waiting to cross from Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Casualties were confined to those caused by dampness coupled with bone-chilling weather, but only because the tactical situation was benign.8
历史上不乏这样的例子：一些杰出的将领悲哀地认为，敌方的地形分析会与己方如出一辙。在第二次布匿战争期间，新迦太基城落入罗马的西庇阿·阿非利加努斯之手。当时，西庇阿的先锋部队在退潮时涉水穿过泻湖，抵达并攀越了汉尼拔的兄弟马戈疏忽大意、未加防守的城墙。1759年，英国将军沃尔夫率领的军队攻占了魁北克，因为他们爬上了法国守军蒙卡尔姆侯爵防守过于松懈的悬崖。1941 年 12 月， 10 个日本纵队在新加坡以北的马来半岛登陆，然后穿过看似无法通行的红树林沼泽到达新加坡。新加坡于次年 2 月陷落，部分原因是英国守军的重炮全部指向大海。1940 年 5 月， 11 辆德国坦克几乎未遇抵抗便涌入阿登森林，此前亨利·贝当元帅宣称这片森林“坚不可摧”。1944 年阿登战役期间，德军再次宣称这片森林坚不可摧，因为美国战略家并没有从贝当的教训中吸取多少经验。12
History is replete with prominent commanders who sorrowfully assumed that enemy area analyses would mimic their own. New Carthage fell to Rome’s Scipio Africanus during the Second Punic War when his vanguard waded a lagoon at low water to reach and scale a city wall that Hannibal’s brother, Mago, fecklessly left unprotected.9 British General Wolfe’s forces captured Quebec in 1759 after they climbed cliffs that the French defender, Marquis de Montcalm, guarded too lightly.10 Japanese columns landed on the Malay Peninsula well north of Singapore in December 1941, then penetrated presumably impassable mangrove swamps to reach the city, which fell the following February, partly because the heavy artillery of British defenders all pointed seaward.11 German Panzers poured through the Ardennes almost unopposed in May 1940, after Marshal Henri Pétain proclaimed that forest “impenetrable,” and did so again during the Battle of the Bulge in 1944, because U.S. strategists learned little from Pétain’s lesson.12
那些连基本的地图判读都做不好，或者对气候和地形缺乏了解的领导人，很容易犯地理上的错误。亨利·纳瓦尔将军就曾不明智地将法国在亚洲的未来押在了防守根本无法守住的奠边府（1954年）。奠边府位于印度支那一个孤立的盆地，远离最近的后援基地，只能依靠空中补给，而且周围地形险峻。13猪湾事件（1961 年 4 月）的失败行动引发了波及白宫的后果，当时无能的美国策划者将反卡斯特罗的“自由战士”部署在鳄鱼出没的沼泽地上，而通往内陆的主要道路只有一条。14
Leaders who flunk elementary map reading courses or lack much feel for clime and terrain are prone to make geographic miscalculations. General Henri Navarre unwisely staked the future of France in Asia on the defense of indefensible Dien Bien Phu (1954), an isolated Indochinese basin that was far from the nearest support base, was sustainable only by air, and was dominated by forbidding terrain.13 Ill-fated operations at the Bay of Pigs (April 1961) caused repercussions that reached the White House when incompetent U.S. planners put anti-Castro “freedom fighters” ashore in an alligator-filled marsh that had only one major route inland.14
值得注意的是，人为因素往往比自然地理因素更具说服力。切·格瓦拉，这位曾经的游击战大师，几乎是在玻利维亚自杀身亡，很大程度上是因为他误判了当地的文化背景。一个阿根廷人，从古巴经刚果来到玻利维亚丛林深处，这又有什么逻辑可言呢？为了让一个已经拥有土地、几个世纪以来目光都转向内向的民族皈依基督教，就去死记硬背错误的印度语言动词？15他远非革命战士们所宣扬的“人海中的一条鱼”，而是“离水的一条鱼”。他为地理上的无知付出了生命的代价。
It is worth remembering that human factors often may be more cogent than physical geography. Che Guevara, once a guru on guerrilla warfare, almost literally committed suicide in Bolivia, largely because he misread the cultural context. What logic could explain “an Argentinian out of Cuba by way of the Congo in the wilds of the Bolivian jungles memorizing the verbs of the wrong Indian language in order to convert a people, already possessing land, whose vision for endless centuries had turned inward?”15 Far from being a fish in a sea of people, as revolutionary warriors advocated, he was a fish out of water. He paid with his life for geographic ignorance.
分析技术
ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES
只有当地理因素与核冲突、常规冲突和非常规冲突以及战争以外的行动（例如武力展示、人道主义援助、救灾、维和、搜救、禁毒和反恐行动）中友军和敌军的行动方案和既定任务（攻击、防御、迟滞、撤退等）的潜在影响相关联时，地理因素才会在政治和军事上具有充分的意义。分析也会因可用兵力（作战和支援力量、陆地、海洋、空中、两栖和太空力量）的不同而有所差异。无数问题亟待解答，以下示例便可说明这一点：
Geographic factors become fully significant politically and militarily only when related to probable effects on friendly and enemy courses of action and assigned missions (attack, defend, delay, withdraw, and so on) during nuclear, conventional, and unconventional conflicts as well as operations other than war typified by shows of force, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping, search and rescue, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism. Analyses also vary with forces available (combat and support, land, sea, air, amphibious, and space). Countless questions require answers, as the following samples illustrate:
• 在有利于防守方的地形上，最明智的进攻策略和战术是什么？
• What offensive strategies and tactics would be most advisable in terrain that favors defenders?
• 2千吨级核地面爆炸产生的放射性尘埃会漂移多远、多快，会影响多大范围的区域？
• How far and fast would radioactive fallout from a 2-kiloton nuclear surface burst drift and how wide an area would it afflict?
• 邻国的地形和植被是否隐藏着敌军撤退休养、恢复元气的庇护所，以便他们重返战场？
• Do land forms and vegetation in adjacent countries conceal sanctuaries into which enemy forces retreat to recuperate, then return to the fray?
• 如果轰炸机摧毁冥河上的一座大型水坝，哪些区域会被淹没，淹没多长时间？
• What area would be submerged for how long if bombers destroyed a large dam on the River Styx?
• 海况、潮汐和洋流会对战斗游泳员及其运送工具起到帮助还是阻碍作用？
• Would sea states, tides, and currents help or hinder combat swimmers and their delivery vehicles?
• 大雾是否会妨碍夜视设备、战场照明、激光和热成像瞄准器的使用？
• Will fog preclude proposed use of night vision devices, battlefield illumination, lasers, and thermal sights?
• 连接后方基地和战区的唯一一条主要公路将承受多大的交通压力？
• How much heavy traffic will the only major highway bear between rear area bases and the combat zone?
• 心理战宣传单上应该避免使用哪些颜色和符号，因为迷信的读者会认为它们不吉利？
• What colors and symbols should psychological operations leaflets avoid because superstitious recipients consider them unlucky?
• 地下水位太高或者土壤太松软，导致部队无法挖掘散兵坑吗？
• Is the water table too high or the soil too friable for troops to dig foxholes?
• 饥饿的难民会欢迎美国提供的即食餐吗？还是说其中一些内容会冒犯他们的文化信仰？
• Will starving refugees welcome U.S. Meals-Ready-to-Eat or will some contents offend cultural beliefs?
幸运的是，我们已经拥有一个便捷的区域分析框架。记忆技巧将战争因素排列成首字母缩写词 COCOA：
A convenient framework for area analyses fortunately is available. Mnemonic devices line up war fighting factors to form the acronym COCOA:
关键地形障碍物
、
掩体和隐蔽
、观察和射击区域
、接近地点
Critical Terrain
Obstacles
Cover and Concealment
Observation and Fields of Fire
Avenues of Approach
另一些人则更倾向于 OCOKA，其中 K 代表关键地形。这两种顺序看似都不合逻辑，但无论采用哪种方法，所有五项考量因素都已准备就绪，可供审查。区域分析格式还会考虑地理因素对后勤、民事事务和其他相关事项的影响，然后首先将所有这些因素与敌方可能采取的行动方案联系起来，然后再与己方的行动方案联系起来。
Others prefer OCOKA, in which the K stands for key terrain. Neither sequence seems logical, but all five considerations in either case stand ready for inspection. The area analysis format also addresses geographic effects on logistics, civil affairs, and other relevant matters before relating the whole lot first to options that enemies might adopt, then to friendly courses of action.
此类分析并非万能。精明的用户会立即运用这些分析结果，或定期更新，以确保事实、假设、解释和结论在当前环境和事件发生时仍然有效。一旦发现不一致之处，他们就会重新审视之前的分析。
Such analyses are perishable. Astute users employ them posthaste or update periodically to guarantee that facts, assumptions, interpretations, and findings remain valid with regard to environmental conditions and ongoing events. Inconsistencies send them back to their drawing boards.
一位美国四星上将读完上述初稿后说：“我需要知道本书的其余部分如何才能成为一本实用指南。”他的要求很容易回答。武装冲突和战争以外的军事行动或许是人人都能参与的游戏，但并非人人都能玩好。只有天赋异禀的参与者才能赢得胜利。长期的经验表明，在其他条件相同的情况下，那些有意识地运用地理知识的军事人员及其文职主管往往是赢家，而那些对地理重要性缺乏深刻理解的人，成功往往只是偶然。虽然没有硬性规定对违规行为处以重罚，也没有什么普适的“学校式解决方案”，但本书后续章节中的主题标题和历史案例可以作为知识清单和工具，帮助读者做出合理的判断，前提是他们要认识到，没有两种情况是完全相同的。
One U.S. four-star officer, after reading the foregoing in first draft, said, “I need to know how the rest of this book will serve as a practical guide.” His request was easy to answer. Armed combat and military operations other than war may be games that anyone can play, but they are not games that just anyone can play well. Only gifted participants win prizes. Long experience indicates that, all else being equal, military practitioners and their civilian supervisors who purposefully make geography work for them are winners more often than not, whereas those who lack sound appreciation for the significance of geography succeed only by accident. There are no hard and fast rules that impose stiff fines for infractions, and universally applicable “school solutions” are scarce, but topic headings and historical examples in each succeeding chapter of this treatise could serve as intellectual checklists and tools to help readers arrive at sound judgments, provided they recognize that no two situations are precisely alike.
笔记
NOTES
1.更多概述可参阅 Patrick O'Sullivan 的《地形与战术》（纽约：Greenwood Press，1991 年）；C. Peltier 和 G. Etzel Pearcy 的《军事地理》（纽约：D. Van Nostrand，1966 年）；以及 Edward S. May 爵士的《军事地理导论》（伦敦：Hugh Rees，1909 年）。
1. Additional overviews are available in Patrick O’Sullivan, Terrain and Tactics (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991); C. Peltier and G. Etzel Pearcy, Military Geography (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1966); Sir Edward S. May, An Introduction to Military Geography (London: Hugh Rees, 1909).
2.比尔·莫尔丁，《前线》（俄亥俄州克利夫兰：世界出版社，1945 年），第 20 页。
2. Bill Mauldin, Up Front (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing, 1945), 20.
3. HM Forde，“军事地理导论，第一部分”，《军事评论》 28，第11期（1949年2月）：30-36；“军事地理导论，第二部分”，《军事评论》 28，第12期（1949年3月）：55-62；Louis C. Peltier，“军事地理的潜力”，《专业地理学家》 13，第6期（1961年11月）。
3. H. M. Forde, “An Introduction to Military Geography, Part I,” Military Review 28, no. 11 (February 1949): 30-36; “An Introduction to Military Geography, Part II,” Military Review 28, no. 12 (March 1949): 55-62; Louis C. Peltier, “The Potential of Military Geography,” The Professional Geographer 13, no. 6 (November 1961).
4. Gavin de Beer，《阿尔卑斯山与大象》（纽约：EP Dutton，1956 年）。
4. Gavin de Beer, Alps and Elephants (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1956).
5. Curtis D. Cochran、Dennis M. Gorman 和 Joseph D. Dumoulin 编，《太空手册》（阿拉巴马州麦克斯韦空军基地：空军大学出版社，1985 年 1 月），第 1-3 页和第 1-4 页；G. Harry Stine， 《太空殖民者手册》 （纽约：霍尔特·莱因哈特和温斯顿出版社，1985 年），第 47-63 页。
5. Curtis D. Cochran, Dennis M. Gorman, and Joseph D. Dumoulin, eds., Space Handbook (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, January 1985), 1-3 and 1-4; G. Harry Stine, Handbook for Space Colonists (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1985), 47-63.
6.野战手册（FM）90-5，丛林作战（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1982 年 8 月 16 日）；FM 31-70，基本寒冷天气手册（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1968 年 4 月）。
6. Field Manual (FM) 90-5, Jungle Operations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, August 16, 1982); FM 31-70, Basic Cold Weather Manual (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, April 1968).
7. Ronald O'Rourke，“美国海军的未来”，载于Joel J. Sokolsky 和 Joseph T. Jockel 编辑的《加拿大-美国防务合作五十年》（缅因州刘易斯顿：Edwin Mellen 出版社，1992 年），第 318-320 页，以及 Ronald O'Rourke 在“海军部队结构规划：新环境，旧思维习惯”研讨会上的简报幻灯片（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1993 年 6 月 21 日）。
7. Ronald O’Rourke, “The Future of the U.S. Navy,” in Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation, eds. Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel (Lewiston, ME: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 318-320, and briefing slides from a seminar, “Naval Force Structure Planning: New Environment, Old Habits of Thought” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 21, 1993), presentation by Ronald O’Rourke.
8. Dennis Steele，“跨越萨瓦河”，陆军46，第 2 期（1996 年 2 月）：16-19。
8. Dennis Steele, “Spanning the Sava,” Army 46, no. 2 (February 1996): 16-19.
9. Basil H. Liddell Hart，《西庇阿·阿非利加努斯：比拿破仑更伟大》（加利福尼亚州诺瓦托：Presidio出版社，1992年），第20-43页。
9. Basil H. Liddell Hart, Scipio Africanus: Greater Than Napoleon (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992), 20-43.
10. JFC Fuller，《西方世界军事史》，第 2 卷（纽约：Funk and Wagnals，1955 年），第 258-268 页。
10. J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, vol. 2 (New York: Funk and Wagnals, 1955), 258-268.
11. Noel Barber，《险恶的黄昏：新加坡的陷落》（波士顿，马萨诸塞州：霍顿·米夫林出版社，1968 年）。
11. Noel Barber, A Sinister Twilight: The Fall of Singapore (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1968).
12. Alistair Home，《战败：法国 1940》（波士顿，马萨诸塞州：Little, Brown, and Co.，1969 年），第 192、195-198、211-212、235-239、244-268 页；John SD Eisenhower，《苦涩的森林》（纽约：GP Putnam's Sons，1969 年）。
12. Alistair Home, To Lose a Battle: France 1940 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Co., 1969), 192, 195-198, 211-212, 235-239, 244-268; John S. D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1969).
13.伯纳德·福尔，《小地方的地狱》（宾夕法尼亚州费城：利平科特出版社，1966 年）。
13. Bernard Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1966).
14. Peter Wyden，《猪湾事件》（纽约：西蒙与舒斯特出版社，1979 年）。
14. Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979).
15. Daniel James 编，《切·格瓦拉的玻利维亚日记全集及其他缴获文件》（纽约：Stein and Day 出版社，1969 年）；引文出自 J. Bowyer Bell，《游击队的迷思：革命理论与误用》（纽约：Alfred A. Knopf 出版社，1971 年），第 240 页。
15. Daniel James, ed., The Complete Bolivian Diaries of Che Guevara and Other Captured Documents (New York: Stein and Day, 1969); the quotation is from J. Bowyer Bell, The Myth of the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), 240.
2. 空间关系
2. SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS
空间是地理学的整合因素，正如时间是历史学的整合因素一样。
Space is the integrating factor in geography just as time is for history.
露西尔·卡尔森
地理与世界政治
Lucille Carlson
Geography and World Politics
自石器时代以来，陆地和大型水体的位置、大小和形状就极大地影响着武装力量的能力、局限性和脆弱性。可以肯定的是，空间关系的重要性将无限期地保持下去。1
THE LOCATION, SIZE, AND SHAPE OF LAND MASSES AND LARGE BODIES OF WATER HAVE INFLUENCED TO great degrees the capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of armed forces since the Stone Age. It seems safe to predict that the pertinence of spatial relationships will remain undiminished indefinitely.1
地点
LOCATION
两千多年前，阿基米德阐述杠杆原理时曾断言：“给我一个支点，我就能撬动地球。” 有利的地理位置能带来军事上的优势，而劣势则会造成不安全感。
Archimedes, elaborating about the value of levers more than two millenia ago, asserted, “Give me a place to stand and I will move the Earth.” Favorable geographic locations confer militarily advantageous leverage, while poor positions foster insecurity.
进入海洋的通道
ACCESS TO OCEANS
任何一个不具备出海口的国家都无法在全球范围内投射军事力量。美国自1848年以来就拥有得天独厚的优势，其不冻岸沿线遍布大西洋、太平洋以及各大洲，拥有天然良港，因此能够迅速地将军事力量从一个战区部署到另一个战区。目前，没有任何其他世界强国享有如此巨大的行动自由。俄罗斯虽然濒临大西洋、太平洋和北冰洋，拥有世界上最长的海岸线，但其舰队却被困在缺乏便捷出海口的港口内，每年冬季都会被冰封，只有黑海和挪威北角附近的基地例外，那里有墨西哥湾暖流温暖着冰冷的海水（见图1和图2）。2
No nation that lacks access to any ocean has ever been able to project military power globally. The United States, blessed since 1848 with sheltered ports on ice-free coasts that open on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and on every continent, can deploy military power rapidly from one theater to another. No other world power currently enjoys comparable freedom of action. Russia, which fronts on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans, boasts the world’s longest coastline, but its fleets are bottled up in ports that lack convenient outlets to blue water and are ice-bound every winter, except for bases in the Black Sea and near Norway’s North Cape, where the Gulf Stream warms frigid waters (maps 1 and 2).2
然而，拥有海滨地段并不一定意味着海上贸易和强大海军的良好前景。畅通无阻的航道、天然良港以及与内陆便捷的交通连接，都必须与沿海地区相辅相成。如果其中任何一项要素有所欠缺或缺失，其发展潜力都会有所下降。
Ocean front property, however, does not ipso facto indicate good prospects for sea-going commerce and mighty navies. Unobstructed approaches, sheltered harbors, and convenient connections with the hinterland must complement maritime locales. Capabilities diminish to some degree if even one of those attributes is deficient or absent.
Map 1. Selected Russian Naval Bases
Map 2. Bottlenecks That Inhibit the Russian Navy
北大西洋咽喉要道
North Atlantic Choke Points
北太平洋咽喉要道
North Pacific Choke Points
安全地点
SECURE LOCATIONS
安全的地点能将敌友在物理上隔离开来。不列颠群岛位于欧洲大陆以西仅22英里（35公里）处，上一次有入侵者成功入侵还要追溯到1066年征服者威廉在黑斯廷斯战役中击败哈罗德国王。希特勒代号为“海狮行动”的跨海峡进攻计划于1940年9月中止。3.日本从未遭受过外敌入侵。自1812年战争以来，美国本土也未曾遭受过敌对势力的侵扰。当时，英军焚毁了白宫和国会大厦，炮轰了巴尔的摩的麦克亨利堡，并试图洗劫新奥尔良，但最终失败。加拿大和墨西哥与美国保持友好关系已超过一个世纪。目前没有任何国家拥有足够的两栖突击能力，能够跨越阻隔美国与其敌人的重重水域，并在美国防御严密的海岸线上建立立足点。因此，来自武装敌对势力的潜在严重外部威胁，仅包括太空武器、远程飞机、导弹和跨国恐怖分子。
Secure locations physically separate friends from foes. The British Isles, only 22 miles (35 kilometers) west of continental Europe, last saw successful invaders when William the Conqueror defeated King Harold at Hastings in 1066. Hitler’s cross-channel attack plan code-named Operation Sea Lion aborted in September 1940.3 Japan has never been stormed by outsiders. The continental United States has seen no hostile forces on its soil since the War of 1812, when British troops burned the White House and Capitol, bombarded Fort McHenry in Baltimore, and unsuccessfully sought to sack New Orleans. Canada and Mexico have been friends of the United States for more than a century. No nation now has sufficient amphibious assault capabilities to bridge the watery miles that isolate America from its enemies, then seize a foothold on defended U.S. shores. Spaced-based weapons, long-range aircraft, missiles, and transnational terrorists consequently pose the only potentially serious external threats by armed adversaries.
缓冲区是有效的屏障。约瑟夫·斯大林在20世纪40年代中期吞并了六个欧洲国家（东德、波兰、捷克斯洛伐克、匈牙利、罗马尼亚和保加利亚），随后拉下了铁幕。这些所谓的“卫星国”将北约中部战区的部队与最近的苏联边境隔开数百英里。非军事区（DMZ）提供的保护程度各不相同，这在很大程度上取决于地理环境。例如，自1953年以来，越过朝鲜非军事区的入侵仅限于袭击和撤退，部分原因是这个狭长的半岛上没有陆路通道；而敌军和补给却能不断地通过老挝的侧翼绕过南北越之间的屏障。
Buffer zones make admirable shields. Joseph Stalin swallowed six European countries in the mid-1940s (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria), then rang down an Iron Curtain. Those so-called “satellite states” separated forces in NATO’s center sector from the nearest Soviet border by several hundred miles. Demilitarized zones (DMZs) provide variable degrees of protection, depending in large part on geographic circumstances. Incursions across the Korean DMZ, for example, have been restricted to hit-and-run raids since 1953, partly because no overland bypasses are available on that narrow peninsula, whereas enemy troops and supplies consistently circumvented the barrier between North and South Vietnam via the open flank in Laos.
同时在多个战线作战的武装力量必须克服严重的战略、战术和后勤问题，否则就有战败的风险。以色列在与埃及和叙利亚的两场战争中找到了令人满意的解决方案，第一次是在1967年，第二次是在1973年。4但德军在一战期间奔赴东线和西线战场，二战期间又在包括北非和意大利在内的四个战线作战，兵力分散，两次战争都以失败告终。因此，苏联领导人担心在20世纪60年代初中苏分裂后，可能同时与北约和中国开战，这也不难理解。5
Armed forces that do battle on more than one front at a time must overcome serious strategic, tactical, and logistical problems or risk defeat. Israel found satisfactory solutions during two wars with Egypt and Syria, first in 1967 and again in 1973,4 but German forces that saw combat on Eastern and Western Fronts during World War I, then on four fronts counting North Africa and Italy during World War II, were spread too thinly during both conflicts and both times they lost. Soviet leaders for that reason understandably feared the possibility of simultaneous wars with NATO and China after the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s.5
时间-距离因素
TIME-DISTANCE FACTORS
时间、距离和交通方式不仅决定了军队从一个地方转移到另一个地方的速度，还影响着他们抵达目的地后立即发挥最大效能的能力。训练有素的步兵连队以每小时2.5英里（4公里）的速度行军20英里（32公里）所需的时间，比乘坐大型运输机的空降部队跨越大西洋所需的时间还要长。然而，步兵抵达后可能更渴望战斗，因为飞行机组人员和乘客在快速穿越多个时区后，常常会受到时差反应的影响，伴随疲劳、消化系统紊乱和技能下降，从而扰乱了他们的“代谢钟”（24小时昼夜节律）。6
Time, distance, and modes of transportation not only determine how fast armed forces can move from one place to another but influence abilities to perform most effectively immediately upon arrival. Well-conditioned rifle companies take longer to march 20 miles (32 kilometers) at 2.5 miles per hour (4 kph) than airmobile troops in huge transport aircraft take to cross the Atlantic Ocean, yet the “grunts” may arrive more eager to fight, because jet lag accompanied by fatigue, digestive disorders, and reduced proficiency commonly afflicts flight crews and passengers who swoosh rapidly through several time zones and thereby disrupt their “metabolic clocks” (24-hour circadian rhythms).6
基地与作战区域之间的遥远距离降低了在紧急情况下及时运用军事力量的机会。漫长的补给线和通信能力的提升增加了长途运输的需求，如果易受敌方干扰，则迫使用户调动作战力量来保护自身。例如，二战期间，美国和英国的海军水面舰艇不得不护送商船和运兵船队从美国东海岸和墨西哥湾前往英国和苏联，而岸基反潜作战飞机则在两端以及冰岛执行搜索和摧毁巡逻任务。7
Great distances between home bases and operational areas reduce opportunities for timely employment of military power in emergencies. Lengthy lines of supply and communication increase requirements for long-haul transportation and, if vulnerable to enemy interdiction, make users divert combat forces to protect them. U.S. and British naval surface combatants, for example, had to escort merchant ships and troop convoys from the U.S. east coast and the Gulf of Mexico to Great Britain and the Soviet Union during World War II, while shore-based antisubmarine warfare aircraft conducted search and destroy patrols at both ends and from Iceland.7
在友方领土上的前沿部署，以遍布全球的美军基地和设施为典型代表，可以缓解但无法彻底消除快速反应问题，因为需求可能出现在没有集中兵力的地方。1991年，帮助将伊拉克军队驱逐出科威特的五十万美军士兵中，大部分在危机爆发时驻扎在美国和德国。预先部署在印度洋中部迪戈加西亚岛的装备和物资，距离波斯湾的转运点超过两千英里，而这些转运点的保管人员需要将这些物资发放给从遥远基地空运过来的人员。8
Forward deployments on friendly territory, best typified by globally distributed U.S. bases and facilities, alleviate but cannot eliminate quick-reaction problems, because requirements may arise in locations where no concentrations exist. Most of the half million U.S. forces that helped drive Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 were stationed in the United States and Germany when that crisis erupted. Equipment and supplies prepositioned at Diego Garcia in the middle of the Indian Ocean were more than 2,000 miles from transfer points in the Persian Gulf, where custodians issued them to personnel airlifted from far distant bases.8
冷战期间，美国和苏联的处境都并非始终有利。北约军队眼睁睁地看着苏联军队镇压了1956年匈牙利起义，却无能为力，部分原因是北约军队的通道要经过共产主义的捷克斯洛伐克和中立的奥地利，而苏联则能够迅速集结强大的战斗力，并在其控制的短线内维持这种力量。9尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫在 1962 年古巴导弹危机期间采取了相反的退让策略，部分原因是苏联的大部分武装力量远离加勒比海地区。10与他的前任和继任者一样，他向遥远地区的亲共政权提供资金、物资和意识形态援助，但出于类似的原因避免了大规模军事介入。早在冷战结束之前就已确立的欧洲相互裁军目标，直到1990年才得以实现。此前，谈判代表们克服了批评者的质疑，这些批评者正确地指出，苏联军队可以陆路撤退几百英里，如果关系恶化，可以随时返回，而美国军队则必须从偏远基地空运和海运。11
Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was consistently well situated during the Cold War. NATO’s armed forces watched impotently while Soviet troops crushed the 1956 uprising in Hungary, partly because their access routes ran through Communist Czechoslovakia and neutral Austria, whereas the Soviets were in position to generate great combat power rapidly and sustain it over short, internal lines under their control.9 Nikita Khruschchev conversely backed down during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, partly because most Soviet armed forces were remote from the Caribbean.10 Like his predecessors and successors, he furnished money, materiel, and ideological assistance to pro-Communist regimes in distant places, but avoided large-scale military involvement for similar reasons. Mutual force reductions in Europe, an arms-control goal established well before the Cold War wound down, succeeded in 1990 only after negotiators overcame critics who correctly claimed that Soviet forces could withdraw a few hundred miles overland, then return on short notice if relations soured, whereas U.S. counterparts would have to be airlifted and sealifted from remote bases.11
距离也可能破坏联盟关系。日本于1940年11月与德国缔结了安全条约，但这两个好战的国家始终未能建立联合最高指挥部，很少协调政策、计划或方案，从未共享基地，也从未在相距遥远的战区开展相互支援的行动。这些战区在其鼎盛时期直线距离超过3500英里（5630公里）。
Distance may also discombobulate alliances. Japan concluded a security pact with Germany in November 1940, but that aggressive pair never were able to form a combined high command, seldom coordinated policies, plans, or programs, never shared bases, and never conducted mutually supporting operations in widely separated theaters that at their zenith remained more than 3,500 straight-line miles (5,630 kilometers) apart.
优越的地理位置
DOMINANT GEOGRAPHICAL POSITIONS
在地球或太空的任何有利地理位置，都能最大程度地帮助占据者实现各种当前或预期目标。最理想的位置可能大如一个国家，也可能小如大型战术地图上的几个点。任何特定地点或区域所能发挥的作用通常会因任务、局势、可用兵力、地形、可用时间和政治限制而有所不同。攻击者和防御者看待每个地点的角度都不同。陆军、海军和空军也是如此，它们都力求为自己获取地理优势，并阻止对手获得这种优势。
Dominant geographical locations anywhere on Earth or in space best enable occupants to achieve present or anticipated objectives of any kind. The most desirable positions may be as large as a country or as small as spots plotted on large-scale tactical maps. The leverage available from any given point or area usually varies with missions, situations, forces on tap, terrain, available time, and political restrictions. Attackers and defenders view each site from different perspectives. So do armies, navies, and air forces which strive to gain geographic advantage for themselves and deny it to adversaries.
战略、作战和战术地位形式多样，用途广泛。英国最初获得直布罗陀、马耳他、塞浦路斯、苏伊士、亚丁和索科特拉岛，是为了保护其通往中东和南亚的生命线。苏联曾一度成功，试图在非洲之角和印度建立影响力和立足点，并以此为据点。它们可能威胁到连接美国及其盟国与波斯湾沿岸石油生产国的海上交通线。20世纪60年代初，北美防空司令部（NORAD）在北极地区，从阿留申群岛到大西洋，部署了81个远程预警（DEW）站，以防范苏联对北极发动突袭。在更南边的加拿大中部防线和松树防线，还部署了大量的雷达和警戒舰艇来补充防御空域。位于阿拉斯加克利尔、格陵兰岛图勒和英国弗林代尔斯荒原的三个大型弹道导弹预警站（BMEWS）严密监视苏联洲际弹道导弹（ICBM）的发射，并借助监视卫星的辅助，扫描潜射弹道导弹和洲际弹道导弹。12
Strategic, operational, and tactical positions take many forms and serve many purposes. Great Britain originally acquired Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Suez, Aden, and Socotra to help protect lifelines of empire to the Middle East and South Asia. The Soviets, with transitory success, sought influence and footholds along the Horn of Africa and in India from which they could threaten sea lines of communication that linked the United States and its allies with petroleum producers astride the Persian Gulf. The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) in the early 1960s draped 81 Distant Early Warning (DEW) stations across the arctic from the Aleutians to the Atlantic as safeguards against a Soviet surprise air attack over the North Pole. A generous group of gap-filler radars and picket ships augmented the Mid-Canada and Pine Tree Lines farther south. Three huge Ballistic Missile Early Warning Sites (BMEWS) located in Clear, Alaska, Thule, Greenland, and Fylingdales Moor, England kept a sharp lookout for Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) shots, with assistance from surveillance satellites that scanned for submarine-launched ballistic missiles as well as ICBMs.12
位置合适的岛屿往往是理想的跳板。朝鲜战争期间，横跨太平洋的螺旋桨运输机从旧金山附近的特拉维斯空军基地起飞，经停檀香山、中途岛和威克岛（从空中俯瞰，威克岛宛如一枚邮票），最终抵达东京。当时飞越大西洋的航班还会在拉布拉多的鹅湾和冰岛的凯夫拉维克停留。1973年阿以冲突期间，运往特拉维夫的美国武器、装备和物资之所以能够迅速抵达，正是因为葡萄牙允许其在亚速尔群岛进行空中加油。
Appropriately located islands often make ideal stepping stones. Propeller-driven transport aircraft that spanned the Pacific during the Korean War hopped from Travis AFB near San Francisco to Honolulu, Midway, and Wake Island (which looked like a postage stamp from the air), then on to Tokyo. Flights over the Atlantic at that time called at Goose Bay, Labrador and Keflavik, Iceland. U.S. weapons, equipment, and supplies bound for Tel Aviv during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict arrived rapidly only because Portugal granted refueling rights in the Azores.
政治禁忌
POLITICAL INHIBITIONS
人为划定的边界，仅仅是地图上的线条，却会造成政治障碍，有时甚至会像实际的物理屏障一样阻碍军事行动。当盟友或中立国禁止外来武装力量侵犯其领土或领海时，这种阻碍作用尤为显著。而那些执意越界者，则可能付出政治、经济或军事代价，其性质和严重程度并非总是事先显而易见。
Manmade boundaries, which are merely lines on maps, impose political obstacles that sometimes inhibit military operations as much as physical barriers when allies or neutrals forbid the armed forces of outsiders to violate their land or territorial waters. Transgressors who nevertheless choose to do so may pay political, economic, or military prices, the nature and intensity of which are not always obvious beforehand.
高风险低回报的局面会促使侵略者无视政治边界。1940年，希特勒显然认为可以肆无忌惮地践踏中立国比利时、卢森堡和荷兰，一路北上前往法国。相反，低风险高回报的局面则会促使人们保持谨慎。1986年4月15日，驻扎在英国的美国轰炸机在前往的黎波里和班加西的途中，绕道比斯开湾，然后经直布罗陀返回，因为法国政府拒绝了他们的飞越权。当时，美国总统罗纳德·里根下令对利比亚支持的柏林恐怖袭击进行报复。12
High stakes coupled with low risks in relation to likely gains encourage aggressors to ignore political boundaries. Hitler clearly felt free to ride roughshod over neutral Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands on his way to France in 1940. Low stakes coupled with high risks in relation to likely gains contrariwise encourage caution. British-based U.S. bombers on April 15, 1986, made long dog-legs over the Bay of Biscay and back through Gibraltar en route to hit Tripoli and Benghazi because the French Government denied them overflight rights when President Ronald Reagan directed retaliation for a Libyan-backed terrorist attack in Berlin.12
在神圣不可侵犯的边界之后，那些允许敌对双方随意交战并随后撤离的特权庇护所，也造成了政治上的阻碍。然而，只有当扰乱这些庇护所的潜在惩罚超过其带来的收益时，它们才能得以存续。在朝鲜战争期间，满洲就是这样一个庇护所：最初是中国向朝鲜提供补给的基地；后来成为战败的朝鲜军队的避难所，他们通过浮桥逃过鸭绿江；1950年10月之后，又成为中国共产党发动进攻的跳板。如果联合国军司令部接到指示，他们本可以刺破这个毒瘤，但却因为担心此举会引发“在错误的时间、错误的地点、错误的敌人”而拒绝这样做。在尼克松总统于 1970 年和 1971 年两次授权美国武装部队进行跨境突袭后，柬埔寨境内的14 个共产党庇护所的境况就没那么好了。15在整个越南战争期间，美国在日本、冲绳、泰国和菲律宾维持了庇护所，尽管许多观察家忽略了这一事实。
Privileged sanctuaries behind sacrosanct boundaries, which permit adversaries to fight when they wish and then run away, also impose political inhibitions, although such asylums seem to survive only if probable penalties for disturbing them surpass potential benefits. Manchuria comprised such a shelter throughout the Korean War, first as a Chinese supply base for North Korea, then as a haven for defeated North Korean troops who fled across the Yalu River on floating footbridges and, after October, 1950, as a springboard for Chinese Communist offensives. The U.N. Command could have lanced that boil if so directed but declined to do so for fear that such action would precipitate “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.” 14 Communist sanctuaries inside Cambodia fared less well after President Nixon authorized U. S. armed forces to conduct cross-border raids in 1970 and again in 1971,15 The United States maintained sanctuaries in Japan, Okinawa, Thailand, and the Philippines throughout the Vietnam War, although many observers overlooked that fact.
尺寸
SIZE
任何作战区域所包含的平方英里或平方公里范围，为武装部队的进攻或防御机动以及指挥中心、军事编队、港口、机场、后勤设施和其他固定或移动目标的部署提供了空间。然而，总面积只是一个相关标准，可用空间同样重要。
The square miles or square kilometers encompassed by any operational area furnish room for armed forces to maneuver offensively or defensively and to disperse command centers, military formations, ports, airfields, logistic installations, and other static or mobile targets. Total size, however, is only one relevant criterion. Usable space is equally important.
大面积区域作为攻击性资产
LARGE AREA AS AM OFFENSIVE ASSET
与投入兵力相比，面积较大的区域能够提供更丰富的进攻选择，并带来更大的行动自由，这比拥挤的空间更为有利。包围和迂回战术在地面上成为可能，而狭窄的空间通常迫使部队进行正面突击，并导致更多伤亡（试想一下，突击部队试图从滩头阵地或桥头堡的暴露位置突破敌军防线）。1945年2月，美国陆军第503伞兵步兵团在科雷吉多岛创下了微型团级空降区（DZ）的世界纪录：较大的空降区原为阅兵场，尺寸为325码×250码（297米×229米）；较小的空降区原为九洞高尔夫球场；两个空降区的南侧均以悬崖为界。每架C-47运输机完成了多次飞行，每次飞行仅持续6秒，时间短到跳伞教官几乎只够将8名伞兵推出舱门。16
Areas that are large in proportion to forces employed therein offer a greater range of offensive options and facilitate greater freedom of action than crowded spaces afford. Envelopments and turning movements become feasible on the ground, whereas cramped quarters commonly compel frontal assaults accompanied by increased casualties (picture assault forces trying to puncture enemy defenses from exposed positions on beachheads or bridgeheads). The U.S. 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment established a world’s record for microsized regimental drop zones (DZs) in February 1945, when it leaped onto Corregidor: the larger DZ had been a parade ground that measured 325 by 250 yards (297 by 229 meters), the smaller was once a nine-hole golf course, and both were bounded on the south by a cliff. Each C-47 transport completed multiple passes that lasted 6 seconds apiece, barely long enough for jumpmasters to push eight paratroopers out the door.16
在当今高科技时代，进攻性海军舰队和陆军都需要很大的机动空间，这使得近距离作战风险过高。例如，没有哪位现代海军将领会热衷于在封闭水域作战，比如萨拉米斯海战（公元前480年，地米斯托克利在此击败了波斯海军）、阿布基尔湾（1798年，纳尔逊勋爵在此重创拿破仑·波拿巴的舰队，赢得了尼罗河战役的胜利）或伊利湖（1813年，奥利弗·哈泽德·佩里船长在此击败了英国舰队，并宣布：“我们与敌人交战，他们已被我们击败！”）。
Offensive naval flotillas as well as land forces need a lot of maneuver room in this hightech age, which renders close combat excessively risky. No modern admiral, for example, would be enthusiastic about battle in closed bodies of water such as Salamis, where Themistocles defeated the Persian Navy in 480 B.C., Aboukir Bay, where Lord Nelson blasted Napoleon Bonaparte’s fleet to win the Battle of the Nile in 1798, or Lake Erie, where Captain Oliver Hazard Perry beat the British in 1813, then announced, “ We have met the enemy and they are ours!”
大面积区域作为防御资产
LARGE AREA AS A DEFENSIVE ASSET
陆地和海上的防御者都倾向于选择拥有足够横向和纵深机动空间的战场，必要时可以用空间换取时间，然后在敌军位于漫长补给线末端的先锋部队失去动力时，重新集结、增援并再次部署，发起进攻。小小的卢森堡不擅长玩猫捉老鼠的游戏，而沙皇俄国则利用纵深防御挫败了拿破仑的入侵者。拿破仑的入侵者曾在1812年短暂占领并焚毁莫斯科，但随着冬季临近，最终在压力下撤退。 1941 年 6 月希特勒发动巴巴罗萨行动后，苏联采取的撤退策略，加上焦土政策，取得了成功。共产党守军不情愿地放弃阵地，留下一片废墟，焚烧庄稼，并将重要的工业从战区系统地转移到内陆地区——绝望的工人们拆除了全国近四分之一的制造业产能，并将其运往乌拉尔山脉以东，之后暂时取得胜利的德军占领了剩余的地区。17
Defenders on land and at sea prefer arenas that contain enough room to maneuver laterally and in depth, trade space for time if necessary, then regroup, reinforce, and redeploy for offensive action when enemy spearheads at the end of extended supply lines lose momentum. Tiny Luxembourg plays poor games of cat and mouse, whereas Tsarist Russia used defenses-in-depth to frustrate Napoleonic invaders, who briefly occupied and burned Mosow in 1812 but fell back under pressure when winter approached. Retreat, coupled with scorched earth policies, paid off for the Soviet Union after Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941. Communist defenders ceded ground grudgingly, left communes in ruins, torched crops, and systematically shifted essential industries from war zones to interior sites—desperate workers dismantled nearly a quarter of the nation’s manufacturing capacity and carted it east of the Ural Mountains before temporarily victorious Germans overran the rest.17
大多数国家的逃脱大师都羡慕内兹珀斯酋长约瑟夫所拥有的广阔空间。他带领 300 名战士以及 400 名妇女和儿童，历经 4 个月，跋涉近 2000 英里（3220 公里），穿越俄勒冈州、爱达荷州、怀俄明州和蒙大拿州的部分地区，最终在 1877 年 10 月被美国军队围困。18毛泽东的经典长征（图3）与此大体相同，于1934年10月率领约10万人从他的大本营出发。6000英里（9655公里）366 天后，2 万名幸存者逃入陕西北部，他们物资匮乏，但职业自豪感十足，此前他们一路追击蒋介石的国民党军队，绕道中国半个地区。19
Evasion and escape artists in most countries envy the vast space available to Nez Percé Chief Joseph, who led 300 warriors along with 400 women and children on a 4-month trek that totaled nearly 2,000 miles (3,220 kilometers) through parts of Oregon, Idaho, Wyoming, and Montana before the U.S. Army finally brought his starving tribe to bay in October, 1877.18 Mao Zedong’s classic Long March (map 3), in much the same mold, departed his base camp with about 100,000 men in October 1934. Six thousand miles (9,655 kilometers) and 366 days later 20,000 survivors slipped into northern Shaanxi Province, short on provisions but long on professional pride, after leading Chiang Kai-Shek’s Kuomintang troops on a roundabout chase through half of China.19
开阔水域可以极大地增强陆地上的防御能力，正如日本在二战期间所展现的那样。日本的四个本土岛屿面积大约相当于北达科他州和南达科他州的总面积，但从阿留申群岛经太平洋托管地、新赫布里底群岛、所罗门群岛和荷属东印度群岛延伸的前哨阵地，又提供了数百万平方英里的额外区域，可以进行拖延战事（见地图 25，第 160 页）。
Open water can add great depth to holdings on land, as Japan demonstrated during World War II. Its four home islands cover an area approximately equal to North and South Dakota, but outpost lines that ran from the Aleutian Islands through Pacific Trust Territories, New Hebrides, the Solomon Islands, and the Netherlands East Indies afforded several million more square miles within which to conduct delaying actions (see map 25, page 160).
最后，值得强调的是，任何国家都可以出于威慑目的而展示核武器，但对于除那些拥有冗余（最好是受到严密保护的）权力基础的国家之外的所有国家而言，即使是有限地对拥有类似武器的对手使用核武器的政策也显得过于草率。只有少数几个超级大国符合这一描述。其余大多数国家，由于其潜在目标集中在少数几个城市或首都，根本无法承受小规模核攻击。
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that any nation may brandish nuclear weapons for deterrent purposes, but policies that contemplate even limited use against similarly armed opponents appear excessively imprudent for all save those that possess a redundant (preferably well- protected) power base. Only a few very large countries fit that description. Most of the remainder, which concentrate likely targets in a handful of cities or in the capital, could not survive small-scale nuclear attacks.
大面积区域构成军事隐患
LARGE AREA AS A MILITARY LIABILITY
广阔的作战区域有时有利有弊。幅员辽阔的澳大利亚将大部分政治、经济和军事力量集中在其周边地区，幸运的是，潜在目标主要位于其南部海岸，远离潜在敌人。加拿大与美国接壤的主要资产也较为安全，因为两国是合作伙伴。然而，许多中等规模国家的首都和其他“皇冠上的明珠”却面临着高风险。沙特阿拉伯和叙利亚就是典型的例子，这些国家的大部分土地都比较空旷，其核心资产却靠近不安全的边界；而韩国首尔距离分隔其与宿敌的非军事区直线距离仅40公里（25英里）。
Large operational areas sometimes are mixed blessings. Continent-sized Australia, which concentrates most elements of political, economic, and military power along its periphery, is fortunate that potential targets are mainly on its southern shores far from potential enemies. Canada’s principal assets, which hug the United States, are safe because those two countries remain partners. The capital cities and other “crown jewels” of many medium-sized states, however, run high risks. Saudi Arabia and Syria typify largely empty lands wherein core assets are close to insecure borders, while Seoul, Korea is barely 25 straight-line miles (40 kilometers) south of the demilitarized zone that separates it from sworn enemies.
庞大的疆域显然既是军事上的劣势，也是优势。在苏联，领土的无限延伸只是一种幻象。这个庞然大物横跨波罗的海和白令海峡之间7000英里（11230公里）的疆域，横跨九个时区。纳粹德国入侵时，约80%的人口以及相当一部分工业产能都位于乌拉尔山脉以西。连接俄罗斯欧洲部分和苏联远东地区的交通几乎完全依赖于贯穿东西伯利亚的铁路干线，这使得苏联军队不得不在两个相距甚远且协调性极低的战区作战。整个冷战期间，漫长的苏联边界难以防守，桀骜不驯的抵抗力量也难以控制，因此，装备精良的边防部队和内卫部队在20世纪80年代达到顶峰，总兵力约为60万人（超过大多数国家的军队）。其他20个大国，如中国和印度，也经历过类似的内部问题。
Gigantic size clearly can be a military liability rather than an asset. Territorial infinity was illusionary in the U.S.S.R., a colossus that spanned 7,000 miles (11,230 kilometers) and nine time zones between the Baltic Sea and Bering Strait. Approximately 80 percent of the population, along with a high proportion of industrial capacity, were west of the Ural Mountains when Nazi Germany invaded. Connections between European Russia and the Soviet Far East depended almost entirely on the ribbonlike Trans-Siberian Railroad, a condition that compelled Soviet Armed Forces to operate in two widely separated and only slightly synchronized theaters. Long Soviet boundaries were so hard to defend and recalcitrants so hard to control throughout the Cold War that heavily armed Border Guards and Internal Security Troops peaked in the 1980s at a combined personnel strength that approximated 600,000 (more than most national armies).20 Other huge nations, such as China and India, have experienced similar internal problems.
形状
SHAPE
有利的形状通常能带来军事优势，而形状不规则的则不然。一个圆形区域，其珍贵物品分散在远离边缘的地方，便是理想的形状。有些国家或作战区域接近这种理想状态，但很多国家或区域的形状是狭长的、不连续的或破碎的。21
Favorable configurations generally confer military advantages, whereas awkward shapes do not. A circle with prized possessions dispersed well back from its rim would be perfect. Some countries or operational areas approach that ideal, but a good many are elongated, discontinuous, or fragmented.21
细长形状
ELONGATED SHAPES
狭长的智利，长2650英里，最宽处不超过250英里（4265公里×400公里），幸运的是，巍峨的安第斯山脉守护着它的大部分陆地边界。相比之下，以色列在1967年战争期间占领并控制西岸领土之前，其国土宽度仅有8英里（不足13公里）——约旦步兵行军到地中海需要3个小时，中型坦克只需15分钟，而距离最近的敌军阵地甚至不到炮兵射程。以空间换取时间的机会几乎为零。1967年，法国总统戴高乐将北约军队撤出法国，极大地增加了北约的军事脆弱性；他的这一举动将美国的作战和支援部队挤进了西德最狭窄的地带，而西德的宽度仅为150英里（240公里）。22
Spindly Chile, 2,650 miles long and nowhere more than 250 miles wide (4,265 by 400 kilometers), is lucky, because the towering Andes Mountains guard most of its land borders. Israel, in contrast, had a waistline only 8 miles wide (<13 kilometers) before it seized and retained West Bank territories during the 1967 war—the Mediterranean was a 3-hour march for Jordanian foot troops, 15 minutes in medium tanks, and less than artillery range from the nearest enemy positions. Opportunities to trade space for time were nil. President Charles de Gaulle greatly increased NATO’s military vulnerability when he evicted its armed forces from France in 1967; his action crammed U.S. combat and support formations into the narrowest part of West Germany where that nation is barely 150 miles wide (240 kilometers).22
军事突出部，一种程度较轻的延伸形式，会深入敌方领土。一旦敌方武装力量足够强大，能够攻击一侧或两侧，那么深入敌方领土的突出部就会带来问题。例如，1990年占领科威特的伊拉克师就处于极其危险的暴露状态。科林·鲍威尔将军公开宣称：“我们追击这支军队的战略非常简单。首先，我们要切断它的退路，然后将其歼灭。”在阿登战役（1944 年 12 月 16 日至 1945 年 1 月中旬）期间，盟军的23 次反攻同样扼杀了德国的一个突出部，在其鼎盛时期，该突出部向比利时境内楔入了近 50 英里（80 公里），如图4所示。24
Military salients, a less exaggerated form of elongation, extend into enemy territory. Problems accompany those that penetrate deeply whenever hostile armed forces remain strong enough to hit one or both flanks. Iraqi divisions that captured Kuwait in 1990, for example, were dangerously exposed. General Colin L. Powell publicly announced, “Our strategy in going after this army is very simple. First we are going to cut it off, and then we are going to kill it.”23 Allied counteroffensives during the Battle of the Bulge (December 16, 1944 to mid-January 1945) similarly pinched a German salient that, at its zenith, drove a wedge almost 50 miles (80 kilometers) into Belgium, as map 4 depicts.24
与突出部不同，半岛往往能将冲突孤立起来。盟军在意大利——一个“次要”战场——取得了积极成果。1943年至1945年间，盟军采取的兵力节约策略牵制了大量德军师，否则这些部队可能会加强大西洋壁垒，或在英美军队登陆诺曼底后强化德军的防御能力。朝鲜战争持续了三年（1950-1953），战火并未蔓延至朝鲜半岛本土。然而，在无法脱身的半岛上，面对优势敌军的防御作战鲜有圆满结局。驻菲美军就深有体会，日军将他们逼至马尼拉湾旁狭小的巴丹半岛。1942年4月9日投降后，美军开始了长达90英里的“死亡行军”。25
Peninsulas, unlike salients, tend to isolate conflicts. Allied campaigners obtained positive results in Italy, a “sideshow” theater, where economy of force operations in 1943-1945 pinned down many German divisions that otherwise might have bolstered the Atlantic Wall or have reinforced German defensive capabilities in Normandy after Anglo-American armed forces landed. Armed combat lasted three years in Korea (1950-1953) without spreading to the mainland. Defensive actions against superior foes on peninsulas from which there is no escape, however, seldom have happy endings, as U.S. forces in the Philippines found after Japanese invaders backed them onto minuscule Bataan Peninsula hard by Manila Bay. A 90-mile “Death March” followed their surrender on April 9, 1942.25
不连续形状
DISCONTINUOUS SHAPES
具有军事意义的非连续性区域大小不一，持久性也各有不同。最小的是敌方领土上的伞降区和直升机着陆区。除非迅速得到增援、陆路推进的友军迅速会合或被包围的部队撤退，否则这些区域都无法长期存在。 1944年9月的“市场花园行动”就充分证明了这一点。当时，美军两个空降师和一个英军空降师竭力夺取荷兰境内五座横跨大河和运河的桥梁，以便装甲纵队能够沿着一条狭窄的走廊快速推进103公里（64英里），在阿纳姆渡过莱茵河，绕过齐格菲防线，然后直扑纳粹德国的工业中心鲁尔区（见图5）。英国陆军中将弗雷德里克·“博伊”·布朗宁担心该计划过于雄心勃勃，他对该计划的设计者伯纳德·蒙哥马利元帅说：“我认为我们可能有点操之过急了。”他的判断是正确的。英国第一空降师在阿纳姆英勇坚守了10天，徒劳地等待着与主力部队会合，最终溃败。该师一万名士兵中，只有不到四分之一安全返回莱茵河对岸；其余的人要么阵亡，要么被俘，要么失踪。26
Discontinuous shapes of military significance come in assorted sizes and degrees of permanence. The smallest are parachute drop zones and helicopter landing zones in enemy territory. None can survive long unless it is reinforced rapidly, friendly forces advancing overland link up expeditiously, or surrounded units withdraw. Operation Market Garden decisively demonstrated that point in September 1944, when two U.S. and one British airborne divisions strove to secure five bridges over large rivers and canals in Holland so armored columns could scoot 64 miles (103 kilometers) up a narrow corridor, cross the Rhine at Arnhem, outflank the Siegfried Line, then head for the Ruhr, which was Nazi Germany’s industrial heartland (map 5). British Lieutenant General Frederick (Boy) Browning, who feared that the plan was overly ambitious, said to Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, its architect, “I think we might be going a bridge too far.” He was right. The British 1st Airborne Division held out heroically at Arnhem for 10 days waiting in vain for a linkup, then disintegrated. Fewer than one-fourth of its 10,000 men made it safely back across the Rhine; the rest were killed, captured, or missing.26
Map 4. The Battle of the Bulge
前沿基地和设施，即位于外国领土上的半永久性飞地，构成了“不连续形状”范畴下的第二个子类别。位于敌方领土上的基地和设施，例如美国在古巴关塔那摩的海军基地，以及（不时出现的）巴拿马运河区，尤其值得关注，因为它们需要严格的安全保障。规模更大的飞地主要是政治实体，经常成为冲突爆发点。阿道夫·希特勒觊觎东普鲁士，该地区在1920年根据《凡尔赛条约》从德国本土分离出来。他最初向波兰提出（但从未得到）通过但泽自由市连接该地区的走廊，然后在1939年9月通过武力夺回了这些土地以及更多其他领土。巴基斯坦由相距1000英里（1610公里）的东、西两部分组成，从1947年一直持续到1971年。1971年，在印度的帮助下，东巴基斯坦经过一场血腥的内战后获得独立，成为孟加拉国。被围困的柏林（地图6）位于铁幕以东160公里（100英里）处，是自由世界的一块飞地，也是一个潜在的火药桶，具有巨大的象征意义和实际意义。其地理位置在战术上十分危险，因为如果苏联和东德军队愿意冒核战争的风险，他们可以随意封锁或吞并这座城市。只有大规模的柏林空运才使柏林居民在1948年6月至1949年5月持续的封锁期间得以幸存。27
Forward bases and facilities, which are semipermanent enclaves on foreign soil, constitute a second subcategory under the rubric of disconnected shapes. Those in enemy territory, such as the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo, Cuba, and (from time to time) the Panama Canal Zone, are noteworthy because they demand stringent security. Exclaves on a grander scale primarily are political entities that frequently become flash points. Adolf Hitler, who hungered for East Prussia, which the Treaty of Versailles had separated from Germany proper in 1920, first requested from Poland (but never received) a connecting corridor through the free city of Danzig, then reclaimed those lands and much more by force of arms in September, 1939. Pakistan comprised east and west sectors 1,000 land miles apart (1,610 kilometers) from 1947 until 1971 when East Pakistan, with Indian assistance, gained independence as Bangladesh after a bloody civil war. Beleaguered Berlin (map 6), a Free World exclave and potential powder keg 100 miles (160 kilometers) east of the Iron Curtain, had huge symbolic as well as practical importance. Its position was tactically untenable, because Soviet and East German forces could seal off or swallow the city at their pleasure if willing to risk a nuclear war. Only the massive Berlin Airlift kept the population alive during a prolonged blockade that lasted from June 1948 until May 1949.27
Map 5. Operation Market Garden
碎片形状
FRAGMENTED SHAPES
岛国形态的碎片化主要体现在日本和菲律宾等岛国身上，这些国家在局部作战中极易被击败。其中最引人注目的是印度尼西亚，它由数千个岛屿组成，其中许多岛屿无人居住，绵延3000英里（4825公里），位于东南亚沿岸，这一距离与美国大西洋和太平洋沿岸之间的距离相当。这种孤立状态不利于在相距遥远的地区开展协调一致的进攻或防御性军事行动，在某些情况下（例如东帝汶），甚至会助长分离主义运动。
Fragmented shapes mainly pertain to island nations such as Japan and the Philippines, which are open to defeat in detail. Indonesia, the most noteworthy, consists of several thousand islands, many uninhabited, that festoon off the coast of Southeast Asia for 3,000 miles (4,825 kilometers), a distance comparable to that between the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Isolation discourages coordinated offensive or defensive military campaigns in widely separated places and, in some cases (such as Timor), encourages separatist movements.
要点
KEY POINTS
• 陆地和大型水体的位置、大小和形状对军事能力、局限性和脆弱性有重大影响。
• The location, size, and shape of land masses and large bodies of water strongly influence military capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities.
• 任何一个没有海洋出海口的国家都不可能在全球范围内投射强大的军事力量。
• No nation that lacks access to any ocean has ever been able to project great military power globally.
• 地理隔离为各国提供了抵御入侵的强大保护。
• Geographical isolation offers countries considerable protection against invasion.
• 即使是规模庞大的武装力量，在多个战线上与强大的敌人作战，也可能处于严重劣势。
• Even very large armed forces that battle strong adversaries on more than one front may be seriously disadvantaged.
• 时间、距离和交通方式决定了武装部队对远程突发事件的反应速度。
• Time, distance, and modes of transportation determine how rapidly armed forces can respond to remotely-located contingencies.
• 武装力量分散在幅员辽阔的国家和作战区域，在进攻和防御方面都处于劣势。
• Armed forces spread thinly throughout large countries and operational areas are offensively and defensively disadvantaged.
• 部署在群岛和其他不连续作战区域的武装部队可能会遭到逐个击败。
• Armed forces deployed throughout archipelagos and other discontinuous operational areas may be subject to defeat in detail.
笔记
NOTES
1.许多政治地理教科书在国际背景下讨论空间关系。例如，参见 Paul Buckholts 的《政治地理学》（纽约：Ronald Press，1966 年），第 73-93 页，以及 Lucille Carlson 的《地理与世界政治》（新泽西州恩格尔伍德克利夫斯：Prentice Hall，1958 年），第 24-39 页。
1. Many political geography textbooks discuss spatial relationships in an international context. See, for example, Paul Buckholts, Political Geography (New York: Ronald Press, 1966), 73-93, and Lucille Carlson, Geography and World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1958), 24-39.
2.苏联解体后，俄罗斯的海上力量不足与苏联海军面临的不足如出一辙。参见约翰·M·柯林斯，《美苏军事平衡：概念与能力，1960-1980》（华盛顿特区：麦格劳-希尔出版社，1980 年），第 239-244 页。
2. Russia’s maritime deficiencies following the demise of the U.S.S.R. duplicate those that confronted the Soviet Navy. See John M. Collins, The U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities, 1960-1980 (Washington, DC: McGraw-Hill Publications, 1980), 239-244.
3. JFC Fuller，《西方世界军事史》，第 1 卷（纽约：Funk and Wagnals，1955 年），第 360-384 页；Peter Fleming，《海狮行动》（纽约：Simon and Schuster，1957 年）。
3. J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, vol. 1 (New York: Funk and Wagnals, 1955), 360-384; Peter Fleming, Operation Sea Lion (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957).
4. Trevor N. Dupuy，《难以捉摸的胜利》（爱荷华州迪比克：Kendall/Hunt，1992 年）。
4. Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt, 1992).
5 . Donald S. Zagoria，《中苏冲突，1956-1961》（新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1962 年）。
5. Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962).
6. Arthur N. Strahler，《自然地理学》，第 2 版（纽约：John Wiley and Sons，1963 年），第 5 章；Richard D. Lee，“代谢钟”，《航空航天安全评论》 3，第 3 期（1966 年冬季）：3-5。
6. Arthur N. Strahler, Physical Geography, 2d ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), chapter 5; Richard D. Lee, “Metabolic Clock,” Aerospace Safety Review 3, no. 3 (Winter 1966): 3-5.
7.陆军上将乔治·C·马歇尔、陆军上将H·H·阿诺德和海军上将欧内斯特·J·金的战争报告（纽约：JB Lippincott出版社，1947年），第557-563页；巴里·皮特，《大西洋之战》（纽约：时代生活图书出版社，1977年）。
7. The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall, General of the Army H.H. Arnold, and Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (New York: J. B. Lippincott., 1947), 557-563; Barry Pitt, The Battle of the Atlantic (New York: Time-Life Books, 1977).
8. Leonard Bushkoff，“匈牙利（1956 年 10 月至 11 月）”，载于《国际冲突中的挑战与应对》，第 2 卷，《欧洲和中东的经验》，Doris M. Condit、Bert H. Cooper, Jr. 等编（华盛顿特区：美国大学社会系统研究中心，1967 年 3 月），第 529-578 页。
8. Leonard Bushkoff, “Hungary (October-November 1956),” in Challenge and Response in International Conflict, vol. 2, The Experience in Europe and the Middle East, eds. Doris M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, American University, March 1967), 529-578.
9. Peter David，《沙漠中的胜利》（纽约：兰登书屋，1991 年）。
9. Peter David, Triumph in the Desert (New York: Random House, 1991).
10. James A. Nathan 编，《古巴导弹危机再探》（纽约：圣马丁出版社，1992 年）；Robert Smith Thompson，《十月的导弹：约翰·F·肯尼迪与古巴导弹危机的解密故事》（纽约：西蒙与舒斯特出版社，1992 年）；Raymond L. Carthoff，《古巴导弹危机反思》，修订版（华盛顿特区：布鲁金斯学会，1989 年）。
10. James A. Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992); Robert Smith Thompson, The Missiles of October: The Declassified Story of John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Raymond L. Carthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989).
11. Richard M. Nixon，《1970 年代的美国外交政策：和平的新兴结构》（华盛顿：1972 年 2 月 9 日），第 177 页；Mark M. Lowenthal，《欧洲常规武装力量条约：核查和遵守问题》，简报 91009（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1991 年）。
11. Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: The Emerging Structure of Peace (Washington: February 9, 1972), 177; Mark M. Lowenthal, The CFE Treaty: Verification and Compliance Issues, Issue Brief 91009 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1991).
12.柯林斯，159-167。
12. Collins, 159-167.
13.有关背景信息，请参阅 Daniel P. Bolger 的《美国人在战争中：暴力和平的时代，1975-1986》（加利福尼亚州诺瓦托：普雷西迪奥出版社，1988 年），第 169-189 页、第 383-441 页。
13. For background, see Daniel P. Bolger, Americans at War: An Era of Violent Peace, 1975-1986 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), 169-189, 383-441.
14. J. Lawton Collins，《和平时期的战争：朝鲜战争的历史和教训》（波士顿，马萨诸塞州：霍顿·米夫林出版社，1969 年），第 19、82、183、200、217、291-292、296 页。引文出自陆军上将、参谋长联席会议主席奥马尔·N·布拉德利之口，摘自他在参议院军事委员会和外交关系委员会就远东军事形势所作的证词，第 82届国会，第 1会期，第 2 部分，1951 年 5 月 15 日，第 732、753 页。
14. J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 19, 82, 183, 200, 217, 291-292, 296. The quotation is by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is reproduced in testimony before the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations on The Military Situation in the Far East, 82d Congress, 1st sess., part 2, May 15, 1951, 732, 753.
15. Keith William Nolan，《进入柬埔寨：春季战役、夏季攻势，1970 年》（加利福尼亚州诺瓦托：Presidio Press，1990 年）。
15. Keith William Nolan, Into Cambodia: Spring Campaign, Summer Offensive, 1970 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990).
16. Gerard M. Devlin，《重返科雷吉多岛》（纽约：圣马丁出版社，1992 年）；尤其参见第 37-39 页、第 44-61 页、第 76-85 页。
16. Gerard M. Devlin, Back to Corregidor (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992); see especially 37-39, 44-61, 76-85.
17. Alexander Werth，《战时俄国，1941-1945》（纽约：EP Dutton and Co.，1964 年），第 144-260 页。
17. Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941-1945 (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1964), 144-260.
18. SLA Marshall，《绯红草原》（纽约：Charles Schribner's Sons，1972 年），191-237 页。
18. S.L.A. Marshall, Crimsoned Prairie (New York: Charles Schribner’s Sons, 1972), 191-237.
19. Robert Payne，《革命家肖像：毛泽东》（纽约：Ablard-Schuman，1961 年），第 6 章。
19. Robert Payne, Portrait of Revolutionary: Mao Tse-Tung (New York: Ablard-Schuman, 1961), chapter 6.
20. James T. Reitz，“苏联安全部队：克里姆林宫的其他军队”，载于《苏联：未来之路？》第 6 卷第 5 部分，共产主义事务研究（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1985 年），第 549-580 页。
20. James T. Reitz, “The Soviet Security Troops: The Kremlin’s Other Armies,” in part 5, Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead? vol. 6, Studies in Communist Affairs (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985), 549-580.
21.例如，参见 Buckholts，《政治地理学》，第 73-78 页。
21. See, for example, Buckholts, Political Geography, 73-78.
22. Gordon A. Moon, II，“反向入侵”，陆军17，第 2 期（1967 年 2 月）：24-30 和“不确定的未来”，1967 年 3 月，38-42。
22. Gordon A. Moon, II, “Invasion in Reverse,” Army 17, no. 2 (February 1967): 24-30 and “Uncertain Future,” March 1967, 38-42.
23. Colin L. Powell 与 Joseph E. Persico 合著，《我的美国之旅》（纽约：兰登书屋，1995 年），第 509-510 页。
23. Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 509-510.
24.约翰·S·D·艾森豪威尔，《苦涩的森林》（纽约：GP Putnam's Sons出版社，1969年）。
24. John S. D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1969).
25.约翰·W·惠特曼，《巴丹：我们最后的希望》（纽约：Hippocrene Books，1990 年）；约翰·托兰德，《但并非羞愧：珍珠港事件后的六个月》（纽约：Random House，1961 年），第 265-366 页。
25. John W. Whitman, Bataan Our Last Ditch (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1990); John Tolland, But Not in Shame: The Six Months After Pearl Harbor (New York: Random House, 1961), 265-366.
26. Cornelius Ryan，《遥远的桥》（纽约：西蒙与舒斯特出版社，1974 年）。
26. Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974).
27. Ann 和 John Tusa，《柏林空运》（纽约：雅典娜出版社，1988 年）；James M. Schick，《柏林危机，1958-1962》（宾夕法尼亚州费城：宾夕法尼亚大学出版社，1971 年）。
27. Ann and John Tusa, The Berlin Airlift (New York: Athenium Press, 1988); James M. Schick, The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962 (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971).
3. 地形地貌
3. LAY OF THE LAND
和平时期，士兵必须了解地形地貌，了解山脉的陡峭程度、山谷的走向、平原的位置，以及河流和沼泽的性质——然后，通过在一个地方获得的知识和经验，就可以很容易地了解任何其他地方。
In peace, soldiers must learn the nature of the land, how steep the mountains are, how the valleys debouch, where the plains lie, and understand the nature of rivers and swamps—then by means of the knowledge and experience gained in one locality, one can easily understand any other.
尼科洛·马基雅维利
《论说》
Niccolo Machiavelli
Discorsi
冷战期间，一位美国陆军少将在海军战争学院发表讲话时，面无表情地宣称：“各军种的年轻人要么学习地形，要么学习俄语。” 我们永远无法确定他是否言过其实，因为美国和苏联从未交战，但早在文艺复兴时期博学多才的马基雅维利500多年前发表这番言论之前，地形地貌就具有重要的军事意义，而且这种意义很可能还会延续下去。
A U.S. ARMY MAJOR GENERAL WHO ADDRESSED THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE DURING THE COLD WAR DECLARED without cracking a smile, “Young men of all services must learn terrain or learn Russian.” No one will ever know for sure whether he overstated his case, because the United States and the Soviet Union never went to war with each other, but the lay of the land was militarily important long before Rennaissance Man Machiavelli made his pronouncement more than 500 years ago and likely will remain so.
地形
LAND FORMS
地形构成了所有其他陆地特征叠加的基础（图 1为示意图）。1它们占据了三个具有重要军事意义的类别，表 2列出了这些类别，并按高度、面积或深度从高到低排列。高地、平坦的地形和洼地各自以独特的方式影响着空军和地面部队的自由机动能力、目标定位能力、有效火力投送能力、非战斗行动能力、行动协调能力以及在战略、作战和战术层面提供必要支援的能力。
Land forms comprise the foundation upon which all other terrestrial features are superimposed (figure 1 is illustrative).1 They occupy three militarily significant categories, which table 2 lists with the highest, largest, or deepest first. High ground, level land, and depressions each uniquely influence the abilities of air and ground forces to maneuver freely, locate targets, deliver firepower effectively, conduct non-combat operations, coordinate actions, and furnish essential support at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
高地
HIGH GROUND
“山脉”和“丘陵”都是不够精确的术语，其定义取决于具体情况的解读。印度南部帕尔米山脉的高地海拔与美国阿巴拉契亚山脉相当，而阿巴拉契亚山脉与阿尔卑斯山脉或安第斯山脉相比又显得矮小。有些山峰呈锯齿状，有些则较为平缓。从平均海平面到陆地上任意一点的总海拔高度与从山脚到山顶的地形起伏（图2）之间可能几乎没有相关性。例如，科罗拉多州的派克峰比黎巴嫩海岸山脉的最高峰高出4000英尺（1220米），但由于其攀登起点海拔超过1英里，因此其地形起伏较小。空军人员根据海拔高度设置高度计，他们对地形起伏的看法与陆军部队不同，陆军前线部队可能会将小丘视为高地。坡度是衡量地面在给定水平距离内垂直上升或下降的速度，通常用正负百分比表示，具体取决于移动方向（图 3显示从 A 到 B 的上升坡度为 +23%，从 B 到 A 的下降坡度为 -23%）。
“Mountains” and “hills” are imprecise terms, the definitions of which depend on circumstantial interpretations. High spots in southern India’s Palmi Hills are equal in elevation to those of the U.S. Appalachian Mountains which, in turn, are small compared with the Alps or Andes. Some summits are saw-toothed, others are smooth. Little correlation may be evident between total elevation, measured from mean sea level to any point on land, and local relief, which measures topographic features from base to top (figure 2). Pike’s Peak in Colorado, for example, is 4,000 feet (1,220 meters) higher than the loftiest pinnacle along Lebanon’s coastal range, yet local relief is less because its climb begins more than a mile above sea level. Airmen, who set their altimeters according to elevation, view local relief from different perspectives than land forces, whose front-line troops may consider hummocks to be high ground. Gradients, which measure how rapidly the ground rises or falls vertically over given horizontal distances, generally are expressed as plus or minus percentage figures, depending on direction of movement (figure 3 shows a +23 percent ascending grade from A to B and -23 percent descending from B to A).
Figure 1. Land Forms Displayed Schematically
陡峭的山坡严重限制了军事行动的灵活性。例如，直升机飞行员必须小心，在悬停时避免旋翼桨叶触地，以免在士兵下机时造成人员伤亡；他们还必须确保起落架在着陆时能够稳固支撑，而不是滑下山坡。地面部队在陡峭地形上的作战能力取决于专业技能、运输方式和载荷。登山队员可以攀越普通步兵难以逾越的山壁；履带车辆比卡车更能应对陡峭的地形；如果平板车装载的是帐篷而不是坦克，铁路机车就能牵引更长的列车爬上更陡的坡。在地形崎岖、山脊密集的地区，即使在天气晴朗的情况下，近距离空中支援也充满危险，因此，空中观察员和高空轰炸机很难识别和打击被地形遮蔽的目标。
Very steep slopes severely limit military flexibility. Helicopter pilots, for example, must take care that rotor blades don’t hit the ground on the uphill side while they hover or decapitate troops when they debark and ensure that the skids will hold instead of sliding downhill if they have to land. The proficiency with which ground forces negotiate steep terrain depends on professional skills, types of transportation, and loads. Mountaineers can scale walls that would stop standard infantry; tracked vehicles can negotiate steeper ground than trucks; railway locomotives can tow longer trains up sharper grades if flatcars are laden with tents instead of tanks. Aerial observers and high-flying bombers are hard pressed to identify and hit targets concealed by rugged terrain where closely-spaced ridges make close air support a perilous proposition even in perfect weather.
Figure 2. Elevation and Local Relief
只有当地形最高点（最高海拔）和军事最高点（能够看到山脚下所有地形的最高点）重合时，裸露山坡上的点和区域才能从山顶到山脚一览无余。凸起的山坡和其他不规则的地形通常会形成“盲区”——在军事术语中称为掩体或隐蔽处——这些盲区能够保护敌方阵地免受步枪和机枪等平射武器的攻击（见图4）。地形掩体还会降低甚高频（VHF）无线电的性能，因为甚高频无线电同样依赖于视线。部署在陡峭狭窄山谷中的地对地导弹和野战炮兵阵地无法将发射器或发射管抬升到足够高的高度，从而越过附近的山脊。
Points and areas on bare slopes are visible from the top to the bottom of any hill only if the topographical crest (the highest elevation) and the military crest (the highest point from which terrain all the way to the base is visible) happen to coincide. Convex slopes and other surface irregularities commonly create “blind spots”—masks or defilades in military parlance—that protect enemy positions from flat-trajectory weapons, such as rifles and machine guns (see figure 4). Terrain masks also degrade the performance of Very High Frequency (VHF) radios, which likewise depend on line-of-sight. Surface-to-surface missile and field artillery batteries emplaced along steep, narrow valleys cannot elevate launchers or tubes high enough to clear nearby crests.
相对平坦的土地
RELATIVELY LEVEL LAND
平坦或起伏的地形包括相对较小的台地和孤丘，以及广袤的美国大平原、俄罗斯草原和高原，例如海拔 4875 米（16000 英尺）的青藏高原，其高度超过大多数山脉。在广阔的平原和高原上，坡度通常不超过 5-15 度，只有少数孤立的隆起物会突然从水平地形中拔地而起。
Flat to rolling surfaces include relatively small mesas and buttes as well as the gargantuan U.S. Great Plains, Russian steppes, and high plateaus such as the Tibetan Tableland, which, at 16,000 feet (4,875 meters), is higher than most mountains. Slopes nowhere exceed 5-15 degrees on large plains and plateaus, except for isolated protuberances that rise abruptly above otherwise horizontal terrain.
Figure 3. Slopes and Gradients
历史上，地势相对平坦的地区曾多次发生重大军事行动。最早的游牧社会与农业社会之间的冲突之一发生在公元前18世纪，当时喜克索斯骑兵入侵了下埃及，而下埃及当时和现在一样，主要占据尼罗河三角洲地区。公元451年，罗马的杰出人物阿克提乌斯和狄奥多里克在莫里亚克平原（今法国沙隆附近）阻止了匈奴王阿提拉的进攻。公元732年，法兰克人查理·马特在图尔附近的卢瓦尔河谷击败了摩尔入侵者，遏制了伊斯兰势力从非洲向北席卷而来的浪潮。1781年，华盛顿在弗吉尼亚州约克镇附近的丘陵地带击败了康沃利斯，从而确保了新生的美国最终的胜利。1815年，拿破仑在比利时低地与惠灵顿交锋，遭遇滑铁卢战役。2.现代史上规模最大的军事行动发生在广袤的苏联平原上，这并不令人意外。这片平原使得庞大的武装力量能够灵活机动，并进行大规模的空地联合作战。“堡垒行动”（Operation Zitadelle），即库尔斯克战役，据报道造成7万名德军伤亡（不包括被俘或失踪人员），并摧毁了3000辆坦克、1400架飞机、1000门火炮和5000辆卡车。在这场规模空前的装甲战中，苏军的损失也仅略低于德军。3
Relatively level lands throughout history have witnessed major military operations. One of the first confrontations between pastoral and agricultural societies occurred in the 18th century B.C, when Hyksos horsemen overran Lower Egypt, which, then as now, mainly occupied the Nile Delta. Roman luminaries Actius and Theodoric stopped Attila the Hun on the Mauriac Plain near what now is Chalôns-sur-Marne, France, in 451 A.D. Charles Martel, a Frank, defeated Moorish invaders in the Loire Valley close by Tours (732 A.D.) to stem the Islamic tidal wave that was sweeping northward from Africa. Washington defeated Cornwallis on rolling lands around Yorktown, Virginia, in 1781 and thereby assured eventual victory for the infant United States, while Napoleon met Wellington and his Waterloo on Belgian lowlands in 1815.2 It should come as no surprise that the most expansive military campaigns in modern times took place on vast Soviet flatlands that allow gigantic armed forces to maneuver fluidly and conduct air-land combat on a grand scale. Operation Zitadelle, the epic clash at Kursk, reportedly culminated in 70,000 Germans killed or wounded (not counting captured or missing in action) and the destruction of 3,000 tanks, 1,400 aircraft, 1,000 artillery pieces, and 5,000 trucks. Soviet loses in that largest of all armored battles were only slightly less.3
地形凹陷
TOPOGRAPHICAL DEPRESSIONS
峡谷和深渊是绝佳的障碍，但数量远不及洞穴和岩洞，后者大小不一，用途广泛。例如，毛泽东的战略构想就是在陕西的一个洞穴中形成的，长征结束后，他有充足的时间在那里反思。天然的掩体，或许经过进一步的挖掘和完善，其规模远不及电影《纳瓦隆大炮》中隐藏的悬崖洞穴。顽强的日军在贝里琉岛、塞班岛、硫磺岛、冲绳岛和其他太平洋争议岛屿上，都曾利用过这些洞穴进行防御。由于空袭和海军重炮几乎完全摧毁了这些藏身之处，使得美军不得不付出惨重的伤亡代价才能将它们一网打尽，而这些藏身之处又被美军摧毁得几乎毫发无损。1941 年至 1944 年间， 4 名南斯拉夫游击队员躲藏在洞穴和山洞中，给相当数量的德国师造成了极大的麻烦，这些德国师本可以有效地部署到其他战线上。5.储存在基岩深处的武器、装备和物资通常不会受到常规轰炸的直接命中。敌方用于储存核武器、生物武器或化学武器的地下设施同样令人担忧，因为正面攻击摧毁这些设施代价高昂且结果难以预料。一支由11人组成的破坏小组，根据秘密获取的平面图，袭击了希特勒位于挪威弗莫克的重水工厂，一次小规模爆炸就重创了纳粹德国的核武器计划。6但事实证明，这一惊人的成就只是个例外，而不是普遍规律。
Canyons and gorges make awesome obstacles, but are fewer than caverns and caves, which come in many sizes and serve many military purposes. Mao’s strategic concepts, for example, took shape in a Shaanxi cave where he had ample time for reflection after the Long March. Natural shelters, perhaps further hollowed out and refined, need not be nearly as large as the cliff side cavity that hid the fictional Guns of Navaronne. Tenacious Japanese troops on Peleliu, Saipan, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and other contested Pacific islands that were honeycombed with comparatively small caves made U.S. forces root them out at the expense of frightful casualties on both sides, because air strikes and heavy naval artillery left those sanctuaries virtually intact.4 Yugloslav guerrillas who took refuge in caverns and caves from 1941 through 1944 gave fits to a sizable number of German divisions that might have been profitably employed on other fronts.5 Weapons, equipment, and supplies stockpiled deeply beneath bedrock generally are safe from direct hits by conventional bombardment. Subterranean facilities used by enemies to store nuclear, biological, or chemical munitions cause concern for identical reasons, because actions to neutralize them by frontal assaults would be costly and outcomes uncertain. An 11-man sabotage team, following surreptitiously acquired floor plans, hit Hitler’s heavy water plant at Vermork, Norway, and with one small explosion crippled Nazi Germany’s nuclear weapons program,6 but that spectacular achievement has proved to be an exception instead of a rule.
Figure 4. Line-of-Sight and High-Angle Trajectories
被陡峭地形环绕的盆地，一旦敌军占据制高点，便会将盆地底部的部队暴露在致命的火力之下，正如法国伞兵在越南奠边府战役（1954年）中所经历的那样，以及美国海军陆战队在接下来的十年（1967-1968年）在溪山战役中所遭遇的那样。阿尔弗雷德·丁尼生勋爵用这句令人心碎的诗句，将1853年巴拉克拉瓦战役中轻骑兵的冲锋永载史册：
Basins surrounded by steep terrain expose forces on the bottom to murderous fire if opponents occupy commanding heights, as French paratroopers in Vietnam found at Dien Bien Phu (1954) and U.S. Marines discovered at Khe Sanh during the next decade (1967-1968). Alfred, Lord Tennyson immortalized the Charge of the Light Brigade during the battle of Balaclava in 1853 with these heart-wrenching words:
右边是炮，
左边是炮，
前面是炮
，齐射雷鸣……
直奔死亡之口。
六百勇士骑着马进入了地狱之口。
Cannon to the right of them,
Cannon to the left of them,
Cannon in front of them
Volley’d and thunder’d . . .
Into the jaws of death,
Into the mouth of hell
Rode the six hundred.
当轻骑兵队进入“死亡谷”时，震惊的旁观者鸦雀无声，甚至能清晰地听到马嚼子和马具的叮当声。二十分钟后，近250名士兵和两倍于此数量的马匹丧生。7
Shocked onlookers became so hushed when the Light Brigade entered the “Valley of Death” that the jingle of bits and accouterments could clearly be heard. Twenty minutes later almost 250 men and twice that many horses were dead.7
河流和水库
RIVERS AND RESERVOIRS
快速移动的地面进攻部队如果缺乏足够的空中突击能力，就必须游泳、涉水、渡河或在大河上架桥，而不能中断步伐或放弃前进动力，同时还要让对岸的守军坚守阵地。8.所有军种都需要充足的水用于饮用、烹饪和卫生，以及特殊用途，例如在化学战中进行去污。因此，排水系统、河流渡口和军事用途的水库都是相关议题。（第11章涵盖内河航道。）
Fast-moving offensive ground forces that lack sufficient air assault capabilities must swim, ford, ferry across, or build bridges over large streams without breaking stride or forfeit forward momentum while defenders on the far bank hold in place.8 All military services routinely require adequate water for drinking, cooking, and sanitation, plus special purposes such as decontamination during chemical combat. Drainage systems, river crossing sites, and militarily useful reservoirs thus are relevant topics. (Chapter 11 covers inland waterways.)
排水系统
DRAINAGE SYSTEMS
排水系统通常呈不对称树状，每条分支都将水流汇入更大的溪流，直至最大的支流与主干相连。像亚马逊河和密西西比河这样巨大的系统汇集了数百万平方英里的径流，而较小的系统则服务于小得多的区域。发源于水资源丰富的地区并流经此地的大河拥有众多支流。例如，在西欧，每隔约6英里（9公里）就有一条宽30至60英尺（9至18米）的溪流，而宽达300英尺的河流平均每隔30英里就出现一条。相比之下，底格里斯河、幼发拉底河和尼罗河的支流相对较少，它们发源于水资源丰富的地区，但之后流经干旱的陆地。9
Drainage systems generally are shaped like asymmetrical trees, each branch of which empties its contents into a larger stream until the biggest tributaries connect with the trunk. Immense systems such as the Amazon and Mississippi funnel runoff from several million square miles, while minor systems service much smaller areas. Great rivers that arise and remain in well-watered regions have many tributaries. Streams 30 to 60 feet wide (9 to 18 meters), for example, lace Western Europe every 6 miles (9+ kilometers) or so, while rivers up to 300 feet across occur on the average at 30-mile intervals. Relatively few branches in contrast feed the Tigris, Euphrates, and Nile, which arise where water is plentiful but traverse dry lands thereafter.9
具有军事意义的河流特征首先是河宽，以英尺、码或米为单位测量河岸之间的距离，其次是水深，即从水面到河底的距离（图 5）。流速通常以英尺/秒或米/秒表示，主要取决于河床的坡度。每秒 25 至 30 英尺（7 至 9 米）或每小时 17 至 20 英里被认为是相当快的流速，而每秒 1 至 2 英尺或更低的流速则被认为是缓慢的。由于河岸和河床起到摩擦制动的作用，最深、最快的水流通常沿着主河道，且水位远高于河底。水流在河道外侧弯曲处会加速，就像“鞭子”一样。
Militarily important riverine characteristics begin with widths, measured in feet, yards, or meters from bank to bank, and with depths which indicate the distance from surface to bottom (figure 5). Current velocities, usually stated in feet or meters per second, depend primarily on the steepness of the stream bed. Twenty-five to 30 feet (7-9 meters) per second or 17 to 20 miles an hour is considered quite fast, whereas 1 or 2 feet per second or less is sluggish. The deepest, fastest flow normally follows the main channel well above the bottom, because stream banks and beds function as friction brakes. Currents accelerate along outside curves, where they figuratively play “crack the whip.”
河流的宽度、深度、流速和流量（以立方英尺、码或米为单位）并非恒定不变。军事策划者和行动人员会预料到季节性波动，例如尼罗河谷的年度洪水，并且他们完全了解潮汐河流会因月相变化而每日涨落两次。然而，并非所有破坏性洪水都是可以预测的，也并非所有洪水都是自然原因造成的：1944年11月，德军守军炸毁了施密特鲁尔河上的水坝，以延缓盟军的推进；1951年，在朝鲜华川水库，中国“志愿兵”威胁要释放洪水，这股洪水足以冲毁指挥所、补给站和桥梁，并可能将美军第九军分割。10
Widths, depths, velocities, and volumes measured in cubic feet, yards, or meters past particular points are by no means constant. Military planners and operators anticipate seasonal fluctuations, typified by annual inundations along the Nile Valley, and are fully aware that tidal rivers rise and fall twice daily in response to lunar cycles. Not all destructive floods, however, are predictable nor are they all from natural causes: Germans defenders in November1944 blew dams on the Roer River at Schmidt to delay advancing Allied armies; Chinese “volunteers” at Hwachon Reservoir in Korea (1951) threatened to release a wall of water that could have washed away command posts, supply dumps, and bridges and split U.S. IX Corps.10
沙洲、泥滩和岩石露头在近岸处构成天然障碍，尤其是在外弯道处。水流中的漂浮物和浮冰会对船只和桥梁造成破坏，但足够厚的坚固冰层则有利于航行，能够承受军队、卡车和坦克的重量。
Sand bars, mud banks, and rock outcroppings impose natural obstacles close to shore, especially along outside curves. Floating debris and ice floes in stream can be destructive to river craft and bridges, but solid ice is beneficial when thick enough to bear the weight of troops, trucks, and tanks.
Figure 5. Selected Stream Characteristics
1.河床从河岸到河岸的宽度。
1. The width of stream bed from bank to bank.
2. 正常水位下测量的实际水宽。此外，根据当地观测或高水位和低水位记录，估算最大水宽2a和最小水宽2b，并记录在案。
2. The actual width of the water measured at normal stage. In addition, maximum width 2a and minimum width 2b are estimated, based on local observations or records of high water and low water, and then recorded.
3.正常水位时溪流的实际深度。
3. The actual depth of the stream at normal water level.
3a.根据当地观察或记录估计的最大水深。
3a. Estimated maximum water depth based on local observations or records.
3b.根据当地观察或记录估计的最小水深。
3b. Estimated minimum water depth based on local observations or records.
4.引道坡度是指开挖引道所穿过的河岸坡度。
4. The slope of the approaches is the slope of the stream banks through which the approach roads are cut.
交叉点
CROSSING SITES
在广阔的战线上设置多处渡河点，可以最大限度地削弱敌军集中决定性防御力量攻击脆弱目标的能力，甚至可能动用大规模杀伤性武器。理想的渡河点应具备以下特征：11
River crossings at many places on broad fronts minimize enemy abilities to concentrate decisive defensive power against vulnerable targets, perhaps employing weapons of mass destruction. Ideal locations exhibit the following attributes:11
• 良好的道路紧邻河流，以便进攻部队能够轻松到达最佳渡河点。
• Good roads closely parallel the river so that offensive forces can easily reach the best crossing sites.
• 防护良好的区域足以容纳后续部队，等待增援进攻波次。
• Well-protected areas are ample to hold follow-on forces waiting to reinforce assault waves.
• 易于通行的斜坡通往近岸的水域和远岸的陆地。
• Easily negotiable slopes lead to water on the near shore and to land on the far side.
• 狭窄的河道便于快速突击渡河、用木筏和渡船往返，从而支持后续的集结和战斗桥梁建设。
• Narrows facilitate fast assault crossings, round trips by rafts and ferries that support subsequent buildups, and combat bridge construction.
• 水流速度小于每秒 5 英尺（每小时 3.5 英里）时，会限制向下游漂移。
• Current velocities less than 5 feet per second (3.5 miles per hour) limit down-stream drift.
• 涉水点水浅，水底坚实，足以承受重型交通，并且选定的路线没有具有军事意义的障碍物。
• Fording sites are consistently shallow, their bottoms are firm enough to bear heavy traffic, and selected routes are free from militarily significant obstacles.
• 无法涉水的溪流水深足以让游泳艇、充气船、木筏和渡船漂浮。
• Unfordable streams are consistently deep enough to float swimming vehicles, inflatable boats, rafts, and ferries.
• 急流、浅滩、沙洲、障碍物、碎片和冰冻障碍物都明显不存在。
• Rapids, shoals, sandbars, snags, debris, and icy obstructions are conspicuously absent.
• 位置便利的岛屿可以作为跳板，减少战斗中架桥的需求。
• Conveniently located islands that act as stepping stones reduce combat bridging requirements.
遗憾的是，最佳渡河点往往防守严密，实际情况也鲜有理想。例如，二战期间在俄罗斯作战的德军装甲师经常发现，大溪流两岸都是沼泽低地，洪水裹挟着大量泥沙堵塞了发动机，每年春天浮冰都会冲击临时搭建的桥梁，而夏季暴雨过后，车辆在缓坡上会变成雪橇。12熟练的战术家克服了这些逆境，并了解到在意想不到的地方着陆可以提高低成本成功的可能性。
The best crossing sites unfortunately are apt to be staunchly defended and actual conditions seldom are ideal. German panzer divisions in Russia during World War II, for example, frequently found that marshy lowlands abutted both banks of large streams, floods loaded with sediment clogged inboard engines, ice floes each spring bombarded expedient bridges, and vehicles became toboggans on moderate slopes after torrential summer rains.12 Skilled tacticians nevertheless overcame such adversities and learned that landings at unexpected spots improve prospects for low-cost success.
供水
WATER SUPPLIES
大型武装部队在和平时期和战争时期，无论是主动作战还是被动作战，无论是在固定设施还是野战环境中，都需要大量的水。在干旱地区，尤其是在师级规模的地面部队和空军频繁调动的情况下，满足用水需求尤为困难。饮用水必须适口（颜色、气味和味道都至关重要），并且不能受到传播伤寒、霍乱和阿米巴痢疾等传染病的致病菌污染。当用作冷却剂的水具有腐蚀性时，耗时耗力的净化过程就变得必不可少。地表水和地下水是互补的，因为两者都无法在所有情况下都满足需求。两者提供的水量和水质都会因时间和地点而异，便利程度也各不相同。13
Large armed forces demand enormous quantities of water in peacetime as well as war, whether active or passive, at fixed installations or in the field. Requirements are most difficult to satisfy in arid regions, especially when division-sized ground elements and air wings move frequently. Drinking water must be palatable (color, odor, and taste all count) and be unpolluted by pathogenic bacteria that spread contagious diseases such as typhoid fever, cholera, and amoebic dysentery. Time-consuming and expensive purification processes become obligatory when water for use as coolants is corrosive. Surface and subsurface sources are complementary, because neither suffices under all conditions. Both contribute supplies that differ quantitatively as well as qualitatively from time-to-time and place-to-place with varying degrees of convenience.13
地表水。河流、湖泊和一些内陆海是地球表面主要的淡水来源。较小的水源包括池塘、小溪和泉水。有些水源长期稳定可靠，而其他地区的洪水和干旱则会季节性地减少可用水量，使其低于所需水平。自然灾害或敌方行动造成的不可预测的水资源枯竭也可能在几乎没有预警的情况下导致水资源短缺。因此，谨慎的指挥官会在水危机发生之前努力寻找替代水源。
Surface Water. Rivers, lakes, and some inland seas are large sources of fresh water on Earth’s surface. Lesser repositories include ponds, small streams, and springs. Some sources are consistently reliable, whereas floods and droughts elsewhere seasonably reduce usable water supplies below required amounts. Unpredictable depletions caused by nature or enemy actions may do likewise with little or no notice. Prudent commanders consequently try to identify alternative sources before water crises occur.
常年流淌的清甜凉爽的泉水通常有机杂质含量低，但分布分散，矿物质含量高，而且水量很少能满足大型军事单位的需求。这些单位通常需要在交通便利、便于公路运输的地点建立、运营和维护供水点。在年降雨量超过 60 厘米（25 英寸）的平原和高原地区，通常有大量优质地表水；但在山地径流开始的地方、水源常年被冰雪覆盖的寒冷地区、污染严重的地区以及未经处理或处理不彻底的污水和有毒化学物质有时会污染自来水和水库的小城镇和城市中心附近，则很难找到充足的水源。
Perennial flows of sweet, cool spring water usually are low in organic impurities but tend to be widely scattered, high in mineral content, and output seldom is enough to satisfy large military formations which most often must establish, operate, and maintain water supply points at locations that are easily accessible and facilitate distribution by road. Large quantities of good quality surface water are commonly available on plains and plateaus where rainfall annually exceeds 25 inches (60 centimeters), but ample sources are hard to find in mountains where runoff starts, in frigid climes where sources are ice-bound many months each year, in the tropics where pollution frequently is rampant, and near small towns and urban centers where raw or incompletely treated sewage and toxic chemicals sometimes contaminate running water and reservoirs.
海军舰艇和一些沿海国家利用海水淡化技术生产淡水。位于沙特阿拉伯的世界最大海水淡化厂每天从波斯湾抽取超过500万加仑（近1900万升）的海水，经过净化后，将淡水输送到远至利雅得的内陆地区。在1990年至1991年的“沙漠盾牌”和“沙漠风暴”行动期间，盟军导弹防御部队采取了特别措施，保护该设施免受伊拉克“飞毛腿”导弹的袭击。14驻扎在古巴关塔那摩湾的美国海军陆战队驻军，由于雷区和其他人为障碍物与奥连特省其他地区隔绝，每月通常需要约 120 万加仑（450 万升）淡化海水。由于有剩余的产能和驳船，加上 1500 万加仑的储存量，使得该驻军能够容纳 55000 名古巴和海地难民，这些难民使得 1995 年 10 月的用水高峰超过 7300 万加仑（2760 万升）。15
Naval vessels and some coastal countries distill brine to produce fresh water. The world’s largest desalinization plant, located in Saudi Arabia, siphons more than 5 million gallons per day from the Persian Gulf (nearly 19 million liters) and, after purification, pipes fresh water as far inland as Riyadh. Allied missile defense batteries took special precautions to protect that facility against Iraqi Scud attacks during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-1991.14 The U.S. Marine garrison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which is isolated from the rest of Oriente Province by minefields and other man-made obstacles, routinely requires about 1.2 million gallons (4.5 million liters) of desalinated sea water per month. Surplus capacity and barges, plus 15 million gallons in storage, made it possible to accommodate 55,000 Cuban and Haitian refugees who inflated peak consumption to more than 73 million gallons in October 1995 (27.6 million liters).15
地下水。并非所有降水和融水都直接流入地表排水系统。相当一部分会渗入地下水库。渗入量取决于总积水量、坡度、土壤成分以及下伏岩石的渗透性。水分首先渗过一个通气层，该通气层会交替地湿润和干燥，然后到达地下水位。地下水位是一个饱和层，其厚度和深度变化不定，可能很浅也可能很深（图 6）。部分水会继续沿着裂缝和缝隙向下渗流，最终被几乎不透水的岩层包裹的含水层所吸收。自流泉在静水压力的作用下沿着裂缝和断层线涌出地表，受季节波动或污染的影响很小，但通常矿化程度过高，不适合人类饮用或用于冷却系统。通常情况下，较浅的井（即钻入地下水位的井）是更可取的，但有两个明显的例外：沿海地区的井水往往是微咸的；从北极永久冻土层以上获取的资源每年只有很短的时间才能产生生产力。16
Subsurface Water. Not all precipitation and melt water empties directly into surface drainage systems. A good deal seeps into subterranean reservoirs instead. How much depends on total accumulations, slopes, soil compositions, and the permeability of underlying rocks. Moisture first percolates through an aerated zone that alternately dampens and dries, then reaches the water table, a saturated layer of variable thickness and depths that may be shallow or deep (figure 6). Some water continues to trickle down through cracks and crannies until contained by aquifers encased in nearly impervious rock formations. Artesian springs that rise to the surface under hydrostatic pressures along fissures and fault lines are little affected by seasonal fluctuations or by pollution, but often are too mineralized for human consumption or cooling systems. Relatively shallow wells sunk into the water table generally are preferable with two prominent exceptions: well water along littorals tends to be brackish; supplies drawn from arctic sources above permafrost are only briefly productive each year.16
机动地面部队很少会长时间停留下来抽取地下水库的水，但港口、机场、补给站、大型维修车间和其他固定设施却经常受益。负责人道主义援助、旨在改善贫困人口生活质量的民政部门挖井队也同样受益。在干旱的内陆地区，地下水库是唯一可靠的水源，这一点在夏季高温加剧日常用水需求、以及在压力条件下用水量激增时尤为重要。例如，保守估计，仅一个遭受持续性化学战剂重创的美国陆军或海军陆战队师，就需要大约20万加仑的清洗水来对人员、武器、装备和设施（例如救护站和野战医院）进行消毒。17即使消防栓很方便，这也是一项艰巨的任务，在沙漠中可能更是不可能，因为如果以牙还牙地进行报复，化学武器的使用可能会给双方带来难以承受的风险。
Mobile ground forces seldom sit still long enough to tap subsurface reservoirs, but ports, airfields, supply depots, major maintenance shops, and other static installations frequently benefit. So do Civil Affairs well-digging teams whose humanitarian mission is to improve the quality of life for impoverished people. Subterranean repositories furnish the only reliable source of water inland wherever lands are parched, a fact of particular importance when summer heat heightens routine requirements and demands soar under stressful conditions. Conservative estimates, for example, indicate that it would take approximately 200,000 gallons of wash water to decontaminate the personnel, weapons, equipment, and facilities (such as aid stations and field hospitals) of just one U.S. Army or Marine division hard hit by persistent chemical warfare (CW) agents.17 That would be a tall order even if fire hydrants were handy, and perhaps impossible in the desert, where the employment of CW munitions could entail unconscionable risks for both sides if reprisals in kind drenched aggressors.
Figure 6. Water Tables, Acquifers, and Wells
地质与土壤
GEOLOGY AND SOILS
各军种从最高层到最低层的指挥官、参谋人员和下属都需要了解地质和土壤如何影响作战和支援行动，但大多数人对这些技术性内容感到枯燥乏味。本节旨在激发大家的兴趣，首先概述地球地幔，然后用通俗易懂的语言解释其重要的军事意义。
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates from the highest to the lowest echelons of every armed service need to know how geology and soils affect combat and support operations, but most are bored to tears by those technical subjects. This brief section, which seeks to stimulate interest, first characterizes Earth’s mantle, then explains important military implications in simple terms.
表面特征
SURFACE CHARACTERISTICS
地球陆地表面覆盖着土壤，土壤层厚度不一，从冲积平原上的几百英尺到陡峭山坡上的一英寸左右不等。砾石、沙子、粉砂和粘土按粒径大小降序排列，有时以纯净形式出现，但更多时候以混合物的形式出现（粉质砾石、砂质粘土等），每种物质都具有独特的性质，例如质地、密实度、孔隙度和稠度，这些都会影响军事用途（表 3）。18
Soil covers Earth’s land surface in layers that vary from several hundred feet thick on some alluvial plains to an inch or so on steep mountain slopes. Various grades of gravel, sand, silt, and clay, classified in descending order of particle size, occasionally appear in pure form but more often in a mix (silty gravel, sandy clay, and so on), each with distinctive properties such as texture, compactness, porosity, and consistency that affect military utility (table 3).18
Table 3. Selected Soil Characteristics
砾石由粗糙光滑的石块组成，形状有圆润也有棱角分明，直径约为 2.5 至 7.6 厘米（1/4 英寸至 3 英寸），不受天气条件的影响。更小的颗粒构成沙子，干燥时松散，潮湿时则变得紧实。干燥的粉砂颗粒更细，除了表面外，其他部分都是固体，在有风的情况下会扬起尘土；而潮湿的粉砂则会变成柔软湿滑的泥浆，直到阳光、温暖或风力使其重新凝固。可塑性和粘性是微小（几乎无孔）粘土颗粒的显著特征，这些颗粒干燥时坚硬且通常易碎。粘土排水性好，但一旦饱和，就会兼具粘性和黏性。粘土干燥时间长，并且像粉砂一样，会因冻融循环而隆起。不同的混合物会改变每种基本土壤类型的特性。
Gravel consists of coarse and smooth rocks, rounded or angular, that range from about 1/4 inch to 3 inches (2.5 to 7.6 centimeters) in diameter and are unaffected by weather conditions. Smaller grains constitute sand, which is unconsolidated when dry yet compact when wet. Dry silt is finer still, but solid except for the surface, which raises dust clouds under windy conditions, whereas wet silt constitutes soft, slippery mud until sunshine, warmth, or wind re-solidify it. Plasticity and adhesiveness are salient characteristics of microscopic (almost poreless) clay particles, which are hard and often brittle when dry. Clay sheds water well but, once saturated, combines the worst attributes of slime and glue. Clay also takes a long time to dry and, like silt, heaves in response to alternating freezes and thaws. Combinations modify each basic soil type, depending on the mix.
泥炭沼泽中富含腐殖质（分解的植物）的表层土壤厚达数英尺，沼泽和草甸中的表层土壤则稍薄一些。在降水稀少、植物稀少的沙漠地区，腐殖质层通常很薄；在寒冷抑制腐烂的北极地区，以及热带地区炎热潮湿的环境，腐殖质层也往往很薄。
Top soils heavy in humus (decomposed vegetation) are several feet thick in peat bogs, somewhat less in marshes and meadows. Humus invariably is thin in deserts where scanty precipitation supports little plant life, in the arctic where cold retards decay, and wherever tropical heat and humidity disintegrate organic waste.
所有土壤之下的基岩有时位于地表或近地表，但通常深埋地下。其显著特征包括：层状或实心结构、粗糙或光滑的质地以及断裂模式（整齐或锯齿状断裂）。花岗岩和石英岩等“古老岩石”极其坚硬，但所有砾岩、砂岩、粉砂岩，甚至易碎的页岩，都比其基本组成成分（砾石、沙子、粉砂和粘土）更加耐用，这些成分在高压下胶结在一起。富含钙质的石灰岩的硬度范围很广，从非常坚硬的建筑材料到非常柔软的白垩都有，后者以多佛的白色悬崖为典型代表。19
Bedrock beneath all soil sometimes lies at or near the surface, but often is deeply buried. Structures (laminated or solid), textures (coarse or smooth), and fracture patterns (clean or jagged breaks) are notable attributes. “Rock of Ages” like granites and quartzites are exceedingly hard, but all conglomerates, sandstones, siltstones, even splintery shales are more durable than their basic constituents, which were gravel, sand, silt, and clay before being cemented together under great pressures. Calcium-rich limestones range from very hard construction material to very soft chalk, the latter typified by the white cliffs of Dover.19
跨国通行能力
CROSS-COUNTRY TRAFFICABILITY
承载能力、牵引力和稳定性，以及在持续使用下的稳定性，决定了特定土壤能够承受从雪地摩托这样轻型轮式和履带式车辆，到拖车或坦克这样重型车辆的通行能力。在砾石地面上进行越野行驶始终可行，而沼泽和湿地除了小型两栖动物外，其他车辆都无法通行。然而，越野行驶通常取决于天气状况。冰冻的田地通常有利于越野行驶。除沙土以外的干燥土壤也同样如此，因为松散的沙土会使没有低压轮胎的卡车寸步难行。相比之下，饱和的淤泥在最初几辆车通过后就会变成松软的泥浆，如果经过耕作，速度会更快。湿粘土的情况更糟：会迅速出现深深的车辙；粘稠的黏土会阻碍车辆行驶，降低速度，并且使转向变得复杂；适度的坡度变得太滑而无法攀爬；暴雨过后，坦克和装甲战车会像奥运会级别的雪橇一样滑下斜坡。20
Load-bearing capacities, traction, and stability despite sustained use characterize the abilities of particular soils to tolerate traffic by wheeled and tracked vehicles as light as snowmobiles and as heavy as tractor-trailers or tanks. Cross-country mobility over gravelly ground is consistently feasible, whereas bogs and swamps are impassable to all but small amphibians. Off-the-road movement, however, most often depends on weather conditions. Frozen fields generally are conducive. So are dry soils other than sand, which in its loose state immobilizes trucks that lack low-pressure tires. Saturated silt, in contrast, churns into soft mud after the first few vehicles pass, faster than usual when loosened by cultivation. Wet clay is worse: deep ruts rapidly appear; stickiness gums drive trains, degrades speed, and complicates steering; modest inclines become too slippery to climb; and after soaking rains tanks and armored fighting vehicles slide down slopes like Olympic-class luges.20
遍布巨石的地形也阻碍了自由行动，英国准将约翰·巴戈特·格拉布在1931年就深有体会。当时他率领一支阿拉伯军团巡逻队进入外约旦狭长地带，镇压桀骜不驯的贝都因人。黑色的熔岩块遍布大地，骑马行进极其缓慢，下马的军团士兵花了整整十天时间才清理出一条仅够一队卡车通行6英里（9.6公里）后掉头的狭窄道路。21
Terrain strewn with boulders also inhibits free movement, as British Brigadier John Bagot Glubb discovered in 1931, when he took an Arab Legion patrol into Trans-Jordan’s panhandle to suppress rambunctious Bedouins. Blocks of black lava so littered the landscape that progress on horseback was painfully slow and dismounted legionnaires took 10 days to clear a path that was barely wide enough for a column of trucks to proceed 6 miles (9.6 kilometers), then turn around.21
武器性能
WEAPON PERFORMANCE
土壤条件和岩石会影响许多常规武器和运载车辆的性能。裸露的岩石和砾石会放大常规弹药的杀伤半径，这些弹药在撞击时会发生跳弹，并像弹片一样散布石块碎片；而松软的土壤则会掩埋高爆炸药，使其在引爆前钻入泥土中。即使是轻型火炮也会在饱和的土壤中留下相当深的“足迹”，这种特性限制（有时甚至完全消除）了理想的射击位置。在越南，当火炮在潮湿的地面上以接近最大仰角或最大仰角射击时，炮手很难保持牵引式火炮瞄准目标。在那种情况下，只需几发炮弹就能将155毫米榴弹炮的炮膛深深地压入泥泞中，导致后坐力装置失效。因此，每门火炮每晚都必须移动数次，这是一项极其繁重的任务，当土壤吸力超过卡车的承受能力时，甚至会导致绞盘钢缆断裂。事实证明，榴弹炮炮架无法在低角度射击时保持稳定，导致整个炮兵连在发射一两轮齐射后就会滑落。无论采取多少加固措施都无法解决这些问题，但湄公河三角洲的炮兵们凭借着丰富的经验，研制出了长腿直升机平台，这些平台架设在坚固的地基上，为火炮提供了可接受的稳定性。
Soil conditions and rock affect the performance of many conventional weapons and delivery vehicles. Rocky outcroppings and gravel magnify the lethal radius of conventional munitions, which ricochet on impact and scatter stone splinters like shrapnel, whereas mushy soil smothers high explosives that burrow before they detonate. Even light artillery pieces leave fairly heavy “footprints” in saturated earth, a peculiarity that limits (sometimes eliminates) desirable firing positions. Gunners struggled to keep towed artillery pieces on targets when they worked at or near maximum tube elevations on wet ground in Vietnam where it didn’t take many rounds to drive 155-mm howitzer trails so deeply into the mire that recoil mechanisms malfunctioned. Each piece consequently had to be shifted several times each night, a grueling proposition that caused trucks to snap winch cables when soil suction exceeded their capacities. Howitzer trails proved impossible to seat permanently at lower angles of fire, which caused whole batteries to slide after one or two volleys. No amount of shoring solved those problems, but resourceful artillerymen in the Mekong Delta improvised long-legged heliborne platforms that rested on solid foundations that gave their guns acceptable stability.
地表状况同样会影响核武器的效应。干燥土壤形成的弹坑直径和深度小于潮湿土壤；核冲击波穿过湿黏土的强度可能是穿过松散沙土的50倍；核辐射的强度和衰减速率也与土壤成分和密度有关。地下试验场的研发专家会利用相关数据来确定特定当量核装置的埋藏深度，以防止辐射泄漏到空气中。厚厚的火山灰层，即“凝灰岩”，似乎是最佳选择。22
Surface conditions likewise amplify or mute nuclear weapon effects. The diameters and depths of craters are less when soil is dry than when soaked, nuclear shock waves transmitted through wet clay are perhaps 50 times more powerful than those through loose sand, and the intensities as well as decay rates of nuclear radiation reflect soil compositions and densities. Research and development specialists at underground test sites use related data to determine how deeply they must bury nuclear devices of specified yields to prevent radiation from venting in open air. Massive beds of volcanic ash called “tuff” seem best.22
军用建筑材料
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS
负责修建、维修和维护军用道路、简易机场、车辆停放处、桥梁基础和野战工事的工程师们，经常使用推土机、装载机、自卸卡车和铲子来铲取、整理和重新堆放表层土壤。然而，有些材料比其他材料更适合用于此类用途。
Engineers whose mission is to build, repair, and maintain military roads, airstrips, vehicle parks, bridge foundations, and field fortifications routinely use bulldozers, front loaders, dump trucks, and shovels to scoop, prepare, and redeposit surface soils. Some materials, however, are much better suited than others for such purposes..
花岗岩和其他硬岩的开挖需要拆除和电动工具，而大多数砂岩、石灰岩和页岩则更容易开采，前提是覆盖的土层便于进入。砾石与淤泥或沙子的混合物是很好的填料，可用于建造稳定的路堤和地基，但任何淤泥或粘土混合物都不适合用于飞机跑道、滑行道或路面，即使采取了缓解措施来减少旱季扬尘也不行。风化玄武岩干燥时会形成坚硬的外壳，但雨后会形成深深的车辙，因此也不理想。23红土，一种在热带冲积层中常见的沉积物，是这种材料是越南主要补给线和C-130运输机可用机场的首选建筑材料，因为其铁铝氧化物凝结物会不可逆地硬化，并能承受巨大的磨损。Peneprime底漆、油或其他沥青化合物可以起到防水和控制粉尘的作用。24
Excavations in granite and other hard rock require demolitions and power tools, whereas most sandstones, limestones, and shales are easier to extract, provided the earthen overburden allows easy access. Amalgams of gravel with silt or sand make good material for fill, stable embankments, and foundations, but no mix of silt or clay is suitable for aircraft runways, taxi strips, or road surfaces, even with palliatives to keep dust down during dry seasons. Weathered basalt, which forms a hard crust when dry but develops deep ruts after rains, also is undesirable.23 Laterite, a common deposit in tropical alluviums, was the construction material of choice for main supply routes and C-130-capable airfields in Vietnam, because its iron and aluminum oxide concretions harden irreversibly and withstand tremendous abuse. Peneprime, oil, or some other asphaltic compound waterproofed and controlled dust.24
植被
VEGETATION
旧石器时代的步兵手持石斧和木棍，发现茂密的植被限制了他们的陆地机动性和对前方、侧翼和后方的观察。随着战士们开始使用需要开阔射击视野的“远距离”武器（如长矛、标枪、弹弓、弓箭），组建骑兵部队，以及发明“机械化”交通工具（主要是马拉战车），问题变得更加复杂。此后，包括盔甲、飞机和热核武器在内的技术创新深刻地改变了植被覆盖的重要性，但这些创新都未能消除植被的影响。裸露的地面仍然有利于进攻；森林仍然有利于防御。
Paleolithic foot soldiers armed with stone axes and wooden clubs discovered that dense vegetation limits land mobility and observation to front, flanks, and rear. Problems multiplied when warriors began to employ “standoff” weapons that required clear fields of fire (spears, javelins, slingshots, bows and arrows), formed cavalry squadrons, and devised “mechanized” modes of transportation (mainly horse-drawn chariots). Technological innovations that include armor, aircraft, and thermonuclear weapons have profoundly altered the significance of vegetative cover since then, but none has neutralized its effects. Bare ground still favors offensive forces; forests still favor defense.
全球分销
GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION
北极和南极的荒漠环绕着南北极，但地球其他大部分地方都被某种植被覆盖着（图 7）。25在北半球，从高纬度到低纬度，可以观察到几条明显的带状区域，一条接一条，其中大部分是巨大的陆地。
Arctic and Antarctic barrens girdle the globe around the North and South Poles, but the Earth is covered thickly or sparsely with some sort of vegetation in most other places (map 7).25 Several distinctive belts, one below the other from high to low latitudes, are observable in the Northern Hemisphere where huge land masses predominate.
苔原是一片荒凉的区域，始于永久冰盖的尽头，上面覆盖着苔藓、地衣、夏季花卉，以及一些形态怪异、紧贴地面的矮小乔木。在稍南一些的地方，由于生长季较长，一片被称为“泰加林”的常绿林带取代了苔原。云杉、松树、铁杉和冷杉林与落叶乔木桦树、桤木、落叶松和柳树交错分布，横跨亚北极的阿拉斯加、加拿大、俄罗斯欧洲部分和西伯利亚。苔藓覆盖的沼泽地则遍布平坦、排水不良的土地。
Tundra, a bleak zone that begins where perpetual ice caps terminate, supports a mat of mosses, lichens, summer flowers, and a few grotesquely twisted dwarf trees that hug the ground. A great band of evergreens, commonly called the “taiga,” replaces tundra somewhat farther south in response to a longer growing season. Spruce, pine, hemlock, and fir forests intermingled with deciduous birch, alders, larch, and willow trees sweep across subarctic Alaska, Canada, European Russia, and Siberia. Moss-covered swamps cover level, poorly drained lands.
阔叶林，曾经以英国的舍伍德森林、德国的黑森林以及密西西比河以东的美国北部地区为代表，如今在中纬度地区取代了泰加林（有人说，在殖民时期，一只松鼠可以不着地横穿宾夕法尼亚州）。然而，耕地和牧场早已取代了原始的橡树、白蜡树、枫树、山核桃树、榆树、胡桃树和山毛榉树林。天然草原曾经覆盖了加拿大和美国中西部的大部分地区，以及从乌克兰到东方的欧亚草原，那里的气候过于干燥，不适宜树木生长。如今，这些土地中的很大一部分也用于农业。
Broadleaf woodlands, once typified by Sherwood Forest in England, Germany’s Schwartzwald (Black Forest), and the northern United States east of the Mississippi River, replace the taiga in middle latitudes (some say a squirrel could cross the State of Pennsylvania in colonial times without touching ground). Cultivated fields and pastures, however, have long since supplanted primeval stands of oak, ash, maple, hickory, elm, walnut, and beech trees. Natural grasslands originally covered much of mid-western Canada and the United States as well as Eurasian steppes from Ukraine to the Orient, where the climate is too dry for trees. A good deal of that land also is agricultural today.
地中海沿岸、南加州、智利中部和南非开普省的气候条件适宜矮壮的栓皮栎、橄榄树、葡萄园和灌木丛生长，这些植物喜好凉爽湿润的冬季和漫长的夏季干旱。仙人掌、牧豆树、灌木丛和矮灌丛等带刺革质叶片的植物则偏爱沙漠及其边缘地带，这些区域大致以北回归线和南回归线为中心。这两条不连续的回归线与赤道的夹角均不超过15度，也不超过40度，但各个沙漠的面积差异很大。面积达350万平方英里（630万平方公里）的撒哈拉沙漠几乎相当于美国50个州的总面积，而澳大利亚大沙漠几乎占据了其所在大陆一半的面积，相比之下，伊朗的卢特沙漠面积仅为15.5万平方英里（40.1万平方公里），相对较小。有些沙地和裸露的岩石地带寸草不生，但即使是最干燥的土壤，总体上也能维持一些顽强生长的植物。
Mediterranean borders, southern California, central Chile, and South Africa’s Cape Province furnish conditions conducive to squat cork oaks, olive trees, vineyards, and scrubs that prefer cool, wet winters and long summer droughts. Prickly, leathery-leaved plants such as cacti, mesquite, creosote bushes, and chaparral favor deserts and their fringes that are more or less centered along the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn. Neither of those discontinuous strips dips closer to the Equator than 15 degrees or much farther away than 40, but individual deserts very considerably. The 3.5-million-square-mile Sahara (6.3 million square kilometers) occupies almost as much space as all 50 United States, and the Great Australian Desert constitutes almost half of its parent continent, whereas the Lut Desert in Iran, at 155,000 square miles (401,000 square kilometers), is relatively small. Some stretches of sand and bare stone are devoid of vegetation, although even the driest soils by and large support some struggling plant life.
资料来源：美国农业部年鉴，1941 年，“气候与人类”。艾托夫等面积投影法由 VC Finch 改编。
Source: U.S. Dept. Agriculture Yearbook, 1941, “Climate and Man.” Aitoff’s equal-area projection adapted by V.C. Finch.
热带森林环绕地球中部，尤其以亚马逊河流域、中西非、印度部分地区、东南亚、印度尼西亚以及附近的太平洋岛屿最为著名。这些地区降雨充沛，生长季漫长，孕育了茂盛的植被。柚木、桃花心木和乌木等丛林巨树通常形成双层、三层甚至四层树冠，阻挡阳光照射到林下。与人们普遍的误解相反，林下植被只有在光线能够穿透的地方才会变得茂密。横跨赤道的红树林在咸水沿岸生长最为茂盛，但这些植物飞扶壁的根系可以向上游延伸，直至潮汐影响的区域。
Tropical forests ring the world at its midriff, most notably in the Amazon Basin, West-Central Africa, parts of India, Southeast Asia, Indonesia, and nearby Pacific Islands where abundant rainfall and an endless growing season encourage exuberant vegetation. Jungle giants that include teak, mahogany, and ebony trees commonly form double, triple, even quadruple canopies that exclude sunshine from forest floors. Undergrowth, contrary to popular misconception, is dense only where light filters through. Mangrove thickets that straddle the Equator flourish best along salt water coasts, but those botanical flying buttresses take root as far upstream as tidal influences are felt.
植被随海拔和纬度而变化。每上升1000英尺（305米），大致相当于向北或向南移动300英里（480公里）。例如，在科罗拉多落基山脉东麓，海拔一英里处，迎接背包客的是鼠尾草和短草。通往山顶的路线会进入稀疏分布的黄松林，然后是茂密的道格拉斯冷杉林，最终到达海拔约11500英尺（3500米）的林线。此后的景观由高山牧场组成，再往下是覆盖着地衣的地表，位于风蚀山峰下方，那里的环境对最耐寒的植物来说也过于恶劣。
Vegetation varies with altitude as well as latitude. Each 1,000-foot ascent (305 meters) is roughly equivalent to a trip 300 miles (480 kilometers) north or south of the Equator. Sage brush and short grass, for example, greet back-packers at the eastern base of the Colorado Rockies a mile above sea level. Routes to the top enter woods with widely-spaced ponderosa pines, then thick stands of Douglas fir before they reach the timber line at about 11,500 feet (3,500 meters). Landscapes thereafter consist of alpine pastures, then a crust of lichens well below wind-swept peaks where the environment is too hostile for the hardiest plants.
操作重要性
OPERATIONAL IMPORTANCE
每种植被都会以独特的方式对军事行动产生重大影响。进攻性强的植被几乎总是会阻碍防御，反之亦然，以下案例便可说明这一点。
Each type of vegetation significantly influences military operations in unique ways. Varieties that are offensively advantageous almost always frustrate defense and vice versa, as the following vignettes indicate.
森林。童话故事里，食人魔在阴森的森林中伺机袭击毫无防备的旅人。而真正的恐怖却在黑暗的森林中降临到战士身上。在那里，军队如同蒙着眼睛的拳击手，无法看清对手，步兵的小规模作战占据主导地位，战场控制权难以掌控，灵活的机动也难以实现。无论时代如何变迁，最先进的技术都难以带来多少优势：
Forests. Fairy tales fantasize about ogres who wait for unwary travelers in gloomy forests. Legitimate terrors confront warriors in dark woods, where armed forces battle like blindfolded boxers who cannot see their opponents, small-unit actions by foot troops predominate, control is uncertain, and fluid maneuvers are infeasible. State-of-the-art technologies confer few advantages regardless of the day and age:
• 除了在平坦的道路上，任何类型的车辆几乎都毫无用处。
• Vehicles of any kind are virtually useless, except on beaten paths.
• 树干能偏转平直轨迹的抛射物。
• Tree trunks deflect flat-trajectory projectiles.
• 核爆炸导致树木倒塌，可能造成无法通行的障碍物，这对任何人都没有好处。
• Nuclear blasts that topple timber could create impassable abatis that benefit nobody.
• 坦克可以推倒小树，但堆积的植被会阻碍或阻止前进。
• Tanks can bulldoze small trees, but the vegetative pileups impede or stop progress.
• 常规炸弹和炮弹的致命半径比在开阔地形中要小得多，尽管飞溅的木屑带来的“额外”效果可能相当可观。
• The lethal radius of conventional bombs and artillery shells is much less than in open terrain, although the “bonus” effect of flying wood splinters can be considerable.
• 手榴弹除非在近距离滚动，否则会漫无目的地弹跳，有时会危及投掷者自身。
• Hand grenades bounce aimlessly unless rolled at short ranges that sometimes endanger the senders.
• 凝固汽油弹在潮湿的植被中燃烧迅速；燃烧弹发出的光很少；茂密的树叶会阻碍无线电通讯。
• Napalm burns out rapidly in moist greenery; flares illuminate very little; and dense foliage deadens radio communications.
在森林中作战，胜负难料。公元9年，在条顿堡森林战役中，普布利乌斯·昆提利乌斯·瓦鲁斯在如今的明斯特附近遭到条顿蛮族围攻，损失了三个装备精良、训练有素的罗马军团。战败后，他和他的高级部下为了避免被俘而自杀，而幸存者则被钉死在十字架上、活埋或献祭给异教神灵。凯撒·奥古斯都塑造了罗马的政治格局。在许多方面勾勒出欧洲的轮廓，因此，他放弃了殖民后来成为德国的土地的计划。此后，森林战役往往令交战双方付出惨重代价。荒野战役（美国内战，1864年5月）、贝洛森林和阿贡森林战役（第一次世界大战）、瓜达尔卡纳尔岛、缅甸和新几内亚战役（第二次世界大战）、越南和老挝战役，只是美国卷入的众多不幸事件中的几个典型例子。
Winners and losers are hard to predict when combat takes place in forests. Publius Quintilius Varus lost three well-armed, well-trained Roman legions when beset by teutonic barbarians near what now is Münster during the battle of Teutoburgerwald in 9 A.D. He and his senior henchmen committed suicide to avoid capture after that defeat, while survivors were crucified, buried alive, or sacrificed to pagan gods. Caesar Augustus shaped the political outline of Europe in many respects when, as a result, he abandoned plans to colonize lands that have become Germany.26 Forest campaigns ever since have often been costly to belligerents on both sides. Wilderness (U.S. Civil War, May 1864), Belleau Wood and Argonne Forest (World War I), Guadalcanal, Burma, and New Guinea (World War II), Vietnam, and Laos typify a few among many unhappy experiences that involved the United States.
植被稀疏的景观。灌木丛、高草、以高粱和玉米为代表的高大作物、果园以及稀疏的种植园树木，对空中或天基传感器和武器系统的阻碍作用甚微。这类植被对车辆通行影响不大，但会减缓步兵的行进速度，降低他们的能见度，并限制陆基视距武器的射击范围。需要炮手和目标之间保持空旷的线导导弹在灌木丛和其他植被覆盖的环境中毫无用处。茂密的草丛可以偏转核爆炸产生的热辐射，但会增强化学战剂的持久性。广袤的草原上稀疏地覆盖着短草，而沙漠则寸草不生，几乎无法为武装部队或军事设施提供掩护或隐蔽，但却有利于远程观察和开阔的射击视野。在那种情况下，制空权和技术实力至关重要。伊拉克总统萨达姆·侯赛因在1991年的“沙漠风暴”行动中就深有体会，那场行动的战场就像一张沙色的台球桌。他的军队战术和技术都落后，缺乏空中掩护。因此，在卫星情报的协助下，盟军得以随心所欲地进行轰炸和机动，而伊拉克部队无论移动还是静止都面临着全军覆没的风险。一位美国海军陆战队飞行员打趣道：“这就像参加超级碗，但对方却没来。”27
Scantily Clad Landscapes. Brush, high grass, tall crops typified by sorghum and corn (maize), orchards, and widely spaced plantation trees do little to limit aerial or spaceborne sensors and weapon systems. Such vegetation hinders vehicular movement very little, but it slows foot soldiers, reduces their visibility, and restricts fields of fire for land-based line-of-sight weapons. Wire-guided missiles that require clear ground between gunners and targets are useless in thickets and other entanglements. Dense herbage deflects thermal radiation caused by nuclear blasts, yet amplifies the persistence of chemical warfare agents. Immense steppes sparingly carpeted with short grass and deserts devoid of vegetation afford little cover or concealment for armed forces or military installations, but favor long-range observation and clear fields of fire. Air superiority and technological prowess count a lot under those conditions, as Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein discovered during Operation Desert Storm (1991), which took place on the geographic equivalent of a sand-colored pool table. His army, which was tactically and technologically deficient, lacked an air umbrella. Allied forces, aided by satellite intelligence, thus were able to bombard and maneuver at will while Iraqi formations risked destruction whether they moved or stayed still. One U.S. Marine Corps pilot quipped, “It was like being in the Super Bowl, but the other team didn’t show up.”27
军事改装
MILITARY MODIFICATIONS
长期以来，军方一直试图清除妨碍观察、射击通道、越野通行或为敌方提供伏击地点的植被。罗马军团士兵在敌占区作战时，常常会清除危险道路两侧弓箭射程内的灌木和树木。清理作业可以消除进攻性植被，而挖根作业则可以清除树根和树桩。具体采用的技术取决于植被的种类和密度、涉及的面积、紧迫程度、现有兵力以及可用的工具，从重型工程设备到手动工具，不一而足。
Military men have long sought to modify vegetative cover whenever it interferes with observation, fire lanes, cross-country trafficability, or affords adversaries convenient ambush sites. Roman legionaires in hostile territory often stripped brush and trees a bow-shot distance on both sides of dangerous roads. Clearing processes eliminate offensive verdure, while grubbing removes roots and stumps. Techniques employed depend on the type and thickness of vegetation, the acreage involved, perceived urgency, troops on hand, and available implements that range from heavy engineer equipment to hand tools.
土地清理。推土机用于大多数大规模土地清理作业，可以推倒直径达 6 英寸（15 厘米）的小树和树桩；树木推土机（俗称“罗马犁”）可将稍大的树干齐地切断，然后由链锯砍伐几乎无限直径的木材，并将森林巨树切割成易于处理的段。拖拉机式设备用于拔除树桩；松土器用于破坏根系；平地机用于将残枝落叶堆成垛以便处置。有时，精心控制的灌木丛火灾也能起到辅助作用。炸药有时可能必不可少，但填平由此产生的弹坑需要额外的时间和精力。28
Land Clearing. Bulldozers, which are used for most large-scale land clearing operations, can upend small trees and stumps up to 6 inches in diameter (15 centimeters), tree dozers (commonly called “Rome plows”) shear off somewhat larger trunks at ground level, leaving chain saws to fell timber of almost unlimited diameters and cut forest giants into manageable segments. Tractor-mounted units pull stumps; rippers reduce root systems; and graders windrow debris for disposal. Carefully controlled brush fires sometimes assist. Explosives occasionally may prove indispensable, but it takes additional time and energy to fill resultant craters.28
驻越美军工兵每队使用30台推土机和罗马犁，清除营地周边、敌军渗透路线和潜在伏击地点的茂密植被。每队可以在几分钟内清理出一个直升机停机坪，或者在相对平坦的地形上每天清理150到250英亩的林地，但崎岖的地形和茂密的次生林会使效率降低一半。两栖树木粉碎机，重量……这辆重达 97 吨的卡车，能够以每小时 3 英里（4 公里）的稳定速度穿越沼泽，并在干燥的土地上开辟出大片道路，但焊工和散热器修理工不得不昼夜不停地工作，修补所有车辆被刺破的冷却系统，并更换被茂密的灌木丛扯断的液压管路。29
U.S. Army engineers in Vietnam used 30 bulldozers and Rome plows per team to remove dense vegetation around base camp perimeters, enemy infiltration routes, and potential ambush sites. Each team could create a helicopter landing zone in a matter of minutes or clear 150 to 250 forested acres a day on reasonably level terrain, although rough ground and thick secondary growth reduced output by half. Amphibious tree crushers, which weighed in at 97 tons, could churn through bogs and hack out wide swaths on dry land at a steady 3 miles (4 kilometers) an hour, but welders and radiator repairmen had to work round-the-clock on all vehicles to patch up punctured cooling systems and replace hydraulic lines that heavy brush ripped off.29
落叶剂喷洒。1962年，美国空军在越南共和国的许可下，开始在湄公河三角洲的桥瓯半岛喷洒化学落叶剂。这种做法随后蔓延至荣萨特区（Rung Sat Special Zone），这是一片沿西贡航道分布的红树林沼泽地，之后遍及全国，包括非军事区的南部。这些落叶剂虽然取得了预期效果，但随之而来的生态和健康问题引发了争议，即使在最后一批落叶剂喷洒完毕数十年后，这些争议仍未得到解决。30
Defoliation. The U.S. Air Force, with permission from the Republic of Vietnam, began to spray chemical defoliants over the Cau Mau Peninsula in the Mekong Delta during 1962. That practice spread to the Rung Sat Special Zone, a mangrove swamp along shipping channels into Saigon, then countrywide, including the southern half of the demilitarized zone. Herbicides thus deposited produced desired results, but accompanying ecological and health problems sparked controversies that remained unresolved decades after the last load was released.30
要点
KEY POINTS
• 高地、平原、山谷和洼地都以独特的方式影响着陆军和空军。
• High ground, level land, valleys, and depressions each influence armies and air forces in unique ways.
地面部队在陡峭地形上的作战能力取决于专业技能、运输方式和载荷。
• The proficiency with which ground forces can negotiate steep terrain depends on professional skills, types of transportation, and loads.
• 崎岖的地形大大降低了观察能力、平直弹道武器的价值以及视线通信系统的性能。
• Rugged topography drastically reduces observation, the value of flat-trajectory weapons, and line-of-sight communication systems performance.
• 尽管高科技传感器和武器系统不断普及，但地面部队仍然发现占据优势的地形具有优势。
• Ground forces find dominant terrain advantageous despite the proliferation of high-technology sensors and weapon systems.
• 在敌对领土上跨越宽阔河流的战斗突击需要合适的场地，以及特殊的战术、技术、装备和训练。
• Combat assaults across broad streams in hostile territory demand suitable sites, plus special tactics, techniques, equipment, and training.
• 地表材料对核爆炸和常规爆炸的杀伤力、机动车辆的越野运输以及军事建设能力有显著影响。
• Surface materials strongly influence the lethality of nuclear as well as conventional explosives, cross-country movement by motor vehicles, and military construction capabilities.
• 茂密的植被有利于防御作战，而植被稀疏、地势平坦的地形有利于进攻行动。
• Dense vegetation benefits defensive operations, whereas sparsely covered, level terrain favors offensive maneuvers.
• 即使在干旱气候下，野战部队也必须能够获取、净化、储存和分配足够数量的水源，以满足各种用途。
• Armed forces in the field must be able to tap, purify, store, and distribute water supplies in adequate quantities for assorted purposes even in arid climes.
笔记
NOTES
1. Norman AE Hinds，《地貌学：景观的演变》（纽约：Prentice-Hall，1943 年）；Arthur N. Strahler，《自然地理学》，第2版（纽约：John Wiley and Sons，1963 年），第 4 部分，地貌。
1. Norman A. E. Hinds, Ceomorphology: The Evolution of the Landscape (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1943); Arthur N. Strahler, Physical Geography, 2d ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), part 4, Land Forms.
2. R. Ernest 和 Trevor N. Dupuy，《哈珀军事史百科全书：从公元前 3500 年至今》 ，第4版（纽约：哈珀柯林斯出版社，1993 年），一部 1654 页的鸿篇巨制。
2. R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3,500 B.C. to the Present, 4th ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), a monumental work of 1,654 pages.
3.同上，1203；厄尔·F·齐姆克，《斯大林格勒到柏林：德国在东线的失败》，陆军历史系列（华盛顿特区：美国陆军，军事历史主任办公室，1968 年），第七章，“堡垒行动”。
3. Ibid., 1203; Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, Army Historical Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1968), chapter VII, “Operation Zitadelle.”
4. Henry L. Shaw, Jr. 等，《中太平洋战役：二战海军陆战队作战史》 ，第3卷（华盛顿特区：美国海军陆战队历史分部，1966年）（相关页码见第680页）；George W. Garand 和 Thurman R. Strobridge， 《西太平洋作战史》，第4卷，1971年（相关页码见第843页）；Roy E. Appleman 等，《冲绳：最后的战役》 二战中的战斗，美国陆军（华盛顿特区：美国陆军军事历史中心，1984 年）（有关页码，请参见第 515 页）。
4. Henry L. Shaw, Jr., et al., Central Pacific Drive, History of Marine Corps Operations in World War II, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, U.S. Marine Corps, 1966) (see page 680 for pertinent pages); George W. Garand and Thurman R. Strobridge, vol. 4, Western Pacific Operations, 1971 (see page 843 for pertinent pages); Roy E. Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1984) (see page 515 for pertinent pages).
5. Earl F. Ziemke，“南斯拉夫 1941-1944”，载于Doris M. Condit 和 Bert H. Cooper, Jr. 等编，《国际冲突中的挑战与应对》 ，第 2 卷（华盛顿特区：美国大学社会系统研究中心，1967 年 3 月），第 321-351 页； 《巴尔干地区的反游击战行动（1941-1944）》，DA 小册子 20-243（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1954 年 8 月）。
5. Earl F. Ziemke, “Yugoslavia 1941-1944,” in Challenge and Response in International Conflict, eds. Doris M. Condit and Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et al., vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, American University, March 1967), 321-351; Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944), DA Pamphlet 20-243 (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, August 1954).
6. Dan Kurtzman，《血与水：破坏希特勒的原子弹》（纽约：亨利·霍尔特出版社，1997 年）。
6. Dan Kurtzman, Blood and Water: Sabotaging Hitler’s Bomb (New York: Henry Holt, 1997).
7.阿尔弗雷德·丁尼生勋爵，《轻骑兵的冲锋》，1854 年，第 3 节。欲了解更多详情，请阅读塞西尔·伍德汉姆-史密斯，《原因何在》（纽约：麦格劳-希尔出版社，1954 年），尤其是第 197-249 页。
7. Alfred, Lord Tennyson, The Charge of the Light Brigade, 1854, Stanza 3. For elaboration, read Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Reason Why (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), especially 197-249.
8.卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨在19世纪初就论述了河流防线的军事意义。参见迈克尔·霍华德和彼得·帕雷特编著的《战争论》（新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1976 年），第 433-446 页、第 532-534 页。
8. Carl von Clausewitz addressed the military significance of river lines early in the 19th century. See On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 433-446, 532-534.
9. Leon Bertin，《拉鲁斯地球百科全书》，第 2版（纽约：普罗米修斯出版社，1965 年），第 68-91 页；Arthur N. Strahler，《自然地理学》，第 23 章。
9. Leon Bertin, Larousse Encyclopedia of the Earth, 2d ed. (New York: Prometheus Press, 1965), 68-91; Arthur N. Strahler, Physical Geography, chapter 23.
10. Edward G. Miller，《黑暗血腥之地：许特根森林和鲁尔河大坝》（德克萨斯州德克萨斯站：德克萨斯农工大学出版社，1995 年）；Martin Blumenson，“华川大坝的游骑兵”，《陆军》，第 3 期（1967 年 12 月）：36-53。另见“寻找更安全的过河地点”，《陆军文摘》 25（1970 年 3 月）：1。
10. Edward G. Miller, A Dark and Bloody Ground: The Hürtgen Forest and the Roer River Dams (Texas Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1995); Martin Blumenson, “The Rangers at Hwachon Dam,” Army, no. 3 (December 1967): 36-53. See also, “Look for Safer Crossing Places,” Army Digest 25 (March 1970): 1.
11.概述请参见《野战手册 90-13/舰队海军陆战队手册 7-26：渡河作战》（华盛顿特区：陆军部和美国海军陆战队司令部，1992 年 9 月 30 日），特别是第 2 章和第 7 章；《FM 5-36：路线侦察和分类》（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1988 年 3 月），第 2-36 至 2-47 页；查尔斯·休伊，《苏联军队竞相提升渡河机动性》，《陆军》 18（1968 年 12 月）：41-44。
11. For overviews, refer to Field Manual 90-13/Fleet Marine Force Manual 7-26: River Crossing Operations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army and Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, September 30, 1992), especially chapters 2 and 7; FM 5-36: Route Reconnaissance and Classification (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, March 1988), 2-36 through 2-47; Charles Huie, “Soviet Army Bids for River Crossing Mobility,” Army 18 (December 1968): 41-44
12. DA 小册子 20-290：俄罗斯战役中的地形因素（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1951 年 7 月，16-27 页）。
12. DA Pamphlet 20-290: Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, July 1951, 16-27.
13. FM 30-10：地形分析（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1972 年 3 月 27 日，127-130 页（已被 FM 5-33 取代，标题相同，1990 年 7 月，但包含有关供水的更详细信息）。
13. FM 30-10: Terrain Analysis (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, March 27, 1972, 127-130 (superseded by FM 5-33, same title, July 1990, but contains more detailed information about water supplies).
14. Arthur P. Clark 等编，《沙特阿美及其世界：阿拉伯和中东》，修订版（沙特阿拉伯达兰：沙特阿拉伯石油公司，1995 年），第 166 页；Abdulaziz Al-Sweel 编，《沙特阿拉伯：转型中的王国》（华盛顿特区：沙特阿拉伯驻美国文化部，1995 年）。
14. Arthur P. Clark et al., ed., ARAMCO and Its World: Arabia and the Middle East, rev. ed. (Dhahran, Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabian Oil Co., 1995), 166; Abdulaziz Al-Sweel, ed., Saudi Arabia: A Kingdom in Transition (Washington, DC: Saudi Arabian Cultural Ministry to the United States, 1995).
15.拉丁美洲事务专家马克·沙利文，作者于 1996 年 3 月 21 日在华盛顿特区国会研究服务处对其进行了采访；美国海军陆战队计划处于 1996 年 3 月 29 日致函。
15. Mark Sullivan, specialist in Latin American Affairs, interview by author, Congressional Research Service, March 21, 1996, Washington, DC; correspondence from Plans Division, U.S. Marine Corps, March 29, 1996.
16. FM 5-484：海军设施工程司令部手册 P-1065，以及空军手册 32-1072：多军种钻井作业程序（华盛顿特区：陆军、海军和空军部，1994 年 3 月 8 日）。
16. FM 5-484: Navy Facilities Engineering Command Pamphlet P-1065, and Air Force Manual 32-1072: Multiservice Procedures for Well-Drilling Operations (Washington, DC: Depts. of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, March 8, 1994).
17. 1996 年 2 月与陆军化学战专家的谈话。
17. Conversations with Army chemical warfare specialists in February 1996.
18. FM 30-10：地形分析，82-83，145；FM 5-33：地形分析（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1990 年 7 月），1-4 和 1-5。
18. FM 30-10: Terrain Analysis, 82-83, 145; FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, July 1990), 1-4 and 1-5.
19.技术手册 5-545：地质学（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1971 年 7 月），第 2 章；切斯特·R·朗韦尔、阿道夫·克诺夫和理查德·F·弗林特，《物理地质学纲要》，第 2版（纽约：约翰·威利父子出版社，1946 年），第 24-42 页。
19. Technical Manual 5-545: Geology (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, July 1971), chapter 2; Chester R. Longwell, Adolph Knopf, and Richard F. Flint, Outlines of Physical Geology, 2d ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1946), 24-42.
20. Daniel O. Graham, Jr.，“土壤和坡度”，Armor（1977 年 9 月-10 月）：41-44；FM 30-10：地形分析，80-82，142-147。
20. Daniel O. Graham, Jr., “Soils and Slopes,” Armor (September-October 1977): 41-44; FM 30-10: Terrain Analysis, 80-82, 142-147.
21.约翰·巴戈特·格拉布，《阿拉伯军团的故事》（伦敦，霍德勒和斯托顿出版社，1952 年），第 106-109 页。
21. John Bagot Glubb, The Story of the Arab Legion (London, Hoddler and Stoughton, 1952), 106-109.
22. Samuel Glasstone 编，《核武器的影响》，DA 小册子 39-3（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1964 年 2 月），第 267-27、289-296、300-301 页；FM 30-10：地形分析，第 82-83 页。
22. Samuel Glasstone, ed., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, DA Pamphlet 39-3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 1964), 267-27, 289-296, 300-301; FM 30-10: Terrain Analysis, 82-83.
23.越南作战情报中心 (CICV) 工作文件，1968 年；James A. Wilson, Jr.，“地形的第四维度”，《军事评论》 26，第 6 期（1946 年 9 月）：52-53；Glenn R. Locke，“尘土”，《美国陆军航空文摘》（1970 年 8 月）：34-35。
23. Working papers, Combat Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV), 1968; James A. Wilson, Jr., “The Fourth Dimension of Terrain,” Military Review 26, no. 6 (September 1946): 52-53; Glenn R. Locke, “Dust,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest (August 1970): 34-35.
24.红土及其工程特性：地质/土壤调查，越南作战情报中心，1967 年 3月10 日，第 1、3、5、7 页。
24. Laterite and Its Engineering Properties: A Geology/Soils Survey, Combat Intelligence Center Vietnam, March 10, 1967, 1, 3, 5,7.
25. Peter Farb，《森林》，修订版（纽约：时代生活出版社，1969 年），第 57-80 页；A. Starker Leopold，《在地球的沙漠中》（纽约：Harcourt, Brace, Janonovich 出版社，1961 年），第 9-15 页、第 53-67 页。
25. Peter Farb, The Forest, rev. ed. (New York: Time-Life Books, 1969), 57-80, and A. Starker Leopold, In the Desert of the Earth (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Janonovich, 1961), 9-15, 53-67.
26. JFC Fuller，《西方世界军事史》，第 1 卷（纽约：Funk and Wagnals，1955 年），第 8 章。
26. J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, vol. 1 (New York: Funk and Wagnals, 1955), chapter 8.
27. Williamson Murray，《海湾战争空中力量调查》，第2卷，作战、效果和效能（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1993年）；Frank N. Schubert和Theresa L. Kraus编，《旋风战争》 （华盛顿特区：美国陆军军事历史中心，1995年）。引文出自《武装部队杂志》 （1991年3月）第58页的“杂散电压”一文。
27. Williamson Murray, Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 2, Operations and Effects and Effectiveness (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993); Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1995). The quotation is from “Stray Voltage,” Armed Forces Journal (March 1991): 58.
28. FM 5-430-00.1/空军联合手册 32-8013，第 1 卷：战区道路、机场和直升机场的规划和设计——道路设计（华盛顿特区：陆军部和空军部，1994 年 8 月 26 日），第 4 章。
28. FM 5-430-00.1/Air Force Joint Pamphlet 32-8013, vol. 1: Planning and Design of Roads, Airfields, and Heliports in the Theater of Operations—Road Design (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army and Dept. of the Air Force, August 26, 1994), chapter 4.
29. Robert R. Ploger，“‘不同的’战争——同样的古老智慧”，《陆军》 18，第9期（1968年9月）：71-72；Joseph M. Kiernan，“铁三角地区的战斗工兵”，《陆军》17，第6期（1967年6月）：42-45；Richard Duke，“根除查理”，《陆军文摘》 （1967年11月）：56；“在越南测试树木食者”，《陆军文摘》（1967年12月）：14。
29. Robert R. Ploger, “ ’Different’ War—Same Old Ingenuity,” Army 18, no. 9 (September 1968): 71-72; Joseph M. Kiernan, “Combat Engineers in the Iron Triangle,” Army 17, no. 6 (June 1967): 42-45; Richard Duke, “Rooting Out Charlie,” Army Digest (November 1967): 56; “Tree Eater Tested in Vietnam,” Army Digest (December 1967): 14.
30. Arthur F. McConnell, Jr.，“任务：牧场工人”，空军大学评论21，第 2 期（1970 年 1 月-2 月）：89-94；退伍军人与橙剂：越南战争中使用的除草剂的健康影响，美国国家科学院医学研究所（华盛顿特区：国家科学院出版社，1994 年）；“橙剂与糖尿病有关”，陆军时报，1997 年 5 月 19 日，第 2 页。
30. Arthur F. McConnell, Jr., “Mission: Ranch Hand,” Air University Review 21, no. 2 (January-February 1970): 89-94; Veterans and Agent Orange: Health Effects of Herbicides Used in Vietnam, Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Science (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994); “Agent Orange Linked to Diabetes,” Army Times, May 19, 1997, 2.
4. 海洋和海岸
4. OCEANS AND SEASHORES
我们的星球名字错了。我们的祖先根据他们周围发现的陆地，把它命名为地球……如果古人知道地球的真实面貌，他们无疑会根据覆盖其表面70.8%的广袤水域，把它命名为海洋。
Our planet has the wrong name. Our ancestors named it Earth, after the land they found all around them. . . . If the ancients had known what the earth is really like they undoubtedly would have named it Ocean after the tremendous areas of water that cover 70.8 percent of its surface.
伦纳德·恩格尔《
海洋》
Leonard Engel
The Sea
1943年，时任美国陆军参谋长的乔治·C·马歇尔将军透露：“我在第一次世界大战期间接受的军事教育和经验主要基于公路、河流和铁路。然而，在过去的两年里，我接受的教育却以海洋为基础，我不得不重新学习一切。”这使他成为一个非常庞大的俱乐部的成员，而这个俱乐部的成员人数至今没有减少。
GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, SPEAKING AS CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY IN 1943, REVEALED, “MY MILITARY education and experience in the First World War [was] based on roads, rivers, and railroads. During the past two years, however, I have been acquiring an education based on oceans and I’ve had to learn all over again.”1 That made him a member of a very large club whose membership has not diminished.
海洋学于 1855 年成为一门独特的军事研究领域，当时美国海军中尉马修·F·莫里发表了第一部关于该主题的专著《海洋的自然地理学》。2此后的研究成果影响了从船舶设计到大西洋、太平洋、印度洋、北冰洋和南冰洋的开放水域及其沿岸水域的海上、水下和海上的所有海军活动。
Oceanography emerged as a distinctive field of military study in 1855, when U.S. Navy Lieutenant Matthew F. Maury published the first treatise on that subject, The Physical Geography of the Sea.2 Findings since then have affected every naval activity from ship design to employment practices above, below, and on open waters of the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, Arctic, and Antarctic Oceans, as well as along their littorals.
海水属性
SEA WATER ATTRIBUTES
水是地球上少数几种以固态、气态和液态三种形式存在的物质之一，尽管大部分水仍以液态存在。海水的四个基本属性对军事至关重要：盐度、密度、从海面到海底的分层以及对光和声音的渗透性。这四个属性相互关联。3
Water is one of the few substances on Earth that exists in solid, vaporous, and fluid forms, although most remains liquid. Four basic attributes of sea water are militarily important: salinity, density, stratification from surface to sea bottom, and permeability to light and sound All four are interconnected.3
盐度
SALINITY
海水，更准确地说是盐水，其盐度并不均匀。溶液中氯化钠和其他化学物质的比例决定了盐度，通常来说，盐度在南北纬30度之间的马纬度地区最高，那里干燥的风促进了蒸发；在横跨地球赤道的赤道无风带地区盐度较低，那里降雨充沛；在两极附近盐度最低，那里融化的冰川和浮冰提供了淡水。亚马逊河、刚果河和密西西比河等大型河流系统也会稀释远海的盐度。气温和陆地径流也会影响相对较小的海域的盐度。内陆海直接或间接与海洋相连，例如寒冷的波罗的海（尤其是芬兰附近的波的尼亚湾），其海水异常淡；而位于热带地区的红海则异常咸。注入咸淡水交汇的地中海的主要河流不多，而多瑙河、德涅斯特河、第聂伯河和顿河则注入黑海。
Sea water, best described as brine, is not uniformly salty. The proportion of sodium chloride and other chemicals in solution determines salinity which, as a rule, is highest in the Horse Latitudes, which straddle 30 degrees north and 30 degrees south where dry winds encourage evaporation; less in the Doldrums astride Earth’s Equator, where rainfall is abundant; and least near both poles, where melting glaciers and pack ice provide a stream of fresh water. Large river systems like the Amazon, Congo, and Mississippi also dilute the salt contents far offshore. Air temperatures and terrestrial streams condition the salinity of relatively small inland seas that directly or indirectly connect with oceans, as exemplified by the cool Baltic Sea (especially the Gulf of Bothnia near Finland), which is abnormally fresh, while the Red Sea in a torrid zone is exceptionally salty. Few major rivers feed the brackish Mediterranean, whereas the Danube, Dneister, Dneiper, and Don empty into the Black Sea.
密度
DENSITY
高盐度会增加海水的密度（重量和质量）。水温也会增加密度，直至冰点，冰点约为零下2摄氏度（28.5华氏度）。赤道附近的海面温度平均约为26.7摄氏度（80华氏度），通常随着纬度南北每增加一度而下降0.5华氏度，但也存在许多异常情况。例如，在波斯湾浸入式温度计通常显示高达29摄氏度（85华氏度）的温度，比南部2000英里外的迪戈加西亚岛附近的开阔水域还要高一些。压力也会影响水的密度，每下潜30米（100英尺），压力就会增加约每平方英尺2磅，直到深渊中上方海水的重量达到惊人的每平方英寸15吨。
High salinity increases the density (weight and mass) of sea water. So do water temperatures down to the freezing point, which approximates 28.5 °F (-2 °C). Surface temperatures, which average about 80 °F (26.7 °C) near the Equator, generally decrease 0.5 °F with every degree of latitude north or south, but many anomalies obtain. Thermometers dipped in the Persian Gulf, for example, commonly register as much as 85 °F (29 °C), somewhat warmer than open waters around Diego Garcia 2,000 miles to the south. Pressures, which also contribute to water density, increase about 2 pounds per square foot for every 100 feet (30 meters) of descent until the weight of waters above exerts an astonishing 15 tons per square inch in the abyss.
分层
STRATIFICATION
一个简化的海水模型揭示了海洋表面和海底之间三种截然不同的水平层理。第一层是受风浪充分搅动的混合水层，覆盖了温带地区（北纬50度至南纬50度）海面数百英尺的表层，而在热带地区，则覆盖着一层较薄的温暖轻质海水。第二层是温跃层，温度和盐度骤降，密度也相应增加，直至在5000至6000英尺（约2000米）的深度趋于稳定。最冷、盐度最高、密度也最大的海水位于第三层，几乎不受季节变化的影响，因为中间的温跃层起到了阻隔海面和海底的屏障作用。在两极附近，海水层理模式有所不同，冷水和低盐度海水在海面和海底都占主导地位，并且由于没有永久性温跃层，海水可以从深海涌升，如图7所示。
A much simplified representation of sea water reveals three remarkably different horizontal laminations between the ocean surface and the floor. Layer One, a watery mix well stirred by wind and waves, covers the top few hundred feet in temperate climes up to 50 degrees north and 50 degrees south latitude, although a thinner cover of warm, light water prevails in the tropics. Temperatures and salinity plummet in Layer Two, a thermocline where densities increase correspondingly until they stabilize at a depth of 5,000 to 6,000 feet (2,000 or so meters). The coldest, saltiest, and therefore the heaviest waters little influenced by seasonal change lie in Layer Three below, because the intervening thermocline acts as a barrier between top and bottom. A modified pattern exists near both poles, where cold water and low salinity dominate on the surface as well as the seabed and the absence of a permanent thermocline allows upwelling from ocean depths, as figure 7 indicates.
渗透性
PERMEABILITY
极少有电磁辐射能够穿透深海。极低频（ELF）无线电是主要的例外，但发送一条三字母信息需要15分钟或更长时间，这意味着必须找到其他方式才能让潜艇艇员了解足球、棒球和篮球比赛的比分。在理想条件下，可见光的极限深度略大于600英尺（200米），但浮游生物、有机碎屑、淤泥和其他悬浮物通常会将海岸线的照明深度降低到50英尺（15米）或更浅。雷达、红外线和大多数无线电信号都会从海面反射回来。
Few electromagnetic emanations can penetrate sea water at great depths. Extremely low frequency (ELF) radios, the principal exception, take 15 minutes or more to transmit a three-letter message, which means that some other mode must be found to keep submarine crews abreast of football, baseball, and basketball scores. The limit of visible light is slightly more than 600 feet (200 meters) under ideal conditions, but plankton, organic debris, silt, and other suspended materials commonly reduce illumination to 50 feet (15 meters) or less along coastlines. Radar, infrared, and most radio signals rebound from the surface.
与此形成鲜明对比的是，声音可以在水下传播数千英里，但其传播方向和强度取决于可用能量、地理位置、季节变化和时间。无机颗粒、鱼群、气泡、船舶交通和近海钻井活动都会散射或吸收信号。沿着特定声波通道快速传播的声音，在试图穿越三层水平海水之间的边界或穿透上升流水柱时，可能会发生反射或折射，角度可达15度，从而转向更有利的传播路径。声波无法到达的阴影区和声波被放大的汇聚区进一步加剧了声音传播的复杂性。4
Sounds, in sharp contrast, may transmit thousands of miles under water, but directions and intensities depend on available power, geographic locations, seasonal variations, and time of day. Inorganic particles, schools offish, gas bubbles, ship traffic, and offshore drilling scatter or absorb signals. Sounds that travel swiftly along any given duct may bounce about when they try to cross boundaries between the three horizontal sea water layers or penetrate upwelling water columns and may bend or refract as much as 15 degrees toward more favorable channels. Shadow zones that exclude sounds and convergence zones where amplifications occur further complicate sound propagation.4
Figure 7. Sea Water Stratification
海面行为
SEA SURFACE BEHAVIOR
海水最上层始终处于动态变化之中，受到地球自转、太阳和月亮引力、风、水密度、温度、地震活动和地磁影响等因素的影响。洋流、潮汐、波浪、涌浪和海冰等现象，对于计划、准备、执行或依赖海军行动的军事海员和民事决策者而言，都是极其重要的考量因素。5
The uppermost layer of sea water is eternally dynamic in response to Earth’s rotation, the pull of sun and moon, winds, water densities, temperatures, seismic activities, and geomagnetic influences. Currents, tides, waves, swell, and sea ice are manifestations of intense interest to military mariners and civilian policymakers who plan, prepare for, conduct, or depend upon naval operations.5
电流
CURRENTS
与波浪和潮汐不同，洋流能够以无休止的循环方式将海水长距离输送。1492年，洋流与盛行风一起，载着克里斯托弗·哥伦布和他的旗舰“圣玛利亚号”横渡大西洋，从欧洲抵达新大陆；1947年，洋流又载着托尔·海尔达尔和“康提基号”从秘鲁航行至南太平洋的图阿莫图群岛。自公元前480年希腊在伯罗奔尼撒战争期间于萨拉米斯海战中击败波斯舰队以来，大多数海上行动都发生在北半球。6但赤道以南的洋流可能会在最意想不到的时候变得具有军事重要性。
Ocean currents, unlike waves and tides, transfer sea water long distances in endless redistribution cycles. Together with prevailing winds, they carried Christopher Columbus and his flagship the Santa Maria across the Atlantic from Europe to the New World in 1492 and took Thor Heyerdahl and the Kon-Tiki on a grand ride from Peru to the South Pacific archipelago of Tuamotu in 1947. Most naval operations have taken place in the Northern Hemisphere since Greece defeated a Persian fleet at Salamis during the Pelopponesian War in 480 B.C,6 but currents south of the Equator may become militarily important when least expected.
温差形成了主要的环流模式：南北半球表层较轻、较暖的海水向极地漂移，而寒冷、较咸的海水则穿过深渊向赤道方向流动。洋流的运动方向，或称“流向”，是指洋流的走向，而流速则构成“漂移”。盛行风推动表层海水向前流动，从而形成环流模式。地球自转使赤道以北的洋流顺时针偏转，赤道以南的洋流逆时针偏转，但有三个显著的例外：赤道洋流几乎正西偏转；存在一股潜在的逆流。南极环流向相反的方向流动；南极环流向东环绕地球流动，不受任何大型陆地的阻碍（图 8）。
Temperature differentials set up primary circulation patterns with light, warm waters near the surface floating poleward in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, while cold, salty waters head toward the Equator through the abyss. The direction of movement, or “set,” is the course currents steer, whereas current velocities constitute “drift.” Prevailing winds, which push surface water before them, start to shape a circular pattern. Earth’s rotation deflects currents clockwise north of the Equator and counterclockwise to the south, with three prominent exceptions: Equatorial currents set almost due west; an underlying countercurrent sets in the opposite direction; and the Antarctic Circumpolar Current takes an easterly course around the globe unobstructed by any large land masses (map 8).
大西洋、太平洋和印度洋西缘存在着相对快速、狭窄的洋流，而东海岸附近的洋流则相对较宽、较浅且流速缓慢。墨西哥湾暖流在佛罗里达州迈阿密附近宽约 80 公里（50 英里），深约 457 米（1500 英尺），以每小时 3 至 4 海里的速度向北漂移。北大西洋暖流是墨西哥湾暖流的延伸，它将异常温暖的海水从北极圈向北扩散，经过斯匹次卑尔根群岛和俄罗斯不冻港摩尔曼斯克，最终在新地岛附近以稀释后到达。北太平洋的坚实海岸线阻止了如此大规模的洋流漂移，但寒冷的堪察加洋流（如同同样起源于极地地区的拉布拉多洋流和格陵兰洋流一样）在向南流动的过程中，与向北流动的暖流相遇时，会形成翻滚的雾气。
Relatively fast, narrow currents parallel the western rim of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, whereas counterparts off east coasts are comparatively wide, shallow, and slow. The Gulf Stream, which is 50 miles wide (80 kilometers) and 1,500 feet deep (457 meters) near Miami, FL, drifts northward at 3 to 4 nautical miles an hour. The North Atlantic Drift, a prolongation of the Gulf Stream, spreads abnormally warm water north of the Arctic Circle past Spitzbergen and the ice-free Russian port of Murmansk until it touches Novaya Zemlya in much diluted form. Solid coastlines prevent any drift on such a scale in the North Pacific, but the cold Kamchatka Current, like the Labrador and Greenland Currents which also originate in polar regions, creates billowing fog banks on its way south when it collides with warm water headed north.
潮汐
TIDES
潮汐每天都在撼动着海洋，大约每隔12.5小时一次，这主要是由于月球引力的作用。大潮每月出现两次，比平均潮位高出约20%。此时正值新月和满月，太阳增强了月球的引力，地球、月球和太阳呈一条直线。小潮每月出现两次，比平均潮位低约20%。此时正值月相变化，太阳抵消了月球的引力，太阳和月球呈直角（图8）。
Tides rock the oceans daily, about 12.5 hours apart, in response to gravitational tugs primarily by the moon. Spring tides about 20 percent greater than average arise twice a month when the sun reinforces lunar pull at the time of new and full moons and the Earth, moon, and sun are directly in line. Neap tides about 20 percent below average occur when the sun offsets the moon’s pull at the time of lunar first and third quarters and the sun and moon are at right angles (figure 8).
详细的潮汐表预测主要港口、海滩和许多较小地点的每日潮汐。计算十分复杂，因为各地高潮和低潮每天大约会推迟50分钟，而且高潮和低潮的持续时间比涨落的时间更长。赤道南北特定地点的连续潮汐并不相等，尽管相邻潮位相同。奇怪的是，这种现象每月两次在月球运行至赤道上方时消失。每月一次，当月球运行至近地点（距离地球最近）时，潮汐高度会比正常水平高出15%至20%；每月一次，当月球运行至远地点（距离地球最远）时，潮汐高度会比正常水平低约20%。近地点潮和春潮同时出现时，潮位会达到极高。潮差也因地而异。在一些直线或受保护的海岸线上，水位上升或下降一英尺或更少是常见的，但在新不伦瑞克省的芬迪湾，水位曾记录到 50 英尺（15 米）的升降。芬迪湾是一个漏斗状的盆地，它限制了涌入的浪花，并将 4 英尺高的水墙以每小时 10 至 15 英里（16 至 24 公里）的速度喷射到狭窄的入口处。
Elaborate tables forecast daily tides for principal ports, beaches, and many lesser locales. Calculations are complex, because high and low waters everywhere arrive about 50 minutes later each day, while high and low water readings persist longer than rise and fall. Successive tides for specific spots north and south of the Equator are unequal, although alternate levels are identical. That phenomenon, oddly enough, disappears twice a month when the moon passes over the Equator. Tides register 15 to 20 percent higher than normal once a month when lunar orbits bring the moon closest to Earth (at perigee) and about 20 percent below normal once a month when the moon is farthest away (at apogee). Extreme heights occur when perigee and spring tides coincide. Tidal ranges also differ from place to place. The rise and fall of a foot or less is common along some straight line or sheltered coasts, but 50 feet (15 meters) have been recorded in New Brunswick’s Bay of Fundy, a funnel-shaped basin that confines incoming slosh and rockets a 4-foot wall of water up narrow inlets at 10 to 15 miles an hour (16 to 24 kilometers per hour).
波浪
WAVES
与洋流和潮汐不同，波浪完全由风力驱动。当风力减弱时，被称为涌浪的长而低的平行波浪会持续不断，但输送的水量却很少（图9显示了一个漂浮的软木塞，它随着每一个涌来的波浪上升，然后沿着反向斜坡滑下，但并未远离其起始点）。波峰和波谷之间的垂直距离决定了波高，相邻波峰或波谷之间的距离决定了波长，每个波浪前进的速度决定了其速度，以英尺每秒或海里每小时表示，而一个波峰到达下一个波峰所需的时间决定了波周期。波列有时表现为平行的波峰和波谷，但由强风驱动的波列经常相互追赶、超越或淹没，形成波涛汹涌、泡沫翻滚的海面（表4列出了风速与海况的关系）。当强劲稳定的强风持续吹袭深水区时，海浪会形成巨大的波浪——“风程”可达500至1000英里（800至1600公里）甚至更远。大型海湾中产生的海浪，无论风力多么强劲，通常也只有几英尺高；而开阔海洋上的飓风和台风则会形成超级巨浪，其高度通常超过50英尺（15米）。据报道，1933年2月7日，美国海军油轮“拉马波”号从马尼拉驶往圣地亚哥途中，一名值班军官看到船尾涌起巨浪，“浪高超过主桅瞭望台”，并计算出其高度为创纪录的112英尺（34米）。7
Waves, unlike currents and tides, are whipped up entirely by winds. When winds abate, long, low, parallel waves called swell continue indefinitely, but transfer very little water from one place to another (figure 9 shows a bobbing cork that ascends each approaching wave, then slides down the reverse slope without moving far from its point of origin.) The vertical distance between the crest and trough determines wave height, the distance between successive peaks or depressions determines wave length, the speed at which each wave advances determines its velocity expressed in feet per second or nautical miles per hour, and the time it takes one crest to succeed another determines the wave period. Wave trains occasionally appear as parallel crests and troughs, but those driven by stiff breezes often overtake, pass, or overwhelm each other to form a choppy sea checkered with foam (table 4 connects wind velocities with sea states). Waves grow largest in deep water when lashed by strong steady winds over long distances—a “fetch” of 500 to 1,000 miles (800 to 1,600 kilometers) or more. Those generated in large bays never exceed a few feet no matter how hard the wind blows, whereas hurricanes and typhoons over open oceans develop superwaves that routinely top 50 feet (15 meters). A watch officer on the U.S. Navy tanker Ramapo en route from Manila to San Diego on February 7, 1933, reportedly saw a great sea rising astern “at a level above the mainmast crow’s nest,” and calculated its height at a record 112 feet (34 meters).7
Figure 8. Lunar and Solar Influences on Tides
改编自伦纳德·恩格尔的《大海》。
Adapted from Leonard Engel, The Sea.
当海浪和涌浪到达水深约为波峰间距一半的浅水区时（图 10），其速度开始减缓。海底阻力随后减小波峰间距，波高和波陡迅速增加，直至波峰向前翻滚形成破碎浪，拍打悬崖或将大量海水冲刷到平坦的海岸上，部分海水渗入海岸，其余海水则涌回海岸。当海浪以锐角冲击海岸时，沿岸流会横向移动。
Ocean waves and swell begin to slow when they reach shallow water that is about half as deep as the distance between crests (figure 10). Bottom drag then reduces spacing between waves, which rapidly increase in height and steepness until crests roll forward as breakers that pound cliffs or wash sheets of brine over flat shores where some seeps in while the rest pours back. Longshore currents slip sideways when waves strike coasts at sharp angles.
冰山和浮冰
ICEBERGS AND FLOES
冰山会使水面舰艇和潜艇瘫痪甚至沉没，如果船长疏忽大意，后果不堪设想。 1912年4月一个晴朗平静的夜晚，泰坦尼克号的乘客和船员就亲身经历了这一惨痛教训。这艘号称“永不沉没”的豪华邮轮最终葬身海底。北大西洋的大多数冰山都源自格陵兰岛巨大冰盖的冰舌。春季，巨大的冰块从冰盖上崩落，形成尖锐的山峰和锯齿状的山体，这一过程被称为“冰崩”，之后它们会随着洋流向南漂移。冰山之所以能够漂浮，是因为冰的密度小于海水，但它们约有十分之九的质量隐藏在水下。许多冰山高出水面250英尺（76米）甚至更高，并在水下展开约四分之一英里（400米）。泰坦尼克号的灾难发生在北纬41°46′，与西班牙马德里连成一线，尽管大西洋中的大多数冰山在漂移到如此南的地方之前就已经融化了。北太平洋的冰山数量较少，因为其“繁殖”区域有限；但南极冰架崩解出的冰山体积庞大、数量众多，而且比格陵兰岛的冰山漂移得更靠近赤道。不过，由于海上交通较少，相关的危险也较小。
Icebergs can cripple or sink surface ships and submarines whose skippers are unwary, as passengers and crew of the Titanic discovered on a clear, calm night in April 1912, when that “unsinkable” luxury liner took a one-way trip to Davy Jones’ locker. Glacial tongues of Greenland’s gigantic ice cap are the source of most icebergs in the North Atlantic. Huge blocks with sharp peaks and jagged bellies break off in springtime, a process called “calving,” then drift southward with ocean currents. Icebergs float, because ice is less dense than sea water, but about nine-tenths of their mass are concealed. Many tower 250 feet (76 meters) or more above the surface and spread a quarter of a mile (400 meters) or so below. Titanic’s catastrophe occurred at 41° 46’ North Latitude, on a line with Madrid, Spain, although most icebergs in the Atlantic melt before they float that far south. Fewer bergs appear in the North Pacific, because “breeding” grounds are restricted, but those that break off the Antarctic ice shelf are immense, numerous, and drift farther toward the Equator than those from Greenland. Associated hazards, however, are less owing to lighter seagoing traffic.
Figure 9. Ocean Wave Motions and Measurements
改编自伦纳德·恩格尔的《大海》。
Adapted from Leonard Engel, The Sea.
Figure 10. Conditions Conducive to Surf
Table 4. Beaufort Wind Scale Related to Sea States
常年覆盖北冰洋大部分区域的浮冰，形成顶部平坦、侧面陡峭的板状浮冰，这些浮冰在盛行风的带动下各自独立地向外移动。冰架之间有被称为“冰间水道”的狭长水域。有些冰块足够大且表面光滑，足以容纳配备滑橇的中程货运飞机；而另一些冰块则被变幻莫测的风吹得东倒西歪，表面崎岖不平，难以通行。在格陵兰岛图勒空军基地，卡车司机经常在深秋至晚春期间驾车穿越北极星湾的海冰。这些海冰厚度达5至10英尺（2至3米），每年都会在永久冰盖边缘融化。夏季从南极冰架分离出来的冰块大多比北半球的同类冰块大得多；许多冰块宽达数英里，厚约2000英尺（600米），形成壮观的冰崖，高出水面200至300英尺（60至90米）。
Pack ice, which perennially covers most of the Arctic Ocean, produces flat-topped, steep-sided, tabular floes of which all proceed independently before dominant winds with narrow strips of water known as “leads” in between. Some such floes are sufficiently large and smooth enough to accommodate medium-range cargo aircraft equipped with skis while others, buckled together by vagrant winds, feature rough surfaces that impede foot travel. Truckers at Thule Air Base, Greenland regularly drive across North Star Bay from late autumn until late spring on sea ice, which freezes 5 to 10 feet thick (2 to 3 meters) and thaws annually on the fringe of the permanent ice pack. Most floes that separate from Antarctic ice shelves in summer are much larger than any counterparts in the Northern Hemisphere; many are miles wide and 2,000 feet (600 meters) or so thick, with spectacular cliffs that tower 200 to 300 feet (60 to 90 meters) above the water.
海洋地形学
MARINE TOPOGRAPHY
任何海洋的上、下地形都包括大陆架、大陆坡、岛屿和深海。两栖部队主要关注沿岸地区，特别是海滩、其向海延伸的通道和海峡，而“远洋”水兵则需要考虑隐藏在海面下的山脉、海槽和平原。8
Marine topography above and below any ocean includes continental shelves, continental slopes, islands, and the abyss. Amphibious forces are essentially concerned with littorals, especially beaches, their seaward approaches, and straits, whereas “blue water” sailors factor in mountain ranges, troughs, and plains concealed under the seas.8
海滩和通道
BEACHES AND APPROACHES
海滩从海岸线延伸至内陆第一个显著的地形变化处，其大小、形状、颜色和特征各不相同。低洼海岸的海滩通常宽阔、绵长且连绵不断，而有些海滩则被岬角分割，被高耸的悬崖限制成狭长的地带，或者在山海交汇处完全消失。度假者偏爱广阔柔软的白色沙滩，但在臭名昭著的硫磺岛和夏威夷科纳海岸的一些地方，海滩却是黑色的。法国尼斯以及蔚蓝海岸其他豪华度假胜地的狭窄海滩上散落着鹅卵石、卵石和巨石。泥沙沉积也并不罕见。
Beaches, which start at the shoreline and extend inland to the first marked change in topography, come in all sizes, shapes, colors, and descriptions. Those found along low-lying coasts generally are wide, long, and continuous, while others are interrupted by headlands, are confined to tiny strips by towering cliffs, or are displaced completely where mountains meet the sea. Vacationers prefer broad expanses of soft, white sand, but beaches are black on infamous Iwo Jima and some places along the Kona coast of Hawaii. Narrow strands at Nice, France, and other ritzy resorts on the Cote d’Azur are strewn with pebbles, cobblestones, and boulders. Mud deposits are by no means unusual.
军事上有用的海滩研究着重考察近海环境和内陆出口，尤其关注水深、海底坡度、障碍物、潮汐、水流、海浪以及岸上主要地形（图 11）。海滩长度必须足以容纳相应规模的两栖部队，通常为一个营级登陆队，但战术情况可能需要更大或更小的部队。特遣部队指挥官通常会将超长海滩划分为若干段，并分别命名为红、白、蓝，必要时甚至可以命名为红1、红2、红3。海滩宽度应为高水位线以上的陆地上必要的指挥控制和后勤人员提供充足的空间。除此之外，理想的海滩还应具备以下特征：
Militarily useful beach studies address offshore conditions and exits inland, with particular attention to water depths, bottom gradients, obstructions, tides, currents, surf, and dominant terrain ashore (figure 11). Lengths must be adequate for amphibious forces of appropriate size, normally a battalion landing team, although tactical situations may demand larger or smaller formations. Task force commanders regularly subdivide very long beaches into segments code-named, for example, Red, White, and Blue, even Red 1, Red 2, Red 3 if necessary. Widths should afford ample room for essential command/control and logistical shore parties on dry ground above the high water mark. Beyond that, beaches ideally display the following characteristics:
• 近海水域足够深，运输船可以在战术形势允许的情况下，尽可能靠近海滩作业。
• Water offshore is deep enough for transport ships to operate as near the beach as tactical situations prudently allow.
• 最后进近航道上没有沙洲、浅滩、暗礁、离岸岛屿、岩石露头和其他障碍物。
• Final approaches are free of sandbars, banks, shoals, reefs, offshore islands, rocky outcroppings, and other obstacles.
• 通道配置不利于挖矿。
• Channel configurations discourage mining.
• 海滩坡度允许两栖登陆舰艇在高水位线附近的干燥地面上卸载部队和物资。
• Beach gradients allow amphibious landing ships and craft to discharge troops and loads on dry ground near the high water mark.
• 海底和沙滩都足够坚实，可以支撑轮式和履带式车辆行驶，而干式登陆是不可行的。
• The sea bottom and beach both are firm enough to support wheeled and tracked vehicles where dry landings are infeasible.
• Adequate landing zones are available ashore for helicopters.
• 防守方缺乏可以俯瞰登陆海滩的制高点。
• Defenders lack dominating terrain that overlooks landing beaches.
• 多条容量充足的出口从海滩通往内陆的初始军事目标。
• Multiple exits of ample capacity lead from the beach to initial military objectives inland.
Figure 11. A Typical Beach Profile
凡是沙质平坦的海岸，向海进发的坡度通常都比较缓和；而岩石海岸线则往往陡峭得多。背靠高地的海滩几乎总是与深水相连，但位于悬崖底部的海滩则常常遍布巨石，只有在退潮时才能看到，甚至完全看不到。卡车在平坦海岸干燥、易滑的沙地上行驶时，抓地力十分有限；卵石和鹅卵石海滩虽然能承受重载，但滚动性极差，坦克和其他履带车辆很容易滑倒；泥滩则常常深不见底。相比之下，潮湿的沙子是两栖作战的最佳地面。由细沙到中沙风吹形成的沙丘很少超过高水位线以上 5 到 30 米（20 到 100 英尺），尽管有些沙丘的高度是这个数字的三倍。即使部分被植被覆盖的沙丘也相对坚实，因此可以通行。风暴将碎片和漂流木冲上岸后形成的低矮沙脊也是如此。海滩后方广阔的沿海平原提供了充足的机动空间和通往内陆的替代路线（前提是地基稳固），但地面部队难以轻易划定边界。地形平坦，缺乏明显的炮兵或舰炮射击目标，侧翼也暴露在外。崎岖的地形可以缓解部分问题，但也可能限制进入内陆的通道。9
Seaward approaches generally are gentle wherever shores are sandy and flat, whereas rocky coastlines tend to drop off more sharply. Beaches backed by high ground almost always abut deep water, but those at the base of cliffs habitually are littered with boulders visible only at low tide, if at all. Trucks fight for traction in dry, shifting sands on level shores; pebble and cobblestone beaches bear heavy loads, but roll so freely that tanks and other tracked vehicles slide; mud beaches often seem bottomless. Damp sand, in contrast, provides the best surface for amphibious operations. Dunes formed from fine to medium-sized windblown sand rarely rise more than 20 to 100 feet (5 to 30 meters) above high water, although some measure three times that high. Those that are even partly covered with vegetation are relatively firm and therefore traffickable. So are low ridges that storms create when they wash debris and driftwood ashore. Broad coastal plains behind beaches afford ample maneuver room and alternative avenues inland, provided the footing is solid, but boundaries that troops on the ground can easily find are hard to draw. Featureless terrain also affords few prominent registration points for artillery or naval gunfire, and flanks remain open. Rough topography alleviates some of those problems, but may restrict access to the hinterland.9
实地侦察需要具备秘密渗透和撤离能力，以及一系列专业技能。在两栖指挥官批准登陆计划之前，只要条件允许，都会进行第10次勘察，以确定海滩、进出路线的精确特征。训练有素的海空陆空（SEAL）特种部队配备齐全。他们运用最先进的技术，通常为美国国防部执行此类任务。敌军并非他们唯一的对手——茂密的海藻、鲨鱼、梭鱼、毒海蛇以及各种带毒刺的鱼类都在水下伺机而动，等待着粗心大意的垂钓者。11
On-the-spot reconnaissance, which calls for clandestine infiltration and exfiltration capabilities along with a lengthy list of specialized skills,10 is performed whenever possible to ascertain precise characteristics of beaches, approaches, and exits before amphibious commanders approve landing plans. Superbly trained Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams equipped with state-of-the-art technologies most often implement such missions for the U.S. Department of Defense. Enemy armed forces are not their only adversaries—dense sea weed, sharks, barracudas, venomous sea snakes, and various fish with poisonous spines await the unwary under water.11
海峡和其他海军狭窄水道
STRAITS AND OTHER NAVAL NARROWS
自两千多年前海战兴起以来，控制关键海峡和其他天然或人工狭窄水道一直是基本的军事目标，因为任何海上咽喉要道一侧或两侧的敌对武装力量都可能试图阻止对手自由通行。12 20 世纪，一些这样的瓶颈问题曾成为引人注目的新闻头条（图 9）。巴拿马运河和苏伊士运河、直布罗陀海峡、红海南门曼德海峡、分隔台湾和中国大陆的海峡，以及横跨波斯湾产油国海上交通线 (SLOC) 的霍尔木兹海峡，都曾是（或仍然是）争论的焦点。
Control over key straits and other natural or manmade narrows has been a basic military objective since naval warfare came into vogue well over two millennia ago, because unfriendly armed forces on one or both sides of any naval choke point may try to deny free passage to opponents.12 Several such bottlenecks have made bold headlines in the 20th century (map 9). The Panama and Suez Canals, Gibraltar, the Red Sea’s southern gate at Bab-el-Mandeb, the strait that separates Taiwan from mainland China, and the Strait of Hormuz astride sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to and from Persian Gulf oil producers are among those that have been (or still are) bones of contention.
第一次世界大战期间，英联邦投入了 25 万兵力试图从奥斯曼帝国手中夺取达达尼尔海峡，但最终失败；土耳其的伤亡也与之相当。八十年后， 13 名车臣分离主义分子在黑海劫持了一艘渡轮，并威胁说，如果俄罗斯总统鲍里斯·叶利钦拒绝解除对他们祖国的围困，他们就要在博斯普鲁斯海峡炸毁这艘渡轮。14这一大胆举动的灵感或许来自埃及前总统贾迈勒·阿卜杜勒·纳赛尔。在1967年阿以战争期间，他曾下令下属将船只装满水泥，然后沉入苏伊士运河。从他的角度来看，结果令人满意：主航道一直关闭到1975年。15
The British Commonwealth expended 250,000 men in unsuccessful attempts to wrest the Dardanelles from the Ottoman Empire during World War I; Turkish casualties were comparable.13 Chechen separatists seized a ferry in the Black Sea eighty years later and threatened to blow it up in the Bosporus if Russian President Boris Yeltsin refused to lift a siege in their homeland.14 Inspiration for that audacious act may have come from former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who ordered subordinates to load ships with cement, then sink them in the Suez Canal during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Results from his standpoint were rewarding: the main channel remained closed until 1975.15
图9中标出的咽喉要道在整个冷战期间对美苏军事战略的形成起到了重要作用。对落单的“红色十月”猎杀行动在苏联为其战略核潜艇配备远程弹道导弹之前， 16艘潜艇的部署十分普遍。这些导弹可以从靠近俄罗斯海岸的隐蔽地点攻击目标。北方舰队的潜艇藏身于格陵兰-冰岛-挪威海峡（简称格陵兰海峡）外的巴伦支海。苏联太平洋舰队的潜艇则藏身于鄂霍次克海的堡垒中。然而，优势并非一边倒。苏联的攻击型潜艇和水面舰艇无法在不经战斗的情况下大规模进入大西洋，因为北约海军和岸基飞机封锁了格陵兰海峡。苏联的波罗的海舰队和黑海舰队分别被丹麦海峡和土耳其海峡封锁，而这两个海峡仍然掌握在北约手中。克里姆林宫的统治者一直试图（但从未成功）削弱日本，利用邻近的海峡到达公海，并阻止美国海军进入这些海峡，这将阻碍美国向韩国增援和补给联合国军的紧急行动。17
Choke points identified on map 9 helped shape U.S. and Soviet military strategy throughout the Cold War. Hunts for lone Red Octobers16 were commonplace until the Soviet Union armed its strategic nuclear submarines with long-range ballistic missiles that could attack targets from sanctuaries close to Russian coasts. Those in the Northern Fleet took cover in the Barents Sea beyond the Greenland-Iceland-Norway (G-l-N) Gaps. Counterparts with the Soviet Pacific Fleet hid in the Okhotsk bastion. Advantages, however, were by no means one sided. Soviet attack submarines and surface ships could not reach the Atlantic Ocean en masse without a fight, because NATO navies and shore-based aircraft blocked the G-l-N Gaps. Soviet Baltic and Black Sea Fleets were respectively bottled up by the Danish and Turkish Straits, which remained in NATO’s hands. Occupants of the Kremlin consistently sought (but never were able) to neutralize Japan, use adjacent straits to reach open water, and close them to the U.S. Navy, which would have frustrated emergency efforts to reinforce and resupply U.N. forces in the Republic of Korea.17
大陆架和斜坡
CONTINENTAL SHELVES AND SLOPES
大陆架位于低潮线至水深500至600英尺（85至100英寻）之间。它们包括墨西哥湾、哈德逊湾、黄海、黑海和波罗的海等浅海湾和内陆海。这些地区富含食用鱼类、石油和矿产资源，因此引发了激烈的经济竞争，且往往带有军事色彩，因为一些国家提出了高达200英里（325公里）的领土主张，而这些主张尚未被国际公约所否定。
Continental shelves lie between low tide and depths of 500 to 600 feet (85 to 100 fathoms). They include shallow embayments and inland seas such as the Gulf of Mexico, Hudson Bay, the Yellow Sea, Black Sea, and the Baltic. Regions rich in food fish, oil, and mineral deposits stimulate intense economic competition, often with military overtones, because some countries press extravagant territorial claims—up to 200 miles (325 kilometers)—that international conventions have not yet negated.
Map 9. Crucial Naval Choke Points During the Cold War
大陆架的宽度差异很大，从西伯利亚以北北极冰层下的 800 英里（1300 公里）到崎岖地形挤满海岸线或湍急海流阻碍大陆架形成的狭窄地带（甚至不存在）。大多数大陆架是起伏的平原，但低洼地带和隆起也很常见。阿留申群岛横跨北太平洋，绵延 1000 英里（1600 公里），而印度尼西亚群岛的长度是其两倍多。附着在海岸的珊瑚礁群落——裙礁，通常形成于热带气候地区。与更远处大陆架上的堡礁类似，裙礁部分淹没在水下，与海岸线平行，常常阻碍人们从公海轻松抵达海滩，即使是平底船也难以通行。大陆坡宽 10 至 20 英里（16 至 32 公里），从大陆架的尽头开始，然后以陡峭的角度向下倾斜，直至到达海底，在某些地区，海底低于海平面数英里。地球上最壮观的断崖位于智利海岸，安第斯山脉的阿空加夸峰与秘鲁-智利海沟最深处之间垂直落差超过13公里（8英里），而两者之间的水平距离不到400公里（250英里）。海底的岩石和泥沙偶尔会以特快列车的速度倾泻而下，沿着切割大陆坡的典型水下峡谷奔涌而下。18
Shelf widths range from 800 miles (1,300 kilometers) under arctic ice north of Siberia to narrow (even nonexistent) strips where rough terrain crowds the coast or swift currents keep sheves from forming. Most shelves are undulating plains, but low spots and protuberances are common. The Aleutian Islands festoon across the North Pacific for 1,000 miles (1,600 kilometers), while the Indonesian Archipelago stretches more than twice that far. Fringing reefs, which are coral formations attached to shore, often form in tropical climes. Like barrier reefs farther out on the shelf, they are partly submerged, parallel to the coast, and frequently block easy access from high seas to the beach, even for flat-bottomed boats. Continental slopes 10 to 20 miles wide (16-32 kilometers) begin where shelves leave off, then plunge at sharp angles until they reach the bottom which is miles below sea level in some locales. The most spectacular dropoff on Earth is located along the coast of Chile, where more than 8 vertical miles (13 kilometers) separate the Andean peak of Cerro Aconcaqua from the deepest spot in the Peru-Chile Trench fewer than 250 horizontal miles (400 kilometers) away. Undersea avalanches of stone and soupy silt occasionally race at express train speed down submerged gorges and canyons that characteristically cut into continental slopes.18
深渊之上
THE ABYSS AND ABOVE
寒冷黑暗的深海平原覆盖着厚厚的沉积物，在巨大的压力下，位于海平面以下 15,000 至 20,000 英尺（4,570 至 6,095 米）处。然而，并非所有的海底都是平坦的。位于关岛以南的挑战者深渊是众多海沟中最令人叹为观止的一个，它足以吞噬珠穆朗玛峰而不留痕迹。世界上最长的山脉——大洋中脊——蜿蜒穿过大西洋、太平洋和印度洋，绵延 40,000 英里（64,375 公里），平均海拔 5,000 至 6,000 英尺（1,525 至 18,285 米）。这些隆起物仅在冰岛露出水面，但在夏威夷、亚速尔群岛以及其他一万多个大小不一的地方，火山海山则露出水面。太平洋温暖海域广泛分布着地势低洼、环绕着静谧泻湖的珊瑚礁环礁。退潮时，浅滩露出水面，珊瑚礁的缺口便成为人们进出的唯一便捷通道。
Cold, dark abyssal plains covered with a thick carpet of sediments under tremendous pressure lie 15,000 to 20,000 feet (4,570-6,095 meters) below sea level. Not all of the ocean floor, however, is level. Challenger Deep, south of Guam, the most awesome of many trenches, could swallow Mount Everest without a trace. The world’s longest mountain chain, known as the Mid-Ocean Ridge, winds through the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans for 40,000 miles (64,375 kilometers) at elevations that average 5,000 to 6,000 feet (1,525-18,285 meters). Those eminances break the surface only in Iceland, but volcanic seamounts project above water in Hawaii, the Azores, and 10,000 other places large and small. Low-lying atolls that feature coral reefs around quiet lagoons are widely distributed in warm Pacific waters. Breaks in such reefs afford the only convenient avenues of arrival and departure when flats are exposed at low tide.
海军相关代表性问题
REPRESENTATIVE NAVAL RAMIFICATIONS
海洋、其内部环境、水下地形和海岸线影响着海军在近岸、水上和水下以及公海上的计划、方案和行动。本概要重点阐述了三个方面：舰艇设计；两栖登陆；潜艇和反潜作战。
The oceans, their contents, underwater topography, and shorelines shape naval plans, programs, and operations on, above, and below the surface along the littoral as well as on high seas. This synopsis singles out three ramifications: ship designs; amphibious landings; submarine and antisubmarine warfare.
水面舰艇和潜艇设计
SURFACE SHIP AND SUBMARINE DESIGNS
在古代，浮力、浮力、稳定性和航速是每艘战舰必不可少的特性，而且这种特性将永远存在。在木制战舰盛行的年代，在海浪、涌浪和狂风的冲击下保持适航性相对容易，但自1862年3月9日，首批两艘蒸汽动力铁甲舰——联邦军的“莫尼特”号和邦联军的“弗吉尼亚”号（原名“梅里马克”号） ——在切萨皮克湾进行不分胜负的战斗以来，设计难题已经成倍增加和放大。19
Flotation, buoyancy, stability, and speed were essential properties of every man-of-war in olden times and will remain so eternally. Seaworthiness in the presence of ocean waves, swell, and buffeting winds was relatively easy to attain when wooden warships were fashionable, but design problems have multiplied and magnified manyfold since the first two steam-driven ironclads, the Federal ship USS Monitor and the Confederate ship CSS Virginia (originally christened the Merrimac) did battle inconclusively on March 9, 1862, in Chesapeake Bay.19
船体尺寸、形状、体积、重量和重心必须保持适当的比例；即使其中任何一个因素出现偏差，都会影响船舶性能。水面舰艇只有在水下船体排水量的重量等于船舶总重量（包括船员、武器、弹药、淡水、燃料和其他物资）时才能漂浮。在货船最大允许吃水深度处绘制的吃水线表明，在平均盐度的温海水中，船舶是否安全装载。辅助标记考虑了水密度的差异，因为无论载重如何，当水温和盐度发生变化时，船舶的吃水深度都会增加或减少（图 12）。
Hull dimensions, shapes, volumes, weights, and centers of gravity must be in proper proportion; performance suffers if even one of those factors is out of kilter. Surface ships float only if the submerged hull displaces a weight of water equal to the vessel’s total weight, including crew, weapons, munitions, water, fuel, and other stores. Plimsoll lines drawn on cargo ships at the maximum allowable draft indicate whether they are safely loaded in tepid sea water of average salinity. Subsidiary marks account for difference in water densities, because ships ride higher or lower regardless of load when water temperatures and salt contents change (figure 12).
Figure 12. Plimsoll Line Markings
航行中的船舶会围绕其浮心上下左右摇摆，而浮心很少与重心或浮力中心重合。因此，稳定的船体形状是每位船舶设计师梦寐以求的目标，因为波浪和风不仅会使军舰在恶劣海况下发生纵摇、横摇、垂荡、横滚、俯仰和偏航（图13），还会造成巨大的结构应力。冰冻天气下，上层甲板结冰也会严重降低船舶稳定性，导致设计不良的船舶反应迟缓、倾覆甚至沉没。
Ships underway tip up, down, and sideways around the center of flotation, which seldom coincides with centers of gravity or buoyancy. Stable hull shapes thus are the Holy Grail of every naval architect, because waves and winds not only make warships surge, sway, heave, roll, pitch, and yaw in heavy seas (figure 13), but introduce great structural stress. Ice that forms on upper decks during freezing weather also degrades stability to such an extent that poorly designed ships respond sluggishly, founder, or sink.
水面舰艇必须足够坚固，才能承受平直的船首以锐角撞击巨浪时的猛烈冲击。前进动力会瞬间停止，舰体剧烈颤抖，从船首到船尾的振动会对武器系统造成不利影响。剧烈的横摇和纵摇也会造成同样的问题。巨浪会损坏甲板上的设备，散射电子信号的波峰有时会在雷达屏幕上产生虚假回波，固定翼飞机和直升机的作业将无法进行，无论是否需要，海上补给都必须推迟。此外，风浪造成的不稳定性还会导致即使是最强壮的船员和乘客在遭遇恶劣天气时也出现晕船症状——美国海军陆战队传奇人物刘易斯·B·“切斯蒂”·普勒上校在1950年乘坐的舰艇遭遇台风尾部剧烈摇晃时，就晕船了。在这样的恶劣天气下，人的思维敏捷度和手部灵活性会受到极大影响，以至于简单的任务也会变得困难。因此，设计师们将操作和控制中心以及住所设置在船体中部，因为那里的湍流最不明显。
Surface ships must be sturdy enough to withstand slamming when flat-plated bows meet huge waves at acute angles. Forward momentum stops momentarily, the ship shudders, and vibrations from stem to stern adversely affect weapons systems. So do extreme rolling and pitching. Walls of water can damage deck-mounted equipment, wave crests that scatter electronic signals sometimes cause spurious echoes to appear on radar screens, fixed-wing and helicopter operations become impossible, and underway replenishment must be deferred regardless of need. Instability induced by winds and waves moreover may encourage motion sickness among the hardiest crew members and passengers when really foul weather strikes— Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, a legendary U.S. Marine, turned green in 1950 when the tail end of a typhoon rocked the ship upon which he was embarked. Mental acuity and manual dexterity suffer so greatly at such times that simple tasks become difficult. Designers consequently locate operations and control centers as well as quarters amidships, where turbulence is least pronounced.
Figure 13. Effects of Wave Action on Ship Stability
改编自 PG Gates 和 NM Lynn 的《船舶、潜艇和海洋》。
Adapted from P. G. Gates and N. M. Lynn, Ships, Submarines, and the Sea.
潜艇的情况比较特殊，因为它们必须能够下沉或在水下特定深度保持中性浮力。事实上，过大的浮力反而会妨碍紧急情况下的快速下潜。艇员会向压载舱内泵水以进行下潜，排出部分水以减缓或终止下潜，并在需要上升时重新注入压缩空气。前后舱室维持潜艇的平衡，这在潜艇使用武器系统或在潜望镜深度巡航时尤为重要，因为这些深度的水流通常较为湍急。为了确保潜艇的高效性能，必须采用折衷设计，因为水下性能优异的流线型艇身在水面航行时效率较低。
Submarines constitute a separate case, for they must sink or remain neutrally buoyant at required levels beneath the sea. Excessive buoyancy in fact would prevent rapid submersion in emergency. Crewmen pump water into ballast tanks to dive, pump part of it out to slow or terminate descent, and restore compressed air when they want to rise. Tanks fore and aft maintain submarines on an even keel, which is particularly important when they employ weapon systems or loiter at periscope depth where waters often are turbulent. Compromise designs are required to ensure effective performance, because streamlined shapes that are well suited under water are less efficient on the surface.
海水和盐雾对水面舰艇和潜艇的腐蚀作用普遍而严重，是每个在第一次巡航中大部分时间都在剥落油漆的“水兵”的噩梦。上层建筑和浸没在水中的船体都遭受着持续不断的侵蚀。外观上的瑕疵反而是最不严重的问题，因为金属最终会失去强度，导致电路短路、螺栓卡死，导弹发射轨道上的积垢如果长期无人清理，还会导致导弹故障。即使是不锈钢也无法幸免，因此人们仍在不断寻找应对之法和防锈材料。
The corrosive effects of sea water and salt air on surface ships and submarines are pervasive and pernicious, the curse of every “swabbie” who spent most of his or her first cruise chipping paint. Superstructures and immersed hulls are under ceaseless attack. Unsightliness is the least serious problem, because metals eventually lose strength, electrical shorts occur, bolts seize up, and accretions on launch tracks cause missiles to malfunction if untended for long. Not even stainless steel is immune, so the search for antidotes and rust-resistant materials continues.
附着在螺旋桨上的海藻和附着在龙骨上的藤壶，以及浸没在水中的仪器（例如监控设备），其破坏性不亚于锈蚀。缓慢释放铜、锡或汞到海水中的防污涂料有一定的保护作用，但是……它们的有毒排放物对环境有害，且对操作人员构成危险。在共聚物等可接受的替代品广泛应用之前，只能暂时使用危害较小的物质进行频繁的重新涂漆。
Sea weeds that foul screws and barnacles that encrust keels along with immersed instruments (such as surveillance devices) can be just as destructive as rust. Antifouling paints that slowly leach copper, tin, or mercury into sea water are somewhat protective, but their poisonous emissions are envionmentally inadvisable and hazardous to handlers. Frequent repainting with less objectionable substances must suffice until acceptable substitutes such as co-polymers become widely available.
两栖着陆
AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS
等待完美海滩和登陆点的两栖作战部队往往会错失良机，而那些在进行充分地形分析后采取谨慎冒险的部队则有时会获得丰厚的回报。例如，二战期间在太平洋战场上，即使日军抵抗顽强，且极少有登陆行动是在理想条件下进行的，美军仍然仅用了不到三年时间就从瓜达尔卡纳尔岛（1942年8月）跃升至冲绳岛（1945年3月）。20
Amphibious warriors who wait for picture perfect beaches and approaches are apt to miss golden opportunities, while those who take calculated risks after making sound terrain analyses sometimes reap rich rewards. Island hoppers in the Pacific during World War II, for example, took fewer than 3 years to leapfrog from Guadalcanal (August 1942) to Okinawa (March 1945), even though Japanese resistance was tenacious and precious few landings took place under ideal conditions.20
两种截然不同的结果。1942年3月，英国突击队员凭借对德军位于法国圣纳泽尔的海军要塞的准确描述，发动了一次两栖突袭。他们出人意料地摧毁了唯一一个足以容纳希特勒超级战列舰“提尔皮茨”号的干船坞。此次行动代价惨重（五名队员因其英勇表现荣获维多利亚十字勋章），但最终取得了胜利。失去母港的“提尔皮茨”号驶往挪威，1943年遭到英国小型潜艇的重创，1944年英国皇家空军用大量6000磅炸弹将其击沉。1943年11月在塔拉瓦岛发生的这场血腥战役计划不够周密，美军装备也较为落后。超过3000名海军陆战队员伤亡，部分原因是地形情报不足。装甲两栖拖拉机是唯一能够穿越该环礁珊瑚礁的车辆或登陆艇，但仅够前三波部队使用，因此后续部队不得不在猛烈的炮火下涉水400-500码（350-450米）才能登陆。经过三天的残酷战斗，进攻最终取得胜利，但这场胜利的价值至今仍存在争议。22
Two Contrasting Outcomes. British commandos armed with accurate descriptions of the German Navy stronghold at St. Nazaire, France conducted an amphibious raid in March 1942 and, against all odds, destroyed the only dry dock large enough to accommodate Hitler’s superbattleship Tirpitz. The cost was high (five participants won Victoria Crosses for their valor), but ends and means were well matched. The Tirpitz, denied a home port, headed for Norway where British mini-submarines damaged it badly in 1943 before the Royal Air Force sank it in 1944 with a bevy of 6,000-pound bombs.21 The bloodletting at Tarawa in November 1943 was less well planned and U.S. troops were less well equipped. More than 3,000 Marines were killed or wounded, partly because terrain intelligence was deficient. Armored amphibious tractors, the only available vehicles or landing craft able to cross that atoll’s coral reef, were sufficient only for the first three waves, so follow-on forces had to wade 400-500 yards (350-450 meters) under withering fire before they reached dry land. The assault succeeded after 3 vicious days, but the value of that victory still provokes disputes.22
仁川登陆。1950 年 9 月在韩国仁川（地图 10）发生的登陆战，由陆军上将道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟策划，主要由美国海军陆战队执行，利用突袭取得了成功，双方伤亡都很小。尽管正如一位参谋军官后来透露的那样，“我们列出了所有自然和地理上的不利因素——而仁川全都具备”：23
The Inchon Landings. Landings at Inchon, Korea, in September 1950 (map 10), conceived by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and conducted mainly by U.S. Marines, capitalized on surprise to achieve success with few casualties on either side even though, as one staff officer later revealed, “We drew up a list of every natural and geographic handicap—and Inchon had ’em all”:23
• 潮汐落差巨大。
• The tidal range is tremendous.
• 低水位使大片泥滩裸露出来。
• Low water exposes extensive mud flats.
• 只有一条狭窄的通道通往着陆区。
• Only one narrow channel led to the landing areas.
• 一座设防岛屿阻挡了最后的进路。
• A fortified island blocked the final approach.
• 没有一个海滩配得上“海滩”这个名字。
• No beaches were worthy of the name.
• 高高的海堤将所有登陆点与城市隔开。
• A high sea wall separated all landing sites from the city.
此次任务旨在绕过朝鲜侵略者，缓解釜山防御圈内部队的压力，当时釜山防御圈已濒临崩溃。1950年8月，麦克阿瑟将军及其助手认真考虑了三个备选方案。位于东海岸三八线以北的元山似乎过于雄心勃勃；位于西海岸以南的群山则显得过于保守。尽管参谋本部反对，麦克阿瑟最终还是选择了仁川登陆。24主要因为他的主要政治目标是在九月底解放首尔。
The mission was to outflank North Korean invaders and relieve pressures on forces in the Pusan Perimeter, which was in danger of collapse. General MacArthur and his assistants seriously considered three alternatives in August 1950. Wonson, well north of the 38th Parallel on the east coast, seemed a bit ambitious. Kunsan, well to the south on the west coast, seemed overly conservative. MacArthur elected Inchon despite objections by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),24 primarily because his main political aim was to free Seoul by the end of September.
Map 10. Beaches and Approaches at Inchon
地理障碍的确十分严峻。美日两国过时的潮汐表差异很大，但普遍认为，吃水深度为29英尺（9米）的登陆舰（LST）只有在9月15日日出后不久和黄昏时分才能靠岸，每次大约持续3小时。因此，作战计划要求两个海军陆战团的突击部队间隔12小时先后登陆，期间第一波登陆部队无法获得增援。如果船只无法在如此短的时间内卸载部队、装备和补给，就会被宽阔黏稠的泥滩困住，这些泥滩看起来像正在凝固的巧克力，却散发着粪便的恶臭。
Geographic obstacles indeed were daunting. Outdated U.S. and Japanese tide tables differed significantly, but generally agreed that water would be deep enough to float landing ships, tank (LSTs), with a draft of 29 feet (9 meters) only on September 15th, soon after sunrise and again at dusk, for periods that approximated 3 hours apiece. Schedules consequently called for the assault elements of two Marine regiments to debark 12 hours apart, with no possibility of reinforcement for first waves in the interim. Ships unable to unload troops, equipment, and supplies in that short time would be immobilized by wide, gooey mud flats that looked like solidifying chocolate but smelled like fecal matter.
登陆舰和突击运输舰只能在昏暗的光线下摸索着穿过狭窄的航道，由于当时这些舰艇都没有配备先进的导航设备，这项任务难上加难。潮汐涨落时，水流速度可达6至8节（近10英里/小时），接近当时可用的登陆艇逆流而上的速度。海军炮火支援舰必须在航道内抛锚，否则就会被水流冲走，这使它们成为岸上敌军炮兵的活靶子。最后的进港航道极其狭窄，几乎没有机动或掉头的空间，航道内也极易布设水雷，一艘受损的舰艇就会阻断往返最终目的地的航道。幸运的是，对于这支两栖特遣部队而言，敌军的炮火攻击零星分散，没有发现水雷，也没有舰艇受损。
LSTs and assault transports had to feel their way through tricky channels in dim light, a doubly difficult task because none at that time mounted technologically advanced navigational gear. Currents ran 6 to 8 knots (almost 10 miles per hour) when tides flowed in and out, close to the speed of available landing craft, which struggled upstream. Naval gunfire support ships had to anchor in the channel or be swept away, which made them sitting ducks for enemy artillery batteries ashore. Final approaches were so narrow there was little room to maneuver or turn around, passages were easy to mine, and one disabled ship would have blocked passage to or from final destinations. Fortunately for the amphibious task force, hostile artillery fire was desultory, no mines were found, and no ships were disabled.
月尾岛是一座小型防御岛屿，通过一条长达一英里的堤道与大陆相连。由于它扼守着港口和沿岸的各个方向，必须在清晨涨潮前攻占该岛，才能让船只进入。仁川的海滩，从北到南分别被命名为红、绿、蓝三个区域，面积都很小，彼此隔开，低潮时临海一侧是泥滩，后方则是盐田、码头、工业区和需要用梯子攀爬的海堤等各种障碍。两场台风分别向日本的港口和目标区域袭来，使情况雪上加霜。
Wolmi Do, a small fortified island connected to the mainland by a mile-long causeway, had to be taken on the morning tide before any ships could enter, because it dominated the harbor and waterfront in every direction. Inchon’s beaches, code named Red, Green, and Blue from north to south, were small, separated from each other, bounded on the seaward side by mud flats at low tide, and backed by some combination of salt pans, piers, industrial congestion, and sea walls that had to be scaled with ladders. Two typhoons on a collision course with ports of embarkation in Japan as well as objective areas made matters worse.
尽管如此，巧妙的计划安排还是使入侵舰队避开了台风的猛烈袭击，并让朝鲜敌人措手不及：在D日当天晚些时候，麦克阿瑟将军告诉参谋长联席会议：“我们的损失很轻[21人死亡，174人受伤]”，联合国军司令部第9号公报宣布，首尔于1950年9月26日被重新夺回，比原计划略早。尽管地理位置不利，但仁川战役（ 25）很快就成为了“中奖之地”，正如特遣部队指挥官亚瑟·D·斯特鲁布尔海军中将所预测的那样，并且仍然是美国海军陆战队弗吉尼亚州匡蒂科两栖作战学校战略和战术出其不意的经典案例研究。
Shrewd scheduling nevertheless enabled the invasion fleet to avoid the full brunt of both typhoons and catch North Korean foes flat-footed: late on D-Day General MacArthur told the JCS, “Our losses are light [21 killed, 174 wounded],” and U.N. Command Communique Number 9 announced that Seoul was recaptured on September 26, 1950, slightly ahead of schedule.25 Inchon, despite geographic adversities, in short became the “jackpot spot,” as Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, the Task Force Commander, predicted and remains a classic case study of strategic as well as tactical surprise at the U.S. Marine Corps’ Amphibious Warfare School in Quantico, Virginia.
潜艇战和反潜战
SUBMARINE AND ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE
有记载的潜艇首次作为武器系统使用发生在美国独立战争期间。当时，一艘名为“海龟” （Turtle ）的单人潜艇，配备手动螺旋桨，试图在纽约港击沉英国战舰“鹰” （HMS Eagle），但未能成功。1864年，一艘名为“汉利”（Hunley）的六人潜艇，悬挂着南方邦联旗帜，艇首装有一枚鱼雷，撞沉了正在封锁南卡罗来纳州查尔斯顿的联邦护卫舰“豪萨托尼克”（Housatonic）。1915年，配备柴油发动机、蓄电池和自航鱼雷的德国U型潜艇发动了一场“见即击沉”的战役，最终导致数百艘盟军舰船沉没，其中包括载有1198名男女老幼的库纳德远洋客轮“卢西塔尼亚”（Lusitania）。自此以后，潜艇和反潜作战部队在独特的地理环境中展开了日益复杂的捉迷藏游戏。
The first recorded use of submarines as a weapon system occurred during the American Revolution when the Turtle, a one-man model with a hand-operated screw propeller, unsuccessfully sought to sink HMS Eagle, a British man-of-war, in New York harbor. The six-man Hunley flying a Confederate flag and armed with one torpedo attached to the bow, rammed and sank the Housatonic, a Federal corvette that was blockading Charleston, South Carolina, in 1864. German U-boats equipped with diesel engines, storage batteries, and self-propelled torpedoes implemented a “sink on sight” campaign in 1915 that eventually sent hundreds of Allied ships to the bottom, including the Cunard ocean liner Lusitania with 1,198 men, women, and children aboard. Submarines and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces have played increasingly sophisticated games of hide-and-seek ever since in a unique geographic medium.
潜艇。每位潜艇艇长的雄心壮志都是在巡逻中不被发现，并毫发无损地完成既定任务。他们只有能够欺骗那些在潜艇出港时就埋伏在那里追踪其踪迹的敌方侦察人员，然后悄无声息地消失，才能实现这一目标。远离目标、独自巡逻的远程导弹潜艇比那些必须进入鱼雷射程的潜艇更难被发现，但所有航行中的潜艇都会发出能量信号，造成热扰动，在其湍流尾迹中留下死亡微生物的生物痕迹，并扰乱海洋中的紫外线辐射。核动力潜艇吸入海水冷却反应堆，然后排出温热的残留物，这些残留物上升到水面，留下“热痕”。高速机动的大型潜艇会留下最明显的“特征”。26
Submarines. The ambition of every submarine skipper is to remain undetected on patrol and accomplish assigned missions unscathed. They can achieve those aspirations only if able to deceive enemy snoopers positioned to pick up the trail when they leave port, then disappear without a trace. Long-range missile submarines that maintain solitary vigils far from their targets are more difficult to find than those that must approach within torpedo range, but all submarines in motion emit energy signals, cause thermal disruptions, leave biological tracks of dying microorganisms in their turbulent wake, and disturb ultraviolet radiations in the sea. Nuclear-powered submarines ingest salt water to cool reactors, then discharge warm residue that rises to the surface where it leaves “thermal scars.” Large submarines that maneuver at high speeds leave the most obvious “signatures.”26
潜艇在深海中航行会削弱其与远距离总部交换信息和接收指令的能力，而这种近乎“无声”的通信方式在近距离观察者面前却极其显眼。一位艇长在谨慎地升起潜望镜时，发现一群海鸥在他穿越敌方船队时紧随其后。一种替代方案是投放一次性浮标，这些浮标可以在自毁前发送预先设定的、可选择多种频率的“脉冲”信息。然而，所有这些方案都容易被截获，而且截获的信息可以追溯到源头。潜艇可以通过中断深海活动并重新部署到近海，在超过1000英里（1650公里）或更远的距离上，按预定时间表接收甚低频（VLF）通信。重复广播让舰长有多次联系机会，从而提高了操作灵活性，但窄VLF频段拥挤，传输速度不比电报快，无法进行双向通信，发送方也无法确认收件人是否收到了他们的消息。相比之下，极低频（ELF）无线电几乎可以向世界各地深海潜艇发送强信号。然而，所需的大型装置成本高昂且易受攻击，操作程序繁琐，而且出于政治、社会和环境方面的考虑，任何此类项目都遭到批评。28
Immersion in the ocean inhibits the ability of the almost “silent service” to exchange information with and receive instructions from far distant headquarters. Transmission modes that trail antennae on the surface are dead giveaways if observers are nearby; one captain who cautiously raised his periscope discovered a flock of sea gulls riding behind him as he crisscrossed an enemy convoy. One alternative is to float expendable buoys that can send preprogrammed “burst” messages with a wide choice of frequencies before they self-destruct. All options, however, are susceptible to intercepts that are traceable back to the source. Submarines can receive Very Low Frequency (VLF) traffic on set schedules at ranges that exceed 1,000 miles (1,650 kilometers) or more, provided they interrupt activities in the deep and reposition near the surface. Repeat broadcasts that give captains more than one chance to make contact foster operational flexibility, but the narrow VLF band is congested, transmissions are no faster than telegraphy, reciprocal communications are impossible, and senders cannot verify whether addressees received their messages.27 Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) radios, in contrast, can send strong signals to deeply submerged submarines almost anywhere around the world. The huge installations required, however, are costly and vulnerable, procedures are ponderous, and critics oppose any such project on political, social, and environmental grounds.28
反潜部队。尽管反潜部队拥有种类繁多的监视和武器系统，但他们在这场致命的捉迷藏游戏中仍远未取得胜利。即便相关官员投入巨资进行研发，也鲜有乐观者预测科学技术很快就能让海洋变得透明。许多专家认为其他替代方案“不可靠”，因此声学传感器是他们最青睐的选择。然而，即使是那些探索所有可能性的人，也会遇到令人匪夷所思的障碍。声学设备尤其适用于远程探测，但必须浸没在水中，保持静止或缓慢移动，否则水动力噪声会淹没传入的声音，使人难以区分真实信号和干扰信号。声波在盐水中传播水平距离很远，衰减很小，只有扩散和吸收。但如果传感器位于水层，而潜艇位于水层，温度、盐度和压力差异很大，那么弯曲和折射就会扭曲信号。29
Antisubmarine (ASW) Forces. ASW forces are by no means assured victory in their deadly game of hide and seek, despite the vast array of surveillance and weapon systems at their disposal. Not many optimists predict that science and technology will soon render oceans transparent, no matter how much money responsible officials devote to research and development (R&D). Acoustical sensors are most popular among many specialists who consider alternatives “unsound,” but even those who pursue the full spectrum of possibilities encounter mind-boggling obstacles. Acoustical devices, which are particularly useful for long-range detection, must be submerged, remain stationary, or move slowly through the water lest hydrodynamic noises drown out incoming sounds that make it hard to differentiate legitimate indications from distractions. Ducted sounds travel great horizontal distances in salt water with little attenuation other than spreading and absorption, but bending and refraction distort signals if sensors are located in one layer and submarines in another where temperature, salinity, and pressure are quite different.29
远程瞭望员将敌方潜艇定位在约 50 平方英里（130 平方公里）半径范围内后，短程声学和非声学监视设备会进一步缩小搜索范围。通常情况下，许多互补系统会协同工作进行搜索，计算机记录每一个动作，经验丰富的分析人员则负责解读结果。飞机可能会投放数十个声呐浮标，在不同深度进行监听，有时还会携带潜水温度计。水深仪用于测试局部水层温度并估算采石场的可能深度。磁异常探测器用于探测潜艇对地球磁场造成的扰动。其他设备则试图发现电异常、生物发光、润滑油泄漏、放射性微量元素以及到达水面的所谓“开尔文尾流”。30
Short-range acoustic and nonacoustic surveillance devices narrow the search after long-range lookouts locate enemy submarines within a radius of 50 square miles (130 square kilometers) or so. Many complementary systems commonly conduct the search while computers record every action and skilled analysts interpret results. Aircraft may drop dozens of sonobuoys to listen at various depths, perhaps along with submersible thermometers (bathographs) to test the temperature of local water layers and estimate the quarry’s likely depth. Magnetic anomaly detectors search for distortions that submarines make in Earth’s magnetic field. Other equipment tries to spot electrical aberrations, bioluminescence, leaking lubricants, radioactive trace elements, and so-called “Kelvin wakes” that reach the surface.30
目前所有已部署或正在研发中的反潜作战系统都存在严重的局限性。没有任何一种现有组合能够克服所有地理障碍。因此，根据大多数权威人士的观点，在出现重大技术突破之前，海洋很可能仍将保持不透明的状态，而很少有专家预测这种突破会在短期内出现。
All ASW systems now deployed or on drawing boards nevertheless have serious limitations. No current combination can overcome all geographic obstacles. Oceans, according to most well-informed opinion, thus seem likely to remain opaque pending major technological breakthroughs that few pundits predict at any early date.
要点
KEY POINTS
• 海水的特性影响着从船舶设计到海洋和邻近海域水面上下各种作业方式的每一项海军活动。
• The characteristics of salt water influence every naval activity from ship design to employment practices above, on, and beneath the surface of oceans and contiguous seas.
• 雷达、可见光、红外线和短波无线电信号会从海洋和海面反射回来，而声音在水中传播效果很好。
• Radar, visible light, infrared, and short-wave radio signals rebound from ocean and sea surfaces, whereas sound transmits well in water.
• 洋流、潮汐、波浪、涌浪和海冰对海军计划、方案和行动有着重大影响。
• Currents, tides, waves, swell, and sea ice strongly influence naval plans, programs, and operations.
• 当两栖部队和后勤人员必须在无法使用港口设施的情况下完成指定任务时，海滩的特征和进出路线是他们最关心的问题。
• Beach characteristics and approaches thereto are primary concerns of amphibious forces and of logisticians whenever they must accomplish assigned missions without access to port facilities.
• 海峡和其他靠近重要海上交通线的咽喉要道通常是旨在关闭或保持其畅通的军事计划和行动的目标。
• Straits and other choke points adjacent to important sea lines of communication often are the objectives of military plans and operations designed to close them or keep them open.
• 船舶设计师不断努力克服海水、巨浪和冰的有害影响，而这些条件是民用船舶很少遇到的。
• Naval architects constantly struggle to overcome the pernicious effects of salt water, heavy seas, and ice under conditions that civilian ships seldom experience.
• 潜艇和反潜作战发生在独特的环境中，除了水面水兵所需的知识外，还需要具备深入的海洋学知识。
• Submarine and antisubmarine warfare transpire in a unique environment that demands intimate oceanographic knowledge in addition to that required of surface sailors.
笔记
NOTES
1. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr.，《军事和海军名言词典》（马里兰州安纳波利斯：美国海军学院，1966 年），第 289 页。
1. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1966), 289.
2.马修·F·莫里，《海洋的自然地理》（纽约：哈珀兄弟出版社，1855 年）。后续详述，参见本杰明·达顿和埃尔伯特·S·马洛尼，《达顿航海与领航》，第14版（马里兰州安纳波利斯：美国海军学院出版社，1985 年）；罗兹·W·费尔布里奇，《海洋学百科全书》（纽约：莱因霍尔德出版社，1979 年）。
2. Matthew F. Maury, The Physical Geography of the Sea (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1855). For subsequent elaboration, see Benjamin Dutton and Elbert S. Maloney, Dutton’s Navigation and Piloting, 14th ed. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1985); Rhodes W. Fairbridge, The Encyclopedia of Oceanography (New York: Reinhold, 1979).
3.关于海水属性，参见 Harold V. Thurman，《海洋学导论》，第 2版（俄亥俄州哥伦布市：Charles E Merrill 出版社，1978 年），第 25-46 页；Richard A. Davis, Jr.，《海洋学原理》（马萨诸塞州雷丁市：Addison Wesley 出版社，1972 年），第 69-73 页、134-181 页；PJ Gates 和 NM Lynn，《船舶、潜艇和海洋》（伦敦：Brassey's 出版社，1990 年），第 18-24 页、85-89 页；William L. Donn，《海洋应用气象学》（纽约：McGraw-Hill 出版社，1946 年），第 384-386 页；Leonard Engel，《海洋》（纽约：Time-Life Books 出版社，1969 年），第 10-12 页、79-80 页。
3. For sea water attributes, see Harold V. Thurman, Introductory Oceanography, 2d ed. (Columbus, OH: Charles E Merrill, 1978), 25-46; Richard A. Davis, Jr., Principles of Oceanography (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1972), 69-73, 134-181; P. J. Gates and N. M. Lynn, Ships, Submarines, and the Sea (London: Brassey’s, 1990), 18-24, 85-89; William L. Donn, Meteorology With Marine Applications (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946), 384-386; Leonard Engel, The Sea (New York: Time-Life Books, 1969), 10-12, 79-80.
4 . PJ Gates 和 NM Lynn，《船舶、潜艇和海洋》，132-133；唐纳德·C·丹尼尔 (Donald C. Daniel)，“核时代的反潜战”，Orbis 28，第 1 期。 3（1984 年秋季）：530-533。
4. P. J. Gates and N. M. Lynn, Ships, Submarines, and the Sea, 132-133; Donald C. Daniel, “Antisubmarine Warfare in the Nuclear Age,” Orbis 28, no. 3 (Fall 1984): 530-533.
5.关于海面行为，请参阅 Davis, Jr.，《海洋学原理》，第 74-133 页；Thurman，《海洋学导论》，第 183-272 页；Donn，《海洋应用气象学》，第 396-408 页；Gates 和 Lynn，《船舶、潜艇和海洋》，第 85-106 页；Engel，《海洋》，第 77-78 页、88-92 页。
5. For sea surface behavior, see Davis, Jr., Principles of Oceanography, 74-133; Thurman, Introduction to Oceanography, 183-272; Donn, Meteorology With Marine Applications, 396-408; Gates and Lynn, Ships, Submarines, and the Sea, 85-106; Engel, The Sea, 77-78, 88-92.
6. JFC Fuller，《西方世界军事史》，第 1 卷（纽约：Funk and Wagnals，1955 年），第 1 章。
6. J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, vol. 1 (New York: Funk and Wagnals, 1955), chapter 1.
7.引文出自恩格尔，《海洋》，第 89 页。
7. The quotation is from Engel, The Sea, 89.
8.有关海洋地形，请参阅 Davis, Jr. 的《海洋学原理》，第 19-40 页、第 289-377 页；Harold V. Thurman 的《海洋学导论》，第 65-102 页、第 139-156 页。
8. For marine topography, see Davis, Jr., Principles of Oceanography, 19-40, 289-377; Harold V. Thurman, Introductory Oceanography, 65-102, 139-156.
9. FM 30-10：地形分析（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1972 年 3 月 27 日，第 73-80、126、139、141 页（已被 FM 5-33 取代，标题相同，1990 年 7 月，但早期版本包含有关海滩和进出路线的更详细信息）。
9. FM 30-10: Terrain Analysis (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, March 27, 1972, 73-80, 126, 139, 141 (superseded by FM 5-33, same title, July 1990, but the earlier edition contains more detailed information about beaches and approaches).
10. Orr Kelly，《勇敢的男人，黑暗的水：海豹突击队不为人知的故事》（加利福尼亚州诺瓦托：Presidio出版社，1992年）；其中几章的部分内容涉及海滩侦察任务。
10. Orr Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Water: The Untold Story of Navy SEALs (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992); parts of several chapters address beach reconnaissance missions.
11. Engel，《海洋》，第 34-35 页，第 131-143 页。
11. Engel, The Sea, 34-35, 131-143.
12.部分海峡的描述见A/Con/13/16：《海洋法会议筹备文件》（纽约：联合国，1957年）；《海洋主权》（华盛顿特区：美国国务院，1965年）。关于一项区域分析，参见约翰·H·诺尔与戴维·格雷戈里合著的《咽喉要道：东南亚的海洋经济问题》（华盛顿特区：美国国防大学出版社与海军分析中心合作出版，1996年）。
12. Selected straits are described in A/Con/13/16: Preparatory Paper for Conference on Law of the Sea (New York: United Nations, 1957); Sovereignty of the Sea (Washington, DC: Dept. of State, 1965). For one regional analysis, see John H. Noer with David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press in cooperation with the Center for Naval Analyses, 1996).
13.艾伦·穆尔黑德，《加里波利》（纽约：哈珀出版社，1956年）。
13. Alan Moorehead, Gallipoli (New York: Harper, 1956).
14. Kelly Couturier，“亲车臣枪手劫持渡轮”，《华盛顿邮报》，1996 年 1 月 17 日，A1、A20 版。
14. Kelly Couturier, “Pro-Chechen Gunmen Seize Ferry,” Washington Post, January 17, 1996, A1, A20.
15. 1974 年苏伊士运河打捞作业（华盛顿特区：由Booz , Allen and Hamilton 和 Sea Salvage, Inc. 为海军部编写，1975 年）。
15. Suez Canal Salvage Operations in 1974 (Washington, DC: prepared for Dept. of the Navy by Booz, Allen and Hamilton and Sea Salvage, Inc., 1975).
16.汤姆·克兰西，《猎杀红色十月》（马里兰州安纳波利斯：美国海军学院出版社，1984 年）。
16. Tom Clancy, The Hunt for Red October (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1984).
17. John M. Collins，《美苏军事平衡，1980-1985》（华盛顿特区：Pergamon-Brassey's，1985 年），第 145-151 页。
17. John M. Collins, The U.S.-Soviet Military Balance, 1980-1985 (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1985), 145-151.
18. Charles H. Sinex 和 Robert S. Winokur，“影响近岸战场军事行动的环境因素”，约翰·霍普金斯大学应用物理实验室技术文摘14，第 2 期（1993 年）。
18. Charles H. Sinex and Robert S. Winokur, “Environmental Factors Affecting Military Operations in the Littoral Battlespace,” Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest 14, no. 2 (1993).
19.船舶设计部分主要参考了 PJ Gates 和 NM Lynn 的《船舶、潜艇和海洋》第 24-46 页、第 65-84 页。
19. The section on ship design relies mainly on P. J. Gates and N. M. Lynn, Ships, Submarines, and the Sea, 24-46, 65-84.
20. Alfred Vagts，《从古代到 1945 年的登陆作战》（宾夕法尼亚州哈里斯堡：军事服务出版社，1946 年）；Joseph H. Alexander 和 Merrill L. Bartlett，《冷战中的海兵：1945-1991 年两栖作战》（马里兰州安纳波利斯：美国海军学院出版社，1995 年）；Theodore L. Garchel，《在水边：防御现代两栖突击》（马里兰州安纳波利斯：美国海军学院出版社，1996 年）。
20. Alfred Vagts, Landing Operations from Antiquity to 1945 (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co., 1946); Joseph H. Alexander and Merrill L. Bartlett, Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare 1945-1991 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1995); Theodore L. Garchel, At the Water’s Edge: Defending Against Modern Amphibious Assault (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1996).
21. CE Lucas Phillips，《史上最伟大的突袭》（波士顿：Little, Brown出版社，1960年）；Leonce Peillard，《击沉提尔皮茨号！》（纽约：GP Putnam's Sons出版社，1968年）。
21. C. E. Lucas Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960); Leonce Peillard, Sink the Tirpitz! (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1968).
22. Joseph H. Alexander，《极度野蛮：塔拉瓦的三天》（马里兰州安纳波利斯：美国海军学院出版社，1995 年）。
22. Joseph H. Alexander, Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1995).
23. Walt Sheldon，《赴汤蹈火》（纽约：麦克米伦出版社，1968 年）；Robert Debs Heinl，《高潮中的胜利：仁川-首尔战役》（纽约：JB Lippincott 出版社，1968 年），第 18-121 页。
23. Walt Sheldon, Hell or High Water (New York: Macmillan, 1968); Robert Debs Heinl, Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1968), 18-121.
24. J. Lawton Collins，《和平时期的战争：朝鲜战争的历史和教训》（波士顿：霍顿·米夫林出版社，1969 年），第 114-137 页。
24. J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 114-137.
25.同上，第155页，收录了麦克阿瑟将军的引言。另见T.R.费伦巴赫，《这种战争》（纽约：麦克米伦出版社，1963年），第15章。
25. Ibid., 155, contains General MacArthur’s quotation. See also T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (New York: Macmillan, 1963), chapter 15.
26. Daniel，“核时代的反潜战”，528、535-540。
26. Daniel, “Antisubmarine Warfare in the Nuclear Age,” 528, 535-540.
27. WTT Packingham，“潜艇作战的指挥与控制”，《海军部队》 6，第 2 期（1985 年春季）：50-53；Robert J. Carlin，“与沉默的部队沟通”，《美国海军学会会刊》 107，第 12 期（1981 年 12 月）：75-78。
27. W. T. T. Packingham, ’The Command and Control of Submarine Operations,” Naval Forces 6, no 2 (Spring 1985): 50-53; Robert J. Carlin, “Communicating with the Silent Service,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 107, no. 12 (December 1981): 75-78.
28. “美国政府问责局称，ELF 通信系统并非必要，可能也无法运行”，《航空航天日报》，1979 年 3 月 22 日，第 107 页（引用美国政府问责局的机密报告《海军战略通信系统》，PSAD-79-48）；《海员 ELF 通信系统选址和测试运行最终评估影响声明》（华盛顿特区：海军部，1977 年 12 月）。
28. “ELF Communications System Isn’t Needed, Might Not Work, GAO Says,” Aerospace Daily, March 22, 1979, 107 (cites GAO classified report, The Navy’s Strategic Communications System, PSAD-79-48); Seafarer ELF Communications System Final Evaluation Impact Statement for Site Selection and Test Operation (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Navy, December 1977).
29. Robert S. Winokur 和 Craig E. Dorman，“反潜战与海军海洋学”，《海洋学》 33，第 4 期（1990/91 年冬季）：20-30；《海军应用海洋学和水下声学》（华盛顿，美国海军海洋局海洋科学部海洋分析处，1965 年 10 月）；Daniel，“核时代的反潜战”，530-533；Jonathan B. Tucker，“深海冷战”，《高科技》（1985 年 7 月）：29-35。
29. Robert S. Winokur and Craig E. Dorman, “Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval Oceanography,” Oceanus 33, no. 4 (Winter 1990/91): 20-30; Oceanography and Underwater Sound for Naval Applications (Washington, Oceanographic Analysis Division, Marine Sciences Dept., U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office, October 1965); Daniel, “Antisubmarine Warfare in the Nuclear Age,” 530-533; Jonathan B. Tucker, “Cold War in the Ocean Depths,” High Technology (July 1985): 29-35.
30. Tom Stefanick，“潜艇的非声学探测”，《科学美国人》 258，第3期（1988年3月）：41-47；Paul Seully-Power和Robert F. Stevenson，“吞下透明药丸”，《美国海军学会会刊》 113，第12期（1987年12月）：150-152；Thomas B. Allen和Norman Polmar，“无声的追逐”，《纽约时报杂志》，1984年1月1日，13-17，26-27；Daniel，“核时代的反潜战”，535-545。
30. Tom Stefanick, “The Nonacoustic Detection of Submarines,” Scientific American 258, no. 3 (March 1988): 41-47; Paul Seully-Power and Robert F. Stevenson, “Swallowing the Transparency Pill,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 113, no. 12 (December 1987): 150-152; Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, “The Silent Chase,” New York Times Magazine, January 1, 1984, 13-17, 26-27; Daniel, “Antisubmarine Warfare in the Nuclear Age,” 535-545.
5. 地球大气层
5. EARTH’S ATMOSPHERE
风雨无阻，无论是下雪、下雨、酷暑还是夜幕降临，都无法阻止这些信使迅速完成他们指定的任务。
Neither snow, nor rain, nor heat, nor gloom of night stays these couriers from the swift completion of their appointed rounds.
美国邮政署的座右铭，
改编自希罗多德的名言
Motto of the U.S. Postal Service,
adapted from Herodotus
地球大气层如同陆地和海洋一样，是一种独特的地理介质。在其中作战的武装部队必须在恶劣天气下执行比递送信件和包裹的公务员更广泛的任务。1944年12月，在阿登战役期间，当上帝似乎一直在偏袒他的对手时，乔治·S·巴顿将军便开始祈祷。 “长官，”他恳求道，“我是巴顿。过去十四天简直是人间炼狱。雨，雪，雨，雪——我开始怀疑你们司令部到底在搞什么鬼。你们到底站在哪一边？……我不会提出不可能的要求……我只请求四天晴天……这样我的战斗轰炸机才能轰炸扫射，我的侦察机才能为我威力强大的炮兵部队选定目标。给我四天时间，让我把这该死的泥泞晒干。”1上帝是否应允了他的请求尚有争议，但第二天天气转好，盟军空军扭转了战局，德军攻势受阻，盟军地面部队恢复了进攻。2
EARTH’S ATMOSPHERE, LIKE LAND AND SEA, IS A DISTINCTIVE GEOGRAPHIC MEDIUM. ARMED FORCES THAT operate therein must perform a much wider range of missions in foul weather than civil servants who deliver letters and packages. General George S. Patton, Jr., resorted to prayer during the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, when God seemed to be giving all the breaks to his opponents. “Sir,” he beseeched, “this is Patton talking. The last fourteen days have been straight hell. Rain, snow, more rain, more snow— and I’m beginning to wonder what’s going on in your headquarters. Whose side are You on, anyway? ... I am not going to ask for the impossible ... all I request is four days of clear weather... so that my fighter-bombers can bomb and strafe, so that my reconnaissance may pick out targets for my magnificent artillery. Give me four days to dry out this blasted mud.”1 Whether God granted his request is debatable, but good weather broke the following day, Allied air power tipped the balance favorably, the German drive stalled, and Allied ground forces resumed the offensive.2
然而，指挥官不能总是指望祈祷来操控大气现象。长期规划者认为气候调查更为可靠，而着眼于短期作战的军事行动人员则高度依赖气象观测，这些观测必须及时、准确，并能根据具体情况进行调整。无论结果好坏，都会影响军事战略、战术、部队发展、任务编组、战备状态、士气和作战表现。
Commanders, however, cannot consistently count on prayers to manipulate atmospheric phenomena. Long-range planners find climatological surveys more reliable, while military operators, who take shorter views, lean heavily on meteorological observations that must be timely, accurate, and tailored to specific circumstances. Results, for good or ill, influence military strategies, tactics, force development, task organizations, readiness, morale, and performance.
大气现象
ATMOSPHERIC PHENOMENA
地球大气层的一半位于海平面到 4500 米（15000 英尺）之间。接下来的 6000 米（20000 英尺）左右包含了剩余大气层的一半。大多数具有军事意义的大气现象都发生在这个大气层内部或其边缘：气压、风、气流、温度、湿度、雾、云、降水和风暴。3
Half of Earth’s atmosphere lies between sea level and 15,000 feet (4,500 meters). The next 20,000 feet or so (6,000 meters) contains half of the remainder. Most militarily significant atmospheric phenomena develop within that envelope or along its periphery: barometric pressures, winds, air currents, temperatures, humidity, fog, clouds, precipitation, and storms.3
气压
BAROMETRIC PRESSURE
国际权威机构将“正常”大气压定义为赤道南北纬45度平均海平面处每平方英寸14.7磅（标准气压计读数为29.2英寸或1013.2毫巴）。然而，地球表面不规则的加热会导致大气压出现显著偏差。相对较高的气压常年环绕着南北两极，那里的空气始终寒冷而稠密；相对较低的气压则主要分布在热带地区，那里的空气始终温暖而稀薄；而高低气压交替出现的区域则自西向东移动，给天气预报员带来诸多难题，因为中纬度地区的气温变化无常。虽然例外情况很多，但通常情况下，高气压穹顶下晴空万里，而低气压则预示着恶劣天气。由于空气密度随海拔升高而逐渐降低，大气压在各地都会下降。在 900 英尺（275 米）处，气压比海平面低 1/30；在 1800 英尺处，气压比 900 英尺处低 1/30，依此类推。
International authorities define “normal” atmospheric pressure as 14.7 pounds per square inch at mean sea level 45 degrees north and south of the Equator (29.2 inches or 1013.2 millibars on standard barometers). Irregular heating of Earth’s surface, however, causes significant deviations. Relatively high pressures permanently surround both poles, where the air always is cold and dense; relatively low pressures predominate in the tropics, where the air always is warm and light; and alternating pockets of high and low pressure that give forecasters fits travel from west to east in middle latitudes, where variable temperatures prevail. Exceptions to the rule are plentiful, but clear skies usually accompany high pressure domes, whereas depressions presage poor weather. Atmospheric pressures everywhere decrease with altitude, since the air becomes progressively thinner. Barometric pressures are one-thirtieth less at 900 feet (275 meters) than at sea level, one-thirtieth less at 1,800 feet than at 900 feet, and so on.
风和气流
WINDS AND AIR CURRENTS
地表风像水流下山一样，从高压区吹向低压区。坡度陡峭的地方风速最快，因为短距离内气压变化剧烈；坡度平缓的地方风速最慢，因为长距离内气压变化缓慢。一般来说，开阔水域上的风比平坦陆地上的风更稳定、更强劲，因为陆地表面的摩擦力不仅限制了风速，还会产生独特的效应（参见第54页表4和第71页表5，了解海上和陆地上的风力对比）。阵风在最大风速和最小风速之间波动10节或以上时，会产生水平湍流，这种湍流方向变化无常，在约1500英尺（450米）的高度范围内会变得“颠簸”，之后表面摩擦力的影响明显减弱。
Surface winds blow from high toward low pressure like water flows down hill, fastest where gradients are steep because great pressure changes occur over short distances, slowest where slopes are gradual because slight changes transpire over long distances. Winds as a rule are steadier and stronger over open water than over level land, where surface friction not only limits velocities but produces distinctive effects (see table 4 on page 54 and table 5 on page 71 for comparative consequences at sea and ashore). Gusts that fluctuate 10 knots or more between minimum and maximum velocities create horizontal turbulence that changes direction erratically and becomes “bumpier” up to about 1,500 feet (450 meters), after which the influence of surface friction is noticeably less pronounced.
地表风具有独特的特性。例如，温暖的日子里，轻盈的空气会沿着山坡向上流动；而夜幕降临后，冷空气则会向下流动。海风会吹向白天形成的局部低气压系统，然后在夜幕降临时转向，因为陆地升温和冷却的速度比水更快（图14）。出于类似的原因，席卷南亚的季风也会季节性地改变风向，而不是每日改变。一些拥有奇特名称的局部风，例如博拉风、布兰风、奇努克风、厄尔尼诺风、焚风、坎辛风、密斯特拉风、圣安娜风、沙马尔风和西罗科风，在不同地区以不同的组合方式带来冷热、干湿两种天气状况。飓风、台风以及穿过山口或从格陵兰冰盖呼啸而过的强风，通常都能达到惊人的速度。
Surface winds are individualistic. Light air, for example, flows up slopes on warm days, whereas cool air drains downhill after dark. Sea breezes blow toward locally low pressure systems that develop during daylight hours, then face about when night falls because land heats and cools faster than water (figure 14). Monsoonal winds that visit southern Asia reverse their fields seasonally rather than daily for similar reasons. Local winds that bear such exotic names as Bora, Buran, Chinook, El Nino, Föhn, Khamsin, Mistral, Santa Ana, Shamal, and Sirocco blow hot and cold, wet and dry, in various locales and various combinations. Hurricanes, typhoons, and winds that funnel through mountain passes or roar off Greenland’s ice cap commonly atttain terrifying speeds.
高空风与地面风截然不同。地表摩擦引起的湍流消失了，但垂直于主气流的强劲上下气流产生的跷跷板效应常常使飞机难以操控。强烈的风切变也可能出现在强气流的边界处，这些气流有时会在彼此上方和下方以相反的方向疾驰。两条蜿蜒的急流，一条位于北半球，另一条位于南半球，交替地在30,000至40,000英尺（9,000至12,000米）的高度上向赤道和两极盘旋。在中纬度地区，从西向东飞行的军用飞机机组人员会利用冬季可达160节的顺风（天气温暖时为90-100节），从而避免返程时遭遇逆风。
Winds aloft are notably different. Turbulence due to surface friction disappears, but seesaw effects from powerful up-down drafts perpendicular to the main airflow often make aircraft unmanageable. Intense shearing also can occur along boundaries between strong currents that sometimes race in opposite directions above and below one another. Two serpentine jet streams, one in the Northern Hemisphere and a twin in the south, alternately loop toward the Equator and the poles at altitudes that vary from 30,000 to 40,000 feet (9,000 to 12,000 meters). Military air crews headed from west to east in middle latitudes take advantage of tail winds therein that reach 160 knots during winter months (90-100 knots when weather is warm) and avoid bucking head winds on return trips.
Table 5. Beaufort Scale Related to Surface Winds Ashore
温度
TEMPERATURE
地球表面附近的气温通常以华氏度 (°F) 或摄氏度 (°C) 为单位，但高层大气报告始终使用摄氏度。军事指挥官和参谋人员特别关注日平均最高气温和最低气温以及极端气温，这些指标反映了军队在任何特定月份可能遇到的最热和最冷天气（表 6）。在某些作战区域，气温低于冰点的天数非常重要，尤其是在考虑风寒效应的情况下。（表7）显示了低温和气流对裸露人体皮肤的综合影响，其中考虑了“真实”风速。例如，乘坐敞篷车以20英里/小时（32公里/小时）行驶的人员，如果遇到10英里/小时（16公里/小时）的逆风，则会感受到相当于30英里/小时（48公里/小时）的颠簸。螺旋桨飞机的回流气流会在气温降至冰点以下很久之前就使地勤人员患上严重的疟疾，因此警觉的指挥官会采取适当的预防措施。局部逆温会使寒冷沉重的空气沿陡坡向下流动，但通常情况下，海拔每升高1000英尺（300米），气温就会下降3.5华氏度。读数以该速度下降到大约 35,000 英尺（10,670 米）的高度，华氏温度计通常在此高度显示 -60°F 至 -65°F，然后保持或多或少恒定，直至平均高度 120,000 英尺（36,575 米），超过大多数军用飞机的极限。
Air temperatures near Earth’s surface usually are measured in degrees Fahrenheit (°F) or degrees Celsius (°C), but upper atmosphere reports always cite Celsius. Military commanders and staffs express special interest in mean daily maximum and minimum temperatures as well as temperature extremes, which indicate the hottest and coldest weather that armed forces might encounter in any given month (table 6). The number of days below freezing is important in some operational areas, especially when coupled with wind chill factors (table 7), which indicate the combined effects of low temperatures and circulating air on exposed human flesh, taking “true” wind speeds into account. Personnel riding in open vehicles at 20 miles (32 kilometers) per hour, for example, experience the equivalent of a 30 mph (48 kph) buffeting if they buck 10 mph head winds. Back blasts by propeller-driven aircraft can give ground crews a bad case of ague long before thermometer readings dip below freezing, so alert commanders take appropriate precautions. Local inversions make cold, heavy air drain down steep slopes, but air temperatures as a rule decrease 3.5 °F with every 1,000-foot (300-meter) increase in elevation above sea level. Readings drop at that rate up to 35,000 feet (10,670 meters) or so, where Fahrenheit thermometers generally register between -60 °F and -65°F, then remain more or less constant up to an average altitude of 120,000 feet (36,575 meters), beyond the limit of most military aircraft.
Figure 14. Land and Sea Breeze Regimes
改编自 William L. Donn 的《海洋气象学》。
Adapted from William L. Donn, Meteorology with Marine Applications.
Table 6. Militarily Important Temperature Statistics (A typical table in degrees Fahrenheit)
相对湿度
RELATIVE HUMIDITY
“不是热，是湿”这句古老的谚语，实际上，这两个大气要素密不可分。绝对湿度，定义为每立方英尺或每立方米空气中水蒸气的体积，在沙漠中几乎为零，而在一些潮湿地区则高达4%或5%。相对湿度是指实际水蒸气含量与最大可能含量的百分比，在温暖的空气中最高。当空气中的水蒸气含量和容量相等时，空气达到饱和状态（相对湿度100%）。进一步冷却后，水蒸气会从气态凝结成液态或固态。水滴（露水）或冰晶（霜）随后在空气中或地球表面形成，通常发生在黄昏和黎明之间。
“It’s not the heat, it’s the humidity,” is an age-old adage, but those two atmospheric elements in fact are inseparable. Absolute humidity, defined as the volume of water vapor in a cubic foot or cubic meter of air, varies from nearly nil in deserts to four or five percent in some soggy climes. Relative humidity is the percentage of vapor present compared with the maximum amount possible, which is greatest in warm air. Saturation (100 percent relative humidity) occurs when contents and capacities become equal. Condensation from gaseous to liquid or solid states follows further cooling. Water droplets (dew) or ice crystals (frost) then form in the air or on Earth’s surface, often between dusk and dawn.
大多数人觉得温度计显示 90 华氏度（32 摄氏度）时，只要相对湿度保持在 20% 左右，环境就比较舒适。但如果空气中的水蒸气含量达到 60% 或更高，同样的温度就会让人汗流浃背，因为在这种环境下，降水和汗液都很难快速蒸发，除非有微风吹拂，否则身体很难散热。潮湿寒冷的环境同样令人难以忍受。二战期间，刺骨的寒风和潮湿的天气让争夺阿留申群岛控制权的美国和日本军队苦不堪言；而最近，在争夺福克兰群岛/马尔维纳斯群岛主权的战斗中，英国和阿根廷军队也同样饱受折磨。
Most humans find conditions acceptable when thermometers register 90 °F (32 °C), as long as relative humidity stands, say, at 20 percent, but that same temperature produces a sweat box when water vapor in the air reaches 60 percent or more, because neither precipitation nor perspiration evaporates rapidly in such environments and bodies cool slowly unless wafted by breeze. Damp cold also is debilitating. Bone-chilling winds and wet weather made life miserable for U.S. and Japanese Armed Forces who contested control of the Aleutian Islands during World War II and more recently discomfited British and Argentine troops who battled to determine sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas.
云雾
CLOUDS AND FOG
云和雾是两种不同的凝结形式，都由悬浮在空气中的微小水分子组成。云高悬空中，而雾则贴近地面，但当低云接触陆地或水面时，两者便难以区分。无论其成因如何，云和雾都会在不同程度上影响能见度。
Clouds and fog are distinctive forms of condensation that consist of minute water particles suspended in air. Clouds remain aloft whereas fog hugs the surface, but the two are indistinguishable whenever low-lying clouds touch land or water and both obscurants limit visibility in various degrees regardless of their origin.
雾。地面雾通常在凉爽、平静、晴朗的夜晚形成，最先出现在低洼地带，并在低洼处达到最浓，然后在日出后，随着风力增强、气温升高到露点以上（相对湿度100%），雾气便会消散。在被群山环绕的港口，能见度低常常导致夜间交通管制问题，因为那里的空气接近饱和，与上方冷空气接触会导致凝结。工业烟雾和其他人为空气污染物会在许多城市附近将雾转化为烟雾。（表8显示了视力为20/20的军事人员能够识别显著物体的最大距离。）
Fog. Ground fog, which most often develops on cool, calm, clear nights, appears first and becomes densest in depressions, then “burns off” after sunrise as soon as winds pick up and temperatures rise above the dew point (100 percent relative humidity). Poor visibility often causes nighttime traffic control problems in harbors surrounded by hills, because the atmosphere there is so close to saturation that contact with cool air above causes condensation. Industrial smoke and other manmade airborne pollutants convert fog into smog near many cities. (Table 8 displays maximum distances at which military personnel with 20-20 vision can identify prominent objects.)
稀薄的海雾，被称为“北极烟雾”，形成于极北和极南地区，当相对温暖的海水上升的水汽遇到冷空气时就会形成。但大约五分之四的浓雾都出现在中纬度地区，那里暖空气与冷水交汇。5到10节的微风足以将悬浮的水汽吹散但不足以驱散，这有助于在纽芬兰沿岸形成巨大的雾层，那里是墨西哥湾暖流和拉布拉多寒流的交汇处。“豌豆汤”般的浓雾偶尔会在冬季笼罩不列颠群岛和西北欧部分地区，当时温暖潮湿的空气覆盖了寒冷的陆地。
Thin maritime fog, called “arctic smoke,” forms in the far north and south when vapors rising from relatively warm water meet cold air, but perhaps four-fifths of all dense fogs at sea are found in middle latitudes where warm air collides with cool water. Light winds of 5 to 10 knots, which are strong enough to distribute but not disperse suspended vapors, help build huge fog banks off Newfoundland’s coast where the Gulf Stream and the Labrador Current intersect. “Pea soup” fog occasionally blankets the British Isles and parts of Northwestern Europe in wintertime, when warm, wet air overrides cold land.
Table 8. Fog Linked to Visibility
云。有三种基本云类型可以识别：卷云和层云，它们水平扩散；积云，它们垂直发展（表9和图15）。其他所有云都是它们的变体。由冰晶组成的纤细卷云通常占据20,000英尺（6,000米）以上稀薄干燥的空气，而层云则像薄片一样覆盖着下方的大部分或全部天空。相比之下，蓬松的、底部平坦的积云有时从底部到顶部可达30,000英尺（9,150米）甚至更高。所有中层云都带有前缀“alto”，而“nimbus”（拉丁语意为雨）则指湍流风暴云，包括飞行员尽量避开的砧状积雨云雷暴云。
Clouds. Three elemental cloud types are recognizable: cirrus and stratus, which spread horizontally; cumulus clouds, which develop vertically (table 9 and figure 15). All others are modifications. Wispy cirrus clouds composed of ice crystals habitually occupy thin, dry air above 20,000 feet (6,000 meters), whereas stratus clouds spread sheets across all or most of the sky far below. Fluffy, flat-bottomed cumulus clouds in contrast sometimes tower 30,000 feet (9,150 meters) or more from base to top. The prefix “alto” accompanies all middle level clouds, while “nimbus”—Latin for rain—designates turbulent storm clouds, including anvil-shaped cumulonimbus thunderheads that aviators try to avoid.
云量以零星云（1/8 至 4/8）、碎云（5/8 至 7/8）和阴天（8/8）来表示，决定了垂直能见度。单层云量即可反映整体情况，但两层或多层零星云或碎云也会导致阴天。最低云底高度决定了云底高度，云底高度从零到无限大不等，并且在丘陵地形上因地而异（图 16）。
Cloud cover, expressed as scattered (1/8th to 4/8ths), broken (5/8ths to 7/8ths), and overcast 8/8th), determines vertical visibility. One tier may tell the whole tale, but scattered or broken clouds on two or more levels also cause overcast conditions. The lowest cloud bases determine ceilings, which range from zero to unlimited and differ significantly from place to place over hilly terrain (figure 16).
Table 9. Cloud Classifications
沉淀
PRECIPITATION
云层持续、间歇或阵雨状降水以雨、雨夹雪、雪、冰雹或冰碛的形式降临地球，有时还会混合出现，其混合比例主要取决于气温和地表温度。降水强度从毛毛雨到倾盆大雨不等，总降水量则分为微量、少量、中等和大量。通常情况下，1英寸（2.5厘米）的降雨量相当于10英寸（25厘米）的降雪量。雨夹雪或冰雹（有时会堆积数英寸厚）以及冰碛（会将高速公路和船甲板变成临时溜冰场）没有类似的换算系数。除非降水分布均匀，否则月平均值和年平均值意义不大。军事指挥官和参谋人员需要知道四月份3英寸的降雨是均匀分布在当月的大部分时间里，还是像“沟壑倾盆”一样集中而来（喜剧演员会拿统计学家在穿越一条通常干涸的溪流时溺水身亡的故事开玩笑）。
Steady, intermittent, and showery precipitation from clouds strike Earth as rain, sleet, snow, hail, or glaze, sometimes in combinations, the mixture of which depends primarily on air and surface temperatures. Intensities range from drizzles to downpours, with total accumulations characterized as a trace, light, medium, and heavy. One inch of rain (2.5 centimeters) normally is equivalent to 10 inches of snow (25 centimeters). There are no comparable conversion factors for sleet or hail, which sometimes pile several inches deep, or for glaze that turns turnpikes and ship decks into impromptu ice skating rinks. Monthly and annual averages mean little unless precipitation is evenly distributed. Military commanders and staffs need to know whether three inches of rain in April spreads over most of that month or generally arrives as a “gully washer” (comedians chortle about the statistician who drowned while crossing a normally dry stream).
风暴
STORMS
热带气旋（飓风、台风）和锋面系统形成于中纬度地区冷暖气团交界处，其特征是低气压、强风、阴天、低云层、能见度差，降水量从涓涓细流到倾盆大雨不等。最猛烈的风暴通常在几小时（甚至几分钟）内消散，而其他风暴则会持续数天。龙卷风虽然移动轨迹不规则，但威力最大，而且很少影响军事行动，由于其持续时间短、范围小、难以预测，因此对计划和方案的影响甚微。热带气旋的典型特征是围绕平静核心（风眼）旋转的毁灭性强风，它们很少危及海上船舶和沿海或近海的军事设施，但带来阵风、切变和变幻莫测的锋面风、危险的上下气流、冰雹、暴雨和破坏性放电的雷暴却经常发生在陆地和水域上（图 17）。高耸的积雨云雷暴云有时高达 5 英里（约 8 公里），宽达 20 英里（约 32 公里），长达 60 英里（约 97 公里）（8 × 32 × 96 公里），对执行关键战时任务的军用飞机构成严重阻碍。
Tropical cyclones (hurricanes, typhoons) and frontal systems that form along the boundary between warm and cold air masses in middle latitudes feature low pressures, high winds, overcast skies, low ceilings, poor visibility, and precipitation that varies from trickles to torrents. The most violent storms usually pass in a few hours (even minutes), while others linger for days. Tornadoes that hop, skip, and jump erratically are by far the most furious, but rarely affect military operations and exert little or no influence over plans and programs because they are short-lived, localized, and unpredictable. Tropical cyclones, typified by devastating winds that circle around a calm core (the eye), only occasionally imperil ships at sea and military installations on or near seacoasts, but thunderstorms that bring gusty, shearing, shifty winds along the front, hazardous up-down drafts, hailstones, heavy rain, and destructive electrical discharges regularly occur over land and water (figure 17). Towering cumulonimbus thunderheads, which sometimes measure more than 5 miles high, 20 miles wide, and 60 miles long (8 × 32 × 96 kilometers), pose serious impediments to military aircraft in pursuit of critical wartime missions.
Figure 15. Cloud Types Depicted
Figure 16. Cloud Ceilings Related to Terrain
自然光照水平
NATURAL LIGHT LEVELS
阳光、月光和星光是自然照明的主要来源，其强度以英尺烛光 (fc) 为单位进行测量。太阳在正午时分，不受云雾遮蔽的情况下，照射到地球平坦表面的光照强度约为 10,000 fc，而类似条件下满月的光照强度仅为 0.02 fc（足以进行稳定读数的光照强度平均约为 10 英尺烛光）。
Sunshine, moonlight, and starlight are the main sources of natural illumination, which is measured in footcandles (fc). The sun at its zenith, unfiltered by clouds or fog, lights flat surfaces on Earth at about 10,000 fc compared with 0.02 fc for full moons under similar conditions (sufficient light for steady reading averages about 10 footcandles).
日光和黑暗并非大气现象，但气象参谋人员会定期向军事指挥官提供特定时间和地点的各种光照数据。相关信息包括日出日落、晨昏蒙影、月升月落、月相以及夜视设备最适用的时段。四种类型的晨昏蒙影，每一种都具有重要的军事意义，已被普遍认可：
Daylight and darkness are not atmospheric phenomena, but staff weather officers routinely furnish military commanders with a wide range of light data for particular times and places. Relevant information includes sunrise, sunset, periods of morning and evening twilight, moon rise, moon set, lunar phases, and times that night vision devices would prove most useful. Four types of twilight, each with important military implications, are recognized universally:
• 天文曙暮光，只要天空中还有可探测到的光亮，它就会持续存在。它从早晨太阳位于地平线以下 18° 时开始，持续到日出，日落后再次出现，然后一直持续到天黑。
• Astronomical twilight, which persists as long as any detectable glow remains in the sky, starts in the morning when the sun is 18° below the horizon, lasts until sunup, reappears after sundown, then remains until dark.
Figure 17. Anatomy of a Thunderstorm
•晨曦航海曙暮光（BMNT）的开始发生在日出之前，此时太阳位于地平线以下 12° 之间，此时可以辨认出大的轮廓，并且在晴朗的天气中可以看到用于导航的星星。
• The beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT) occurs before sunup when the sun is between the horizon and 12° below, at which times large silhouettes are distinguishable and stars that serve navigational purposes are visible in clear weather.
•傍晚航海暮光(EENT) 的结束发生在日落之后，此时太阳位于地平线以下 12° 之间。
• The end of evening nautical twilight (EENT) occurs after sundown when the sun is between the horizon and 12° below.
• 在民用曙暮光期间，当太阳在黎明和黄昏时位于地平线以下 6° 之间时，无需人工照明即可进行正常的户外活动。4
• Normal outdoor activities are feasible without artificial light during civil twilight, when the sun is between the horizon and 6° below at dawn and again at dusk.4
自然光照强度随纬度和季节而变化。例如，春分和秋分时，南北纬60°的民用曙暮光持续时间是赤道的两倍。北极附近地区从9月中旬到11月中旬有7周的天文曙暮光，从1月中旬到3月中旬也有7周。在严冬，这里终年黑暗；而在“午夜太阳之地”（南极洲的情况与之相反），夏季则终年白昼。位于华盛顿特区的美国海军天文台每年都会更新并发布每日的各种光照数据，以及转换系数，方便用户根据自身需求进行计算。5
Levels of natural illumination vary according to latitude and seasons of the year. Civil twilight during spring and autumn equinoxes, for example, lasts twice as long at 60° north or south as it does at the Equator. Regions near the North Pole experience 7 weeks of astronomical twilight from mid-September to mid-November, and 7 more weeks from mid-January to mid-March. Perpetual darkness prevails in the dead of winter, perpetual daylight during summertime in the “Land of the Midnight Sun” (Antarctica encounters analogous regimes in reverse order). The U.S. Naval Observatory in Washington, DC, annually updates and publishes a wide selection of light data for each day, together with conversion factors that enable users to tailor additional calculations that meet individualistic requirements.5
军事战略家的气候学
CLIMATOLOGY FOR MILITARY STRATEGISTS
气候学家汇编大气统计数据，揭示全球和区域模式。如果合格的观测员能够收集特定地点在数十年时间段内的特定数据，那么突出显示每日、每月和每年平均值和极端值的图表就会变得越来越可靠。当数据不足以解释气候现象时，必须使用插值来补充或替代事实。6
Climatologists compile atmospheric statistics that disclose global and regional patterns. Displays that highlight daily-monthly-annual means and extremes become progressively more dependable, provided qualified observers compile specified information for particular places over periods that span several decades. Interpolations must supplement or supplant facts when they do not.6
战略规划人员和项目人员关注的是下个月、明年或不确定的未来，他们是气候学的主要受益者。气候学对于必须在陌生地区执行任务的武装部队至关重要。专门的研究不仅帮助高级应急计划人员确定武器、装备、补给、服装和其他资源是否适合在可能随时承担军事责任的地区开展行动，而且还能指出哪些研发、测试、评估和采购项目最能弥合需求与能力之间的差距。战区级作战计划人员、部队建设人员和资源分配人员同样依赖气候评估。例如，时任美国驻越军事援助司令部司令的威廉·C·威斯特摩兰将军每年都会批准一系列所谓的“季风计划”，这些计划考虑到了越南山脉两侧的旱季和雨季。从10月中旬到次年3月初，东北季风将沿海平原变成泥泞沼泽，老挝和柬埔寨气候干旱。而从5月到9月，西南季风接管气候，情况则相反。7
Strategic planners and programmers, who focus their attention on next month, next year, or the indefinite future, are the principal beneficiaries of climatology, which is most important for armed forces that must prepare to implement missions in unfamiliar territory. Specialized studies not only help high-level contingency planners determine whether weapons, equipment, supplies, clothing, and other resources are well suited for operations within regions where military responsibilities might arise on short notice, but they indicate what research, development, test, evaluation, and acquisition programs would best bridge gaps between requirements and capabilities. Theater-level campaign planners, force developers, and resource allocators likewise rely on climatic assessments. General William C. Westmoreland, in his capacity as Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, for example, annually approved a series of so-called “monsoon plans” that took wet and dry seasons into account on each side of Vietnam’s mountain backbone. When the Northeast Monsoon turns coastal plains to quagmires from mid-October until early March Laos and Cambodia are dry. When the Southwest Monsoon takes over from May to September that regime reverses.7
气候分类
CLIMATOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATIONS
任何气候分类都存在缺陷，无论它侧重于降水（干旱、半干旱、温带、湿润、多雨）、温度（寒冷、温和、温暖、炎热）还是其他大气现象。以温暖气候为特征却不包含明显冬季的区域、以寒冷气候为特征却不包含明显夏季的区域，以及以四季划分的中间气候，对于实际军事应用而言都过于宽泛。“热带”并非普遍炎热（横跨赤道的肯尼亚和厄瓜多尔高原地区气候宜人凉爽）。北极圈和南极圈以北的“寒带”也并非普遍寒冷（西伯利亚东北部的维尔霍扬斯克和奥米亚基翁冬季冰天雪地，夏季却酷热难耐）。“温带”既非气候温和，也非气候均匀。那些只关注季节性或年度降水量而忽略气温的气候分类方法同样存在缺陷，因为它们没有考虑到蒸发作用，而高温会促进蒸发——伊拉克沙漠中的巴士拉明显比莫斯科以北1600公里（1000英里）的俄罗斯科拉海岸干燥得多，后者虽然降水量基本相同，但水分保持能力更强。此外，大多数气候地图的覆盖范围仅限于陆地，且边界清晰，而海洋上空的气候模式则较为独特，气候区域之间的过渡通常较为平缓。8
Every climatological classification is flawed in some respects, whether it emphasizes precipitation (arid, semi-arid, moderate, humid, wet), temperature (cold, tepid, warm, hot), or other atmospheric phenomena. Characteristically warm climes that exclude identifiable winters, cold regions that exclude identifiable summers, and intermediate climates identified by four seasons are much too broad for practical military applications. The “Torrid Zone” isn’t uniformly hot (highlands in Kenya and Ecuador, which straddle the Equator, are delightfully cool). “Frigid Zones” poleward of the Arctic and Antarctic Circles aren’t uniformly cold (Verkhoyansk and Omyakyon in northeastern Siberia are frozen solid in winter but swelter in summer). “Temperate Zones” are neither climatically moderate nor uniform. Classifications that focus on seasonal or annual precipitation at the expense of temperatures are equally faulty, because they fail to account for evaporation, which heat encourages—Basra, in the Iraqi desert, is notably drier than Russia’s Kola coast 1,000 miles (1,600 kilometers) north of Moscow, which receives essentially the same amount of moisture but retains more of it. Most climatic maps moreover limit coverage to land and show sharp boundaries, whereas distinctive patterns appear over oceans and intersections between climatic regions generally are gradual.8
军事上有用的妥协
MILITARILY USEFUL COMPROMISES
三种基本气候类型，每种类型下又细分为若干子类型，无论部队是在空中、陆地还是海上，都能很好地满足大多数军事需求：低纬度气候受赤道和热带气团控制；中纬度气候受热带和热带气团控制；极地气团；受极地和北极气团控制的高纬度气候。高地在每种情况下都会造成温度和降水异常（图 11和表 10详细说明）。9
Three basic climatic groupings with several subdivisions apiece serve most military purposes reasonably well, whether forces are aloft, ashore, or afloat: low latitude climates controlled by equatorial and tropical air masses; middle latitude climates controlled by tropical and polar air masses; high latitude climates controlled by polar and arctic air masses. Highlands create temperature and precipitation anomalies in each case (map 11 and table 10 elaborate).9
军事作战人员气象学
METEOROLOGY FOR MILITARY OPERATORS
军事指挥官若想化变幻莫测的天气为己所用，而非受其制约，就必须及时掌握各自责任区域内当前的气象状况和预期发展趋势。气象参谋人员掌握着最佳信息，能够洞悉近期未来，评估各种因素，识别明显趋势，运用过往经验，并预测特定地点在特定时间段内的气象事件。10他们的预测很少超过一周（通常为 1 或 2 天），因为尽管报告站数量激增，并且陆地、海洋、空中和太空中都有技术先进的传感器提供帮助，但长期预测的可靠性仍然不稳定。11
Military commanders who seek to make capricious weather work for rather than against them require timely, relevant information about current meteorological conditions and anticipated developments within respective areas of responsibility. Staff weather officers armed with the best available information peer into the immediate future, evaluate variables, identify apparent trends, apply past experience, then predict meteorological events at particular places for specified periods of time.10 Their prognoses seldom cover more than a week (typically 1 or 2 days), because the reliability of longer outlooks remains spotty despite the proliferation of reporting stations and assistance from technologically advanced sensors on land, at sea, in the air, and in space.11
对常规陆地战争的影响
IMPACT ON CONVENTIONAL LAND WARFARE
1776年圣诞夜，乔治·华盛顿将军故意选择暴风雨之夜，横渡冰封的特拉华河，利用突袭的策略。尽管河水汹涌，狂风呼啸，他麾下2400名饥寒交迫、衣衫褴褛的士兵被冰冷的雨水、湿雪和冰雹淋得透湿，但他依然成功渡河。第二天清晨，华盛顿将军在新泽西州特伦顿附近登陆，打了黑森雇佣军一个措手不及，仅用一个多小时就将其击败，自身仅伤亡四人。12然而，大自然母亲会惩罚那些傲慢或无知地无视天气的鲁莽指挥官。1939年11月30日，苏联军队装备和气候条件都欠佳，却在有记录以来最严酷的冬季之一已经开始之后，下令苏联军队入侵芬兰，斯大林为此付出了惨痛的代价。芬兰军队训练有素，他们预料到了危险，并为严寒的陆地作战做好了充分的准备，在1940年3月中旬被苏军人数优势击败之前，曾给苏军造成了十倍的伤亡。13
General George Washington capitalized on surprise when he deliberately picked a stormy Christmas night in 1776 to cross the ice-caked Delaware River, despite roiling waters and high winds that drenched his 2,400 half-starved, threadbare troops with cold rain, wet snow, and hail. He landed early next morning near Trenton, New Jersey, caught the Hessian garrison off guard, then trounced them in little more than an hour at the expense of four American wounded.12 Mother Nature, however, punishes imprudent commanders who arrogantly or ignorantly disregard weather. Generalissimo Joseph Stalin learned hard lessons when he ordered poorly acclimated and equipped Soviet Armed Forces to invade Finland on November 30, 1939, after one of the worst winters on record had already begun. Skillful Finnish troops, who anticipated trouble and were well prepared for frigid land warfare, inflicted 10-to-1 casualties on Soviet adversaries before they were overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers in mid-March, 1940.13
通行能力。有关降水和温度对通行能力可能产生的影响的信息至关重要，因为地面部队在路况不佳时无法有效机动。他们能在完全冻结的开阔地形上快速行进（1795年，当厚厚的冰层意外覆盖须德海时，英勇的法国骑兵在特塞尔锚地俘获了一支完整的荷兰舰队，包括其尴尬的海军上将）。14），但泥泞阻碍了人员和机器的行进。1917年第三次伊普尔战役前，英国炮兵的猛烈炮击在持续不断的降雨中摧毁了排水系统，并在战场上留下了超过400万个充满水的新弹坑，使得快速推进成为不可能。在第二次世界大战期间， 15支德国坦克和卡车纵队被困在苏联草原的泥泞中，当夜幕降临气温降至冰点以下时，它们就像希腊浮雕一样被冻住了。泥泞不仅在平原地区造成混乱，在山区也同样如此。驻扎在意大利的美军就是一个例证，士兵和驮骡在湿滑的小路上艰难跋涉，而四驱车根本无法通过。16
Trafficability. Information about the possible impact of precipitation and temperature on trafficability deserves a high priority, because ground forces cannot maneuver effectively when the footing is unfriendly. They move fast across open terrain that is frozen solid (dashing French cavalry captured a complete Dutch fleet at the Texel roadstead, including its embarrassed admiral, when thick ice unexpectedly covered the Zuider Zee in 179514), but mud stalls men and machines. British artillery barrages before the Third Battle of Ypres in 1917 destroyed the drainage system during incessant rains and pocked the battlefield with more than four million new water-filled craters that made rapid progress impossible.15 German tank and truck columns stranded in muck on Soviet steppes during the next World War were cemented in place like Greek friezes when thermometers dipped below freezing after dark. Mud made a mess in mountainous territory as well as on level land during that same time frame, witness U.S. forces in Italy, where men and pack mules skidded up and down slippery trails that four-wheel drive vehicles never could negotiate.16
Map 11. Regional Climates Depicted
资料来源：Arthur N. Strahler，《自然地理学》，第2版，1963年，第192页
Source: Arthur N. Strahler, Physical Geography, 2d ed, 1963, p.192
Table 10. Regional Climates Described
武器性能。大气现象对武器系统和弹药的性能有显著影响。气压变化和相对湿度会改变气压引信和起爆计算，稠密的空气会降低最大有效射程，近地表的阵风会使自由火箭和制导导弹产生不规则的摆动，而高空风则会影响弹道轨迹。雨水浸透的土壤会降低炮弹的威力，而冻土则会增加接触引信炮弹的碎片。浓雾会降低目视监视和目标捕获能力，也会给负责调整炮火射击的前线观察员带来困难。在能见度极低的情况下，诸如管式发射、光学跟踪、线导（TOW）反坦克导弹之类的视距武器毫无用处。此外，TOW导弹尾焰会在寒冷潮湿的空气中形成冰雾，即使在晴朗的日子里也会使炮手无法看清目标，并暴露敌方狙击手的射击位置。酷热使装甲车辆烫得不戴手套都无法触摸，降低了自动武器、火炮和坦克炮的持续射速，并使白磷弹药不稳定。17严寒的影响截然不同，正如美国海军陆战队在朝鲜长津水库附近的零下低温战斗中（1950 年 12 月）所发现的那样，迫击炮底板在坚硬的地面上断裂，手榴弹也变得不受欢迎，因为使用者脱下手套去拔保险销，如果握住冰冷的金属超过一秒钟，手指就会被冻伤。18
Weapon Performance. Atmospheric phenomena significantly affect the performance of weapon systems and munitions. Pressure changes and relative humidity alter barometric fusing and arming calculations, dense air reduces maximum effective ranges, gusty crosswinds near Earth’s surface make free rockets and guided missiles wobble erratically, while winds aloft influence ballistic trajectories. Rain-soaked soils deaden artillery rounds, but frozen ground increases fragmentation from contact-fused shells. Dense fog, which degrades visual surveillance and target acquisition capabilities, also makes life difficult for forward observers, whose mission is to adjust artillery fire. Line-of-sight weapons, such as tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) antitank missiles, are worthless where visibility is very limited. Exhaust plumes that follow TOWs moreover form ice fog in cold, damp air, which conceals targets from gunners even on clear days, and reveals firing positions to enemy sharpshooters. Scorching heat makes armored vehicles too hot to touch without gloves, reduces sustained rates of fire for automatic weapons, artillery, and tank guns, and renders white phosphorus ammunition unstable.17 Brutal cold has quite different effects, as U.S. Marines discovered in subzero combat around North Korea’s Changjin Reservoir (December 1950), where mortar base plates broke on the rock hard ground and hand grenades became unpopular, because users who removed mittens to pull the pin suffered frostbitten fingers if they held the cold metal for more than a moment.18
对常规水面海战的影响
IMPACT ON CONVENTIONAL SURFACE NAVAL WARFARE
狂风、巨浪和严寒对海战的影响远超其他任何大气因素。有时，这些因素会带来有利的结果——例如， 13世纪的神风（“神风”）使日本免遭蒙古舰队入侵；1588年，暴风雨驱散了西班牙无敌舰队，英国也因此受益——但恶劣的海上天气鲜少受到欢迎。
Winds, towering seas, and frigid temperatures influence naval operations more than any other atmospheric factors. Results sometimes are favorable—a kamikase (”Divine Wind”) saved Japan from invasion by a Mongol fleet in the 13th century, and Britain benefited when storms dispersed the Spanish Armada in 1588—but foul weather at sea is seldom welcome.
航空母舰。大型航空母舰受恶劣海况的影响小于护航舰艇，但即便如此，当飞行甲板暴露在强风中时，舰体仍可能出现9度或更大的横摇。因此，1995年8月往返于波斯尼亚和弗吉尼亚州诺福克海军基地之间的美国航母战斗群格外谨慎地避开当时活跃在大西洋上的三场飓风也就不足为奇了。风力不足烈风时，固定翼飞机和直升机需要额外的系留装置；甲板湿滑时，重新部署变得复杂；战斗机可能要等到弹射器附近才能展开折叠机翼。海上补给本就十分棘手，在恶劣天气下更是危险重重，巨浪可能冲走悬挂在输送缆绳上的货物，甲板上的货物装卸也变得异常困难。因此，恶劣天气下的补给程序强调减少补给量、延长补给时间，并加大补给舰与接收舰之间的距离，以防止碰撞。19
Aircraft Carriers. Large aircraft carriers are less affected than their escorts by heavy seas, but even so may roll nine degrees or more when their flight decks are exposed to strong winds. Small wonder, therefore, that U.S. carrier battle groups plying back and forth between Bosnia and Norfolk Naval Base, Virginia, in August 1995 took special pains to bypass three hurricanes that then were active in the Atlantic Ocean. Less than gale force winds demand additional tie downs for fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, repositioning becomes a complex proposition when decks are slick, and fighters may not be able to spread folding wings until they reach catapults. Underway replenishment, always a delicate business, becomes additionally hazardous in rough weather, when waves may wash away loads suspended on transfer lines and cargo handling on deck becomes infinitely more difficult. Foul weather procedures consequently emphasize smaller than normal loads, longer than normal transfer times, and greater than normal distances between support ships and recipients to prevent collisions.19
其他水面舰艇。持续的恶劣天气会危及水面舰艇的稳定性、浮力、动力和结构完整性。经验丰富的舵手在遭遇剧烈的纵摇、横摇、涌浪、偏航和垂荡时，也很难保持航向。而反复从右舷到左舷再到右舷的大角度横摇则格外危险，因为如果恢复稳定性的努力失败，大多数水面作战舰艇和支援舰艇都可能倾覆。当舰艇的航向与风暴路径平行时，情况最为糟糕，因为此时舰艇的横摇周期（一艘典型的驱逐舰为9至10秒）与波峰和波谷之间的周期重合。垂直于涌浪方向的航向可以最大限度地减少横摇，但会最大限度地增加纵摇。船首和螺旋桨在高速下交替拍击空气，整艘船剧烈震动。非核动力船舶主要通过用海水压载代替消耗的燃料来保持尽可能低的重心，这样既能保持船体下部的重量，又能防止部分装满的油箱晃动。所有经验丰富的船长都会尽可能地将重物放置在甲板下方，轮机员也会格外注意保持推进动力，因为摇晃的船舶毫无自救能力。20
Other Surface Ships. Persistent heavy weather endangers surface ship stability, buoyancy, power, and structural integrity. Experienced helmsmen have a hard time maintaining course when beset by sharp pitching, swaying, surging, yawing, and heaving, but repeated wide-angle rolls from starboard to port and back again are exceptionally dangerous, because most surface combatants and support ships may capsize if efforts to restore stability fail. Conditions are worst when ships steer a course that parallels the storm path and their roll period (9 to 10 seconds for a typical destroyer) coincides with the period between wave peaks and troughs. Paths perpendicular to the onrushing sea minimize roll but maximize pitch, which alternately causes bows to slam and propellers to beat thin air at high speeds while the whole ship shudders. Nonnuclear ships maintain the lowest possible center of gravity primarily by replacing consumed fuel with salt water ballast, which maintains low-level weight and prevents partially filled tanks from sloshing. All savvy captains position heavy loads below deck to the greatest practicable extent, and engineers take special pains to maintain propulsive power, because wallowing ships are helpless.20
当盐雾在冰点以下冲击船体表面时，甲板、船舷、上层建筑、舱口、桅杆、索具、裸露的机械设备、天线和武器系统等都会迅速形成厚厚的冰层。在极寒气候下，根据风速和浪高，24小时内即可积聚两英尺甚至更厚、总重达数百吨的冰层。船体重心升高和风阻增大，会严重影响船舶的适航性和作战效能。21
Thick layers of ice can quickly form on decks, sides, superstructures, hatches, masts, rigging, exposed machinery, antennas, and weapon systems when salt spray hits ship surfaces at subfreezing temperatures. Two feet or more totaling several hundred tons may accumulate within 24 hours in very cold climes, depending on wind velocities and wave heights. Seaworthiness and combat effectiveness then suffer from top heaviness and increased wind resistance.21
小型舰艇。两栖登陆艇和海军特种作战艇对风、浪和涌浪尤其敏感。旋风级巡逻艇是目前美国海豹突击队最适航的舰艇，在5级海况（风速22至27节，浪高10至12英尺，即3至4米）下仍能正常航行，但在更强的风暴中则难以幸存。22.人员从海上“巴士”转移到小艇上，即使在理想情况下也颇为棘手，一旦条件恶劣，更是令人胆战心惊。一支海豹突击队在冰冷的北海进行训练时，乘坐一艘猛烈下沉的拖船。他们先是竭力阻止船上的六名波士顿捕鲸艇被海浪卷走，随后眼睁睁地看着其中三艘在被放入波涛汹涌的海水中时，被50节的狂风像煎饼一样翻了个底朝天。42名负重作战的突击队员必须把握好浪涌的时机，纵身跃向小艇，同时祈祷自己不会被螺旋桨碾压或撕裂。23
Small Craft and Boats. Amphibious landing craft and naval special operations boats are especially sensitive to wind, waves, and surf. Cyclone class patrol boats, the most seaworthy vessels currently available to U.S. SEALs, are fully functional through Sea State 5 (winds 22 to 27 knots, waves 10 to 12 feet, or 3 to 4 meters, high), but struggle to survive stronger storms.22 Personnel transfers from seagoing “buses” to small boats are tricky under perfect conditions and fearful when they are not. One SEAL team aboard a slam-dunking tugboat on a training exercise in the frigid North Sea first fought to keep its six Boston whalers from washing overboard, then watched 50-knot winds flip three of them like flapjacks when they were lowered into foaming water. Forty-two heavily laden shooters had to time the swells, leap toward the boats, and pray they wouldn’t be crushed or chewed by propellors.23
对常规空战的影响
IMPACT ON CONVENTIONAL AIR WARFARE
和平时期，几乎所有地区的军用飞行员都必须遵守目视飞行规则（VFR）和仪表飞行规则（IFR）。美国陆基固定翼军用飞机的VFR限制通常规定：飞行高度至少为1200英尺（365米），目的地和起飞机场的能见度至少为3英里（4.8公里），并且航路中云层上方、下方和周围的最小距离。飞行高度较低或能见度较差时，飞行员必须提交IFR飞行计划。陆基直升机的24 VFR 规定更为宽松。25 位美国航空母舰舰长，他们通常决定天气是否适合起飞和降落，并考虑在岸上合适的基地以及母舰上成功回收的可能性。26所有武装部队在战斗或其他高优先级行动开始时都会搁置和平时期的限制，因为此时分配的任务优先于安全。
Military aviators almost everywhere in peacetime must comply with visual and instrument flight regulations (VFR, IFR). VFR limitations for land-based, fixed-wing U.S. military aircraft generally prescribe a ceiling of at least 1,200 feet (365 meters), visibility of 3 statute miles (4.8 kilometers) at destinations as well as departure airfields, and minimum distances above, below, and around clouds en route. Lower ceilings or poorer visibility obligate pilots to file IFR flight plans.24 VFR for land-based helicopters are more lenient.25 U.S. aircraft carrier captains, who generally determine whether weather is agreeable for takeoffs and landings, consider prospects for successful recovery at suitable bases ashore as well as aboard the mother ship.26 All armed forces shelve peacetime restrictions when combat or other high priority operations commence, because assigned missions then take precedence over safety.
云雾。二战期间，美国轰炸机机组人员在阿留申群岛的乌姆纳克岛上与日本敌军一起对抗恶劣天气。当时雾气非常浓，机组人员不得不从敞开的窗户探出头来，帮助飞行员保持在滑行道上，并沿着跑道笔直飞行。1944 年 9 月 19 日，在“市场花园行动”期间，从英国的空军基地到荷兰的空投和着陆区，一路恶劣的天气使第三波进攻变成了一场灾难——满载着急需的增援部队和补给品的运输机和滑翔机，只有不到一半穿过“泥潭”到达了预定的目的地。28
Clouds and Fog. U.S. bomber crews during World War II fought weather along with Japanese adversaries on Umnak Island in the Aleutians, where fog was so dense that crew members poked their heads out of open windows to help pilots stay on taxi strips and steer straight courses down runways.27 Bad weather all the way from air bases in England to drop and landing zones in Holland during Operation Market Garden on September 19, 1944, turned the third wave into a disaster—fewer than half of the troop transports and gliders laden with desperately needed reinforcements and supplies found their way through the “soup” to intended destinations.28
技术进步大大方便了现代飞行员的工作，但机场积水严重和低云层仍然会导致他们偶尔无法执行任务，即使任务十分紧急；低云层有时还会遮蔽目标区域的进近路线。美国及其盟军部队例如，越南的高地前哨在雨季的大部分时间里都缺乏近距离空中支援（CAS）、武装直升机的协助和空中补给。此时，高性能的固定翼近距离空中支援飞机只能低空低角度飞行，这使其更容易受到敌方防空武器和小口径武器的攻击（关于越南和老挝的天气详情，请参见第19章）。北约最近在1995年12月中旬取消或改道了近360次军事空运任务，从而使其在波斯尼亚的初始集结行动推迟了一周多。29
Technological improvements make life much easier for modern airmen, but “socked in” airports and low ceilings still ground them occasionally regardless of pressing requirements, and low ceilings sometimes obscure approaches to target areas. U.S. and allied troops at highland outposts in Vietnam, for example, lacked close air support (CAS), assistance from gunships, and aerial resupply for all or most of many days during rainy seasons. High-performance, fixed-wing CAS aircraft at such times were limited to low-level, low-angle avenues that maximized their exposure to enemy air defense weapons and small arms (see chapter 19 for weather details in Vietnam and Laos). NATO more recently canceled or diverted nearly 360 military airlift missions in mid-December 1995, thereby delaying its initial buildup in Bosnia for more than a week.29
气压。所有飞行员在起飞前都会将高度表设置为起飞机场的气压值，并在着陆前更新读数，以便始终了解自身距地面或水面的高度。对于需要在山区地形进行低空或贴地飞行，且飞行条件恶劣或昏暗的军用飞行员来说，准确的高度指示至关重要。气压与温度和湿度共同决定了空气密度，而空气密度限制了任何特定类型飞机在特定载荷下起飞以及后续有效飞行的能力。海平面寒冷天气下常见的稠密空气可提供最佳升力，但随着温度升高，空气密度会降低。高度会迅速降低地球大气层的稀薄度，因此美国军方规定，当机舱高度超过 10,000 英尺（3,050 米）时，机组人员必须使用补充氧气。30虽然党卫军上尉奥托·斯科尔兹内 (Otto Skorzeny) 证明了在稀薄的空气中也能完成惊人的壮举，他在 1943 年驾驶 12 架滑翔机降落在意大利布满巨石的格兰萨索山顶，从意大利看守手中抓走了贝尼托·墨索里尼，并用一架轻型飞机将他带走。1996 年 5 月13日，尼泊尔陆军中校马登在珠穆朗玛峰海拔 5850 米（19200 英尺）处，执行了世界上最高的直升机救援任务，救出了两名半冻僵的幸存者，然后将他们空运到加德满都的一家医院。32
Barometric Pressures. All aviators set altimeters to reflect barometric pressure at departure airfields before they take off and update readings before they land so they always know how high they are above land or water. Accurate indications are most important for military airmen whose missions demand low-level or nap-of-the-earth flights through mountainous terrain under blacked out or murky weather conditions. Barometric pressures, together with temperatures and humidity, determine air density, which limits the ability of any given type aircraft to get off the ground with any given load and thereafter perform effectively. Heavy air that is common on cold days at sea level provides the best possible lift, but density decreases when thermometers climb. Altitude thins Earth’s atmosphere so rapidly that regulations require U.S. military air crews to use supplemental oxygen when cabin altitude exceeds 10,000 feet (3,050 meters),30 although SS Hauptsturmführer (Captain) Otto Skorzeny proved that fantastic feats are possible in thin air when he landed 12 gliders atop Italy’s boulder-strewn Gran Sasso Mountain in 1943, snatched Benito Mussolini from his Italian custodians, and whisked him away in a light airplane.31 Lieutenant Colonel Maden of the Nepalese Army conducted the world’s highest helicopter rescue on May 13, 1996, when he plucked two half frozen survivors off Mount Everest at 19,200 feet (5,850 meters), then flew them to a hospital in Katmandu.32
风。风速和风向对军事航空行动的影响巨大，而民用飞行员很少会遇到这种情况。远征机场只有一条跑道，因此无法像其他机场那样每次遇到强劲侧风就更换跑道，所以这些机场的朝向取决于盛行风向。没有哪艘远洋客轮或游轮会故意迎着风暴航行，而航母指挥官却经常这样做，以寻找足够的“甲板上风”（持续风速20节或以上）来起降固定翼飞机。当风向不利时，心理战传单也毫无用处。1943年7月，第82空降师的33名伞兵冒着时速高达35英里的狂风完成了任务。狂风将他们吹得四散奔逃，甚至在夜深人静时将他们撞向石墙。 1980年，营救被伊朗激进分子扣押在德黑兰的美国人质的行动以失败告终，八架执行任务的直升机中有三架中止飞行，其中一架是因为被狂风卷起的沙尘暴阻挡而返航。34
Winds. Wind velocities and vectors strongly affect military air operations in many ways that civilian fliers seldom experience. Expeditionary airfield users cannot switch runways every time strong crosswinds develop because they possess only one runway, so prevailing winds dictate the orientation of these fields. No ocean liner or cruise ship ever deliberately heads toward a storm, as carrier commanding officers often do in search of sufficient “wind over deck” (20 sustained knots or more) to launch and recover fixed-wing aircraft. Psychological operations (PSYOP) leaflets are worthless when winds blow in the wrong direction.33 Paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division had to accomplish their missions in July 1943 despite 35-mile-an-hour winds that scattered them across Sicily and slammed them against stone walls in the dead of night.33 Efforts to rescue U.S. hostages that Iranian radicals held in Teheran (1980) failed when three of the eight mission-essential helicopters aborted, one because wind-blown dust storms turned it back.34
对核生化战争的影响
IMPACT ON NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WARFARE
核武器会以多种方式受到天气的影响，其中地表和高空的风或许最为重要。化学战剂和生物战剂在略有不同的条件下也会对多种大气现象产生影响。
Nuclear weapons respond to weather in several ways, of which winds on the surface and aloft perhaps are most important. Chemical and biological warfare (CW, BW) agents are sensitive to several atmospheric phenomena under somewhat different conditions.
核武器。云层下方的低空爆炸会通过反射增强热辐射，而云层上方爆炸产生的热量则会反射回太空。强降水会提高热辐射点燃特定材料的温度，并减少二次火灾的蔓延。夜间爆炸会增加爆炸的射程。核爆炸产生的闪光会使未加防护的目视者失明。在地球表面、下方或低空进行的爆炸会将大量碎片吸入蘑菇云的云柱中，并随风飘散。最重、污染最严重的碎片会在几分钟内落回爆炸中心附近，但高空的风会将致命的放射性雾气吹送到数百甚至数千英里之外。放射性沉降物的大小、形状和强度会随着风速和风向的变化而变化，因为地形阴影、侧风和局部降水有时会在每个扇形区域内形成热点和跳跃区。例如，在内华达州一座塔顶进行的一次核试验产生的放射性沉降物向东北方向飘散，并在爆炸中心附近保持了较高的放射性浓度；而同一座塔在不同日期进行的第二次核试验则在爆炸中心西北方向 95 公里（60 英里）处形成了一个比周围环境温度高出七倍的“熔炉”（图 18）。即使在理想条件下，这种难以预测的结果也很难预测。35
Nuclear Weapons. Low air bursts beneath clouds amplify thermal radiation by reflection, whereas the heat from bursts above cloud blankets bounces back into space. Heavy precipitation raises the temperature at which thermal radiation will ignite given materials and reduces the spread of secondary fires. Detonations after dark increase the range at which flashes from nuclear explosions blind unprotected viewers. Blasts on, beneath, or at low altitudes above Earth’s surface suck enormous amounts of debris up the stems of mushroom clouds that drift downwind. The heaviest, most contaminated chaff falls back near ground zero within a few minutes, but winds aloft waft a deadly mist hundreds or thousands of miles. The size, shape, and potency of resultant radioactive fallout patterns differ with wind speeds and directions, because terrain shadows, crosswinds, and local precipitation sometimes create hot spots and skip zones within each fan. Fallout from one test conducted atop a tower in Nevada, for example, drifted northeast and retained strong radioactive concentrations around ground zero, while a second test from the same tower on a different date featured a “furnace” that was seven times hotter than its immediate surroundings 60 miles (95 kilometers) northwest of the test (figure 18). Such erratic results are hard to predict even under ideal conditions.35
Figure 18. Nuclear Fallout Related to Wind
生物战剂。生物战剂可能通过大规模感染敌方武装部队、平民、牲畜和农作物，造成大规模的国际混乱。小型实验室能够以极快的速度生产出具有军事意义的生物战剂，以至于不再需要冷藏设施。然而，微生物病原体和毒素在炸弹、导弹弹头、喷雾罐和炮弹等高温低湿环境下，通常只能存活几个小时。一些生物弹药本身就不稳定，既无法承受弹丸飞行带来的剧烈冲击，也无法经受阳光直射。36
Biological Warfare Agents. Biological warfare agents conceivably could create international chaos on a grand scale by infecting enemy armed forces, civilian populations, livestock, and crops en masse. Small laboratories can generate BW products so quickly in militarily significant quantities that refrigerated storage facilities no longer are necessary, but microbiol pathogens and toxins as a rule last only a few hours when exposed to high temperatures and low humidity inside bombs, missile warheads, spray tanks, and artillery shells. Some biological munitions, inherently unstable, can neither tolerate sharp strains associated with projectile flights nor stand direct sunlight.36
化学战剂。与生物武器截然不同，化学战剂在生物武器无法承受的气候条件下反而能更好地发挥作用。高温高湿的环境不仅不会阻碍它们的生存，反而会促进其繁殖。芥子气和路易氏剂在炎热天气下尤其有效，因为……汗液容易导致水泡。防护服、口罩和防毒掩体是抵御各种化学武器的最佳保障，但在温暖气候下长时间“全副武装”的人员容易因疲劳和中暑而昏厥，而缺乏可靠过滤器的空调设施则会变成死亡陷阱。持久性液体制剂比气溶胶制剂持续时间更长，且不易受风的影响，因此化学战专家建议指挥官在风速为3至7节且风向适宜时发起蒸汽攻击，避开雨天，并等待逆温层出现，使制剂滞留在空气底层。37
Chemical Warfare Agents. Chemical warfare agents, in sharp contrast, thrive under weather conditions that biological weapons cannot tolerate. Heat and humidity help rather than hinder. Mustard and lewisite are particularly effective in hot weather, because perspiration promotes blisters. Protective clothing, masks, and gas-proof shelters are the best insurance against CW weapons of any kind, but fatigue followed by heat prostration afflicts personnel who “button up” very long in warm climes, while air conditioned facilities that lack fool-proof filters become death traps. Persistent agents laid down as liquids last longer than aerosols and are less sensitive to vagrant winds, so chemical warfare specialists advise commanders to initiate vapor attacks when breezes blow in the right direction between three and seven knots, to avoid rainy days, and to wait for temperature inversions that trap agents in the lowest layer of air.37
对光电操作的影响
IMPACT ON ELECTRO-OPTICAL OPERATIONS
主动和被动式光电系统包括图像增强器（例如夜视镜）、红外设备（例如夜视瞄准器）、激光指示器（其中一些用于辅助“智能”弹药）以及能够在黑暗中“看”到图像的低照度电视机。研发实验室正在迅速扩展和改进现有产品。
Active and passive electro-optical (E-O) systems include image intensifiers, typified by night vision goggles; infrared devices, such as night sights; laser designators, some of which assist “smart” munitions; and low-light-level television sets able to “see” in the dark. Research and development laboratories are rapidly expanding and improving existing inventories.
不利的大气影响。风吹起的尘土、雾、霾、高湿度、云层和降水都会降低甚至破坏所有收集可见光的光电系统的性能。长波长受到的影响小于短波长，但分辨率会降低。大气折射（通常不如海市蜃楼那样明显）会使目标在闪烁的地表空气中看起来移动（甚至消失），并降低光电系统的效能。热量是造成这种现象的最常见原因，但当气温远低于冰点时，在积雪覆盖的地面上也会出现类似的失真。红外和毫米波传感器依靠热对比度来区分目标和背景（例如，隐藏在凉爽树林中的温暖发动机），但当风、雨、雪或隔热云层使温度差异难以区分时，它们的区分能力无法达到用户的预期，因此相关实验项目仍在快速推进。38
Adverse Atmospheric Influences. Windblown dust, fog, haze, high humidity, clouds, and precipitation degrade or defeat all E-O systems that gather visible light. Long wave lengths are less affected than short waves, although resolution is fuzzier. Atmospheric refraction, often less obvious than a mirage, can make targets seem to move (even disappear) in shimmering surface air and otherwise reduce electro-optical effectiveness. Heat is the most common cause of that phenomenon, but similar distortions sometimes appear above snow-covered ground when temperatures are well below freezing. Infrared and millimeter wave sensors, which depend on thermal contrasts to differentiate targets from backgrounds (warm engines, for example, concealed in cool woods), cannot discriminate as well as users would like when winds, rain, snow, or insulating clouds make temperature differences indistinguishable, so experimental programs continue apace.38
光线不足。过去的军事行动通常安排在黎明前开始，然后在白天继续进行，因为很少有军队做好在夜间作战的充分准备。增强光线的工具或许有一天能让士兵、水兵、飞行员和海军陆战队员“掌控黑夜”，但研发技术人员首先必须解决几个与天气相关的问题。在相对晴朗的夜晚，当月亮满月或接近满月时，过强的光线有时会使夜视设备失效，因为增强的光线会使视野过于饱和，导致明暗几乎融为一体。在阴天，当月亮昏暗或下垂时，光线可能不足，因为星光被遮蔽。与几年前的产品相比，目前市面上的大多数夜视设备都已小型化，但对于步兵来说仍然过于笨重，难以轻松使用。因此，研发目标集中在提高分辨率、增强深度感知、延长探测距离、增强立体视觉功能、缩小尺寸、减轻重量以及提高整体通用性等方面。39
Inadequate Light. Military operations in the past typically were timed to begin just before dawn, then continue in daylight, because few armed forces were well prepared for armed combat after dark. Light enhancement tools may some day enable soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines to “own the night,” but research and development technicians first must solve several weather-related problems. Too much light sometimes defeats night vision devices on relatively clear nights when the moon is full or nearly so, because amplifications so saturate viewing areas that light and dark almost merge. Too little light may be available on overcast nights that conceal starlight when the moon is dark or down. Most night vision implements now on the market are miniaturized compared with predecessors even a few years ago, yet remain too bulky for facile employment by foot troops. Research and development goals accordingly concentrate on sharper resolution, better depth perception, longer range, stereoscopic capabilities, smaller size, reduced weight, and greater overall versatility.39
对定向能武器的影响
IMPACT ON DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS
以光速进行攻击的定向能武器主要分为两大类。电磁束包括高能激光（HEL）和高功率微波（HPM）。粒子束包括带电粒子束（CPB）和中性粒子束（NPB）。
Directed energy weapons, which attack at the speed of light, occupy two basic categories. Electromagnetic beams embrace high-energy lasers (HEL) and high-powered microwaves (HPM). Particle beams include charged particle beams (CPB) and neutal partical beams (NPB).
电磁波束。大气层至少会以四种重要方式干扰电磁波束：40
Electromagnetic Beams. Atmosphere interferes with electromagnetic beams in at least four important ways:40
•当光束照射到云、雾、不可见的蒸汽、灰尘、烟雾以及其他被空气漂浮的物质时，就会发生散射。
• Scatter occurs when beams strike clouds, fog, invisible vapors, dust, smoke, and other matter buoyed by air.
• 吸收同时发生，原因类似。
• Absorption occurs simultaneously for similar reasons.
•当热空气使光束膨胀并扩散时，就会发生光晕现象。
• Blooming occurs when heated air makes beams expand and splay.
当上下气流、横流、热浪和其他大气现象扰乱光束时，就会产生湍流，其效率在几英里内可能会下降 100 到 300 倍。
• Turbulence occurs when up-down drafts, cross currents, heat waves, and other atmospheric phenomena disrupt beams, the efficiency of which may fall by a factor of 100 to 300 within a few miles
粒子束。粒子束与激光的不同之处在于，它们发射的是高能电子、质子、中子、氢原子或离子流，而不是辐射光子。带电粒子束在地球大气层中传播良好，不受天气影响，但目前其射程受到严格限制。对于中性粒子束而言，天气无关紧要，它们只能在真空的太空中传播。41
Particle Beams. Particle beams differ from lasers in that they project a stream of highly energetic electrons, protons, neutrons, hydrogen atoms, or ions rather than radiant photons. Charged particle beams propagate well in Earth’s atmosphere regardless of weather, but ranges at this writing are strictly limited. Weather is irrelevant with regard to neutral particle beams, which propagate only in the vacuum of space.41
对军事人员的影响
IMPACT ON MILITARY PERSONNEL
每天暴露在恶劣天气下的军人很难说酷暑和严寒哪个更难熬，但非正式调查显示，无论个人耐力、体能和适应程度如何，几乎所有人都把这两种极端天气排在最末位。普遍认为，寒冷伴随凛冽寒风和酷热伴随高湿度是最糟糕的天气组合。
Military men and women exposed daily to the elements cannot decide whether extreme heat or extreme cold is worse, but informal polls put one or both of those abominations at the bottom of almost everybody’s list, regardless of individual tolerances, physical conditioning, and degrees of acclimatization. Cold coupled with bitter winds and heat coupled with high humidity are the worst weather combinations by consensus.
严寒。低于冰点的干燥寒冷极易导致衣着单薄、训练不足的人员冻伤。1941-1942年冬季，驻俄德军因此伤亡10万人，其中1.5万人需要截肢。在那种残酷的严寒中，人的呼吸会凝结成冰柱，眼睑会冻在一起，接触金属的皮肤会冷焊在一起，汽油不小心喷到裸露的皮肤上会起高尔夫球大小的水泡，屠夫的斧头砍在坚硬如石的马肉上会像回旋镖一样反弹，厨师用锯子切黄油。与人们普遍的误解相反，在严寒天气中，由于人员每次呼吸都会呼出体内的水分，脱水现象可能很普遍。低温会抑制血液凝固，导致伤口更容易出血，如果不及时治疗，循环缓慢会导致严重的休克。为了应对这种情况，美国医护人员曾将吗啡注射器放在腋下，以便在需要时保持温暖。高空高开伞（HAHO）跳伞员在零度以下的气温中跳出飞机时，会经历极度寒冷。首先是自由落体时，他们以高达每小时120英里（193公里）的速度坠落；然后是长达30分钟或更长时间的漂浮。当风寒指数远低于冰点时，地面人员的唯一实际目标往往是生存。42
Cruel Cold. Dry cold below freezing encourages frostbite among poorly clothed and trained personnel. German Armed Forces in Russia suffered 100,000 casualties from that cause during the winter of 1941-1942, of which 15,000 required amputations. Human breath turned to icicles in that brutal cold, eyelids froze together, flesh that touched metal cold-welded, gasoline accidentally sprayed on bare skin raised blisters the size of golf balls, butchers’ axes rebounded like boomerangs from horse meat as solid as stone, and cooks sliced butter with saws. Dehydration, contrary to popular misconceptions, can be prevalent in frigid weather when personnel exhale bodily moisture with every breath. Low temperatures, which inhibit clotting, cause wounds to bleed more freely, and severe shock due to slow circulation sets in early unless treated expeditiously. U.S. medics armed with morphine for that purpose once kept syringes in their armpits so they would be warm enough to work when needed. High-Altitude High-Opening (HAHO) parachutists who exit aircraft in subzero temperatures experience extreme chill, first when they free-fall at up to 120 miles per hour (193 kilometers per hour), then while they drift for as much as 30 minutes or more. Survival often becomes the only practicable objective of forces on the ground when wind chill factors plummet far below freezing.42
在某些方面，湿冷环境的危害更大。战壕足是一种典型的致残性疾病，由小腿和脚长时间浸泡在略高于冰点的温度下引起。其主要症状始于麻木，随后出现肿胀、剧烈疼痛，如不及时治疗，则会导致坏疽。二战期间，在欧洲战场，战壕足在美国步兵中呈流行之势。这些士兵连续数日在冰冷的泥泞中跋涉而非行军，居住在充满水的散兵坑中，缺乏遮蔽物和干燥的鞋袜。超过45,000名士兵因此患上战壕足。从 1944 年 11 月到 1945 年 2 月，其中许多伤亡人员挤满了野战医院，损失相当于 10 个师的前线步枪兵力。43
Wet cold is even more debilitating in some respects. Crippling trench foot, a classic casualty producer, is caused by prolonged immersion of lower legs and feet at temperatures a bit above freezing. Prominent symptoms begin with numbness, followed by swelling, terrible pain and, in untreated cases, gangrene. During World War II, in the European Theater of Operations, trench foot assumed epidemic proportions among U.S. combat infantrymen who for days on end waded rather than marched through chilly muck, lived in water-filled foxholes, and lacked access to shelter or dry shoes and socks. More than 45,000 of them filled field hospitals to overflowing between November 1944 and February 1945, a loss equivalent to the front-line rifle strength of 10 divisions.43
酷热难耐。在酷热难耐的环境下，军队面临着一系列不同的挑战。为了防止脱水，饮水量会急剧增加，因为在 38 摄氏度（100 华氏度）的高温下进行 8 小时的高强度训练，每天大约需要 14 升水。沙漠中的后勤人员也面临着巨大的物资供应压力，每人平均需要携带 30 磅（约 14 公斤）的物资，一个 18000 人的美国装甲师平均需要携带 270 吨的物资。高温高湿的环境会更快地消耗体力，尤其是在军人穿着防弹背心或为防范敌方化学武器袭击而穿戴防护服的情况下。44.还有许多其他问题也引起了人们的关注。例如，食品处理人员在缺乏现代化设施的移动厨房中，与污染未冷藏易腐食品的细菌进行着一场永无休止的斗争。储存的汽油中胶质的积累速度会随着温度每升高20华氏度而增加四倍，这会堵塞过滤器，并在军队缓慢消耗库存时降低辛烷值。
Oppressive Heat. Armed forces in enervating heat face a different set of difficulties. Water consumption soars to prevent dehydration, since exertions over an 8-hour period in 100 °F (38°C) heat demand about 15 quarts a day (14 liters). Logisticians in the desert are hard pressed to supply huge loads, which amount to 30 pounds per person, or 270 tons for an 18,000-man U.S. armored division. Heat coupled with high humidity saps strength more quickly, especially when military personnel wear flak jackets or don protective clothing in anticipation of enemy chemical warfare attacks.44 Myriad other matters attract concerted attention. Food handlers, for example, fight a ceaseless war against bacteria that contaminate unrefrigerated perishables in mobile kitchens lacking modern amenities. The rate of gum accumulations in stored gasoline quadruples with each 20°F increase in temperature, which clogs filters and lowers octane ratings when forces deplete stockpiles slowly.
当人体体温低于正常值（98.6°F，约37°C）时，无论周围环境是寒冷、凉爽还是温暖，都会发生体温过低——即使在80°F（26.7°C）的水中，如果浸泡时间过长，也可能出现体温过低的情况。最初的症状可能是无法控制的颤抖和完成简单任务的能力下降。如果体温持续下降，接下来会出现精神萎靡和记忆力减退，然后颤抖停止，出现昏迷，呼吸减慢。体温低于78°F（25.6°C）左右时，除非及时采取保暖措施、更换干燥衣物，并可能使用兴奋剂来逆转这一过程，否则可能会出现心力衰竭、内出血甚至死亡。在水温介于 40 至 60 华氏度（约 16 至 4 摄氏度）的海域， 45 名战斗游泳队员穿着湿式潜水服，这种潜水服能在皮肤表面形成一层薄薄的温水层（透气性优于橡胶的合成材料是首选）。在更冷的水域，穿着防水干式潜水服并搭配保暖内衣是必不可少的。46
Hypothermia occurs when human body temperature drops below normal (98.6°F), whether surroundings be cold, cool, or warm—individuals can become hypothermic in 80°F (26.7°C) water if immersed too long. The first visible signs may be uncontrollable shivering and impaired abilities to accomplish simple tasks. Sluggishness and amnesia appear next if body temperature continues to drop, then shivering ceases, stupor sets in, and respiration slows. Heart failure, internal bleeding, and death occur below about 78°F (25.6 °C) unless warmth, dry clothing, and perhaps stimulants reverse that process in time.45 Combat swimmers in seas between 60 and 40°F wear wet suits that trap a thin layer of warm water next to their skin (synthetics that “breathe” better than rubber are preferred materials). Watertight dry suits over thermal underwear are essential in colder water.46
要点
KEY POINTS
• 天气和气候几乎影响着和平时期和战争时期陆地、海洋和空中的每一项军事活动。
• Weather and climate influence almost every military activity on land, at sea, and in the air during peacetime as well as war.
• 军事战略家和长期规划者依赖于世界各地许多地方的观察员在通常跨越多年的时间内收集的气候统计数据。
• Military strategists and long-range planners rely on climatological statistics that observers in many locations around the world have collected over periods that usually span many years.
• 军事战术家和短期计划者主要依赖于当前的天气预报，而天气预报很少能预测到几天以后的情况。
• Military tacticians and short-range planners rely primarily on current weather forecasts that seldom peer more than a few days into the future.
所有大气现象和环境光照水平都会以各种方式和不同程度影响各军种的作战行动。
• All atmospheric phenomena and ambient light levels influence operations by all military services in various ways and differing degrees
• 极端高温和低温、高湿度、土壤水分饱和、积雪覆盖的地形对地面部队构成了严峻的限制。
• Extremely hot and cold temperatures, high humidity, water-logged soils, and snow-covered terrain impose critical constraints upon ground forces.
• 强风、暴风雨、极寒气温和海冰对水面海军构成了严峻的制约。
• High winds, stormy seas, extremely cold temperatures, and sea ice impose critical constraints upon surface navies.
• 低云层、低能见度、风、气流和气压对陆基和海军航空作战构成严重限制。
• Low cloud ceilings, low visibility, winds, air currents, and barometric pressures impose critical constraints upon land-based and naval air operations.
笔记
NOTES
1. Carlo d'Este，《巴顿：战争天才》（纽约：哈珀·柯林斯出版社，1995 年），第 685-688 页。
1. Carlo d’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 685-688.
2. John SD Eisenhower，《苦涩的森林》（纽约：GP Putnam's Sons，1969 年），第 375-430 页。
2. John S. D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1969), 375-430.
3. William L. Donn，《海洋应用气象学》，第 1版（纽约：麦格劳-希尔出版社，1946 年）；Arthur N. Strahler，《自然地理学》，第 2版（纽约：约翰·威利父子出版社，1963 年），第 7、8、10、11 章；Guy Murchie，《天空之歌》（波士顿：霍顿·米夫林出版社，1954 年）。
3. William L. Donn, Meteorology With Marine Applications, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946); Arthur N. Strahler, Physical Geography, 2d ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), chapters 7, 8, 10, 11; Guy Murchie, Song of the Sky (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1954).
4.自然地理，76-78；野战手册 34-81-1：战场天气影响（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1992 年 12 月 23 日），2-4、3-6、3-7、G10、G12、G16 。
4. Physical Geography, 76-78; Field Manual 34-81-1: Battlefield Weather Effects (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, December 23, 1992), 2-4, 3-6, 3-7, G10, G12, G16.
5. 《航空年鉴》（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，每年发行）。
5. The Air Almanac (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, issued annually).
6. FM 5-33：地形分析（华盛顿：陆军部，1990 年 7 月），B-1、B-2；FM 34-81-1；战场天气影响，2-7；空军条令文件 45：航空航天气象作战（华盛顿特区：空军部，1994 年 8 月 31 日），2-4。
6. FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis (Washington: Dept. of the Army, July 1990), B-1, B-2; FM 34-81-1; Battlefield Weather Effects, 2-7; Air Force Doctrine Document 45: Aerospace Weather Operations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Air Force, August 31, 1994), 2-4.
7.作者回忆录，1967-1968 年担任美国陆军越南战役计划组组长；哈兰·G·科赫，《季风与军事行动》，《军事评论》 45，第 6 期（1965 年 6 月）：25-34。
7. Author’s recollections as Chief, Campaign Planning Group, U.S. Army, Vietnam, 1967-1968; Harlan G. Koch, “Monsoons and Military Operations,” Military Review 45, no. 6 (June 1965): 25-34.
8.自然地理，182-188 。
8. Physical Geography, 182-188.
9.同上，188-193；194-255 逐个地区详细说明。
9. Ibid., 188-193; 194-255 elaborate region by region.
10.有关代表性指南，请参阅联合出版物 3-59：《气象和海洋支援联合条令》（华盛顿特区：参谋长联席会议主席办公室，1993 年 12 月 22 日）和空军条令文件 45：《航空航天气象》。历史背景可参阅约翰·F·富勒的《雷神军团：1937-1987 年美国空军和陆军的气象支援》（马萨诸塞州波士顿：美国气象学会，1990 年）。
10. For representative guidelines, see Joint Pub 3-59: Joint Doctrine for Meteorological and Oceanographic Support (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 22, 1993) and Air Force Doctrine Document 45: Aerospace Weather. Historical background is available in John F. Fuller, Thor’s Legions: Weather Support to the U.S. Air Force and Army, 1937-1987 (Boston, MA: American Meteorological Society, 1990).
11. William J. Cook，“领先于天气”，《美国新闻与世界报道》，1996 年 4 月 29 日，第 55-57 页；Kevin McManus，“来自天气观测系统的数据有时全是湿的”，《华盛顿邮报》，1996 年 1 月 22 日，A3 版。
11. William J. Cook, “Ahead of the Weather,” U.S. News and World Report, April 29, 1996, 55-57; Kevin McManus, “Data from Weather-Observing System Sometimes All Wet,” Washington Post, January 22, 1996, A3.
12.克里斯托弗·沃德，《革命战争》，第 1 卷（纽约：麦克米伦出版社，1952 年），第 91-304 页。
12. Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution, vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1952), 91-304.
13. Allen F. Chew，“在雪地里击败俄国人：芬兰人和俄国人，1940 年”，《军事评论》 60，第 6 期（1980 年 6 月）：38-47，以及《冬季与俄国人作战：三个案例研究》，莱文沃思论文第 5 号（堪萨斯州莱文沃思堡：美国陆军指挥与参谋学院作战研究学院，1981 年 12 月），17-30。
13. Allen F. Chew, “Beating the Russians in the Snow: The Finns and the Russians, 1940,” Military Review 60, no. 6 (June 1980): 38-47, and Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies, Leavenworth Papers No. 5 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, December 1981), 17-30.
14. Samuel van Valkenburg 编，《美国战时：地理分析》（纽约：Prentice-Hall，1942 年），第 103 页。
14. Samuel van Valkenburg, ed., America at War: A Geographical Analysis (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1942), 103.
15. Leon Wolff，《在弗兰德斯战场：1917 年战役》（纽约：维京出版社，1958 年），尤其是第 xii、81-87 页、第 9 章和第 13 章。
15. Leon Wolff, In Flanders Fields: The 1917 Campaign (New York: Viking Press, 1958), especially xii, 81-87, chapters 9 and 13.
16. 《冬季防线》 ，美国军队行动系列（华盛顿特区：美国战争部历史司，1945 年 6 月 14 日），第 5、15、88、90 页。
16. The Winter Line, American Forces in Action Series (Washington, DC: Historical Division, U.S. War Dept., June 14, 1945), 5, 15, 88, 90.
17. FM 34-81-1：战场天气影响，附录 BD、H、J。
17. FM 34-81-1: Battlefield Weather Effects, appendices B-D, H, J.
18. SLA Marshall，《朝鲜战争中的步兵作战和武器使用，1950-51 年冬季》（马里兰州切维蔡斯：约翰·霍普金斯大学运筹学办公室，1951 年），第 21、94、101 页。
18. S. L. A. Marshall, Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea, Winter 1950-51 (Chevy Chase, MD: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 21, 94, 101.
19.美国海军水面舰艇寒冷天气手册（华盛顿特区：海军作战部长水面舰艇生存能力办公室，OP 03C2，1988 年 5 月），2-9 至 2-11、6-5、6-7、6-10、7-1、8-1 至 8-4。
19. U.S. Navy Cold Weather Handbook for Surface Ships (Washington, DC: Chief of Naval Operations, Surface Ship Survivability Office, OP 03C2, May 1988), 2-9 to 2-11, 6-5-6-7, 6-10, 7-1, 8-1 to 8-4.
20.同上，第8-1至8-4页
20. Ibid., 8-1 to 8-4
21.同上，2-1 和 2-2、2-4、7-1。
21. Ibid., 2-1 and 2-2, 2-4, 7-1.
22. “特种艇队”，海军特种作战司令部资料（加利福尼亚州科罗纳多：1993 年 1 月）；什么是海军特种作战？，未注明日期（1993 年），第 8、11、25-28、30-37 页。
22. “Special Boat Section,” Naval Special Warfare Command Fact File (Coronado, CA: January 1993); What Is Naval Special Warfare?, undated (1993), 8, 11, 25-28, 30-37.
23. Richard Marcinko，《流氓战士》（纽约：袖珍书出版社，1992 年），第 250-254 页。
23. Richard Marcinko, Rogue Warrior (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), 250-254.
24.空军指令 11-206：通用飞行规则（华盛顿特区：空军部，1994 年 7 月 25 日），第 7-8 章；海军作战部长办公室指令 3710.7Q：北约通用飞行和操作指令（华盛顿特区：海军作战部长办公室，1995 年 5 月 1 日），5.10-5.15；陆军条例 95-1：飞行条例（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1990 年 5 月 30 日），第 9-10、21-23 条。
24. Air Force Instruction 11-206: General Flight Rules (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Air Force, July 25, 1994), chapters 7-8; OPNAV Instruction 3710.7Q: NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, May 1, 1995), 5.10-5.15; Army Regulation 95-1: Flight Regulations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, May 30, 1990), 9-10, 21-23.
25.有关天气对直升机作业的影响，请参阅《航空气象》，16 份学生讲义 2/5/9/9E-0525-23（阿拉巴马州鲁克堡：美国陆军航空中心，1995 年）。
25. For weather effects on helicopter operations, see Aviation Weather, 16 student handouts 2/5/9/9E-0525-23 (Fort Rucker, AL: U.S. Army Aviation Center, 1995).
26. NAVAIR 00-80T-105:CV NATOPS 手册（华盛顿特区：海军航空系统司令部，1985 年 12 月），5-18 和 5-19；史蒂夫·约克，《气象和海面对海军航空的影响》，致作者的备忘录，1996 年 6 月。
26. NAVAIR 00-80T-105:CV NATOPS Manual (Washington, DC: Naval Air Systems Command, December, 1985), 5-18 and 5-19; Steve York, Meteorological and Sea Surface Effect Upon Naval Aviation, memorandum to the author, June 1996.
27. Brian Garfield，《千里之战：阿拉斯加和阿留申群岛的二战》（纽约花园城：Doubleday出版社，1969年），第114页。
27. Brian Garfield, The Thousand Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1969), 114.
28. Cornelius Ryan，《遥远的桥》（纽约：西蒙与舒斯特出版社，1974 年），416-418 页。
28. Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), 416-418.
29.战争与天气：波斯尼亚——1995 年，简报幻灯片（华盛顿特区：空军气象局局长办公室，未注明日期，1996 年）；“大雾再次阻止美军抵达塔尔扎”，《华盛顿邮报》，1995 年 12 月 18 日，第 16 页。
29. Warfighting and Weather: Bosnia— 1995, a briefing slide (Washington, DC: Office of the Director, Air Force Weather Service, undated, 1996); “Fog Again Prevents U.S. Forces From Reaching Tulza,” Washington Post, December 18, 1995, 16.
30.空军指令 11-206，16；OPNAV 指令 3710.7Q，8-4。
30. Air Force Instruction 11-206, 16; OPNAV Instruction 3710.7Q, 8-4.
31. Glenn B. Infield，《斯科尔兹内：希特勒的突击队》（纽约：圣马丁出版社，1981 年），第 29-45 页。
31. Glenn B. Infield, Skorzeny: Hitler’s Commando (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 29-45.
32. Jerry Adler 和 Rod Nordland，“高风险”，《新闻周刊》， 1996 年 5 月 27 日，第 55、57 页。
32. Jerry Adler and Rod Nordland, “High Risk,” Newsweek, May 27, 1996, 55, 57.
33. John R. Galvin，《空中突击》（纽约：霍桑出版社，1969 年），第 97-110 页。
33. John R. Galvin, Air Assault (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1969), 97-110.
34. 《救援任务报告》（霍洛威报告）（华盛顿特区：参谋长联席会议特别审查小组，1980 年），第 9-10 页、第 38-45 页；詹姆斯·H·凯尔，《削减尝试》（纽约：猎户座出版社，1990 年），第 246-255 页；保罗·B·瑞安，《伊朗救援任务》（马里兰州安纳波利斯：美国海军学院出版社，1985 年），第 67-75 页。
34. Rescue Mission Report (The Holloway Report) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Review Group, 1980), 9-10, 38-45; James H. Kyle, The Cuts to Try (New York: Orion, 1990), 246-255; Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1985), 67-75.
35. DA 小册子 39-3：核武器的影响，修订版（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1964 年 2 月），436-488。
35. DA Pamphlet 39-3: The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 1964), 436-488.
36.大规模杀伤性武器背后的技术（华盛顿特区：技术评估办公室，1993 年 12 月），第 103、105 页；化学和生物战问题，第 2 卷，今日化学和生物武器（纽约：斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所，1973 年），第 37-48、61-72 页；特伦斯和凯瑟琳·怀特，“生物武器：威胁有多大？”国际防务评论，1990 年 8 月，第 843、845 页。
36. Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Office of Technology Assessment, December 1993), 103, 105; The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, vol. 2, CB Weapons Today (New York: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1973), 37-48, 61-72; Terrance and Kathleen White, “Biological Weapons: How Big Is the Threat?” International Defense Review, August 1990, 843, 845.
37. FM 21-40：化学、生物和核防御（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1977 年 10 月 15 日），第 1 章和第 5 章；ABC 岸上作战防御，技术出版物 PL-2（华盛顿特区：海军部船坞局，1960 年 4 月），第 2-4 章。
37. FM 21-40: Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Defense (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, October 15, 1977), chapters 1 and 5; ABC Warfare Defense Ashore, Technical Publication PL-2 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Yards and Docks, Dept. of the Navy, April 1960), chapters 2-4.
38. FM 34-81-1：战场天气影响，附录 F。
38. FM 34-81-1: Battlefield Weather Effects, appendix F.
39. Glenn W. Goodman, Jr.，“掌控黑夜”和 John G. Roos，“代沟”，《国际武装部队杂志》（1996 年 5 月）：40、43-45；Robert G. McClintic，“重振黑夜”，《陆军》 19，第 8 期（1969 年 8 月）：28-35。
39. Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., “Owning the Night,” and John G. Roos, “Generation Gap,” Armed Forces Journal International (May 1996): 40, 43-45; Robert G. McClintic, “Rolling Back the Night,” Army 19, no. 8 (August 1969): 28-35.
40. Kosta Tsipis，“激光武器”，《科学美国人》 （1981 年 12 月）：54-57。
40. Kosta Tsipis, “Laser Weapons,” Scientific American (December 1981): 54-57.
41. “定向能武器科学与技术研究小组向美国物理学会提交的报告：执行摘要和主要结论”，《今日物理》（1987 年 5 月）：S-8、S-10。
41. “Report to the APS of the Study Group on Science and Technology of Directed Energy Weapons: Executive Summary and Major Conclusions,” Physics Today (May 1987): S-8, S-10.
42. FM 34-81-1：战场天气效应，L-1 至 L-3；美国海军水面舰艇寒冷天气手册，9-2、10-1、10-6、10-7。
42. FM 34-81-1: Battlefield Weather Effects, L-1 through L-3; U.S. Navy Cold Weather Handbook for Surface Ships, 9-2, 10-1, 10-6, 10-7.
43. Graham A. Cosmas 和 Albert E. Cowdrey，《二战欧洲战区医疗服务》 ，美国陆军（华盛顿特区：美国陆军军事历史中心，1992 年），488-496 页； 《美国海军水面舰艇寒冷天气手册》，9-2、10-6 页。
43. Graham A. Cosmas and Albert E. Cowdrey, Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992), 488-496; U.S. Navy Cold Weather Handbook for Surface Ships, 9-2, 10-6.
44. FM 34-81-1；战场天气效果，L-3 至 L-6。
44. FM 34-81-1; Battlefield Weather Effects, L-3 through L-6.
45.美国海军水面舰艇寒冷天气手册，9-1、10-4和10-5。
45. U.S. Navy Cold Weather Handbook for Surface Ships, 9-1, 10-4 and 10-5.
46. Peter B. Bennett 和 David H. Elliott 编，《潜水生理学和医学》，第4版（宾夕法尼亚州费城：WB Saunders），302-341。
46. Peter B. Bennett and David H. Elliott, eds., The Physiology and Medicine of Diving, 4th ed. (Philadelphia, PA: W. B. Saunders), 302-341.
6. 区域特色
6. REGIONAL PECULIARITIES
兔子兄弟说话很谦卑。“我不在乎你对我做什么，狐狸兄弟，”它说，“所以你别把我扔进荆棘丛里。狐狸兄弟，随便你，”它说，“但别把我扔进荆棘丛里。”
Den Brer Rabbit talk mighty ’umble. “I don’t keer w’at you do wid me, Brer Fox,” sezee, “so you don’t fling me in dat briar-patch. Roas’ me, Brer Fox,” sezee, “but don’t fling me in dat briar patch,” sezee.
乔尔·钱德勒·哈里斯，
《荆棘丛》，《雷姆斯叔叔：
他的歌谣和格言》
Joel Chandler Harris,
“The Briar Patch,” Uncle Remus:
His Songs and His Sayings
自古以来，随时准备在任何地点、任何时间完成既定任务一直是军队的一项重要目标。然而，准备工作必须因地制宜，因为人或动物都不可能为每一种突发情况都做好万全准备。正如“在荆棘丛中长大”的兔兄弟深知自己能在荆棘丛中智胜狐狸兄弟，但在裸露的地面上却注定落败。同样，军事机器也需要根据陆地、海洋、空中或太空的各种情况进行调整，才能在不同的环境中发挥最大效能。
READINESS TO ACCOMPLISH ASSIGNED MISSIONS WHEREVER AND WHENEVER REQUIRED HAS BEEN AN imperative military objective since time immemorial. Preparations, however, must suit situations, because neither man nor beast can be equally well prepared for every eventuality. Brer Rabbit, “bred and bawn in a briar-patch,” knew he could out-fox Brer Fox in the brambles, but was bound to lose on bare ground. Military machines tailored to suit any given situation on land, at sea, in the air, or in space similarly function most effectively in disparate environments only after they satisfactorily modify strategies, tactics, techniques, weaponry, equipment, clothing, and supplies.
明智的指挥官们深知每个责任区 (AOR) 都具有独特的空间关系、地形、海洋特征、天气和气候，他们尊重区域特殊性原则，该原则认为：“武装部队在组织、装备和训练方面，能够更好地完成特定地理位置的特定任务，才能发挥最佳作用。”1以下论述结合了第 1 章至第 5 章的内容，探讨了七个对军事行动产生明显不同影响的独特区域：寒冷的平原；寒冷的海洋；山脉；沙漠；森林；湿地；以及沿海水域。
Wise commanders, well aware that every geographical area of responsibility (AOR) possesses unique spatial relationships, topography, oceanographic characteristics, weather, and climate, honor the Principle of Regional Peculiarity, which posits, “Armed forces perform best when organized, equipped, and trained to accomplish particular missions in particular geographic locales.”1 The following discourse, which incorporates considerations covered in chapters 1 through 5, addresses seven distinctive regions that affect military operations in markedly different ways: frigid flatlands; frigid seas; mountains; deserts; forests; wetlands; and coastal waters.
寒冷的平原
FRIGID FLATLANDS
迄今为止，极地冰盖上的大多数军事活动都局限于科学考察，例如在格陵兰岛图勒附近的世纪营地和南极洲的小美国营地进行的考察。2没有证据表明，对这些荒地下潜在宝贵资源的争夺很快就会演变成武装冲突，但常年寒冷且季节性寒冷的平原一直延伸到美国北部、俄罗斯欧洲大部分地区和西伯利亚中部，过去曾发生过残酷的战争，而且很可能会再次发生（地图 12）。3
Most military activities on polar ice caps thus far have been confined to scientific investigations such as those at Camp Century, near Thule, Greenland, and Little America in Antarctica.2 There is no evidence that competition for potentially valuable resources beneath those wastelands will soon culminate in armed combat, but perennially and seasonably frigid flatlands that extend as far south as the northern United States, much of European Russia, and central Siberia have seen vicious wars in the past and likely will again (map 12).3
个人生存
PERSONAL SURVIVAL
军事手册和指挥官总是强调任务完成，但身处严寒环境中的下属往往把个人生存放在首位。罗伯特·W·塞维斯在他关于萨姆·麦基的诗中提到了一种不同寻常的做法。萨姆·麦基是一位不适应环境的探矿者，在阿拉斯加一个寒冷的夜晚死去前，他恳求被火化：
Military manuals and commanders invariably emphasize mission accomplishment, but subordinates exposed to killing cold often put personal survival first. Robert W. Service noted one offbeat technique in his poem about Sam McGee, a poorly acclimated prospector who begged to be cremated just before he succumbed on a frigid night in Alaska:
山姆就那样坐在那里，一副冷静沉着的样子。
And there sat Sam, looking cool and calm, in the
炉膛深处发出咆哮声。
heart of the furnace roar.
他脸上挂着灿烂的笑容，一英里外都能看到。
And he wore a smile you could see a mile, and
他说：“请把门关上。”
he said, “Please close that door.
这里还好，但我很担心你会放人进来。
It’s fine in here, but I greatly fear you’ll let in
寒冷和暴风雨——
the cold and storm—
自从我离开田纳西州的普拉姆特里之后，就……
Since I left Plumtree down in Tennessee, it’s
这是我第一次感到温暖。4
the first time I’ve been warm.”4
不幸的是，在现实世界中，战士们发现萨姆·麦基的方案并不能令人满意地预防冻伤、体温过低、脱水以及流感等寒冷相关疾病。在那些极度寒冷的地区，唾液还没落地就会噼啪作响，人体暴露在凛冽的寒风中不到一分钟就会冻僵。因此，切实可行的措施对于作战部队和后勤部队都至关重要。5
Real world warriors unfortunately find Sam McGee’s solution an unsatisfactory way to prevent disabling frostbite, hypothermia, dehydration, and cold-related diseases such as influenza in regions so frigid that spit crackles before it hits the ground and human flesh freezes in less than a minute after exposure to cruel winds. Practical measures then become crucially important to combat forces and logistical troops alike.5
随意制定寒冷天气着装规定是不明智的，因为每个人的新陈代谢不同，对冷湿/冷干环境的需求也存在差异。但最好选择六七层相对轻便、宽松、防风、防水且保暖的衣物。无论如何，至少要准备一两件厚重的衣物。典型的装备包括保暖内衣、羊毛衬衫和长裤、绗缝外套和内衬裤、防风夹克和长裤、带护耳的抓绒帽、毛绒面罩、派克大衣内衬和派克大衣。此外，每个人的衣物还包括厚底袜、速干靴（最适合搭配滑雪板、雪鞋以及供部队在固定阵地中使用）、雪地靴、手套（最好是连指手套）和一套白色迷彩服。防弹衣会增加体积和重量，但护目镜或其他防雪盲装备则不会。
Arbitrary cold weather uniform regulations are inadvisable, because metabolisms differ and cold-wet/cold-dry requirements are dissimilar in some respects, but six or seven layers of clothing that are relatively light, loose, wind resistant, waterproof, and warm are preferable to one or two heavy garments in any case. Typical articles include long underwear, a woolen shirt and trousers, quilted coat and trouser liners, wind-breaker jacket and trousers, a pile cap with earflaps, a fluffy face mask, a parka liner, and parka. Cushion-sole socks, vapor boots (best for use with skis, snow shoes, and by troops in static positions), mukluks, gloves (preferably mittens), and a white camouflage suit round out each individual’s wardrobe. Body armor adds bulk and weight, but goggles or other protection against snow blindness do not.
参与高强度作战行动的战斗和支援部队必须避免穿衣过多，因为过度出汗会导致精疲力竭，或水分蒸发导致身体迅速降温，其危害不亚于过度暴露。因此，经验丰富的人员会在必要时解开纽扣、拉开拉链或脱掉衣物，以确保良好的通风。在寒冷气候下进行化学战会带来两大特殊风险：一是必须足够宽松才能套在所有其他衣物外面的不透水防护服几乎无法通风；二是橡胶面罩不能戴在胡须上，只有在温暖的情况下才能保持足够的柔韧性以确保气密性，而且无论如何都容易导致面部冻伤。6
Combat and support troops engaged in strenuous activities must guard against overdressing, which can be just as injurious as overexposure if excessive perspiration leads to exhaustion or evaporation causes bodies to cool too rapidly. Experienced personnel consequently unbutton, unzip, or shed clothing to ensure proper ventilation whenever necessary. Chemical warfare in cold climes poses two special risks: impervious protective shells, which must be baggy enough to slip over all other layers, are virtually impossible to vent; rubber masks cannot be worn over beards, remain pliable enough to ensure an air-tight fit only when warm, and encourage frostbitten faces in any cases.6
庇护所。在严寒地区，庇护所往往决定着生死。很少有部队像驻波斯尼亚的美国维和人员那样幸运，他们抵达后不久就能轮流在野外营地和精心设计的营地之间辗转。在1995-96年的冬天，他们可以在营地里取暖，享用热腾腾的饭菜，清洗脏兮兮的制服，睡在行军床上，每次休息三天，直到下一批550人抵达六个这样的“营地”之一。7.大多数在冬季作战区域的军事人员都住在中小型帐篷里。与以前用大象帮助搭建和拆卸大帐篷的玲玲马戏团不同，他们必须展开被冻僵的厚重帆布帐篷（通常是在黑暗中），努力将帐篷钉钉入比砖块还硬的冻土上（或许会借助炸药），堆起雪墙抵御呼啸的寒风，然后在雪墙被吹走之前将其砍断。大本营通常铺设木地板，而裸露的地面上则必须铺上保暖的睡袋，睡袋下面垫着充气床垫或其他隔热材料。在野外作战的部队偶尔会搭建一些临时住所，例如冰屋和雪洞，它们的隔热效果与岩棉或玻璃纤维一样好，但卡车驾驶室和装甲车并不适合作为卧室，因为一氧化碳中毒的危险始终存在，而且冰冷坚硬的表面会使睡眠者感到寒冷。8
Shelter. Shelters frequently spell the difference between life and death in frigid regions. Not many troops are as fortunate as U.S. peacekeepers in Bosnia, who soon after arrival were able to rotate between the field and elaborate modules where they warmed themselves during the winter of 1995-96, enjoyed hot meals, laundered dirty uniforms, slept on cots, and relaxed for 3 days at a time until the next batch of 550 arrived at one of six such “cities.”7 Most military personnel in wintry areas of operation instead occupy small-to-medium-sized tents. Unlike Ringling Brothers, Barnum, and Bailey Circus, which formerly used elephants to help roustabouts erect and strike Big Tops, they must unfurl heavy canvas stiff with cold (usually in the dark), try to drive tent pegs into tundra frozen harder than bricks (perhaps aided by explosives), build snow walls to ward off howling winds, then chop out before they displace. Base camps generally boast wooden floors, while warm sleeping bags atop air mattresses or other insulating materials are obligatory on bare ground. Troops in the open occasionally construct expedient shelters such as igloos and snow caves, which insulate as well as rock wool or fiber glass, but truck cabs and armored vehicles make poor bedrooms, because carbon monoxide is an ever present danger, and cold, hard surfaces rob sleepers of warmth.8
食物和水。在严寒天气下，充足的、轻便的、营养均衡的、最好是温热的口粮至关重要，尤其对于从事高强度活动的部队而言。美军设定每日4500卡路里的目标摄入量，而拥有更丰富实践经验的芬兰同行则建议每日摄入6000卡路里。甜食是正餐之间极佳的快速补充能量的零食。指挥官和炊事员必须时刻谨记，未妥善保温的食物在厨房和食用者之间运输过程中会冻结。此外，每人每天需要4至6夸脱（升）饮用水以防止在寒冷天气下脱水，但当溪流结冰时，充足的水源难以获取。即使装满热水，5加仑（18升）的罐子和水壶在零度以下的温度下也会迅速冻结。后勤人员还要考虑出于卫生目的的用水，更不用说对遭受持久性化学战剂袭击的部队进行消毒所需的大量用水，这使得问题更加复杂。9
Food and Water. Generous, lightweight, well-balanced, nutritious, and preferably warm rations are essential in very cold weather, especially for troops engaged in strenuous activities. The U.S. Army sets 4,500 calories per day as a goal, although Finnish counterparts with greater practical experience recommend 6,000. Sweets make excellent instant-energy snacks between regular meals. Commanders and cooks must constantly bear in mind that food not in well-insulated containers will freeze in transit between kitchens and consumers. Each individual moreover requires 4 to 6 quarts (liters) of drinking water per day to prevent dehydration in cold weather, although adequate sources are difficult to tap when streams turn to ice. Five-gallon (18-liter) cans as well as canteens freeze fast in subzero temperatures, even when first filled with hot water. Problems compound when logisticians factor in water for hygienic purposes, not to mention huge amounts needed to decontaminate units hit by persistent chemical warfare agents.9
领导力。体能、适应性和训练可以使军人做好应对寒冷天气作战的准备，但充足的食物、合适的衣物和足够的住所也至关重要。如果相当一部分人裹得严严实实，从头到脚裹得严严实实，被派克大衣的帽子遮住了眼睛，几乎耳聋眼花，开始进入冬眠状态，那么部队就无法维持运转。在这种情况下，身强力壮的初级军官和士官就显得至关重要，因为部队可能会瓦解，任务也会失败。
Leadership. Physical fitness, acclimatization, and training may prepare military men and women for cold weather warfare, but ample food, proper clothing, and adequate shelter cannot sustain them if a sizable percentage, bundled from head to foot against the cold, nearly deaf and blinded by parka hoods, begin to hibernate. Strong junior officers and noncommissioned officers then become truly indispensable, for units can disintegrate and missions fail under such conditions.
材料维护
MATERIEL MAINTENANCE
大约在零下10华氏度（零下23摄氏度）时，就会出现严重的维护问题，并且此后温度每下降一度，问题就会加剧：
Big maintenance problems begin to develop at about -10°F (-23 °C) and intensify with every degree that thermometers drop thereafter:
• 润滑剂会变硬。
• Lubricants stiffen.
金属会失去抗拉强度。
• Metals lose tensile strength.
橡胶失去可塑性。
• Rubber loses plasticity.
• 塑料和陶瓷的延展性降低。
• Plastics and ceramics become less ductile.
• 电池效率大幅下降。
• Battery efficiencies decrease dramatically.
• 燃料汽化不完全。
• Fuels vaporize incompletely.
玻璃在突然受热时会破裂。
• Glass cracks when suddenly heated.
• 密封件容易失效。
• Seals are subject to failure.
静电增加。
• Static electricity increases.
• 仪表和刻度盘卡住了。
• Gauges and dials stick.
内燃机难以启动，部分原因是电池输出功率远低于正常水平（在-40°F/-40°C时几乎为零）。在车库中以适中温度充气的轮胎，在卡车驶出车库进入极寒环境时，会在轮辋上打滑并扯断气门嘴。在-20°F/-29°C以下，可折叠油囊的价值值得怀疑；被低温浸泡的连接器、控制旋钮和电气触点难以组装和维修；玻璃钢水拖车由于无法承受浸入式加热器的加热而结冰。除非机动车辆和帐篷炉灶正确接地，否则易燃燃料很容易爆炸。在缺乏加热设施的情况下，处理这些问题所需的维护工时会大幅增加。几乎所有东西都需要更多：更多的机械师、更多的电池充电器、更多的替换零件、更多的燃料。还需要不同的油和润滑脂。10
Combustion engines are hard to start, partly because battery output at best is far below normal (practically zero at -40 °F and -40 °C). Tires inflated in garages at moderate temperatures slip on rims and rip off valve stems when trucks drive out the door into extreme cold. The value of collapsible fuel bladders is dubious below about -20 °F (-29 °C), cold-soaked connectors, control knobs, and electrical contacts are hard to assemble and repair, and fiberglass water trailers freeze because they cannot tolerate immersion heaters. Flammable fuels are apt to erupt unless motor vehicles and tent stoves are properly grounded. Maintenance man-hours required to cope with such problems balloon in the absence of heated facilities. More of almost everything is needed: more mechanics, more battery chargers, more replacement parts, more fuel. Different oils and greases also are required.10
寒冷天气会使飞机维护难度至少增加一个数量级，在没有大修机库的情况下，难度会更大。除冰至关重要，因为即使机翼上只有一层薄薄的冰层也可能致命。例如，20世纪50年代初，有8架F-84战斗机在起飞后不久坠毁，原因是堵塞喷气发动机进气口的冰导致发动机爆炸。11
Cold weather increases aircraft maintenance difficulties by at least one order of magnitude, greater in the absence of overhaul hangars. De-icing is crucially important, because even a thin coating on air foils can be fatal. Eight F-84 fighters, for example, crashed shortly after take-off in the early 1950s, because ice that blocked jet intakes caused their engines to explode.11
任务完成
MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT
寒冷的平原究竟有利于进攻还是防守，尚无定论。进攻方可以利用吹雪，这有助于出其不意，但对于缺乏全球定位系统（GPS）辅助的部队来说，这会使陆地导航变得困难。驻守在固定观察哨的防守方可以利用暴风雪掩埋行进路线和伪装阵地，但通常比巡逻的进攻方遭受更多的冻伤。移动车辆和温暖的帐篷等高温物体与寒冷背景形成的鲜明热对比，可能对一方有利，也可能对双方都不利，或者两者都不利。皑皑白雪反射着月光、星光和极光。漫漫冬夜，北极光照亮敌我双方。寒冷天气对行动和后勤保障的限制，从根本上影响着任务的完成，下文将对此进行详细阐述。
Whether frigid flatlands favor offense or defense is subject to conjecture. Forces on the attack benefit from blowing snow, which facilitates surprise but makes land navigation difficult for troops that lack Global Positioning System (GPS) assistance. Defenders in static observation posts benefit from blizzards that cover tracks and camouflage positions, but generally suffer more cold casualties than offensive forces on patrol. Brilliant thermal contrasts caused by hot objects against cold backgrounds—such as moving vehicles and heated tents—may benefit one side, both, or neither. Blankets of snow that reflect moonlight, starlight, and the Aurora Borealis on long winter nights illuminate friend and foe alike. Cold weather limitations on mobility and logistics, which elementally influence mission accomplishment, are amplified below.
陆路机动。步兵通常在平坦或起伏的地形上以每小时约3英里的速度行进，在齐膝深的积雪中艰难跋涉，遇到粘稠或更深的雪堆时便寸步难行。而经过长时间高强度训练、由经验丰富的教官指导的全副武装的军用滑雪者，则能轻松滑过这样的雪面。雪鞋行走虽然不如滑雪那样引人注目，速度更慢，也更费力，但大多数士兵只需一个小时左右就能掌握所需的所有技能。开路先锋通常很早就出发，为部队开辟道路，并在必要时引导主力部队穿越人迹罕至的区域，那里几乎没有任何地形特征可以作为显著的地标（高科技全球定位系统可以告诉士兵他们的位置，但无法确定正确的路线）。12
Overland Mobility. Infantrymen, who regularly log about 3 miles an hour on level to rolling terrain, struggle through knee-deep snow and come to a standstill when drifts are sticky or much deeper, whereas heavily laden military skiers, tutored by skilled instructors during long periods of intensive training, glide over such surfaces. Snowshoeing is less glamorous, slower, and requires greater exertion, but most troops can learn all they need to know in an hour or so. Trailbreakers normally leave early to blaze the way and, when necessary, navigate for the main body through trackless territory where few topographic features make prominent landmarks (hi-tech global positioning devices tell troops where they are but not how to set true courses).12
任何军队依赖公路作战的倾向都会削弱各级军事能力，因为寒冷的平原地区越野通行条件极其恶劣，交通网络也极其稀疏。四驱卡车通常在积雪超过车轮直径三分之一时就会陷入泥潭，在等待除雪车清理深雪时也会停滞不前，即使地面光秃秃的，也难以穿越苔原或泥炭沼泽。履带车辆虽然更擅长应对崎岖地形，但在积雪远超其离地间隙时也会失去牵引力。坦克驾驶员为了突破积雪而反复前后摇晃，会给动力装置、传动系统和链轮带来巨大压力，一旦坦克最终倾覆，救援人员将难以脱困。在这种情况下，拖拉机牵引的货运雪橇、雪地摩托、气垫船和其他特种运输工具的实用性将大幅提升。13但如果冰冻的湖泊和溪流的承载能力足以容纳特定重量的车辆，并且驾驶员按规定的间隔单列行驶，那么它们就可以成为安全的通道。例如，在1941-42年的冬天，尽管遭到德军猛烈的炮火和空中轰炸，苏军仍然通过横跨拉多加湖的“生命之路”向饥荒肆虐的列宁格勒运送了大量物资。14
Any tendency for armed forces to be roadbound degrades military capabilities at every level, because frigid flatlands combine wretched cross-country trafficability with exceedingly sparse transportation networks. All-wheel drive trucks as a rule bog down when snows on roads measure more than one-third of wheel diameters, stall in line waiting for plows to clear the way through deep drifts, and cannot easily traverse tundra or muskeg even when the land is bare. Track-laying vehicles, which are better able to negotiate rough ground, lose traction when snows are much deeper than their ground clearance. Tank drivers who repeatedly rock back and forth trying to break through put power plants, drive trains, and sprockets under great stress and make it difficult for recovery crews to set them free if they finally go belly up. The utility of tractor-drawn cargo sleds, snowmobiles, air-cushion vehicles, and other special purpose transports skyrockets under such conditions,13 but frozen lakes and streams make safe routes if load-bearing capacities are sufficient for vehicles of particular weights and drivers proceed single file at specified intervals. Soviet forces during the winter of 1941-42, for example, delivered substantial supplies to starving Leningrad via the “Road of Life” across Lake Ladoga, despite intense German artillery fire and aerial bombardment.14
空中力量。除南部边缘地带外，寒冷的平原地区人烟稀少。这一地理事实凸显了尽快取得并保持空中优势的必要性，以便空中作战部队能够执行侦察、纵深打击和近距离支援任务，同时空中机动部队能够部署、重新部署、补给、撤离以及为地面部队提供其他支援。冰冻的湖泊和溪流在工程师平整崎岖不平的地面后，可以作为轻载滑雪飞机的临时机场；直升机在选择着陆区方面也拥有很大的自由度，但缺乏超短距起降（VSTOL）、垂直起降（VTOL）能力的战斗机、攻击机、轰炸机和运输机中队则需要硬质跑道。
Air Power. Frigid flatlands are sparsely settled except along the southern fringe. That geographic fact magnifies needs to gain and retain air superiority as soon as possible, so that air combat forces can conduct reconnaissance, deep-strike, and close-support missions while air mobility forces deploy, redeploy, supply, evacuate, and otherwise support troops on the ground. Frozen lakes and streams make extemporaneous airfields for lightly laden ski planes after engineers smooth out rough spots and helicopters enjoy large latitude in their choice of landing zones, but fighter, attack, bomber, and airlift squadrons that lack very short or vertical takeoff and landing (VSTOL, VTOL) capabilities require hard-surfaced runways.
冬季天气下的军事空袭行动总是充满变数，其危险性往往超过武装敌人。隔热不良的建筑物、沥青跑道、滑行道和停车场如果吸收足够的阳光融化下方的永久冻土，就会坍塌。低云、冰雾和暴风雪可能导致连续数日无法起降，而强风吹起的积雪若不反复清理，则会使机场关闭。明智的指挥官会在“白茫茫一片”导致水平能见度急剧下降，以及“灰蒙蒙一片”在清晨和傍晚的长时间昏暗光线下扭曲深度感知时，暂停近距离空中支援任务。15在零下气温中，直升机和伞降突击是极其危险的，正如美国第504伞兵步兵团的成员在 1954 年 2 月在格陵兰岛图勒附近的“北极之夜行动”中发现的那样，当时温度计显示 -35 °F (-37 °C)。空速为130节，当他们跃过敞开的舱门时，螺旋桨产生的气流冲击着他们，温度远低于传统风寒指数表所记录的温度（表7，第73页）。只有严格的纪律和周密的准备才能避免跳伞受伤和冻伤。16
Military air operations always are iffy in wintry weather, which often poses worse hazards than armed enemies. Improperly insulated buildings, black-topped runways, taxi strips, and parking areas collapse if they absorb enough sunshine to melt underlying permafrost. Low ceilings, ice fog, and snow storms may prevent takeoffs or landings for several consecutive days, while wind-driven drifts close airports unless cleared repeatedly. Sensible commanders suspend close air support missions when “whiteouts” drastically reduce horizontal visibility and “grayouts” distort depth perception during prolonged periods of morning and evening twilight.15 Heliborne and parachute assaults are numbing propositions in subzero weather, as members of the U.S. 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment discovered in February 1954 during Operation Arctic Night near Thule, Greenland, when thermometers read -35 °F (-37 °C), the airspeed was 130 knots, and the prop blast that hit them as they leaped through wide open doors was far colder than conventional wind-chill charts ever register (table 7, page 73). Only strict discipline and thoughtful preparations prevented jump injuries and cold casulaties16
补给。寒冷气候下的后勤物资需求量会大幅增加，几乎所有物资都需要更多，从口粮、衣物、帐篷、热水器和炉灶，到粉刷涂料、除雪机、防冻液、电池、维修零件、建筑材料，以及雪鞋和滑雪板等专用装备。冬季，军队的燃料消耗量惊人。例如，在雪地上行驶的车辆，油耗可能比在陆地上高出25%。当气温低至零下20华氏度（零下29摄氏度）时，维持一个10人小队帐篷的居住环境，每天需要10加仑（38升）柴油。为了维持分销商的正常运营，还需要额外的石油、润滑油和燃料油（POL）供应。因此，集中式后勤设施，包括野战厨房（地面作战部队的主要热餐来源），在寒冷的平原地区往往成为诱人的攻击目标，也就不足为奇了。17
Supply. Cold clime logistical loads expand prodigiously in response to requirements for more of almost everything from rations, clothing, tents, water heaters, and stoves to whitewash, snow plows, antifreeze, batteries, repair parts, construction materials, and specialized accouterments such as snow shoes and skis. Armed forces in wintry weather burn fuel at outrageous rates. Motor vehicles churning through snow, for example, consume perhaps 25 percent more than on solid ground. It takes 10 gallons (38 liters) of diesel per day to keep a 10-man squad tent habitable when the thermometer registers -20 °F (-29 °C). Additional petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) supplies are needed to keep distributors in business. Small wonder, therefore, that centralized logistic facilities, including field kitchens (the main source of warm meals for ground combat forces), often become tempting targets in frigid flatlands.17
冰冷的海洋
FRIGID SEAS
早在公元 6 世纪维京海盗入侵爱尔兰之前，身着野生动物皮毛的凶猛水手们就已经熟悉了冰冷的大海。二战期间，北大西洋、北太平洋和北冰洋的海军利益急剧增加，在美苏冷战时期（1946-1989 年）也保持强劲，而且很可能会继续保持这种势头，因为这三个海域都具有重要的战略位置。
Fierce seafarers dressed in wild animal skins were familiar with frigid seas long before Viking raiders invaded Ireland in the 6th century A.D. Naval interests in the North Atlantic, North Pacific, and Arctic Oceans, which intensified sharply during World War II, remained strong throughout the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union (1946-1989) and likely will continue to do so, because all three are strategically located.
地面作业
SURFACE OPERATIONS
严寒天气导致海面冰冷，一年中的大部分时间，除非破冰船开辟出通往外海的航道，否则水面作战舰艇、支援舰艇和商船都只能被困在冰封的港口内。所有船员、舰艇和舰载飞机都会面临许多陆上武装部队所面临的问题，同时还要承受海军特有的额外艰辛。
The subfreezing weather that creates frigid seas confines surface combatants, support ships, and merchantmen inside ice-clogged harbors much of the year unless icebreakers clear the way to open water. All crews, ships, and embarked aircraft experience many of the problems that afflict armed forces ashore and endure additional hardships that are uniquely naval.
破冰船。没有哪个国家比俄罗斯更需要破冰船，因为只有黑海舰队拥有不冻港（见第12页图1和第51页图8）。芬兰湾在圣彼得堡和喀琅施塔得（波罗的海舰队的母港）附近经常结冰，冰层厚度达1米。北方舰队位于挪威边境附近，墨西哥湾暖流略微温暖着巴伦支海，地理位置相对有利，但仍然依赖破冰船。俄罗斯太平洋舰队的舰艇，包括南至符拉迪沃斯托克的舰艇，也同样依赖破冰船，至少从11月到次年3月，破冰船的援助至关重要。除了受相对温和的库里西洋流影响的堪察加彼得罗巴甫洛夫斯克海军基地外，没有其他海军基地能够便捷地通往海洋。
Icebreakers. No nation has greater need for icebreakers than Russia, where only the Black Sea Fleet enjoys ice-free ports (map 1 on page 12 and map 8 on page 51). The Gulf of Finland often freezes 3-feet (1-meter) thick at Saint Petersburg and Kronstadt, which is home port for the Baltic Fleet. The Northern Fleet, ensconced near the Norwegian frontier where the Gulf Stream slightly warms the Barents Sea, is situated more favorably but still relies on icebreakers, as do ships of Russia’s Pacific Fleet as far south as Vladivostok, where assistance is essential from November through March as a minimum. No naval base save Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, washed by the relatively tepid Kurishio Current, has easy access to the ocean.
因此，自19世纪末以来，俄罗斯人便专注于破冰船的建造。破冰船不仅能在严酷的冬季疏通港口，还能在公海上凿开浮冰之间的缝隙，寻找极地冰层中的通道，拓宽航道以便后续船只通行，并协助其他海上作业。各国破冰船的特点是船身短粗，便于在狭窄水域中灵活机动；船体宽阔，能够开凿出大片冰面；动力强劲，无需反复撞击即可在需要的地方开辟航道；船首采用切角设计，可以滑过冰面而非正面撞击；加固的船体外扩，能够在压力下提升船体，避免被冰压碎。在航行区域，破冰船的燃料消耗量巨大。由于补给可能是不可能的，苏联于 1957 年开发并部署了列宁号，这是世界上第一艘核动力破冰船，专门设计用于强行穿过超过 6 英尺（2 米）厚的冰原，并保持一年以上的自给自足。18
Russians since the late 19th century consequently have specialized in icebreakers, which not only unclog their ports during brutal winters but drive wedges between floes on high seas, locate leads in polar ice, widen such channels for ships that follow in trail, and otherwise facilitate naval operations. Icebreakers of all countries characteristically are stubby enough to maneuver in close quarters and feature broad beams designed to cut wide swaths, enough horsepower to slice paths where required without repeated ramming, cutaway bows that ride over ice instead of hitting it head on, and reinforced hulls flared to lift the ship under pressure rather than let it be crushed. Huge fuel expenditures in regions where underway replenishment may be impossible led the Soviet Union in 1957 to develop and deploy the Lenin, the world’s first nuclear-powered icebreaker expressly designed to bull its way through ice fields more than 6 feet (2 meters) thick and remain self-sufficient for more than a year.18
内务问题及应对措施。水面舰艇及其船员若无法有效应对严寒、狂风和巨浪，必将遭受残酷对待。在许多方面，日常准备工作与驻扎在潮湿阴冷北极地区的陆上部队类似：防护服抵御严寒；高热量口粮；温暖的舱室；冬季适用的武器装备；专用物资；以及预防性维护措施。19然而，海军舰艇生活特有的内务问题依然显而易见。
Housekeeping Problems and Responses. Surface ships and crews that cannot cope well with freezing temperatures, wild winds, and towering waves can anticipate cruel treatment. Routine preparations in many respects parallel those of armed forces in dank arctic regions ashore: protective clothing to shield wearers against cold weather; rations with high caloric contents; warm quarters; winterized weapons and equipment; specialized supplies; and preventive maintenance precautions.19 Housekeeping problems peculiar to life aboard naval ships nevertheless are evident.
狭窄的舱室使得御寒装备的存放空间变得尤为珍贵，尤其是在驱逐舰、护卫舰和轻型护卫舰等小型水面作战舰艇上。例如，存放每人多层冬季衣物大约需要1立方英尺的空间，而连体防寒服则需要两倍的空间。厨房通常需要比在温暖地区多存放10%的食物。笨重的防冻液桶、防冰剂、除冰剂和沉重的沙袋都会占用宝贵的空间。此外，由于恶劣天气导致的异常快速的维修支出，所需的额外维修零件也占据了宝贵的空间。指挥官还必须安置许多尺寸不规则的工具，固定无法放入储物柜的物品，并确保能够方便地取用最常用的物资。带走什么、留下什么，都需要做出艰难的权衡。20
Cramped compartments put storage space for cold weather gear at a premium, especially on board small surface combatants such as destroyers, frigates, and corvettes. It takes about 1 cubic foot, for example, to stow the layered winter clothing of each individual, twice that much for one-piece exposure suits. Galleys generally must find room for 10 percent more food than they stock in warmer climes. Bulky drums of antifreeze, ice preventives, de-icing chemicals, and heavy bags of sand soak up precious space. So do additional repair parts needed to compensate for abnormally rapid expenditures as a direct result of severe weather. Commanders also must accommodate many awkwardly dimensioned implements, lash down impedimenta that does not fit in lockers, and assure easy access to stocks in greatest demand. What to take and what to leave behind involves painful tradeoffs.20
内陆地区未知的冰冻盐水喷溅会覆盖甲板、舱壁、上层建筑、进气口、舱口盖、桅杆、索具、裸露的机械、天线和武器系统，形成厚厚的冰层，增加排水量、降低干舷、削弱作战能力，如果不及时处理，还会危及船舶稳定性。岩盐、氯化钙、乙二醇、乙醇、尿素和其他能降低海水冰点的物质，都能使冰在远低于2°C (28.5°F) 的温度下融化，但需谨慎使用，因为这些物质都兼具优点和缺点。尿素会释放氨气，而且按重量计算，其除冰效率不如盐，但腐蚀性较小。乙二醇在低至-15°C (5°F) 的温度下比大多数替代品效果更好，但价格昂贵，而且会使表面变得湿滑。因此，收益递减规律决定了哪些应用最具成本效益，同时又能将损害降到最低。21
Frozen salt water spray, unknown inland, can cover decks, bulkheads, superstructures, air intakes, hatches, masts, rigging, exposed machinery, antennas, and weapon systems with thick layers of ice that increase displacement, decrease freeboard, degrade combat capabilities and, if not countered in time, endanger ship stability. Rock salt, calcium chloride, ethylene glycol, ethanol, urea, and other materials that depress the freezing point of sea water cause ice to melt at temperatures well below 28.5 °F (2 °C), but caution is advisable, because all mingle good and bad attributes. Urea emits ammonia gas and is not as efficient as salts pound per pound, but is less corrosive. Ethylene glycol, which works better than most substitutes at temperatures as low as 5 °F (-15 °C), is expensive and creates slippery surfaces. The Law of Diminishing Returns consequently determines which applications would be most cost effective and simultaneously least detrimental.21
航行中的危险。即使在夏季，北极和南极水域航行的水面舰艇也面临着其他地区所没有的危险。1942年7月18日，在阿拉斯加科迪亚克和阿留申群岛基斯卡之间的海域，巨浪不仅将海水灌入摇晃的驱逐舰的进气口，还引发了严重的晕船反应，以至于“呕吐物粘在了所有表面上”。重巡洋舰“印第安纳波利斯”号上的船员几乎立即救起了一名落水者，却发现他已经因体温过低而死亡。姊妹舰在浓雾中擦肩而过，直到两艘被浓雾遮蔽视线的驱逐舰最终相撞，随后第三艘又撞上了第四艘，之后特遣舰队一枪未发地返回了港口。22
Hazards Underway. Surface ships underway in arctic and antarctic waters even during summer months face hazards that no other regions duplicate. Tremendous waves on July 18, 1942, not only dumped water down the air intakes of rolling destroyers between Kodiak, Alaska, and Kiska in the Aleutian Islands but induced seasickness to such an extent that “vomit clung to every surface.” Shipmates on the heavy cruiser Indianapolis, who almost immediately rescued a man overboard, discovered that hypothermia already had killed him. Sister ships curtsied past each other in dense fog until two blinded destroyers finally collided, then a third rammed a fourth, whereupon the task force returned to port without firing a shot.22
北冰洋北纬90°至80°之间常年被冰层覆盖，但每年冬季在更南边形成的不规则边缘冰区（MIZ）有时会延伸至纽芬兰和日本海。水面船舶若在没有破冰船协助的情况下冒险进入边缘冰区前缘的冰层，可能会损坏螺旋桨和舵；而那些驶得过远的船舶则可能面临严重的船体损坏，甚至可能……被困住的冰块在救援人员到达前无法移动。宽度从几英尺到几英里不等的浮冰经常从中间冰区脱落并向南漂去，在北大西洋，它们与主要源自格陵兰岛、巴芬岛和斯瓦尔巴群岛的冰山一同漂流。23
Perpetual ice packs cover the Arctic Ocean between 90° and 80° or so north latitude, but the irregularly shaped Marginal Ice Zone (MIZ) that forms farther south each winter sometimes extends fingers as far as Newfoundland and the Sea of Japan. Surface ships that venture into the mushy forward edge of the MIZ without icebreaker assistance may damage screws and rudders, while those that proceed too far risk major hull damage or could be immobilized until rescuers arrive. Floes that vary from a few feet to several miles in width habitually break off from the MIZ and float south, accompanied in the North Atlantic by icebergs that primarily originate in Greenland, Baffin Island, and Svalbard.23
二战期间，盟军护航船队从冰岛向苏联北极港口运送美国租借物资，途中不仅要躲避海上障碍物，还要提防敌军（见地图13和14）。在所谓的“摩尔曼斯克航线”上，船员们通过救生索与从船头延伸到船尾的缆绳相连，在颠簸的船体上航行。坦克、机车、卡车和装在箱子里的飞机，在剧烈摇晃导致缆绳断裂后，必须反复用绞车将其拉回原位。1942年3月从雷克雅未克出发的PQ-13船队，首先遭遇了时速高达100英里的狂风，导致其19艘货船和9艘护航舰艇在巴伦支海150英里的航程中分散，随后又遭受了德国轰炸机和潜艇的猛烈攻击。许多船员在冰冷的海水中丧生或遭受严重冻伤，最终 35 艘运输船中有 11 艘在 7 月份完成了那次痛苦的航行（有三艘船幸存下来，因为粉刷和床单帮助它们与浮冰融为一体）。24
Allied convoys that carried U.S. Lend-Lease supplies from Iceland to arctic ports in the Soviet Union dodged those floating obstacles as well as enemy armed forces during World War II (maps 13 and 14). Crews on the so-called “Murmansk Run” were tethered by life lines to hawsers that stretched from bow to stern on each pitching ship. Tanks, locomotives, trucks, and crated aircraft had to be winched back into place repeatedly after wrenching motions broke their bonds. Convoy PQ-13, which left Reykjavik in March 1942, first met 100-mile-per-hour winds that scattered 19 of its cargo ships and 9 escorts over 150 miles of the Barents Sea, then came under relentless German bomber and submarine attacks. Many crewmen perished in the frigid waters or suffered from severe frostbite before 11 of 35 transports finally completed that traumatic voyage in July (three ships survived because whitewash and bedding sheets helped them blend with ice floes).24
潜艇作战
SUBMARINE OPERATIONS
寻找绕过西伯利亚、连接大西洋和太平洋的东北航道始于16世纪，当时有四位无畏的航海家：休·威洛比、理查德·钱塞勒、斯蒂芬·伯勒和威廉·巴伦支。另有四位航海家（乔瓦尼·达·韦拉扎诺、马丁·弗罗比舍爵士、约翰·戴维斯和亨利·哈德逊）试图沿着如今加拿大北极边界寻找西北航道，但均以失败告终。尼尔斯·诺登舍尔德男爵最终在1878年至1879年间完成了从西向东的航行，而罗尔德·阿蒙森则在1904年至1906年间历时三年，从东向西完成了这段航程。25但我们现在知道，即使在夏季借助破冰船，也不存在水面舰艇在北极上双向可靠的军事航线。
The search for a Northeast Passage that skirted Siberia from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean started in the 16th century with four fearless navigators: Hugh Willoughby, Richard Chancellor, Stephen Burrough, and Willem Barents. Four more failed to find a Northwest Passage along what currently is Canada’s arctic frontier (Giovanni da Verrazano, Sir Martin Frobisher, John Davis, and Henry Hudson). Baron Nils Nordenskiöld finally made the trip from west to east in 1878-1879 and Roald Amundson took a 3-year trek from east to west between 1904 and 1906,25 but we now know that no militarily reliable arctic route for surface ships exists in either direction, even in summer with the aid of icebreakers.
尽管如此，在冰封的海域进行海军作战仍然是可行的。1958 年 8 月，美国核动力攻击潜艇“鹦鹉螺”号（SSN-571）配备了特殊的声呐和导航设备，从华盛顿州西雅图出发，穿越极地冰盖前往大西洋。26 “鹬”号（SSN-578）配备了硬化的帆和其他新颖的特征，于第二年穿过厚厚的冰层浮出水面（图 15）。
Naval operations beneath ice-filled seas nevertheless have been feasible since the U.S. nuclear-powered attack submarine Nautilus (SSN-571), equipped with special sonar and navigational gear, crossed under the polar ice pack en route from Seattle, Washington, to the Atlantic Ocean in August 1958.26 The Skate (SSN-578), with a hardened sail and other novel features, surfaced though heavy ice the following year (map 15).
冷战后期，苏联弹道导弹潜艇占据了巴伦支海和鄂霍次克海的水下堡垒，但海军战略家和战术家认为，这种猫捉老鼠般的竞争可能会蔓延到北冰洋以南边缘冰区的其他周边海域。海洋学家们正在收集有关水深、地形特征、水密度、生物声学、声波传播和环境噪声等方面的详细情报，他们得出结论：厚度从1英尺到超过100英尺（30米）的漂浮海冰层，顶部坚硬如石，底部质地如同廉价混凝土，是一个在持续热应力作用下的动态体，并在洋流和盛行风的影响下缓慢地沿可预测的方向移动。其下构成了一个颠倒的世界，遍布荒地、孤丘、巨石、山脊、尖塔、山丘、山谷、平原、裂缝、湖泊和巨大的被囚禁的冰山，所有这些都叠加在构成地面的类似景观之上。27能够在如此复杂的环境中高效作战的潜艇，可以忽略高速和深潜能力，但需要一系列精密的导航和目标捕获/跟踪传感器，能够360度扫描前后左右上下。可靠的破冰上浮方式也必不可少，因为一旦空气供应因任何原因中断，艇员都将丧命。战斗至少在某一方面可以比作丛林战：装备精良的防御者可以悄无声息地等待敌军在丛林中潜行进入攻击范围，然后发动伏击。因此，进攻性反制措施的研发重点在于隐蔽性和近距离快速区分敌我的能力。一些专家还认为，短粗的椭圆形潜艇应该取代细长的雪茄形潜艇，因为后者在狭小空间内机动性较差。28
Soviet ballistic missile submarines occupied bastions beneath the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk late in the Cold War, but naval strategists and tacticians believe that cat-and-mouse competition could spread to other peripheral seas in Marginal Ice Zones south of the Arctic Ocean. Oceanographers, who are amassing detailed intelligence concerning bathymetry, topographic characteristics, water densities, bio-acoustics, sound transition, and ambient noise, conclude that the floating canopy of sea ice, which measures from 1 to more than 100 feet (30 meters) thick, is rock hard on top, has the consistency of cheap concrete below, is a dynamic mass under constant thermal stress, and moves sluggishly in predictable directions under the influence of currents and prevailing winds. Underneath, it constitutes an upside down world of bad lands, buttes, blocks, ridges, spires, hills, dales, planes, open cracks, lakes, and massive imprisoned icebergs, all superimposed above a similar landscape that shapes the floor.27 Submarines able to operate most effectively in that complex environment could safely ignore high speed and deep submergence abilities but need an array of sophisticated navigation and target acquisition/tracking sensors that scan 360 degrees front and rear, left and right, above and below. Reliable ways to surface through solid ice also seem obligatory, because crews otherwise would perish if air supplies failed for any reason. Combat could be likened to jungle warfare in at least one respect: heavily armed defenders could silently wait until adversaries creeping through the clutter come within reach, then trigger ambushes. The quest for offensive countermeasures consequently emphasizes stealthiness and abilities to differentiate friends from foes quickly at close quarters. Some authorities also believe that stubby, ellipsoidal submarines should replace long, cigar-shaped models that cannot maneuver well in tight spaces.28
Map 13. Iceberg Routes to the North Atlantic
山区
MOUNTAINOUS REGIONS
环绕太平洋盆地和横贯欧亚大陆的巍峨山脉，以及除澳大利亚以外各大洲的高山丘陵，几乎构成了地球海平面以上表面的一半（图16）。所有大小不一的山脉、山链和科迪勒拉山脉都具有地貌分割、坡度陡峭、高速公路稀少等特征，但纬度、海拔、形状、土壤、水文、植被和气候等因素仍然造就了它们独特的差异。29白雪皑皑的欧洲阿尔卑斯山与相对低矮但崎岖的马埃斯特拉斯山脉截然不同，后者曾是菲德尔·卡斯特罗和他的革命队伍在 1959 年推翻古巴独裁者富尔亨西奥·巴蒂斯塔之前的藏身之处。撒哈拉沙漠和邻近西奈半岛的30座塞雷尖峰，与越南雨水充沛的森林山坡只有些许相似之处。此外，山区在军事上的意义也颇具争议，因为战术优势有时会变成战略劣势，反之亦然。
Imposing mountains that girdle the Pacific Basin and cut across Eurasia, together with high hills on every continent save Australia, constitute almost half of Earth’s surface above sea level (map 16). All ranges, chains, and cordilleras large and small feature compartmented topography, steep gradients, and few high speed avenues, but latitudes, elevations, shapes, soils, hydrology, vegetation, and climate nevertheless produce distinctive variations.29 Snow-covered European Alps are quite unlike the relatively low but rugged Sierra Maestras that harbored Fidel Castro and his revolutionary band before they overthrew Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959.30 Sere spires in the Sahara and neighboring Sinai only faintly resemble forested slopes in rain-drenched Vietnam. The military implications of mountainous regions moreover are controversial, because tactical advantages sometimes become strategic liabilities, and vice versa.
Map 15. The Arctic Ocean and Peripheral Seas
共同面额
COMMON DENOMINATORS
所有山脉，无论其形状或位置如何，都具有一个共同的特点：只有凭借特殊技能才能克服恶劣的环境。那些在平原作战中准备极其充分的武装部队，往往在适应地形之前表现不佳。
Environmental adversity overcome only by special skills characterizes all mountains, regardless of their configuration or locale. Armed forces that are superlatively prepared for operations on flatlands often do poorly until they adjust.
环境的不利影响。英国陆军元帅斯利姆子爵曾遗憾地指出，那些在小比例尺地图上绘制距离和计算行军时间的资深军事策划者，无法体会到山脉带来的阻碍。“要做到这一点，”他评论道，“你必须攀爬陡峭的山坡，然后从另一侧滑下来，如此反复，就像走在锯齿上一样。”31
Environmental Adversity. British Field Marshal the Viscount Slim once ruefully observed that senior military planners who plot distances and calculate movement times on small-scale maps cannot appreciate what impediments mountains impose. “To do that,” he opined, “you must scramble up the precipitous slopes and slide down the other side, endlessly, as if you were walking along the teeth of a saw.”31
在地形崎岖的山区，行军确实困难重重。这里障碍重重，隘口狭窄，机动空间受限，而占据高地的敌军则占据有利位置，可以压制下方的敌人。机动车辆通常只能在简陋狭窄、路况极差的道路上行驶，这些道路几乎都是如此，路肩陡峭，弯道急促，桥梁众多（其中许多结构脆弱），还有隧道、栈桥和涵洞，所有这些都限制了交通流量，并容易招致敌军的阻拦。在这种情况下，一辆坦克或卡车一旦发生故障，甚至拖车发生折叠，都可能导致整个纵队瘫痪。陡峭的山坡阻碍了轮式车辆的通行，也让坦克难以通过，坦克在坡度过陡时可能会熄火、打滑、履带在松散的碎石上脱落，甚至侧翻。因此，在最恶劣的地区，只能依靠步兵和驮畜进行越野通行。天气允许时，空中交通是一种受欢迎的补充，但由于浓雾或强风伴随严重湍流经常会出乎意料地介入，并长时间中断飞行作业，因此空中交通并不可靠。32
Movement indeed is difficult in mountainous terrain where obstacles abound, defiles limit maneuver room, and armed forces perched above are well positioned to dominate opponents below. Motorized conveyances as a rule are confined to roads that, with few exceptions, are rudimentary, narrow, and poorly constructed, with steep shoulders, switchback curves, numerous bridges (many of them flimsy), tunnels, trestles, and culverts, all of which restrict traffic flow and invite enemy interdiction. One disabled tank or truck, even a jackknifed trailer, could immobilize an entire column under such conditions. Steep slopes stymie wheeled vehicles and discourage tanks which may stall, slide, throw a track on loose gravel, or topple sideways if driven on too sharp a slant. Cross-country trafficability consequently is confined to foot troops and pack animals in the worst areas. Air mobility is a welcome supplement when weather permits, but is unreliable because thick fog or strong winds accompanied by severe turbulence often intervene unexpectedly and disrupt flight operations for prolonged periods.32
Map 16. Major Mountainous Regions
山地天气，以温度逆增、变幻莫测的风和突如其来的暴风雨等气象异常现象为特征，对徒步行军者和飞机都造成了不利影响。在空气无污染的地方，强烈的太阳辐射使得山谷温度在日出后迅速上升，而在夜幕降临后，随着寒冷的空气沿山坡向下流动，温度又迅速下降。在高海拔地区，白天阳光照射和阴凉处的温差可能高达 40 至 50 华氏度（20 至 25 摄氏度）。背风坡可以免受强风侵袭，而其他地方的强风则会席卷裸露的山坡，并在狭窄的山口处加速增强，这些山口如同放大器一般放大风力。因此，合适的制服很大程度上取决于具体的地点和时间——在寒冷气候下，穿着清晨登山服装的部队往往在中午之前就会感到过热。33
Mountain weather, typified by meteorological anomalies such as temperature inversions, capricious winds, and sudden squalls, adversely affects foot sloggers as well as aircraft. Intense solar radiation causes valley thermometers to rise swiftly after sunup wherever the atmosphere is pollution free and drop after dark as soon as heavy, chilled air drains downslope. Daytime temperatures may vary as much as 40 or 50 °F (20 or 25 °C) between sun and shade at high altitudes. Leeward locations are sheltered from winds, which elsewhere sweep across exposed mountainsides and accelerate through constricted passes that act as amplifiers. Appropriate uniforms thus depend in large part on particular places and times of day—troops clad for early morning climbs in cold climates frequently become too warm well before noon.33
可用于修建简易机场、重型武器和后勤设施的空间通常稀少、拥挤且易受攻击。20世纪90年代初，位于前南斯拉夫境内的萨拉热窝机场之所以还能为联合国人道主义救援航班开放，完全取决于波斯尼亚塞族人的意愿。当时，他们占据着制高点，直到1995年11月所有交战方都接受了《代顿协议》，北约部署了强大的维和部队。34直升机可以将轻型炮兵连队部署并补给到其他方式难以到达的有利位置，但自行式和重型牵引式榴弹炮很少远离山谷底部的主要道路，这使得它们在射击角度过高时难以击中逆坡。此外，前线观察员发现，针对……的炮击山脊和狭窄的山谷很难调整，因为炮管仰角的轻微增加或减少都会导致炮弹浪费，要么过冲，要么落点过近，甚至可能落到友军阵地。35
Usable space for airstrips, heavy weapons, and logistic installations usually is scarce, cramped, and vulnerable. The airport that serves Sarajevo in former Yugoslavia remained open for U.N. humanitarian relief flights in the early 1990s only at the pleasure of Bosnian Serbs, who held commanding high ground until all belligerents accepted the Dayton Accords in November 1995 and NATO deployed powerful peacekeeping forces.34 Helicopters can deposit and provision light artillery batteries in advantageous locations that otherwise would be inaccessible, but self-propelled and heavy, towed howitzers seldom stray far from main roads along valley floors, which makes it hard for them to hit reverse slopes whenever angles of fire are excessively high. Forward observers moreover find that artillery directed against ridgelines and narrow valleys is difficult to adjust, because slight increases or decreases in tube elevation result in wasted rounds that overshoot or land short, perhaps among friendly troops.35
特殊技能。能够背负100磅重的背包攀爬90度角岩壁的攀岩者需求有限，因为军事行动很少发生在需要特殊技术的山区。然而，有时也会出现紧急需求，例如1943年12月，美国和加拿大第一特种部队（“魔鬼旅”）的600名步枪兵攀登了一座近乎垂直的1000英尺（305米）高的悬崖，随后出其不意地击败了驻守在意大利卡西诺附近迪芬萨山的德军守军。四个月后，美国第十山地师的一个营装备了岩钉和绳索，攀登了亚平宁山脉北部里瓦山脊近乎垂直、覆盖着冰层的3000英尺高的山壁，取得了类似的战果。36
Special Skills. Requirements for rock climbers who can lug 100-pound rucksacks up 90-degree angles are limited, because military operations infrequently take place on mountainous terrain that demands esoteric techniques. Urgent needs, however, sometimes arise, which was the case in December 1943, when 600 U.S. and Canadian riflemen of the 1st Special Service Force (the “Devil’s Brigade”) scaled a 1,000-foot (305-meter) cliff that was almost perpendicular, then surprised and defeated German defenders atop Monte la Difensa near Cassino, Italy. A battalion of the U.S. 10th Mountain Division equipped with pitons and ropes topped that feat 4 months later when they worked their way up the 3,000-foot, very nearly vertical, ice-glazed face of Riva Ridge in the northern Apennines with similar results.36
在山地作战中，规模庞大、技术先进的地面部队的价值远不及在平坦地形上，因为在平坦地形上，他们可以灵活机动，并发挥强大的火力。大多数作战任务反而更侧重于由正规步兵营下属单位开展的分散式小规模作战。成功主要取决于训练有素的基层指挥官和能够独立作战的步兵，他们必须体能充沛，并精通山地作战的基本要领（例如，未经训练的炮兵向下射击时往往会瞄准过高，而向上射击则会产生相反的效果，直到训练纠正这些错误）。地形导航、侦察、巡逻、掩护、隐蔽、生存、逃脱和规避都是值得密切关注的方面。鉴于自人类开始记录以来，山区一直是游击队的天然栖息地，因此，当地的安全问题也同样重要。分散在交通要道沿线宽阔地带的指挥所、简易机场和后勤设施，都成为了极具吸引力的攻击目标。37
The value of large, technologically superior ground forces is less than on level land, where they can maneuver fluidly and bring tremendous firepower to bear. Most combat missions instead emphasize decentralized small unit actions by subordinate elements of standard infantry battalions. Success depends primarily on skilled junior leaders and self-reliant foot soldiers who are superbly conditioned and well schooled in the fundamentals of mountain warfare (untutored gunners shooting down hill, for example, tend to aim high, while firing up hill has the opposite effect until training corrects those faults). Land navigation, scouting, patrolling, cover, concealment, survival, escape and evasion are topics that deserve close attention. So does local security, given the fact that mountains have been the natural habitat of guerrillas since human beings began to keep records. Dispersed command posts, airstrips, and logistic facilities necessarily located at wide spots along well-traveled roads make lucrative targets.37
专为山地作战而设计的标准步兵师通常会用更轻便、更易于运输的装备替换大量重型装备。他们还会增设工兵，负责修建、改善和维护道路、小径、机场、直升机停机坪和后勤索道，设置障碍物，并构筑野战工事。太空卫星或多频道中继站通常会被空运到视野开阔的高处，以便远距离接收，因为它们必须重新传输调频无线电信息，否则由于地形阻挡视线，这些信息将无法送达目标接收者。此外，艰苦的作战活动会增加对食物和水的需求；大量依赖直升机会导致航空燃料异常快速地消耗；而恶劣的使用环境则需要储备大量的衣物和维修零件，其中轮胎、拉杆、变速器、刹车片、装甲车履带、燃油泵和绞盘部件等都是常见的备件。38
Standard infantry divisions tailored for mountain warfare generally replace a good deal of heavy equipment with lighter loads that are easily transportable. They also add engineers to construct, improve, and maintain roads, trails, airfields, helicopter landing zones, and logistical tramways, install obstacles, and prepare field fortifications. Space satellites or multichannel relay stations airlifted to perches from which they have long-range views as a rule must retransmit FM radio messages that otherwise could not reach intended recipients because topographical features block line-of-sight paths. Strenuous activities moreover increase requirements for food and water; heavy reliance on helicopters expends aviation fuel at abnormally rapid rates; and rough usage calls for unusually large reserves of clothing and repair parts, of which tires, tie rods, transmissions, brake shoes, armored vehicle tracks, fuel pumps, and winch parts are typical.38
桥梁、隧道、其他交通瓶颈以及狭窄山路上的敌军车辆，在天气允许的情况下，都是装备精确制导武器的战术飞机的理想拦截目标。相反，在地形狭窄的区域进行近距离空中支援（CAS）行动则难以控制，如果敌军在最有利的进场路线上部署大量巧妙隐藏且可能被基岩保护的防空武器，机组人员可能会面临致命的风险。高性能固定翼飞机和无人机的低空飞行几乎总是必须沿着狭窄的通道进行，这使它们暴露在两侧敌军武器的火力之下。39
Bridges, tunnels, other transportation bottlenecks, and enemy traffic on narrow mountain roads are ideal interdiction targets for tactical aircraft armed with precision-guided munitions, providing weather permits. Close-air-support (CAS) sorties in tight terrain conversely are difficult to control, and crews may run fatal risks if hostile forces seed the most favorable approaches with a profusion of air defense weapons that are cleverly concealed and perhaps protected by bedrock. Low-level flights by high-performance fixed-wing aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles almost always must follow constricted corridors that expose them to enemy weapons on both flanks.39
环境多样性
ENVIRONMENTAL DIVERSITY
尽管我们刚才讨论过高山和丘陵的共同特征和可互换的技能，但它们在许多方面却截然不同。高海拔地区空气稀薄、气温更低等地理现象，在军事上比地形差异更为重要。
Massive mountains in many respects are very different than high hills, despite the common characteristics and interchangeable skills just discussed. Geographical phenomena associated with ever thinner air and colder temperatures at high altitudes are militarily more important than topographical distinctions.
稀薄的大气。落基山脉、安第斯山脉以及分隔中国和印度-巴基斯坦次大陆的雄伟的喀喇昆仑-喜马拉雅山脉，都是典型的巨大山脉。近150座山峰海拔超过10,000英尺（3,000米）：亚洲45座，美国33座，拉丁美洲25座，欧洲16座，非洲12座。其余的则分布在南极洲、格陵兰岛和大洋洲。珠穆朗玛峰、乔戈里峰（K2）以及其他14座海拔超过25,000英尺（7,600米）的巨峰，都远超雄伟的勃朗峰——阿尔卑斯山脉的最高峰，海拔仅为15,781英尺（4,810米）。这些数字意义重大，因为稀薄的大气会对从近海平面地区紧急调往海拔远高于10,000英尺（3,000米）的陆地部队构成潜在的生命威胁。海拔在 10,000 英尺到 20,000 英尺之间，难度几乎呈对数增长，正如 16 世纪西班牙征服者在秘鲁高原寻找黄金国时所发现的那样，也正如印度军队在 1962 年再次证实的那样，当时他们从低洼的驻军地冲出来，阻止中国入侵者敲响了喜马拉雅山的大门。40
Rarefied Atmosphere. The Rockies, Andes, and the awesome Karakorum-Himalayan wall that separates China from the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent typify massive mountain chains. Nearly 150 peaks top 10,000 feet (3,000 meters): 45 in Asia, 33 in the United States, 25 in Latin America, 16 in Europe, and 12 in Africa. Antarctica, Greenland, and Oceana contain the remainder. Mount Everest, Godwin Austin (K2), and 14 other giants that exceed 25,000 feet (7,600 meters) all dwarf imposing Mont Blanc, the loftiest spot in the Alps at a mere 15,781 feet (4,810 meters). Those figures are significant, because rarefied atmosphere poses potentially life threatening problems for land forces transferred on short notice from near sea level to elevations much above 10,000 feet. Difficulties increase almost logarithmically between 10,000 and 20,000 feet, as 16th-century Spanish conquistadors discovered during their search for El Dorado on the Peruvian altiplano and as Indian troops reconfirmed in 1962, when they rushed from low-lying garrisons to block Chinese intruders knocking at their Himalayan door.40
缺氧，临床上称为低氧症，会导致几乎所有处于这种环境中的人在数日内出现头痛、呼吸急促、心跳加速、头晕、恶心、疲劳、食欲不振和抑郁等症状。严重病例可能导致肺充血或脑水肿，如果医护人员未能立即将受伤士兵撤离到海拔较低（2000英尺/600米或以下）的地方休息、恢复并接受补充氧气，则这两种情况都会导致早期死亡。在稀薄干燥的空气中呼吸困难不仅会加速脱水，还会危险地降低人体血液中的水分含量（极端情况下会降低15%至50%），除非士兵定期补充呼出的水分。在高海拔地区，红细胞迅速积聚会加剧冻伤和体温过低，因为血液变得粘稠，流动缓慢，尤其是在手脚部位。
Oxygen deprivation, clinically called hypoxia, causes almost all persons in such situations to suffer for several days from headaches, shortness of breath, pounding heartbeats, dizziness, nausea, fatigue, loss of appetite, and depression. Severe cases may lead to pulmonary congestion or cerebral edema, both of which culminate in early death if medics fail to evacuate stricken soldiers immediately to lower elevations (2,000 feet/600 meters or less) where they can rest, recuperate, and receive supplemental oxygen. Labored breathing in thin, dry air not only hastens dehydration but dangerously reduces the water content of human blood (from 15 to 50 percent in extreme cases) unless troops regularly replenish exhaled fluids. The rapid buildup of red cells at high altitudes encourages frostbite and hypothermia, because thickened blood becomes sluggish, especially in hands and feet.
即使是轻度的“高原反应”也会抑制突然爆发的精力，例如投掷手榴弹和将重型装备搬到卡车车厢上。这些症状通常会在几天内消退，但夜视障碍会持续数周，士兵通常需要数月才能完全恢复到能够胜任需要长时间体力消耗或高度集中注意力的任务的状态。分阶段的攀登，允许士兵在前往更高海拔的途中进行2到4周的中级训练，可以减轻甚至消除大多数损伤，但突发事件很少允许这样做。因此，率先适应高原环境的一方将获得巨大的优势。41
Even moderate “mountain sickness” inhibits sudden bursts of energy, such as lobbing hand grenades and heaving heavy gear onto truck beds. Such symptoms usually fade within a few days, but night vision disorders persist for weeks and it normally takes months before troops can fully perform duties that demand prolonged exertion or concerted attention to detail. Staged ascents that permit 2 to 4 weeks training at intermediate levels en route to higher elevations can alleviate if not eliminate most disabilities, but fast-breaking contingencies seldom allow such luxuries. The side that acclimatizes first thus enjoys great advantage.41
稀薄的空气也会降低吸气式发动机的性能，这些发动机就像人类一样，需要呼吸才能获得氧气。卡车在海拔7000英尺（1800米）以上时会过热，并损失10%到25%的额定马力。加速性能和爬坡能力下降是最明显的后果之一。固定翼飞机在给定载荷下需要更长的跑道才能起降，而直升机在起飞时却难以起飞，即使其总重量在海平面上可以轻松起飞。因此，经验丰富的机组长、装卸长和其他计算密度高度的人员会在目的地和出发地预留充足的误差余量，并在必要时计划两次飞行而不是一次，以避免不必要的事故。此外，在稀薄空气中飞行的飞行员必须不断地……要警惕凶猛的气流和风，它们会在天黑后顺着山坡向下吹，在黎明后改变方向，翻过山脊，从山谷壁上反弹，在不可预测的下沉气流中将飞机下降一千英尺甚至更多（300米以上），并在毫无预警的情况下猛烈地撞击飞机。42.为躲避敌方防空炮火和导弹而进行的低空飞行任务在山区地形中极其危险，尤其是在夜间灯火管制的情况下，但高空飞行同样危险。二战期间，美国机组人员多次驾驶满载物资的运输机，飞越喜马拉雅山脉“驼峰”500英里险峻路段，从印度向中国运送蒋介石的补给，然后再穿越暴风雨天气返回，创造了后勤奇迹（图17）。43
Rarefied atmosphere also impairs the performance of air-breathing engines, which, like human beings, gasp for oxygen. Trucks overheat and lose 10 to 25 percent of rated horsepower at elevations above 7,000 feet (1,800 meters). Poorer than usual acceleration and grade-climbing capacities are among the most noticeable consequences. Fixed-wing aircraft need longer runways to take off and land with given loads, while helicopters struggle to get off the ground with gross weights they could easily lift at sea level. Smart crew chiefs, loadmasters, and others who calculate density altitudes therefore allow healthy margins for error at destinations as well as points of departure and, if necessary, plan two trips instead of one to prevent avoidable accidents. Pilots flying through thin air moreover must constantly be alert for vicious air currents and winds that variously blow down slopes after dark, reverse course after daybreak, curl over crests, bounce off valley walls, drop aircraft a thousand feet or more (300+ meters) in unpredictable down drafts, and whiplash them without warning.42 Nap-of-the-earth missions designed to avoid enemy air defense guns and missiles are extremely dangerous in mountainous terrain, especially at night under blackout conditions, but high-level flights can be equally hazardous. U.S. crews who repeatedly flew heavily laden transports 500 treacherous miles over the Himalayan “Hump” from India to China with supplies for Chiang Kai-shek, then back again through stormy skies, accomplished logistical miracles during World War II (map 17).43
雪崩。在海拔高、积雪深厚的陡峭山峰上，大规模雪崩会带来额外的危险（第一次世界大战期间，至少有4万名奥地利和意大利山地部队士兵在蒂罗尔地区被活埋，其中四分之一是在1916年那可怕的两天里遇难的）。最严重的雪崩发生在凸形山坡上，那里层层积雪承受着越来越大的张力，直到在坡度最陡峭的地方断裂（图19）。44.雪崩的发生有多种原因，包括雪堆因自身重力坍塌、气温升高导致粘结力减弱以及气温下降导致脆性增加。剪切作用滑雪板的动作，甚至树上掉落的积雪，都可能引发雪崩。雷声、音爆、爆炸、车辆行驶，甚至人声产生的远距离震动，都能松动数吨积雪，使其瞬间从静止加速到每小时60英里（100公里）甚至更高，并沿着光秃秃的沟壑咆哮而下，粉碎沿途的一切。由于目前尚无法进行准确的雪崩预报，明智的指挥官会在执行任务的前提下，尽可能避开可疑区域，最好能得到当地居民的协助，因为他们对当地雪崩的了解已持续多年。
Avalanches. Massive avalanches pose additional dangers wherever deep snows cover steep mountains at high elevations (at least 40,000 Austrian and Italian alpine troops were buried alive in Tyrolian territory during World War I, one-fourth of them on 2 terrible days in 1916). The worst avalanches occur on convex slopes, where successive layers of snow come under increasing tension until they fracture at the sharpest point on the curve (figure 19).44 Slides start spontaneously when snow banks collapse under their own weight, when rising temperatures weaken bonds, and when falling temperatures increase brittleness. Shearing actions by skis, even snow dropping out of trees, can start the process. Long-range vibrations from thunder, sonic booms, explosions, moving vehicles, even the sound of human voices can loosen tons of snow that accelerate almost instantaneously from 0 to 60 miles an hour or more (100 kph) and pulverize everything in their path as they roar down gullies devoid of vegetation. Accurate forecasts are not yet possible, so wise commanders avoid suspicious spots to the extent possible consistent with their missions, preferably with assistance from residents whose first-hand knowledge of local avalanches dates back many years.
Figure 19. Conditions Conducive to Avalanches
高地相对价值
THE RELATIVE VALUE OF VERY HIGH GROUND
公元前329年左右，亚历山大大帝多次穿越中亚的兴都库什山脉，途经海拔在3050米至3350米之间、风雪交加的山隘。五个世纪后，汉尼拔率领军队翻越欧洲阿尔卑斯山脉，自西向东进军；随后，凯撒大帝则反方向进军高卢。然而，这些著名的战士，如同他们之后的先辈和后继者一样，最关键的胜利都是在海拔适中的地区取得的。44没有证据表明，创新的战术或技术会在短期内大幅提高高地的相对价值。
Alexander the Great crossed and re-crossed Central Asia’s Hindu Kush circa 329 B.C. through wind-swept, snow-covered mountain passes at altitudes between 10,000 and 11,000 feet (3,050 and 3,350 meters). Hannibal led armed forces over Europe’s high Alps from west to east five centuries later, followed by Julius Caesar going in the opposite direction on his way to Gaul, but those famous warriors, like predecessors and successors ever since, won their most decisive victories at moderate elevations.44 There is no evidence that innovative tactics or technologies will substantially increase the relative value of very high ground any time soon.
防御性积分
DEFENSIVE CREDITS
山地地形为兵力处于劣势但训练有素的部队提供了机会，使其能够建立纵深防御阵地，形成相互交错的火力网；利用难以突破的天然障碍；将野战工事炸入基岩；摧毁敌军高速进攻路线上的桥梁；在其他路线布设地雷；将坦克和火炮部署在隐蔽处；实施欺骗战术；并方便地储备补给。进攻方由于对当地地形特征不太熟悉，常常在缺乏掩体且坡度陡峭到无法挖掘散兵坑的地形上发起进攻。沿平行走廊行进的多支纵队很少能够相互支援，因为他们既无法互相观察，也无法进行有效的沟通；而且，如果守军选位得当，他们就必须向上坡发起进攻。
Mountainous terrain opens opportunities for numerically inferior but disciplined troops to establish defensive positions-in-depth with interlocking fields of fire, take advantage of abundant natural obstacles that are difficult to breach, blast field fortifications into bedrock, destroy bridges on high-speed enemy approaches, litter other routes with land mines, locate tanks and artillery in defilade, implement deception plans, and stockpile supplies conveniently. Offensive formations, less familiar with local terrain features, often attack across ground devoid of cover and so steep that foxhole digging is impossible. Multiple columns that proceed along parallel corridors seldom are mutually supporting, since they can neither see nor communicate effectively with each other and, if defenders have chosen positions wisely, must assault up hill.
凯尔特人、罗马人、勃艮第人、蛮族、奥地利人、瑞典人、法国人和普鲁士人的战士都未能攻克孚日山脉的守军，而孚日山脉的海拔很少超过4000英尺（1220米）。1944年10月中旬至1945年1月中旬，美国第七集团军在强大的空中力量支援下，与德国G集团军群在这片古老的战场上展开激战，最终成为历史上第一支突破孚日山脉防线、战胜顽强抵抗的武装力量。1943 年 11 月至 1944 年 5 月期间， 46 名顽强的轴心国守军在横跨意大利、从第勒尼安海延伸至亚得里亚海的冬季防线上，封锁了盟军通往罗马的道路长达 7 个月。蒙特卡西诺山是这条防线上最广为人知的堡垒，海拔仅 1700 英尺（520 米），但坚守在山顶的顽强德国伞兵在 2 月 15 日之后仍然顽强抵抗，直到美军轰炸机用 600 吨炸弹将山顶的修道院夷为平地。从 1951 年初到 1953 年 7 月 27 日，双方在朝鲜半岛的山脊线上展开了长达 2年半的拉锯战，试图取得微不足道的战术优势，直到双方签署停战协定。48
Celtic, Roman, Burgundian, barbarian, Austrian, Swedish, French, and Prussian warriors all failed to defeat defenders in the Vosges Mountains, which seldom exceed 4,000 feet (1,220 meters). The U.S. Seventh Army, assisted by strong air power, slugged it out on that ancient battleground with German Army Group G from mid-October 1944 until mid-January 1945 before it became the first armed force in history to break through the Vosges against determined opposition.46 Dogged Axis defenders who manned the Winter Line that ran across Italy from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Adriatic blocked Allied routes to Rome for 7 months, between November 1943 and May 1944. Monte Cassino, the most publicized cork in that bottle, is barely 1,700 feet high (520 meters), but tough German paratroopers ensconced on top resisted long after February 15th, when U.S. bombers pulverized the abbey on its summit with 600 tons of bombs.47 Stalemated front lines see-sawed back and forth along Korea’s mountainous spine for 2½ years to gain dubious tactical advantage from early 1951 until July 27, 1953, when both sides signed a cease-fire agreement.48
防御性债务
DEFENSIVE DEBITS
卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨在他的巨著《战争论》中，理所当然地称山地地形中的防御战是“弱者的真正避难所——是那些不再能够寻求绝对胜利的人的避难所”。49.故意选择这种冲突形式的交战方或许能争取时间进行增援和整顿，然后重新发起进攻，但只有当对手因代价过高而先放弃进攻时，他们才能原地“取胜”。否则，他们所能做的最多也只是延缓最终的失败。
Carl von Clausewitz, in his great tome On War, justifiably called defensive combat in mountainous terrain “a true refuge for the weak—for those no longer able to seek an absolute decision.”49 Belligerents who deliberately elect that form of conflict may buy time with which to reinforce and refurbish, then resume the offensive, but can “win” in place only if rivals quit first because costs have become too high. The best they can do otherwise is defer eventual defeat.
干旱地区
ARID REGIONS
西方文明的摇篮——阿拉伯半岛，除了连接尼罗河谷和底格里斯河-幼发拉底河谷、途经黎凡特的肥沃新月地带外，历来干旱少雨。这里见证了最早有记载的战争。苏美尔人、阿卡德人、亚述人、巴比伦人和埃及人的军队率先踏上这片土地，随后是波斯人、马其顿人、帕提亚人、罗马人、阿拉伯人、十字军、土耳其人、法国人、英国人、美国人和以色列人等等。约书亚、拉美西斯、萨尔贡、亚述巴尼拔、大流士、亚历山大、哈立德、帖木儿、艾伦比和阿拉伯的劳伦斯等众多名将，都曾在这片沙漠战场上驰骋沙场，名垂青史。世界各地的50 个沙漠仍然是武装冲突的温床（地图 18）。
The Cradle of Western Civilization, which always has been largely arid aside from the Fertile Crescent that links the Nile and Tigris-Euphrates Valleys via the Levant, saw the earliest recorded warfare. Sumerian, Akkadian, Assyrian, Babylonian, and Egyptian armies came first, followed by Persians, Macedonians, Parthians, Romans, Arabs, Crusaders, Turks, French, British, Americans, and Israelis, among others. Joshua, Ramases, Sargon, Ashurbanipal, Darius, Alexander, Khalid, Tamerlane, Allenby, and Lawrence of Arabia were a few among many who won military fame as desert warriors in that cockpit.50 Deserts around the world remain hotbeds of armed combat (map 18).
所有沙漠都饱受烈日炙烤、狂风侵蚀，气候干燥（年平均降雨量通常不足25厘米），但即便如此，它们之间也存在着巨大的多样性。有些沙漠面积辽阔，有些则相对狭小；其长度、海拔、相对湿度以及距海的距离差异显著；地形特征也从单调的平原到壮丽的山峰，应有尽有。撒哈拉沙漠东西绵延350万平方英里，横跨北非10个国家的全部或部分地区；而狭长的阿塔卡马沙漠位于智利境内，南北走向，长度超过撒哈拉沙漠的一半，但面积却只有撒哈拉沙漠的4%。加利福尼亚州的死亡谷是北美洲的最低点，海拔-86英尺（-30米），夏季酷热难耐；而蒙古的戈壁沙漠位于内陆高原，海拔远高于海平面，冬季西伯利亚寒风凛冽，寒冷刺骨。大多数沙漠的空气异常干燥，但波斯湾和红海沿岸地区却因高湿度而变得闷热难耐。与人们普遍的误解相反，石质地面比巨大的沙丘（例如沙特阿拉伯的鲁卜哈利沙漠和乍得南部的沙丘）更为常见。51
All deserts are sun seared, wind scoured, and dry (average annual rainfall as a rule is less than 10 inches/25 centimeters), but great diversity nevertheless is evident. Some arid lands are immense, others are small by comparison; linear dimensions, elevations, relative humidity, and distance from sea water vary considerably; topographical features run the full range from monotonous plains to spectacular peaks. Three and a half million square miles of Sahara Desert stretch from east to west across all or part of 10 North African countries, while the lanky Atacama, which runs from north to south in Chile, measures more than half as long but covers only 4 percent as much area. Death Valley, California, the lowest point in North America at -86 feet (-30 meters) is blistering hot in summer, whereas Mongolia’s Gobi Desert on an interior plateau far above sea level is bitterly cold when winter winds blow in from Siberia. Most desert air is uncommonly dry, but high humidity turns Persian Gulf and Red Sea coasts into sweat boxes. Stony ground, contrary to popular misconceptions, is more common than humongous sand dunes, such as those in Saudi Arabia’s Rub al Khali and southern Chad.51
气候异常
CLIMATIC ECCENTRICITIES
气候异常现象，例如降雨不规律、酷热难耐和狂风肆虐，是世界各地沙漠的共同特征。因此，军事人员需要特殊的装备、训练和适应环境的能力。
Climatic eccentricities such as irregular rainfall, intemperate heat, and gale force winds even so characterize deserts the world over. Military personnel consequently require special equipment, training, and acclimatization
降雨不规律。难以预测的暴雨经常取代了大多数水源充足地区赖以生存的持续、温和、普降的降雨。暴雨在一两个小时内倾泻而下，降水量可达年平均降水量的两到三倍，渗入沙地或从坚硬的地面流走，短暂缓解旱情，随后大地又恢复了之前的荒芜。位于埃及卢克索正西的达克拉绿洲并非个例：尽管其年降水量约为13厘米（5英寸），但这里曾连续十多年滴雨未下。汹涌的洪水毫无预兆地灌满干涸的河床，然后冲毁桥梁、建筑物、军营以及其他鲁莽阻挡其路径的障碍物。 1943 年 3 月 20 日，突尼斯东南部的湍急水流将齐格扎乌河谷变成了一条临时护城河，伯纳德·蒙哥马利元帅的装甲纵队未能突破这条护城河。英国工兵用成捆的灌木铺平河底后，四辆瓦伦丁坦克成功渡河，但排在后面的一辆坦克却陷进了泥潭，炮塔都陷了进去。52
Irregular Rainfall. Unpredictable cloudbursts habitually replace prolonged, gentle, widespread rains that bless most well-watered regions. Downpours dump double or triple the average annual amount of precipitation in an hour or two, sink into sand or run off hard surfaces, provide brief respites from drought, then leave the land as barren as before. Dakla Oasis, located due west of Luxor, Egypt, is not atypical: it once went more than a decade without a drop of rain, although its yearly quota is about five inches (13 centimeters). Raging torrents without warning fill desiccated stream beds to overflowing, then sweep away bridges, buildings, military bivouacs, and other impedimenta that rashly block their paths. Roiling waters in southeast Tunisia turned Wadi Zigzaou into an impromptu moat that Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s armored columns failed to breach on March 20, 1943. Four Valentine tanks crossed after British sappers paved the bottom with bundles of brush, but the next tank in line sank up to its turret in muck.52
酷热难耐。即使在戈壁沙漠和中国塔克拉玛干沙漠等冬季平均气温常年低于冰点数月的地区，夏季也如同烤箱般炙热。午后气温通常在 48 摄氏度左右，与沙尘暴的温度相比，这已算是“温和”的，沙尘暴的温度可能超过 73 摄氏度。没有空调的重型装甲车辆的乘员舱会变得难以忍受，而装甲薄弱的卡车驾驶室升温更快，温度更高——84 摄氏度并不罕见。这些数字意义重大，因为 49 摄氏度是人类的疼痛阈值，而低至 60 摄氏度的温度就可能造成一度烧伤。
Intemperate Heat. Oven-like summers generally prevail, even in parts of the Gobi Desert and China’s Taklimakan where mean winter temperatures remain below freezing for several months each year. Thermometers that commonly hover around 120 °F (48 °C) in mid-afternoon are “mild” compared with sand temperatures, which may exceed 165 °F (73 °C). The crew compartments of heavily armored vehicles that lack air conditioning can become unbearable, while thin-skinned truck cabs heat up faster and reach even higher temperatures—185 °F (84 °C) is not exceptional. Those figures are significant, because 120 °F is the threshold of human pain and readings as low as 140 °F (60 °C) may cause first-degree burns.
二战期间，驻扎在北非沙漠的大多数英德士兵都穿着短袖衬衫和短裤，或者干脆脱到腰部。然而，遮盖性更好的衣物不仅能防止晒伤和狂风吹沙，还能在汗水浸透时起到降温作用。经验丰富的飞机和车辆机械师还会戴手套。飞机在高温下有效载荷会大幅下降，导致运载能力降低，而精密的计算机、传感器、通信设备和其他电子设备也容易发生故障。电池的蓄电效率也会降低（一个美军装甲师需要3660块电池才能维持327辆艾布拉姆斯坦克和283辆布雷德利战车的运转，更不用说还有许多其他履带式车辆和卡车，这些车辆的电池需求量是普通车辆的数倍）。炸弹、导弹弹头以及火炮和坦克弹药最好储存在露天坑中，并用双层遮阳网保护。易腐食品会迅速变质，而未冷藏的水在阳光下暴晒后会变得难以下咽，甚至在蒸发之前就会变质。某些沿海地区夜晚炎热，湿度高达90%至100%，即使是适应良好的部队也难以忍受这种高温环境；而内陆地区夜间气温可能骤降70华氏度（21摄氏度）甚至更多。因此，擅长夜战的部队拥有显著优势。53
Most British and German troops in the North African desert during World War II wore short-sleeved shirts and short pants or stripped to the waist, although clothing that provides better coverage not only prevents sunburn and sand blasting by violent winds but serves as a coolant when sweat-soaked. Savvy aircraft and vehicle mechanics also wear gloves. Aircraft payloads plummet in excessive heat, which reduces lift capacities, while sensitive computers, sensors, communications equipment, and other electronics malfunction. Batteries hold their charge less efficiently (one U.S. armored division requires 3,660 batteries to keep 327 Abrams tanks and 283 Bradley fighting vehicles rolling, not to mention many additional tracked vehicles and trucks that swell the total severalfold). Bombs and missile warheads as well as artillery and tank ammunition are best stored in open pits protected by double sun screens, perishable food spoils quickly, and unrefrigerated water left unattended in the sun becomes unpalatable before it vaporizes. Hot nights and high humidity on the order of 90 to 100 percent make duty eternally hard to endure along some sea coasts, even for well-acclimated troops, but temperatures inland may drop 70 °F (21 °C) or more after dark. Armed forces skilled at night fighting thus enjoy a sharp edge.53
狂风肆虐。持续数日的破坏性狂风也是沙漠的标志性特征。风沙威力强大，足以在一段时间内将未加防护的电线杆吹断，它无情地侵蚀着地面以上几英尺内的一切，而高耸入云的细沙云如同滑石粉般弥漫，遮蔽了天空，刺痛了双眼，令士兵们渴望呼吸器。沙尘暴将能见度降至几乎为零，渗入帐篷，堵塞武器，阻塞机器，损坏光学设备，污染食物和饮用水。沙砾产生的电力足以使磁罗盘失灵（1942年，利比亚托布鲁克附近的一个弹药库显然发生了爆炸）。此外，沙砾还会覆盖库存物资，缩短装备的使用寿命（即使采取了预防措施），相应增加后勤负担，并使人和牲畜的生活苦不堪言。在最严重的风暴期间，军事行动会放缓，有时甚至会停止。54
Gale Force Winds. Destructive gales that blow for days at a time also are desert trademarks. Windblown sand, powerful enough to amputate unprotected telephone poles over time, impartially abrades everything in its path for a few feet above ground level while towering clouds of silt as fine as talcum powder blacken the sky, inflame eyes, and make troops wish for respirators. Sand and dust storms together reduce visibility to near zero, infiltrate tents, jam weapons, clog machines, pit optical devices, contaminate food and drink, and generate enough electricity to drive magnetic compasses crazy (explosives apparently detonated at an ammunition dump near Tobruk, Libya, in 1942). Grit additionally blankets stockpiles, shortens the life span of equipment despite preventive measures, increases logistic loads commensurately, and otherwise makes life miserable for man and beast. Military operations slow, sometimes stop, during the worst wind storms.54
适应性问题。大多数身体健康的军人大约需要两周时间适应高温环境，但在酷热难耐的环境下，他们可能永远无法达到最佳状态。因此，指挥官会将高强度活动安排在每天最凉爽的时段，并根据任务完成情况，给予比平时更长的休息时间。此外，除非部队采取预防性医疗措施，否则个人卫生和清洁问题可能会变得难以控制，而这说起来容易做起来难。（隆美尔元帅的非洲军团士兵有时会用沙子擦洗汗湿的制服，以防止其腐烂。）痱子会扰乱排汗机制，导致中暑；而污垢和昆虫叮咬如果不及时处理，会使轻微的擦伤变成溃烂的伤口。苍蝇以垃圾、人类粪便和在烈日下爆裂的尸体为食，它们藏身于食物残渣和开放性伤口中，然后传播痢疾、腹泻和其他肠道疾病。厕所至关重要，但在某些地区，流沙会迅速填满沟渠，几乎与挖掘的速度一样快；而在其他地方，岩石地面使得不使用炸药就无法进行挖掘。55
Acclimatization Problems. Most military personnel in fit condition take about 2 weeks to acclimate, but may never reach peak performance in oppressive heat. Commanders consequently schedule strenuous activities during the coolest parts of each day and allow longer than usual rest periods, consistent with mission accomplishment. Personal hygiene and sanitation problems moreover can become unmanageable unless troops practice prophylactic medicine, which is easier said than done. (Members of Field Marshal Rommel’s Afrika Korps sometimes scrubbed sweaty uniforms with sand to keep them from rotting.) Prickly heat, which upsets sweating mechanisms, encourages heat prostration, while dirt and insect bites turn minor scratches into running sores unless treated promptly. Flies feed on garbage, human feces, and dead bodies that burst under the hot sun, batten in food and open wounds, then spread diseases such as dysentery, diarrhea, and other intestinal disorders. Latrines are crucially important, but shifting sands fill slit trenches almost as fast as they can be dug in some regions, whereas rocky ground elsewhere makes excavations impossible without explosives.55
需水量
WATER REQUIREMENTS
在干旱地区，饮用水、烹饪用水、洗浴用水、洗衣用水、军医院用水以及其他各种用途的水资源都是无价之宝，比包括石油在内的任何其他自然资源都更为珍贵。因此，水源、蓄水池、净化设施、海水淡化厂、储水罐车、输水管道及相关资产都构成了重要的军事目标。
Water for drinking, cooking, bathing, laundry, use in military hospitals, and assorted other purposes is a priceless commodity in arid regions, more precious than any other natural resource, including petroleum. Sources, repositories, purification facilities, desalinization plants, tank trucks, water pipelines, and associated assets accordingly constitute prime military targets.
补给。大型可靠的水源仅限于少数淡水水体和常年河流，例如科罗拉多河、底格里斯河、幼发拉底河、印度河和尼罗河。这些河流之所以能够承受高蒸发率，仅仅是因为远方的流域源源不断地为其提供充足的水源。较小的溪流每年都会干涸数月。曾经闻名遐迩的绿洲，例如喀什、叶尔羌和和田（马可·波罗在1272年前往契丹的途中，沿着丝绸之路途经这些绿洲），如今也几乎无法满足当地居民的用水需求。无论是这些绿洲，还是绵延数英里、横跨撒哈拉沙漠的带状绿洲，都无法长期支持大规模军事行动。（1990-1991年美国及其盟军对伊拉克作战期间的首席后勤官格斯·帕戈尼斯中将震惊地发现，仅第十八空降军在最初几个月就需要数十亿加仑的水。）56）位于干涸河床和一些冲积扇下的易于获取的水库无法提供如此大量的水。
Supplies. Large, reliable sources are limited to a few bodies of fresh water and perennial rivers, such as the Colorado, Tigris, Euphrates, Indus, and Nile, which survive high evaporation rates only because far distant watersheds feed them copiously and consistently. Smaller streams run dry several months each year. Once famous oases such as Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan, which Marco Polo visited along Central Asia’s Silk Route on his way to Cathay in the year 1272, are barely able to supply current civilian populations. Neither they nor ribbon-like counterparts that stretch for miles across the otherwise waterless Sahara could long support large-scale military operations. (Lieutenant General Gus Pagonis, the chief logistician during U.S. and allied operations against Iraq in 1990-1991, was appalled to find that XVIII Airborne Corps alone would need billions of gallons over the first few months.56) Easily accessible reservoirs that lie beneath dry stream beds and some alluvial fans cannot supply such quantities.
在荒芜的开阔地带钻探水源的风险至少不亚于开采石油，因为精确定位十分困难，最有希望的集水区通常位于地表以下 150 至 250 米（500 至 800 英尺）处，有些水体是微咸的，而且在许多情况下，抽取水源需要大功率水泵。谨慎的用户无论水源如何都会进行净化处理，以去除可能在军用设备内部形成钙化的致病细菌和矿物质。因此，干旱地区的主要武装力量往往不得不进口或淡化大部分水源。57
Drilling for water in open wastelands is at least as chancy as sinking wildcat oil wells, because precise locations are problematic, the most promising sumps often lie 500 to 800 feet (150-250 meters) below the surface, some are brackish, and extraction in many cases would require high capacity pumps. Prudent users purify water regardless of its source to remove disease-bearing bacteria and minerals that might calcify inside military machines. Major armed forces in arid regions as a direct result often must import or desalinate most water supplies.57
需求。曾经一度流行但考虑不周的适应性训练措施——限水，如今已被摒弃，因为它会降低作战效能，并带来持续的脱水风险。在干燥炎热的沙漠中，汗液蒸发速度极快，即使在休息时，人体通常每小时也会流失约1品脱（约473毫升）的水分，但直到水分流失达到这个数值的四倍（2夸脱，约2升）时，人们才会注意到不良反应或感到口渴，而此时中暑可能已迫在眉睫。剧烈运动需要摄入更多的水分，但1942年夏天，隆美尔的非洲军团每天只为卡车、坦克和人员携带15夸脱（约14升）的水。他那些口渴难耐的士兵珍惜每一滴水，然而在一次进攻中，他们仍然断水，最终幸存下来仅仅是因为他们缴获了英军的供水系统。驻扎在沙特阿拉伯和科威特的58名美军人员，由于后勤保障条件优越，每天大约消耗11加仑（42升）饮用水，每辆车还要额外消耗10到12加仑。尽管沙漠酷热难耐，冷藏车仍然保证了大部分饮用水的适口性。59
Demands. Water rationing, once a popular but ill-conceived part of the acclimatization process, has been discredited because performance suffers and dehydration poses ever present dangers. Sweat evaporates so rapidly in dry desert heat that humans commonly lose about 1 pint of water per hour even at rest, yet never notice adverse effects or feel thirsty until the deficit reaches four times that amount (2 quarts, or 2 liters), by which time heat prostration may be imminent. Heavy exertion requires much greater intake, but Rommel’s Afrika Korps in the summer of 1942 carried only 15 quarts per day for trucks and tanks as well as personnel. His parched troops made every drop count, yet still ran dry during one offensive and survived only because they captured British water supplies.58 U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, who were much better endowed logistically, consumed approximately 11 gallons per day (42 liters), plus 10 to 12 gallons more per vehicle. Refrigerated vans kept a good deal of it palatable despite intense desert heat.59
火力与机动性
FIREPOWER AND MANEUVER
二战期间的澳大利亚记者艾伦·穆尔黑德曾将平坦沙漠上的战斗比作海上战争，因为这两种环境都缺乏明显的标志性建筑。庞大的陆军部队，如同敌对的舰队一样，可以随意机动以占据有利位置，在交战前一直保持在地平线之外，并且除了偶尔争夺交通要道（例如突尼斯的卡塞林山口）之外，通常会集中火力攻击敌军而非关键地形。60
Alan Moorehead, an Australian journalist during World War II, once compared combat on flat desert floors to warfare at sea, because both environments lack distinctive landmarks. Massive land forces, like opposing flotillas, can maneuver at will for favorable positions, remain over the horizon until they make contact, and concentrate on enemy forces rather than key terrain, except for occasional struggles to control transportation bottlenecks such as Kasserine Pass in Tunisia.60
常规作战。在马鞍和马镫出现之前，骑兵作战一直是沙漠战争的主要作战方式，而此后骑兵作战一直如此。例如，1940 年 12 月， 61 名英国摩托化部队仅用了 3 天时间就在埃及西迪巴拉尼附近摧毁了三个意大利师，并俘虏了 39,000 名步兵。50 年后，入侵科威特后构筑工事的62 名伊拉克士兵遭受了更惨重的打击：先是联军飞机切断了他们与祖国的所有联系，并摧毁了他们的固定阵地；然后是空中机动部队、装甲部队和机械化部队，这些部队在为期 6 周的战争中，在 100 小时的地面阶段，利用垂直和水平包围战术取得了巨大优势。63在这两次战争中，胜利者与失败者相比伤亡都很少。
Conventional Operations. Mounted operations that marked desert warfare before the advent of saddles and stirrups have done so ever since.61 Motorized British forces, for example, took just 3 days to destroy three Italian divisions and capture 39,000 foot soldiers outside Sidi Barrani, Egypt in December 1940.62 Iraqi troops who dug in after they invaded Kuwait 50 years later took a worse walloping, first from coalition aircraft that severed all links with their homeland and pulverized static positions, then from airmobile, armored, and mechanized divisions that used vertical and horizontal envelopments to great advantage during the 100-hour ground phase of a 6-week war.63 The victors in both cases suffered few casualties compared with the vanquished.
各种陆路交通工具都必须绕开陡峭的山坡、深邃的沟壑以及巨大的沙丘，例如伊朗南部、撒哈拉沙漠西部大沙丘和沙特阿拉伯鲁卜哈利沙漠的沙丘。松软的沙子、锋利的岩石和拇指般粗壮的荆棘阻碍了卡车的越野通行，尤其是那些拖挂拖车的卡车（1990年8月，沙特阿拉伯国民警卫队第一旅从利雅得向封锁阵地行进时，不幸遭遇了161次爆胎）。然而，履带车辆则更容易穿越大多数沙漠特有的砾石平原、碎石路面和浅沙地带。
Land transportation of all types must detour around steep slopes and deep gullies as well as huge dunes, such as those that sprawl across southern Iran, the Sahara Desert’s Great Western Erg, and Saudi Arabia’s Empty Quarter. Soft sand, sharp rocks, and thorns as thick as thumbs inhibit cross-country movement by trucks, especially those that tow trailers (the 1st Brigade of the Saudi Arabian National Guard unhappily suffered 161 flat tires when it moved from Riyadh to blocking positions in August 1990). Tracked vehicles, however, can more easily traverse the gravelly plains, stony pavements, and stretches of shallow sand that characterize most deserts.
地势平坦或略有起伏、几乎没有植被的沙漠地形，为平射武器提供了良好的射击视野，这些武器通常能够在最大射程内使用。经验丰富的气象员掌握先进技术，能够预测特定目标在每天特定时间哪一侧的温度最高，从而帮助机组人员和地面炮手在高温、雾霾和沙尘等恶劣环境下使用红外传感器和激光。他们还可以计算“热交叉”时间，即目标与地面之间的热对比度何时达到最大值。周围区域的视野范围将因各种材料的热性能而异。例如，金属升温和冷却速度都很快，而沥青升温缓慢且保温时间长。空中观察员声称拥有肉眼和传感器所能及的清晰视野，因此能够轻松识别许多静止目标，并追踪低空飞行的直升机和车队，它们都会反射挡风玻璃的光线并扬起明显的尘土。良好的能见度也便于从敌方防空武器射程之外的位置使用空对地导弹。因此，能够尽早取得制空权的一方将获得决定性的优势。65
Level to rolling desert landscapes, virtually devoid of vegetation, afford fine fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons, which usually are employable at maximum ranges. Skilled weather officers in possession of technologically advanced techniques can help air crews and ground-based gunners employ infrared sensors and lasers despite heat, haze, and dust by predicting which side of particular targets will be hottest at particular times each day. They also can calculate “thermal crossover” times that tell when the contrast between targets and surrounding territory will be greatest and least, given the thermal properties of various materials. Metals, for example, heat and cool quickly, whereas asphalt heats slowly and stays hot a long time. Aerial observers, who claim clear views as far as naked eyes and sensors can see, find it easy to identify many stationary targets and can track low-flying helicopters as well as vehicular columns, both of which reflect light from wind screens and raise telltale clouds of dust. Great visibility also facilitates the use of air-to-ground missiles from positions beyond the reach of enemy air defense weapons. The side able to establish air superiority early consequently gains a decided edge.65
尽管大多数沙漠土壤呈单调的米黄色，但除了清晨和傍晚地形特征投射出长长的阴影时分，其他时间都难以区分不同的海拔高度。事实上，晴朗的夜晚比正午时分更容易进行地面观测，因为正午时分眩光强烈，刺眼的阳光会使所有面向它的人目眩，而闪烁的海市蜃楼不仅会扭曲深度感知，还会使图像看起来像漂浮在空中。雷达高度计在阳光强烈和月光皎洁的夜晚可以帮助飞行员和导航员。66
The monotonously beige color of most desert soil nevertheless makes it difficult to distinguish different elevations, except during early morning and evening hours when terrain features cast long shadows. Ground-level observation in fact often is better on clear nights than at mid-day, when glare is intense, bright sunlight blinds all who face in its direction, and shimmering mirages not only distort depth perception but make images seem to float. Radar altimeters help pilots and navigators when the sun is high and on bright moonlit nights.66
特种作战。特种作战部队能够在干旱地区独立作战，或与常规部队协同作战，即便面对敌方空中力量和植被稀少的困境。英国上校大卫·斯特林组建的初创特种空勤团（SAS），有时得到擅长侦察的远程沙漠部队的协助，于1941年11月至1943年1月间在撒哈拉北部地区横行无忌，经常深入敌后约100英里（约160公里）的地区，摧毁地面飞机、炸毁车辆库、引爆弹药库、焚烧油库、劫持车辆、埋设地雷、破坏火车。19 世纪阿富汗的67游击队让英国军队头疼不已，他们的后裔在 20 世纪又让技术更先进的苏联入侵者苦不堪言，以至于克里姆林宫在经历了 10 年（1980 年至 1989 年）的挫败之后，最终为了避免在金钱、军事人力和物资方面遭受不可接受的损失而放弃了入侵。68
Special Operations. Special operations forces can function independently or complement conventional formations in arid regions despite the presence of enemy air power and the paucity of vegetation. British Colonel David Stirling’s nascent Special Air Service (SAS), assisted at times by the Long Range Desert Group, which excelled at reconnaissance, ran rampant in the northern Sahara between November 1941 and January 1943, often 100 miles or so behind hostile lines, where they destroyed aircraft on the ground, blew up motor pools, detonated ammunition stocks, set fire to petrol dumps, hijacked vehicles, mined roads, and derailed trains.67 Nineteenth century guerrillas in Afghanistan gave British troops headaches, and their descendants so plagued technologically superior Soviet invaders in the 20th century that the Kremlin finally quit to preclude unacceptable losses in money, military manpower, and materiel after 10 frustrating years, from 1980 to 1989.68
核生化作战。和平时期进行的试验（而非实战经验）表明，对分散在沙漠中的部队使用核生化武器，在某些方面威力会低于通常水平，而在另一些方面则会更加危险。总体而言，其有效性主要取决于气候模式、当地天气状况和地形地貌。
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations. Peacetime tests in lieu of practical experience suggest that nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons employed against troops widely dispersed in the desert would be less potent than usual in some respects and more dangerous in other regards. Overall usefulness would depend mainly on climatic patterns, local weather conditions, and topographic configurations.
在平坦或起伏的地形上，核爆炸造成的严重破坏半径可能比在寒冷气候下要小，因为高温会降低产生冲击波的静压。因此，在沟壑或散兵坑中作战的士兵以及有掩体保护的武器系统会比在寒冷的平原上更安全一些。然而，威力较小的爆炸冲击波穿过稀薄的沙漠空气，可能会使远处的薄皮目标（例如停放在开阔地带的飞机）失去作用，同时热辐射和眩光也会灼伤和致盲暴露在外的人员。巨大尘埃云中放射性沉降物的方向和持续时间将取决于沙漠风和湍流的无常变化。69
The radius of heavy damage from nuclear detonations on level to rolling terrain likely would be shorter than in cool climes, because heat reduces static overpressures that give shock waves their punch. Troops in gullies or foxholes and weapon systems protected by revetments consequently would be somewhat safer than on frigid flatlands. Less powerful blast effects rocketing through light desert air, however, could disable distant thin-skinned targets such as aircraft parked in the open, while thermal radiation and dazzle concurrently burned and blinded exposed personnel. The direction and duration of radioactive fallout from gigantic dust clouds would depend on the erratic behavior of desert winds and turbulent currents.69
在沙漠酷热难耐的环境下，需要使用高浓度的有毒化学战剂来造成大规模伤亡，因为高温、强风和不稳定的气团会迅速蒸发蒸汽和液体。然而，汗流浃背、过早脱掉防护服的人员仍然极易受到致命和致残性化学制剂的侵害，因为这些制剂在汗湿的皮肤上效力最高。即使是虚假的威胁和误报，如果能够有效削弱敌方的能力，也能起到一定的作用。迫使部队反复穿戴不透水的防护服，有时甚至长时间穿着。口罩会阻碍呼吸，使口头交流变得含糊不清；防护手套会降低触觉灵敏度；密不透水的防护服如同便携式桑拿房；完成日常任务所需的时间会延长，疲劳也会迅速袭来。如果生物战气溶胶能够经受住储存，那么强烈的阳光、干燥的空气和高温会将其限制在非常小的区域内；但各级指挥官和关键下属都应采取积极措施，防止敌人污染水源，因为断水可能会造成灾难性后果。70
High concentrations of toxic chemical warfare munitions designed to inflict mass casualties would be required whenever desert heat is intense, because sizzling temperatures, strong winds, and unstable air masses dissipate vapors and evaporate liquids rapidly. Perspiring personnel who shed protective clothing prematurely nevertheless would be extremely vulnerable to lethal and incapacitating agents that attain maximum effectiveness on sweaty skin. Even bogus threats and false alarms can undercut enemy capabilities if they make troops don impermeable gear repeatedly, perhaps for lengthy periods. Masks impair breathing and muffle oral communications, protective gloves degrade tactile dexterity, poreless suits act as portable saunas, time to accomplish routine tasks expands, and fatigue sets in fast. Bright sunlight, dry air, and heat would limit biological warfare aerosols to very small areas, provided they survived storage, but commanders and key subordinates at every level should take positive steps to prevent enemies from polluting water supplies, because deprivation could be disastrous.70
物流压力
LOGISTICAL STRAINS
有利于大规模机动作战的干旱地区或许是战术家的梦想之地，但广袤的沙漠酷热、尘土飞扬、土地贫瘠，且缺乏军事资源，却令后勤人员噩梦连连。大部分物资必须进口，消耗量飙升，维护需求成倍增长，而长时间的机动作战也会给物资配送系统带来巨大压力。随着与支援基地距离的增加，问题也日益增多。一旦作战部队因推进速度和其他机动行动超出后勤能力而停滞不前，就会造成惨痛的后果。
Arid regions that facilitate maneuver warfare on a grand scale may be a tactician’s dream, but vast deserts that are hot, dusty, hard scrabble, and devoid of militarily useful resources give logisticians nightmares. Most supplies must be imported, consumption rates soar, maintenance requirements multiply, and extended mobile operations strain distribution systems. Troubles burgeon as distances from support bases increase. Painful consequences ensue whenever combat forces stall because rates of advance and other maneuvers outstrip logistical capabilities.
油罐车队必须在供应点和客户之间反复往返，因为长途越野行驶在沙地、松散砾石和其他抓地力差的路面上会大大降低轮式和履带式车辆的燃油效率。在炎热天气下，车辆主要以低速档行驶，在崎岖地形上积累的高里程会对发动机、散热器、弹簧、减震器、变速箱、电池、履带、轮胎和驾驶员造成严重损害。持续的振动会导致金属开裂和断裂。垫片和风扇皮带会迅速磨损。沙砾会磨损各种易受摩擦的部件，例如点火装置、刹车片、衬套、轴承、水泵和化油器，以及麦克风、开关和断路器。空气滤清器、燃油滤清器和机油滤清器需要每天维护和频繁更换。类似的供应和维护问题也困扰着所有其他类型的军事物资，正如美国陆军中将格斯·帕戈尼斯在“沙漠风暴”行动后在其题为《移山》的非官方报告中生动描述的那样。71
Fleets of fuel tankers must make repeated round trips between supply points and customers, because long-distance, cross-country motoring over sand, loose gravel, and other surfaces that afford poor traction greatly decreases the gas mileage obtainable from wheeled and tracked vehicles. High mileage accrued in hot weather on rough terrain mainly in low gears moreover is hard on engines, radiators, springs, shock absorbers, transmissions, batteries, tank tracks, tires, and drivers. Constant vibrations crack and break metal. Gaskets and fan belts wear out quickly. Grit grinds assorted parts subject to friction, such as ignitions, brake shoes, bushings, bearings, water pumps, and carburetors, as well as microphones, switches, and circuit breakers. Air, fuel, and oil filters demand daily servicing and frequent replacement. Similar supply and maintenance problems afflict all other types of military materiel, as U.S. Lieutenant General Gus Pagonis graphically described after Operation Desert Storm in his unofficial report entitled Moving Mountains.71
热带雨林
TROPICAL RAIN FORESTS
热带雨林从来都不是中立的，它有利于准备充分的军队，并惩罚那些未能理解这一点的军事领导人：
Tropical rain forests, which never are neutral, favor well-prepared forces and penalize military leaders who fail to understand that:
小规模单位行动占主导地位。
• Small unit actions predominate.
• 陆路运输总是缓慢而艰辛的。
• Overland movement invariably is slow and laborious.
• 骑马和乘坐机动车辆的部队机动性不如步兵。
• Troops mounted on horseback and motor vehicles are less mobile than foot soldiers.
• 天然的空投区、着陆区和潜在的简易机场面积小且稀少。
• Natural drop zones, landing zones, and potential airstrips are small and scarce.
• 平射弹道武器的可视范围和射击范围受到严重限制。
• Visibility and fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons are severely limited.
• 陆地导航需要专门的技术。
• Land navigation requires specialized techniques.
• 坦克、火炮、其他重型武器和近距离空中支援飞机均被禁止使用。
• Tanks, artillery, other heavy weapons, and close air support aircraft are inhibited.
• 指挥、控制、通信和后勤尤其困难。
• Command, control, communications, and logistics are especially difficult.
• 特种作战部队和防御部队享有独特的优势。
• Special operations forces and defenders enjoy distinctive advantages.
• 数量和技术优势不如适应能力重要。
• Quantitative and technological superiority count less than adaptability.
1941年出版的小册子《独自阅读此书——战争便可取胜》对从寒冷的满洲抽调到马来亚和新加坡作战的日本师进行了灌输，这些部队迅速击败了未经训练的英国守军及其印度盟友。与此同时，美国类似的文献却对丛林战轻描淡写，或几乎未引起美国高级军事官员的重视。美国海军陆战队的《小型战争手册》（1940年）基于其在海地（1915-1934）、多米尼加共和国（1916-1924）和尼加拉瓜（1926-1933）的长期服役经验，与热带雨林作战的关联甚微。而且，无论如何，在二战前夕，大多数海军陆战队员都觉得两栖作战更有意思。美国陆军基本上忽略了《野战手册 31-20：丛林战》，该手册在 1941 年 12 月分发后，受众非常有限。因此，两军的指挥官和普通士兵都在艰苦的条件下接受了在职培训。72
A 1941 pamphlet, Read This Alone—and The War Can Be Won, indoctrinated Japanese divisions drawn from frigid Manchuria for duty in steamy Malaya and Singapore, where they quickly defeated untutored British defenders and their Indian allies. Analogous U.S. documents at that time conversely slighted jungle warfare or received scant attention from America’s senior military officials. The U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual (1940), predicated on long service in Haiti (1915-1934), the Dominican Republic (1916-1924), and Nicaragua (1926-1933), was only marginally related to combat in tropical rain forests, and in any event, most Marines on the eve of World War II found amphibious operations a far more entertaining topic. The U.S. Army largely ignored Field Manual 31-20: Jungle Warfare, which reached a very restricted audience after distribution in December 1941. Commanders as well as rank and file in both services accordingly received on-the-job training under trying conditions.72
丛林战争背景
JUNGLE WARFARE SETTINGS
充沛的全年降水、酷热的气温和高湿度共同造就了茂密、潮湿、阴暗的热带雨林（图19）。在所罗门群岛的布干维尔岛，雨量计经常记录到每天高达7英寸（17.8厘米）的降雨量，但这与附近的新不列颠岛相比似乎并不算多，那里季风带来的暴雨有时甚至超过这个数字的两倍。二战期间驻缅甸美军最高指挥官“醋乔”史迪威中将1944年曾写道：“这个国家的‘旱季’简直是个笑话……12月下了雨，1月下了12天，2月下了18天，3月下了10天，4月下了10天，现在又要下雨了。”他的预言成真了；夏季季风于5月1日开始。茂密的树叶遮天蔽日，阻挡了所有微风，而雨林地面则变成了有毒的泥浆。73
Copious, year-round precipitation, torrid temperatures, and high humidity combine to create rain forests, which are dense, dripping, dank, and dark (map 19). Rain gauges often record as much as 7 inches a day (17.8 centimeters) in Bougainville in the Solomon Islands, but this may seem moderate compared with nearby New Britain, where monsoonal deluges sometimes dump more than double that amount. Lieutenant General “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell, the senior American commander in Burma during World War II, noted in 1944, “The ’dry season’ in this country is a joke . . . We have had rain in December, 12 days in January, 18 in February, 10 in March, 10 in April, and now it’s really going to rain.” He was right; the summer monsoon started on May 1st. Wall-to-wall foliage, always in full leaf, blocks any breeze, while rain forest floors turn into noxious mush.73
原始雨林，例如亚马逊盆地和赤道非洲的大部分雨林，主要由成熟的树木组成（最高的树可达 60 米甚至更高），它们枝繁叶茂，相互交错，形成三四层树冠，高耸于巨大的树干之上。由于阳光几乎无法照射到林地，林下植被稀疏，但巨大的藤蔓交织成网，有些藤蔓至少有 30 厘米粗，从高处垂落至林下。次生林则生长在自然或人类开垦过的土地上，其林下植被茂盛，包括幼树、灌木丛、带刺的藤蔓和蕨类植物。某些竹子品种如同杰克的魔豆一般，每天可生长 1 米，最终可长到 30 米以上。茂密的、比大多数成年男子还高的锋利的苦无草经常覆盖着没有稻田、小农场或公园式种植园的空地，在这些地方，橡胶树和椰子树整齐地排列成行。74
Virgin rain forests, such as most of those in the Amazon Basin and equatorial Africa, consist mainly of mature trees (the largest tower 200 feet/60 meters or more), the spreading branches of which interlock to form three or four overarching canopies high above huge boles. Undergrowth is sparse, because little or no sunlight reaches the forest floor, although a latticework of giant lianas, some at least a foot thick, festoons from great heights to the bottom. Secondary jungles that sprout wherever nature or humans have cleared the land feature luxuriant undergrowth in the form of saplings, thickets, thorny vines, and ferns. Some species of bamboo that must be akin to Jack’s beanstalk grow 3 feet (1 meter) a day and ultimately tower more than 100 feet. Dense stands of razor-sharp kunai grass taller than most men frequently cover open spaces not occupied by rice paddies, small farms, or park-like plantations where well-spaced rubber and coconut trees are planted in neatly kept rows.74
世界上最大的热带雨林位于南美洲赤道附近，地势平坦或起伏，从安第斯山脉山麓一直延伸到大西洋。非洲大部分丛林也生长于低地之上，而丛林密布的山脉则覆盖着中美洲、部分加勒比海岛屿、印度西海岸、东南亚大部分地区以及从苏门答腊岛到塔希提岛的群岛。这里环境多样性显著。例如，瓜达尔卡纳尔岛融合了平原、山麓和山脉，植被种类繁多，包括草地、椰林和茂密的丛林；而仅隔锡拉克海峡17英里的图拉吉岛，则是一片完全被森林覆盖的山丘。新几内亚岛是仅次于格陵兰岛的世界第二大岛，岛上壮丽的山坡上也生长着热带雨林。白天，那里闷热潮湿；但夜幕降临后，高海拔地区就会变得异常寒冷。75
The world’s largest rain forest lies on level to rolling terrain astride the Equator in South America from the foothills of the Andes to the Atlantic Ocean. Most African jungles also rise above lowlands, but jungle shrouded mountains cover Central America, some Caribbean islands, India’s west coast, most of southeast Asia, and archipelagos that stretch from Sumatra to Tahiti. Great environmental diversity is evident. Guadalcanal, for example, mingles plains, foothills, and mountains with varied vegetation that includes grassy patches, coconut groves, and forbidding jungles, whereas the tiny island of Tulagi, just 17 miles away across Sealark Channel, is a homogeneously wooded hill mass. New Guinea, which after Greenland is the second largest island on this globe, grows tropical rain forests on awesome slopes. Oppressive heat and humidity prevail there during daylight hours, but penetrating cold sets in after dark at high altitudes.75
近战
CLOSE COMBAT
步兵班、排、连队在丛林中缓慢行进，各单位之间的距离很近，几乎没有相邻单位的直接支援，因为对于弹道平直的武器而言，目视接触和自然射界通常不超过几码（米）。车辆几乎只能在公路上行驶。紧张的搜索最终演变成近距离的短暂交火，这就是近距离个人战斗的特点。托马斯·霍布斯在其1651年的著作《利维坦》中，无意间描述了许多丛林战士“孤独、贫困、肮脏、野蛮而短暂”的生活，他们“时刻生活在对暴力死亡的恐惧和危险之中”。在这种情况下发生的武装冲突凸显了以下几点的重要性：简明集中的作战计划、能够预见意外情况的标准作业程序（SOP）、分散的执行方式，以及最重要的——精明干练的基层指挥官。
Infantry squads, platoons, and companies grope slowly through jungles at reduced distances between elements with little or no direct assistance from adjacent units, because visual contact and natural fields of fire for flat-trajectory weapons seldom exceed a few yards (meters). Vehicles are road-bound with rare exceptions. Tense searches that culminate in fleeting fire-fights at point-blank range characterize up close and personal combat. Thomas Hobbes, in his 1651 treatise, Leviathan, inadvertently described the “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” life of many jungle warriors who experience “continual fear and danger of violent death.” Armed conflict under such circumstances emphasizes needs for simple, centralized plans, standing operating procedures (SOPs) that anticipate unexpected contingencies, decentralized execution, and, above all, astute junior leaders.
强调第六感。环绕四周的热带雨林会加剧人们潜在的幽闭恐惧症和妄想症倾向，因为即使在最佳条件下，交战双方的视力和听力也十分有限。即使是空中观察员和监视卫星，能见度也极其有限，因此巧妙隐藏的敌方防御工事也难以被发现。热成像仪在茂密的植被下仍能正常工作，但光放大装置、红外传感器和雷达的效果则较差。潮湿的植被还会阻碍声音传播，梅里尔的突击队员在缅甸砍伐坚硬的竹林时就深有体会——他们发出的噪音如同……铁路工人在铁轨上钉钉子，但后方的士兵却什么也没听到。“同流合污”的危险始终存在，尤其是在漆黑的夜晚，各种怪异的声响会刺激那些容易冲动的新手，让他们对着每一个移动的影子开枪，直到他们习惯为止。然而，狗牌的叮当声、步枪保险打开的声音以及枪栓砰然关闭的声音，在近距离仍然能发出清晰的警告。受惊的鸟类和野生动物突然尖叫或安静下来，也可能表明有敌人活动。嗅觉和触觉有时可以补充甚至取代视觉和听觉：剃须液、香皂、驱虫剂、香烟烟雾和其他非本地气味都是明显的信号；巡逻的尖兵会用手指和树枝小心翼翼地摸索绊线。那些拥有被称为“第六感”的直觉感知能力的徒步士兵，不仅能提高自身的生存几率，也能提高战友的生存几率。76
Emphasis on Sixth Sense. Wrap-around rain forests intensify latent tendencies toward claustrophobia and paranoia, since belligerents can neither see nor hear well under best case conditions. Visibility is so limited, even by aerial observers and surveillance satellites, that cleverly concealed enemy fortifications are hard to spot. Thermal imagers work reasonably well despite thick foliage, but light amplification devices, infrared sensors, and radar are less effective. Wet vegetation also muffles sound, as Merrill’s Marauders discovered when they hacked their way through rock-hard bamboo thickets in Burma—they made a racket like spike-driving gandy dancers building a railroad, but men in the rear heard nothing. Dangers from “fratricide” are ever present, especially during pitch black nights filled with weird noises that prompt trigger-happy neophytes to shoot at every moving shadow until they become accustomed. The sound of jingling dog tags, rifle safeties snapping open, and bolts slamming shut nevertheless sends audible warnings at short-range. Frightened birds and wild animals that suddenly screech or fall silent may also indicate enemy activity. Senses of smell and touch can occasionally supplement or supplant sight and sound: shaving lotion, scented soap, insect repellent, cigarette smoke, and other non-indigenous aromas literally are dead giveaways; point men on patrol use fingers and twigs to feel cautiously for trip wires. Foot sloggers gifted with intuitive powers of perception called Sixth Sense enhance survival prospects for comrades as well as themselves.76
陆地导航。即使借助全球定位系统（GPS），棘手的陆地导航问题依然存在。军用地图比1942年要好得多，当时驻扎在瓜达尔卡纳尔岛的美国海军陆战队员发现，他们的首要目标之一——奥斯汀山——位于海滩后方数英里处，而不是几百码处。但地图仍然存在一些重要的缺陷，部分原因是高空摄像机很少能拍到地面。此外，丛林会迅速吞噬那些在过时地图上清晰可见的、鲜有人使用的道路、铁路线和其他地标。因此，新来者最好效仿梅里尔的突击队员，他们尽可能雇用克钦族向导带领他们穿越缅甸丛林，因为这些向导对家乡的每一处地形都了如指掌。澳大利亚招募的“海岸观察员”在所罗门群岛各地担任侦察兵、搬运工和间谍，表现出色，取得了巨大的成功，以至于美国海军上将威廉·F·（公牛）·哈尔西声称，他们“拯救了瓜达尔卡纳尔岛，而瓜达尔卡纳尔岛拯救了太平洋”。美国和澳大利亚都曾表彰过一位名叫雅各布·沃扎的英雄，他后来被授予爵士头衔。77
Land Navigation. Knotty land navigation problems persist, even when assisted by Global Positioning Systems (GPS). Military maps are much better than in 1942, when U.S. Marines at Guadalcanal found that Mount Austen, one of their immediate objectives, was situated several miles rather than a few hundred yards behind the beach, but important shortcomings persist, partly because cameras aloft infrequently see the forest floor. Jungles moreover rapidly reclaim little used roads, rail lines, and other landmarks that appear prominently on outdated maps. Newcomers thus do well to emulate Merrill’s Marauders who, whenever possible, employed Kachin guides to lead them through Burmese jungles, because they knew every wrinkle in their home territories. Australian-recruited “coastwatchers” performed admirably as scouts, porters, and spies throughout the Solomon Islands with such success that U.S. Admiral William F. (Bull) Halsey claimed that they “saved Guadalcanal and Guadalcanal saved the Pacific.” The United States and Australia both decorated one such hero, Jacob Vouza by name, who later was knighted.77
陆路行军。在丛林中，陆路行军平均速度约为每小时半英里（路况良好时），或每天半英里（路况不佳时），除非部队沿着人迹罕至的小路行进，但这会引诱敌方埋设地雷、诡雷、路障和伏击。在茂密的次生林中，指挥、控制和通信（C3 ）问题尤为突出，因为茂密的次生林会削弱高频/甚高频无线电传输，使线路难以安装（更不用说维护），使大多数视觉信号失效，并使地面信使服务既危险又缓慢。空中机动也不可靠，因为当地天气恶劣，敌方经常占据最佳的直升机着陆区（着陆区），而这些着陆区本来就稀少且面积小，而且在双层、三层甚至四层树冠的热带雨林中从零开始建造着陆区是一个耗时耗力且成本高昂的过程，除非借助炸药。
Overland Movement. Overland travel in jungles averages about ½ mile an hour where the going is good and ½ mile a day where it is not, unless troops follow well-trodden trails that invite adversaries to install mines, booby traps, road blocks, and ambushes. Command, control, and communication (C3) problems are particularly difficult in thick secondary growth, which weakens HF/VHF radio transmissions, makes wire circuits hard to install (not to mention maintain), invalidates most visual signals, and makes surface messenger service both risky and slow. Air mobility is unreliable, because local weather is uncooperative, adversaries often cover the best helicopter landing zones (LZs), which are scarce and small, and LZ construction from scratch in double, triple, or quadruple canopy rain forests is a costly, time-consuming process without assistance from explosives.
臭名昭著的科科达小径，至今仍是连接莫尔兹比港和巴布亚新几内亚布纳之间穿越欧文斯坦利山脉的唯一陆路通道，二战期间，这里曾发生过艰苦卓绝的丛林战（图20）。澳大利亚、日本以及后来的美国军队，每天都被五分钟内降雨量高达2.5厘米的暴雨淋透，在几乎没有任何机动空间的垂直地形上展开残酷的战斗。在刀锋般陡峭的沙吉岭上，战区前沿阵地（FEBA）有时甚至只有一名澳大利亚步枪兵狙击一名日军士兵，而其他人则排成一列等待。那些在树林隧道中艰难地从一个危险的据点爬到另一个据点的疲惫不堪的英雄们说，更东边的崎岖的芬尼斯特雷山脉的情况更加糟糕。78
The infamous Kokoda Track, still the only passable land route over the Owen Stanley Mountains between Port Moresby and Buna in Papua, New Guinea, saw extensive jungle warfare under aggrieved conditions during World War II (map 20). Australian, Japanese, then U.S. troops, drenched daily by rainfall that measured as much as an inch (2.5 centimeters) in 5 minutes, engaged in savage struggles over vertical terrain where maneuver room was virtually zero. The Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) atop razor-backed Shaggy Ridge sometimes consisted of one Australian rifleman sniping at one Japanese counterpart while everyone else waited in line. Haggard heroes who clawed their way single file from one precarious perch to another through a tunnel of trees say the jagged Finisterre Range farther east was worse.78
游击队与地下组织。著名著作《迷雾中的大猩猩》的作者黛安·福西，如果不是被偷猎者过早夺去了生命，或许会写一部名为《迷雾中的游击队》的续集。因为只要附近社区的地下组织能够帮助招募、灌输思想、训练人员、筹集资金、提供情报、供应物资，并以其他方式支持反叛事业，丛林边缘地带便成为非正规武装的理想行动基地。那些从雨林中出击又返回的游击队员，在拉丁美洲、亚洲和非洲的热带地区，屡次以袭击、伏击和破坏行动令追捕者疲于奔命。79
Guerrillas and Undergrounds. Dian Fossey, author of the celebrated book, Gorillas in the Mist, might have written a sequel entitled Guerrillas in the Mist if poachers hadn’t cut her life short, because jungle fringes offer ideal bases of operations for irregular forces, provided undergrounds in nearby communities help recruit, indoctrinate, and train personnel, raise funds, furnish information, provide supplies, and otherwise support rebel causes. Guerrillas who sally forth from and return to rain forests have repeatedly given pursuers fits with raids, ambushes, and acts of sabotage in tropical parts of Latin America, Asia, and Africa.79
重型火力
HEAVY FIREPOWER
在热带雨林从平原拔地而起的地方，依靠飞机、火炮和坦克进行精准的重型火力支援几乎是自相矛盾的。在丛林覆盖的山区，火力支援的效果就更差了。
Heavy, accurately aimed firepower delivered by aircraft, artillery, and tanks is almost an oxymoron wherever tropical rain forests rise from flatlands. Fire support in jungle covered mountains is even less effective.
Map 20. The Kokoda Trail and Shaggy Ridge
改编自拉斐尔·斯坦伯格的《岛屿战斗》。
Adapted from Rafael Steinberg, Island Fighting.
对隐藏在热带雨林中的大片目标进行地毯式轰炸，如果轰炸员击中要害，会造成心理和身体上的双重伤亡，但与生态破坏和弹药浪费相比，军事效益往往微乎其微。对穿过丛林的敌方补给线进行空中封锁打击也需要付出巨大的努力，但收效甚微（参见第19章，该章讨论了切断胡志明小道交通的尝试）。配备激光指示器等先进目标捕获设备的固定翼飞机和武装直升机经常在茂密的植被下为与敌军交战的友军部队提供近距离支援，但误伤友军的风险很高。
Carpet bombing directed against sprawling targets concealed in rain forests inflicts psychological as well as physical casualties when bombardiers hit the right spot, but military benefits often are poor compared with ecological devastation and wasteful expenditures of ordnance. Aerial interdiction strikes against enemy supply lines that lead through jungles also demand huge efforts in return for modest results (see chapter 19, which discusses attempts to stop traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail). Fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter gunships equipped with sophisticated target acquisition devices such as laser designators frquently fly close support missions for friendly troops in contact with enemy forces under dense foliage, but the danger of “fratricide” is great.
炮兵部队常常容易遭受突袭和反炮兵攻击，因为沿稀少道路和小径分布的合适射击阵地难以实施“打了就跑”的战术。相比于会在高枝间引发无害爆炸的近炸引信、机械引信和电子引信，延时引信能让弹药穿透树冠后再引爆，因此更为可取。此外，炮火的射程和方向难以调整——空中观察员可以判断炮弹落在树梢的位置，但很少能看到地面目标；而地面前沿观察员依靠听觉而非视觉来计算修正值，由于丛林中声音的传播距离有限，他们在这方面处于劣势。美国驻越南军事援助司令部（MACV）的兵力编制中只保留了一个装甲骑兵团，没有装甲师或机械化师，这主要是因为在丛林和沼泽中使用坦克的机会通常仅限于空地、种植园和已修缮的道路。80
Artillery units often are vulnerable to hit-and-run raids as well as counterbattery attacks, because suitable firing positions along scarce roads and trails rule out “shoot and scoot” tactics. Time-delay fuses that let munitions penetrate canopies before they detonate are preferable to proximity, mechanical, and electronic fuses that trigger harmless explosions among lofty branches. The range and direction of artillery fire moreover are difficult to adjust—aerial spotters can tell where rounds strike treetops, but seldom see targets on the ground, while land-based forward observers, who depend on sound instead of sight to calculate corrections, are disadvantaged given the short distance that noises are audible in jungles. U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) maintained only one armored cavalry regiment and no armored or mechanized divisions on its trooplist, essentially because opportunities to employ tanks in jungles and swamps generally are confined to clearings, plantations, and improved trails.80
然而，精明的指挥官有时也能克服上述限制，有效地利用火炮和坦克。二战期间驻缅甸的英军高级指挥官斯利姆中将就曾得出结论：“除了沼泽地，坦克几乎可以在任何国家使用。”他利用坦克攻击敌军据点，步兵则“随行”在旁掩护，就像在南太平洋进行跳岛作战的美军和海军陆战队一样。在武元甲将军的指挥下， 81个越南师扛着大炮、其他重型武器以及大约8000吨补给品，翻越群山，穿过看似无法穿越的丛林，跋涉数英里，在俯瞰奠边府的高地上建立射击阵地，然后给予守军决定性的失败，将法国人赶出了印度支那。82
Astute commanders, however, occasionally can make good use of artillery and tanks despite restrictions just delineated. Lieutenant General Slim, the senior British commander in Burma during World War II, concluded that “tanks can be used in almost any country except swamp.” He used them to engage enemy strong points with infantrymen “riding shotgun,” as did U.S. Army and Marine counterparts who conducted island-hopping campaigns in the South Pacific.81 Vietnamese divisions under General Vo Nguyen Giap manhandled artillery, other heavy weapons, and perhaps 8,000 tons of supplies many miles over mountains and through presumably impenetrable jungles, established firing positions on high ground that dominated Dien Bien Phu, then dealt defenders a decisive defeat that drove France from Indochina.82
持久力
STAYING POWER
在旷日持久的冲突中，持久作战能力至关重要，但在热带雨林地区，弹药、制服、地图、口粮、医疗用品以及所有其他未妥善保管或未立即消耗的军事物资都极易腐烂生锈，这无疑是一项艰巨的任务。维护问题加上补给路线的匮乏，使得物资补充成为一项极其繁琐的工作。疾病肆虐、医疗后送困难重重以及物资快速腐烂，令所有相关人员，包括伤员、担架员、埋葬人员和墓地登记人员，都苦不堪言。
Staying power, a key requirement during protracted conflicts, is elusive in rain forests where ammunition, uniforms, maps, rations, medical supplies, and all other military materiel not safeguarded or immediately consumed are subject to rotting and rust. Maintenance problems coupled with the paucity of supply routes makes replenishment a laborious process. Debilitating diseases, medical evacuation (medevac) difficulties, and rapid rates of decay make life miserable for all concerned, including casualties, litter bearers, burial details, and graves registration personnel.
维护与补给。丛林后勤人员的工作条件极其艰苦，因为适合大规模物资补给和撤离的道路、小径、内河航道、空投区、着陆区和固定翼飞机跑道不仅稀少，而且难以保障和维护。检查站、巡逻队、车队护航、排雷队和工程队像海绵一样吸收人员。驮骡和搬运工往往是……最好的（有时甚至是唯一的）可靠交通方式。事实上，在新几内亚的科科达小径上，盟军雇佣了超过1万名赤脚的巴布亚人，他们背负着沉重的货物翻越欧文斯坦利山脉。修建新的陆路交通线路所需的成本和时间会随着距离的增加而急剧上升——修建这条从阿萨姆邦雷多到中国昆明、横跨缅甸的1770公里（1100英里）公路，耗费了2.8万名作战支援部队、3.5万名当地劳工、1.5亿美元的二战资金以及两年时间。这条原始的道路穿越丛林、峡谷、急流，其中一段很短的路段就有21个密集的急转弯，虽然算不上是一条交通要道，但仍然堪称工程奇迹（详见第11章）。83
Maintenance and Replenishment. Jungle logisticians work under demanding conditions, because roads, trails, inland waterways, drop zones, landing zones, and fixed-wing airstrips suitable for large-scale supply and evacuation purposes not only are scarce but are hard to secure and maintain. Check points, roving patrols, convoy escorts, mine clearance crews, and engineering gangs soak up personnel like sponges. Pack mules and porters often are the best (sometimes the only) reliable means of transportation. Allied forces on the Kokoda Track in New Guinea in fact employed more than 10,000 barefoot Papuans, who lugged backbreaking loads over the Owen Stanley Mountains. Costs and times required to construct new land lines increase dramatically with distance—it took 28,000 combat service support troops, 35,000 indigenous laborers, $150 million in World War II dollars, and 2 years to build the 1,100-mile (1,770-kilometer) road that led across Burma from Ledo in Assam to Kunming in China. That primitive avenue, which traversed jungles, gorges, rapids, and 21 closely spaced hairpin turns along one short stretch, was hardly an arterial highway but qualified as an engineering masterpiece nonetheless (see chapter 11 for details).83
丛林中的医疗灾难。丛林里充斥着各种会叮咬、蜇伤和黏附的生物和非生物，以及大量对人类有害的微生物，还有士兵们戏称为“丛林腐烂病”的真菌感染，以及容易导致大量出汗、皮疹和中暑的潮湿空气。许多热带疾病都与昆虫有关，例如登革热、丛林斑疹伤寒和对蜂蜇的过敏反应。在二战南太平洋战役中，疟疾造成的伤亡甚至超过了敌军炮火造成的伤亡。吸血水蛭的唾液中含有抗凝血剂，若不及时治疗，会造成伤口并发展成溃疡。伤寒、霍乱、肝炎、腹泻和阿米巴痢疾在受污染的食物和水中肆虐。免疫接种和严格的野战卫生措施可以显著减少大多数非战斗伤亡，这些伤员，如同行动不便的伤员一样，必须被后送至救护站或医院。患者和医务人员都尽可能选择空中医疗后送，因为担架员即使只是在丛林中跋涉几百米，也十分艰难。84
Medical Miseries. Jungles are filled with animate and inanimate objects that bite, sting, and stick, a host of microorganisms that are harmful to humans, fungus infections that troops affectionately call “jungle rot,” and steamy atmosphere that encourages profuse perspiration, body rashes, and heat exhaustion. Many tropical maladies traceable to insects include dengue fever, scrub typhus, and allergic reactions to bee stings. More casualties could be traced to malaria than to hostile fire during World War II campaigns in the South Pacific. Blood-sucking leeches, whose saliva contains an anticoagulant, leave sores that turn into ulcers unless properly treated. Typhoid fever, cholera, hepatitis, diarrhea, and amoebic dysentery thrive in contaminated food and water. Immunizations and scrupulous field sanitation practices can dramatically reduce most resultant nonbattle casualties which, like nonwalking wounded, must be evacuated to aid stations or hospitals. Patients and medical personnel both prefer air medevac whenever feasible, because stretcher bearers struggle through jungles, even for a few hundred yards.84
在热带雨林的高温高湿环境下，尸体无论露天躺卧还是埋于浅坑，都难以长久保存。正如一位老兵所描述的那样，腐肉的恶臭“会沾染你的……眉毛、牙龈和脚掌”，随后苍蝇、蚂蚁、蛆虫、甲虫、鸟类和动物会将所有骨头啃食殆尽。负责收殓遗体的工作人员面临着一项令人作呕的任务。对于没有身份牌的尸体，通常需要通过牙齿记录、骨骼疤痕或DNA样本来确认身份。85
Cadavers don’t last long in the heat and high humidity of tropical rain forests, whether they lie in the open or occupy shallow graves. The pervasive stench of putrefying flesh, as one veteran put it, “sticks to your. . . eyebrows, your gum line and the balls of you feet” before flies, ants, maggots, beetles, birds, and animals pick all bones clean. Personnel whose primary job is to retrieve remains face a revolting task. Positive identification of corpses that lack dog tags frequently awaits confirmation from dental records, skeletal scars, or DNA samples.85
湿地
WETLANDS
湿地是“最不适宜通行地形”的有力竞争者，它们被咸水、半咸水或淡水浸透，并可能部分、全部、常年或间歇性地被淹没。有些湿地与茂密的森林相邻，有些则位于几乎所有气候带（包括沙漠）的高低海拔开阔地带，在沙漠中，它们有时与溪流平行，并渗透到河流三角洲。“沼泽”一词涵盖了潮湿的林地；沼泽地则生长着高草、灯心草、芦苇和香蒲；泥炭地由疏松、排水不良的土壤构成，上面覆盖着莎草、石楠、苔藓、地衣和其他矮小的植物。
Wetlands, which strongly compete for the title “Least Trafficable Terrain,” are saturated with and partially, completely, perennially or intermittently inundated by salty, brackish, or fresh water. Some are collocated with dense forests, others lie on open lands at high and low elevations in almost every clime including deserts, where they occasionally parallel streams and permeate river deltas. The generic term “swamp” subsumes wet woodlands; marshes feature tall grass, rushes, reeds, and cattails; bogs comprise spongy, poorly-drained soils variously covered with sedges, heath, mosses, lichens, and other stunted plants.
季节性沼泽
SEASONAL SWAMPS
1939-40年的俄芬冬季战争是历史上唯一一场在苔原或泰加林（俄语意为“沼泽森林”）上进行的大规模武装冲突，这些地区覆盖了加拿大、俄罗斯欧洲部分和西伯利亚的大部分寒冷平原（图12，第94页）。湿地战争那些人口稀少、地理环境恶劣的地区无论如何都不可能长久存在，因为夏季短暂，而且一年中大部分时间里，潮湿的土壤都被冻住了。
The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-40 is the only large-scale armed conflict ever fought on the tundra or in the taiga (Russian for “swamp forests”), which overlie most of the frigid flatlands in Canada, European Russia, and Siberia (map 12, page 94). Wetland warfare in those sparsely settled, geographically forbidding regions could never last long in any case, because summers are short and moisture-soaked soil is frozen solid most of each year.
在排水不畅的南部地区，季节性沼泽在军事上更为重要，因为那里夏季更长，气候温暖潮湿。弗朗西斯·马里恩准将因其游击队在独立战争期间于卡罗来纳州将英国红衫军打得溃不成军而被称为“沼泽狐狸”，之后便消失在潮湿的沼泽地带。86普里佩特沼泽位于白俄罗斯、乌克兰和俄罗斯欧洲部分地区，几个世纪以来一直是大规模人口迁徙和军事行动的通道。这片令人望而生畏的沼泽地，纵横交错着茂密的森林、无数的池塘、沼泽地、险峻的草甸和蜿蜒的溪流，东西绵延300英里（480公里），南北宽140英里（225公里），横跨普里佩特河，还不包括通往芬兰湾附近佩普斯湖和拉戈达湖的两条不连续的支流（图21）。整个沼泽地每年扩张两次：一次是在春季，融雪使水位上升，河流泛滥；另一次是在秋季，从秋雨开始到第一次霜冻来临，持续约4周。除了边缘地带和少数几个地方中心（如平斯克）外，常住居民稀少。
Seasonal swamps are militarily more significant in poorly drained regions a bit farther south, where summers are longer and warm weather is wetter. Brigadier General Francis Marion made a name for himself as the “Swamp Fox” when his guerrilla bands ran British redcoats ragged in the Carolinas during the American Revolution, then disappeared into sodden sanctuaries.86 The Pripet Swamp, currently located in parts of Belarus, Ukraine, and European Russia, has channelized mass migrations and military operations for centuries. That formidable morass, which intersperses dense woods with countless ponds, moors, treacherous meadows, and shifting streams, extends 300 miles (480 kilometers) west to east and 140 miles (225 kilometers) north to south astride the Pripet Rivier, not counting two discontinuous offshoots that lead to Lakes Peipus and Lagoda near the Gulf of Finland (map 21). The entire complex expands twice a year, once in springtime when melting snows raise water levels and rivers overflow, again in the fall for about 4 weeks from the onset of autumn rains until the first hard frost. Permanent inhabitants are scarce, except along the fringe and in a few local centers such as Pinsk.
步兵的越野行军速度缓慢，而机动车辆在大多数地方根本无法通行。该地区的道路稀疏，大多未经修缮，主要服务于当地，而且像除普里佩特河以外的所有河流一样，南北走向，与俄罗斯和波兰之间的地形走廊垂直。许多车道极其狭窄，军用车辆既无法绕行也无法掉头。二战期间，由于缺乏碎石和石料，德国工兵部队利用随处可得的原木修建了绵延数英里的“木板路”——车队以每小时5英里的速度颠簸前行，卡车、坦克和士兵的肾脏都遭受着持续不断的震动，但这却是穿越沼泽障碍的最佳方法。87
Cross-country movement is slow for foot soldiers and impossible for motor vehicles in most places. Roads in the region are widely spaced, mainly unimproved, largely of local importance, and, like all rivers save the Pripet, run north-south at right angles to topographical corridors between Russia and Poland. Many lanes are so narrow that military vehicle columns can neither detour nor turn around. German engineer troops during World War II used readily available logs to build mile after mile of “corduroy” roads in the absence of gravel and stone—trucks, tanks, and kidneys suffered incessant concussions as convoys bumped along at 5 miles per hour, but there was no better way to breach swampy obstacles.87
1941年6月希特勒入侵苏联后不久，普里佩特沼泽在德军中央集团军群和北方集团军群之间形成了一个巨大的缺口，使得大型军事编队无法进行相互支援的作战行动。试图绕过这片广袤的湿地极其危险，因为一旦德军先头部队消失，被包围的苏军留守部队和游击队就会立即对后勤部队发起猛攻。88在其他高纬度沼泽地区作战的指挥官和参谋人员应该预料到会遇到类似的问题。
The Pripet Swamp, which created a great gap between German Army Group Center and Army Group North soon after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, made it impossible for large military formations to conduct mutually supporting operations. Attempts to bypass such extensive wetlands proved perilous, because outflanked Soviet stay-behind forces and partisans pounced on logistical troops as soon as German spearheads disappeared.88 Commanders and staffs committed to combat in other high-latitude swamps should anticipate similar problems.
多年生沼泽
PERENNIAL SWAMPS
常年沼泽均位于热带或亚热带地区，与季节性湿地有许多共同特征，但它们永不结冰，不断被水填满，且往往很深。根据其军事意义，常年沼泽可分为三个截然不同的类别：第一类以草地荒野为主；第二类是稻田、种植园与原始沼泽交错分布的区域；第三类则以潮间带森林为特征。
Perennial swamps, all in the tropics or subtropical lands, share many characteristics with seasonal wetlands but never freeze, are refilled constantly, and tend to be deep. Three distinctive categories with significantly different military implications are discernible: Category One emphasizes grassy wilderness; Category Two mingles rice paddies and plantations with primeval swamps; Category Three features tidewater forests.
第一类：草地荒野。大沼泽地是第一类湿地中战争最为惨烈的地区。这片位于奥基乔比湖和佛罗里达南端之间的广袤沼泽，宽达40英里（65公里），长超过100英里（160公里）。齐腰高的锯齿草和其他水生植物从鳄鱼出没的水泥混合物中生长出来，在某些地方，这混合物似乎深不见底。苔藓覆盖的红胶木、绞杀榕、落羽杉、桃花心木以及八种棕榈树以各种组合点缀着寸土寸金的干燥土地。
Category One: Grassy Wilderness. The Everglades have seen more warfare than any other wetlands in Category One. That immense marsh, between Lake Okeechobee and the tip of Florida, is 40 miles wide (65 kilometers) and more than 100 miles long (160 kilometers). Head-high saw grass and other aquatic plants emerge from an alligator-infested solution of water and muck that seems almost bottomless in some places. Moss-draped gumbo limbo, strangler fig, bald cypress, mahogany, and eight species of palm trees in assorted combinations adorn dry ground, which is at a premium.
Map 21. The Pripet Swamp and Its Offshoots
1817-1818年，安德鲁·杰克逊将军击败了比利·鲍莱格斯率领的塞米诺尔印第安人，但并未瓦解他们的士气。这些骁勇善战的游击队员们悄然融入了当时覆盖超过300万英亩的沼泽地。奥西奥拉酋长曾多次拒绝美国政府将他的部落迁往密西西比河以西的计划，在第二次塞米诺尔战争期间（1835-1842年），他与美国陆军在佛罗里达大沼泽地展开了长达8年令人恼火的拉锯战。这些行动最终都以失败告终，不仅使美国付出了比任何其他反印第安战争都多的生命和金钱代价，还导致数百名桀骜不驯的部落成员继续控制着祖传土地。第三次塞米诺尔战争（1855-1858年）未能彻底清除这些部落后，美国政府出资让他们迁徙，但仍有少数人一直抵抗到1934年，也就是杰克逊将军进入佛罗里达大沼泽地117年后。89
General Andrew Jackson defeated, but did not demoralize, Seminole Indians under Billy Bowlegs in 1817-18. Superb guerrilla warriors simply melted into marshlands that then covered more than 3 million acres. Chief Osceola, who resisted subsequent U.S. efforts to resettle his tribe west of the Mississippi River, played tag in the Everglades with U.S. Army troops for 8 exasperating years (1835-42) during the Second Seminole War. Inconclusive operations not only cost the United States more lives and money than any other counter-Indian campaign but left several hundred recalcitrant tribesmen in control of ancestral lands. The U.S. Government paid them to move after the Third Seminole War (1855-58) failed to root them out, but a few resisted until 1934, 117 years after General Jackson entered the Everglades.89
20世纪90年代初，伊拉克独裁者萨达姆·侯赛因试图将居住在波斯湾顶端的什叶派穆斯林“沼泽阿拉伯人”连同逃兵和其他异见人士一起驱逐出家园。当时，“焦土政策”优先于搜寻和摧毁行动。排干沼泽、改道底格里斯河和幼发拉底河的行动导致水位急剧下降，污染相关疾病加剧，并破坏了当地居民世代相传的生活方式。随后，伊拉克军队放火焚烧大片草地。这些冷酷无情的举措，加上空中轰炸和炮火猛烈轰击，迅速削弱了这些被其憎恶的人口。90
“Scorched earth” programs took precedence over search and destroy missions in the early 1990s, when Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein sought to exterminate, control, or chase Muslim Shiite “Marsh Arabs” from their homeland at the head of the Persian Gulf, along with army deserters and additional dissidents. Actions to drain the swamps and divert the Tigris-Euphrates Rivers drastically reduced water levels, increased pollution-related diseases, and disrupted age-old life styles. Iraqi troops then set widespread grass fires. Those compassionless steps coupled with aerial bombardments and artillery barrages quickly depleted the despised populations.90
Map 22. The Mekong Delta and Rung Sat Special Zone
第二类：稻田、种植园和原始沼泽。湄公河三角洲堪称第二类地区的典范。从1945年到1975年，正规军和非正规军为了争夺这片富饶的粮仓和庞大的人口而在此激战。这片战略要地位于泰国湾和南海之间，面积约4万平方公里（16,000平方英里），位于西贡（后来的胡志明市）西南方向（见地图22）。
Category Two: Paddies, Plantations, and Primeval Swamps. No region represents Category Two more ably than the Mekong Delta, where regular and irregular armed forces battled from 1945 until 1975 to control its overflowing rice bowl and huge population. That strategically crucial property, bounded by the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea, spreads 16,000 square miles or so (40,000 square kilometers) southwest of Saigon, which later became Ho Chi Minh City (map 22).
这些平原中约有三分之一是未开发的丛林或沼泽地，例如芦苇平原，这是一片位于胡志明市西部的广袤草原，雨季时常被水淹没，而当带来降雨的冬季季风停止吹拂时，这里又干涸得足以燃烧。通往金瓯的唯一一条硬质路面公路——4号公路——沿线遍布着许多脆弱的桥梁和渡口，这条公路途经芹苴和其他农业中心。其余较好的路段大多是便利的通道，而非具有军事用途的交通要道。对于步兵来说，穿越这些地区十分艰难，在许多地方，即使在旱季，车辆也无法通行。稀疏的高地上遍布着密集的居民点和农田，几乎没有空间建造机场和永久性直升机停机坪。91此外，合适的材料稀缺使得建设成为一个昂贵且耗时的过程。1967 年，美国陆军工程兵花了 6 个月时间和大约 2000 万美元，在美托附近一个 600 英亩的人工岛上疏浚并倾倒了每英亩 5295 立方码（4045 立方米）的沙子，并在岛上建造了建筑物，并为一支旅级海上机动部队提供了必要的设施。92
About one-third of those flatlands are unreclaimed jungles or marshes, such as the Plain of Reeds, a sprawling prairie west of Ho Chi Minh City that is waterlogged during the wet season but dry enough to burn when rain-bearing winter monsoons stop blowing. Many vulnerable bridges and ferry sites mark Route 4, the only hard surface road to Ca Mau via Can Tho and other agricultural centers. The best of the rest are mainly paths of convenience rather than militarily useful lines of communication. Cross-country movement is laborious for foot troops and, in many places, impossible for vehicles even during the dry season. Wall-to-wall settlements and farmlands on scanty high land leave little room for airfields and permanent helicopter pads.91 The scarcity of suitable materials moreover makes construction an expensive and time-consuming process. It took U.S. Army Engineers 6 months and approximately $20 million to dredge and deposit 5,295 cubic yards (4,045 cubic meters) of sand per acre over a 600-acre artificial island, erect buildings on site, and provide essential amenities in 1967 for a brigade-sized Mobile Afloat Force near My Tho.92
沼泽式河战，一种特殊的两栖作战形式，在拥有超过4000英里（6400公里）可通航河流和小溪的水域环境中发展成为一门精湛的技艺。“棕水”水手们效仿丹尼尔·T·帕特森准将，后者在1812年战争期间开创了美国的先例：他率领的炮艇在密西西比河的河湾中短暂地阻滞了前往新奥尔良的英国红衫军。几年后，美国陆军、海军和海军陆战队在大沼泽地运用了更先进的技术和一支由纵帆船、平底船、平底驳船和独木舟组成的“蚊子舰队”；20世纪，在尼加拉瓜和菲律宾湿地的后续作战中，这种战术又得到了进一步的改进。93
Swamp-style riverine warfare, a specialized form of amphibious operations, became a fine art in that watery environment dominated by more than 4,000 miles (6,400 kilometers) of navigable rivers and streams. “Brown water” sailors emulated Commodore Daniel T. Patterson, who established a U.S. precedent during the War of 1812 when his gunboats in Mississippi River bayous briefly delayed British redcoats on their way to New Orleans. The U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps employed more advanced techniques and a “mosquito fleet” of schooners, flat-bottom boats, bateaux, and canoes in the Everglades a few years later; 20th-century successors in Nicaraguan and Philippine wetlands produced additional refinements.93
驻扎在湄公河三角洲的美国内河部队拥有先进的技术，他们设计了创新的作战理念、理论、战术、组织结构、武器装备和运输方式。他们的舰队由各种各样的舰艇组成，包括袖珍战舰、两栖登陆艇、装甲运兵车、扫雷艇、气垫船、巡逻艇和橡皮艇，所有这些都非常适合在浅水区作战。在浅水区，狭窄的弯道、岛屿、沙洲、沼泽草、鱼笼、低矮的桥梁、水雷以及敌方设置的障碍物都限制了他们的行动。海上支援部队负责指挥、控制和通信，配备了空调营房船，营房内设有医务室、手术室和净水设备，此外还有补给、维护、修理和打捞设施。蹼足步兵热切期盼着便携式桥梁、个人水上翼以及类似的便利设施，但这些设施要么不存在，要么供应不足。不过，他们也受益于灵活的战术，这些战术是由富有创造力的思想家专门为近距离战斗而设计的，因为在近距离战斗中，河岸湿滑陡峭，而隐藏在茂密植被中的敌人可以在突击部队到达之前就看到和听到他们。94
U.S. riverine forces in the Mekong delta, who had superior technologies at their disposal, devised innovative concepts, doctrines, tactics, organizations, weapons, equipment, and modes of transportation. Their flotillas contained a motley assortment of “pocket battleships,” amphibious landing craft, armored troop carriers, mine sweepers, air-cushion vehicles, patrol boats, and rubber rafts, all well-adapted for warfare in shallow waters where tight turns, islands, sand bars, swamp grass, fish traps, low bridges, mines, and enemy-installed obstacles restricted maneuvers. Support forces afloat provided command, control, and integrating communications, air-conditioned barrack ships replete with sick bays, surgery wards, and water purification plants, plus supply, maintenance, repair, and salvage facilities. Web-footed infantrymen fervently wished for man-portable bridges, individual water wings, and similar amenities that were nonexistent or in short supply, but they benefited from flexible tactics that creative thinkers concocted explicitly for close combat where stream banks were slick as well as steep and adversaries concealed in dense vegetation could see and hear assault troops well before they arrived.94
第三类：潮间带森林。曾在巴布亚新几内亚珊瑚海沿岸布纳附近的潮间带森林中作战的老兵回忆说，那里高耸入云的树木遮蔽了阳光，白天不见太阳，夜晚也看不到星星。溪流如同隧道般穿过红树林。沼泽地里，盘根错节的板根从黑色的、吸水的泥土中拔地而起，隐藏在这些天然障碍物中的日本机枪巢穴似乎堵死了每一条道路。95
Category Three: Tidewater Forests. Veterans of combat in tidal forests near Buna on Papua New Guinea’s Coral Sea coast recall towering trees that made it impossible to see the sun during daylight hours or the stars at night. Creeks constituted tunnels through mangrove swamps where gnarled buttress roots rose from black, sucking mud, and Japanese machine gun nests concealed in those natural abatis seemingly blocked every route.95
越南老兵认为，位于湄公河三角洲东北角的荣萨特区（地图22）是一片潮间带森林，相比之下，布纳湿地和其他湿地简直就像野餐场地。那里的高潮流速高达8节，水位涨落幅度可达5米，河道走向和深度都会发生剧烈变化，大部分“干燥”的陆地每天会被淹没两次。红树林和榕树从咸淡水交汇、污染严重的水域中伸出，这些水域覆盖了特区约80%的面积。尼帕棕榈、荆棘、灌木和锯齿状的草点缀着数百个小岛，其中很少有人耕种或居住。由于大量使用的化学落叶剂未能驱散叛乱分子或显著干扰他们的活动，船上的船员以及岸上的美军和南越军队经常遭到伏击。水蛭无法忍受如此高盐度的水，但这几乎是唯一的好消息——昆虫成群；精密武器、弹药装药和底火绳经常发生故障；迫击炮底座除非垫在沙袋上，否则就会陷进潮湿的土壤里；散兵坑和掩体变成了露天浴缸。在潮湿阴暗的地区跋涉的美国士兵和海豹突击队员的生活极其艰苦，以至于医务人员建议，决策者也批准，他们每隔48到72小时就必须返回干燥的地面，以免足部感染、丛林腐烂、肌肉拉伤和疲劳严重降低作战能力。尽管如此，Rung Sat行动仍在继续，因为西贡与大海之间的主要商业航道和军事补给线都经过该地区，此外还有其他一些对当地至关重要的主要水道。如果美军及其盟友允许越共游击队阻断交通，后果将不堪设想。96
Vietnam veterans believe the Rung Sat Special Zone, a tidewater forest in the northeast corner of the Mekong Delta (map 22), made Buna and other wetlands look like picnic grounds. High tides there, which run as fast as 8 knots, raise and lower water levels as much as 16 feet (5 meters), drastically change channel directions and depths, and inundate most “dry” land twice daily. Mangrove and banyan trees protrude from brackish, polluted waters that, give or take a couple of percentage points, cover eight-tenths of the Zone. Nipa palms, brambles, brush, and serrated grass adorn hundreds of small islands, few of which were cultivated or inhabited. Boat crews along with U.S. and South Vietnamese troops ashore were constantly subject to ambush, because chemical defoliants, liberally applied, failed to dislodge insurgents or significantly disrupt their activities. Leeches couldn’t tolerate such salty water, but that was about the only good news—insects swarmed; tight-tolerance weapons, ammunition powder trains, and primer cords often malfunctioned; mortar base plates sank in soggy soil unless they rested on sandbags; foxholes and bunkers turned into outdoor bath tubs. American soldiers and SEALs sloshing around in that dank region led such debilitating lives that medics recommended, and policymakers approved, repeated returns to dry ground after no more than 48 to 72 hours, lest foot infections, jungle rot, strain, and fatigue dangerously reduce proficiency. Rung Sat missions continued nonetheless, because the main commercial shipping channel and military supply line between Saigon and the sea ran through that region, along with other major waterways of local importance. Severe consequences would have ensued if U.S. Armed Forces and their allies had allowed Viet Cong insurgents to stop traffic.96
沿海地区和小海
COASTLANDS AND SMALL SEAS
在有组织的战争尚处于萌芽阶段时，海战便开始在沿海水域和小海域爆发。随后，作战舰艇的活动范围不断扩大，但由于技术和战术上的原因，直到第一次世界大战，冲突大多发生在近岸海域。第二次世界大战期间，航母战斗群、攻击型潜艇和反潜作战部队开展了规模空前的“远洋”作战，其规模之大前所未见，后无来者。此后，美国海军在公海上占据绝对优势，直到20世纪60年代中期，在海军元帅谢尔盖·戈尔什科夫的领导下，苏联海军开始挑战美国的霸主地位。然而，冷战在25年后结束，海上未曾爆发过任何战争。截至本文撰写之时，大多数观察家普遍认为，在可预见的未来，远离陆地的海战似乎不太可能发生。因此，无论大小国家的海军战略家们再次将注意力集中在近岸海域和小海域，那里的问题不仅与他们在大洋中部必须解决的问题不同，而且比几年前的前辈们面临的问题要复杂得多。
Naval conflicts began in coastal waters and small seas when organized warfare was in its infancy. Combatant ships subsequently ranged far and wide but, for technological and tactical reasons, conflicts occurred fairly close to shore until World War I. Carrier battle groups, attack submarines, and antisubmarine warfare forces during World War II conducted “blue water” campaigns on a grand scale never seen before or since. The United States Navy thereafter reigned supreme on the high seas until Soviet adversaries under the guidance of Fleet Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov began to challenge U.S. preeminence in the mid-1960s. The Cold War, however, wound down a quarter of a century later without a shot fired in anger at sea and most observers at this writing generally agree that naval conflicts far from land seem a remote possibility for the foreseeable future. Naval strategists in countries large and small accordingly concentrate once again on littorals and small seas, where problems not only are different from those they must solve in mid-ocean but are infinitely more complex than those that predecessors faced a few years ago.
沿海地区和小海域的划定
LITTORALS AND SMALL SEAS DELINEATED
韦氏词典将沿海地区定义为“高水位线和低水位线之间的海岸区域”，而美国海军和海军陆战队可能出于军种间政治考量，认为沿海地区的范围要广泛得多，从“公海”（未定义）延伸到海岸，然后经陆地延伸 650 海里（1200 公里）。97这份文件旨在寻求切实可行的折衷方案，其讨论范围为从海岸线向海延伸不超过100米的沿海地带。海里（185公里）以及向内陆延伸的相同距离，使得每个方向都有足够的深度来组织、开展和支持沿海作战，包括两栖登陆作战。
Webster’s Dictionary defines littorals as “the shore zone between high and low water marks,” whereas the United States Navy and Marine Corps, perhaps playing interservice politics, see a much broader region that reaches from the “open ocean” (undefined) to the shore, thence overland 650 nautical miles (1,200 kilometers).97 This document, in search of a realistic compromise, addresses littorals that extend seaward from the shoreline no more than 100 nautical miles (185 kilometers) and an equal distance inland, which affords enough depth in each direction to stage, conduct, and support coastal operations, including amphibious assaults.
亚得里亚海、爱琴海、黑海、红海、渤海和朝鲜湾（黄海的西北和东北支流）以及波斯湾都是小型海域的典型代表，它们的中心距离陆地不足或略超过100英里。波罗的海、俾斯麦海、加勒比海、珊瑚海、北海、地中海、南海、墨西哥湾、日本海和鄂霍次克海以及其他类似的海洋分支则面积过大，不符合小型海域的定义。
The Adriatic, Aegean, Black, and Red Seas, Bo Hai and Korea Bay (northwest and northeast arms of the Yellow Sea), and the Persian Gulf typify small seas, the centers of which lie less than or little more than 100 miles from land. The Baltic, Bismarck, Caribbean, Coral, North, Mediterranean, and South China Seas, the Gulf of Mexico, the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, and comparable oceanic offshoots are too large to qualify.
典型海岸地形
TYPICAL COASTAL TOPOGRAPHY
沿海地区和小海域通常包括海岸线、离岸通道和内陆出口。每种环境的地理特征都截然不同，而且数量远比“蓝水”地区的地理特征多得多（图 20）。98
Littorals and small seas invariably include seashores, offshore approaches, and exits inland. The geographic features in each environment are strikingly different and infinitely more numerous than those associated with “blue water” (figure 20).98
Figure 20. Typical Coastal Topography
离岸方案。
Offshore Approaches.
• 水动力条件：潮差大或小；横流和涌浪弱或强；低潮线和高潮线之间的距离以几十码或几百码（米）为单位测量
• Hydrodynamic conditions: tidal range great or slight; cross-currents and surf weak or strong; distance between low and high water marks measured in 10s or 100s of yards (meters)
• 水温和盐度：稳定或不稳定
• Water temperatures and salinity: stable or unstable
• 近岸海底：平坦或有切蚀，平缓或陡峭，柔软或坚硬
• Inshore sea bottoms: level or incised, gentle or steep, soft or solid
• 水道：数量多或少，深度深或浅，宽度宽或窄，特征明显或不明显。
• Channels: few or many, deep or shallow, wide or narrow, well or poorly marked
• 各种障碍物：沙洲、沙嘴、钩状岬角、泥滩、浅滩、暗礁、连岛礁（天然堤道）、泻湖、季节性冰、海藻、沉船和垃圾
• Assorted obstacles: sand bars, spits, hooks, mud flats, shoals, reefs, tombolos (natural causeways), lagoons, seasonal ice, sea weeds, ship wrecks, and trash
• 环境噪音：响亮或轻柔；局部或普遍；船舶、休闲船只、鱼类和鸟类产生的声音。
• Ambient noise: loud or muted; localized or universal; sounds caused by ships, recreational boats, fish, and fowl.
海岸。
Seashores.
• 海滩：宽阔或狭窄，短小或绵长，沙滩、砾石滩或泥滩
• Beaches: wide or narrow, short or long, sand, shingle, or mud
• 交通便利性：良好或不良
• Trafficability: good or poor
• 人类居住情况：密集、稀疏或无
• Human habitation: dense, sparse, or absent
• 港口和码头设施：数量多或少；陈旧或现代。
• Harbor and port facilities: many or few; antiquated or modern.
向内陆出口。
Exits Inland.
• 天然障碍物：悬崖、台地、岬角、尖峰、洞穴、岩洞和溶洞；沙丘、沼泽、湿地和森林
• Natural obstacles: cliffs, terraces, promontories, pinnacles, grottoes, caves, and caverns; sand dunes, marshes, swamps, and forests
• 城市、城镇、乡村和独立住宅：无论大小、数量多少、结构简陋还是坚固
• Cities, towns, villages, and isolated dwellings: large or small, many or few, flimsy or solid construction
公路和铁路：数量众多或寥寥无几；通行能力高或低；畅通无阻或交通拥堵
• Roads and railways: many or few; high or low capacity; unobstructed or bottlenecked
• 机场和着陆区：大或小，位置便利或不便利，现代化设施少或多。
• Airfields and landing zones: large or small, conveniently or inconveniently located, few or many modern facilities.
自我保护问题
SELF-PRESERVATION PROBLEMS
当敌对武装力量将近岸海域变成战区时，自保便凌驾于其他海军任务之上，因为敌方舰炮、舰载炮和导弹，无论部署在空中、水面还是岸上，都会使行动缓慢的水面舰艇面临高密度、高强度、近距离的突袭（洞穴和岩洞是绝佳的藏身之处）。各种水面作战舰艇、两栖舰艇、货运/运兵船、油轮以及停泊在狭小空间内的辅助舰艇都成了诱人的攻击目标。埃及的“冥河”（Styx）反舰导弹虽然以现代标准来看十分原始，但在1967年阿以战争中却开创了先例，它击沉了以色列驱逐舰“埃拉特”（Eilath ）号。系泊水雷和浮水雷，这些“潜伏武器”，既经济高效又极具破坏力。例如，1941 年，意大利蛙人偷偷地在埃及亚历山大港外的港口埋设了水雷，导致两艘英国战列舰搁浅。五十年后，美国海军花费 1700 万美元和两个月的时间修复了价值数十亿美元的宙斯盾导弹巡洋舰“普林斯顿”号，此前该舰撞上了一枚价值约 3500 美元的伊拉克水雷。99
Self-preservation takes precedence over other naval missions whenever hostile armed forces convert littorals into combat zones, because enemy guns and guided missiles aloft, afloat, and concealed ashore expose slow-moving surface ships to high-density, high-intensity, short-range surprise attacks (grottos and caves make grand hiding places). Assorted surface combatants, amphibious ships, cargo/troop transports, oil tankers, and auxiliaries in cramped quarters all make tempting targets. Egyptian Styx surface-to-surface antiship missiles that were primitive by modern standards set a precedent during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War when they sank the Israeli destroyer Eilath in shallow water. Moored and floating mines, the “weapons that wait,” are cost effective as well as devastating. Italian frogmen, for example, surreptitiously planted limpet mines that put two British battleships on the harbor bed outside Alexandria, Egypt, in 1941. Fifty years later the U.S. Navy spent $17 million and 2 months to repair the billion-dollar Aegis guided missile cruiser Princeton after it rammed one Iraqi mine worth about $3,500.99
缺乏瞬间反应能力和尖端计算机的近岸作战人员往往处于劣势，因为他们的反应时间通常最多只有一两分钟。亚音速掠海巡航导弹以每小时 600 英里（965 公里）的速度飞行，发射后 150 秒即可击中 25 英里（40 公里）外的目标。导弹防御人员可能需要花费一半的时间才能探测到迎面而来的敌方弹道，这些弹道的雷达反射截面大小与鸬鹚大致相当。这意味着他们只有 75 秒的时间来确认威胁、跟踪目标、计算高度、距离和速度，然后才能进行防御。饱和攻击、超音速导弹、敌方规避行动、海岸杂波造成的虚假图像，以及旨在保护友军和中立国的严格交战规则，都进一步增加了作战的复杂性。100
Littoral warriors who lack split-second reflexes and state-of-the-art computers are out of luck, because reaction times often are measured in a minute or two at most. Subsonic, sea-skimming cruise missiles flying 600 miles per hour (965 kph) hit targets 25 miles (40 kilometers) away 150 seconds after launch. Half that time likely elapses before missile defense crews can detect hostile projectiles with head-on radar cross-sections roughly equivalent in size to cormorants, leaving 75 seconds in which to confirm threats, track them, compute altitudes, ranges, and velocities, then fire. Saturation attacks, supersonic missiles, enemy evasive actions, false images caused by coastal clutter, and restrictive rules of engagement designed to safeguard friendly forces and neutrals are further complications.100
有效的反制措施难以设想。隐身舰艇设计可以降低视觉、声学、电子、红外和雷达“特征”，但怀疑论者认为，这种优势远非万无一失，因为物理定律决定了大型水面作战舰艇不可能在狭小的搜索区域内“消失”。预算限制可能使得隐身技术的应用仅限于少数高价值水面作战舰艇，而改装大型航空母舰的成本将非常高昂。因此，一些近岸作战研究者认为，能够静静地停泊在泥泞海底并在浅水中灵活机动的潜艇可能是最有效的反制措施，因为缺乏种类繁多的反潜传感器和武器系统的对手很难发现并摧毁它们（图21）。另一些人则主张大量部署快速艇。102
Effective countermeasures are hard to conceive. Stealthy ship designs could reduce visual, acoustic, electronic, infrared, and radar “signatures,” but skeptics contend that such advantages would be far from foolproof, because laws of physics make it impossible for large surface combatants to “disappear” within small search areas. Budgetary constraints probably limit applications to a few high-value surface combatants other than huge aircraft carriers, which would be very costly to convert.101 Some students of littoral warfare consequently are convinced that submarines able to sit quietly on muddy sea bottoms and maneuver well in shallow water may be the most effective countermeasures, because adversaries that lack an astonishing array of ASW sensors and weapon systems would be hard pressed to find them and finish them off (figure 21). Others advocate an influx of fast boats.102
权力投射问题
POWER PROJECTION PROBLEMS
沿近岸海域和小海域的兵力投送任务主要包括海上控制和两栖突击。浅水水雷在海上控制中发挥积极作用，而在两栖突击中则发挥消极作用。
Power projection missions along littorals and in small seas prominently feature sea control and amphibious assaults. Shallow water mines figure positively in the first instance and negatively in the second.
浅水海域控制。在某些方面，沿岸海域的控制比在远洋更难实现，因为敌军可以调动陆基和海基作战力量。然而，浅水区简化了难度较低的海上封锁任务的执行，这些任务旨在压制敌方海上贸易，并限制敌方海军指挥官的选择。
Shallow Water Sea Control. Sea control in some respects is more difficult to achieve along littorals than on open oceans, because enemy forces can bring land-based as well as naval combat power to bear. Shallow waters, however, simplify the accomplishment of less demanding sea denial missions, which seek to suppress enemy maritime commerce and limit options open to enemy naval commanders.
根据国际法，封锁通常被视为战争行为，但它也是将敌方海军和商船队困于港口、阻止海上敌舰返回休整、恢复、维护和补给、切断同情者的海上支援以及剥夺敌方海上自由的最经济有效的手段。使用军舰来威慑、偏转、拦截、登船、搜查、扣押或击沉突破封锁船只的封锁线，会使执行封锁的人员面临相当大的风险。一种更经济、同样甚至更有效的技术是使用水雷，这些水雷可以是海底水雷、浮水雷或系泊水雷，可以根据指令、接触或对磁场、声波或压力刺激做出反应而引爆。它们易于安装，并且在沿海航道中难以规避，但前提是必须大规模布设。因此，伊朗在波斯湾分阶段布设水雷以阻碍石油油轮及其护航船只（1987-88 年），结果证明这些水雷更多的是一种麻烦而不是威胁；而 1972 年 4 月，美国航母舰载机在海防港入口处布设了 8000 枚影响水雷，导致海防港的进出交通中断了 10 个月。103
Blockades customarily are considered acts of war under international law, but they also are the most economical way to bottle up opposing navies and merchant marines in port, prevent enemy ships at sea from returning for rest, recuperation, maintenance, and replenishment, seal off seaborne support by sympathizers, and generally deny foes freedom of the seas. Cordons sanitaire that employ men-of-war to deter, deflect, stop, board, search, seize, or sink blockade runners expose implementing crews to considerable risk. A cheaper, equally or more effective technique relies on bottom, floating, or tethered mines that variously activate on command, on contact, or in response to magnetic, acoustic, or pressure stimuli. They are easy to install and hard to avoid in coastal channels, but only if seeded en masse. Mines that Iran deposited piecemeal in the Persian Gulf to impede petroleum tankers and their escorts (1987-88) therefore proved to be more of a nuisance than a menace, whereas traffic into and out of Haiphong harbor ceased for 10 months after U.S. carrier-based aircraft laid 8,000 influence mines across its entrance in April 1972. 103
从海上到陆地的过渡。从舰船登陆到防守严密的海岸是一次充满挑战的经历，这主要是因为地理特征有利于防御方，而不利于水上突击部队。这些部队必须克服汹涌的海浪、沿岸流以及偶尔出现的强风，才能抵达指定海滩，而这些路线缺乏天然掩体或隐蔽物。扫雷艇和猎雷艇的危险任务是探测、标记并清除“泡沫区”中的航道。他们需要一套设备来应对流沙或软泥掩埋水底水雷的情况，另一套设备来应对海浪中悬浮的沉积物造成的遮蔽物，还有一套设备来应对岩石嶙峋导致声呐信号反射的情况。一些海军已经拥有相当规模的直升机机队和一些舰岸登陆艇，这些登陆艇在水面或水面上方行驶，而不是在水中航行。但是，最终可能能够避开浅水水雷的无人潜水器和遥控系统仍处于早期研发阶段。104
Transit from Sea to Shore. The transit from ships onto heavily defended shores is a traumatic experience in large part because geographic features favor defenders and oppose waterborne assault forces who must fight rough surf, long-shore currents, and occasionally strong winds on their way to designated beaches over routes devoid of natural cover or concealment. Mine hunters and mine sweepers whose dangerous duty is to detect, mark, and clear lanes through the “foam zone” need one set of implements for use where shifting sands or soft mud bury bottom mines, another set where sediments suspended in breaking waves act as obscurants, and yet another where rocky approaches cause sonar signals to bounce about. Some naval inventories already include sizable helicopter fleets and a few ship-to-shore vehicles that ride on or above rather than in the water, but unmanned submersibles and remote control systems that eventually may be able to elude shallow water mines are still in early stages of development.104
Figure 21. Shallow Water Antisubmarine Warfare Suites
资料来源：Nathaniel French Caldwell，“我们是否低估了反潜作战？” ，《武装部队杂志》，1996 年 7 月，第 25 页。
Source: Nathaniel French Caldwell, “Are We Shortchanging ASW?,” Armed Forces Journal, July 1996, p25.
• 每个地理区域都具有独特的特征，需要专门的军事计划、行动和方案。
• Every geographical region displays singular characteristics that demand specialized military plans, operations, and programs.
• 任何一支武装部队，如果其组织、装备和训练都旨在适应特定的地理环境，那么在完成必要的调整之前，在其他地区的表现就会大打折扣。
• Armed forces that are organized, equipped, and trained to function in any given geographical environment perform less well elsewhere until they complete essential adjustments.
• 准备工作可能很复杂、成本很高、很耗时，因为这里描述的七个独特区域中的每一个都包含诸如湿热区、干热区、湿冷区、干冷区、沙质沙漠、岩质沙漠等细分区域。
• Preparations can be complex, costly, and time-consuming, because each of the seven distinctive regions described herein contains subdivisions such as hot-wet, hot-dry, cold-wet, cold-dry, sandy deserts, rocky deserts, and so on.
• 每个地区都需要量身定制的战略、战术和技巧。
• Each region requires tailored strategies, tactics, and techniques.
• 每个地区对军事人员、武器、弹药和通信系统的能力都有着独特的影响。
• Each region uniquely influences the capabilities of military personnel, weapons, munitions, and telecommunication systems.
• 每个地区对食物、衣物、住所、维护和医疗支持的需求都有其独特之处。
• Each region uniquely influences requirements for food, clothing, shelter, maintenance, and medical support.
笔记
NOTES
1.九项准备原则可在约翰·M·柯林斯的《军事准备：原则与美国实践的比较》报告第 94-48 S 号（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1994 年 1 月 21 日）第 41-49 页中找到。
1. Nine Principles of Preparedness are available in John M. Collins, Military Preparedness: Principles Compared with U.S. Practices, Report No. 94-48 S (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 21, 1994), 41-49.
2. Charles M. Daugherty，《冰下之城：世纪营地的故事》（纽约：麦克米伦出版社，1963 年）；Trevor Hatherton 编，《南极洲》（纽约：普雷格出版社，1965 年），参考《小美国》第 1、2、3 和 4 页：35-39、68-69、91、193、205-206、211-216、233-235、248-249、280、443、469、474-478、484-486、501 页。
2. Charles M. Daugherty, City Under the Ice: The Story of Camp Century (New York: Macmillan, 1963); Trevor Hatherton, ed., Antarctica (New York: Praeger, 1965), references to Little America 1, 2, 3, and 4: 35-39, 68-69, 91, 193, 205-206, 211-216, 233-235, 248-249, 280, 443, 469, 474-478, 484-486, 501.
3.关于一些历史实例，参见 AW Abbott，“拉普兰 1918-19，英国军队的最北端”，《陆军季刊》 84 (1962): 236-243；Charles S. Stevenson，“零下 40 度战役”[美国军队在欧洲俄罗斯和东西伯利亚的行动，1918-1920]，《陆军》 19，第 2 期（1969 年 2 月）：49-50；Charles O. Lerche, Jr.，“挪威（1940-1945）”，载于《内部冲突中的挑战与应对》，第 2 卷，《欧洲和中东的经验》，DM Condit、Bert H. Cooper, Jr. 等编（华盛顿特区：美国大学社会系统研究中心，3 月），225-249； Alex Bruckner，“苔原上的进攻”，军事评论36，第 1 期（1956 年 4 月）：98-109。
3. For a few historical examples, see A. W. Abbott, “Lapland 1918-19, The British Army’s Farthest North,” Army Quarterly 84 (1962): 236-243; Charles S. Stevenson, “The 40-Below-Zero Campaign” [U.S. forces in European Russia and Eastern Siberia, 1918-1920], Army 19, no. 2 (February 1969): 49-50; Charles O. Lerche, Jr., “Norway (1940-1945),” in Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, vol. 2, The Experience in Europe and the Middle East, eds. D. M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, American University, March), 225-249; Alex Bruckner, “Attack in the Tundra,” Military Review 36, no. 1 (April 1956): 98-109.
4. Robert W. Service，“萨姆·麦吉的火葬”，载于《育空河的魔咒》 （纽约：多德·米德公司，1907 年），第 66 页。
4. Robert W. Service, “The Cremation of Sam McGee,” in The Spell of the Yukon (New York: Dodd Mead and Co. 1907), 66.
5.个人生存问题在约翰·E·斯莱特协调的《北极盆地》（马里兰州森特维尔：潮水出版社为美国北极研究所出版，1963 年）第 278-289 页；FM 31-70：《基本寒冷天气手册》（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1968 年 4 月，第 43-50 页）；罗伯特·D·切尼，“寒冷天气医学：预防胜于治疗”，《海军陆战队公报》，1981 年 2 月，第 43、44-45、47 页。
5. Personal survival problems are described in The Arctic Basin, coordinated by John E. Slater, (Centerville, MD: Tidewater Publishing for The Arctic Institute of America, 1963), 278-289; FM 31-70: Basic Cold Weather Manual (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, April 1968, 43-50; Robert D. Cheney, “Cold Weather Medicine: An Ounce of Prevention,” Marine Corps Gazette, February 1981, 43, 44-45, 47.
6. FM 31-70：基本寒冷天气手册，第 2 章和附录 E；Carl W. Riester，“寒冷天气作战”，特种作战，1994 年 1 月，9-10。
6. FM 31-70: Basic Cold Weather Manual, chap. 2 and appendix E; Carl W. Riester, “Cold Weather Operations,” Special Warfare, January 1994, 9-10.
7. Rowan Scarborough，“高科技服装为美国大兵提供防风雨保护”，《华盛顿邮报》，1995 年 12 月 28 日，第 1 页。
7. Rowan Scarborough, “High-Tech Clothing Gives GIs Weather Protection,” Washington Times, December 28, 1995, 1.
8. FM 31-70：基本寒冷天气手册，16-17、22-27、29-35。
8. FM 31-70: Basic Cold Weather Manual, 16-17, 22-27, 29-35.
9.同上，第 36-39 页、第 42-43 页；Jonathan D. Thompson，“步兵连在极寒环境下的作战”，《步兵》（1995 年 9 月-10 月）：第 31-32 页；“寒冷天气作战”，第 2 部分，《步兵》（1980 年 11 月-12 月）：第 29 页。
9. Ibid., 36-39, 42-43; Jonathan D. Thompson, “Infantry Company Operations in an Extremely Cold Environment,” Infantry (September-October 1995): 31-32; “Cold Weather Operations,” part 2, Infantry (November-December 1980): 29.
10. FM 9-209/技术命令 36-1-40：寒冷天气（0° 至 -60°）下装备的操作和维护（华盛顿特区：陆军部和空军部，1989 年 8 月 10 日，第 1-2 至 1-5、1-7 至 1-9、5-1 和 5-2、6-1 至 6-4 页）；FM 31-70：基本寒冷天气手册，第 177 页；“寒冷天气作战”，第 3 部分，步兵（1981 年 1 月至 2 月）：第 23-24 页。
10. FM 9-209/Technical Order 36-1-40: Operation and Maintenance of Equipment in Cold Weather (0° to -60°) (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army and Dept. of the Air Force, August 10, 1989, 1-2 through 1-5, 1-7 through 1-9, 5-1 and 5-2, 6-1 through 6-4; FM 31-70: Basic Cold Weather Manual, 177; “Cold Weather Operations,” part 3, Infantry (January-February 1981): 23-24.
11.盖伊·默奇，《天空之歌》（波士顿，马萨诸塞州：霍顿·米夫林出版社，1954 年），第 238 页。
11. Guy Murchie, Song of the Sky (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1954), 238.
12. FM 31-70：基本寒冷天气手册，第 4 章，以及第 105-115 页和附录 C；汤普森，“步兵连在极寒环境下的作战”，第 29-31 页。
12. FM 31-70: Basic Cold Weather Manual, chapter 4, plus 105-115 and appendix C; Thompson, “Infantry Company Operations in an Extremely Cold Environment,” 29-31.
13. FM 31-70：基本寒冷天气手册，115-121；弗朗西斯·金，“寒冷天气作战：将会发生什么？”，《军事评论》57，第11期（1977年11月）：86，92；“寒冷天气作战”，第3部分，步兵，24，25。
13. FM 31-70: Basic Cold Weather Manual, 115-121; Francis King, “Cold Weather Warfare: What Will Happen?,” Military Review 57, no. 11 (November 1977): 86, 92; “Cold Weather Operations,” part 3, Infantry, 24, 25.
14. William P. Baxter，“苏联坦克驾驶规范”，《军事评论》 60，第9期（1980年9月）：5-8；Alexander Werth，《战时的俄罗斯，1941-1945》（纽约：EP Dutton，1964年），321-335。
14. William P. Baxter, “Soviet Norms for Driving Tanks,” Military Review 60, no. 9 (September 1980): 5-8; Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941-1945 (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1964), 321-335.
15. Guy Murchie，《天空之歌》，第 233-234、238-239 页；Francis King，“寒冷天气战争：会发生什么？”，第 87、90-91 页；Lewis E. Link，“寒冷地区对陆军作战的影响”，《军事地理读本》，第 1 卷，战术（纽约州西点：美国军事学院地理系，1990 年），第 80、82 页。
15. Guy Murchie, Song of the Sky, 233-234, 238-239; Francis King, “Cold Weather Warfare: What Would Happen?,” 87, 90-91; Lewis E. Link, “Cold Regions Impacts on Army Operations,” Readings in Military Geography, vol. 1, Tactical (West Point, NY: Dept. of Geography, U.S. Military Academy, 1990), 80,82.
16.鲁道夫·M·塔梅兹，他是参加“北极之夜行动”的第504伞兵步兵团混合营的作战官。
16. Rudolph M. Tamez, who was Operations Officer for the composite battalion of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment that participated in Operation Arctic Night.
17. John C. Scharfen，“寒冷天气训练：绝对必要。”海军陆战队公报，1981 年 2 月，第 66、67、68、69 页；Francis King，“寒冷天气战争：会发生什么？”第 87、90 页；北极盆地，第 237-249、263-277 页。
17. John C. Scharfen, “Cold Weather Training: the Absolute Necessity.” Marine Corps Gazette, February 1981, 66, 67, 68, 69; Francis King, “Cold Weather Warfare: What Would Happen?” 87, 90; The Arctic Basin, 237-249, 263-277.
18.《不列颠百科全书》，第12卷，1962年，第41-42页。
18. Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 12, 1962, 41-42.
19.美国海军水面舰艇寒冷天气手册（华盛顿特区：海军作战部长水面舰艇生存办公室（OP 03C2），1988 年 5 月），2-2、2-3、2-12、3-1、3-8 和 3-9，第 5 章，附录 B、D、F。
19. U.S. Navy Cold Weather Handbook for Surface Ships (Washington, DC: Chief of Naval Operations, Surface Ship Survivability Office (OP 03C2), May 1988), 2-2, 2-3, 2-12, 3-1, 3-8 and 3-9, chap. 5, appendices B, D, F.
20.同上，第 2-8 页，第 3-7 页。
20. Ibid., 2-8, 3-7.
21.同上，第 2 章和第 3 章。
21. Ibid., chapters 2 and 3.
22. Brian Garfield，《千里之战：阿拉斯加和阿留申群岛的第二次世界大战》（纽约州花园城：Doubleday出版社，1969年），第119-120页。
22. Brian Garfield, The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969), 119-120.
23. Thomas B. Curtain、Norbert Untersteiner 和 Thomas Callahan，“北极海洋学”，Oceanus（1990/91 年冬季）：58-66；美国水面舰艇寒冷天气手册，4-4 至 4-10、6-5 和 6-6。
23. Thomas B. Curtain, Norbert Untersteiner, and Thomas Callahan, “Arctic Oceanography”, Oceanus (Winter 1990/91): 58-66; U.S. Cold Weather Handbook for Surface Ships, 4-4 through 4-10, 6-5 and 6-6.
24. Barrie Pitt，《大西洋之战》（弗吉尼亚州亚历山大：时代生活出版社，1977 年），第 157-159 页；John R. Elting，《斯堪的纳维亚之战》（弗吉尼亚州亚历山大：时代生活出版社，1981 年），第 146-148 页。
24. Barrie Pitt, The Battle of the Atlantic (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1977), 157-159, and John R. Elting, Battles for Scandinavia (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1981), 146-148.
25. John R. Hale，《探索时代》（纽约：时代公司，1966 年），第 101-102 页、第 118-126 页；William D. Smith，《西北航道》（纽约：美国传统出版社）；Constantine Krypton，《北方海路与苏联经济》（纽约：Praeger 出版社，1956 年）。
25. John R. Hale, Age of Exploration (New York: Time Inc., 1966), 101-102, 118-126; William D. Smith, Northwest Passage (New York: American Heritage Press); Constantine Krypton, The Northern Sea Route and The Economy of the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger, 1956).
26. William R. Anderson 与 Clay Blair, Jr. 合著，《鹦鹉螺 90 北》（宾夕法尼亚州蓝岭峰：TAB Books，1959 年），第 212-239 页。
26. William R. Anderson with Clay Blair, Jr., Nautilus 90 North (Blue Ridge Summit, PA: TAB Books, 1959), 212-239.
27. Waldo K. Lyon，“冰上潜艇作战”，美国海军学会会刊118，第 2 期（1992 年 2 月）：33-40；美国水面舰艇寒冷天气手册，1-6。
27. Waldo K. Lyon, “Submarine Combat in the Ice,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 118, no. 2 (February 1992): 33-40; U.S. Cold Weather Handbook for Surface Ships, 1-6.
28.同上，38-39；HA Jackson 等人，“底部反射阵列声呐潜艇”，美国海军工程师学会杂志（1989 年 9 月）：59。
28. Ibid., 38-39; H. A. Jackson et al., “Bottom Bounce Array Sonar Submarines,” American Society of Naval Engineers Journal (September 1989): 59.
29. Lorus J. 和 Margery Milne，《山脉》，时代生活自然文库，修订版（纽约：时代公司，1967 年）；FM 90-6：《山地作战》（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1980 年 6 月 30 日，第 1-ii、1-1 至 1-3 页，以及附录 G）。
29. Lorus J. and Margery Milne, The Mountains, Time-Life Nature Library, rev. ed. (New York: Time Inc., 1967); FM 90-6: Mountain Operations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, June 30, 1980, l-ii, 1-1 through 1-3, and appendix G
30. John Heins，“古巴（1953-1959）”，载于《国际冲突中的挑战与应对》，第 3 卷，《非洲和拉丁美洲的经验》，DM Condit、Bert H. Cooper, Jr. 等编（华盛顿特区：美国大学社会研究中心，1968 年 4 月），第 435-461 页。
30. John Heins, “Cuba (1953-1959),” in Challenge and Response in International Conflict, vol. 3, The Experience in Africa and Latin America, eds. D. M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Studies, American University, April 1968), 435-461.
31.斯利姆子爵元帅，《从失败走向胜利》（纽约：大卫·麦凯，1961 年），第 6 页。
31. Field-Marshal Viscount Slim, Defeat into Victory (New York: David McKay, 1961), 6.
32. FM 90-6：山地作战，1-14 和 1-15、3-2、3-3、D-1、D-3；摩根·B·希斯利，“冬季山地作战”，《军事评论》 32，第 6 期（1952 年 6 月）：10、11、12、14、15、16。
32. FM 90-6: Mountain Operations, 1-14 and 1-15, 3-2, 3-3, D-1, D-3; Morgan B. Heasley, “Mountain Operations in Winter,” Military Review 32, no. 6 (June 1952): 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16.
33. FM 90-6：山地作战，1-6 至 1-8。
33. FM 90-6: Mountain Operations, 1-6 through 1-8.
34. Julie Kim 和 Steven Woehrel，《波斯尼亚——前南斯拉夫与美国政策》，简报 91089（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1996 年 7 月 23 日），定期更新。
34. Julie Kim and Steven Woehrel, Bosnia —Former Yugoslavia and U. S. Policy, Issue Brief 91089 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 23, 1996), updated periodically.
35. FM 90-6：山区作业，4-1、5-2、5-3；Heasley，“冬季山区作业”，14、15。
35. FM 90-6: Mountain Operations, 4-1, 5-2, 5-3; Heasley, “Mountain Operations in Winter,” 14, 15.
36. Robert Wallace，《意大利战役》（纽约：时代生活图书公司，1978 年），第 108-109 页、第 184-185 页。有关军事登山装备和技术，请参阅 FM 90-6：《山地作战》，B-4、B-5、B-7 和附录 C。
36. Robert Wallace, The Italian Campaign (New York: Time-Life Books, 1978), 108-109, 184-185. For military mountaineering equipment and techniques, see FM 90-6: Mountain Operations, B-4, B-5, B-7, and appendix C.
37. FM 90-6：《山地作战》，第2章“国际冲突中的挑战与应对”论述了20世纪非正规部队的山地作战：第一卷，《亚洲经验》，1968年2月，缅甸（1942-1945）、印度尼西亚（1946-1948）、查谟和克什米尔（1947-1949）、朝鲜（1948-1954）、西藏（1951-1960）；第二卷，《欧洲和中东经验》，1967年3月，希腊（1942-1949）、意大利（1943-1945）、挪威（1940-1945）、南斯拉夫（1941-1944）； 3、非洲和拉丁美洲的经验，1968 年 4 月，埃塞俄比亚（1937-1941 年）、尼加拉瓜（1927-1933 年）、哥伦比亚（1948-1958 年）；增补，1968 年 9 月，多米尼加共和国（1916-1924 年）、海地（1918-1920 年、1958-1964 年）、老挝（1959-1962 年）。
37. FM 90-6: Mountain Operations, chapter 2. Challenge and Response in International Conflict addresses 20th-century mountain operations by irregular forces: vol. 1, The Experience in Asia, February 1968, Burma (1942-1945), Indonesia (1946-1948), Jammu and Kashmir (1947-1949), Korea (1948-1954), Tibet (1951-1960); vol. 2, The Experience in Europe and the Middle East, March 1967, Greece (1942-1949), Italy (1943-1945), Norway (1940-1945), Yugoslavia (1941-1944); vol. 3, The Experience in Africa and Latin America, April 1968, Ethiopia (1937-1941), Nicaragua (1927-1933), Colombia (1948-158); Supplement, September 1968, Dominican Republic (1916-1924), Haiti (1918-1920, 1958-1964), Laos (1959-1962).
38. FM 90-6：山地作战，4-8 至 5-5。
38. FM 90-6: Mountain Operations, 4-8 through 5-5.
39.同上，第 4-5、4-6 页和附录 D。
39. Ibid., 4-5, 4-6, and appendix D.
40.内维尔·C·A·麦克斯韦，《印度的中国战争》（纽约：万神殿出版社，1970 年）。
40. Neville C. A. Maxwell, India’s China War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970).
41. Wayne O. Evans 和 James E. Hansen，“高海拔地区的部队表现”，《陆军》（1966 年 2 月）：55-58；James R. Pulver，“对抗高原反应”，《陆军文摘》 （1970 年 6 月）：45-46；FM 90-6：《山地作战》，1-9、5-6 至 5-9。
41. Wayne O. Evans and James E. Hansen, “Troop Performance at High Altitudes,” Army (February 1966): 55-58; James R. Pulver, “Fight Against Mountain Sickness,” Army Digest (June 1970): 45-46; FM 90-6: Mountain Operations, 1-9, 5-6 through 5-9.
42. DA 小册子 95-8：山地飞行常识（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1962 年）；威尔·F·汤普森，“山地空中机动作战”，《军事评论》 50，第 7 期（1970 年 7 月）：57-62；FM 90-6：山地作战，1-15。
42. DA Pamphlet 95-8: Mountain Flying Sense (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, 1962); Will F. Thompson, “Airmobile Warfare in the Mountains,” Military Review 50, no. 7 (July 1970): 57-62; FM 90-6: Mountain Warfare, 1-15.
43. William H. Tunner，《飞越驼峰》（华盛顿特区：空军历史学家办公室，1985 年）；Otha Cleo Spencer，《飞越驼峰：空战回忆录》（德克萨斯州大学城：德克萨斯农工大学出版社，1992 年）；以及 Don Moser，《中国-缅甸-印度，“翻越喜马拉雅山”》（弗吉尼亚州亚历山大：时代生活图书公司，1978 年），第 78-91 页。
43. William H. Tunner, Over the Hump (Washington, DC: Office of the Air Force Historian, 1985); Otha Cleo Spencer, Flying the Hump: Memories of an Air War (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1992); and Don Moser, China-Burma-India,“Vaulting the Himalayas” (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1978), 78-91.
44. FM 90-6：山地作战，附录 F。
44. FM 90-6: Mountain Operations, appendix F.
45.例如，参见约翰·沃里所著《古典世界的战争》（纽约：圣马丁出版社，1980年），该书涵盖了公元前1600年至公元800年共2400年的历史。
45. See, for example, John Warry, Warfare in the Classical World (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), which covers 2,400 years from 1,600 B.C. to 800 A.D.
46. Keith E. Bonn，《胜算均势：孚日山脉战役，1944 年 10 月至 1945 年 1 月》（加利福尼亚州圣拉斐尔：普雷西迪奥出版社，1994 年）。
46. Keith E. Bonn, When the Odds Were Even: The Vosges Mountains Campaign, October 1944-January 1945 (St. Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1994).
47.华莱士，《意大利战役》，第 100-117 页、第 130-145 页、第 151-164 页。
47. Wallace, The Italian Campaign, 100-117, 130-145, 151-164.
48.马修·B·里奇韦，《朝鲜战争》（纽约州花园城：双日出版社，185-225页）；以及T·R·费伦巴赫，《这种战争》（纽约：麦克米伦出版社，1963年），478-645页。
48. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 185-225; and T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 478-645.
49.卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨，《战争论》 ，迈克尔·霍华德和彼得·帕雷特编辑和翻译（普林斯顿，新泽西州：普林斯顿大学出版社，1976 年），第 417-432 页，第 537-539 页。引文在第 427 页。
49. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 417-432, 537-539. The quotation is on 427.
50.有关西方文明摇篮的战争概述，请参阅 Yigal Yadin 的《圣经之地的战争艺术》（英国诺里奇：Jarrold and Sons 国际出版社，1963 年）；有关干旱地区战斗的更广泛观点，请参阅 Bryan Perrett 的《沙漠战争：从罗马起源到海湾战争》（纽约：Sterling 出版社，1988 年）。
50. For overviews of wars in the Cradle of Western Civilization, see Yigal Yadin, The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands (Norwich, England: Jarrold and Sons, International Publishing, 1963); a broader view of combat in arid regions is contained in Bryan Perrett, Desert Warfare: From Its Roman Origins to the Gulf Conflict (New York: Sterling Publishing, 1988.
51. A. Starker Leopold，《沙漠》，生命自然图书馆（纽约：时代生活图书，1961 年）；FM 90-3/舰队海军陆战队手册 7-27：沙漠作战（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1977 年 8 月 19 日），第 2-3 至 2-5 页和附录 A。
51. A. Starker Leopold, The Desert, Life Nature Library (New York: Time-Life Books, 1961); FM 90-3/Fleet Marine Force Manual 7-27: Desert Operations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, August 19, 1977), 2-3 through 2-5 and appendix A.
52. Richard Collier，《沙漠战争》（纽约：时代生活图书公司，1977 年），第 171-172 页；Leopold，《沙漠》，第 101-102、105、108-109 页；FM 90-3：《沙漠作战》，第 2-7 页。
52. Richard Collier, The War in the Desert (New York: Time-Life Books, 1977), 171-172; Leopold, The Desert, 101-102, 105, 108-109; FM 90-3: Desert Operations, 2-7.
53.《沙漠中的胜利》，通讯第90-7期，特刊（堪萨斯州莱文沃思堡：美国陆军联合兵种训练活动经验教训中心，1990年8月），第12、21页；肯德尔·L·彼得森，“沙漠中的汽车测试”，《军事评论》50，第11期（1970年11月）：第56-61页；威廉·G·（格斯）·帕戈尼斯，《移山：波斯湾战争中的领导力和后勤经验教训》（马萨诸塞州波士顿：哈佛商学院出版社，1992年），第86、96页；利奥波德，《沙漠》，第13-14页；FM 90-3：《沙漠作战》，第2-21和2-22页。
53. Winning in the Desert, Newsletter No. 90-7, Special Edition (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Training Activity, Center for Lessons Learned, August 1990), 12, 21; Kendall L. Peterson, “Automotive Testing in the Desert,” Military Review 50, no. 11 (November 1970): 56-61; William G. (“Gus”) Pagonis, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Persian Gulf War (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), 86, 96; Leopold, The Desert, 13-14; FM 90-3: Desert Operations, 2-21 and 2-22.
54. Collier，《沙漠之战》，50、52-53；Glenn R. Locke，“尘埃”，《美国陆军航空文摘》（1970 年 8 月）：34-35。
54. Collier, The War in the Desert, 50, 52-53; Glenn R. Locke, “Dust,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest (August 1970): 34-35.
55. FM 90-3：沙漠作战，2-20、2-22 和 2-23；帕戈尼斯，《移山》，86；《步兵》，1981 年 7 月至 8 月，168-169。
55. FM 90-3: Desert Operations, 2-20, 2-22 and 2-23; Pagonis, Moving Mountains, 86; Infantry, July-August 1981, 168-169.
56.帕戈尼斯，《移山》，108。
56. Pagonis, Moving Mountains, 108.
57. FM 90-3：沙漠作战，2-9 和 2-10，4-20；利奥波德，《沙漠》，31，102，146-150。
57. FM 90-3: Desert Operations, 2-9 and 2-10, 4-20; Leopold, The Desert, 31, 102, 146-150.
58.理查德·科利尔，《沙漠之战》，54。
58. Richard Collier, The War in the Desert, 54.
59. FM 90-3：沙漠作战，2-15 至 2-18、5-9、5-10、F-6、附录 G；帕戈尼斯，《移山》，96、205；利奥波德，《沙漠》，32、128。
59. FM 90-3: Desert Operations, 2-15 through 2-18, 5-9, 5-10, F-6, appendix G; Pagonis, Moving Mountains, 96, 205; Leopold, The Desert, 32, 128.
60. Martin Blumenson，《卡塞林山口》（波士顿，马萨诸塞州：霍顿·米夫林出版社，1967 年）；摩尔黑德的类比被科利尔引用，《沙漠之战》，第 21 页。
60. Martin Blumenson, Kasserine Pass (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1967); Moorehead’s analogy is quoted in Collier, The War in the Desert, 21.
61.纵观历史，灵活的机动性在以下著作中均有体现：约翰·巴戈特·格拉布爵士，《伟大的阿拉伯征服》（新泽西州恩格尔伍德崖：普伦蒂斯-霍尔出版社，1963年）；利奥·德·哈托格，《成吉思汗：世界征服者》 （纽约：圣马丁出版社，1989年），第78-148页；T·E·劳伦斯，《智慧七柱》（纽约：戴尔出版社，1962年）；埃德加·奥巴兰斯，《阿富汗战争1839-1992》（纽约：布拉西出版社，1993年）；小罗伯特·H·斯凯尔斯，《必胜：美国陆军在海湾战争中的表现》（华盛顿特区：美国陆军参谋长办公室，1993年）。
61. Fluid maneuvering throughout history is typified in Sir John Bagot Glubb, The Great Arab Conquests (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Leo de Hartog, Genghis Khan: Conqueror of the World (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989),78-148; T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Dell Publishing, 1962); Edgar O’Ballance, Afghan Wars 1839-1992 (New York: Brassey’s, 1993); Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993).
62.科利尔，《沙漠之战》，12-29。
62. Collier, The War in the Desert, 12-29.
63. 《海湾战争空中力量调查》，第 I-5 卷，埃利奥特·A·科恩主编（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1993 年）；弗兰克·N·舒伯特和特蕾莎·克劳斯编，《旋风战争》（华盛顿特区：美国陆军军事历史中心，1995 年）。
63. Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. I-5, Eliot A. Cohen, Director (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993); Frank N. Schubert and Theresa Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1995).
64. 利奥波德，《沙漠》，18-19、32、34；《沙漠中的胜利》，16-17。
64. Leopold, The Desert, 18-19, 32, 34; Winning in the Desert, 16-17.
65. William Matthews，“预报员帮助飞行员找到目标”，《空军时报》，1996 年 7 月 1 日，第 16 页；FM 90-3：沙漠作战，第 2-8、4-4 和 4-5 页； 《沙漠中的胜利》，第 18、23 页；“沙漠：它对士兵的影响”，第 2 部分，《步兵》（1981 年 9 月-10 月）：第 31 页。
65. William Matthews, “Forecaster Helps Pilots Find Targets,” Air Force Times, July 1, 1996, 16; FM 90-3: Desert Operations, 2-8, 4-4 and 4-5; Winning in the Desert, 18, 23; “The Desert: Its Effect on Soldiers,” part 2, Infantry (September-October 1981): 31.
66.同上。
66. Ibid.
67.弗吉尼亚·考尔斯，《幽灵少校》（纽约：哈珀兄弟出版社，1958 年）。
67. Virginia Cowles, The Phantom Major (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958).
68. Byron Farwell，《维多利亚女王的小战争》（纽约：哈珀和罗出版社，1972 年）；Charles Miller，《开伯尔，英属印度的西北边境：帝国偏头痛的故事》（纽约：麦克米伦出版社，1977 年）；David C. Isby，《遥远国度的战争：阿富汗入侵与抵抗》（伦敦：武器与盔甲出版社，1989 年）。
68. Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria’s Little Wars (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Charles Miller, Khyber, British India’s Northwest Frontier: The Story of an Imperial Migraine (New York: Macmillan, 1977); David C. Isby, War in a Distant Country: Afghanistan Invasion and Resistance (London: Arms and Armor, 1989).
69. FM 90-3：沙漠作战，附录 D。
69. FM 90-3: Desert Operations, appendix D.
70.同上。
70. Ibid.
71.帕戈尼斯，《移山》；《沙漠中的胜利》，12-13，16-20；《FM 90-3：沙漠行动》，2-20至2-25，5-1，5-6至5-11。
71. Pagonis, Moving Mountains; Winning in the Desert, 12-13, 16-20; FM 90-3: Desert Operations, 2-20 through 2-25, 5-1, 5-6 through 5-11.
72. Masanobu Tsuji，《新加坡：日文版》（纽约：圣马丁出版社，1960 年），附录 1；美国海军陆战队，《小规模战争手册》（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1940 年）；FM 31-20：《丛林战基本野战手册》（华盛顿：美国陆军部，1941 年 12 月）。
72. Masanobu Tsuji, Singapore: The Japanese Version (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1960), appendix 1; U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940); FM 31-20: Basic Field Manual, Jungle Warfare (Washington: U.S. War Department, December 1941).
73. Eric Bergerud，《火之触碰：南太平洋的陆地战争》（纽约：维京出版社，1996 年），第 62-68 页；Joseph W. Stilwell，《史迪威文集》（纽约：肖肯出版社，1972 年），第 293 页。
73. Eric Bergerud, Touched With Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific (New York: Viking, 1996), 62-68; Joseph W. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers (New York: Schocken Books, 1972), 293.
74. FM 90-5：丛林作战（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1982 年 8 月 16 日），第 1-3 至 1-6 页。
74. FM 90-5: Jungle Operations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, August 16, 1982), 1-3 through 1-6.
75. John. L. Zimmerman，《瓜达尔卡纳尔战役》（华盛顿特区：美国缅因军团总部历史部，1949 年），第 15-17 页；Bergerud，《浴火重生》，第 69-83 页。
75. John. L. Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Hqtrs., U.S. Maine Corps, 1949), 15-17; Bergerud, Touched With Fire, 69-83.
76. FM 90-5：丛林作战，5-2 至 5-4、5-10、5-15：在丛林中取胜（堪萨斯州莱文沃思堡：美国陆军联合兵种中心，陆军经验教训中心，1995 年 5 月），I-1、I-5、I-8、II-2、III-2 至 III-4、III-8。
76. FM 90-5: Jungle Operations, 5-2 through 5-4, 5-10, 5-15: Winning in the Jungle (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Center for Army Lessons Learned, May 1995), I-1, I-5, I-8, II-2, III-2 through III-4, III-8.
77. Rafael Steinberg，《岛屿作战》（纽约：时代生活出版社，1978 年），第 20、38-45 页（第 38 页引用了 Halsey 海军上将的著作）；FM 90-5：《丛林战》，第 5-6、5-14 页，附录 B（导航和跟踪）；《丛林中的胜利》，第 I-2 页；Zimmerman，《瓜达尔卡纳尔岛战役》，第 16 页。
77. Rafael Steinberg, Island Fighting (New York: Time-Life Books, 1978), 20, 38-45 (Admiral Halsey is cited on 38); FM 90-5: Jungle Warfare, 5-6, 5-14, appendix B (Navigation and Tracking); Winning in the Jungle, I-2; Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, 16.
78.斯坦伯格，《岛屿作战》，46-71、82、134-136；贝格鲁德，《火之触碰》，80-84；《丛林作战》，I-2至I-5、I-9；FM 90-5：《丛林作战》，附录G。
78. Steinberg, Island Fighting, 46-71, 82, 134-136; Bergerud, Touched With Fire, 80-84; Winning in the Jungle, I-2 through i-5, I-9; FM 90-5: Jungle Operations, appendix G.
79 .伊恩·亨德森 (Ian Henderson)与菲利普·古德哈特 (Philip Goodhart) 合作的《肯尼亚追捕》描绘了丛林地形中的反叛乱问题（纽约花园城：双日出版社，1958 年）。另请参阅《国际冲突中的挑战与回应》，卷。 1、菲律宾（1899-1902、1942-1945、1946-1954）、缅甸（1942-1945）、马来亚（1942-1945、1948-1960）、印度支那和南越（1946-1954、1956-1963）、印度尼西亚（1946-1949、1958-1961）；卷。 3、尼加拉瓜（1927-1933）、马达加斯加（1947-1948）、葡属几内亚（1959-1965）；补充资料：多米尼加共和国（1916-1924 年）、海地（1918-1920 年、1958-1964 年）、老挝（1959-1962 年）。
79. Ian Henderson, Man Hunt in Kenya, with Philip Goodhart, portrays counterinsurgency problems in jungle-like terrain (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1958). See also Challenge and Response in International Conflict, vol. 1, Philippines (1899-1902, 1942-1945, 1946-1954), Burma (1942-1945), Malaya (1942-1945, 1948-1960), Indochina and South Vietnam (1946-1954, 1956-1963), Indonesia (1946-1949, 1958-1961); vol. 3, Nicaragua (1927-1933), Madagascar (1947-1948), Portuguese Guinea (1959-1965); Supplement, Dominican Republic (1916-1924), Haiti (1918-1920, 1958-1964), Laos (1959-1962).
80. FM 90-5：丛林作战，6-5 至 6-17 和附录 I，通过声音调整火力；在丛林中取胜，1-14 至 1-17。
80. FM 90-5: Jungle Operations, 6-5 through 6-17 and appendix I, Adjustment of Fire by Sound; Winning in the Jungle, 1-14 through 1-17.
81.陆军元帅斯利姆子爵， 《从失败走向胜利》，119-200，275。
81. Field-Marshal Viscount Slim, Defeat Into Victory, 119-200, 275.
82.伯纳德·福尔，《小地方的地狱》（宾夕法尼亚州费城：利平科特出版社，1958 年）。
82. Bernard Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1958).
83. FM 90-5：丛林作战，第 7 章，战斗勤务支援；唐·莫泽，《中国-缅甸-印度》（纽约：时代生活图书，1978 年），196-203 页；斯坦伯格，《岛屿作战》，64-67 页。
83. FM 90-5: Jungle Operations, chapter 7, Combat Service Support; Don Moser, China-Burma-India (New York: Time-Life Books, 1978), 196-203; Steinberg, Island Fighting, 64-67.
84. FM 90-5：丛林作战，2-2 至 2-8；Bergerud，《火之触碰》，90-101，452-467。
84. FM 90-5: Jungle Operations, 2-2 through 2-8; Bergerud, Touched With Fire, 90-101, 452-467.
85. Bergerud，《触火》， 72、84、85、86、418、420、467-468。
85. Bergerud, Touched With Fire, 72, 84, 85,86, 418, 420, 467-468.
86. W. Gilmore Simms，《弗朗西斯·马里恩传》（纽约：HG Langley，1844 年）。
86. W. Gilmore Simms, The Life of Francis Marion (New York: H. G. Langley, 1844).
87.前德国将领和参谋军官为华盛顿特区的陆军部准备了四本小册子：DA 小册子 20-201，《俄国战役期间的军事即兴行动》，1951 年 8 月，第 53-55 页；DA 小册子 20-231，《俄国森林和沼泽中的战斗》，1951 年 7 月，第 1-3、5、7-8、13、32-33 页；DA 小册子 20-290，《俄国战役中的地形因素》，1951 年 7 月，第 30、38 页；DA 小册子 20-291，《气候对欧洲俄国战斗的影响》，1952 年 2 月，第 29、49、50 页。
87. Former German generals and staff officers prepared four pamphlets for publication by Dept. of the Army in Washington, DC: DA Pamphlet 20-201, Military Improvisations During the Russian Campaign, August 1951, 53-55; DA Pamphlet 20-231, Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps, July 1951, 1-3, 5, 7-8, 13, 32-33; DA Pamplet 20-290, Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign, July 1951, 30, 38; DA Pamphlet 20-291, Effects of Climate on Combat in European Russia, February 1952, 29, 49, 50.
88.俄罗斯森林和沼泽中的战斗（全部）；俄罗斯战役中的地形因素，28-45；气候对欧洲俄罗斯战斗的影响，29-35，49-55。
88. Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps (all); Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign, 28-45; Effects of Climate on Combat in European Russia, 29-35, 49-55.
89. David 和 Jeanne Heidler，《老胡桃木之战：安德鲁·杰克逊与帝国的追求》（宾夕法尼亚州梅卡尼克斯堡：斯塔克波尔出版社，1996 年）；John K. Mahon，《第二次塞米诺尔战争史，1835-1842》（佛罗里达州盖恩斯维尔：佛罗里达大学出版社，1967 年）；《佛罗里达士兵在印第安战争、内战和美西战争中的经历》（佛罗里达州塔拉哈西：州立机构委员会，未注明日期）。
89. David and Jeanne Heidler, Old Hickory’s War: Andrew Jackson and the Quest for Empire (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996); John K. Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842 (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1967); Soldiers of Florida in the Indian, Civil, and Spanish American Wars (Tallahassee, FL: Board of State Institutions, undated).
90. Kenneth Katzman，《伊拉克：沼泽阿拉伯人和美国政策》，报告编号 94-320F（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1994 年 4 月 13 日）；“曾经的湿地，如今的沙漠”，《波士顿环球报》，1994 年 9 月 8 日，第 20 页。
90. Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Marsh Arabs and U.S. Policy, Report No. 94-320F (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 13, 1994); “Once a Wetland, Now a Desert,” Boston Globe, September 8, 1994, 20.
91. William B. Fulton，《河川作战，1966-1969》（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1985 年，第 17-19 页）。
91. William B. Fulton, Riverine Operations, 1966-1969 (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, 1985, 17-19.
92.同上，第47-49页、57-58页、68-71页；《越南共和国湄公河三角洲地区建设工程概念》，美国陆军工程兵司令部，越南（暂定），日期不详（1967 年）。美国陆军越南工程兵团工程部特别项目处的 James H. Nash 于 1968 年口头提供了东潭的成本数据。
92. Ibid., 47-49, 57-58, 68-71; Engineering Concepts for Construction in the Mekong Delta Region of the Republic of Vietnam, U.S. Army Engineer Command, Vietnam (Provisional), undated (1967). James H. Nash, Special Projects, Engineering Division, U.S. Army Vietnam Engineer Section, orally furnished Dong Tam cost figures in 1968.
93. Richard M. Meyer，“河战中的陆海联合队”，《军事评论》 46，第9期（1966年9月）：54-61。
93. Richard M. Meyer, “The Ground-Sea Team in River Warfare,” Military Review 46, no. 9 (September 1966): 54-61.
94. Fulton，《河川作战》，第21、26-67、89-102页；FM 90-5：《丛林作战》，附录D；John B. Spore，“海上突击部队：湄公河三角洲的祸害”， 《陆军》（1958年2月）：28-32；“湄公河上的路径”和“空中漂浮的怪物”，《陆军》（1968年6月）：72-73、80-81；John W. Baker和Lee C. Dickson，“陆军部队在河川作战中的作用”，《军事评论》47，第8期（1967年8月）：64-74。
94. Fulton, Riverine Operations, 21, 26-67, 89-102; FM 90-5: Jungle Operations, appendix D; John B. Spore, “Floating Assault Force: Scourge of the Mekong Delta,” Army (February 1958): 28-32; “Paths Across the Mekong” and “Monsters That Float on Air,” Army (June 1968): 72-73, 80-81; John W. Baker and Lee C. Dickson, “Army Forces in Riverine Operations,” Military Review 47, no. 8 (August 1967): 64-74.
95. Jay Luvaas，“布纳，1942 年 11 月 19 日至 1943 年 1 月 2 日”，载于Charles E. Heller 和 William A Stofft 编辑的《美国的第一次战役》（堪萨斯州劳伦斯：堪萨斯大学出版社，1986 年），第 201、209-210 页；Bergerud，《浴火重生》，第 73-74 页。
95. Jay Luvaas, “Buna, 19 November 1942-2 January 1943,” in America’s First Battles, eds. Charles E. Heller and William A Stofft (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1986), 201, 209-210; Bergerud, Touched With Fire, 73-74.
96. SLA Marshall，《伏击》（纽约：Cowles，1969 年），186-199 页；《荣萨特区区域分析》，美国陆军越南，未注明日期（1967 年），21 张 21 × 26 英寸的文字、地图和照片；荣萨特老兵小埃德温·W·张伯伦的回忆录，1969 年 7 月 10 日。
96. S. L. A. Marshall, Ambush (New York: Cowles, 1969), 186-199; Area Wide Analysis of the Rung Sat Special Zone, U.S. Army Vietnam, undated (1967), twenty-one 21 × 26-inch sheets of text, maps, and photographs; recollections of Edwin W. Chamberlain, Jr., a Rung Sat veteran, July 10, 1969.
97.《来自海洋：为21世纪做好海军准备》（华盛顿特区：海军部，1992年9月），第6页。
97. ... From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, September 1992), 6.
98. Charles H. Sinex 和 Robert S. Winokur，“影响近岸战场军事行动的环境因素”，约翰·霍普金斯大学应用物理实验室技术文摘14，第 2 期（1993 年）：112-124；Charles W. Koburger, Jr.，《狭窄的海域、小型海军和肥胖的商船》（纽约：Praeger，1990 年），137-145。
98. Charles H. Sinex and Robert S. Winokur, “Environmental Factors Affecting Military Operations in the Littoral Battlespace,” Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest 14, no. 2 (1993): 112-124; Charles W. Koburger, Jr. Narrow Seas, Small Navies, and Fat Merchantmen (New York: Praeger, 1990), 137-145.
99.有关一些成本效益数据，请参阅乔治·R·沃辛顿的文章“作战艇在近岸战争中发挥作用”，美国海军学会会刊120，第 8 期（1994 年 8 月）：24-25。
99. For some cost-benefit figures, see George R. Worthington, “Combat Craft Have a Role in Littoral Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 120, no. 8 (August 1994): 24-25.
100. John W. McGillvray, Jr.，“水面战舰的隐形技术”，《海军战争学院评论》 47，第1期（1994年冬季）：29-30；Yedidia “Didi” Ya'ari，“近岸战场：一个警告”，《海军战争学院评论》 48，第2期（1995年春季）：9、10、12、17；Ronald O'Rourke，《海军DD-51驱逐舰采购率：国会面临的问题和选择》，报告编号94-343F（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1994年4月25日），25-26。
100. John W. McGillvray, Jr. “Stealth Technology in Surface Warships,” Naval War College Review 47, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 29-30; Yedidia “Didi” Ya’ari, “The Littoral Arena: A Word of Caution,” Naval War College Review 48, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 9, 10, 12, 17; Ronald O’Rourke, Navy DD-51 Destroyer Procurement Rate: Issues and Options for Congress, Report No. 94-343F (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 25, 1994), 25-26.
101. McGillvray，“水面战舰的隐形技术”，33-39；Ya'ari，“近岸地区”，14。
101. McGillvray, “Stealth Technology in Surface Warships,” 33-39; Ya’ari, “The Littoral Region,” 14.
102. Norman Friedman，“近岸反潜战：并不像听起来那么容易”，《国际防务评论》（1995 年 6 月）：53-57；Worthington，“作战艇在近岸战争中发挥作用”。
102. Norman Friedman, “Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare: Not As Easy As It Sounds,” International Defense Review (June 1995): 53-57; Worthington, “Combatant Craft Have a Role in Littoral Warfare.”
103. Koburger, Jr.，《狭窄的海域、小型海军和肥胖的商船》，第 43-44、46-48、69、89-90、107、112-113 页；Maurice Griffiths，《隐藏的威胁》（康涅狄格州格林威治：康威海事出版社，1981 年），第 127 页。
103. Koburger, Jr., Narrow Seas, Small Navies, and Fat Merchantmen, 43-44, 46-48, 69, 89-90, 107, 112-113; Maurice Griffiths, The Hidden Menace (Greenwich, CT: Conway Maritime Press, 1981), 127.
104. Arthur P. Brill, Jr.，“最后的二十英尺”，《海权》（1995 年 11 月）：43-46；Sinox 和 Winokur，“影响近岸战场军事行动的环境因素”，114、115-117、121。
104. Arthur P. Brill, Jr., “The Last Twenty Feet,” Sea Power (November 1995): 43-46; Sinox and Winokur, “Environmental Factors Affecting Military Operations in the Littoral Battlespace,” 114, 115-117, 121.
7. 内太空和外太空
7. INNER AND OUTER SPACE
伊卡洛斯是个勇敢的男孩，
他引以为傲的羽翼是一对羽毛翅膀。
他飞得很高，玩得很开心
，直到他靠近炽热的太阳，
太阳融化了他脆弱的玩具。
Icarus was a brave boy,
feathered wings his pride and joy.
He flew high and had fun
’til he neared the hot sun,
which melted his fragile toy.
匿名人士
《第一次太空飞行》：
一首警示性的打油诗
Anonymous
The First Space Flight
A Cautionary Limerick
与神话中飞得太靠近太阳而坠落的伊卡洛斯不同，军事太空部队目前将其活动限制在内太空，在那里，他们在与陆地、海洋或空中截然不同的环境中执行至关重要的侦察、监视、目标获取、跟踪、通信、导航、气象、导弹预警和核查任务。1.战斗行动最终可能会发生2但出于政治、经济、军事和技术方面的原因，星际战争似乎还遥遥无期。例如，往返火星需要2到3年时间。因此，接下来的讨论将集中在地月系统中的四个不同区域：航空航天界面、环地空间或内空间、月球及其周围环境，以及一个模糊的外层包层，其外层包层之外便是外太空（图23）。
MILITARY SPACE FORCES, UNLIKE MYTHOLOGICAL ICARUS WHO FLEW TOO CLOSE TO THE SUN, CURRENTLY confine their activities to inner space, where they perform crucially important reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, tracking, communications, navigational, meteorological, missile warning, and verification missions in a medium quite different than land, sea, or air.1 Combat operations eventually may occur2 but interplanetary warfare seems far in the future for political, economic, military, and technical reasons. Round trips to Mars, for example, would take 2 or 3 years. The following discussions therefore concentrate on four distinctive regions within the Earth-Moon System: Aerospace Interfaces, Circumterrestrial or Inner Space, the Moon and Its Environs, and an amorphous Outer Envelope, beyond which outer space begins (map 23).
太空与陆地和海洋的比较
SPACE COMPARED WITH LAND AND SEA
地球-月球系统中的空气、水、天气、气候和植被都是地球独有的。3.地形地貌和自然资源仅限于地球、月球和小行星。宇宙辐射、太阳风、微陨石以及可忽略不计或几乎为零的引力是太空的独特属性。除地球及其周边地区外，太空几乎处于真空状态。
Air, water, weather, climate, and vegetation within the Earth-Moon System are exclusively indigenous to this planet.3 Land forms and natural resources are restricted to the Earth, Moon, and asteroids. Cosmic radiation, solar winds, micrometeorites, and negligible or neutralized gravity are unique properties of space. Near vacuum is present everywhere except on Earth and vicinity.
太空和海洋表面上很相似，但实际上差异巨大：
Space and the seas are superficially similar, but differences are dramatic:
• 大陆环绕着五大洋，这些海洋是液态的，几乎是不透明的，而太空没有形状，也没有多少物质。
• Continents bound all five oceans, which are liquid and almost opaque, whereas space has no shape and little substance.
• 地球曲率限制了海面能见度，使其只能在视线范围内，而太空中的能见度和机动空间几乎是无限的。
• Earth’s curvature limits sea surface visibility to line-of-sight, whereas visibility as well as maneuver room are virtually limitless in space.
注：区域 I、II 和 IV 呈球形。区域 III 像一块四分之一的馅饼，深度相对较小。L1 至 L5 为月球天平动点。
NOTE: Regions I, II, and IV are globe-shaped. Region III is like a quarter slice of pie, with little depth in comparison. L1 through L5 are lunar libration points.
• 声学是反潜战的主要手段，但在太空中却不起作用，因为声音无法在真空中存在。
• Acoustics, an antisubmarine warfare staple, play no part in space, because sound cannot survive in a vacuum.
• 太空欢迎电磁辐射，而水几乎完全不透无线电波和雷达波。
• Space welcomes electromagnetic radiation, whereas water is practically impervious to radio and radar waves.
• 地球上普遍存在的昼夜循环和冲击波在太空中并不存在。
• Day-night cycles and shock waves, which are prevalent everywhere on Earth, are nonexistent in space.
• 大气现象和盐水会干扰地球上的光线和聚焦能量射线，但它们在太空中都不会发生折射。
• Atmospheric phenomena and salt water interfere with light and focused energy rays on Earth, but neither refract in space.
此外，太空没有东南西北之分来指代位置和方向。一个半径无限大、不旋转的天球，其中心位于地核，是参考系。赤纬（相当于天文纬度）是指天球赤道南北方向的角度距离；赤经（相当于天文经度）；白羊座（地球上的观测者在春季太阳越过地球赤道时看到的太阳就位于白羊座的背景下）定义了本初子午线。太空中的角度位置都是相对于格林尼治天文台的天球参考系来测量的。
Space moreover has no north, east, south, or west to designate locations and directions. A nonrotating celestial sphere of infinite radius, with its center at Earth’s core, is the reference frame. Declination, the astronomical analog of latitude, is the angular distance north or south of the celestial equator, right ascension is the counterpart of longitude, and the constellation Aries, against which spectators on Earth see the sun when it crosses Earth’s Equator in springtime, defines the prime meridian. Angular positions in space are measured from that celestial counterpart of Greenwich Observatory.
太空中的距离主要以时间来衡量。从美国太平洋沿岸驶往波斯湾的商船通常需要大约一个月的时间才能航行12,000海里（22,240公里）。而阿波罗11号飞抵月球，航程是这个距离的20倍，却只用了三天多一点的时间。尽管距离遥远，实时通信仍然成为可能，传输速度高达每秒186,000英里（地球和太空中的光速）。地球和月球之间的通信延迟约为1秒。
Distances in space are meaningful mainly in terms of time. Merchant ships en route from the U.S. Pacific coast to the Persian Gulf typically take about a month to sail 12,000 nautical miles (22,240 kilometers). Apollo 11 flew to the Moon, 20 times as far, in slightly more than 3 days. Real time communications, transmitted at 186,000 miles per second (the speed of light on Earth and in space) are possible despite great distances—the delay between Earth and Moon amounts to about 1 second.
区域一：航空航天接口
REGION I: AEROSPACE INTERFACES
第一区域的四个地理因素影响着太空往返：大气和重力，以及地球的自转和倾角。其中一些影响对军事行动不利，而另一些则有利。
Four geographic factors in Region I influence transits to and from space: atmosphere and gravity, together with Earth’s rotation and inclination. Some effects are militarily adverse, whereas others are advantageous.
气氛
ATMOSPHERE
地球大气层的一半位于海平面以上不到 3 英里（4.6 公里）处，即对流层的底部（图 22）。4.大多数人在达到该高度之前就需要补充氧气才能维持高效运转。大约在9英里（14.5公里）的高度，加压服或舱室就成了必需品，因为宇航员无法自行排出肺部的二氧化碳和水蒸气，否则就会窒息。如果没有这种保护，在12英里（30.5公里）以上的高度，他们的血液会沸腾。军用飞机和航天器在接近约15英里（44.5公里）的高度后，依赖于密封环境中产生的纯净空气，因为在该高度热传递过强且存在有毒臭氧。涡轮喷气发动机在20英里（32.2公里）以上就无法正常工作；冲压式发动机在高度表显示28英里（45公里）时就会停止运转；超过这个高度则需要使用火箭发动机。
Half of Earth’s atmosphere is located less than 3 miles above sea level (4.6 kilometers), in the bottom of the troposphere (figure 22).4 Most humans need supplemental oxygen to sustain efficient performance well before they reach that elevation. Pressurized suits or cabins become obligatory at about 9 miles, because crew members, unable to expel carbon dioxide and water vapor from their lungs unassisted, otherwise would suffocate. Their blood literally would boil above 12 miles in the absence of such protection. Military aircraft and space vehicles depend on pure air produced in a sealed environment after they approach altitudes that approximate 15 miles, where heat transfer is excessive and poisonous ozone is present. Turbojet engines refuse to function much above 20 miles; ramjets sputter and stop when altimeters register 28 miles (45 kilometers); rockets are required beyond that point.
强风、极端湍流、闪电和冰冻等恶劣天气常常导致发射和着陆延误，即使是对于时间紧迫的军用遥控飞机和无人航天器也不例外。美国航天飞机重心偏高，经常为美国国防部运送敏感货物，如果侧风超过目前允许的每小时15英里（24公里），它可能会倾覆。雷电也会带来类似的危险，例如1987年3月击落一枚美国阿特拉斯-半人马座火箭的雷电，该火箭当时搭载着一颗价值数百万美元的通信卫星。
High winds, extreme turbulence, lightning, and ice often cause launch and landing delays, even for remotely-piloted aircraft and unmanned space vehicles on tight military schedules. The top-heavy U.S. piggyback space shuttle, which often transports sensitive cargo for the U.S. Department of Defense, might capsize if it tried to take off when crosswinds exceed the currently permissible 15 miles per hour (24 kph). Thunderbolts, such as the one that destroyed a U.S. Atlas-Centaur rocket laden with a multimillion dollar communications satellite in March 1987, pose similar hazards.
Figure 22. Aerospace Interfaces
航天器发射后必须克服强大的空气阻力，但随着它们上升穿过对流层，阻力会逐渐减弱，因为稀薄的空气压力较小，而且燃料消耗量的减少也减轻了它们需要提升的载荷。在平均高度约为 95 公里（60 英里）的中间层和热层交汇处，航天器便能摆脱空气阻力，实现实际飞行。当各种航天器以高速重返地球大气层时，摩擦生热会消耗它们的能量，除非有防护罩保护外壳，并且隔热层能使宇航员（如果有）和其他舱内物品保持在适宜的低温范围内。例如，从月球返回的阿波罗指令舱必须克服 1900 摄氏度（5000 华氏度）的高温，是高炉温度的四倍。
Spacecraft must overcome strong aerodynamic drag immediately after launch, but resistance becomes progressively weaker as they rise through the troposphere, because thinner air bears down with less pressure and the amount of fuel expended lightens the load they must lift. They break free for practical purposes where the mesosphere and thermosphere merge at an altitude that averages about 60 miles (95 kilometers). Frictional heat consumes space vehicles of all kinds when they reenter Earth’s atmosphere at high velocities unless a shield protects exteriors and insulation keeps crews (if any) and other contents acceptably cool. Apollo command modules returning from the Moon, for example, had to offset 5,000 °F (1,900 °C), four times that of blast furnaces.
然而，摩擦力也会产生一些积极影响。在大气层与太空无缝交汇的界面处，空气动力阻力可以起到制动作用，或者在不消耗燃料的情况下改变轨道构型，前提是计算机能够正确计算再入角度。当轨道角度过浅时，航天器会不规则地跳跃或反弹；当轨道角度过陡时，则会导致燃烧殆尽。但一般来说，动力航天器的再入窗口比滑翔航天器更宽。
Friction nevertheless exerts some positive effects. Aerodynamic drag at the interface where atmosphere and space imperceptibly merge can act as a brake or alter orbit configurations without burning fuel, provided computers calculate reentry angles correctly. Spacecraft skip or bounce back erratically when trajectories are too shallow and incineration results when they are too steep, but reentry windows as a rule open wider for powered vehicles than for those that glide.
重力
GRAVITY
推进系统必须足够强大，才能将军用航天器送入轨道，克服大气阻力和重力（g），重力使地球上的物体没有锚定物，并将没有支撑的物体从大气层或太空拉向地表。5.宇航员和有效载荷在垂直发射过程中都会承受巨大的压力，因为当发动机消耗推进剂（约占初始重量的90%）并以废气形式排出质量时，净力、加速度和速度都会迅速增加。重力随高度增加而减小，但在100英里（160公里）的高度仍然达到1个g，远远超过第一区域的上限。
Propulsion systems must be powerful enough to boost military spacecraft into orbit, despite atmospheric drag and gravity (g), which keeps objects on Earth without an anchor and pulls unsupported bodies from atmosphere or space toward the surface.5 Astronauts and payloads both experience enormous stress during vertical liftoffs, because net force, acceleration, and velocity all increase rapidly when engines consume propellants (about 90 percent of the original weight) and expel mass in the form of exhaust. Gravitational attraction decreases with altitude, but is still 1 full g at 100 miles (160 kilometers), well beyond the upper boundary of Region I.
在轨航天器保持恒定的速度，几乎不受大气阻力或重力的影响。沿圆形轨道运行的航天器，由于地球曲面似乎每秒钟向后移动的距离相同，因此能够保持在正确的轨道位置，仅需进行微调以防止漂移（图 23）。减速可以使航天器进入更低的轨道或返回地球，而额外的能量则可以推动它们飞得更远。所有未固定的航天器及其内部物品都会处于“失重”状态，除非缓慢旋转产生人造重力，因为它们会以恒定的速度自由落体。
Spacecraft in orbit maintain constant speeds that are little affected by atmospheric drag or gravity. Those that follow circular paths fall the same distance every second that Earth’s curved surface seems to recede and thus stay in proper position, aided only by minor adjustments to prevent drifting (figure 23). Braking enables them to attain lower orbits or return to Earth, whereas additional energy propels them farther out. All spacecraft and contents not battened down become “weightless” unless slow rotations create artificial gravity, because they free fall constantly at the same rate.
旋转和倾斜
ROTATION AND INCLINATION
整个地月系统，其质心位于地球表面以下 1,000 英里处，每 365.25 天绕太阳做一次椭圆轨道运动，平均线速度为每小时 666,000 英里（超过 100 万公里/小时）。6.地球相对于其轨道倾斜23度27分，自转（旋转）方向为自西向东，在赤道处自转速度为每小时1040英里（1675公里/小时），在北纬60度附近速度约为赤道的一半，仅在南北两极静止不动。地球自转一周等于一天。向正东方向发射的军用航天器可以利用地球自转获得加速，从而更容易达到轨道速度。对于靠近赤道的航天器而言，这种优势最为显著，越靠近两极优势越小，在两极则完全没有优势。自转既不会帮助也不会阻碍向北或向南发射的航天器。
The entire Earth-Moon System, with its center of mass 1,000 miles beneath Earth’s surface, completes one elliptical orbit around the sun every 365.25 days at a mean linear velocity of 666,000 miles per hour (1+ million kph).6 The Earth, tipped on its axis 23 degrees 27 minutes with respect to that orbit, rotates (spins) west to east 1,040 miles per hour at the Equator (1,675 kph), half as fast at the 60th parallels, and remains stationary only at the North and South Poles. One complete turn equals one day. Military spacecraft launched due east get a flying start from Earth’s rotation, which makes it easier to attain orbital velocities. Benefits are greatest for vehicles near the Equator and progressively less toward each pole, where advantages are nil. Rotation neither assists nor resists launches that point north or south.
Figure 23. Gravity Versus Space Vehicle Velocity
地球曲率平均在不到5英里的距离内下沉16英尺。绕地球运行的航天器，在重力为1g的区域内，第一秒内就会下沉相同的距离。因此，除非受到摄动影响，否则5英里/秒（18,000英里/小时）的速度可以产生永久轨道。图中显示的100英里高度只是一个示例。只要重力约为1g，实际高度可以更高或更低。
The Earth’s curvature, on the average, dips 16 feet in a little less than 5 miles. Spacecraft circling the globe fall that same distance in the first second, wherever gravitational pull is 1g. A velocity of 5 miles per second (18,000 mph) therefore produces perpetual orbit, unless perturbations prohibit. The 100-mile altitude displayed is exemplary. It could be higher or lower, as long as gravity is about 1g.
轨道高度决定了航天器绕地球一周所需的时间。对于高度为 125 英里（200 公里）的圆形轨道，周期为 90 分钟；轨道高度越低，周期越短；轨道高度越高，由于路径较长且克服引力所需的速度越低，周期越长。椭圆轨道的周期取自距地球最近点和最远点的平均值。航天器在平均高度为 22,300 英里（35,885 公里）的地球同步轨道上运行，其绕地球飞行 24 小时的时间与地球自转一周的时间完全一致。地球同步轨道可以是圆形的，也可以是椭圆形的。赤道轨道被称为地球静止轨道，因为它们似乎始终悬停在地球表面的某一点上空，而其他地球轨道则以赤道中心线为起点，呈“8”字形运行。太阳同步轨道每天都会在同一地方时经过预定的地点，不受冬夏春秋的影响。这种轨道对于许多军事用途都非常有用，尤其是在情报收集和通信方面。
Orbital altitudes determine the time it takes to complete one circuit around Earth. The period is 90 minutes for circular orbits at 125 miles (200 kilometers), less at lower altitudes, and longer higher up where paths are lengthy and less velocity is needed to counteract gravity. The period of elliptical orbits averages the nearest and farthest distances from Earth. Spacecraft achieve geosynchronous orbits at a mean altitude of 22,300 miles (35,885 kilometers), where their 24-hour flight around the world corresponds precisely with the time it takes Earth to rotate once on its axis. Geosynchronous orbits that are circular and equatorial are called geostationary, because they seemingly hover over a single spot, while other Earth orbits make figure eights from center lines over the Equator. Sun synchronous orbits pass over prescribed spots at the same local time every day, come winter, summer, spring, or fall. Such options are useful for many military purposes, especially intelligence collection and communications.
第二区域：环地球空间
REGION II: CIRCUMTERRESTRIAL SPACE
本文所定义的地球周围空间或内部空间7号大气层是一个环境恶劣的区域，从地球上方约60英里（约97公里）处开始，空气动力阻力和摩擦生热的影响在这里几乎消失殆尽。重达数吨的小行星和流星体以每小时3万至16万英里（约4.8万至25万公里）的速度在太空中穿梭。虽然与航天器发生灾难性碰撞的可能性似乎很小，但人造“垃圾”却可能造成麻烦。高速粒子长时间撞击太空舱和宇航服，不仅会损坏光学透镜，还会损坏温度控制表面。后者尤为重要，因为热层中物体的表面温度有时会超过2500华氏度（1400摄氏度）。在环绕地球的太空中，任何向阳面都会被“烤熟”，而背阴面则会被“冻住”，除非有反射器和隔热罩保护。此外，航天器还必须设计出能够排出舱内产生的过量热量的系统。
Circumterrestrial or inner space, as defined herein,7 is a harsh region that begins about 60 miles above Earth, where aerodynamic drag and frictional heat lose most of their significance. Asteroids and meteoroids that weigh many tons hurtle through the void at 30,000 to 160,000 miles per hour. Catastrophic collisions with spacecraft seem improbable, although manmade “trash” is potentially troublesome and high-speed particles that pepper capsules and space suits over long periods not only pit optical lenses but chip temperature control surfaces. The latter are particularly important, because surface temperatures of objects in the thermosphere sometimes exceed 2,500 °F (1,400 °C). Sunlit sides anywhere in circumterrestrial space figuratively fry, while shady sides freeze, unless reflectors and insulating shields protect them. Moreover, systems must be designed to expel excessive heat generated on board.
太空，也就是“蔚蓝的远方”，一片漆黑，因为光线无法在极稀薄的空气或绝对真空中散射。那里也一片寂静，无论飞行器速度多快，都不会产生冲击波或音爆。地球引力，加上太阳风、电磁力以及地球同步轨道以上区域的日月引力等其他扰动，会随着时间的推移而显著地扭曲航天器的轨道，除非进行修正。“冷焊”是指金属意外接触时发生的现象，因为裸露的表面之间没有空气膜隔开，而一面寒冷、另一面炎热的结构会承受巨大的应力。
Space, which lies beyond “the wild blue yonder,” is absolutely black because light cannot scatter in very thin air or hard vacuums. Total silence also prevails, and there are no shock waves or sonic booms, regardless of vehicle velocities. Earth’s gravity, in combination with other perturbations such as solar winds, electromagnetic forces, and lunisolar gravitation above geosynchronous levels, radically warps spacecraft orbits over time unless corrected. “Cold welding” can occur if metals touch accidentally, because no film of air separates exposed surfaces, while structures that are frigid on one side and torrid on the other undergo great stress.
X射线、紫外线和红外线充斥着电离层和磁层。两条范艾伦辐射带环绕地球，南北纬45度之间由低密度缝隙隔开，并伴有磁场。内辐射带起始于地球上方250至750英里之间，并在约6200英里处逐渐消失。外辐射带则在37000至52000英里处消失，具体距离取决于太阳活动。采取充分的屏蔽措施，并辅以谨慎的飞行计划以减少在最危险区域停留的时间，是避免辐射过量和可能干扰重要军事任务的电子干扰的最佳方法。
X-rays, ultraviolet light, and infrared flood the ionosphere and magnetosphere. Two Van Allen radiation belts, separated by a low-density slot, girdle the globe with magnetic fields between latitudes 45 degrees north and south. The inner belt begins between 250 and 750 miles above Earth and tapers off at about 6,200 miles. The outer belt expires at 37,000 to 52,000 miles, depending on solar activity. Adequate shielding, coupled with prudent flight planning that reduces time in the most dangerous zones, is the best way to avoid overdoses and electronic disruptions that could interfere with important military missions.
范艾伦辐射带以外的宇宙射线会带来更多问题。偶发的太阳耀斑会引发质子风暴，其喷射出的质子通量高、电荷量大、密度高，射程远，强度是常规太阳风粒子的百万倍。即使是强度较低的质子风暴，也能损伤或摧毁人体细胞，包括中枢神经系统的组成部分，造成通信中断，并使防护薄弱的导航系统失灵。因此，能够及时推迟或召回航班以避开太阳耀斑的预报至关重要。
Cosmic rays beyond the Van Allen belts pose additional problems. Sporadic solar flares cause proton storms that project high-energy, high-charge, high-density, long-range flux a million times more powerful than particles in routine solar winds. Less potent doses can damage or destroy human cells, including components of the central nervous system, cause communication blackouts, and discombobulate poorly protected guidance systems. Forecasts that defer flights or recall them in time to avoid solar flares consequently are crucial.
第三区域：月球及其周边地区
REGION III: MOON AND ENVIRONS
从地球到月球的旅程平均需要飞行 240,000 英里（386,000 公里）的近月空间，其环境与范艾伦辐射带上方的环地球空间非常相似（图 24）。然而，月球的特性以及月球平动点的重要性值得特别一提。
The voyage from Earth to the Moon averages 240,000 miles (386,000 kilometers) of cislunar space that is environmentally much the same as circumterrestrial space above the Van Allen belts (map 24). Lunar attributes and the significance of lunar libration points, however, merit special mention.
地球和月球引力井
EARTHLY AND LUNAR GRAVITY WELLS
位于地球“引力井”底部的军事航天部队需要巨大的能量才能离开发射台并迅速升空。而位于顶部、占据类似“高地”位置的对手则拥有更大的机动空间和行动自由。简而言之，将物体投入井中比将其抛出井中要容易得多。月球的引力强度只有地球的六分之一，因此相关的发射问题也微乎其微，如图24所示。8
Military space forces at the bottom of Earth’s “gravity well” need immense energy to leave launch pads and climb quickly into space. Adversaries at the top, in positions analogous to “high ground,” have far greater maneuver room and freedom of action. Put simply, it is easier to drop objects down a well than to throw them out. Gravitational pull on the Moon is one-sixth as strong and related launch problems consequently are miniscule in comparison, as figure 24 shows.8
月球表面
LUNAR TERRAIN
月球的面积与非洲大致相同。其赤道直径为2160英里（3475公里），略大于地球直径的四分之一。这颗黯淡的星球自转一周需要27.3天，与地球公转一周的时间相同，因此月球的昼夜各持续两周，而地球上的观测者永远都能看到月球的同一面。月球表面约3英尺深处的温度始终保持在零下46华氏度左右，但阳光照射的赤道表面温度远高于地球的沸点212华氏度（86摄氏度），夜幕降临后温度则会降至零下245华氏度（零下104摄氏度）以下。9
The Moon’s square mileage is essentially the same as Africa’s. The diameter at its Equator is 2,160 miles (3,475 kilometers), a little more than one-fourth that of Planet Earth. That bleak orb rotates once on its axis in 27.3 days, the same time it takes to complete one revolution around our world, so lunar days and nights each last 2 weeks, and the Moon eternally presents the same face to observers on Earth. Temperatures at a depth of 3 feet or so consistently register about -46 °F, but sunlit equatorial surfaces sizzle well above the boiling point on Earth, 212 °F (86 °C), and dip below -245 °F (-104 °C) after dark.9
月球表面没有大气层、植被和水（极地可能存在冰层），背面是崎岖的高地，而我们能看到的这一面则以巨大的浅碟状地貌为主——伽利略称之为“月海”，因为透过望远镜它们看起来像海洋。被称为月沟的山脊和峡谷交错纵横，形成月球网格状的地貌。碗状陨石坑，其中一些边缘极其陡峭，遍布巨石、石块、凹坑和丘状碎屑，使得平坦的地形难以寻觅。被称为月尘的月尘覆盖了大部分平坦的地表，但丰富的自然资源，如铁、钛、铝、锰、钙和硅，就蕴藏在地表之下。建筑材料也很容易获取。
Lunar terrain, devoid of atmosphere, vegetation, and water (except perhaps for ice at the poles), features rough highlands on the far side, while huge shallow saucers predominate on the side we see—Galileo called them maria, because they looked like seas through his telescope. Ridges and canyons known as rilles cross-hatch to form a lunar grid. Bowl-shaped craters, some of which have extremely steep sides, boulders, blocks, dimples, and hummocky debris make smooth topography hard to find. Lunar dust, called fines, mantles most of the level land, but abundant natural resources such as iron, titanium, aluminum, manganese, calcium, and silicon lie just beneath the surface. Construction materials also are accessible.
地图绘制者和军队缺乏与海平面类似的基准来定义海拔和深度。因此，每一座小山丘和山峰都必须从山脚到山脊测量，每一条峡谷和火山口都必须从顶部到底部测量。如果按照这种方式计算，科罗拉多州落基山脉的派克峰的高度将略低于9000英尺，而不是14110英尺，因为它的山脚高于海平面超过一英里。
Map makers and armed forces lack any criterion comparable to sea level from which to define elevations and depths. Each molehill and mountain therefore must be measured from base to crest, each canyon and crater from top to bottom. Pike’s Peak in the Colorado Rockies would loom slightly less than 9,000 feet instead of 14,110 if calculated in that fashion, because its base is more than a mile above sea level.
月球平动点
LUNAR LIBRATION POINTS
五个所谓的月球平动点根本不是点，而是空间中的三维位置，形状有点像肾形豆，长 10,000 英里（16,000 公里）（图 24）。理论上，如果计算正确，航天器可以无限期地停留在那里而无需消耗太多燃料，因为地球和月球的引力场似乎相互抵消。数学模型和计算机模拟得出结论：位于地球和月球连线上的半稳定L1至L3点的自由漂浮物体会逐渐漂移，而位于月球轨道上前后60度处的稳定L4和L5点的物质则更能抵抗漂移，因此会留在大致区域内。然而，这些假设尚未得到证实。目前尚未发现与特洛伊小行星类似的、位于木星轨道L4和L5区域的天体，也未证实存在被捕获的粒子云。
Five so-called lunar libration points are not points at all, but three-dimensional positions in space, shaped somewhat like kidney beans 10,000 miles (16,000 kilometers) long (map 24).10 Spacecraft theoretically could linger there indefinitely without expending much fuel if calculations are correct, because Earthly and lunar gravitational fields seem to cancel each other. Mathematical models and computer simulations conclude that free-floating objects at semistable L1 through L3, on a line with Earth and Moon, would gradually wander away, while substances at stable L4 and L5, which are 60 degrees ahead and behind the Moon in its orbit, would resist drift more vigorously and thus remain in the general region. Those hypotheses, however, have not yet been verified. There are no known counterparts of the Trojan Asteroids that inhabit areas similar to L4 and L5 along Jupiter’s orbit, nor have captive particle clouds been proven.
Figure 24. Earthly and Lunar Gravity Wells
第四区：外层
REGION IV: OUTER ENVELOPE
第四区域从地球向各个方向辐射，与地月空间的大部分特征相似。它巨大的体积提供了宝贵的机动空间，除了偶尔会穿越地球轨道的小型小行星（其中一些富含原材料）之外，几乎没有大型物质。第四区域的边界位于距地距离的两倍处，超过这个距离后，太阳和其他行星的影响将占据主导地位。
Region IV, which radiates from Earth in all directions, shares most characteristics of cislunar space. Its immense volume affords valuable maneuver room devoid of sizable matter, except for small asteroids (some rich in raw materials) that cross Earth’s orbit. Region IV terminates at twice the distance to the Moon, beyond which solar and other planetary influences dominate.
给军事航天规划者的建议
TIPS FOR MILITARY SPACE PLANNERS
轨道选项
ORBITAL OPTIONS
理论上，轨道选择几乎是无限的，可以连接地月系统中的所有点，但大气界面、重力和辐射实际上限制了灵活性。11.空气动力阻力和引力使得目前设想的飞行器即使在理想天气条件下也无法进行高速地空发射。敌方陆基防御系统可能会覆盖利用地球自转的已知发射轨迹。太空航线相对容易被对手预测，急剧改变高度和倾角会消耗大量燃料和时间，即使是微小的偏差也需要辅助推进器进行精细的启动。在《星球大战》等电影中流行的翻滚、桶滚、剧烈规避动作和其他炫酷战术，在技术人员开发出新的真空机动方法之前，仍然只能停留在科幻小说中。极地轨道可以绕过范艾伦辐射带，这进一步限制了载人飞行的航线选择，但这样做会遭遇磁层的一部分，这些区域会像漏斗一样引导间歇性太阳耀斑，如果没有比目前更好的屏蔽措施，这些耀斑可能会严重破坏军事行动。避免航天器撞击地球大气层时产生过多摩擦热的再入角度，还可以引导航天器进入大气层，从而降低战略或战术突袭的可能性。
Orbital options, which are virtually limitless, hypothetically could connect all points in the Earth-Moon System, but atmospheric interfaces, gravity, and radiation in fact confine flexibility.11 Aerodynamic drag and gravitational pull rule out high-speed Earth-to-space launches with currently envisioned vehicles, even in perfect weather. Enemy land-based defenses may straddle well-known launch trajectories that take advantage of Earth’s rotation. Routes in space are relatively easy for opponents to predict, sharp altitude and inclination changes are costly to make in terms of fuel and time, and even minor deviations demand fine-tuned activation by auxiliary thrusters. Loop-the-loops, barrel rolls, violent evasive actions, and other flamboyant tactics popularized in movies like Star Wars will remain science fiction until technologists develop new ways to maneuver in a vacuum. Polar orbits could bypass both Van Allen radiation belts, which further restrict the choice of routes for manned flights, but in so doing would encounter parts of the magnetosphere that serve as funnels for intermittent solar flares that could cripple military operations in the absence of better shielding than currently is available. Reentry angles that avoid excessive frictional heat when spacecraft hit Earth’s atmosphere also canalize approaches, and thereby reduce prospects for strategic or tactical surprise.
太空战略位置
STRATEGIC LOCATIONS IN SPACE
少数固定轨道在太空中具有显著优势。三颗地球静止通信卫星等距分布在赤道上方22,300英里（35,885公里）的圆形轨道上，可以接收来自地球上除两极以外任何地点的信号，并将其转发到这些地点。绕地球南北运行的侦察和监视卫星迟早能够全面观测到地球上的每一个角落。
A few fixed orbits confer valuable advantages in space. Three geostationary communications satellites positioned equidistantly around the circular track that runs 22,300 miles (35,885 kilometers) above our Equator can receive signals from, and relay them to, any place on Earth except the poles. Reconnaissance and surveillance satellites that make north-south great circles around the world sooner or later get a good look at every place on this globe.
月球上的五个拉格朗日点都是太空中的战略要地。L1点是地球与火星之间2.3亿英里旅程中能量转移距离最低的地点，除了美国国家太空委员会曾经设想的“汽车旅馆/加油站/仓库/餐厅/车库”等设施外，还可以配备军事设施。L2是一个潜在的重要秘密集结区，因为地月空间站和地球上的哨兵都无法观测到它。L3 可能成为一个半稳定的中转基地，用于针对地球或绕地球轨道运行的航天器的军事行动。然而，大自然为 L4 和 L5 这两个稳定的拉格朗日点保留了决定性的优势。这些点理论上可以俯瞰地球和月球，因为它们分别位于地球和月球的引力井下方。没有其他任何地点能与之匹敌。
All five lunar libration points constitute strategic locations in space. L1, the lowest energy transfer site for 230 million mile trips between Earth and Mars, could be fitted with military facilities as well as the “motel/gas station/warehouse/restaurant/garage” that the U.S. National Commission on Space once envisaged.12 L2 is a potentially important clandestine assembly area, since cislunar and Earth-based sentinels cannot see it. L3 could become a semi-stable staging base for military operations directed against Earth or spacecraft in orbit around it Nature, however, has reserved decisive advantages for L4 and L5, the two stable libration points, which theoretically could dominate Earth and Moon because they look down both gravity wells. No other location is equally commanding.
占领月球的武装部队将拥有巨大的战略优势，可以从月球上开展作战行动。然而，在技术人员研发出适用于月球的全球定位系统（GPS）或制图师绘制出能够精确标示海拔高度并包含军事网格的大比例尺地图（用于绘制射程和精确定位）之前，在月球上进行进攻和防御战争将只能是碰运气式的。
Occupying armed forces would possess great strategic leverage with which to mount operations from the Moon. Offensive and defensive warfare on the Moon, however, would be a catch-as-catch-can proposition until technologists produce the equivalent of a Global Positioning System (GPS) for lunar use or cartographers develop large-scale maps that identify precise elevations and include a military grid upon which to plot ranges and pinpoint positions.
武器效果
WEAPON EFFECTS
地理因素对核武器、定向能武器、化学武器、生物武器和常规武器的影响深远而根本。大气界面、重力和真空是其中最重要的因素。
Geographic influences on nuclear, directed energy, chemical, biological, and conventional weapon effects are far-reaching and fundamental. Atmospheric interfaces, gravity, and vacuum are the most important factors.
核武器效应。在地球大气层中引爆的核武器会产生冲击波、狂风和高温，对爆炸中心以外的地区造成严重破坏和人员伤亡。13在太空中不会出现此类效应，因为真空中不会有风，在没有空气、水或土壤阻碍压缩的地方无法形成冲击波，而且在地球表面上方超过 65 英里（105 公里）的地方，既不会形成火球，也不会形成过热大气。因此，只有直接命中或近距离接触才能利用核爆炸和热辐射达到所需的效果。
Nuclear Weapon Effects. Nuclear weapons detonated in Earth’s atmosphere create shock waves, violent winds, and intense heat that inflict severe damage and casualties well beyond ground zero.13 No such effects would occur in space, because winds never blow in a vacuum, shock waves cannot develop where no air, water, or soil resists compression, and neither fireballs nor superheated atmosphere could develop more than 65 miles (105 kilometers) above Earth’s surface. Consequently, it would take direct hits or near misses to achieve required results with nuclear blast and thermal radiation.
初始核辐射，包括β粒子和γ射线，会彻底改变电离层，扭曲或削弱无线电波和雷达波，并导致地球大片区域长时间的高频（HF）通信中断（1958年8月1日，在约翰逊岛上空的中层大气引爆的百万吨级TEAK核试验，从午夜过后不久到日出，导致方圆数千英里内的高频无线电通信中断）。地球大气层会在几英尺内吸收X射线，而X射线在太空中却能以光速传播数千英里。高剂量X射线会剥落航天器的蒙皮，并破坏精密的机械装置。如果任何高空核爆炸产生的γ射线级联与地球高层大气碰撞，就会产生电磁脉冲（EMP），这种脉冲范围广泛，并可能瘫痪陆地、海洋或空中的电子设备（图25）。一股速度比闪电快100倍的巨大脉冲会直射地面，然后攻击未屏蔽的电子设备。固态电路尤其容易受到损坏，因为微型元件无法承受高电流，而足以熔化半导体的巨大电压会瞬间将复杂的系统变成垃圾。
Initial nuclear radiation from beta particles and gamma rays would radically alter the ionosphere, warp or weaken radio and radar waves, and cause lengthy high frequency (HF) blackouts over vast areas on Earth (the megaton-range TEAK test shot, detonated in the mesosphere over Johnson Island on August 1, 1958, degraded HF radio traffic for several thousand miles in every direction from shortly after midnight until sunrise). X-rays, which Earth’s atmosphere absorbs within a few feet, travel thousands of miles at the speed of light in space. Strong doses can peel spacecraft skins and destroy delicate mechanisms. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP), widespread and potentially paralyzing to electronics on land, at sea, or in the air, would occur if a cascade of gamma rays from any high altitude nuclear explosion collided with Earth’s upper atmosphere (figure 25). A prodigious surge that peaks 100 times faster than lightning would bolt toward ground, then attack unshielded electronics. Solid state circuitry would be especially vulnerable, because miniature components cannot tolerate high currents and immense voltages able to melt semiconductors would instantaneously turn sophisticated systems into trash.
定向能武器的影响。定向能武器一旦研制成功，就能以接近光速的速度将能量远距离投射，但目前任何一种正在认真考虑的定向能武器都无法在地球和太空中发挥同样出色的性能。因此，如果它们试图跨越这种界面，就会出现问题。14
Directed Energy Weapon Effects. Directed energy weapons, if and when perfected, will project energy at or near the speed of light over great distances, but none now under serious consideration could perform equally well on Earth and in space. Problems consequently will arise if they try to cross the interface.14
太空几乎是高能激光的理想环境，因为光在真空中可以畅通无阻地传播。功率输出是其射程的主要限制因素。衍射在远距离上虽然显著，但可以控制。据报道，处于实验阶段的高功率微波武器在太空中效果良好，但在相对较低的能量水平下，它们就会在大气层中发生介电击穿，这将严重削弱其对地或对空攻击的杀伤力。粒子束也存在类似的缺陷，因为带电粒子只能在地球大气层中有效传播，而中性粒子只能在真空中有效传播。除非科学家和技术人员能够促进更好的导电性，否则两者之间的边界仍将构成障碍。然而，设计用于承受再入大气层高温的飞行器在太空中将不堪一击，因为带电粒子束可以穿透加固的外壳而不造成穿孔，然后成功攻击未受特殊保护的部件、推进剂和炸药。
Space is a nearly perfect environment for high-energy lasers, because light propagates unimpeded in a vacuum. Power output is the principal range limitation. Diffraction is significant over long distances, but is controllable. High-powered microwave weapons in experimental stages reportedly would work well in space, but break down dielectrically in atmosphere at relatively low energy levels, which would fatally impair space-to-Earth or Earth-to-space lethality. Particle beams suffer from similar shortcomings, because charged particles propagate well only in Earth’s atmosphere and neutral particles only in a vacuum. The boundary between will remain a barrier to both unless scientists and technologists facilitate better conduction. Vehicles designed to survive intense reentry heat, however, would be vulnerable in space, where charged particle beams could penetrate hardened exteriors without burning a hole, then successfully attack components, propellants, and explosives not specifically protected.
Figure 25. Electromagnetic Pulse Propagation
化学和生物武器的影响。与地球相比，太空中自给自足的生物圈为化学和生物战提供了绝佳的环境，在地球上，天气和地形几乎决定了投放时间、地点和技术。15大多数航天器和月球设施都必须依赖闭路生命维持系统，这些系统持续循环空气和水，因此它们极易成为特种部队的目标。这些特种部队可能使用无色无味、致命或致残性毒剂，而这些毒剂在症状出现前几乎无法察觉。笨重的防护面罩和防护服只有在持续佩戴的情况下才能起到保护作用。类似某些飞船上占据宝贵空间的无毒堡垒那样的避难所，对大多数航天器而言是不切实际的，而且即使建造，也只能保护少数特定人员。任何遭受持久性化学物质侵害的飞行器或建筑物都可能永久无法居住，因为用于消毒的大量水和溶剂将无法获得。
Chemical and Biological Weapon Effects. Self-contained biospheres in space afford a superlative environment for chemical and biological warfare compared with Earth, where weather and terrain virtually dictate delivery times, places, and techniques.15 Most spacecraft and installations on the Moon, which must rely on closed-circuit life support systems that continuously recirculate air and recycle water, are conceivable targets for special operations forces armed with colorless, odorless, lethal, or incapacitating agents that would be almost impossible to spot before symptoms appear. Cumbersome masks and suits could protect individuals only if worn constantly. Sanctuaries comparable to the toxic-free citadels that eat up precious room on some ships would be infeasible for most spacecraft and safeguard only a few selected personnel. Any vehicle or structure victimized by persistent chemicals probably would become permanently uninhabitable, because vast quantities of water and solvents required for decontamination would be unavailable.
常规武器效应。坦克、巡航导弹和其他使用“吸气式”发动机的系统在月球无空气的表面上将无法运作。目前正在探索的16种替代方案包括电池动力发动机和火箭推进发动机。会氧化舰载燃料。牛顿第三运动定律（作用力与反作用力大小相等、方向相反）规定了太空真空环境下无后坐力武器的要求，否则爆炸产生的动量会将太空发射平台向后推动，其动量与飞行中的弹药动量相等。牛顿第一运动定律（物体在受到外力作用前会沿直线运动）基本上可以控制月球上的弹道轨迹，因为月球上的速度和低重力，以及大气阻力的影响，使得“发射后不管”的系统极具吸引力。传统炸药必须直接击中目标或在附近引爆，因为在真空中没有冲击波会放大爆炸效应，但即使是鸟弹大小的碎片也能轻易穿透加压月球设施的薄壁，而这些设施的设计目的仅仅是为了抵御比微流星体大得多的物体。
Conventional Weapon Effects. Tanks, cruise missiles, and other systems with “air-breathing” engines would be inoperative on the Moon’s airless surface.16 Alternatives currently under exploration include battery-powered motors and rocket-propelled engines that oxidize fuel on board. Newton’s Third Law of Motion (to every action there is an equal and opposite reaction) establishes requirements for recoilless weapony in the vacuum of space, because blast otherwise would propel spaceborne firing platforms backward with momentum equal to that of the ammunition in flight. Newton’s First Law of Motion (bodies in motion move in a straight line until another force intervenes) would basically regulate projectile trajectories on the Moon, where velocity and low lunar gravity unopposed by atmospheric drag make “fire-and-forget” systems attractive. Conventional explosives would have to hit targets directly or detonate nearby, because no shock waves amplify blast effects in a vacuum, but even bird shot-size fragments could easily puncture the thin walls of pressurized lunar facilities built to repel nothing much larger than micrometeoroids.
人员熟练程度
PERSONNEL PROFICIENCY
太空中的人类需要的后勤保障系统不仅要提供空气、食物和水，还要调节温度、湿度、压力、光照、噪音、振动和辐射。对于长期部署的武装部队来说，满足这些要求将非常困难。17
Humans in space need support systems that not only provide air, food, and water but regulate temperatures, humidity, pressures, light, noise, vibrations, and radiation. Such requirements would be difficult to satisfy for armed forces on extended deployments.17
生存与卫生。仅供三名宇航员一个月使用的氧气、食物和饮用水，就需要储存超过一吨的物资，而这无疑会占用宝贵的推进剂和军事载荷。每位宇航员都会轮流排出等量的废物，包括粪便、尿液、汗液、体内气体、二氧化碳和其他呼出气体。如果不加以控制、排出或消毒，这些废物在密封舱内会迅速达到有毒浓度。目前，生命维持系统会在短途任务中倾倒或储存有机废物，但这种做法对于缓解长期补给问题收效甚微。因此，高优先级的研究项目着重于探索替代技术。
Subsistence and Sanitation. A one-month supply of oxygen, food, and drinking water just for a crew of three amounts to more than a ton stored at the expense of precious propellant and military payloads. Each crew member in turn would deposit an equal amount of waste in the form of feces, urine, perspiration, internal gases, carbon dioxide, and other exhalation vapors that could quickly reach toxic proportions in a sealed capsule unless quelled, expelled, or sterilized. Life support systems currently dump or stow organic waste on short missions, but such practices do little to alleviate long-term resupply problems. High-priority research projects consequently emphasize alternative techniques.
辐射风险。军事太空部队一旦离开地球的保护性大气层，便会进入充满辐射能量的危险区域。在近地轨道，风险最小，但在范艾伦辐射带及更远的轨道上，风险会迅速上升。那里高能、高电荷的宇宙射线通量构成持续的威胁，而太阳耀斑和其他太阳活动（始终令人担忧）每十一年就会达到峰值强度。人类的中枢神经系统、血液系统、消化系统和生殖系统尤其容易受到此类辐射的影响，辐射会损害生殖细胞。包括白血病、实体瘤、白内障和不孕症在内的延迟效应可能会阻碍军队的招募和留住人才。限制在范艾伦辐射带停留时间的飞行计划和警告太阳活动剧烈的预测，除了辐射危险外，还会降低军事灵活性，但允许的辐射暴露量可能需要根据实际情况进行调整，因为 35 岁以下的人员显然可以承受更高的辐射水平，并且比老年人恢复得更快，而老年人似乎更能承受更长时间的中等辐射过载。
Radiation Risks. Military space forces would enter a perilous realm of radiant energy as soon as they leave Earth’s protective atmosphere. Risks would be least in low Earth orbits but rise rapidly in the Van Allen belts and beyond, where high-energy, high-charge cosmic flux poses persistent hazards, while solar flares and other eruptions on the sun, always of concern, reach peak intensities every eleven years. Human central nervous, blood, digestive, and reproductive systems are particularly vulnerable to such radiation, which assaults reproductive cells. Delayed effects that could include leukemia, solid tumors, cataracts, and infertility might retard military recruitment and retention programs. Flight plans that limit time in the Van Allen belts and forecasts that warn of acute solar activity would reduce military flexibility along with radiation dangers, but permissible exposure may have to fit on a sliding scale, because personnel under age 35 apparently can tolerate higher levels and recuperate more quickly than older persons, who seem better able to withstand moderate overloads for longer periods.
晕动症和失重。晕动症有点像加剧版的晕船，大约一半的太空旅行者都会受到其困扰，而且他们对药物的反应难以预测。在每次飞行最初的几天里，晕动症可能会严重影响任务的执行效率，甚至决定任务的成败，这取决于哪些机组人员的症状最为严重，这些症状包括嗜睡、精神萎靡和剧烈呕吐。
Motion Sickness and Weightlessness. Motion sickness, somewhat like an aggravated form of sea sickness, afflicts about half of all space travelers whose responses to medical suppressants are unpredictable. It conceivably might undermine mission proficiency enough during the first few days of each flight to mark the difference between military success and failure, depending on which crew members suffer worst from symptoms that variously include drowsiness, indifference, and severe vomiting.
失重会损害反应速度、精细动作能力以及即使是训练有素、体能最佳的航天员的工作能力。当大脑发出指令让身体器官排出积聚在胸腔内的体液时，就会发生脱水。血液随后变得粘稠，血液和氧气的流动受阻，导致组织获得的营养和氧气量低于正常水平。运动能力的下降反过来又会导致肌肉萎缩和肌肉张力降低。目前的证据表明，大多数身体素质良好的人都能较好地适应失重状态，并在返回1g重力环境后完全恢复，尽管不可逆的骨质脱矿可能是一个重要的例外。人造重力或许有一天能够缓解或消除大型、缓慢旋转的空间站中失重带来的最严重的危害，但对于小型战术航天器而言则不然。
Weightlessness impairs response times, precision movements, and the work capacities of the best-trained, best-conditioned spacecraft crews. Dehydration occurs when the brain tells bodily organs to discharge fluids that pool in the chest. Blood, which thereafter thickens and flows less freely, supplies needy tissues with smaller than usual amounts of fresh nutrients and oxygen. Reduced abilities to exercise in turn cause muscles to lose mass and tone. Evidence so far suggests that most physically fit humans tolerate weightlessness reasonably well and recover completely after they return to a 1-g environment, although irreversible bone demineralization may be a significant exception. Artificial gravity may some day alleviate or eliminate the most debilitating aspects of weightlessness in large, slowly rotating space stations, but not in small, tactical space vehicles.
团队效率。“幽闭恐惧症”可能会在长期军事部署期间对团队合作产生不利影响，除非指挥官采取积极措施来限制和控制太空舱密闭空间造成的心理压力。在太空舱中，由于缺乏明显的昼夜节律，工作休息规律被打乱，其程度堪比时差反应，而且这种影响会被放大数倍。其表现形式多种多样，包括情绪不稳定、疲劳、注意力不集中，以及心跳、脉搏、脑电活动、体温和新陈代谢等重要机能受损。有些人早餐前状态最佳，有些人则在晚餐后状态最佳。因此，只有当团队成员的生物节律组合合理，并且安排每位成员在其最佳状态时执行任务，才能实现最佳的团队效率，因为许多军事任务使得所有人无法同时兼顾工作和休息。
Group Proficiency. “Cabin fever” might affect teamwork adversely during very long military deployments, unless commanders took positive steps to limit and control psychological stresses caused by close confinement in space vehicles where the absence of identifiable days and nights deranges work-rest schedules like jet lag magnified many times. Manifestations range from emotional instability, fatigue, and short attention spans to impaired vital functions such as heartbeat, pulse, brain activity, body temperature, and metabolism. Some individuals perform best before breakfast, others after supper. Optimum unit efficiency therefore is possible only if crews contain a beneficial mix of biorhythms and schedules assign each member duties during his or her period of peak proficiency, because many military tasks make it impossible for all to work and relax simultaneously.
要点
KEY POINTS
• “航空航天”一词用词不当，因为空气和太空是截然不同的地理介质。
• The term “aerospace” is a misnomer, because air and space are distinctively different geographic mediums.
• 目前，军事太空活动仅限于无人侦察、监视、目标获取、跟踪、通信、导航、气象、导弹预警和军备控制任务，以支持地球上的武装部队。
• Military space activities currently are confined to unmanned reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, tracking, communications, navigational, meteorological, missile warning, and arms control missions in support of armed forces on Earth.
• 在月球和太空其他地方开展和维持大规模、长期军事行动所需的许多物品仍有待发明，但可能很快就会在技术上变得可行。
• Many items needed to mount and sustain large-scale, extended military operations on the Moon and elsewhere in space remain to be invented, but could soon become technologically feasible.
• 很少有战略、战术、组织、武器系统、装备和训练是为地球上的武装部队设计的，却适用于太空军事行动。
• Few strategies, tactics, organizations, weapon systems, equipment, and little training designed for use by armed forces on Earth would be suitable for military operations in space.
• 在技术专家们找到在真空中操纵航天器的创新方法之前，轨道选择将保持可预测性。
• Orbital options will remain predictable until technologists devise innovative ways to maneuver spacecraft in a vacuum.
• 月球、月球天平动点 L-4 和 L-5 以及地球赤道上空的地球同步轨道路径是地月系统中的战略位置。
• The Moon, lunar libration points L-4 and L-5, and the geostationary orbital path above Earth’s Equator are strategic locations within the Earth-Moon System.
在可预见的未来，任何类型的军事太空行动都需要广泛的地球指挥、控制、通信、后勤和行政支持。
• Military space operations of any kind will demand extensive Earth-based command, control, communications, logistical, and administrative support for the foreseeable future.
笔记
NOTES
1.第 7 章修改了约翰·M ·柯林斯 (John M. Collins) 的《军事太空部队：未来五十年》 （华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1989 年 10 月 12 日）中的文本，并整合了资料来源注释，特别是第 3-36 页，该书由 Pergamon-Brassey 出版社于 1989 年以同名书名重印，第 5-39 页。
1. Chapter 7 modifies the text and consolidates source notes in John M. Collins, Military Space Forces: The Next Fifty Years (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 12, 1989), especially 3-36, reprinted by Pergamon-Brassey’s, same title, 1989, 5-39.
2. William B. Scott，“五角大楼将太空视为新的责任领域”，《航空周刊与航天技术》，1997 年 3 月 24 日，第 54 页。关于太空作战，请参阅 C. Harry Stine，《太空对抗》（新泽西州恩格尔伍德克利夫斯：普伦蒂斯-霍尔出版社，1981 年）；Daniel O. Graham，《高边疆》（华盛顿特区：高边疆出版社，1982 年）。
2. William B. Scott, “Pentagon Considers Space As a New Area of Responsibility,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 24, 1997, 54. For war fighting in and from space, see C. Harry Stine, Confrontation in Space (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981); Daniel O. Graham, High Frontier (Washington, DC: High Frontier, 1982).
3. Curtis D. Cochran、Dennis M. Gorman 和 Joseph D. Dumoulin 编，《太空手册》（阿拉巴马州麦克斯韦空军基地：空军大学出版社，1985 年 1 月），第 2-27 至 2-29 页。
3. Curtis D. Cochran, Dennis M. Gorman, and Joseph D. Dumoulin, eds., Space Handbook (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, January 1985), 2-27 through 2-29.
4.同上，第 1-3、1-4、第 8 章和附录 A；G. Harry Stine，《太空殖民者手册》（霍尔特、莱因哈特和温斯顿出版社，1985 年），第 47-79 页；Robert G. Fleagle，“大气层”， 《美国百科全书》（国际版，1978 年）。
4. Ibid., 1-3, 1-4, chap. 8, and appendix A; G. Harry Stine, Handbook for Space Colonists (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985), 47-79; Robert G. Fleagle, “Atmosphere,” Encyclopedia Americana (International Edition, 1978).
5.《太空手册》，3-1 至 3-12；威廉·M·考拉，《地球，引力场》和杰西·M·比姆斯，《引力》，载《新不列颠百科全书》，第15版；《太空殖民者手册》，81-95。
5. Space Handbook, 3-1 through 3-12; William M. Kaula, “Earth, the Gravitational Field of,” and Jesse M. Beams, “Gravitation,” in New Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed.; Handbook for Space Colonists, 81-95.
6. Frederick C. Durant，“太空探索”，《新不列颠百科全书》； David Baker，《未来战争的形态》（纽约：Stein and Day，1982 年），第 35-39 页。
6. Frederick C. Durant,” Space Exploration,” New Encyclopedia Britannica; David Baker, The Shape of Wars to Come (New York: Stein and Day, 1982), 35-39.
7. 《太空手册》第 1-5 至 1-14 页，第 2-41 至 2-47 页，以及第 7 章；艾萨克·阿西莫夫，《声音》和 NC·格森，《范艾伦辐射带》，载于《美国百科全书》。
7. Space Handbook, 1-5 through 1-14 passim, 2-41 through 2-47, and chapter 7; Isaac Asimov, “Sound” and N. C. Gerson, “Van Allen Radiation Belts,” in Encyclopedia Americana.
8.太空对抗，56-58，86；开拓太空前沿：国家太空委员会报告（纽约：Bantam Books，1986 年），60-61。
8. Confrontation in Space, 56-58, 86; Pioneering the Space Frontier: Report of the National Commission on Space (New York: Bantam Books, 1986), 60-61.
9. Gilbert Fielder，“月球”和 Victor G. Szebehely，“天体力学”，《新不列颠百科全书》； James D. Burke，“月球”，《美国百科全书》。
9. Gilbert Fielder, “Moon,” and Victor G. Szebehely, “Mechanics, Celestrial,” New Encyclopedia Britannica; James D. Burke, “Moon,” Encyclopedia Americana.
10.开拓太空前沿，131-132；杰拉德·K·奥尼尔，《高边疆：太空中的人类殖民地》（纽约：莫罗出版社，1977 年），128-130。
10. Pioneering the Space Frontier, 131-132; Gerard K. O’Neill, The High Frontier: Human Colonies in Space (New York: Morrow, 1977), 128-130.
11. Ashton B. Carter，“卫星和反卫星”，《国际安全》 10，第 4 期（1986 年春季）：48-66；Robert B. Giffen，《美国太空系统生存能力：20 世纪 90 年代的战略选择》（华盛顿特区：国防大学出版社，1982 年），6-8、12；《太空手册》，2-37 至 2-40。
11. Ashton B. Carter, “Satellites and Anti-Satellites,” International Security 10, no. 4 (Spring 1986): 48-66; Robert B. Giffen, U.S. Space System Survivability: Strategic Alternatives for the 1990s (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982), 6-8, 12; Space Handbook, 2-37 through 2-40.
12.开拓太空前沿，133-13 。
12. Pioneering the Space Frontier, 133-13.
13. Samuel Glasstone 和 Philip J. Dolan 编，《核武器的影响》，第 3版（华盛顿特区：国防部和能源部，1977 年）。
13. Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, eds., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3d ed. (Washington, DC: Dept. of Defense and Dept. of Energy, 1977).
14. Dietrich Schroder，《定向能武器与战略防御：入门》，Adelphi Paper 221（伦敦：国际战略研究所，1987 年夏季）；5pace手册，9-1 至 9-21、9-25 至 9-42、9-50、9-51、9-54。
14. Dietrich Schroder, Directed Energy Weapons and Strategic Defense: A Primer, Adelphi Paper 221 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer, 1987); 5pace Handbook, 9-1 through 9-21, 9-25 through 9-42, 9-50, 9-51, 9-54.
15.大规模杀伤性武器扩散：风险评估（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1993 年 8 月）；化学和生物战问题，第 2 卷，今日化学和生物武器（纽约：斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所，1973 年），第 37-43 页，第 61-72 页；FM 21-40：核生化防御（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1977 年 10 月 14 日），第 5 章和附录 B。
15. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 1993); The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, vol. 2, CB Weapons Today (New York: Stockholm International Peace Institute, 1973), 37-43, 61-72; FM 21-40: NBC Defense (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, October 14,1977), chapter 5 and appendix B.
16.太空对抗，78-80，95-6；奥尼尔，《高边疆》，138-140。
16. Confrontation in Space, 78-80, 95-6; O’Neill, The High Frontier, 138-140.
17. Roy L. DeHart 编，《航空航天医学基础》（费城，宾夕法尼亚州：Leas and Febiger，1985 年）；Arnold E. Nicogossian 和 James F. Parker, Jr.，《空间心理学与医学》（华盛顿特区：国家航空航天局，1982 年）。
17. Roy L. DeHart, ed., Fundamentals of Aerospace Medicine (Philadelphia, PA: Leas and Febiger, 1985); Arnold E. Nicogossian and James F. Parker, Jr., Space Psychology and Medicine (Washington, DC: National Aeronautical and Space Agency, 1982).
8. 自然资源和原材料
8. NATURAL RESOURCES AND RAW MATERIALS
起初，神创造天地。地是空虚混沌，渊面渊面……神说：“天下的水要聚在一处，使旱地露出来。”事就这样成了。神称旱地为地，称水的聚处为海。神看着是好的。
In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form, and void.... And Cod said, “Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry land appear”: and it was so. And God called the dry land Earth; and the gathering together of the waters called he Seas; and God saw that it was good.
创世记 1:1
Genesis 1:1
根据旧约圣经，上帝起初从无到有地创造了万物。此后，万物皆由有之物所造。自然资源是所有原材料的基本组成部分，而原材料又是所有成品（包括军火、装备和物资）的基石。资源的来源、短缺和补偿计划与每个国家都息息相关。经济战和武装封锁的脆弱性同样不容忽视。
GOD CREATED EVERYTHING FROM NOTHING IN THE BEGINNING, ACCORDING TO THE OLD TESTAMENT. Everything since then has been created from something. Natural resources are the basic ingredients of all raw materials which, in turn, are the building blocks of all finished products, including military arms, equipment, and supplies. Sources, shortages, and compensatory programs are relevant to every nation. So are vulnerabilities to economic warfare and armed interdiction.
来源与短缺
SOURCES AND SHORTAGES
世界各国在自然资源和原材料方面存在着不公平的分化，分为“拥有国”和“缺乏国”。即使是资源最丰富的国家也面临着资源短缺的问题，这些问题会对军事能力产生不利影响。然而，任何特定短缺的严重程度取决于相关武装力量的技术水平、扩充和补充需求、与外国供应商的关系、替代供应商以及连接资源产地和消费地的长途运输通道的安全状况。
The world community is divided inequitably into “have” and “have not” nations with regard to natural resources and raw materials. Even the best endowed countries suffer deficiencies that adversely affect military capabilities, but the criticality of any given shortage depends on the technological sophistication of armed forces in question, expansion and replenishment requirements, relationships with foreign suppliers, alternative providers, and the security of long-haul transportation lanes between sources and consumers.
矿物和金属
MINERALS AND METALS
超过 90 种矿物、金属和材料对军事用途至关重要。1.相对重要性取决于当前和预计的需求，但铁以及表11所列的十几种材料都具有普遍的需求特性。它们中的大多数可以形成用途广泛的铁合金和/或有色合金。
More than 90 minerals, metals, and materials are critically useful for military purposes.1 Relative importance depends on present and projected needs, but iron plus the dozen items listed on table 11 possess properties that are universally in demand. Most of them form ferrous and/or nonferrous alloys of great utility.
Table 11. One Dozen Militarily Useful Minerals and Metals
重要特性
IMPORTANT PROPERTIES
硬度、韧性和轻质都是备受重视的特性。铝的重量比钢轻三分之一，是军用飞机制造商的主要材料。与不锈钢（铁与铬的合金）一样，铝也具有耐腐蚀性。锰是所有金属元素中最重要的元素之一，因为没有其他物质能像锰一样有效地控制炼钢过程中的氧化和硫含量。锰还能增强铁合金的强度，帮助铝防止生锈，并与铜或镍结合，用于制造耐海水腐蚀的船用螺旋桨、配件、齿轮和轴承。铜此外，镍合金因其高抗拉强度和高导电性，在通信电缆领域需求旺盛；镍合金则用于制造一流的电镀飞机零件和机身。钴合金能够承受喷气发动机产生的高温，并为切削刀具、推土机、铲子和刮刀等需要保持锋利刃口的工具提供金属基体。钛具有极高的强度重量比，因此被广泛用于制造太空舱蒙皮、飞机防火墙、喷气发动机部件和起落架。超硬钨拥有所有金属中最高的熔点（6170°F，3410°C），是高强度钢合金、火花塞和电触点的基本成分。2
Hardness, toughness, and lightness of weight are highly valued properties. Aluminum, which weighs one-third less than steel, is a mainstay of military aircraft manufacturers. Like stainless steel, which amalgamates iron with chromium, it resists corrosion. Manganese is among the most important of all metallic elements, because no other substance so effectively controls oxidation and sulfur content during steel production processes. Manganese also strengthens iron alloys, helps aluminum ward off rust, and combines with copper or nickel to make marine propellers, fittings, gears, and bearings that wear well in salt water. Copper additionally is in demand for telecommunication wires of great tensile strength and high conductivity, while nickel alloys make first-class electroplated aircraft parts and air frames. Cobalt alloys tolerate high temperatures that jet engines generate and furnish the metal matrix for carbides in cutting tools, bulldozers, shovels, and scrapers that must keep sharp edges despite abrasion. High strength-to-weight ratios make titanium useful for space capsule skins, aircraft fire walls, jet engine components, and landing gears. Super hard tungsten, which boasts the highest melting point of any metal (6,1 70 ° F, 3,410 °C), is the basic constituent of tenacious steel alloys, spark plugs, and electrical contact points.2
除了硬度和韧性之外，其他特性也使一些矿物和金属极具价值。稀有的铂金以其卓越的催化活性和高熔点而闻名，它不仅能提高石油提炼过程中的辛烷值，还能用于制造灵敏的电子继电器开关。用途广泛的钽比铂金更耐腐蚀，是许多电子元件的基本成分，其氧化物形式可与其他材料混合，用于制造清晰的航空相机镜头。耐酸铌合金是汽油和石油油轮的理想材料。3.放射性铀是一种特殊的物质，它是为高性能海军水面舰艇和潜艇提供核动力的反应堆提供燃料。核弹、导弹弹头和爆破装置的核心都含有高浓缩同位素铀-235或武器级钚。4
Properties in addition to or other than hardness and toughness make several minerals and metals quite valuable. Scarce platinum, noted for extraordinary catalytic activity and high melting points, not only raises octane ratings during petroleum refinement but makes sensitive electronic relay switches. Versatile tantalium, which resists corrosion more effectively than platinum, is the basic ingredient of many electronic components and, in oxide form, mingles with other materials that make sharp aerial camera lenses. Acid-resistant columbium alloys are ideal for gasoline and oil tankers.3 Radioactive uranium, in a class by itself, fuels reactors that furnish nuclear power for high-performance naval surface ships and submarines. Nuclear bombs, missile warheads, and demolitions all contain highly enriched isotope U-235 or weapon-grade plutonium at their core.4
重要的供应问题
IMPORTANT SUPPLY PROBLEMS
20世纪80年代中期美苏两国物资供应来源及短缺情况的对比图，生动地展现了这两个超级大国竞争白热化时期各自的优势和劣势（图26）。两国都拥有足够的铀用于军事用途，但美国在许多其他方面远未实现自给自足。包括铝土矿、钴、铌、锰和钽在内的九种重要矿产和金属，90%以上的供应依赖于分散的供应商。铬、镍和铂的进口量也超过了75%。美国在北约欧洲和远东地区的5个主要盟友处境更糟。例如，德意志联邦共和国完全依赖外国进口16种工业矿物，而日本则有十分之九的矿物需求来自遥远的产地。6与之形成鲜明对比的是，苏联的经济状况相当不错，因为华沙条约组织成员国满足了其大部分需求。只有萤石、铝土矿、锡、银和钨这几种商品完全或主要来自宿敌或援助无法保证的国家。7事实上，莫斯科曾大量出口钛以换取现金，直到阿尔法级攻击潜艇的船体消耗了大量的钛金属，才停止了出口。
Comparative U.S. and Soviet sources of supply and shortages in the mid-1980s graphically illustrate relative strengths and weaknesses when competition between those two superpowers was at its zenith (figure 26). Both nations had sufficient uranium for military purposes, but the United States was far from self-sufficient in many other respects. Widely scattered suppliers provided 90 percent or more of nine important minerals and metals that included bauxite, cobalt, columbium, manganese, and tantalum. Chromium, nickel, and platinum imports exceeded 75 percent.5 Major U.S. allies in NATO Europe and the Far East were worse off. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, relied entirely on outsiders for 16 industrial minerals, while Japan drew on distant sources for nine-tenths of its total mineral needs.6 The Soviet Union, in contrast, was reasonably well off, because Warsaw Pact partners supplied most demands. Flourspar, bauxite, tin, silver, and tungsten were the only commodities available solely or in large part from sworn enemies or countries whose assistance was by no means assured.7 Moscow in fact exported large amounts of titanium in exchange for hard cash until Alfa class attack submarine hulls consumed so much of that metal that shipments ceased.
然而，官僚主义的拙劣和技术的落后却大大削弱了苏联的优势。储量巨大的矿藏以异常快的速度消耗殆尽，不仅远离工业中心（而且至今仍然如此），还位于气候恶劣的地区，开采成本高昂。例如，位于西伯利亚中部北极圈内的诺里尔斯克出产的钼，需要经过6435公里（4000多英里）的河流、公路和铁路运输才能到达顿涅茨克的冶金炉——比从佛罗里达州迈阿密到华盛顿州西雅图的陆路距离还要远965公里（600英里）。位于西伯利亚东北部“寒极”附近的诺斯克矿区规模庞大，位置更加偏远。
Bureaucratic bungling and technological obsolescence nevertheless reduced Soviet advantages considerably. Vast reserves, depleted at abnormally rapid rates, not only were (and still are) far removed from industrial centers but underlay harsh climatic regions that made extraction expensive. Molybdenum from Noril’sk, above the Arctic Circle in central Siberia, traveled more than 4,000 miles (6,435 kilometers) by river, road, and rail to reach metallurgical furnaces in Donetsk—600 miles (965 kilometers) farther than the land route from Miami, Florida, to Seattle, Washington. Norsk, an immense mining complex near northeastern Siberia’s “Cold Pole,” was even more isolated.
图 26.美国和苏联矿产和金属进口（20 世纪 80 年代中期）
Figure 26. U.S. and Soviet Mineral and Metal Imports (Mid-1980s)
石油
PETROLEUM
目前，各种形式的石油为大多数飞机、舰船、坦克、卡车和其他军事装备提供动力。因此，生产原油并拥有大量已探明储量的国家和石油集团能够施加强大的政治和经济影响力，尤其是在它们也出口成品油的情况下。表12列出了1990年伊拉克占领科威特并威胁要吞并沙特阿拉伯时，日产量超过1000桶的石油所有者，这些石油所有者的地下储油库总储量超过80亿桶。
Petroleum in various forms currently propels most aircraft, ships, tanks, trucks, and other military machines. Countries and cartels that produce crude oil and possess large proven reserves thus can exert strong political and economic leverage, particularly if they ship refined products as well. Table 12 lists oil owners who pumped more than 1,000 barrels per day from subterranean reservoirs that contained more than 8 billion barrels in 1990, when Iraq occupied Kuwait and threatened to overrun Saudi Arabia.
不难理解为何海湾战争会令整个工业化世界感到震惊：伊拉克、科威特、沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国（阿联酋）提供了日本一半以上的石油进口，几乎占西欧需求的五分之一，足以满足美国超过十分之一的既定需求。并非所有石油都能从其他来源替代，而且其他国家的原油大多较重。后一点尤为重要，因为萨达姆·侯赛因的掌权以及随之而来的报复性禁运，使得原石油供应国无法再使用伊拉克和科威特几家先进的炼油厂，而这些炼油厂专门生产汽油、航空煤油和馏分燃料油等轻质产品。8.简而言之，不可容忍的情况需要强有力的应对措施。
It is easy to understand why the Persian Gulf War caused shudders throughout the industrialized world: Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) furnished more than half of Japan’s petroleum imports, almost one-fifth of Western Europe’s requirements, and enough to satisfy well over one-tenth of stated U.S. needs. Not all was replaceable from other sources, and most crude oil from other countries was somewhat heavier. The latter fact was significant, because Saddam Hussein’s takeover coupled with a retaliatory embargo denied former recipients access to several sophisticated Iraqi and Kuwaiti refineries that specialized in such light products as gasoline, jet fuel, and distillate fuel oil.8 Intolerable situations, in short, demanded strong counteractions.
Table 12. Crude Oil Producers and Proven Reserves (1990)
天然橡胶
NATURAL RUBBER
美国陆军和海军军需委员会于1940年1月30日将天然橡胶列为战略和关键物资，这并非没有道理：轴心国和盟军的所有军种都严重依赖集中在印度等南亚地区的天然橡胶资源。从锡兰到印度尼西亚和印度支那。日本偷袭珍珠港后，美国从远东的进口量以惊人的速度增长，以至于在1942年2月15日新加坡英军投降之前，几乎所有现成的物资都已运抵美国。此后，美国的目光转向利比里亚的橡胶种植园，以及中美洲和南美洲一些尚未开发的橡胶林，但这些地方的橡胶供应都不足以满足需求。9
The U.S. Army and Navy Munitions Board listed natural rubber as a strategic and critical material as of January 30, 1940, with good reason: every military service on the Axis as well as the Allied side was heavily dependent on sources concentrated in southern Asia from India and Ceylon to Indonesia and Indochina. U.S. imports from the Far East increased at such a frenzied pace after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor that virtually all readily available supplies had been shipped before British Armed Forces in Singapore surrendered on February 15, 1942. Attention thereafter turned to rubber plantations in Liberia, along with underdeveloped stands in Central and South America, none of which proved adequate.9
补偿计划
COMPENSATORY PROGRAMS
对于那些自然资源需求超过自身拥有量的国家而言，除了军事行动之外，还有多种途径可以获取所需物资。回收利用和资源节约可以减少进口需求；储备物资可以应对危机爆发时的短缺；合成材料和替代品有时可以缓解自然资源的匮乏，甚至使其变得无关紧要。然而，强国也可能选择诉诸武力来获取所需资源。
Several avenues short of military operations to seize supplies are open to nations that need more natural resources than they possess. Recycling and conservation reduce import requirements; stockpiles hedge against shortages if crises should arise; synthetics and substitutes sometimes relieve nature’s stinginess or render it irrelevant. Strong countries, however, may also choose to take what they want by force of arms.
战略储备
STRATEGIC STOCKPILES
美国国家储备计划始于1939年，但国内政治、特殊利益集团、政策不一致以及成本高昂等因素，使得在最初的40年里，高效的管理几乎不可能实现。20世纪70年代，备用物资供应目标从5年骤降至1年。随后，国会通过了1979年的《战略和关键矿产储备法》，该法案除其他条款外，专门划拨储备用于国防应急，并规定了“足以在国家紧急情况下维持美国至少3年”的特定物资。10.妥善管理随即成为一项紧迫的任务，因为当时美国的库存中充斥着大量浪费的过剩资源，尤其是白银和锡，这些资源占用了数十亿美元，而这些资金本可以得到更好的利用。一些储备在库存中积压了太久，以至于最初的理由已经失效。如果将铝土矿、铬矿、锰矿和其他矿石转化为初级金属和合金，它们将更容易被利用。11道理很明显：无人照管的库存，在主人最需要的时候，往往会令人失望。
U.S. national stockpile programs started in 1939, but domestic politics, special interest groups, inconsistent policies, and costs made efficient administration almost impossible for the first 40 years. Backup supply goals slumped from 5 years to 1 during the 1970s. Congress then passed the Strategic and Critical Minerals Stockpiling Act of 1979 which, among other provisions, earmarked reserves specifically for national defense contingencies and prescribed selected items “sufficient to sustain the United States for a period of not less than 3 years in the event of a national emegency.”10 Proper management concurrently became a pressing mission, because U.S. stockpiles at that time were rife with wasteful excess, especially silver and tin, which tied up several billion dollars that could have been put to better use. Some reserves had lolled in the inventory for so long that original rationales were invalid. Bauxite, chromium, manganese, and other ores would have been more readily usable if converted to primary metals and alloys.11 The moral is clear: untended stockpiles are apt to disappoint when owners need them most.
1973 年 10 月中旬至 1974 年 3 月中旬，阿拉伯国家短暂的石油禁运表明，美国和许多其他国家很容易受到国务卿亨利·A·基辛格所说的“工业化世界可能遭受的扼杀”的影响。此后，国会进一步建立了美国战略石油储备。17 年后伊拉克入侵科威特时，德克萨斯州和路易斯安那州的12 个洞穴中储存着超过 5.8 亿桶石油，但这些都是原油，需要提炼后才能用于武装部队或国防工业。13幸运的是，由于沙特阿拉伯在危机期间大幅提高了产量，因此需要撤回的物资很少。
Congress further established the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve after a brief Arab oil embargo from mid-October 1973 to mid-March 1974 showed how susceptible the United States and many other nations were to what Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger called possible “strangulation of the industrialized world.”12 Caverns in Texas and Louisiana contained more than 580 million barrels when Iraq overran Kuwait 17 years later, but all was crude oil that required refining before it could fuel armed forces or defense industries.13 Fortunately, very little had to be withdrawn, because Saudi Arabia increased its production considerably as long as the crisis lasted.
合成物和替代品
SYNTHETICS AND SUBSTITUTES
目前，无论是合成燃料还是替代品，都无法取代石油作为大多数军事用途的燃料和润滑剂。核反应堆目前为部分水面舰艇和潜艇提供动力，但研制核动力飞机的尝试早在几十年前就已停止。21世纪初，各国海军可能仍将主要依赖化石燃料，军用车辆仍将燃烧汽油或柴油，石油和润滑油的需求也可能依然旺盛。然而，人造材料已经开始补充或取代天然橡胶和许多矿产资源。
Neither synthetics nor substitutes currently can replace petroleum as a fuel and lubricant for most military purposes. Nuclear reactors currently propel selected surface ships and submarines, but serious attempts to produce nuclear-powered aircraft ceased several decades ago. Navies early in the 21st century likely will still rely mainly on fossil fuels, military motor vehicles will still burn gasoline or diesel, oil and lubricants likely will remain in demand. Manmade materials, however, already supplement or supplant natural rubber and many mineral resources.
二战期间，日本占领或封锁了东南亚所有橡胶种植园，此后，再生橡胶在美国备受青睐。1942年6月，富兰克林·罗斯福总统呼吁爱国的美国民众捐献“旧轮胎、旧橡胶雨衣、旧花园水管、橡胶鞋、泳帽、手套”。纽约市一车歌舞女郎捐献了她们的束身衣，作为她们在接下来的一个月里收集的45万吨废橡胶的一部分。但大多数捐赠的废橡胶此前至少被回收过一次，并被证明不适合进一步加工。然而，合成橡胶却完全够用。到1944年，51家新工厂的年产量达到80万吨，大致相当于1.5亿棵橡胶树的产量。14
Recycled rubber was prized in the United States after Japan seized or blocked access to all plantations in Southeast Asia during World War II. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in June 1942 asked patriotic Americans to turn in “old tires, old rubber raincoats, old garden hose, rubber shoes, bathing caps, gloves.” A carload of chorus girls in New York City donated girdles as their contribution to 450,000 tons of scrap rubber collected during the next month, but most submissions had previously been reclaimed at least once and proved unsuitable for further processing. Synthetics, however, sufficed. Fifty-one new factories produced 800,000 tons annually by 1944, an output roughly equivalent to the harvest from 150 million rubber trees.14
所有人造材料，如同天然矿物和金属一样，既有优点也有缺点，但许多前景都十分光明。具有革命性性能的实验性复合材料、合金和纤维正变得日益重要。有些材料比最好的钢材更坚固、更轻便、更耐用。15碳碳聚合物可以承受高达 3,000 °F (1,650 °C) 的温度，而不会明显膨胀或减弱。16.超硬陶瓷易于塑造成复杂形状。人们一直在寻找无需持续浸泡在昂贵的液氦中即可在室温下工作的超导材料，而这种材料或许很快就能受益于主要由现成的铋和铊（一种用于老鼠药的金属）混合而成的陶瓷，而不是由镧、锶、钇和钡等昂贵的稀土金属混合而成的陶瓷。17卤化物玻璃纤维比铜线好得多，它兼具抗电磁干扰能力和高抗拉强度。
All manmade materials, like natural minerals and metals, possess weaknesses as well as strengths, but many prospects appear promising. Experimental composites, alloys, and fibers that possess revolutionary properties are becoming ever more important. Some are stronger, lighter, and more durable than the best steel.15 Carbon-carbon polymers can tolerate temperatures up to 3,000 °F (1,650 °C) without expanding or weakening significantly.16 Super-hard ceramics mold readily into complex shapes. The search for superconductor materials that can function at room temperatures without constant bathing in costly liquid helium may benefit fairly soon from ceramics mixed primarily with off-the-shelf bismuth and thallium (a metal used in rat poison) rather than expensive rare-earth metals like lanthanum, strontium, yttrium, and barium.17 Halide glass fibers, which are far superior to copper wires, combine immunity to electromagnetic interference with great tensile strength.
资源匮乏
RESOURCE DEPRIVATION
资源匮乏是指需求超过现有库存加上可随时补充的资源，如果资源在不合时宜的时候枯竭，由此产生的问题将极其棘手。两个截然不同的案例在这方面都颇具启发意义：1941年至1945年间，东亚和太平洋地区的报复性资源战争摧毁了日本远投境外军事力量的能力，而这远早于原子弹袭击广岛和长崎；1990年至1991年，美国领导的联军开展的先发制人行动消除了人们普遍担忧的伊拉克叛乱总统萨达姆·侯赛因可能利用非法获得的波斯湾石油作为经济武器，打击那些依赖该资源生存的对手。
Resource deprivation occurs whenever requirements exceed stocks on hand plus readily available replenishments and resultant problems can be excruciating if sources dry up at inopportune moments. Two dissimilar cases are instructive in both regards: retaliatory resource warfare in East Asia and the Pacific between 1941 and 1945 destroyed Japan’s abilities to project military power far beyond her borders well before atomic bombs hit Hiroshima and Nagasaki; anticipatory operations by a U.S.-led coalition in 1990-1991 relieved widespread anxieties that renegade Iraqi President Saddam Hussein might use ill-gotten Persian Gulf petroleum as an economic weapon against opponents whose livelihood depends on that resource.
对日资源战
RESOURCE WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN
20世纪30年代初的日本由四个多山的岛屿组成，7000多万人口挤在比当时美国爱荷华州面积还小的耕地上，而且人口每年以100万的速度增长。稀缺的自然资源使得工业发展成本高昂，并限制了军事能力，部分原因是外国以高于自给自足的竞争对手的价格供应了大部分矿产和全部石油，部分原因是运输成本相当高昂。
Japan in the early 1930s consisted of four mountainous islands, crowding more than 70 million people onto less arable land than the State of lowa then contained, and the population was increasing at the rate of one million each year. Scarce natural resources made industrial progress expensive and restricted military capabilities, partly because foreigners supplied most minerals and all petroleum at higher prices than self-sufficient competitors paid, and partly because shipping costs were considerable.
补救措施。日本于1910年吞并朝鲜后，开始补充本土资源。朝鲜不仅为日本提供了水力发电资源，还蕴藏着丰富的煤炭、铁矿石和其他矿产。第一次世界大战后，国际联盟将原属德国的马里亚纳群岛、加罗林群岛和马绍尔群岛托管给日本，这些岛屿为日本带来了磷酸盐和磷矿石。1931年，日本进军满洲，随后不久便对满洲建立了宗主权。在中国北方以及从上海到海南岛南部沿海地区的部分海域，开采出了更多的铁矿石、焦煤、一些锡和含铝页岩。18
Remedial Measures. Japan began to augment home-grown resources in 1910 when it acquired Korea, which opened access to hydroelectric power along with rich deposits of coal, iron ore, and other minerals. The Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands, German possessions that the League of Nations mandated to Japan after World War I, brought phosphates and phosphorite. The 1931 march into Manchuria, followed shortly by suzerainty over northern China and bits of the littoral from Shanghai as far south as Hainan Island, netted more iron ore, coking coal, some tin, and aluminous shale.18
东京对自然资源的渴求在1940年9月遭遇了第一次严重挫折，当时日本与纳粹德国和法西斯意大利签署了三国同盟条约。作为回应，罗斯福总统禁止向日本运送美国废金属和石油，并在10个月后，在维希法国的默许下，日本军队挥舞着旭日旗涌入印度支那后，冻结了日本在美国的所有资产。英国和荷兰政府很快也实施了类似的制裁。19这些打击十分沉重，因为日本的一些储备，包括石油，仅够维持一年多，而另一些则更短。因此，资源匮乏在很大程度上决定了日本的战略。1941年12月的任务是获取所需物资，封锁已占领区域，并顽强守住地图25所示的领土。20
Tokyo’s quest for natural resources received its first serious setback in September 1940, when Japan signed a tripartite pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. President Roosevelt in response embargoed U.S. scrap metal and petroleum shipments to Japan, then froze all Japanese assets in the United States 10 months later after troops flying the Rising Sun flag swarmed over Indochina with Vichy French acquiescence. The British and Dutch Governments soon imposed similar sanctions.19 Those body blows hurt, because some Japanese stockpiles, including oil, were sufficient for little more than a year, others for less. Resource deprivation hence dictated Japanese strategy to a high degree. The mission in December 1941 was to grab what they needed, throw a cordon around the gains, and tenaciously hang onto territory that map 25 depicts.20
Map 25. Japanese Territorial Holdings in 1942
改编自亚瑟·齐奇的《旭日东升》。
Adapted from Arthur Zich, The Rising Sun.
灾难性的后果。日本最初获益匪浅。缅甸、马来亚和暹罗提供了铝土矿、钴、钨和锡。东南亚的种植园是橡胶的重要来源，新喀里多尼亚提供了镍，菲律宾提供了铬。石油来自婆罗洲东北部塔拉坎、更南部的班杰尔马辛以及苏门答腊巨港的石油工人，在短暂而血腥的战斗后，为日军的机器提供了润滑油。荷兰壳牌石油公司的员工纵火焚烧了一些设施，英国将军哈罗德·亚历山大也对仰光郊外缅甸石油公司的1.5亿加仑产品采取了同样的做法，但大多数设施都完好无损，日军技术人员迅速恢复了产能，以至于几个月内产量就超过了预期。21
Ruinous Results. Japan initially enjoyed great gains. Burma, Malaya, and Siam provided bauxite, cobalt, tungsten, and tin. Southeast Asian plantations were lucrative sources of rubber, New Caledonia contributed nickel, and the Philippines furnished chromium. Oil from Tarakan in northeast Borneo, Banjermasin farther south, and Palembang in Sumatra lubricated Japanese machines after bloody but brief fights. Dutch Shell employees torched some facilities and British General Harold Alexander did likewise to 150 million gallons of Burmah Oil Company products outside Rangoon, but most installations remained intact, and Japanese technicians restored capacities so rapidly that output exceeded expectations within a few months.21
然而，日本最终还是难逃“千刀万剐”的命运，美国海空封锁重创了其脆弱的经济。潜艇击沉商船的速度远超日本造船厂的建造速度。战争物资逐渐被盐、大豆和谷物所取代。由于矿产、金属和煤炭短缺，飞机工业生产的机身、发动机、发动机支架、起落架和配件数量锐减，质量低劣，导致飞机性能急剧下降，事故率却不断攀升。1944年，石油运输船的损失超过75万吨，远远超过了建造量。航空燃油的辛烷值大幅下降（部分批次甚至添加了酒精），飞行员的训练时间在1944年被削减至30小时（不到之前的一半），导航学校关闭后，编队飞行只能依靠飞行员的跟随。神风特攻队开始流行，部分原因是单程飞行任务可以将汽油消耗量减少一半。日本舰队需要大量的石油，其状况更加糟糕。几艘主力水面作战舰艇被困在母港，1945年3月只有一艘战列舰有足够的燃料参与冲绳保卫战，战争最后几个月，美国飞机在码头击沉或重创了四艘“活靶子”般的战列舰、三艘航空母舰和两艘重型巡洋舰。22 美国战略轰炸调查报告总结了总体结果如下：“日本战时经济的不足是其战败的根本原因。在对日本城市进行空袭之前，由于原材料日益短缺，战时生产一直在稳步下降……这导致工厂产能闲置率不断上升。因此，即使工厂建筑和设备遭受严重的炸弹破坏，通常也对实际生产几乎没有影响。”23资源战士已经造成了如此巨大的破坏，直接进攻只不过是给予了致命一击。
Japan nevertheless died the Death of a Thousand Cuts, beaten by a U.S. naval and air blockade that devastated its fragile economy. Submarines sank merchant transports faster than Japanese shipyards could build them. Cargoes increasingly substituted salt, soy beans, and cereals for the sinews of war. Aircraft industries, strapped for minerals, metals, and coal, turned out fewer airframes, engines, motor mounts, landing gears, and fittings of such poor quality that performance fell sharply while accident rates rose. Petroleum tanker losses, which exceeded 750,000 tons in 1944, outstripped construction. The octane ratings of aviation fuel dropped dramatically (some batches were alcohol blends), pilot training was cut to 30 hours in 1944 (less than half the previous allocation), and formations played follow-the-leader after navigation schools closed. Kamikaze flights became popular, partly because one-way missions cut gasoline consumption in half. Japanese fleets, which required prodigious amounts of petroleum, were in even worse shape. Several major surface combatants were confined to home ports, only one battleship had enough fuel to help defend Okinawa in March 1945, and U.S. aircraft sank or heavily damaged at dockside four “sitting duck” battleships, three aircraft carriers, and two heavy cruisers during final months of the war.22 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey summarized overall results as follows: “The insufficiency of Japan’s war economy was the underlying cause of her defeat. Before the air attacks against [Japanese] cities began, war production had been steadily declining because of the ever-increasing shortages of raw materials.... This resulted in a growing margin of unused plant capacity. Thus, even substantial bomb damage to plant structures and equipment frequently had little, if any effect on actual production.”23 Resource warriors had already wreaked such havoc that direct assaults merely administered a coup de grace.
伊拉克的资源战争
RESOURCE WARFARE BY IRAQ
1991年1月，伊拉克总统萨达姆·侯赛因在波斯湾北部倾泻了一场巨大的石油泄漏事故（每天泄漏10万桶），其目的显然是为了污染潜在的入侵海滩，阻止美军两栖登陆。不久之后，油污随洋流一路漂流至霍尔木兹海峡，造成了灾难性的环境后果。24 1991年2月伊拉克军队撤离后，萨达姆的爪牙放火焚烧了650口科威特油井，或许是为了确保萨达姆的反对者无法从他的失败中获得多少安慰，也无法从中获得多少早期经济利益。16个国际消防队和1万名消防员连续工作了8个多月，日夜不停地扑灭了这些大火，耗资约10亿美元（比最初预估的要快得多），而据估计，灾后重建和修复费用是这个数字的20倍。25
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in January 1991 unleashed an immense oil spill (100,000 barrels a day) at the head of the Persian Gulf, apparently to foul potential invasion beaches and forestall U.S. amphibious landings. Currents shortly carried slicks all the way to the Strait of Hormuz, with environmentally disastrous consequences.24 His henchmen later set 650 Kuwaiti oil wells afire when Iraqi Armed Forces withdrew in February 1991, perhaps to ensure that Saddam’s opponents could take less comfort from his defeat and reap fewer early financial benefits. Sixteen international fire fighting companies and 10,000 men worked round-the-clock for more than 8 months to extinguish those flames at a cost of about $1 billion (much faster than first predicted), while estimates placed reclamation and reconstruction costs at twenty times that figure.25
沙特阿拉伯的石油设施。如果沙特阿拉伯没有强大的联盟保护，萨达姆·侯赛因很可能就会攫取其控制权，从而造成更大的破坏。只要他控制了如此庞大的石油生产能力并将其用于自身目的，所有依赖石油的国家都将任他摆布。
Saudi Arabian Petroleum Facilities. Possibilities for infinitely greater mischief were present in Saudi Arabia, which Saddam Hussein might have seized had that nation remained undefended by a formidable coalition. Petroleum-dependent nations everywhere would have been at his mercy as long as he controlled so much productive capacity and exploited it for his own purposes.
沙特阿拉伯庞大的石油基础设施一旦遭到严重损坏或摧毁，将难以重建。其主要综合设施占地350英里乘250英里（5630公里乘3220公里）（见地图26），许多油井位于波斯湾沿岸的水下。图27所示的开采、收集、加工和分配系统包含许多独一无二的组件，难以替代：50座巨型油气分离器；众多巨型泵站（每座泵站日处理量达200万桶）；世界上最大的注水厂（仅阿布盖格油田的日注水量就达4亿立方英尺）；世界上最大的储油罐，高72英尺，直径352英尺，每个储油罐容量达125万桶；最大的石油港口；以及一座巨型海水淡化厂。如果敌方破坏主要设施，钻杆、套管、油管、钻头、防喷器、阀门、压力表、发动机和压缩机，以及必不可少的淀粉、烧碱、醇类、有机化学品和建筑钢材，都将立即出现短缺。运输需求也会给远洋运输带来巨大压力。26
Outsized Saudi Arabian petroleum infrastructure would have been hard to replace if badly damaged or destroyed. The main complex sprawls over an area 350 by 250 miles—5,630 by 3,220 kilometers (map 26), and many wells lie under water along the Persian Gulf littoral. Extraction, collection, processing, and distribution systems illustrated schematically in figure 27 contain many one-of-a-kind components that would be hard to replace: 50 gigantic gas-oil separators; many huge pumping stations (2 million barrels each per day); the world’s biggest water injection plants (400 million cubic feet daily for the Abqaiq field alone); the world’s biggest storage tanks, 72 feet high, 352 feet in diameter, capacity 1.25 million barrels apiece; the biggest oil port; a monster desalinization plant. Drill pipes, casings, tubing, bits, blowout preventers, valves, pressure gauges, engines, and compressors plus indispensable starches, caustic sodas, alcohols, organic chemicals, and construction steels would be instantaneously insufficient if enemies sabotaged major elements. Shipping requirements would strain oceangoing transports.26
潜在的破坏风险。 1991年盟军可用的弹道导弹防御系统或许可以用“漏洞百出”来形容，但伊拉克的飞毛腿导弹精度太差，除了偶然事件外，几乎无法造成多大破坏；而伊拉克空军又过于胆怯，不足以构成严重威胁。然而，如果负责的人员具备足够的专业技能，那么在伊拉克地面部队撤离沙特阿拉伯阵地之前，他们完全可以利用各种机会进行大规模破坏。油井、管道、泵站、发电厂、储罐、炼油厂和装卸设施都存在不同程度的脆弱性。
Sabotage Potential. Ballistic missile defense systems available to the allied coalition in 1991 might best be described as “porous,” but Iraqi Scuds were too inaccurate to do much damage except by chance, and the Iraqi Air Force was too timid to cause serious concerns. Opportunities for sabotage on a grand scale, however, would have been wide open to Iraqi ground forces before they abandoned positions in Saudi Arabia, provided personnel in charge possessed sufficient expertise. Wells, pipelines, pumping stations, power plants, storage tanks, refineries, and loading facilities all were vulnerable in varying degrees.
在厚度约为半英寸（1.3厘米）的焊接钢制管道上打孔很容易，但即使爆破专家撕开巨大的缺口，油田工人也能相对轻松地修复。重质原油很难在底部壁厚达1.7英寸（4.3厘米）的巨型储罐中点燃，因为聚能装药会在粘稠的液体中溅射。装满高辛烷值燃料的容器会喷射出火炬，但即使破坏分子找到方法点燃熊熊大火，储罐之间的距离也会限制火势蔓延。
It would be easy to punch holes in welded steel pipelines half an inch or so thick, although oil field workers could repair punctures with relative ease even if demolition experts tore great gaps. Heavy crude oil would be hard to ignite in giant storage tanks with walls 1.7 inches (4.3 centimeters) thick at the base, because shaped charges would sputter in the thick liquid. Flares would shoot from containers full of high-octane fuel, but distances between tanks would confine spreads even if saboteurs found ways to kindle full-fledged fires.
相反，专注于分离器、稳定器、动力装置和泵站的拆除专家可能会造成瘫痪效应。沙特阿拉伯的自由流动油井，就像科威特的油井一样，极易燃。海上设施的火灾尤其可怕。1970年，路易斯安那州海岸附近的一个壳牌石油平台发生11口油井爆炸事故，仅扑灭大火就用了136天。在马尔尚湾发生的另一场海上火灾中，16家私营公司和3个美国政府机构共出动650人进行扑救。两艘驳船向平台上层建筑喷洒海水以防止其熔化。5座移动式钻井平台、2座自升式钻井平台和11艘泥浆驳船协同作业，开凿新井，向生产层注水以防止地下油藏助燃，然后用泥浆封堵燃烧的油井。一艘配备500吨起重机的起重驳船清理了3000吨残骸，之后新的井口才能与新的平台连接。为了安置管理人员，建造了一个设施齐全的岸基控制中心，配备了通信、电力、燃料供应、直升机停机坪、水上飞机码头和生活区。27
Demolition specialists who concentrate on separators, stabilizers, power packs, and pumping stations conversely could produce paralytic effects. Free-flowing Saudi wells, like those in Kuwait, are extremely flammable. Fires in offshore facilities would be especially fearsome. It took 136 days to smother flames at just one Shell Oil platform off Louisiana’s coast after 11 wells blew in 1970. Sixteen private companies and three U.S. Government agencies committed 650 men to fight another offshore fire at Bay Marchand. Two barges sprayed sea water on the platform superstructure to keep it from melting. Five mobile drilling rigs, two “jack-up” rigs, and eleven mud barges working in concert sank new shafts, pumped water into the producing layer to prevent subterranean oil reservoirs from feeding fires, and then blocked burning wells with mud. A derrick barge with a 500-ton crane cleared 3,000 tons of debris before new well heads could be connected to new platforms. A special shore-based control center replete with communications, power sources, fuel supplies, a helipad, seaplane dock, and living quarters was constructed to accommodate supervisors.27
如果盛行的波斯湾风将燃烧的油污从贝里吹向南部的朱艾迈和拉斯塔努拉港口设施，沙特阿拉伯将面临更多困难，爆炸可能夷平岸上的设施。仅仅一艘满载汽油或石脑油的超级油轮就会造成毁灭性后果（1945年，70吨液化天然气摧毁了俄亥俄州克利夫兰80个街区；相比之下，一艘10万加仑油轮的油气泄漏造成的后果将是灾难性的）。28
Additional difficulties would develop in Saudi Arabia if prevailing Persian Gulf winds swept burning oil slicks south from Berri to port facilities at Juaymah and Ras Tanura, where explosions could level installations ashore. Just one supertanker laden with gasoline or naphtha would have devastating effects (70 tons of liquefied natural gas destroyed 80 square blocks in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1945; the contents of a 100,000-gallon tanker would be catastrophic in comparison).28
Map 26. Saudi Arabian Oil Fields and Facilities
Figure 27. Oil Fields and Facilities
尼科洛·马基雅维利在《君主论》 （公元1514年）中对此问题做了精辟的阐述：“绝不能为了逃避战争而放任混乱持续。逃避不了，战争只是被推迟了，而且最终只会对自己不利。” 从这个角度来看，1990年8月在科威特边境阻击伊拉克军队，并在次年2月将其驱逐的盟军联盟，做出了一项具有国际价值的贡献。与萨达姆·侯赛因在沙特阿拉伯的压力下撤退时可能发动的残酷资源战争相比，所付出的生命损失和金钱代价微不足道。
Niccolo Machiavelli explained the problem nicely in The Prince (1514 A.D.): “One must never allow disorder to continue so as to escape a war. One does not escape. The war is merely postponed to one’s disadvantage.” The Allied coalition that blocked Iraqi Armed Forces at the Kuwaiti border in August 1990, then drove them out the following February, performed an internationally valuable service when seen from that perspective. The price in lives lost and money expended was minuscule compared with penalties that might have been paid if Saddam Hussein had launched a ruthless resource war while withdrawing under pressure from Saudi Arabia.
要点
KEY POINTS
• 各国对自然资源和原材料的利益塑造了国际关系，引发了敌对情绪，并支撑着国防工业，没有国防工业，武装部队就无法运作。
• National interests in natural resources and raw materials shape international relationships, incur enmities, and underpin defense industries without which armed forces could not function.
• 由于很少有国家能够完全自给自足，因此某些商品的竞争非常激烈。
• Competition for some commodities is intense, because few countries are entirely self-sufficient.
• 因此，明智的国家领导人会寻求与外国供应商建立牢固的关系，保障重要的供应路线，并储备物资以备不时之需。
• Prudent national leaders therefore seek to establish strong ties with foreign suppliers, safeguard essential supply routes, and stockpile reserves for use in emergencies.
• 每个国家需要多少资源取决于其武装部队的技术水平，以及当前和预计的需求。
• How much of what each country needs depends on the technological sophistication of its armed forces, together with present and projected requirements.
• 对外国供应商的合理依赖程度取决于任何特定时刻的国际关系、替代来源以及航运线路的安全。
• Sensible degrees of reliance on foreign providers depend on international relationships at any given moment, alternative sources, and the security of shipping lines.
• 储备应按重要性顺序优先储备资源和原材料。例如，钢铁生产需要锰和焦煤，直到技术人员找到替代品或开发出不同的生产方法。
• Stockpiles should emphasize resources and raw materials in order of importance. Steel production, for example, will demand manganese and coking coal until technologists identify substitutes or devise different methods.
• 如果管理人员不按合理的时间间隔将库存与不断变化的需求重新关联起来，那么管理不善的库存就会迅速变质并很快过时。
• Poorly attended stockpiles deteriorate rapidly and soon become obsolescent unless supervisors recorrelate them with changing requirements at realistic intervals.
• 继续依赖化石燃料，而目前还没有合适的替代品，这使得工业化国家及其军队容易遭受毁灭性的资源匮乏。
• Continued reliance on fossil fuels, for which no suitable substitutes now are available, leaves industrialized nations and their armed forces vulnerable to devastating resource deprivation.
• 合成材料正在迅速改变许多其他自然资源的价值。
• Synthetic materials are rapidly altering the value of many other natural resources.
• 资源战争对现代社会的威胁和对军事能力的破坏力，与核武器不相上下。
• Resource warfare can threaten modern societies and damage military capabilities just as surely as nuclear weapons.
笔记
NOTES
1. Alfred R. Greenwood，《关于国家国防储备的问题》，1994 年 3 月 8 日向众议院军事委员会战备小组委员会作简报，附件 2-4。
1. Alfred R. Greenwood, On Issues Relating to the National Defense Stockpile, briefing before the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, March 8, 1994, Attachments 2-4.
2. Ewan W. Anderson，《战略矿产：美国的地缘政治问题》（纽约：Praeger出版社，1988年）；Marc D. Lax，《精选战略矿产：迫在眉睫的危机》（纽约：美国大学出版社，1992年）。
2. Ewan W. Anderson, Strategic Minerals: The Geopolitical Problems for the United States (New York: Praeger, 1988); Marc D. Lax, Selected Strategic Minerals: The Impending Crisis (New York: University of America Press, 1992).
3.同上。
3. Ibid.
4.美国国会众议院联合委员会，《核扩散概况》 ，第99届国会，第1会期，1985年8月，第299-499页；《大规模杀伤性武器扩散：风险评估》（华盛顿特区：美国政府印刷局，1993年8月），第33、35-36页；以及《技术》大规模杀伤性武器的根本原因（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1993 年 12 月），第 131、147-148 页。
4. Congress, House, Joint Committee Print, Nuclear Proliferation Factbook, 99th Congress, 1st sess., August 1985, 299-499; Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 1993), 33, 35-36, and Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 1993), 131, 147-148.
5.阿尔弗雷德·R·格林伍德，《美国经济战略和关键矿产的可用性》（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1983年11月16日）。美国最新信息见《1996年矿产商品概要》（华盛顿特区：美国内政部地质调查局和矿业局）。另见肯特·休斯·巴茨，《新世界秩序中的战略矿产》（宾夕法尼亚州卡莱尔兵营：美国陆军战争学院战略研究所，1993年11月30日）。
5. Alfred R. Greenwood, The Availability of Strategic and Critical Minerals for the United States Economy (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 16, 1983). U.S. updates are contained in Mineral Commodity Summaries, 1996 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey and Bureau of Mines). See also Kent Hughes Butts, Strategic Minerals in the New World Order (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 30, 1993).
6. Michael Shafer，“矿物神话”，《外交政策》，第 47 期（1982 年夏季）：154-171。
6. Michael Shafer, “Mineral Myths,” Foreign Policy, no. 47 (Summer 1982): 154-171.
7.格林伍德，《战略和关键矿产的可用性》，第6、7页。
7. Greenwood, The Availability of Strategic and Critical Minerals, 6, 7.
8. Joseph P. Riva，《波斯湾西部石油状况》，第 90-378 SPR 报告，1990 年 11 月 13 日；Bernard A. Gelb 和 Dario Scuka，《石油流量、世界储量和伊拉克-科威特局势》，第 90-374E 报告，1990 年 8 月 7 日（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处）。
8. Joseph P. Riva, Petroleum Status of the Western Persian Gulf, Report No. 90-378 SPR, November 13,1990, and Bernard A. Gelb and Dario Scuka, Oil Flows, World Reserves, and the Iraq-Kuwait Situation, Report No. 90-374E, August 7, 1990 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service).
9.吴元利，《经济战》（纽约：普伦蒂斯-霍尔出版社，1952 年），第 277-280 页。
9. Yuan-li Wu, Economic Warfare (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952), 277-280.
10. Greenwood，《战略和关键矿产的可用性》，第 14-18 页。
10. Greenwood, The Availability of Strategic and Critical Minerals, 14-18.
11.同上。美国的最新情况载于国防国家储备中心 1996 年 9 月 30 日发布的《储备物资清单 (LZ-1)》；格林伍德，《关于与国防储备有关的问题》，1994 年 3 月 8 日。
11. Ibid. U.S. updates are contained in Inventory of Stockpile Material (LZ-1), Defense National Stockpile Center, September 30, 1996; Greenwood, On Issues Relating to the National Defense Stockpile, March 8, 1994.
12. “ 《商业周刊》1974 年 12 月 23 日的独家采访”，美国国务院公报，1975 年 1 月 27 日，第 101 页。
12. “Exclusive Interview by Business Week, December 23, 1974,” Department of State Bulletin, January 27, 1975, 101.
13. Robert Bamberger，《战略石油储备》，IB87050（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1990 年 8 月 14 日）。
13. Robert Bamberger, The Strategic Petroleum Reserve, IB87050 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 14, 1990).
14. Ronald H. Bailey，《美国后方》（纽约：时代生活图书公司，1977 年），第 84 页。
14. Ronald H. Bailey, The Home Front: USA (New York: Time-Life Books, 1977), 84.
15. 《先进材料设计》（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1988 年 6 月）。
15. Advanced Materials by Design (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 1988).
16. Howard G. Maahs，“碳-碳复合材料”，《世界与我》，1989 年 6 月。
16. Howard G. Maahs, “Carbon-Carbon Composites,” World & I, June 1989.
17.高温超导商业化（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1988 年 6 月）。
17. Commercializing High-Temperature Superconductivity (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 1988).
18.美国战略轰炸调查（USSBS），由大卫·麦克萨克作序，第 8 卷，战略轰炸对日本战时经济的影响（纽约：加兰出版社，1976 年），第 I 章；亚瑟·齐奇，《旭日东升》（纽约：时代生活出版社，1977 年），第 18-27 页。
18. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), with intro. by David Maclssac, vol. 8, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan’s War Economy (New York: Garland Publishing, 1976), chapter I; Arthur Zich, The Rising Sun (New York: Time-Life Books, 1977), 1 8-27.
19. Jerome B. Cohen，《日本战时和重建时期的经济》（明尼阿波利斯，密西西比州：明尼苏达大学出版社，1949 年），第 3 章。
19. Jerome B. Cohen, Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis, MS: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), chapter 3.
20.同上；齐奇，《旭日东升》，119-129。
20. Ibid; Zich, The Rising Sun, 119-129.
21. Cohen，《日本战时和重建时期的经济》，第 4 章。
21. Cohen, Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction, chapter 4.
22. USSBS，第 9 卷，空袭对日本城市经济的影响，摘要，v-vi。
22. USSBS, vol. 9, The Effects of Air Attack on Japanese Urban Economy, Summary, v-vi.
23. “巨大的石油泄漏污染了波斯湾”，《事实档案年鉴 1991》，世界事件索引记录，第 51 卷（纽约：事实档案，1991 年 1 月 31 日），57-58、92-93；M. Lynne Corn，《波斯湾石油泄漏和波斯湾的生物学》，ENR 报告第 91-123 号（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1991 年 1 月 30 日）。
23. “Huge Oil Spill Fouls Persian Gulf,” Facts on File Yearbook 1991, Indexed Record of World Events, vol. 51 (New York: Facts on File, January 31, 1991), 57-58, 92-93; M. Lynne Corn, Persian Gulf Oil Spills and the Biology of the Persian Gulf, Report No. 91-123 ENR (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 30, 1991).
24. Jennifer Parmalee，“科威特埃米尔扑灭了伊拉克点燃的最后一处油井大火”，《华盛顿邮报》，1991 年 11 月 7 日，第 1 页。
24. Jennifer Parmalee, “Kuwaiti Emir Snuffs Out Last Iraqi-Lit Oil Fire,” Washington Post, November 7, 1991, 1.
25.国会、众议院、《油田作为军事目标》，国会研究服务处为国际关系委员会调查特别小组委员会编写，第94届国会，第1会期，1975年8月21日，第17、71页；Ismail I. Nawwab等人编，《沙特阿美及其世界》（沙特阿拉伯达兰：1980年），第214-217页。
25. Congress, House, Oil Fields As Military Objectives, prepared for the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on International Relations by the Congressional Research Service, 94th Congress, 1st sess., August 21, 1975, 17, 71; Ismail I. Nawwab et al., eds., ARAMCO and Its World (Dhahran, Saudi Arabia:1980), 214-217.
26.油田作为军事目标，45，70。
26. Oil Fields As Military Objectives, 45, 70.
27. “壳牌如何修复被大火损坏的马尔尚湾油井”海洋工业（1973 年 10 月）：47-50；RF Nelson，“马尔尚湾大火”，石油技术杂志（1972 年 3 月）：225-249。
27. “How Shell Rejuvenated Fire-Damaged Bay Marchand Wells” Ocean Industry (October 1973): 47-50; R. F. Nelson, “The Bay Marchand Fire,” Journal of Petroleum Technology (March 1972): 225-249.
28.油田作为军事目标，17，44-46，69-71 。
28. Oil Fields As Military Objectives, 17, 44-46, 69-71.
上图：在吉尔伯特群岛马金环礁，两栖突击部队正趟过齐腰深的珊瑚礁，前往黄滩二号。所有人的目光都转向右侧，那里一挺日军机枪刚刚开火。海军炮火引燃了油罐，浓烟滚滚升起（美国陆军照片）。下图：盘根错节的树根露出地面，下潜于污浊的黑水中，这是潮汐沼泽的典型特征，视野和射击范围在任何方向上最多只有几英尺。在这样的条件下，步兵进行近距离战斗无疑是一场令人胆战心惊的冒险（美国陆军照片）。
Top: Amphibious assault troops wade across a coral reef through hip deep water on their way to Yellow Beach Two on Makin Atoll in the Gilbert Islands. All eyes face right, where a Japanese machine gun has just opened fire. Smoke rises from oil storage tanks ignited by naval gunfire (U.S. Army photograh). Bottom: Gnarled tree roots above ground and under fetid black water typify tidewater swamps, where observation and fields of fire extend a few feet at most in any direction. Close combat by foot troops is a nerve-wracking proposition under such conditions (U.S. Army photograph).
上图：雨季时，厚厚的粘稠泥浆如同吸盘一般，将未铺设路面的道路变成泥潭，阻碍机动车通行。冻结的泥浆甚至能像希腊浮雕一样将卡车车队牢牢固定住（美国陆军照片）。
Top: Deep, sticky mud that acts like a suction cup turns unsurfaced roads into quagmires during rainy seasons and precludes cross-country movement by motor vehicles. Frozen mud can cement truck convoys in place like Greek friezes (U.S. Army photograph).
底部：警惕的、分散的部队沿着一条热带道路前进，这条道路穿过茂密的“象草”丛，阻挡了哪怕一丝微风，闷热难耐，并将观察范围限制在不到一臂之遥（美国海军陆战队照片）。
Bottom: Wary, well-dispersed troops look for enemy ambush sites as they advance along a tropical road that runs between thick stands of “elephant grass,” which excludes the slightest breeze, is stifling hot, and restricts observation to less than one arm’s length (U.S. Marine Corps photograph).
前景中的小城堡和天际线上拥有 1400 年历史的本笃会修道院，在 1945 年初意大利卡西诺战役期间，都提供了良好的观察哨和防御阵地。德国伞兵一直避开这座修道院，直到盟军轰炸机将其夷为平地，他们在下面废墟中顽强抵抗（美国陆军照片）。
The small castle in the foreground and the 1,400-year-old Benedictine monastery on the skyline both offered fine observation posts and defensive positions during the battle for Cassino, Italy, early in 1945. German paratroopers, who avoided the abbey until Allied bombers blasted it flat, fought tenaciously in the debris below (U.S. Army photographs).
一支卡车车队沿着萨尔温江峡谷上方的缅甸公路，缓慢地绕过21个之字形弯道，路面湿滑，两侧都是陡峭的斜坡，而且没有护栏。人、骡子和车辆有时会滑入深渊（美国陆军照片）。
A truck convoy on the Burma Road above the Salween River gorge creeps around 21 switchback curves with slippery surfaces, precipitous slopes on both sides, and no guard rails. Men, mules, and motor vehicles sometimes slipped into the abyss (U.S. Army photograph).
在崎岖不平的小径取代公路的地方，除非有直升机可用，否则人力和骡子必须取代机动车辆。如图所示，重型迫击炮小组在意大利亚平宁山脉陡峭的山坡上行进十分艰难（美国陆军照片）。
Manpower and mules must replace motor vehicles wherever rude tracks and trails supplant roads, unless helicopters are available. Heavy mortar crews like the one depicted found the going difficult whether they moved up or down steep slopes in Italy’s Apennine Mountains (U.S. Army photograph).
1945 年 3 月 7 日，德军爆破队未能将莱茵河上的雷马根大桥彻底摧毁，美军趁机冲过大桥，这座桥因此成为西欧最重要的财产。美军最初占领的脆弱桥头堡在 10 天内不断扩张，直到桥梁结构因日渐脆弱而坍塌（美国陆军照片）。
The bridge over the Rhine River at Remagen became the most important piece of property in Western Europe when German demolition teams failed to destroy it completely before U.S. troops raced across on March 7, 1945. The tenuous bridgehead that they seized initially expanded for 10 days before the weakened structure collapsed (U.S. Army photograph).
前景中的浮桥在 1968 年 2 月的春节攻势期间，越共工兵炸毁了横跨顺化香江的坚固钢桁架桥后，供行人通行，但机动车和火车已无法再通过（美国海军陆战队照片）。
The pontoon bridge in the foreground supported foot traffic after Viet Cong sappers during the Tet offensive of February 1968 dropped the sturdy steel truss that spanned the Perfume River at Hué, but motor vehicles and trains could no longer cross (U.S. Marine Corps photograph).
1950 年 11 月，朝鲜长津水库附近严寒的天气和凛冽的寒风，让美国海军陆战队、陆军第 32 步兵团和英国皇家海军陆战队突击队在与从满洲南下的中国共产党“志愿者”的殊死搏斗中苦不堪言（美国海军陆战队照片）。
Subzero weather and wicked winds near North Korea’s Changjin Reservoir made life miserable for U.S. Marines, the Army’s 32d Infantry Regiment, and British Royal Marine Commandos in mortal combat with Chinese Communist “volunteers” who streamed south from Manchuria in November 1950 (U.S. Marine Corps photograph).
前线医护人员发现，在温暖干燥的天气里救治担架伤员比在冬季容易得多。冬季，冻雨和湿雪会浸透躺在露天的伤员。在这样的环境下，体温过低很常见，其致死速度和效果几乎与致命武器一样快（美国陆军照片）。
Front line medics find it much easier to treat stretcher cases while the weather is warm and dry than in winter, when freezing rain and wet snow soak casualties who lie in the open. Hypothermia, which is common under such conditions, can kill almost as fast and just as surely as lethal weapons (U.S. Army photograph).
上图：当山谷晴朗而山顶云雾缭绕时，近距离空中支援便成为一项极具挑战性的行动，这种情况在越南和老挝溪山附近的狭长地带之间十分常见。照片中，9号公路沿山谷底部呈对角线走向，从左至右（美国海军陆战队照片）。
Top: Close air support is a sporty proposition when valleys experience clear weather while heavy clouds shroud hilltops, a condition that commonly prevails between Vietnam and the Laotian panhandle near Khe Sanh. Route 9 runs diagonally from left to right along the valley floor in this photograph (U.S. Marine Corps photograph).
底部：即使在风平浪静的情况下，海上补给也是一项复杂的任务。经验丰富的驱逐舰舰长和船员需要在暴风雨天气中安全地转移物资，因为翻滚的海水会拍打摇晃颠簸的甲板，撞击舱壁，造成不稳定，从而放大货物装卸的每一个问题，并增加碰撞的风险（美国海军照片）。
Bottom: Underway replenishment is a complex task even under placid conditions. Skilled destroyer skippers and crews are required to transfer supplies safely during stormy weather, when roiling water washes across rolling, pitching decks, slams against bulkheads, creates instability that magnifies every cargo-handling problem, and increases risks of collision (U.S. Navy photograph).
上图：在厚度通常超过3米（10英尺）的北极冰层下航行的潜艇，必须先浮出水面才能安全发射弹道导弹或巡航导弹。它们还必须能够在紧急情况下破冰而出，否则一旦空气供应因任何原因中断，艇员就会窒息而死（美国海军照片）。下图：一队舰船在南极冰层狭窄的通道中“跟随领头舰”前进，这样只需一艘舰船破冰而出即可。由于一年中大部分时间浮冰都处于完全冻结状态，因此在南北两极附近进行此类操作的机会仅限于短暂的夏季（美国海军照片）。
Top: Submarines under arctic ice packs that often are 10 feet (3+ meters) thick must surface before they can safely launch ballistic or cruise missiles. They also must be able to break through in emergency, because crews otherwise would suffocate if air supplies failed for any reason (U.S. Navy photograph). Bottom: A string of ships play “follow the leader” through a narrow lead in Antarctic ice so that only one has to force its way. Opportunities to do so near either pole are limited to short summer seasons, because pack ice is frozen solid most of each year (U.S. Navy Photograph).
上图：厚厚的冰冻盐水喷溅层会堵塞进气口，并给舰船的舱壁、上层建筑、舱口、桅杆、索具、裸露的机械、天线和武器系统增加数吨重量。如果没有有效的应对措施，这将降低破冰船（如图所示）以及水面作战舰艇和运输舰的作战能力并危及它们的稳定性（美国海军照片）。
Top: Heavy coatings of thickly frozen salt water spray can block air intakes and add tons to ship bulkheads, superstructures, hatches, masts, rigging, exposed machinery, antennas, and weapon systems. Results reduce the operational capabilities and endanger the stability of ice breakers (shown) as well as surface combatants and transports in the absence of effective countermeasures (U.S. Navy photograph).
底部：在沙漠军事行动中，水始终是生命之源。1985 年参加“明亮之星”演习并部署到埃及的美军再次证实，与油罐车队相比，软管可以更快、更经济高效地远距离输送大量水（美国陆军照片）。
Bottom: Water always is the staff of life during military operations in deserts. U.S. troops that deployed to Egypt during Exercise Bright Star in 1985 reconfirmed that flexible hoses can transfer large quantities over long distances faster and more cost-effectively than fleets of tanker trucks (U.S. Army photograph).
9. 人口
9. POPULATIONS
有一种所谓的“武器至上”理论……武器在战争中固然重要，但并非决定性因素；真正重要的是人，而非物质。力量的较量不仅是军事和经济实力的较量，更是人类力量和士气的较量。
There is the so-called theory of “weapons mean everything.” . . . Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive one; it is man and not material that counts. The contest of forces is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also one of the power and morale of humans.
毛泽东
论持久战争
Mao Zedong
On Protracted War
毛泽东的讲话并非仅限于1935年完成从江西长征至陕西宝安附近石窟（图3，第19页）的同志们。他也指的是中国人民，特别是农民，他们强健的体魄是他力量的主要来源。即使在25年后拥有核武器的苏联倒戈反对他之后，毛泽东仍然计划“用人海淹没侵略者”，他坚信，面对工业落后但思想坚定、不畏惧为祖国牺牲的群众，任何持久战中，“包括原子弹在内的现代远程武器”都将“无能为力”。1
MAO’S REMARKS WERE NOT RESTRICTED TO UNIFORMED COMRADES WHO, IN 1935, COMPLETED THE LONG March from Jiangxi Province to the Shaanxi caves near Bao’an (map 3, page 19). He also meant the Chinese people, peasantry in particular, whose sturdy stock was his primary source of strength. Mao still planned to “drown [invaders] in a hostile human sea” even after the nuclear-armed Soviet Union turned against him a quarter-century later, steadfast in his belief that “modern long-range weapons, including atomic bombs,” would be “helpless and ineffective” in any protracted war when opposed by industrially backward but ideologically indoctrinated masses who were not afraid to die for their homeland.1
苏联领导人从未检验过毛泽东的这一论断，但大多数权威人士普遍认为，军事事务中的人为因素至关重要。战略家和战术家如果缺乏对盟友和对手的人口统计特征、文化特点和社会结构的充分了解，就贸然制定计划和指挥作战，其策略必然站不住脚。毛泽东的祖师孙子（约公元前500年）更进一步阐述了这一观点：“知己知彼，百战不殆；不知彼而知己，胜负均等；不知彼而知己，每战必遭祸患。”2人口模式、种族-民族-部落构成、语言、宗教、习俗、性情、态度和忠诚在任何地方都很重要。
Soviet leaders never put Mao’s premise to the test, but most authorities generally agree that the human element in military affairs is huge. Strategists and tacticians who concoct plans and conduct operations in the absence of sound knowledge concerning the demographics, cultural characteristics, and social structures of coalition partners as well as opponents are on shaky ground. Sun Tzu, who was Mao’s mentor many times removed (circa 500 B.C.), took that contention one step further: “Know the enemy and know yourself,” he counseled, “in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.”2 Population patterns, the racial-ethnic-tribal mix, languages, religions, customs, tempers, attitudes, and loyalties are everywhere important.
人口统计
DEMOGRAPHY
人口统计学研究世界各地人口的规模、密度、地理分布、构成和其他重要统计数据。军事人员则专注于影响当前计划、方案和行动的人口状况。例如，出生率、预期寿命、一夫多妻制以及已婚人口比例等因素，远不如决定兵役人数和当地劳动力规模的性别和年龄结构重要。少数群体与多数群体之间的关系，比它们各自占总人口的相对比例更为重要。
Demography deals with the size, density, geographic distribution, composition, and other vital statistics of populations the world over. Military practitioners concentrate on demographic conditions that influence current plans, programs, and operations. Birth rates, life expectancies, the practice of polygamy, and percentages of married persons, for example, are less important than sex and age profiles that determine the number of individuals eligible for military service and the size of local labor pools. Relationships between minorities and majorities are more important than relative percentages of the population that each represents.
相关人员统计
PERTINENT HEAD COUNTS
1997年，地球人口约为58亿，其中五分之四生活在最不发达国家（图28）。仅中国和印度就贡献了20亿人口，而西半球、非洲、欧洲以及前苏联的中亚国家则瓜分了其余大部分人口。如果预测准确，到2025年之前，最贫困地区的人口将出现不成比例的增长，其中大部分增长将发生在亚洲和非洲。但考虑到艾滋病、普遍饥荒和战争等不可预测的影响，预测的准确性远非板上钉钉。3
Approximately 5.8 billion people populated Planet Earth in 1997, of which four-fifths lived in the least developed countries (figure 28). China and India alone contributed two billion, while the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Europe, and Central Asian states that belonged to the former Soviet Union divided most of the remainder. Populations in the poorest regions will expand disproportionately before the year 2025, most of them in Asia and Africa, if projections prove correct, which is by no means a foregone conclusion considering the unpredictable impact of AIDS, widespread starvation, and wars.3
军事上重要的统计数据包括任何国家的总人口、适龄男女（通常指15至49岁）人数以及适合现役服役的人口比例。以色列（人口570万，其中15%为巴勒斯坦人）4）无法在“和平时期”维持庞大的现役部队，必须动员平民劳动力储备来应对军事紧急情况，难以承受大规模伤亡，并且在旷日持久的消耗战中将面临经济崩溃。由规模更大的社会供养的武装力量更有能力在失去战斗力之前补充大量损失，正如20世纪两次世界大战期间几个主要强国所证明的那样。然而，即使是战胜国，其付出的代价也比表13所反映的要高，因为表中的数据不包括平民伤亡、永久性患病或致残的军人、1937年至1941年间中国遭受的惨重损失以及无法估量的潜在人才流失。5
Militarily important statistics include total populations in any given country, the number of men and women of military age (generally ages 15 to 49), and percentages that are fit for active service. Israel (population 5.7 million, of which 15 percent are Palestinians4) cannot maintain large active forces in “peacetime,” must mobilize reserves from the civilian work force to meet military emergencies, could ill afford extensive casualties, and would face economic collapse in a protracted war of attrition. Armed services fed by much larger societies are better able to replenish heavy losses before they become combat ineffective, as several major powers demonstrated during two World Wars in the 20th century. Even the winners, however, paid a higher price than table 13 reflects, because figures therein exclude civilian casualties, military personnel rendered permanently ill or disabled, horrendous Chinese losses from 1937 through 1941, and incalculable deprivation of latent talent.5
表13. 第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战的军人死亡和失踪人数
Table 13. Military Dead and Missing, World Wars I and II
分布模式
DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS
少数几个“惠益国”理想情况下会将众多城市、城镇和村庄分散在广袤的土地上，并使很大一部分人口远离敌对的边境。而那些人口分布不均、防御能力较弱的国家则更容易遭受入侵，除非它们拥有友好的邻国（例如加拿大）或地形屏障（例如瑞士的地形屏障）。例如，俄罗斯的领土辽阔，但其人口主要集中在乌拉尔山脉以西的平原地区，这些地区屡遭入侵。叙利亚、以色列、约旦、埃及、沙特阿拉伯、科威特、伊拉克和伊朗的情况则更为脆弱，因为大多数居民居住在首都——大马士革、特拉维夫、安曼、开罗、利雅得、科威特城、巴格达和德黑兰——以及一些其他中心城市，例如哈马、耶路撒冷、亚历山大、吉达、巴士拉、马什赫德和伊斯法罕。即使一枚投放得当的战术核武器，无论是通过飞机、导弹、汽车或其他方式，都可能瞬间使任何一个国家在政治、经济和军事上瘫痪。任何分散部署都无法为任何国家提供完全抵御此类攻击的保障，但人口分布模式使得敌方狙击手需要击中多个目标而非一两个，从而增加了侵略的成本，并降低了过度集中带来的危险。
A few favored nations ideally distribute many cities, towns, and villages over large land masses and keep a high percentage well removed from unfriendly frontiers. Countries cursed with population patterns that afford fewer safeguards are more vulnerable to invasion unless blessed with benign neighbors (as Canada is) or topographic barriers (such as those that shelter Switzerland). Russia’s territory, for example, is immense, but its people are predominantly located on flatlands west of the Ural Mountains in positions that have been overrun repeatedly. Syria, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran are even more vulnerable, because most residents occupy capital cities—Damascus, Tel Aviv, Amman, Cairo, Riyadh, Kuwait City, Baghdad, and Teheran—plus a sprinkling of other centers such as Hama, Jerusalem, Alexandria, Jiddah, Basra, Meshed, and Isphahan. Even one well-placed tactical nuclear weapon delivered by an aircraft, missile, motor vehicle, or other means might instantaneously put any of those countries politically, economically, and militarily out of commission. No amount of dispersion could provide any nation with complete protection against such attacks, but population patterns that require enemy marksmen to hit many targets instead of one or two increase the costs of aggression and reduce dangers that accompany excessive concentration.
Figure 28. Present and Projected World Populations
资料来源：人口参考局、世界银行《世界人口预测》
SOURCES: Population Reference Bureau, World Bank “World Population Projections”
作者：迪塔·史密斯和劳拉·斯坦顿——《华盛顿邮报》
By Dita Smith and Laura Stanton-The Washington Post
人口密度
POPULATION DENSITIES
人口过剩可能导致武装冲突，如果由此产生的压力造成难以承受的溢出效应或内部爆发。人们实际或臆想中无法维持理想生活方式的能力往往会成为冲突的催化剂，阿道夫·希特勒在二战初期就证实了这一点，他占领斯拉夫领土的部分原因是为了满足德国所谓的“生存空间”（ Lebensraum）。日本在1937年入侵满洲，后来又出于大致相同的原因建立了“大东亚共荣圈”。6.自发性人口外流可能无意中引发冲突，而这并非任何人所愿。1971年，900万来自东巴基斯坦（今孟加拉国）的难民涌入本已人口过剩的印度，以躲避西巴基斯坦人的屠杀，由此引发了一场短暂的三方战争。人口压力也可能导致或加剧国界内的内战。例如，布隆迪的著名观察家认为，该国两次发生大规模屠杀，都是因为空间不足加剧了图西族和胡图族之间的政治和阶级冲突，第一次发生在1972年，第二次发生在20世纪90年代。7
Overpopulation can lead to armed conflict if pressures cause intolerable spillovers or internal combustion. Real or imagined inabilities to support preferred life styles often act as catalysts, as Adolph Hitler confirmed early in World War II when he seized Slavic lands partly to satisfy Germany’s alleged need for Lebensraum (literally “living space”). Japan invaded Manchuria in 1937 and later established a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere for much the same reason.6 Spontaneous overflows may inadvertently instigate strife that no one intended, which happened in 1971 when nine million refugees from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) flooded into already overcrowded India to escape massacres by West Pakistanis and thereby precipitated a brief three-way war. Population pressures also can cause or contribute to civil wars contained within national borders. Prominent observers of Burundi, for example, contend that wholesale slaughters in that country twice occurred because too little room exacerbated political and class rivalries between the Tutsi and Hutu tribes, first in 1972 and again in the 1990s.7
物理属性
PHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES
国家和地区的人口在力量、耐力、体质和健康状况方面存在显著差异。军事指挥官和参谋人员只有充分理解这些特征的综合影响（这些影响可能是积极的、消极的或中性的），才能最有效地开展工作。
National and regional populations consist of individuals who differ considerably with regard to strength, endurance, hardiness, and health. Military commanders and staffs function most effectively only if they fully understand the collective implications of such characteristics, which may be positive, negative, or neutral.
体格比较
COMPARATIVE PHYSIQUES
在军事上，能区分不同人群的体格特征并不多。无论身材高矮胖瘦，无论肤色深浅，无论金发碧眼还是红发红发，只要装备齐全、训练有素，并在从熟悉的地理区域转移到陌生的地理区域后进行适应性训练，大多数情况下，男女都能表现出色。但有两个例外情况似乎比较突出。
Not many militarily significant physical attributes distinguish one people from another. Heavily built, lightly built, and moderately built men and women perform equally well under most circumstances, whether they are tall or short, dark or light skinned, blond, brunette, or red-headed, given proper equipment, equal training, and periods of acclimatization when shifted from familiar to unfamiliar geographic regions. Two exceptions seem to stand out.
肤色或发色与敌方不同的军事人员，如果敌方平民抱有敌意，则很难在敌后作战；如果被抓获，后果不堪设想。被监禁的战俘很少能逃脱抓捕。1950年至1953年间，所有从朝鲜战俘营逃脱的美国战俘都被抓获；1965年至1972年间，所有从北越永久战俘营逃脱的战俘也都被抓获，部分原因是黑人和白人的面孔在敌对领土上非常显眼。只有一人从老挝成功返回家园，而从南越共产党控制区内的越共牢笼中逃脱的战俘也寥寥无几。8
Military personnel whose skin or hair color is different than those of opponents find it difficult to operate behind enemy lines if the civilian population is hostile and, if caught and incarcerated, rarely elude recapture. Every U.S. prisoner of war (POW) who slipped out of a North Korean stockade between 1950 and 1953 was apprehended, as was every fugitive from a permanent camp in North Vietnam (1965-1972), partly because black and white faces were conspicuous in hostile territory. Only one made it home from Laos and very few escaped from Viet Cong cages in Communist-controlled territory within South Vietnam.8
在高海拔地区作业是第二个例外。低地居民似乎很少（有人说从来没有）能在稀薄的空气中达到像在树线以上出生和长大的登山者那样的耐力，无论他们在那里待多久。9然而，自弗朗西斯科·皮萨罗在16世纪初击败印加皇帝阿塔瓦尔帕，以及300年后秘鲁人驱逐西班牙军队以来，在极高海拔地区发生的战斗寥寥无几。20世纪50年代，中国正规军和西藏抵抗组织曾零星发生冲突，之后北京镇压了一场毫无希望的起义。10此后，中国、印度和巴基斯坦军队不时在喜马拉雅山脉高地发生小规模冲突，最引人注目的是争夺查谟和克什米尔的控制权，但尽管多次发出威胁，却从未进行过持续的军事行动。11
Operations at very high altitudes comprise the second exception. Lowlanders seldom (some say never) seem to attain the same stamina in rarefied atmosphere as mountaineers born and raised above the tree line, no matter how long they remain.9 Few battles, however, have been fought at extreme elevations since Francisco Pizarro defeated the Incan Emperor Atahualpa early in the 16th century and Peruvians ousted Spanish forces 300 years later. Chinese regulars and Tibetan resistance groups clashed sporadically in the 1950s before Beijing crushed a hopeless revolt.10 Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani troops have periodically skirmished along Himalayan heights since then, most notably over control of Jammu and Kashmir, but never have conducted sustained campaigns despite repeated threats to do so.11
如果尼泊尔传奇的廓尔喀步枪队具有代表性，那么从高海拔地区下撤到海平面附近作战的部队并不会受到任何不利影响。自1817年以来，无论在潮湿闷热的丛林还是寒冷的福克兰群岛，他们都为英国王室立下了汗马功劳。12
Troops that descend from lofty homelands to do battle near sea level experience no adverse effects, if the legendary Gurkha Rifles of Nepal are anywhere near typical. They have served the British Crown well since 1817 under every geographic condition from steaming jungles to the frigid Falkland Islands.12
公共卫生
PUBLIC HEALTH
公共卫生状况恶劣和地方性疾病对军事能力的削弱作用不亚于敌方行动。疟疾、伤寒、斑疹伤寒、霍乱、鼠疫和流感等可能致命的疾病，以及那些会大幅降低作战能力的非致命性疾病，在历史上都给军队造成了惨重的损失。尽管人们进行了广泛而深入的探索以寻求解决方案，但严峻的问题依然存在，二战、朝鲜战争和越南战争期间美国的统计数据就证明了这一点：13
Poor public health conditions and endemic diseases can undercut military capabilities just as surely as enemy actions. Potentially fatal maladies such as malaria, typhoid fever, typhus, cholera, plague, and influenza, together with nonlethal miseries that drastically reduce proficiency, have taken a terrible toll on armed forces throughout history. Serious problems remain despite intensive and extensive searches for solutions, as U.S. statistics from World War II, Korea, and Vietnam illustrate:13
Table 14. Causes of U.S. Wartime Casualties
美国医学情报专家根据潜伏期长短（少于15天）对140个国家的疾病进行分类。炭疽、艾滋病和埃博拉是相对较新的疾病，而此前已有的疾病清单已相当长，包括非洲锥虫病（昏睡病）、雅司病和黄热病。急性呼吸道疾病以及耐青霉素的梅毒和淋病菌株在全球范围内肆虐。蚊媒传播的裂谷热、蜱媒传播的出血热以及由白蛉传播的寄生虫病——利什曼病，只是众多热带疾病中的几种。14 项对策强调免疫接种和卫生，特别注重饮用、烹饪、淋浴设施甚至野战洗衣房的净化水；无害虫的厨房、食堂和住所；消毒厕所；在适当的时候定期“除虱”；控制昆虫和啮齿动物；以及妥善处理废物。
U.S. medical intelligence specialists catalog diseases in 140 countries according to short (less than 15 days) and long incubation periods. Anthrax, AIDS, and ebola are relatively recent additions to an already long list that runs from African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) to yaws and yellow fever. Acute respiratory diseases as well as penicillin-resistant strains of syphilis and gonorrhea are rampant worldwide. Mosquito-borne Rift Valley fever, tick-borne hemorrhagic fever, and leishmaniasis, a parasitic disease deposited by sand flies, are a few among many tropical afflictions.14 Countermeasures emphasize immunizations and sanitation, with particular attention to purified water for drinking, cooking, shower facilities, even field laundries; vermin-free kitchens, chow lines, and living quarters; disinfected latrines; periodic “delousing” whenever appropriate; insect and rodent control; and proper waste disposal.
文化特征
CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
有些人口众多的地区几乎是同质的，但大多数地区都混杂着多数族裔和少数族裔，他们拥有不同的语言、宗教、传统、习俗、风俗、喜好、厌恶和生活方式，这造成了内部或国际上的紧张关系。例如，前南斯拉夫就是一个由种族、宗教、语言和文化冲突交织而成的复杂地区。信奉东正教的塞尔维亚人和信奉罗马天主教的克罗地亚人是最主要的族群，其次是斯洛文尼亚人、斯拉夫穆斯林、阿尔巴尼亚人、马其顿人，以及大约15个较小的族群。塞尔维亚-克罗地亚语被视为一种语言，尽管塞尔维亚人使用西里尔字母，而克罗地亚人则倾向于使用拉丁字母。斯洛文尼亚语和马其顿语是另外两种官方语言。15
Some large populations are nearly homogeneous, but most mingle majorities and minorities with assorted languages, religions, traditions, customs, mores, likes, dislikes, and life styles that create internal or international tensions. Former Yugoslavia, for example, is a crazy quilt of ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural animosities. Serbs, who are Orthodox Christians, and Roman Catholic Croats are the most prominent entities, followed by Slovenes, Slavic Muslims, Albanians, Macedonians, and perhaps 15 smaller groups. Serbo-Croatian is considered one language, although Serbs use the Cyrillic alphabet while Croats prefer Latin letters. Slovene and Macedonian are two other official tongues.15
多数群体和少数群体
MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES
异质性国家通常包含基因不同的种族和文化迥异的族群，这些族群有时会细分为氏族或部落。表15展示了一些典型的复杂关系。人口数量占绝对优势的种族、族群和部落派别并不一定占据主导地位，正如少数欧洲殖民者在人口稠密的亚洲和非洲国家长期所展现的那样。少数族群可能融合良好（例如曾经的美国“熔炉”），也可能遭到排斥（例如欧洲曾经发生的针对犹太人的大屠杀）。军事战略家和战术家应研究其负责区域内的种族、族群和部落关系，因为冲突的根源、升级的可能性、应对措施以及成功概率都因地而异、因案例而异。例如，只要白人占据上风，种族紧张局势就会在黑非洲引发不可调和的麻烦；而宗教和文化因素目前在波斯尼亚占主导地位，那里所有交战方本质上都是斯拉夫人；在中东，阿拉伯人和以色列人都是闪米特人。
Heterogeneous nations generally contain genetically dissimilar racial stocks and culturally distinct ethnic groups that sometimes subdivide into clans or tribes. Table 15 displays representative relationships that commonly are complex. Racial, ethnic, and tribal factions that enjoy a marked quantitative majority do not necessarily dominate, as relatively few European colonists long demonstrated in heavily populated Asian and African countries. Minorities may mesh well (witness the former U.S. “melting pot”) or be anathematized (witness the former pogroms against Jews in Europe). Military strategists and tacticians should study racial, ethnic, and tribal connections in assigned areas of responsibility, because root causes of conflict, potentials for escalation, countermeasures, and probabilities of success are situationally specific from place to place and case to case.16 Racial tensions, for instance, precipitated irreconcilable troubles in Black Africa as long as whites held the upper hand, while religious and cultural factors presently predominate in Bosnia, where all belligerents are essentially Slavic, and in the Middle East where Arabs as well as Israelis are Semitic.
20世纪，三波种族、民族和部落冲突造成了难以估量的苦难。第一波冲突始于第一次世界大战前后，当时奥斯曼帝国和奥匈帝国的统治者失去了控制。针对“饥饿的亚美尼亚人”的暴行最为骇人听闻。17二战后，反殖民主义浪潮席卷南亚和几乎整个非洲。第三波浪潮袭击了第三世界，凡是软弱的替代政府看似不堪一击，或是强权政府实行压迫的地方，都未能幸免。1967年至1970年间，在比夫拉（尼日利亚东南部），强大的富拉尼族和豪萨族与伊博族等少数族裔之间的流血冲突，造成超过一百万人丧生，并一度成为各大媒体的头条新闻。18就像红色高棉在柬埔寨对城市居民实施的种族灭绝行动（1975-1979 年）一样。19前南斯拉夫在铁托去世几年后便陷入动荡，这主要是因为继任者们无法控制由来已久的仇恨。自1990年以来，秘鲁、卢旺达、索马里、苏丹和利比里亚等热点地区也发生了其他一些可追溯到种族、民族或部落冲突的冲突。其动机包括族群暴力、各种侵犯人权行为、分裂主义运动、领土收复主义、收复失地行动以及过度敏感，这些因素往往相互交织。20
Three waves of racial, ethnic, and tribal conflict have caused incalculable suffering in the 20th century. The first onslaught began shortly before, accompanied, and followed World War I, when Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rulers lost control. Atrocities against “starving Armenians” were among the most terrible.17 An anticolonial wave washed across southern Asia and almost all of Africa in the wake of World War II. The third wave hit the Third World wherever weak replacement governments seemed vulnerable or strong ones were repressive. The bloodletting in Biafra (southeastern Nigeria) that pitted powerful Fulani and Hausa tribes against the Ibo minority between 1967 and 1970 took more than a million lives and briefly made banner headlines,18 as did genocidal operations that the Khmer Rouge conducted against city dwellers in Cambodia (1975-1979).19 Former Yugoslavia caught fire a few years after Tito’s death, largely because successors were unable to keep the lid on ancient animosities. Other collisions traceable to racial, ethnic, or tribal rivalries have occurred since 1990 in hot spots such as Peru, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and Liberia. Motivations include communal violence, various abuses, secessionist movements, irredentism, actions to retrieve lost territory, and hypersensitivity, often in combination.20
Table 15. Representative Racial, Ethnic, and Tribal Relationships
语言
LANGUAGES
语言凝聚力往往能巩固社会，而语言分裂则会撕裂社会。因此，沟通不畅常常导致武装冲突也就不足为奇了。目前已知的语系有九个：印欧语系（斯拉夫语系、日耳曼语系、罗曼语系、伊朗语系、印度语系）；含密-闪米特语系；阿尔泰语系；尼日尔-刚果语系；马来-波利尼西亚语系；乌拉语系；汉藏语系；南亚语系；以及一个包含土著语、美洲印第安语、达罗毗荼语、爱斯基摩语、科伊桑语、尼罗-撒哈拉语、古西伯利亚语、巴布亚语和泰语等的杂语系。20世纪末，大约有6000种语言可以被识别，其中只有十几种语言的使用者超过一亿（表16）。21
Linguistic cohesion tends to solidify societies whereas fragmentation pulls them apart. Small wonder, therefore, that inability to communicate effectively often leads to armed conflict. Nine language families currently exist: Indo-European (Slavic, Germanic, Romance, Iranic, Indic); Hamito-Semetic; Altai; Niger-Congo; Malayo-Polynesian; Uraic; Sino-Tibetan; Austro-Asiatic; and a miscellaneous family that includes Aborigine, Amerind, Dravidian, Eskimoan, Khoisan, Nilo-Saharan, Paleosiberian, Papuan, and Tai. Perhaps 6,000 tongues were recognizable at the end of the 20th century, of which only a dozen boasted more than a hundred million speakers (table 16).21
当时许多较小的语言的信徒人数从几百万到几千不等（一些原始部落的信徒人数只有几百），有时这些语言聚集得非常紧密，以至于形成了类似于高加索地区的“破碎区”，在佛罗里达州大小的区域内，有 51 种语言仍然存在（表 17）。22名被部署到该动荡地区维持秩序的俄罗斯士兵发现，他们很难与当地民众进行有效沟通。二战期间，美洲原住民（主要是纳瓦霍族“密码员”）用他们晦涩难懂的语言传递信息，令敌方密码学家困惑不已，因为他们对美洲原住民语言的变体并不熟悉。23
Many lesser languages at that time numbered a few million to a few thousand adherents (a few hundred for some primitive tribes), sometimes clustered so tightly that they form “shatter zones” similar to the Caucasus, where 51 languages persist in an area roughly the size of Florida (table 17).22 Russian troops deployed to keep that volatile region under control found it hard to communicate effectively with the local populace. Native Americans (mainly Navaho “Code Talkers”) transmitted messages in their arcane languages during World War II, confusing enemy cryptologists, to whom Amerind variants were unfamiliar.23
部署在外国的武装部队必须能够与当地部队进行和平时期训练，审讯战俘，对敌方进行电子窃听，与难民沟通，并与盟军伙伴互动。在1991年海湾战争期间，美国特种部队中具备相当流利的阿拉伯语能力，他们随行于100多个中东部队，以协助其与侧翼讲英语的部队进行协调，安排美军炮兵和空袭，并降低友军误伤的风险。24仅仅掌握任何语言的教科书式知识往往是不够的，因为方言、俚语、地方习语和行话层出不穷，还有晦涩难懂的军事术语。此外，修辞手法也经常变化——在美国，很少有人再把大麻称为“grass”，把警察称为“pigs”，尽管在20世纪60年代，“花童”和“嬉皮士”都曾觉得这两个词很时髦。在南太平洋地区流行的皮钦语，几乎无法进行任何基本的对话。在大多数人都是文盲或半文盲的地方，军事“访客”会发现读写能力远不如口语重要。
Armed forces deployed in foreign countries must be able to participate in peacetime training with indigenous troops, interrogate prisoners of war, eavesdrop electronically on enemies, communicate with refugees, and interact with coalition partners. U.S. Special Forces reasonably fluent in Arabic accompanied more than 100 Middle Eastern formations during the Persian Gulf War of 1991 to facilitate coordination with English speaking units on their flanks, arrange U.S. artillery and air strikes, and reduce the likelihood of casualties from “friendly fire.”24 Textbook command of any language seldom is sufficient, because dialects, slang, local idioms, and argot abound, along with arcane military lingo. Figures of speech moreover are subject to frequent change—few in the United States still refer to marijuana as “grass” or police as “pigs,” although “flower children” and “hippies” found both terms fashionable in the 1960s. Pidgin, which is popular in the South Pacific, rules out all but the most rudimentary conversations. Military “visitors” in foreign lands find reading and writing less important than spoken words wherever most people are illiterate or semiliterate.
美国公民通常不太愿意学习语言，部分原因是许多外国官员、店主和酒店员工都懂英语，而且英语还是北约的官方语言，也是世界各地空中交通管制员的通用语言。在拉丁美洲，对美洲原住民语言的需求几乎可以忽略不计，因为那里大多数人讲西班牙语，只有巴西例外，葡萄牙语是主要语言——尽管在哥伦比亚、秘鲁和厄瓜多尔很常见的克丘亚语对于参与禁毒行动的武装部队来说非常有用。
U.S. citizens as a rule are reluctant linguists, partly because many officials, shop keepers, and hotel employees in foreign lands understand English, which additionally is the official language of NATO and air traffic controllers everywhere. Needs for expertise in Native American tongues are next to negligible throughout Latin America, where most people speak Spanish, except for Brazil where Portuguese takes precedence—although Quechua, which is common in Columbia, Peru, and Equador comes in handy for armed forces engaged in counternarcotics operations.
尽管如此，掌握外语在大多数地方都非常有用。美国中央司令部目前管辖东北非和西南亚的17个国家，以及阿富汗和巴基斯坦，这些地区主要使用阿拉伯语、波斯语、乌尔都语、普什图语、达里语、阿姆哈拉语、索马里语和斯瓦希里语。美国太平洋司令部的责任区涵盖东亚、印度次大陆的大部分地区、澳大利亚及其周边岛屿，拥有3000万人口，他们使用18种主要语言和无数方言。基于最佳需求预测的严格优先事项至关重要，因为任何司令部都不可能为每一种情况都配备足够多的合格语言专家（在1990年萨达姆·侯赛因入侵科威特之前，只有16名现役美军语言专家学习过伊拉克方言）。 1992年12月“恢复希望行动”爆发时，索马里语人才极度匮乏，以至于军阀穆罕默德·法拉赫·艾迪德的儿子——一位美国海军陆战队下士——不得不担任翻译，直到他的存在变得不合时宜为止。因此，耗费大量时间和金钱培养的外语专家理应被视为宝贵的资源。25
Proficiency in foreign languages nevertheless is useful in most places. U.S. Central Command currently covers 17 countries in northeast Africa and southwest Asia, plus Afghanistan and Pakistan, where Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, Pashtu, Dari, Amharic, Somali, and Swahili prevail. U.S. Pacific Command’s area of responsibility, which embraces East Asia, most of the Indian subcontinent, Australia, and adjacent islands, contains 30 million people who speak 18 main languages and countless dialects. Strict priorities based on the best possible requirement forecasts are essential, because no command could possibly muster enough well-qualified linguists for every occasion (only 16 U.S. military linguists on active duty had studied Iraqi dialects before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990). Somali speakers were in such short supply when Operation Restore Hope erupted in December 1992 that warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed’s son, a U.S. Marine corporal, served as a translator until his presence became impolitic. Foreign language specialists, produced at great expense in time and money, consequently should be considered prized possessions.25
Table 16. Ten Leading Languages (1990s)
资料来源：L. Luca Cavalli-Sforza 编，《人类基因的历史与地理》（新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1994 年），第 162 页。
Source: L. Luca Cavalli-Sforza, ed., The History and Geography of Human Genes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 162.
Table 17. Linguistic Clutter in the Caucasus
宗教
RELIGIONS
犹太教、基督教和伊斯兰教按此顺序最早出现，它们构成了“全球性宗教”，其信徒遍布其起源地以外的广大地区。佛教、道教、儒教和神道教主要局限于东亚，印度教徒和锡克教徒集中在印度，而各种传统宗教（祖先崇拜、万物有灵论、萨满教和巫毒教）在海地人和黑非洲最为盛行（表18）。26
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, which first appeared in that sequence, constitute “global religions” whose adherents spread far beyond their original regions. Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, and Shinto are confined largely to East Asia, Hindus and Sikhs concentrate in India, and various traditional religions (ancestor worship, animism, shamanism, and voodoo) are most prominent among Haitians and in Black Africa (table 18).26
Table 18. Principal Religions and Selected Denominations
每种宗教都有团结信徒的倾向，而“我们与世界为敌”的心态则往往会撕裂社会，因为它挑拨非犹太人与犹太人、穆斯林与异教徒、基督徒与异教徒以及“真正的信徒”与不可知论者之间的关系。27事实上，宗教冲突可能极其残酷。1095年至1270年间，基督教十字军对待本土的异教徒与对待圣地的穆斯林一样残忍。当西蒙四世·德·蒙福尔询问教皇英诺森三世的使者如何辨别法国贝济耶城的异端时，得到的回答是：“杀光他们。上帝自会认出属于他的人。”28三十年战争，从 1618 年到 1648 年，给西欧带来了毁灭性的灾难，这场战争始于罗马天主教对德国新教改革的反击。1857 年，英国东印度公司在孟加拉雇佣的29 名基督教军官因不尊重宗教禁忌而引发了印度兵变——新配发的恩菲尔德步枪成为了导火索，因为当地士兵不得不咬纸质子弹，而这些子弹据称涂有牛油（印度教徒认为牛油是神圣的）和猪油（穆斯林认为猪油是不洁的）。30英国将军查尔斯·“中国”·戈登后来镇压了中国的太平天国运动，但在此之前，1850 年至 1864 年间有 2000 万人丧生。苏丹的苦行僧信奉自称马赫迪（弥赛亚）的穆罕默德·艾哈迈德·伊本·阿萨伊德，他试图“净化”伊斯兰教，造成了广泛的伤亡，并在二十年后杀死了戈登，之后援军才重新夺回了喀土穆。31
Every religion tends to unify its followers, whereas “we against the world” syndromes tend to tear societies apart whenever they pit gentiles against Jews, Muslims against infidels, Christians against pagans, and “true believers” against agnostics.27 Religious conflicts in fact can be incredibly cruel. Christian Crusaders between 1095 and 1270 were just as merciless toward nonconformists close to home as they were toward Muslims in the Holy Land. When Simon IV de Montfort asked the emissary of Pope Innocent III how he might identify heretics in the French city of Béziers the response was, “Kill them all. God will know his own.”28 The Thirty Years’ War, which devastated Western Europe between 1618 and 1648, began as a Roman Catholic backlash against the Protestant Reformation in Germany.29 Christian officers employed by the British East India Company in Bengal precipitated the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 through failure to respect religious taboos—newly issued Enfield rifles furnished the catalyst, because indigenous troops had to bite paper cartridges that allegedly were greased with fat from cattle, which Hindus consider sacred, and fat from swine, which Muslims consider unclean.30 British General Charles “Chinese” Gordon later crushed the theocratic Taiping Rebellion in China, but not before 20 million people perished between 1850 and 1864. Sudanese dervishes devoted to Muhammad Ahmad Ibn Assayyid, a self-proclaimed Mahdi (messiah) who sought to “purify” Islam, inflicted widespread casualties and slew Gordon two decades later before reinforcements reconquered Khartoum.31
我们无需深入探究过去，就能发现具有深远军事影响的宗教暴行：32
One need not delve so deeply into the past to discover religious atrocities with profound military implications:32
• 维和人员必须将塞浦路斯的希腊基督徒与土耳其穆斯林分开，将西奈半岛的犹太人与穆斯林分开，将波斯尼亚的穆斯林与基督徒分开。
• Peacekeepers must separate Christian Greeks from Islamic Turks on Cyprus, Jews from Muslims in the Sinai, and Muslims from Christians in Bosnia.
• 信奉基督教的亚美尼亚人和信奉伊斯兰教的阿塞拜疆人在高加索地区似乎无法共存。
• Christian Armenians and Azerbaijani Muslims cannot seem to coexist in the Caucasus.
• 斯里兰卡的佛教僧伽罗人和印度教泰米尔人对和平几乎没有兴趣。
• Buddhist Sinhalese and Hindu Tamils in Sri Lanka profess little interest in peace.
• 在北爱尔兰，教派间的冲突导致大量流血事件发生，天主教徒和新教徒互相敌对；在伊拉克，萨达姆·侯赛因总统煽动逊尼派多数群体屠杀什叶派少数群体。
• Interdenominational disputes spill blood by the barrel in Northern Ireland, where Catholics and Protestants are at each other’s throats, and in Iraq where President Saddam Hussein prompts the Sunni majority to slaughter Shiite minorities.
• 宗教战争屡屡亵渎神圣之地：旁遮普邦锡克教金庙数百人丧生；1992 年，据称是罗摩诞生地的寺庙发生骚乱，造成 2000 名印度教徒和穆斯林死亡；1996 年，犹太人在耶路撒冷圣殿山与巴勒斯坦人交战。
• Religious warfare repeatedly desecrates hallowed grounds: hundreds have perished at the Sikh’s Golden Temple in the Punjab; rioting at the temple where Rama reportedly was born left 2,000 Hindus and Muslims dead in 1992; and Jews battled Palestinians on Jerusalem’s Temple Mount in 1996.
军事指挥官和参谋人员若忽视宗教传统和习俗，至少会在两个方面面临错误决策的风险。首先，他们可能无意中冒犯盟友和中立国，后者可能会误认为他们的行为是故意不敬（例如，驻沙特阿拉伯的美军不饮酒，因为伊斯兰教禁止饮酒）。其次，他们可能错失利用宗教习俗的机会。例如，1973年埃及军队穿越苏伊士运河时，以色列守军措手不及，因为这次袭击不仅恰逢犹太教的赎罪日，而且发生在穆斯林通常用于斋戒和祈祷的斋月期间。1968 年， 33 名北越士兵及其越共同伙利用类似的机会，在非军事区以南，正值充满宗教色彩的农历新年庆祝活动如火如荼之际，发动了春节攻势。34
Military commanders and staffs who overlook religious traditions and temperaments risk wrong moves in at least two regards. First, they may inadvertently offend friends and neutrals who might mistakenly interpret their behavior as intentional disrespect (U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia abstain from alcoholic beverages because Islam forbids imbibement). Second, they may miss opportunities to exploit religious practices. Egyptian troops, for example, caught Israeli defenders flatfooted when they crossed the Suez Canal in 1973, because the attack not only coincided with Yom Kippur, a Jewish high holy day, but occurred during the month of Ramadan, which Muslims normally reserve for fasting and prayer.33 North Vietnamese soldiers and their Viet Cong accomplices took similar advantage in 1968 when they triggered the Tet offensive while lunar New Year festivities with religious overtones were in full swing south of the demilitarized zone.34
当前态度
CURRENT ATTITUDES
无论人口规模、分布、密度和文化特征如何，民众情绪在政治军事事务中都起着至关重要的作用。忠诚度、士气、当下情绪（好斗、爱好和平、中立、冷漠）、纪律、法律、伦理和价值观都至关重要。
Moods of the masses play a pivotal role in political-military affairs, regardless of the size, distribution, density, and cultural characteristics of any population. Loyalties, morale, temperaments of the moment (aggressive, pacific, neutral, apathetic), discipline, laws, ethics, and values all are relevant.
忠诚
LOYALTIES
任何希望在和平时期和战争时期对友好、敌对或中立民众产生积极影响的武装力量，都必须了解民众的主要忠诚所在，因为当利益冲突、局势危急时，国家、地区、种族、宗教信仰、族群、部落、政党、社会阶层和其他归属感都可能成为首要的忠诚对象。例如，共产主义目前在朝鲜占据主导地位，法裔加拿大人坚守着他们的民族传统，索马里人则围绕着氏族团结起来。此外，人们的偏好也会随着时间而改变。斯蒂芬·迪凯特那句振奋人心的名言——“我们的国家……愿她永远正确；但无论对错，我们的国家都值得我们尊重”——如今在美国的影响力已不如1816年发表时那么强烈。简而言之，忠诚在很大程度上决定了民众对外部刺激的反应，并强化了民众在压力下巩固或瓦解的倾向。
Armed forces that hope to influence friendly, enemy, or neutral populations favorably in peacetime as well as war must understand where primary loyalties lie, because nations, regions, races, religious preferences, ethnic groups, tribes, political parties, social castes, and other affiliations may stake first claim when interests conflict and the chips are down. Communism currently dominates in North Korea, Canadians of French extraction cling to their ethnic heritage, and Somalis coalesce around clans. Predilections, moreover, may change over time. Stephen Decatur’s stirring words, “Our country . . . may she always be right; but our country right or wrong” currently resonate less in the United States than they did when delivered in 1816. Allegiances, in short, strongly condition popular responses to external stimuli and strengthen tendencies to solidify or crack under pressure.
士气
MORALE
1941年6月15日，乔治·C·马歇尔将军在康涅狄格州哈特福德的三一学院发表讲话时，将公众士气描述为：
General George C. Marshall, speaking at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut, on June 15, 1941, described public morale as
这是一种精神状态。它是坚定、勇气和希望。它是自信、热情和忠诚。它是活力、团队精神和决心。它是持久力，是永不放弃的精神。直到最后——就是必胜的意志。有了它，一切皆有可能；没有它，其他一切，包括计划、准备和生产，都将毫无意义。
a state of mind. It is steadfastness, courage and hope. It is confidence and zeal and loyalty. It is elan, esprit de corps, and determination. It is staying power, the spirit which endures to the end—the will to win. With it, all things are possible, without it everything else, planning, preparation, production count for naught.
领导力、纪律、社区联系和集体自尊通常能够提振士气。痛苦和匮乏，加上对崇高事业的坚定信念，也能起到同样的作用，前提是它们能够激励平民和军人提高生产力、减少消费，并在绝境中坚守阵地。1940年的不列颠空战、后来的列宁格勒、斯大林格勒和柏林战役，以及之后越南人口稠密的地区，都印证了这一点，尽管炮火连天，人们依然保持着勇气。相比之下，法西斯意大利在二战初期就投降了，因为它失去了竞争的欲望。35
Leadership, discipline, community ties, and group self-respect commonly buttress morale. So can pain and privation coupled with steadfast belief in a worthy cause, provided they encourage civilians as well as uniformed personnel to produce more, consume less, and stand fast in desperate situations. That happened during the Battle of Britain in 1940, later in Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Berlin, and later still in heavily populated parts of Vietnam, where courage persisted despite a rain of bombs. Fascist Italy, in contrast, capitulated early in World War II because the urge to compete expired.35
民众情绪可能始终如一，也可能在自由主义与保守主义、鹰派与鸽派、理想主义与现实主义、理性与非理性之间摇摆不定。这种舆论的转变有时会产生类似美国在越南战争期间经历的钟摆效应：20世纪60年代初的冷漠；60年代中期的积极参与；60年代末的幻灭；以及1972年最后一批美军地面部队撤离后再次回归冷漠。能够敏锐把握这种趋势的政治军事领导人，最能利用由此产生的敌方弱点，并最大限度地减少自身的脆弱性。
Moods of the masses may be consistent or vacillate from liberal to conservative, hawkish to dovish, idealistic to realistic, rational to irrational. Shifting opinions sometimes create a pendulum effect similar to that experienced by the United States during the Vietnam War: indifference in the early 1960s; avid involvement in the mid-1960s; disillusionment in the late 1960s; and return to indifference after the last U.S. ground forces withdrew in 1972. Political-military leaders attuned to such trends are best able to exploit resultant enemy weaknesses and limit their own vulnerabilities.
道德和法律约束
MORAL AND LEGAL CONSTRAINTS
在古代，生命属于食肉者，旨在限制军队战争行为的法律、伦理和道德准则几乎不存在。任何男女老幼，无论是否参战，只要效忠于敌对势力或仅仅居住在敌对势力的领土上，都被视为必须消灭的敌人。凯旋的军队常常屠杀战俘或将他们卖为奴隶。整个文明就此消亡。公元前689年，嗜血的亚述人在西拿基立的统治下摧毁了巴比伦。此后不久，米底人和迦勒底人洗劫了亚述首都尼尼微，并在城中撒盐。
Legal, ethical, and moral codes of conduct designed to limit the way armed forces wage war were nearly nonexistent in olden times, when life belonged to the meat eaters. Every man, woman, and child, male or female, young or old, combatant or bystander who owed allegiance to or merely resided in rival territory was an enemy to be eradicated. Triumphant troops commonly slaughtered prisoners of war or sold them into slavery. Entire civilizations disappeared. Bloodthirsty Assyrians under Sennacherib obliterated Babylon in 689 B.C. Medes and Chaldeans shortly thereafter sacked Ninevah, the Assyrian capital, and sowed the site with salt.
如今适用更严格的基本规则。大多数国家原则上（即便在实践中并非如此）都认可两项海牙公约（1899 年、1907 年）以及 1864 年、1906 年、1929 年和 1949 年日内瓦公约中所载的各项控制措施。这些公约共同区分了身着制服的战斗人员和旁观者，禁止不人道的手段，并规定了对战俘的人道待遇。36独裁者坚信强权即公理，常常不顾法律，随心所欲地动用武力达成目的；而自由社会的领导人，若没有其所代表的人民的同意或默许，几乎不可能出于任何目的发动大规模军事行动。因此，密切关注国内外民意的人士，能够提供有关双方或任何一方可能采取或放弃的行动方案的有用线索。
Tighter ground rules apply today. Most nations, in principle if not in practice, approve controls contained in two Hague Conventions (1899, 1907), as well as the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929, and 1949, which, taken together, distinguish between uniformed combatants and bystanders, proscribe inhumane techniques, and prescribe humane treatment of POWs.36 Dictators, firm in their conviction that might makes right, routinely match ends with military means as they see fit without much regard for legality, but leaders in free societies seldom can conduct sizable military operations for any purpose without the consent or passive acquiescence of people they represent. Fingers on the public pulse at home and abroad consequently can furnish useful clues concerning courses of action that either or both sides might adopt or discard.
国家名人
NATIONAL PERSONALITIES
政治学家们一直争论着一个国家在多大程度上（甚至是否）拥有某种集体“人格”，以至于军事策划者和行动者可以安全地将其纳入考量。争论者们很可能也会将类似的论点应用于任何特定社会中的大型种族和族裔群体。
Political scientists eternally debate degrees to which (even whether) any nation possesses a collective “personality” that military planners and operators can safely include in their calculations. Disputants might well apply similar arguments to large racial and ethnic groups within any given society.
一种观点认为，民族性格不仅使不同民族彼此区分开来，并影响他们的行为方式，而且还强烈抵制变革。例如，尽管1917年共产党独裁者取代沙皇后，俄罗斯经历了巨大的动荡，国家制度和价值观在各个层面都受到了冲击；20世纪80年代末，随着“公开性”（glasnost ）和“改革”（ perestroika）政策的实施，这个封闭的社会开始转型，但耐心、坚忍和对祖国的绝对忠诚仍然是俄罗斯人的主要特征。柬埔寨人自认为是战士，而他们的邻国老挝低地人则性情温和；许多老挝人在生死搏斗中，更倾向于用擦伤而非致命一击来吓走敌人的亡灵。该学派的信徒认为，几乎每个国家都表现出同样独特的特征，他们认为德国人具有集体主义、勤劳、自律和服从政府权威的特点，而美国公民则相反，具有个人主义、创新、暴力、慷慨、容易受骗和保护个人权利的特点。37
One school of thought insists that national personalities not only set peoples apart and condition the way they behave but strongly resist change. Patience, stoicism, and dogmatic devotion to the homeland, for example, remained dominant Russian attributes despite huge upheavals that wracked national institutions and values at every level of life after Communist dictators replaced tsars in 1917 and again after glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) programs started to transform that closed society in the late 1980s. Cambodians as a society consider themselves to be warriors, whereas Lowland Laotians, their next door neighbors, are gentle; many in mortal combat seek to scare off enemy spirits with near misses rather than shots aimed to kill. Disciples of this school, who contend that nearly every nation displays equally distinctive characteristics, see Germans as group-oriented, industrious, disciplined, and amenable to governmental authority while U.S. citizenry, in contrast, is individualistic, innovative, violent, generous, gullible, and protective of personal rights.37
第二种观点认为这些概括都是刻板印象，质疑民族性格特征的永久性，并引用历史例子来支持其论点。38德国总参谋部由普鲁士将军领导，他们自诩拥有“战争天才”长达 200 年之久，但在第二次世界大战后消失了。39日本长期以来尊崇武士道（武士之道），至今仍奉行 1946 年宪法，该宪法永远放弃战争。40.美国的思潮在20世纪30年代从孤立主义转向了随后十年的国际参与，并一直延续至今。简而言之，怀疑论者认为，变化比一致性更能体现美国的本质特征。
A second school scoffs at these generalizations as stereotypes, challenges the permanence of national personality traits, and cites historical examples to support its contentions.38 The German General Staff, headed by Prussian generals who prided themselves on “a genius for war” for 200 years, disappeared after World War II.39 Japan, which long honored Bushido (the way of Samurai warriors), still subscribes to a 1946 Constitution that renounces war forever.40 U.S. sentiments switched from isolationism in the 1930s to international involvement the following decade and have remained so ever since. Consistency, in short, is less characteristic than change, according to skeptics.
第三所学校的发言人则认为存在一种折衷方案。他们断言，不同民族“往往比与其他任何国家的成员更相似”，特定文化的成员“往往以相似的方式做出反应”，文化压力将“对个体差异施加或多或少的共同方向，并在一定程度上减轻这些差异”，并且将会出现“大片近乎一致的区域”。41深思熟虑的政治家和军事指挥官在寻求调和各种歧义时会谨慎行事，因为这三种学派似乎都不是完全正确或完全错误的。
Spokespersons for school three see a middle ground. Different peoples, they assert, do ”tend to be more like each other than they are like members of any other nation,” members of a given culture do “tend to respond in similar ways,” cultural pressures will “impose a more or less common direction on individual differences and mitigate them to some extent,” and “large areas of near uniformity” will emerge.41 Thoughtful statesmen and military commanders who seek to reconcile ambiguities tread carefully, because none of those three schools seems entirely correct or erroneous.
跨文化技能
CROSS-CULTURAL SKILLS
与外国同行密切合作的军事人员必须熟悉当地风俗习惯，并具备跨文化沟通能力，包括熟练掌握当地常用语言和方言，以及在与识字人士交流时具备读写能力。
Military personnel who work closely with counterparts in foreign countries must be familiar with local folkways and possess cross-cultural communication skills that include reasonable fluency in prevalent languages and dialects, plus reading and writing abilities wherever their contacts are literate.
熟悉民俗
FAMILIARITY WITH FOLKWAYS
熟悉民俗比熟悉外语更为重要。需要考虑的因素涵盖广泛，包括传统、习俗、价值观、动机、希望、恐惧和禁忌；宗教信仰；仪式、礼节和节日；礼仪和举止；行为；社会等级；权力体系；男女关系；道德准则和性习俗；职业道德、竞争与合作以及守时；对贿赂和官员腐败的看法；以及饮食习惯。42
Familiarity with folkways takes precedence over familiarity with foreign languages. Cogent considerations cover a broad spectrum that includes traditions, customs, values, motivations, hopes, fears, and taboos; religious beliefs; rites, rituals, and holidays; manners and mannerisms; behavior; social hierarchies; lines of authority; relationships between men and women; moral codes and sexual mores; work ethics, competition versus cooperation, and punctuality; views about bribes and official corruption; and dietary regimes.42
与陌生文化打交道需要耐心、自制力、应对挫折的能力以及对不同生活方式的包容。以下摘自沙特阿拉伯的指导语。《阿拉伯：士兵指南》是美国陆军在“沙漠风暴”行动期间向部队发放的，其中列举的物品，经过适当修改后，几乎可以适用于任何地方：
Dealings with unfamiliar cultures demand patience, self-control, abilities to cope with frustration, and tolerance for unfamiliar ways of life. An excerpt from instructions in Saudi Arabia: A Soldier’s Guide, which the United States Army issued to troops during Operation Desert Storm, illustrates items that, properly modified, might apply almost anywhere:
问候
Greetings
做-
DO—
• 与阿拉伯男性见面和离开时要握手
• Shake hands when you meet and leave Arab men
• 当德高望重的人进入房间时，要起立以示尊敬。
• Rise to show respect when an esteemed person enters the room
• 如果阿拉伯男子主动拥抱或亲吻脸颊，请随意回应。
• Feel free to return a hug or a kiss on the cheek initiated by an Arab man
与阿拉伯人合作
Working with Arabs
做-
DO—
• 如果可能，应将军官和士兵分开训练。
• Train officers and enlisted men separately if possible
• 将任何严重问题提交给阿拉伯领导人。
• Refer any serious problems to an Arab leader
不-
DON’T—
• 批评阿拉伯人。如有必要，私下里以积极的方式给予纠正性指导。
• Criticize an Arab. Give corrective guidance privately and positively, if required
在他人面前过分赞扬阿拉伯人
• Overpraise an Arab in front of others
• 发脾气
• Lose your temper
• 希望阿拉伯人能准时参加行政会议
• Expect Arabs to be punctual for administrative meetings
对话
Conversation
做-
DO—
• 进行一些轻松的闲聊（你好吗？你家人都好吗？）
• Open conversation with small talk (How are you? How is your family?)
• 与阿拉伯人平等交谈；避免争论；保持眼神交流
• Talk to Arabs as equals; avoid arguments; maintain eye contact
• 注意言外之意，因为阿拉伯人经常间接回答问题。
• Look for subtle meanings, since Arabs often answer questions indirectly
不-
DON’T—
• 主动谈论政治、宗教，或询问有关女性家庭成员的问题。
• Initiate talk about politics, religion, or ask questions about female family members
• 对阿拉伯人摆出居高临下的态度或轻蔑的语气
• Patronize or talk down to an Arab
• 如果一位阿拉伯人在谈话时离你很近，请远离他/她。
• Move away from an Arab who stands very close to you during conversation
• 与阿拉伯人坐在一起时，不要用脚底指向他（这是侮辱）。43
• Point the soles of your feet at an Arab when you are sitting with him (it is insulting).43
外国领域专家
FOREIGN AREA SPECIALISTS
高级军事参谋人员、武官、对外联络小组、在国外训练部队的团队、心理战部队和民事事务部队都需要外国事务专家，因为如果没有对文化背景的充分了解，任何人都无法最专业地执行分配的任务。
Senior military staffs, attachés, foreign liaison cells, teams that train troops in foreign countries, psychological operations (PSYOP) forces, and civil affairs units all require foreign area specialists, because none can perform assigned missions most professionally without full appreciation for cultural contexts.
军事教官、顾问和流动训练小组需要了解外国的政治特点、等级制度和“古怪”的社会习俗，但他们发现，再多的学校教育和二手资料也无法比实地考察更能让他们做好准备。事实上，没有什么能替代与当地民众的密切接触，因为当地领导人和被领导人性格各异，追求个人或集体目标，而且往往生活在彼此隔绝的世界里，彼此之间存在着等级、年龄、性别、肤色、教育和阶级的隔阂。
Military instructors, advisers, and mobile training teams, who need to know about foreign political peculiarities, pecking orders, and “eccentric” social practices, find that no amount of schooling and second-hand accounts can prepare them as well as onsite assignments. There is, in fact, no substitute for close association with people on the spot, where local leaders and the led possess assorted personalities, pursue personal or group agendas, and often as not live in separate worlds, segregated by rank, age, sex, color, education, and class barriers.
心理战专家试图在战前、战中和战后，以各种方式影响盟友、中立方和敌方的观点、情绪、态度和行为，从而帮助实现国家、国际或国内目标。他们必须精通诸多政治、经济、文化和时事议题，才能制定出能够吸引并持续吸引特定群体注意力、并有效应对反制措施的宣传活动、主题和信息，因为每个外国受众的利益都各不相同。他们必须了解人们的倾向、弱点以及对各种说服方式的敏感性。否则，他们只能猜测心理战传单上的哪些图片和颜色可能吸引特定受众，哪些会令人反感或遭到嘲笑。44
PSYOP specialists seek to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of friends, neutrals, and enemies in ways that assist the accomplishment of national, international, or intranational objectives before, during, and after hostilities. They must master many political, economic, cultural, and topical subjects before they can tailor campaigns, themes, and messages that muster and maintain the attention of any given group and refute countermeasures, because each foreign audience has different interests, predispositions, vulnerabilities, and susceptibilities to various persuasions. Otherwise, they could only guess what pictures and colors on PSYOP leaflets might appeal to particular audiences and which would repel or be received derisively.44
民事事务部队也极其重视跨文化技能，否则他们无法有效地安排在外国领土上为武装部队获取当地劳动力、交通运输、通讯、物资、其他资源和各种服务；无法最大限度地减少平民对军事行动的干扰（难民管控是相关问题之一）；无法协助军事指挥官履行其在指定责任区内对平民的法律和道义义务；也无法根据指示在被占领土行使行政、立法和司法权力。美国民事事务部队与阿拉伯同行合作，执行了上述大部分任务。1991年解放日，他们指挥向科威特城运送紧急食品、饮用水和医疗用品；随后，他们又协助科威特政府恢复卫生、环境卫生、交通和电力设施，修复公用设施，重建警察部队，并扑灭邻近油田的火灾。45
Civil Affairs (CA) forces also covet cross-cultural skills, without which they cannot most competently arrange the acquisition of indigenous labor, transportation, communications, supplies, other resources, and miscellaneous services for use by armed forces in foreign lands; minimize civilian interference with military operations (refugee control is one related concern); help military commanders fulfill legal/moral obligations to civilians within assigned areas of responsibility; and, as directed, exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority in occupied territories. U.S. CA units, in collaboration with Arab counterparts, performed most of those missions when they directed the delivery of emergency food, water, and medical supplies to Kuwait City on liberation day in 1991, then helped the Government of Kuwait restore health, sanitation, transportation, and electrical facilities, repair utilities, reestablish police forces, and extinguish fires in neighboring oil fields.45
熟悉外语
FAMILIARITY WITH FOREIGN LANGUAGES
具备文化敏感性的外事专家需要熟练掌握其工作所在地的通用语言和方言。他们有时可以使用英语、法语或皮钦语等辅助语言，但能够用当地语言交流会赢得更多尊重（一位日本高级官员曾对作者说：“我在美国时理所当然地会说英语，但当我在自己的国家不得不与美国使节说英语时，我感到非常愤怒”）。此外，流利的会话能力还能极大地拓展与非双语人士的联系。如果演讲者能够准确把握对方的语调、重音、语调变化和语速，面对面的交流会更加有效。恰当的面部表情和手势也会因文化而异。例如，美国人用拇指和食指比划成圆圈表示“OK”，而希腊人认为这种手势不礼貌，巴西人则认为这是猥亵的。同一个符号在日本表示金钱，在法国表示零。46
Culturally attuned foreign area specialists need a reasonable command of the language(s) and dialect(s) prevalent where they perform. They sometimes can rely on a substitute tongue such as English, French, or pidgin, but abilities to communicate in the local vernacular gain much greater respect (a senior Japanese official once said to the author, “I expect to speak English when I’m in the United States, but I’m outraged when I must speak English to U.S. emissaries in my own country”). Conversational fluency moreover expands contacts immeasurably among citizens who are not bilingual. Face-to-face communications are most effective if presenters have a good feel for preferred tones of voice, emphases, inflections, and delivery speeds. Appropriate facial expressions and gestures also differ considerably from culture to culture. Americans who form a circle with thumb and forefinger, for example, signal ”OK,” whereas Greeks consider that gesture impolite and Brazilians believe it is obscene. The same sign signifies money in Japan and zero in France.46
缺乏语言技能的外国地区专家必须聘请口译员，即便在最佳情况下，这种做法也远不能令人满意。伦敦东区人、苏格兰人、卡津人和康涅狄格州人都会说英语，但独特的口音、方言和俚语使得他们彼此难以理解。当信息经过可能怀有不可告人目的和隐秘意图的第三方之口时，问题会更加复杂。除非口译员精通军事术语、技术词汇以及当地方言，否则他们无法准确传达文字的含义。此外，即使拥有无可挑剔的语言能力，口译员也必须迎合当地的文化偏见和等级制度，否则听众会更关注口译员的身份而非其所表达的内容。例如，在女性地位较低的社会中，女性往往会做出错误的选择。在许多国家，士兵担任口译员会冒犯军官，而委任的口译员则往往会吓到新兵，从而阻碍学习进程。47
Foreign area specialists who lack linguistic skills must employ interpreters, even though that practice is less than completely satisfactory under best case circumstances. Cockneys, Scots, Cajuns, and Connecticut Yankees all speak English, but unique accents, regional dialects, and colloquialisms make it hard for them to understand each other. Problems compound when messages filter through the minds, value systems, and lips of third parties who may have ulterior motives and hidden agendas. Interpreters cannot transmit meanings along with words unless their competence includes military jargon and technical terms as well as local patois. Those with impeccable linguistic credentials moreover must conform well with cultural prejudices and caste systems, lest audiences pay more attention to who he or she is rather than what is said. Women, for example, make poor choices in societies where their status is low. Enlisted interpreters offend military officers in many countries, while commissioned interpreters tend to intimidate enlisted trainees and thereby impede learning processes.47
最后值得一提的是，能够读写并能说当地语言的外事专家比那些不能读写和说当地语言的专家更能深入了解当地文化和时事。他们的能力和对所分配任务的贡献也会相应提高。
Finally, it seems worth noting that foreign area specialists who can read and write as well as speak local languages learn much more about cultures and current events than those who cannot. Their capabilities and usefulness to assigned commands increase commensurately.
要点
KEY POINTS
“知己知彼，百战不殆”是一条军事准则，而非陈词滥调。孙子或许还会加上一句：“知己知彼，百战不殆”。
• “Know your enemy and know yourself” is a military imperative, not a military cliché. Sun Tzu might have added, “Know your friends and coalition partners” as well.
• 种族、民族、宗教和部落仇恨往往导致战争，并阻碍和平努力。
• Racial, ethnic, religious, and tribal animosities often cause wars and resist peacemaking efforts.
• 人口统计学家预测，在人口过剩已经造成危险动荡的欠发达地区，人口将会出现爆炸式增长。
• Demographers predict population explosions in underdeveloped regions where overcrowding already creates dangerous unrest.
• 除非军队进行适当的免疫接种并重视卫生，尤其是在热带地区，否则疾病造成的伤亡可能比战斗行动造成的伤亡还要多。
• Diseases can cause more casualties than combat actions unless armed forces are immunized appropriately and emphasize sanitation, especially in the tropics.
• 因此，军事计划和行动可以从有关当前或预计作战区域的人口模式、语言、宗教偏好、文化、习俗和社会结构的建议和帮助中获益匪浅。
• Military plans and operations consequently benefit immensely from advice and assistance concerning population patterns, languages, religious preferences, cultures, customs, and social structures in present or projected areas of operation.
• 寻求“力量倍增器”的指挥官和参谋人员应该寻找具有跨文化技能的外国领域专家，这些技能在从和平时期到全面战争的各个方面都具有战略和战术价值。
• Commanders and staffs in search of “force multipliers” should seek foreign area specialists who possess cross-cultural skills that are strategically and tactically valuable across the complete spectrum from peacetime to full-scale war.
笔记
NOTES
1.毛泽东选集（伦敦：劳伦斯和威沙特出版社，1954-1956 年）；拉尔夫·L·鲍威尔，“毛泽东军事理论”，《亚洲调查》（1968 年 4 月）：240-243。
1. Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954-1956); Ralph L. Powell, “Maoist Military Doctrine,” Asian Survey (April 1968): 240-243.
2.孙子，《孙子兵法》，塞缪尔·B·格里菲斯编辑和翻译（纽约：牛津大学出版社，1963 年），第 84 页。
2. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed. and trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.
3. 《华盛顿邮报》 1996 年 7 月 20 日 A21 版刊登文章“这到底是怎么回事” 。
3. “What on Earth,” Washington Post, July 20, 1996, A21.
4.人口统计数据（以色列特拉维夫：以色列外交部中央统计局，1996 年 9 月 11 日）。
4. Population Statistics (Tel Aviv, Israel: Central Bureau of Statistics, Israeli Foreign Ministry, September 11, 1996).
5. Willard Waller 编，《二十世纪的战争》（纽约：兰登书屋，1940 年），第 92-93 页；《第二次世界大战军事史》，T. Dodson Stamps 和 Vincent J. Esposito 编，《欧洲战区作战》，第 1 卷（纽约西点：美国军事学院，1953 年），第 669 页。
5. Willard Waller, ed., War in the Twentieth Century (New York: Random House, 1940), 92-93; A Military History of World War II, T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent J. Esposito, eds., Operations in the European Theaters, vol. 1 (West Point, New York: U.S. Military Academy, 1953), 669.
6. Edward Meade Earle 编，《现代战略的缔造者：从马基雅维利到希特勒的军事思想》（新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1943 年），第 388-400、408、506 页；John Tolland，《旭日东升：日本帝国的衰落与灭亡》（纽约：兰登书屋，1970 年），第 3-53 页；Gordon Prange，《黎明时分我们入睡》（纽约：麦格劳-希尔出版社，1981 年），第 4-5、100-101、169-170、449 页。
6. Edward Meade Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943), 388-400, 408, 506; John Tolland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire (New York: Random House, 1970), 3-53; Gordon Prange, At Dawn We Slept (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), 4-5, 100-101, 169-170, 449.
7. Charles A. Webster，《人口增长：对下一代和平的主要威胁》（华盛顿特区：国家战争学院战略研究小组，1973 年 6 月 11 日），第 1-7 页。
7. Charles A. Webster, Population Growth: Major Threat to the Next Generation of Peace, (Washington, DC: Strategic Research Group, National War College, June 11, 1973), 1-7.
8.尤金·金凯德，《除了一场战争之外的每一场战争》（纽约：WW Norton，1959 年），第 15-16 页；官方统计数据，美国国防情报局，1996 年 9 月 25 日通过电话提供。
8. Eugene Kinkead, In Every War But One (New York: W. W. Norton, 1959), 15-16; official statistics, U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, furnished telephonically, September 25, 1996.
9. Wayne O. Evans 和 James E. Hansen，“高海拔地区的部队表现”，陆军（1966 年 2 月）：55-58。
9. Wayne O. Evans and James E. Hansen, “Troop Performance at High Altitudes,” Army (February 1966): 55-58.
10. Melvyn C. Goldstein，《现代西藏史，1913-1951：喇嘛教国家的消亡》（加州伯克利：加州大学出版社，1989 年）。
10. Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989).
11. Richard F. Cronin 和 Barbara Ann LePoer，《克什米尔争端：当前斗争的历史背景》，报告编号 91-563F9（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1991 年 7 月）。
11. Richard F. Cronin and Barbara Ann LePoer, The Kashmir Dispute: Historical Background to the Current Struggle, Report No. 91-563F9 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 1991).
12. P. Choudhuri，《第9廓尔喀步枪团：团史，1817-1947》（印度新德里：Vision Books，1984年）；Bryon Farwell，《廓尔喀人》（纽约：WW Norton，1984年）。
12. P. Choudhuri, 9 Gurkha Rifles: A Regimental History, 1817-1947 (New Delhi, India: Vision Books, 1984); Bryon Farwell, The Gurkhas (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984).
13.中东的疾病威胁：第 101 空降师（空中突击）的预防策略（肯塔基州坎贝尔堡：第101空降师预防医学活动，1982 年），1；L .达德利·斯坦普，《生与死的地理》（伊萨卡，纽约：康奈尔大学出版社，1964 年），尤其是第四章。
13. Disease Threats in the Middle East: Preventive Strategies for the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) (Fort Campbell, KY: 101st Airborne Division Preventive Medicine Activity, 1982), 1; L. Dudley Stamp, The Geography of Life and Death (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1964), especially chapters I-V.
14.《疾病和环境警报报告》（华盛顿特区：武装部队医学情报中心和国防情报局，1992 年 3 月）；肯尼斯·F·基普尔编，《剑桥世界人类疾病史》（纽约：剑桥大学出版社，1993 年）；罗伯特·帕森斯，“追踪热带疾病”，《陆军文摘》（1970 年 6 月）：42-44；B·丹尼斯·霍金斯，“为部队接种炭疽疫苗的计划获得批准”，《陆军时报》，1996 年 10 月 21 日，第 8 页。
14. Disease and Environmental Alert Reports (Washington, DC: Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center and Defense Intelligence Agency, March 1992); Kenneth F. Kiple, ed., The Cambridge World History of Human Disease (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Robert Parsons, “Tracking Down Tropical Diseases,” Army Digest (June 1970): 42-44; B. Denise Hawkins, “Plan OK’d to Give Troops Anthrax Shots,” Army Times, October 21, 1996, 8.
15. Charles Sudetic，“社会及其环境”，载于《南斯拉夫：国别研究》 ，第 3版，Glenn E. Curtis 编辑（华盛顿特区：国会图书馆联邦研究部，1992 年），第 69-88 页。
15. Charles Sudetic, “The Society and Its Environment,” in Yugoslavia: A Country Study, 3d ed., ed. Glenn E. Curtis (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1992), 69-88.
16. Ted Robert Gurr，“种族战争与全球安全优先事项的变化”， 《地中海季刊》（1990 年冬季刊）：82-98。
16. Ted Robert Gurr, “Ethnic Warfare and the Changing Priorities of Global Security,” Mediterranean Quarterly (Winter 1 990): 82-98.
17. Gerard Chaliand 和 Yves Ternon，《亚美尼亚人从种族灭绝到抵抗》（新泽西州托托瓦：Zed，1984 年）。
17. Gerard Chaliand and Yves Ternon, The Armenians from Genocide to Resistance (Totowa, NJ: Zed, 1984).
18. John J. Stremlau，《尼日利亚内战的内部政治，1967-1970》（新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1977 年）。
18. John J. Stremlau, The Internal Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).
19 . Niyan Chanda，《兄弟敌人》（加利福尼亚州圣地亚哥：Harcourt Brace Jovanovich，1986）。
19. Niyan Chanda, Brother Enemy (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986).
20. William A. Stofft 和 Gary L. Guertner，《种族冲突：对未来军队的影响》（宾夕法尼亚州卡莱尔兵营：陆军战争学院，1994 年 3 月 14 日），第 1-10 页。
20. William A. Stofft and Gary L. Guertner, Ethnic Conflicts: Implications for the Army of the Future (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, March 14, 1994), 1-10.
21. L. Luca Cavalli-Sforza等编，《人类基因的历史与地理》（新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1994 年），160-164 页；Bernard Comrie，“语言”，微软 Encarta 97 百科全书。
21. L. Luca Cavalli-Sforza et al., eds., The History and Geography of Human Genes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 160-164; Bernard Comrie, “Language,” Microsoft Encarta 97 Encyclopedia.
22. Mike Edwards，“破碎的高加索”，《国家地理》（1996 年 2 月 1 日）：130-131。
22. Mike Edwards, “The Fractured Caucasus,” National Geographic (February 1 996): 130-131.
23. Margaret T. Bixler，《自由之风：二战纳瓦霍密码员的故事》（纽约：Two Bytes Publishing Co.，1992 年）。
23. Margaret T. Bixler, Winds of Freedom: The Story of the Navaho Code Talkers of World War II (New York: Two Bytes Publishing Co., 1992).
24. 《波斯湾战争行为：提交国会的最终报告》（华盛顿特区：国防部，1992 年），第 20-21 页；大卫·埃文斯，“一位在索马里服役的令人印象深刻但又令人不安的海军陆战队员”，《芝加哥论坛报》 ，1993 年 1 月 8 日，第 23 页。
24. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Dept. of Defense, 1992), 20-21; David Evans, “An Impressive—Yet Troubling—Marine on Duty in Somalia,” Chicago Tribune, January 8, 1993, 23.
25. John M. Collins，《特种作战部队：评估》（华盛顿特区：国防大学出版社，1994 年），第 85、88、89、129-130 页。
25. John M. Collins, Special Operations Forces: An Assessment (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1 994), 85, 88, 89, 129-130.
26. Edward Geoffrey Parrinder，《世界宗教：从古代历史到现在》（纽约：Facts on File出版社，1984年）；Niels Christian Nielsen，《世界宗教》（纽约：圣马丁出版社，1983年；由Alan Wilson Watts更新，“宗教”，微软Encarta 96百科全书）。
26. Edward Geoffrey Parrinder, World Religions: From Ancient History to the Present (New York: Facts on File, 1984); Niels Christian Nielsen, Religions of the World (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983; updated by Alan Wilson Watts, “Religion,” Microsoft Encarta 96 Encyclopedia.
27. Henry O. Thompson，《和平与战争中的世界宗教》（北卡罗来纳州杰斐逊：麦克法兰公司，1988 年）。
27. Henry O. Thompson, World Religions in Peace and War (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co., 1988).
28. Terry Jones 和 Alan Ereira，《十字军东征》（纽约：Facts on File 出版社，1995 年）；Amin Maalouf，《阿拉伯人眼中的十字军东征》，Jon Rothchild 译（纽约：Schocken Books 出版社，1984 年）。
28. Terry Jones and Alan Ereira, Crusades (New York: Facts on File, 1995); Amin Maalouf, The Crusades Through Arab Eyes, trans. Jon Rothchild (New York: Schocken Books, 1984).
29. Geoffrey Parker 编，《三十年战争》（纽约：军事遗产出版社，1987 年）。
29. Geoffrey Parker, ed., The Thirty Years’ War (New York: Military Heritage Press, 1987).
30. Christopher Hibbert，《伟大的穆蒂纽约：印度 1857》（伦敦：Allan Lane，1978 年）。
30. Christopher Hibbert, The Great MutiNew York: India 1857 (London: Allan Lane, 1978).
31. Charles Chenevix Trench，《通往喀土穆之路：查尔斯·戈登将军的一生》（纽约：WW Norton，1979 年）。
31. Charles Chenevix Trench, The Road to Khartoum: A Life of General Charles Gordon (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979).
32. James A. Haught，《神圣的仇恨：20 世纪 90 年代的宗教冲突》（纽约州阿默斯特：普罗米修斯出版社，1995 年）；Robin Wright，《神圣的愤怒：激进伊斯兰的愤怒》（纽约：林登出版社/西蒙与舒斯特出版社，1985 年）；Barton Gellman，“巴勒斯坦人与以色列警察在圣地上战斗”，《华盛顿邮报》，1996 年 9 月 28 日，第 1 页，A22 版。
32. James A. Haught, Holy Hatred: Religious Conflicts of the 1990s (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1995); Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam (New York: Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, 1985); Barton Gellman, “Palestinians, Israeli Police Battle on Sacred Ground,” Washington Post, September 28, 1996, 1, A22.
33. Saad Shazly，《苏伊士运河的渡河》（加利福尼亚州旧金山：美国中东研究，1980 年）。
33. Saad Shazly, The Crossing of Suez (San Francisco, CA: American Mideast Research, 1980).
34 . Don Oberdorfer，《Tet》（纽约：Da Capo Press，1984）。
34. Don Oberdorfer, Tet (New York: Da Capo Press, 1984).
35. Hans J. Morgenthau，《国家间政治》，第4版（纽约：Alfred A. Knopf，1967 年），第 129-131 页；AFK Organski，《世界政治》，第 2版（纽约：Alfred A. Knopf，1968 年），第 184-189 页。
35. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 129-131; A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 1 84-1 89.
36.尤其参见《海牙第四公约：关于陆战法规和习惯的国际公约》（1907 年 10 月 18 日）；《日内瓦关于战俘待遇的公约》（1949 年 8 月 12 日）；《日内瓦关于战时保护平民的公约》（1949 年 10 月 12 日）。
36. See especially Hague Convention No. IV: International Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18, 1907; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, October 12, 1 949.
37. Morgenthau，《国家间政治》，122-129。
37. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 122-129.
38. Organski，《世界政治》，87-91；Thomas L. Hartshorne，《扭曲的形象：美国性格观念的变迁》（康涅狄格州韦斯特波特：格林伍德出版社，1968 年），1-14。
38. Organski, World Politics, 87-91; Thomas L. Hartshorne, The Distorted Image: Changing Conceptions of the American Character (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1968), 1-14.
39. Trevor N. Dupuy，《战争天才：德国陆军和总参谋部，1807-1945》（新泽西州恩格尔伍德克利夫斯：普伦蒂斯-霍尔出版社，1977 年）。
39. Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977).
40. William Manchester，《美国凯撒：道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟，1880-1964》（波士顿：Little, Brown，1978 年），498-501 页。
40. William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), 498-501.
41.哈特肖恩，《扭曲的形象》，第8页。
41. Hartshorne, The Distorted Image, 8.
42.解释性国别研究：学生大纲 5342（北卡罗来纳州布拉格堡：美国陆军约翰·F·肯尼迪特种作战中心和学校民事事务部，1987 年 5 月）；跨文化交流：课程大纲 3148（北卡罗来纳州布拉格堡：美国陆军约翰·F·肯尼迪特种作战中心和学校，1990 年 3 月）。
42. Interpretive Country Study: Student Outline 5342 (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Civil Affairs Dept., May 1987; Cross Cultural Communications: Lesson Outline 3148 (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, March 1990).
43.沙特阿拉伯：士兵指南（华盛顿特区：陆军部公共事务办公室，未注明日期）（1990 年 9 月），第 12-29 页。
43. Saudi Arabia: A Soldier’s Guide (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, Public Affairs Office, undated) (September 1990), 12-29.
44.联合出版物 3-53：《联合心理作战条令》（华盛顿特区：参谋长联席会议主席办公室，1993 年 7 月 31 日），第 1-1、V-2、V-5 节；《陆军手册 33-1：心理作战》（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1993 年 2 月 18 日）。1979 年 8 月 31 日版的《陆军手册 33-1》在某些方面更有用。尤其参见第 5、9 和 13 章。
44. Joint Pub 3-53: Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 31, 1993), 1-1, V-2, V-5; FM 33-1: Psychological Operations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, February 18, 1993). The August 31, 1979, edition of FM 33-1 is more useful in some respects. See especially chapters 5, 9, and 13.
45. FM 41-10：民事事务行动（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1993 年 1 月 11 日）。1969 年 10 月 20 日的版本在某些方面更有用。尤其参见第 2 章和附录 E、J。
45. FM 41-10: Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, January 11, 1993). The October 20, 1969, edition is more useful in some respects. See especially chapter 2 and appendices E, J.
46. Sidney Shachnow，“跨文化交流：概念技能的必要性”，特种作战（1993 年 2 月）：20-22；人际心理作战：课程大纲和总结表 3906（北卡罗来纳州布拉格堡：美国陆军约翰·F·肯尼迪特种作战中心和学校，1987 年 3 月），LO-2、LO-4、SS-1 至 SS-3。
46. Sidney Shachnow, “Intercultural Communication: The Need for Conceptual Skills,” Special Warfare (February 1993): 20-22; Interpersonal Psychological Operations: Lesson Outline and Summary Sheet 3906 (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, March 1987), LO-2, LO-4, SS-1 through SS-3.
47.野战通告 21-852：通过口译员进行教学（北卡罗来纳州布拉格堡：美国陆军约翰·F·肯尼迪特种作战中心和学校，1984 年 1 月）；口译员的使用：课程大纲 5842（北卡罗来纳州布拉格堡：美国陆军约翰·F·肯尼迪特种作战中心和学校第 3 营民事事务连，1990 年 1 月）
47. Field Circular 21-852: Teaching Through Interpreters (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, January 1984); Utilization of Interpreters: Lesson Outline 5842 (Fort Bragg, NC: 3d Battalion, Civil Affairs Company, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, January 1990)
10. 城市化
10. URBANIZATION
这只猪没有用稻草，也没有用树枝或木棍，
他用砖头盖了房子。
“你抓不到我！”小猪喊道。
“我要把你吹倒！”狼回答。
“你需要，”小猪说，“很多力气，
我觉得你不够。”
狼使劲吹啊吹啊吹，
房子却纹丝不动。
“如果我吹不倒它，”狼说，
“我就只能把它吹起来了。”
No straw for him, no twigs or sticks,
this pig had built his house of BRICKS.
“You II not get me!” the piggy cried.
“I’ll blow you down!” the Wolf replied.
“You’ll need,” Pig said, “a lot of puff,
and I don’t think you’ve got enough.”
Wolf huffed and puffed and blew and blew,
the house stayed up as good as new.
“If I can’t blow it down,” Wolf said,
“I’ll have to blow it up instead.”
罗尔德·达尔的
反叛童谣
Roald Dahl
Revolting Rhymes
前文对三只小猪的戏仿——它们分别用稻草、木棍和砖块建造房屋——同样适用于规模更大的城市战。如果居民顽强抵抗，一些村庄、城镇和城市比其他地区更难攻克和控制，但现代武器可以迅速将最坚固的定居点夷为平地。然而，自孙子兵法指出“攻城是最糟糕的策略”以来，两千五百年来，几乎没有合理的理由去炸毁或摧毁城市。侵略者这样做会让自己损失宝贵的资产，防御者这样做会摧毁珍贵的财产，而好心的朋友这样做会伤害他们的盟友。那位匿名的美国陆军少校脱口而出“为了拯救（南越的）槟椥镇，摧毁它变得不可行”，这番话纯属无稽之谈。2.城市作战还会破坏部队凝聚力，使控制变得复杂，削弱进攻势头，并导致双方伤亡人数激增。
THE FOREGOING PARODY OF THE THREE LITTLE PIGS, WHO RESPECTIVELY BUILT THEIR HOUSES OF STRAW, sticks, and bricks, applies to urban combat on a grander scale. Some hamlets, villages, towns, and cities are more difficult to seize and secure than others if inhabitants strongly resist, but modern munitions can quickly reduce the best built settlements to rubble. Rational reasons to blow cities up or down, however, have been scarce for 2,500 years, since Sun Tzu proclaimed that, “The worst policy is to attack cities.”1 Aggressors who do so deprive themselves of valuable assets, defenders who do so destroy precious possessions, and well-meaning friends who do so wound their allies. The anonymous U.S. Army major who blurted, “It became necessary to destroy the town [of Ben Tre, South Vietnam] to save it” spouted nonsense.2 Urban combat moreover disrupts unit cohesion, complicates control, blunts offensive momentum, and causes casualties to soar on both sides.
因此，世界各地的大多数军事理论都建议陆军指挥官隔离或绕过建成区，但即便如此，控制政治、工业、商业、交通和通信中心有时仍可能对战役、行动乃至战争的结局产生决定性影响。在这种情况下，军事指挥官面临着种类繁多的建筑和设施，由于没有两个城市是完全相同的，因此夺取或控制这些建筑和设施需要复杂的计划、方案和程序。此外，城市化在维和行动、人道主义行动以及以城市为人质的威慑战略中也发挥着至关重要的作用。3.以及旨在通过轰炸将顽固的敌人炸回石器时代来摧毁其意志的战争策略。4
Most military doctrines the world over consequently advise land force commanders to isolate or bypass built-up areas, but the subjugation of political, industrial, commercial, transportation, and communication centers even so may sometimes decisively affect the outcome of battles, campaigns, even wars. Military commanders in such events face an endless variety of structures and facilities the seizure or control of which demands esoteric plans, programs, and procedures, since no two cities are quite alike. Urbanization moreover plays an imperative part in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations as well as deterrent strategies that hold cities hostage3 and war fighting strategies that seek to break the will of stubborn enemies by bombing them back into the Stone Age.4
场地和结构
SITES AND STRUCTURES
就本次评估而言，城市化指的是人口密度达到或超过每平方英里（约3平方公里）1000人，且平均每2英亩至少有一栋建筑物的地块。这一定义涵盖了小城镇和郊区，以及各种规模和形状的城市，无论它们彼此靠近还是相距甚远，也无论它们坐落在平坦、起伏或崎岖的地形上。与人烟稀少的沙漠、沼泽和丛林相比，城市化地区人造景观和自然景观的混合通常更为复杂，因为后者的地形特征相对单一。
Urbanization, for purposes of this appraisal, connotes plots of land where population densities equal or exceed 1,000 persons per square mile (about 3 square kilometers) and buildings average at least one on every 2 acres. That definition embraces small towns and suburbia as well as cities of assorted sizes and shapes, close together or widely separated, superimposed upon flat, rolling, or rough topography. The mixture of manmade and natural features generally is more complex than sparsely inhabited deserts, swamps, and jungles, which contain fewer distinctive terrain features.
城镇格局
TOWN AND CITY CONFIGURATIONS
一些城镇侧重于政府事务、安全保障、工业、商业或服务业，而另一些城镇则兼具两种或多种主要功能。每个城市群在水平和垂直维度、建筑结构、建筑材料、街道格局、交通路线、绕行道路、公园、休闲设施、城市环境中的乡村飞地以及未开发土地等方面都具有独特的配置（表19）。原始布局有时会长期保持完好，但通常会根据新的需求随意扩张。例如，20世纪末北美和西欧的城市中心，随着市政扩张，每平方英里的平均人口密度往往较低，独立式建筑比整体式建筑更多，玻璃的使用量更大，带地下室的建筑更少，而且在私家车盛行的郊区，地铁也相对匮乏。5
Some towns and cities emphasize governmental affairs, physical security, industries, commerce, business, or services, while others accommodate two or more primary functions. Every agglomeration is uniquely configured with regard to horizontal and vertical dimensions, structures, building materials, street patterns, access routes, bypasses, parks, recreational facilities, rural enclaves in otherwise urban settings, and undeveloped lands (table 19). Original layouts occasionally remain intact over long periods of time but often expand willy-nilly in response to new needs. Urban centers in North America and Western Europe toward the end of the 20th century, for example, tend toward lower average population densities per square mile as municipalities expand, more freestanding construction as opposed to solid blocks, greater use of glass, fewer buildings with basements, and a dearth of subways in suburbia where private automobiles abound.5
因此，城市环境在诸多与军事相关的方面存在显著差异。城堡、大教堂和坚固的中世纪建筑与狭窄曲折的街道交相辉映，构成了许多欧洲城市的中心地带；而华盛顿特区的市中心则以宽阔的矩形广场为特色，该广场从国会山延伸至林肯纪念堂，长达3英里（5公里）。富裕的郊区居民有时会环绕着贫民窟林立的大都市，而其他地方的棚户区则环绕着繁荣的市中心，富人或许会与穷人混居。建筑设计和材料反映了城市功能、可用资源、气候条件和文化倾向。在寒冷的西伯利亚森林茂密的地区，木材是常用的建筑材料；在相对温暖干燥的地区，易于获取的土坯很受欢迎；而其他地区的建筑则以芦苇、草皮、钢筋混凝土或石材等不同材料为主。此外，街道格局也多种多样（图29）。主要干道涵盖了从未铺设路面的狭窄小巷到宽阔的硬质路面大道，这些大道两侧是开阔的空地，不仅允许多条车道并排双向通行，还允许车辆在非道路区域行驶。6
Urban environments consequently differ drastically in several militarily relevant respects. Castles, cathedrals and solid medieval buildings flush with narrow, crooked streets mark the midst of many European cities, whereas downtown Washington, DC, features construction astride a wide, rectangular mall that runs for 3 miles (5 kilometers) from Capitol Hill to the Lincoln Memorial. Affluent suburbanites sometimes encircle metropoli loaded with slums, shantytowns elsewhere surround prosperous inner cities, and the rich mayhap mingle with poor. Building designs and materials reflect urban functions, available resources, climatic conditions, and cultural proclivities. Construction in heavily forested parts of frigid Siberia favors lumber, easily obtained adobe is popular in relatively warm, arid regions, and structures elsewhere variously emphasize reeds, sod, reinforced concrete, or stone. Assorted street patterns also are observable (figure 29). Main thoroughfares run the gamut from unpaved threadneedle alleys to broad, hard-surfaced avenues abutted by open spaces that not only permit two-way traffic several lanes abreast but allow off-the-road vehicular movement.6
公用设施、设施和服务
UTILITIES, FACILITIES, AND SERVICES
现代城镇若没有照明、电力、食品和饮用水，以及相应的供应、储存、配送、维护和废物处理系统，就无法履行主要职能，也无法维持现有的生活水平。如果公共交通、警察、消防部门、医院、电话和新闻媒体（报纸、广播、电视）被剥夺，社区生活将会停滞不前甚至彻底瘫痪。
Modern towns and cities could not perform major functions or sustain present standards of living without lights, power, electricity, food, and potable water, together with supply, storage, distribution, maintenance, and waste disposal systems. Community life would slow to a crawl or stop if denied public transportation, police, fire departments, hospitals, telephones, and news media (newspapers, radio, television).
Table 19. Variable Town and City Components
工程师、后勤人员和民防部队非常关注城市基础设施的现状、战时修复需求、总容量以及可以在不危及平民安全的前提下转用于军事用途的比例。典型的考虑因素包括：
Engineers, logisticians, and civic action forces are intensely interested in the current condition of urban infrastructure, restoration requirements in wartime, total capacities, and percentages that could be diverted for military use without dangerously depriving civilian inhabitants. Typical considerations include:
• 水净化厂、水库和输水管道的数量、类型和容量
• The number, type, and capacities of water purification plants, reservoirs, and aqueducts
• 垃圾、废弃物、污水和工业废物的收集、垃圾填埋场、焚烧炉和处理设施
• Garbage, trash, sewage, and industrial waste collection, dumps, incinerators, and processing facilities
• 食品加工厂和面包房
• Food processing plants and bakeries
• 按类型划分的医院数量，以及床位数
• The number of hospitals by type, plus numbers of beds
• 电力、燃气和集中供热厂，以及输配电线路
• Electrical power, gas, and central heating plants, along with distribution lines
• 露天、封闭式和冷藏式仓库、油罐、军火库和弹药库
• Open, covered, and cold storage, POL tanks, arsenals, and ammunition dumps
• 公共交通设施，包括交通工具、停车场、车库、修理厂和维修店
• Public transportation facilities, including conveyances, parking lots, car barns, garages, and repair shops
• 潜在的军事驻地（酒店、汽车旅馆、学校、教堂、兵营、礼堂、公园和其他开放空间）
• Potential military billets (hotels, motels, schools, churches, barracks, auditoriums, parks, and other open spaces)
• 需要保护的历史文化地标
• Historical and cultural landmarks to be preserved
• 娱乐设施，例如电影院、体育馆、体育场和游泳池。
• Recreational facilities, such as cinemas, gymnasiums, stadiums, and swimming pools.
城市扩张
URBAN SPRAWL
地球上一半的人口居住在城市社区，但如果预测准确，到2025年，这一比例将达到三分之二。预测者认为，届时将有超过40座城市的人口超过1000万，其中欧洲、美国和加拿大仅有两座城市——纽约和洛杉矶（见表20）。这些城市的占地面积远超中世纪时期的同类城市，当时大多数中心通常由一座城堡和几英亩土地上的棚屋组成，而1997年洛杉矶的市区面积就接近500平方英里（1300平方公里）。8
Half of all people on Planet Earth live in urban communities, but that number will reach two-thirds by 2025 if expectations prove correct. Forecasters predict that more than 40 cities then will exceed 10 million residents, of which Europe, the United States, and Canada will contribute only two—New York and Los Angeles (table 20). Each complex covers far more area than forerunners did during the Middle Ages, when most centers generally consisted of a castle surrounded by shacks on a few acres, whereas Los Angeles within its incorporated limits occupied almost 500 square miles (1,300 square kilometers) in 1997.8
Figure 29. Assorted Street Systems
此外，除非洲和澳大利亚以外，各大洲许多地方的大城市正在融合，形成巨大的城市屏障。自1950年战争爆发以来，首尔的人口已从110万激增至超过1100万，1997年时已囊括汉江下游流域的大部分地区，西至仁川，并正向南吞并水原。鲁尔区和莱茵-美因区从波恩延伸至荷兰角，绵延近320公里（200英里），并且仍在不断扩张；法兰克福、达姆施塔特、美因茨、曼海姆、卡尔斯鲁厄、哈瑙和斯图加特等城市也开始融合，形成一个特大城市群。彼此间松散连接的村庄、城镇和小城市，相距一两英里，也十分常见。9同样的情况也适用于美国东海岸，从马萨诸塞州波士顿，到纽约市，新泽西州纽瓦克，宾夕法尼亚州费城，华盛顿特区，以及弗吉尼亚州诺福克。
Mighty cities moreover are coalescing to form enormous urban walls in many places on all continents save Africa and Australia. Seoul, which has swollen from 1.1 to more than 11 million since war erupted in 1950, included most of the lower Han River valley as far west as Inchon in 1997 and was swallowing Suwon to the south. The Ruhr and Rhine-Main complexes stretch almost 200 miles (320 kilometers) from Bonn to the Hook of Holland and continue to spread while Frankfurt-am-Main, Darmstadt, Mainz, Mannheim, Karlsruhe, Hanau, and Stuttgart are starting to form one megalopolis. Loosely linked villages, towns, and small cities a mile or two apart are common.9 The same could be said for the U.S. eastern seaboard from Boston, MA, through New York City, Newark, NJ, Philadelphia, PA, Washington, DC, and Norfolk, VA.
表 20.当前和预计的特大城市
（人口超过 1000 万；粗体字表示超过 2000 万）
Table 20. Present and Projected Megalopoli
(more than 10 million inhabitants; boldface indicates more than 20 million)
城市障碍将严重限制阿尔弗雷德·冯·施利芬伯爵将军在 21 世纪推行横扫北德平原、途经荷兰和比利时进入法国的宏伟计划。10次闪电战难以持续，在这样的条件下，补给线也难以维持。乍一看，快速穿过郊区似乎可行，因为郊区人口密度低，结构性障碍也比市中心少，但城市扩张迟早会造成障碍，并将高速公路分割成短小的路段。11
Urban obstacles would seriously constrain 21st century adaptations of General Count Alfred von Schlieffen’s grand plan to sweep across the North German Plain through Holland and Belgium into France.10 Blitzkriegs would be difficult to sustain and secure supply lines hard to maintain under such conditions. Rapid movement through suburbs seems feasible at first glance, because population densities are low and structural impediments few compared with urban cores, but urban sprawl sooner rather than later probably will impose barriers and chop high-speed avenues into short segments.11
传统城市作战
CONVENTIONAL URBAN COMBAT
传统的城市巷战可能早在约书亚攻打耶利哥城、城墙“随即倒塌”（公元前1300年至1200年间）的6000年前就已出现。12当军队无法绕过城市时，现代决策者有三种选择，因为这样做在地理上不可行、在政治上不明智或在军事上不谨慎：如果进攻方和防守方都同意，他们可以放过选定的中心；进攻方可以围攻，而防守方则试图生存；或者进攻方可以尝试从占领的对手手中夺取控制权。
Conventional urban combat began perhaps 6,000 years before Joshua assailed Jericho and “the walls forthwith fell down” between 1300 and 1200 B.C.12 Three options are open to present day policymakers whenever armed forces cannot bypass cities because so doing seems geographically infeasible, politically improvident, or militarily imprudent: they can spare selected centers if attackers and defenders both agree; attackers can lay siege while defenders try to survive; or attackers can try to seize control from opponents in possession.
开放城市
OPEN CITIES
在古代，战败对于城市居民而言无异于生死攸关的赌博。他们永远无法确定，如果默默投降，命运究竟会仁慈还是残酷，因为胜利者通常会为所欲为。仁慈是这条规则的罕见例外。“不设防城市”宣言，即出于政治、经济、军事、美学或人道主义原因而刻意保护城市地区的宣言，仍然寥寥无几，而且其成效也参差不齐。
Defeat in olden days was a life or death crapshoot for city dwellers who never could be certain whether fate would be kind or cruel if they capitulated quietly, because winners ordinarily took as many liberties as they liked. Benevolence was a rare exception to that rule. “Open city” declarations that deliberately preserve urban areas for political, economic, military, aesthetic, or humanitarian reasons remain few, and degrees of success differ considerably.
1944年6月3日，希特勒允许阿尔伯特·凯塞林元帅撤离罗马，主要原因是这座古城是他的意大利盟友贝尼托·墨索里尼的首都；梵蒂冈就坐落于此，受到巴伐利亚天主教徒的崇敬；而且城内的历史珍宝无可替代。德军蜂拥而出，第二天涌入的盟军发现，台伯河上的所有重要桥梁以及其他重要建筑都依然屹立不倒。凯旋的将领们无所畏惧地聚集在卡比托利欧山上的卡比托利欧广场，拍照留念。13
Hitler permitted Field Marshal Albert Kesselring to vacate Rome on June 3, 1944, largely because that ancient city was the capital of his Italian ally, Benito Mussolini; it housed the Vatican, which was revered by Bavarian Catholics; and historical treasures therein were irreplaceable. German forces streamed out, and Allied troops who streamed in the next day found that all key bridges over the Tiber River as well as other valuable structures were still standing. Triumphant generals assembled fearlessly for photo opportunities at Piazza de Campidoglio on Capitoline Hill.13
1940年5月11日，在零星战斗之后，法国总司令马克西姆·魏刚将军正式宣布巴黎为不设防城市。三天后，德军取得胜利并和平占领了巴黎，但低调的抵抗运动持续不断地干扰着德军长达四年的占领。1944年8月，盟军部队逼近巴黎时，希特勒亲自任命迪特里希·冯·肖尔蒂茨将军为要塞指挥官，赋予他最高统帅（ Befehlshaber ）的全部权力，并指示他摧毁这座法国抵抗运动的象征。然而，这位他钦点的破坏者拒绝执行命令，并公然违抗元首的命令，实际上宣布巴黎为不设防城市。双方爆发了激烈的冲突，但冯·肖尔蒂茨将军的这一举动拯救了法国的心脏和灵魂。15
French Commander in Chief General Maxime Weygand officially declared Paris an open city on May 11,1940, after sporadic fighting. Victorious Germans took possession peacefully three days later, but low-key opposition continually marred their 4-year occupation.14 Hitler personally designated General Dietrich von Choltitz as fortress commander when Allied divisions neared Paris in August 1944, vested him with full powers of a Befehlshaber (commander in chief), and directed him to ruin that symbol of French resistance. His handpicked destroyer, however, refused to comply and, in direct defiance of der Führer’s orders, implicitly designated Paris an open city. Sharp clashes occurred, but that action by General von Choltitz saved the heart and soul of France.15
次年，马尼拉的境况更加糟糕，道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟将军兑现了他的重返承诺。日军大将山下奉文非正式地宣布菲律宾首都马尼拉为不设防城市，并计划于1945年1月撤离除少数留守部队外的所有人员，但岩渊三治海军少将率领的顽固部队拒绝服从命令。激烈的战斗一直持续到3月3日，到那时，双方共有超过17000名军人和10万名平民丧生（几乎占总人口的15%）；另有数千人重伤，马尼拉古老的城墙及其内部的一切都被夷为平地。16
Manila fared less well the following year when General Douglas MacArthur made good on his promise to return. Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita informally declared the Philippine capital an open city and planned to evacuate all but a handful of stay-behind forces in January 1945, but diehards under Rear Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi refused to obey his orders. Fierce battles raged until March 3, by which time more than 1 7,000 military men on both sides and 100,000 civilians lay dead (nearly 15 percent of the population); thousands more had been seriously wounded, and Manila’s ancient walled center along with everything in it had been torn to shreds.16
围攻
SIEGES
围城战是指长时间的军事封锁，将城市孤立起来，直到物资耗尽、进攻方突破防线、援军突破包围圈，或者守军士气崩溃投降为止。然而，即使封锁时间很长，如果守军始终没有与重要的补给来源隔绝，那么局部包围战就不符合围城战的定义。
Sieges involve prolonged military blockades that isolate cities until supplies run out, attackers breach defenses, reinforcements break the ring, or morale cracks and occupants surrender. Partial encirclements, however lengthy, fail to satisfy that definition if the defenders never are isolated from essential sources of sustenance.
攻城术在 19 世纪非常流行，当时大多数城市仍然很小，火炮按现在的标准来看还很原始，轰炸机还没有发明，耐心是一种美德。17然而，这些情况已不再适用。如今，即使有其他任务和时间允许，也很少有现代军事指挥官热衷于发动围攻；而他们的文职上级似乎也很少愿意承担看不到尽头的“长期”对抗所带来的政治和经济代价。
Siegecraft was popular well into the 19th century when most cities still were rather small, artillery was primitive by present standards, bombers had not yet been invented, and patience was a virtue.17 Those circumstances, however, no longer pertain. Few modern military commanders currently seem anxious to instigate sieges, even if competing missions and time permit, and few of their civilian supervisors seem willing to pay the political and economic costs of “sedentary” confrontations with no end in sight.
然而，在近代也出现了一些引人注目的例外情况。其中大多数，以新加坡围城战（1941-42年）为代表，都展现了抵抗敌军的殊死搏斗。德国空降部队第 18 号将军伯恩哈特-赫尔曼·拉姆克因其在法国布雷斯特港口设施的出色防御而荣获希特勒最高勋章——带橡叶、宝剑和钻石的骑士十字勋章。1944 年 8 月 12 日起，美国第八军孤立并猛烈攻击该港口，直到 9 月 20 日，驻守该港口的一个师的守军投降。19历史上最惨烈的围城战发生在列宁格勒，1941年9月至1944年1月间，超过一百万平民（占总人口的三分之一）在战斗中阵亡、冻死、饿死或死于疾病。求生本能使他们得以苟延残喘。坚持下去的潜在动力，正如当地共产党领导人安德烈·日丹诺夫直言不讳地解释的那样，“如果纳粹‘优等种族’的代表占领了列宁格勒，列宁格勒的工人阶级就会沦为奴隶，其中最优秀的人将被消灭”。20
Some dramatic exceptions nevertheless have occurred in relatively recent times. Most of them, typified by the siege of Singapore (1941-42), featured desperate efforts to fend off enemy armed forces.18 German General of the Airborne Forces Bernhart-Hermann Ramcke won Hitler’s highest decoration, the Knights Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords, and Diamonds, for his brilliant defense of port facilities at Brest, France, which U.S. VIII Corps isolated and battered from August 12, 1944, until the one-division garrison capitulated on September 20.19 The most horrific siege in history took place at Leningrad, where more than a million civilians (one-third of the population) became battle casualties, froze, starved to death, or died of disease between September 1941 and January 1944. Survival instinct provided the strongest possible incentive to persist because, as local Communist Party chief Andrei Zhdanov bluntly explained, “The working class of Leningrad [would] be turned into slaves, and the best of them exterminated” if Nazi representatives of the “Master Race” overran their city.20
有充裕时间的围攻者可能会在不消耗子弹或炸弹的情况下，对城市中心进行围剿，以试探装备精良的对手在压力下的反应。斯大林在1948-49年就曾这样做过。当时，他命令苏联及其卫星国的军队封锁所有通往政治局势高度紧张的柏林的道路和铁路。柏林位于东德腹地，距离最近的友好边界195公里（120英里）。当时拥有世界上唯一核武器的美国本可以威胁使用核武器，但它却选择进行大规模空运，为柏林提供长达11个月的食品、燃料和其他必需品，直到心怀不满的斯大林最终为了避免一场灾难性的战争而让步。21
Besiegers with time to burn may invest urban centers without expending bullets or bombs to see how well-armed opponents might respond to pressure. Stalin did so in 1948-49, when he ordered Soviet and satellite forces to block all roads and rail lines into politically combustible Berlin, which lay deep in East Germany, 120 miles (195 kilometers) from the nearest friendly frontier. The United States, which then possessed the world’s only nuclear weapons, might have threatened to use them but elected instead to mount a massive airlift that supplied Berlin with food, fuel, and other essentials for 11 months until the disgruntled Generalissimo backed down rather than risk a ruinous war.21
巷战
STREET FIGHTING
每当武装部队试图从顽强的守军手中夺取城市化地带时，巷战便不可避免。在村庄里，巷战可能残酷但短暂；而在城市里，由于钢筋水泥的峡谷和死胡同削弱了技术优势，严重限制了车辆机动性，使战术通信不可靠，情报收集变得复杂，并导致大量部队被吞噬，小股孤立部队之间的战斗往往旷日持久且痛苦不堪。旨在减少附带损害和伤亡的限制性交战规则，可能会进一步削弱空中火力和炮兵的优势，并加剧对步兵的依赖。22
Street fighting ensues whenever armed forces try to wrest urbanized terrain from stubborn defenders. It can be brutal but brief in villages and a lengthy, agonizing struggle between small, isolated units in cities where concrete canyons and culs-de-sac degrade technological advantages, severely limit vehicular mobility, render tactical communications unreliable, complicate intelligence collection, and swallow troops wholesale. Restrictive rules of engagement designed to reduce collateral damage and casualties may further decease benefits obtainable from aerial firepower as well as artillery and magnify dependence on foot soldiers.22
城市街道与障碍。无论地点如何，街头战斗的问题都大同小异，例如斯大林格勒战役（1942-43年）。23首尔（1950 年 6 月 1 日至 1951 年 3 月期间四次易手），24和 Hué (1968)25可以作证。摩托化部队必须沿街道和开阔地带作战，而步兵则在地面、屋顶以及地铁、下水道、地窖等地下建筑中进行三维作战，他们会匍匐前进，或钻过、或绕过建筑物，并在没有更便捷的通道时，炸开墙壁、天花板和地板，开辟“鼠洞”。地雷、诡雷、铁丝网、路障、瓦砾和其他障碍物比比皆是（图 30）。
Urban Avenues and Obstacles. Street fighting problems are similar regardless of locale, as battles for Stalingrad (1942-43),23 Seoul (which changed hands four times between June 1 950 and March 1951),24 and Hué (1968)25 bear witness. Motorized troops must stick to streets and open spaces, whereas infantrymen fight three-dimensional wars at ground level, on rooftops, and in subterranean structures such as subways, sewers, and cellars, creeping over, under, or around each structure, blasting “mouseholes” through walls, ceilings, and floors when more convenient avenues are unavailable. Mines, booby traps, barbed wire, road blocks, rubble, and other obstacles abound (figure 30).
城市中心的每一栋建筑都可能成为一个坚固的堡垒，尤其是那些俯瞰重要路口或开放空间的建筑。26即使在郊区，平直弹道武器的有效射程也很少超过200码（185米），因为那里的观赏灌木和蜿蜒的道路常常会阻挡视线。1944年8月，一位幸运的法国炮手在凯旋门附近可能创造了一项城市作战的世界纪录：他用一发炮弹击中了1800米（超过一英里）外香榭丽舍大街另一端的一辆德国豹式坦克，使其失去战斗力。27
Every inner city building becomes a potential strong point, particularly those that overlook key intersections or open spaces.26 Clear fields of fire for flat-trajectory weapons seldom exceed 200 yards (185 meters) even in suburbs, where ornamental shrubbery and sweeping curves often limit lines-of-sight. One lucky French gunner at the Arc de Triomphe may have established a world’s record during urban combat in August 1944 when, with a first-round hit, he defanged a German Panther tank 1,800 meters (more than a mile) away at the opposite end of the Champs-Elysées.27
装甲火力。坦克和其他装甲车辆在城市中心缓慢行进，在狭窄或瓦砾堆积的街道上几乎没有机动空间，无法急转弯，而且除非“封闭”起来，否则在敌方占领的建筑物下方很容易遭到攻击，而“封闭”会限制视野，容易招致伏击。许多有利可图的目标仍然遥不可及，因为大多数测距仪在近距离成像模糊，坦克炮塔在狭小的空间内无法自由旋转，而位于平地上的主炮既不能仰角也不能俯角，无法轰击附近的高层建筑或地下室。装备短程武器的反坦克小组通常会在由此产生的“死角”中寻找掩体，从那里可以相对安全地攻击坦克的薄弱环节，例如油箱和履带。因此，传统的城市作战需要的坦克数量不多，主要用于为前线步兵提供近距离火力支援。28这条规则的例外情况通常涉及处于混乱状态的对手或其他特殊情况，正如 1944 年 8 月 25 日所证明的那样，当时法国将军雅克-菲利普·勒克莱尔的第 2 装甲师带领盟军解放者进入巴黎。29
Armored Firepower. Tanks and other armored vehicles inch through inner cities at a snail’s pace, find little room to maneuver on narrow or rubble-clogged streets, cannot turn sharp corners, and are vulnerable beneath enemy-occupied buildings unless they “button up,” which limits visibility and invites ambush. Many lucrative targets remain beyond reach, because most range-finders produce fuzzy images close up, tank turrets cannot swivel freely in cramped quarters, and main guns on level ground can neither elevate nor depress enough to blast upper stories or basements nearby. Tank-killer teams armed with short-range weapons commonly seek sanctuaries in resultant “dead spaces,” from which they can attack soft spots such as gas tanks and treads with relative impunity. Conventional urban combat consequently calls for few rather than many tanks, mainly to furnish close support for frontline infantry.28 Exceptions to that rule normally involve opponents in disarray or other special circumstances, as demonstrated on August 25, 1944, when French General Jacques-Philippe Leclerc’s 2d Armored Division led Allied liberators into Paris.29
Figure 30. Three Layers of Urban Obstacles
炮兵作战。如同绿树成荫的城市丛林一样，炮兵作战也面临挑战。化学战弹药在某种意义上非常适用，因为它们可以渗入缝隙，比在开阔地带使用化学战弹药更能长时间保持所需浓度，并且能够在不破坏建筑物的情况下消灭敌人。但如果致命化学物质造成友军平民大量伤亡，则可能引发严重的后果。高爆炸药的效果更容易控制，但在人口稠密的地区难以调整爆炸位置，而且被夷为平地的建筑物比幸存的建筑物更能为敌军提供掩护。因此，城市地区的高角度炮火通常主要用于清除屋顶和打击开阔地带的敌军，而机动性更强、破坏性更小的迫击炮则承担了大部分近距离支援任务。然而，中型和重型炮弹在低角度和近距离射击时表现出色，正如1944年10月21日驻扎在亚琛的德国高级将领所发现的那样。当第一枚美国155毫米炮弹击中他的指挥中心时，他立即挥舞白旗，并讽刺地评论道：“当炮兵变成狙击手时，就该放弃了。”30
Artillery. Urban jungles, like their leafy analogs, discourage artillery. Chemical warfare (CW) munitions in one sense are well suited, since they can seep into crannies, retain required concentrations longer than CW strikes in the open, and neutralize opponents without damaging structures, but inimical consequences could ensue if lethal chemicals caused mass casualties among friendly civilians. The effects of high explosives are easier to control, although detonations are hard to adjust in densely populated areas and buildings reduced to rubble provide better protection for enemy troops than those left standing. High-angle artillery fire in urban areas thus is often used mainly to clear rooftops and target troops in the open while mortars, which are more maneuverable and less destructive, handle most close support missions. Medium and heavy artillery projectiles, however, perform superbly at low angles and pointblank range, as the senior German general in Aachen discovered on October 21, 1944. He waved a white flag as soon as the first U.S.155mm shell hit his command center, with the wry comment, “It’s time to quit when artillerymen turn into snipers,”30
无后坐力炮和线导武器。城市作战也限制了轻型班组武器的使用。后坐力产生的冲击波使得在狭小、不通风的房间或其他狭窄空间部署无后坐力炮非常危险，因为这些空间内必须遮盖或移除松散的物体、玻璃和易燃材料。封闭空间会极大地放大爆炸声，以至于没有耳塞的人员在几次爆炸后就会失聪。最小射程和发射器俯仰角度的限制严重制约了线导导弹系统在城镇中的应用，因为城镇中建筑物、瓦砾、墙壁、栅栏、树木、灌木、电线杆、电线和电视天线等障碍物和缠绕物比比皆是（参见图30中心示意图）。屋顶或高处的房间内的射击位置比街道上的射击位置视野更开阔，但即使如此，远距离射击仍然十分困难。31
Recoilless and Wire-Guided Weapons. Urban combat inhibits lighter crew-served arms as well. Backblast makes it dangerous to emplace recoilless weapons in small, unvented rooms or other cramped spaces where loose objects, glass, and combustible materials must be covered or removed. Enclosures so amplify explosive sounds that personnel without earplugs become deaf after a few experiences. Minimum feasible ranges and limited abilities to elevate or depress launchers severely restrict the utility of wire-guided missile systems in towns and cities, where such obstructions and entanglements as buildings, rubble, walls, fences, trees, brush, telephone poles, power lines, and television antennas are abundant (see center diagram of figure 30). Firing positions on roofs or in lofty rooms allow clearer fields of fire than sites at street level, but long-range shots even so are scarce.31
战斗勤务支援
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
城市中的后勤需求与开阔地带截然不同。车辆稀少降低了石油消耗，工程和发电设备除外。对炮兵弹药的依赖也随之减少，但作为补偿，部队却消耗了大量的轻武器弹药、机枪子弹、手榴弹、迫击炮弹和塑性炸药。武器、装备和制服的损耗速度也异常之快。道路清理是一项高度优先的任务，进攻方需要用推土机清除道路上的瓦砾，而防守方则需要用于构筑路障的材料。双方都使用沙袋来加固建筑物内外的阵地。32
Logistical requirements in cities differ significantly from those in open terrain. The dearth of vehicular traffic reduces petroleum consumption, except for engineer and power generating equipment. Reliance on artillery munitions declines as well, although troops in compensation expend prodigious amounts of small arms ammunition, machine gun bullets, hand grenades, mortar shells, and plastic explosives. They also wear out weapons, equipment, and uniforms at abnormally rapid rates. Route clearance is a high priority task that requires bulldozers wherever offensive forces find rubble in the way, whereas defenders demand materials with which to build barriers. Both sides use sandbags to shore up positions in and around buildings.32
在人口稠密的中心地带，指挥官往往必须调配军事物资、其他资源和人力，以维持非战斗人员的生命安全。这些非战斗人员需要食物、水和某种形式的住所，以及为伤病员提供医疗援助。如果民用卫生系统崩溃，及早控制地方性疾病和败血症威胁就显得尤为重要。可能需要采取严格的安全措施，例如身份证件、宵禁、限制区域、警戒线、检查站和路障。防止偷窃、抢劫和干扰军事行动的行为。如果惊慌失措的平民，无论老幼，其中许多人体弱多病，成千上万地涌出城市，步行、乘坐汽车、自行车、马车、牛车或婴儿车，并携带所有能携带的财物，那么难民管控的规模将变得极其庞大（“闪电乔”柯林斯将军永远不会忘记一位韩国老人，在1950年首尔第一次难民潮中，他背着一个装满米袋的A字架，“他那干瘪的老母亲就坐在上面”）。33
Commanders in densely populated centers often must divert military supplies, other resources, and manpower to sustain life among noncombatants, who need food, water, and some sort of shelter along with medical assistance for the sick and wounded. Early control over endemic diseases and septic threats becomes doubly important if civilian health and sanitation systems break down. Stringent security measures, such as identification cards, curfews, restricted areas, restraining lines, checkpoints, and road blocks, may be required to prevent pilferage, looting, and actions that interfere with military operations. Refugee control can assume immense proportions if panic-stricken civilians, young and old, many of them infirm, pour out of cities by the thousands on foot and aboard automobiles, bicycles, horse-drawn wagons, ox carts, or baby carriages, together with all possessions they can possibly carry (General “Lightning Joe” Collins never forgot one elderly Korean man who, during the first exodus from Seoul in 1950, carried on his back an A-frame laden with rice bags “atop which sat his wizened old mother”).33
研究与开发
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
主要用于开阔地带的军事装备在城市中反而成了累赘，因为在城市里，近程武器比远程武器更有价值，而且廉价、耐用或一次性用品比昂贵的装备更受欢迎。因此，正如以下示例所示，市场正等待着创新者。
Military trappings intended primarily for use in wide open spaces are liabilities in cities, where short-range weapons are more valuable than those with long reaches and inexpensive, durable, or disposable items are preferable to costly accouterments. Ready markets consequently await innovators, as the following samples suggest.
如果坦克炮和火炮能够实现更高和更低的射击角度，它们的效用将会更大。所有参与城市作战的装甲车辆都将受益于冲刺能力、更广阔的视野以及对近战中易受攻击的薄弱环节的更佳防护。更完善的防御系统、更高的机动性和隐蔽性将有助于直升机在高层建筑之间的窗边飞行时生存下来。能够“看穿”拐角和漆黑下水道的传感器将比依赖环境光的传感器优势显著得多。工程兵需要具备在短时间内拆除多层建筑且不造成不必要的附带损害的能力。34
Tank guns and artillery would be more useful if higher and lower angles of fire were feasible. All armored vehicles engaged in urban warfare would benefit from sprint capabilities, greater all-round visibility, and better protection for soft spots that are particularly vulnerable during close combat. Richer defensive suites, increased agility, and stealthiness would help helicopters survive at window level between high-rise buildings. Sensors able to “see” around corners and in pitch black sewers would be infinitely more advantageous than those that rely on ambient light. Engineers need the wherewithal to raze multistory structures on short notice without undesirable collateral damage.34
多种非致命性武器，例如粘合剂（“粘性剂”）、防滑物质（“防滑剂”）、隔热屏障、泡沫、镇静剂和气味剂，或许可以减少交战双方以及非战斗人员的伤亡，并限制对城市财产的意外破坏。35街头斗士们也欢迎轮式、履带式和步行机器人，这些机器人可以远程操控，或者配备人工智能计算机作为大脑，无需补给或睡眠即可长时间运转，并在枪林弹雨中保持冷静。各种各样的自动机器人，各自拥有特殊技能，可以进行侦察、发起进攻、清除障碍、突破雷区，以及执行其他艰苦、繁重、危险、单调或重复性（H 4 R）的任务。36
Several categories of nonlethal weapons, exemplified by adhesives (“stickums”), anti-traction substances (“slickums”), thermal barriers, foams, calmatives, and odiferous agents, perhaps could reduce fatalities among belligerents as well as noncombatants and limit unplanned damage to urban property.35 Street fighters also would welcome wheeled, tracked, and walking robots, remotely controlled or with artificially intelligent computers for brains that could operate for long periods without sustenance or sleep and remain emotionless under fire. Assorted automatons, each with specialized skills, could reconnoiter, spearhead attacks, clear obstacles, breach minefields, and perform other hot, heavy, hazardous, humdrum, or repetitious (H4R) missions.36
非常规城市作战
UNCONVENTIONAL URBAN COMBAT
机智的叛乱分子、抵抗运动和跨国恐怖分子在错综复杂的城市景观中蓬勃发展，这些景观放大了他们的能力，并挫败了技术更先进的对手，这些对手发现很难及时、准确地获取情报，并很快发现传统的军事战术在城市“猫捉老鼠”的游戏中作用甚微。
Ingenious insurgents, resistance movements, and transnational terrorists thrive in labyrinthine cityscapes that amplify their capabilities and frustrate technologically superior adversaries who find it difficult to acquire timely, accurate intelligence and quickly discover that conventional military tactics are marginally useful in urban games of “cat and mouse.”
革命起义
REVOLUTIONARY UPRISINGS
毛泽东、切·格瓦拉和武元甲所阐述的“人民战争”是指主要在农村地区爆发并逐步向城市蔓延的大规模起义。而城市起义则采取不同的策略，它始于人口最稠密的城市，如果成功，就能更快地取得成效。
“People’s wars,” as expounded by Mao Zedong, Che Guevara, and Vo Nguyen Giap, are mass insurrections that open primarily in rural areas and work their way toward cities. Urban insurgencies, which take a different tack, start in cities where most people reside and, if successful, pay off faster.
城市革命的秘诀。法国将军P.-G.克吕塞雷在其1887年的回忆录中写下了城市革命的最初秘诀，列宁于1905年对其进行了改编，并发表在布尔什维克报纸《时报》上。他建议，要么打击要么守住房地产，因为统治阶级“为了保护自己的财产，会出卖任何政府”。一开始就瘫痪警察局，占领控制关键路口的建筑物，炸毁或烧毁任何无法占领的东西，封锁地下通道，设置路障，切断电话线，破坏公用设施，并在黎明前趁大多数城市还在沉睡时发动袭击。37
Recipes for Urban Revolutions. French General P.-G. Cluséret penned the original recipe for urban revolutions in his Memoires of 1887, which Lenin adapted in 1905 and published in the Bolshevik newspaper Vperid. Hit or hold real estate, he advised, because ruling classes “will sell any government you like, in order to protect their property.” Paralyze police stations at the onset, seize buildings that command key intersections, blow up or burn down whatever cannot be captured, block subterranean approaches, build barricades, cut telephone lines, disable utilities, and strike before dawn while most cities sleep.37
卡洛斯·马里盖拉是一位年迈的巴西激进分子，著有《城市游击队小手册》。他强调，熟悉自己城市街道、小巷、岔路、死胡同、海峡、捷径、公园、地下通道和其他特殊地形的革命者，可以多么轻松地秘密行动，出其不意地出现，肆无忌惮地发动袭击，然后像幽灵一样消失。“对警察来说，这是一个无法解决的问题，”他断言，“他们无法抓捕看不见的人，无法镇压抓不到的人，也无法围捕找不到的人。”38
Carlos Marighella, an aging Brazilian firebrand who authored the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, emphasized how easy it is for revolutionaries familiar with streets, alleys, byways, impasses, straits, shortcuts, parks, underground passageways, and other peculiarities of their own city to move surreptitiously, appear by surprise, strike with impunity, then fade away like specters. “It is an insoluble problem for the police,” he asserted, “to get someone they can’t see, to repress someone they can’t catch, to close in on someone they can’t find.”38
言辞与结果。上述言辞与现实结果之间的关联十分薄弱。1917年的俄国革命始于彼得格勒（今圣彼得堡）短暂而自发的起义，在未诉诸严重暴力的情况下公开发展，最终推翻了沙皇尼古拉二世，结束了罗曼诺夫王朝长达300年的统治。地理因素对这场灾难性的变革几乎没有产生影响，即便克鲁塞雷将军和列宁从未发表过任何言论，这场革命也早已实现了所有目标。39阿尔及利亚争取摆脱法国统治的七年独立战争（1954年11月至1962年3月）经过精心策划，旷日持久，其进程与法国殖民统治截然不同。战争的高潮发生在卡斯巴的狭窄巷道中，八万名饱受苦难的人们挤在75英亩的孤立土地上。据克吕塞雷和马里盖拉所述，革命的民族解放阵线（FLN）袭击了公共建筑、警察局、通讯中心、咖啡馆和商店，采取了所有正确的行动。法国军队残酷镇压了消极支持者和积极参与者，但最终战败，因为戴高乐总统认为无法无限期地控制住局势。40简而言之，地理因素对城市暴动的影响因时间和地点而异。
Rhetoric Versus Results. Correlations between the foregoing rhetoric and real-life results are tenuous. The Russian Revolution of 1917, which involved brief, spontaneous uprisings in Petrograd (now Saint Petersburg), developed overtly without recourse to serious violence, ousted Tsar Nicholas II, and terminated 300 years of Romanov rule. Geographic factors scarcely influenced that cataclysmic upheaval, which would have achieved all objectives if neither General Cluséret nor Lenin had ever written a word.39 The 7-year Algerian struggle for independence from France (November 1954 to March 1962), which was well-planned and protracted, proceeded in a very different vein. Climactic actions took place in crooked corridors of the Casbah, where 80,000 wretched souls were cheek to jowl on 75 isolated acres. The revolutionary Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), which hit public buildings, police posts, communication centers, cafes, and shops, made all the right moves according to Cluséret and Marighella. French troops savagely suppressed passive supporters along with active participants, but ultimately lost the war because President Charles de Gaulle saw no way to keep a tight lid on the cauldron indefinitely.40 The influence of geography on urban uprisings, in short, varies radically from time to time and place to place.
抵抗运动
RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS
与革命起义不同，抵抗运动旨在驱逐占领势力、“傀儡”政权，或那些出于好意却令他们感到不满的国内干涉者。即使最终失败，善于利用城市地形的抵抗运动也总是比不善于利用地形的抵抗运动更有优势。
Resistance movements, as contrasted with revolutionary uprisings, aim to evict occupying powers, “puppet” regimes, or well-meaning domestic meddlers whose intrusion they resent. Those who make best use of urban terrain invariably fare better than those who do not, even if they lose.
1953年，柏林少数英雄用燃烧瓶和石块袭击苏联坦克41以及三年后在布达佩斯战斗的匈牙利自由战士42名士兵很快就被击败，而那些装备着老旧武器的非常规城市斗士，尽管寡不敌众，在索马里却势不可挡。狡猾的军阀艾迪德率领的轻装民兵于1993年6月5日在摩加迪沙伏击了不受欢迎的、打着联合国旗号的巴基斯坦维和人员，造成25人死亡，53人受伤，而他们自己却毫发无损地逃脱了。10月3日，美国特种作战部队俘虏了他的几名副手，但在随后的交火中，美方伤亡惨重，91人重伤（18人死亡），索马里方面可能有多达1500人受伤。联合国最终取得的军事“胜利”却变成了一次重大的心理失败。面对国内外舆论的强烈反对，克林顿总统很快下令从索马里撤出所有美军。此后，艾迪德便可以不受外国干预地为所欲为。43
The handful of heroes in Berlin who attacked Soviet tanks with Molotov cocktails and stones (1953)41 and Hungarian freedom fighters who battled in Budapest 3 years later42 were quickly outclassed, whereas unconventional urban brawlers armed with antiquated weapons were formidable in Somalia, despite unfavorable odds. Wily warlord Aideed’s lightly armed militia ambushed unwelcome Pakistani peacemakers under a U.N. banner in Mogadishu on June 5, 1993, killed 25, wounded 53, and escaped unscathed. U.S. Special Operations Forces captured several of his lieutenants on October 3, but the ensuing fire-fight caused 91 serious casualities on the U.S. side (18 dead) and mangled maybe 1,500 Somalis. The resultant U.N. military “victory” became a major psychological defeat. President Clinton, in response to adverse public opinion at home and abroad, soon withdrew all U.S. Armed Forces from Somalia. Aideed thereafter was free to run his own show without foreign interference.43
破坏活动是一种更为隐蔽、风险更低的抵抗形式，如果参与人员对潜在目标的地点、特征、总体价值和弱点了如指掌，就能获得丰厚的回报。掌握及时准确信息的团队可以……要明智地选择行动优先顺序，打击那些能带来最大收益的目标，同时避开那些会使同情者失业、剥夺他们公共服务或以其他方式损害民众支持的目标。另一方面，无知的破坏分子可能会造成更大的危害，正如二战期间一支不负责任的法国小队在巴黎下水道所遭遇的那样：他们引爆了一枚炸药，试图切断与柏林的电话线路，却不知线路就在煤气和自来水管道旁边，结果导致一个街区以上的区域被夷为平地并被淹没，许多同伴伤亡。44
Sabotage, a more subtle, less risky form of resistance, can pay off handsomely provided personnel involved are well informed about the locations, characteristics, overall values, and vulnerabilities of potential targets. Teams armed with timely, accurate information can prioritize intelligently, strike targets that promise the most lucrative payoffs, and avoid those that would put sympathizers out of work, deprive them of public utilities, or otherwise impair popular support. Ignorant saboteurs, on the other hand, may do more harm than good, as one feckless French team discovered in a Paris sewer during World War II: its members leveled and flooded more than a city block and left many friends dead or wounded when they detonated a charge to sever telephone service with Berlin, unaware that the lines lay next to gas and water mains.44
跨国恐怖主义
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
城市中心是跨国恐怖分子的主要活动场所，他们在外国城市的行动旨在散播恐慌，制造动乱，迫使当局为了避免更多苦难而屈从于他们的社会政治诉求。从这个角度来看，针对无辜旁观者的暴行就显得荒谬可笑了。
Urban centers are the main milieu of transnational terrorists, whose operations in foreign cities aim to spread panic and cause such turmoil that authorities comply with their sociopolitical demands to avoid further suffering. Atrocities against innocent bystanders make warped sense when seen in that light.
美国的经验表明，跨国恐怖主义升级的可能性很大，因为1975年拉瓜迪亚机场发生的一枚小型炸弹造成12人死亡。1983 年， 45 名自杀式袭击者在贝鲁特郊外的兵营中埋葬了 220 名美国海军陆战队员、18 名海军水兵和 3 名美国陆军士兵。1993 年 2 月 26 日，纽约市 110 层高的世界贸易中心发生巨大爆炸，造成更大的财产损失和连锁反应。约 55,000 名员工和数千名游客被困在漆黑、浓烟弥漫的楼梯间数小时；曼哈顿下城发生严重的交通堵塞，阻碍了警车、消防车和救护车前往救援；许多银行、企业、经纪公司、律师事务所和其他租户被迫搬迁一个月，并因此直接损失约 10 亿美元；爆炸发生后的前 5 天，纽约市警察局调查了 364 起炸弹威胁（此前平均每天 5 或 6 起）。47其他一些可能成为跨国恐怖分子目标的有利可图的城市设施包括空中交通管制中心、信息存储和传输中心（例如计算机化的银行、商业机构和证券交易所）、交通枢纽（例如机场、桥梁、隧道和转运中心）、核反应堆和石化厂。如果通勤服务中断、通风系统失效或易腐产品变质，都可能造成灾难性后果。
U.S. experience indicates great potential for the escalation of transnational terrorism since one small bomb killed 12 persons at La Guardia Airport in 1975.45 Suicidal assailants buried 220 U.S. Marines, 18 Navy bluejackets, and 3 U.S. Army soldiers in their barracks on the outskirts of Beirut in 1983.46 Greater property damage and repercussions followed an enormous explosion that shook New York City’s 110-story World Trade Center on February 26, 1993. Perhaps 55,000 employees and thousands of visitors were trapped for hours in pitch black, smoke-filled stairwells; a monstrous traffic jam in lower Manhattan impeded police cars, fire trucks, and ambulances en route to rescue them; many banks, businesses, brokerage houses, law firms, and other tenants were displaced for a month and lost about $1 billion as a direct result; and city police investigated 364 bomb threats during the first 5 days after the blast (5 or 6 per day previously was average).47 Other potentially lucrative urban targets for consideration by transnational terrorists include air traffic control centers, information storage and transfer sites (computerized banks, commercial houses, and stock exchanges), transportation nodes (airports, bridges, tunnels, switching centers), nuclear reactors, and petrochemical plants. Calamities could ensue if commuter service ceased, ventilating systems failed, and perishable products spoiled.
因此，总统和国防部长于 1996 年发布了异常紧急的安全指令，旨在保护城市基础设施和居民免受恐怖主义行为的侵害。48这些举措并不令人意外，因为反恐专家尚未制定出能够有效应对最坏情况的应对措施。他们可以将全国各地的关键设施改造成堡垒，美国的盟友也可以这样做，但这会导致预算膨胀，任务效率下降，自由社会也会因此变得更加不自由。因此，我们需要创造性的解决方案。
The President and Secretary of Defense in 1996 consequently issued unusually urgent security directives designed to protect urban infrastructure and occupants against terrorist acts.48 Those steps came as no surprise, because counterterrorism specialists have not yet devised countermeasures that credibly cover worst case contingencies. They could convert critical installations into fortresses across the country, and U.S. allies could do likewise, but budgets would balloon, mission effectiveness would suffer, and free societies would become less free. Creative solutions consequently are required.
常规城市轰炸
CONVENTIONAL URBAN BOMBARDMENT
空中轰炸专家对城市作战的看法与传统街头作战人员和特种部队截然不同，他们提倡两种基本方案或二者的某种组合。方案A强调对精心挑选的目标进行精确打击，摧毁这些目标将削弱敌方的军事能力；方案B则强调传统的地毯式轰炸，其主要目的是瓦解敌人的意志。
Aerial bombardment specialists, who have very different perspectives about urban combat than conventional street fighters and special operations forces, promote two basic options or some combination thereof. Option A emphasizes precision strikes against carefully selected targets, the destruction of which would degrade rival military capabilities; Option B stresses conventional carpet bombing designed primarily to break the enemy’s will.
方案A：精确轰炸
OPTION A: PRECISION BOMBING
“智能”武器最早于 1943 年投入实战，当时德国空军俯冲轰炸机在地中海击沉了叛逃的意大利战列舰“罗马”号。但直到 1972 年 4 月，美国大型激光制导炸弹在北越的保罗·杜美尔桥和清化桥爆炸后，人们才真正认识到精确制导武器 (PGM) 的价值。这两座桥梁此前都曾多次遭受“非制导”武器的攻击。49
“Smart” weapons first saw combat in 1943, when Luftwaffe dive bombers sank the defecting Italian battleship Roma in the Mediterranean Sea, but full appreciation for precision-guided munitions (PGMs) was deferred for three decades until large U.S. laser-guided bombs dropped North Vietnam’s Paul Doumer and Thanh Hoa bridges in April 1972, both of which had survived repeated attacks with “dumb” munitions.49
配备空对地精确制导武器的固定翼飞机和直升机，如今能够比以往任何时候都更精确地发现并打击点目标，同时将附带损害降至最低。更大的有效载荷、更强的爆炸威力以及在引爆前能够穿透钢筋混凝土结构的能力，进一步提升了精确制导武器在敌方将平民与军事重要资产（例如指挥控制中心、城市据点、防空阵地、补给站、国防工业设施、发电厂、铁路货场和港口设施）混杂在一起的地区的效用。然而，在1991年的“沙漠风暴”行动中，并非所有“性能卓越”的空中炸弹或导弹都能像宣传的那样有效打击巴格达市中心的目标。尽管只有 50 个结果，但结果仍然令人印象深刻，重大改进正在开发中，进一步的进步在技术上是可行的。
Fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters armed with air-to-surface PGMs currently can see and strike point targets with far greater accuracy and far less collateral damage than ever before. Heavier pay loads, greater explosive power, and abilities to penetrate far into reinforced steel and concrete structures before detonating further enhance the utility of PGMs wherever enemies mingle civilian populations with militarily valuable assets typified by command/control centers, urban strong points, air defense sites, supply depots, defense industries, power plants, railroad yards, and port facilities. Not every “brilliant” aerial bomb or missile performed as well as advertised against targets in downtown Baghdad during Operation Desert Storm (1991),50 but results were nonetheless impressive, major improvements are under development, and further advances are technologically feasible.
方案二：地毯式轰炸
OPTION B: CARPET BOMBING
意大利准将朱利奥·杜黑在1911年提出了城市地毯式轰炸的概念，当时距离第一架动力飞机首飞已经过去了8年。十年后，他在《空军指挥》一书中发表了他颇具争议的观点。他明确指出，战争的基本目标“过去是、现在是、将来也永远是……迫使敌人屈服于己方意志”，并总结道，“要使敌人屈服，就必须将其置于无法忍受的境地；而最好的方法就是直接攻击其城市和大型工业中心毫无防备的民众”，并使用化学武器以及常规弹药。51
Italian Brigadier General Guilio Douhet voiced urban carpet bombing concepts in 1911, 8 years after the first powered aircraft flew, and published his contentious views in Command of the Air a decade later. He stated unequivocally that the basic objective of war “has always been, still is, and always will be ... to compel the enemy to bow to one’s will,” then concluded that “to bend the enemy’s will, one must put him in intolerable circumstances; and the best way to do that is to attack directly the defenseless population of his cities and great industrial centers” using chemical warfare (CW) as well as conventional munitions.51
过往实践。二战期间，空军力量的支持者们对杜黑的理论进行了最严峻的考验。德国空军率先发动空袭，在帝国元帅赫尔曼·戈林的指挥下，于1940年5月14日夷平了鹿特丹的大部分地区，随后在9月开始轰炸利物浦、布里斯托尔、普利茅斯、南安普顿、曼彻斯特、伯明翰和其他英国城市。从1940年9月到1941年5月，对伦敦的持续轰炸造成1万名平民死亡，1.7万人重伤，并损毁或摧毁了包括议会大厦、圣保罗大教堂、老贝利刑事法院和白金汉宫在内的众多历史建筑。随后，V-1“嗡嗡炸弹”和V-2弹道导弹发动了恐怖袭击。52在 1940 年 11 月 14 日的一次可怕的空袭将这座迷人的城市夷为平地之前，戈林的德国空军曾 17 次造访考文垂。53
Past Practices. Air power proponents exposed Douhet’s principles to their most stringent test during World War II. The German Air Force, which took first turn, razed a good deal of Rotterdam on May 14, 1940, under the guiding hand of Reich Marshal Hermann Goring, then began to bomb Liverpool, Bristol, Plymouth, Southhampton, Manchester, Birmingham, and other British cities in September. The prolonged Blitz of London killed 10,000 civilians, left 17,000 badly wounded, and damaged or demolished historic buildings that included parts of Parliament, St. Paul’s Cathedral, Old Bailey, and Buckingham Palace between September 1940 and May 1941. V-1 “buzz bombs” and V-2 ballistic missiles subsequently mounted terrorist attacks.52 Göring’s Luftwaffe visited Coventry 17 times before a horrific raid on November 14, 1940, left that charming city in ruins.53
随后轮到盟军了。从1943年开始，英国轰炸机司令部夜间轰炸，美国第八航空队白天轰炸，连续两年对德国大部分主要城市进行了炮击。1943年7月24日至8月3日期间，他们六次轰炸汉堡，造成的后果被受灾民众称为“灾难”。到欧洲胜利日，柏林看起来像一片月球表面：50,000 座建筑物被摧毁，更多建筑物只剩下空壳，由此产生的瓦砾保守估计总计达 1 亿立方码（7500 万立方米）。55美丽的德累斯顿，以巴洛克和洛可可式建筑以及精美的瓷器小雕像而闻名，在 1945 年 2 月 13 日晚几乎消失殆尽，当晚有 135,000 名居民、难民、外国劳工和战俘丧生——比广岛和长崎原子弹爆炸后死亡人数的总和还要多。56
The Allies then took their turn. Britain’s Bomber Command by night and U.S. Eighth Air Force by day shellacked most major German cities for 2 consecutive years, beginning in 1943. Together they hit Hamburg six times between July 24 and August 3, 1943, with results that recipients called die Katastrophe.54 Berlin looked like a lunar landscape by VE-Day: 50,000 buildings had been destroyed, many more were little more than shells, and resultant rubble conservatively totaled 100 million cubic yards (75 million cubic meters).55 Beautiful Dresden, famed for baroque and rococo architecture as well as exquisite porcelain figurines, practically disappeared on the night of February 13, 1945, when 135,000 residents, refugees, foreign laborers, and prisoners of war died—more than the combined toll at Hiroshima and Nagasaki after both were atomized.56
美国对日本的低级别空袭全部在夜间进行，少用高爆炸药，多用燃烧弹，主要成分是镁、白磷和凝胶状汽油（一个最终被放弃的奇特方案提议投放数百万只携带微型延时燃烧物的“武装”蝙蝠）。57）。空袭摧毁了66座城市中的40%，使近三分之一的日本人口无家可归，造成的伤亡人数远远超过日本武装部队在整个二战期间的伤亡总和。1945年3月9日至10日，东京遭受了毁灭性的空袭，造成83000人死亡。当时，强风吹过简陋的木质和纸质建筑，掀起无法控制的火风暴，一位目击者形容那景象如同炼狱的画作。在那可怕的夜晚，神户、大阪和名古屋也遭遇了类似的命运。由于空袭集中在更短的时间内，日本平民所感受到的冲击远比德国城市轰炸带来的冲击要大得多。58
Low-level U.S. raids against Japan, all at night, slighted high explosives in favor of incendiaries, mainly magnesium, white phosphorus, and jellied gasoline (one bizarre scheme, eventually discarded, proposed dropping millions of bats “armed” with miniature delayed-action flammables57). Successes destroyed 40 percent of 66 cities, left almost one-third of Japan’s population homeless, and inflicted far more casualties than Japanese Armed Forces suffered during all of World War II. The cataclysmic Tokyo raid of March 9 and 10, 1945, killed 83,000 when high winds among flimsy wooden and rice paper structures whipped up uncontrollable fire storms that one eye witness said looked like paintings of Purgatory. Kobe, Osaka, and Nagoya experienced similar fates that terrible night. Japanese noncombatants felt shock effects many times greater than those that accompanied urban bombing campaigns against Germany, because attacks were concentrated in a much shorter period.58
过去的后果。然而，常规轰炸行动的成效远不及杜黑及其追随者所预期的那样显著。城市轰炸的确摧毁了第三帝国，但根据美国战略轰炸调查报告，“并未大幅降低德国的战争生产，以至于对战争结果产生决定性影响”。德国的韧性强于预期，部分原因是机床（而非建筑物）的损坏程度较轻。抑郁、失败主义和恐惧情绪蔓延，但冷漠使得大多数人更容易接受纪律约束，也更容易接受帝国部长约瑟夫·戈培尔的宣传（“享受战争吧，和平将会很可怕”在战败迫近时成为一句愤世嫉俗的口号）。根深蒂固的职业道德，加上为了维持生计而不得不挣取足够的德国马克，使得大多数家庭的经济支柱坚持工作到战争结束。59日本的情况更为糟糕，早在美军轰炸机开始轰炸日本本土之前，原材料短缺就已严重削弱了日本的战争能力。作为后勤支柱的家庭手工业在工人们大规模逃离火灾风暴后彻底停摆。然而，日本人根深蒂固的服从、顺从、坚忍和牺牲精神，在普遍的绝望中阻止了国家的崩溃——1945年8月14日，当裕仁天皇宣布日本投降时，大多数听到广播讲话的男女老少都震惊不已，难以置信。60
Past Repercussions. Conventional bombing campaigns nevertheless were less rewarding than Douhet and his disciples predicted. Urban bombardment indeed devastated the Third Reich, but “did not so reduce German war production as to have a decisive effect on the outcome of the war,” according to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Resilience was greater than expected, partly because damage to machine tools (as opposed to structures) was slight. Depression, defeatism, and fear were rampant, but apathy made most people amenable to discipline and receptive to Reichminister Joseph Goebbel’s propaganda (“Enjoy the war; the peace will be terrible” became a cynical slogan when defeat loomed). Deeply ingrained work ethics coupled with needs for enough deutsche marks to put ersatz food on the table kept most bread winners on the job until the bitter end.59 Conditions were worse in Japan, where shortages of raw materials crippled war efforts well before U.S. bombers began to batter the home islands. Cottage industries, which were logistical mainstays, closed down completely after workers en masse fled fire storms. National traditions of obedience, conformity, stoicism, and willingness to make sacrifices, however, prevented collapse despite widespread desperation—most men, women, and children who heard Emperor Hirohito’s recorded radio broadcast on August 14, 1945, expressed stunned disbelief when he announced that Japan had surrendered.60
未来适用性。目前可用的制导导弹和携带大量先进常规炸药的现代化轰炸机，其摧毁城市的速度、效率和对敌方士气的打击力，都远超二战时期数量更多的武器系统。致命的化学和生物战攻击足以消灭防御薄弱的人口。因此，对于任何拥有足以突破敌方防御的武装力量的国家而言，地毯式轰炸仍然是一种可行的行动方案。由此可见，需要解决的关键问题在于政策决策是否合情合理，而非军事能力本身。
Future Applicability. Currently available guided missiles and modern bombers that carry huge loads of technologically advanced conventional explosives could ravage cities faster, more efficiently, and with worse effects on enemy morale than World War II weapon systems, which were much more numerous. Lethal chemicals and biological warfare attacks could wipe out poorly defended populations. Carpet bombardment therefore remains a credible course of action for any country that possesses armed forces able to penetrate enemy defenses in sufficient strength. The key question to be resolved thus involves policy decisions concerning conscionability rather than military capabilities.
城市中心与核战略
URBAN CENTERS AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY
城市中心抵御核轰炸的能力因其规模、布局和主要建筑材料而异，但百万吨级核弹头若部署得当，足以摧毁规模最大、结构最坚固的城市，其瞬间冲击波的影响远超以往任何战争时期。因此，自1945年8月15千吨级核弹爆炸以来，核威慑和防御问题一直备受关注。 “小男孩”原子弹夷平了广岛的大部分地区，三天后，当量为 23 千吨、设计不同的“胖子”原子弹摧毁了长崎。61
The ability of urban centers to resist nuclear bombardment varies considerably with size, configuration, and predominant construction materials, but well-placed weapons in the megaton range could obliterate the biggest, most solidly built with instantaneous shock effects many magnitudes greater than any previously experienced in wartime. Deterrence and defense accordingly have attracted intense attention since August 1945, when the 15-kiloton Little Boy bomb flattened much of Hiroshima and the 23-kiloton Fat Man of different design ravaged Nagasaki 3 days later.61
美国政策与态势。20世纪60年代初，苏联对手获得核武器后，美国威慑战略家强调“恐怖平衡”。其理念聚焦于选定的城市目标，旨在“确保苏联、共产主义中国及其卫星国被单独或联合摧毁”。国防部长罗伯特·S·麦克纳马拉认为，消灭“例如五分之一到四分之一的苏联人口和一半的苏联工业能力”的能力将构成“无法容忍的惩罚”，因此具有可信的威慑作用。当时，保护美国城市的努力并未受到重视，因为麦克纳马拉认为，摧毁侵略者的能力才是主要的威慑手段，而不是“部分限制自身损失的能力”。62. 20年后，随着里根总统在1983年3月发表所谓的“星球大战”演讲，国土防御的愿望再次浮出水面。63但到了 21 世纪初，美国及其盟国的城市仍然面临风险，因为足够的弹道导弹防御系统尚未完全开发，更不用说部署了。
U.S. Policies and Postures. U.S. deterrent strategists emphasized a “balance of terror” after Soviet adversaries acquired nuclear weapons in the early 1960s. Concepts focused on urban targets picked to “ensure the destruction, singly or in combination, of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the communist satellites.” Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara assumed that abilities to eradicate “say, one-fifth to one-fourth of [the Soviet] population and one-half of [Soviet] industrial capacity would represent intolerable punishment,” and therefore be credibly dissuasive. Efforts to protect U.S. cities received slight attention at that stage, because McNamara believed that power to pulverize aggressors provided the prime deterrent, not “the ability partially to limit damage to ourselves.”62 Homeland defense aspirations resurfaced two decades later with President Reagan’s so-called “Star Wars” speech in March 1983,63 but U.S. and allied cities at the turn of the 21 st century nevertheless remain at risk, because adequate ballistic missile defense systems have not yet been fully developed, much less deployed.
苏联的政策和姿态。早在苏联的继承者们奉行列宁的名言“全人类的主要生产者是劳动者，是工人。如果他活下来，我们就保全一切……如果他死了，国家也就灭亡了”之前，俄罗斯领导人就高度重视国土安全。64苏联的弹道导弹防御系统与美国类似，主要局限于预警网络，但其防空体系令人印象深刻，而强大的民防体系则强调防空洞、加固设施、储备物资以及对民众进行全面的防空洞使用培训。然而，苏联在危机时期疏散城市的周密计划引起了西方战略家的普遍质疑。他们质疑当时的后勤能力是否足以在夏季为数百万流离失所者提供充足的食物、衣物、住所和其他生活保障，这些人的家园和工作场所可能在他们离开期间被夷为平地，更遑论在严寒的冬季。65
Soviet Policies and Postures. Russian leaders assigned a high priority to homeland defense long before Soviet successors sanctified Lenin’s saying that “the primary producer of all mankind is the laboring man, the worker. If he survives, we save everything ... if he dies, so does the State.”64 Soviet ballistic missile defenses, like those of the United States, were limited largely to warning networks, but their air defense apparatus was impressive and stout civil defenses emphasized fallout shelters, hardened facilities, stockpiles, and thorough indoctrination in their use. Elaborate plans to evacuate Soviet cities during intense crises, however, aroused widespread skepticism among Western strategists, who questioned whether logistical capabilities then available could adequately feed, clothe, shelter, and otherwise minister to millions of displaced persons whose homes and places of employment might be leveled during their absence in summertime, much less in subzero winter.65
城市防御前景。此时，回顾过去的优势和劣势很有帮助。目前很少有城市能像冷战结束前的苏联城市那样做好充分准备抵御核打击。自20世纪80年代中期以来，弹道导弹防御（BMD）专家取得了巨大的技术进步，但即使是拥有核武器的小型国家，也能在更先进的弹道导弹防御系统得到完善、采购和充分部署之前，挟持城市中心。
Prospects for City Defense. It is helpful at this point to put past pluses and minuses in perspective. Few cities currently are as well prepared to withstand a nuclear assault as Soviet counterparts were before the Cold War wound down. Ballistic missile defense (BMD) specialists have made immense technological strides since the mid-1980s, but even small nuclear-capable nations will be able to hold urban centers hostage until much better BMD systems have been perfected, purchased, and deployed in adequate quantities.
城市总体脆弱性
OVERALL URBAN VULNERABILITIES
现代大都市依赖外部资源获取食物、水、燃料、电力和其他必需设施。它们还必须将垃圾、废弃物和有毒废物运出城外进行处理。因此，城市边界以外的供应和配送系统也成为脆弱区域。
Modern metropolises depend on outside sources for food, water, fuel, electricity, and other essential facilities. They also must dispose of garbage, rubbish, and toxic waste materials beyond their borders. Areas of vulnerability consequently include sources of supply and distribution systems far beyond city limits.
要点
KEY POINTS
• 军事行动应根据具体的城市格局进行调整，而城市格局在规模、形状、结构、材料、街道模式和人口密度方面差异很大。
• Military operations should be tailored to suit particular urban configurations, which differ widely with regard to sizes, shapes, structures, materials, street patterns, and population densities.
• 城市扩张日益造成障碍，限制了除非洲和澳大利亚以外各大洲许多地方的军事行动自由。
• Urban sprawl increasingly creates barriers that restrict military freedom of action in many places on every continent save Africa and Australia.
• 当决策者将城市指定为军事目标或武装部队无法方便地绕过时，残酷的街头战斗就成了必要的战争形式。
• Street fighting, a brutal form of warfare, becomes necessary when policymakers designate cities as military objectives or armed forces cannot conveniently bypass.
• 大多数为在开阔地形作战而组织、装备和训练的武装部队，往往对巷战准备不足，巷战的特点是小规模步兵作战，严重限制了重型武器和机动车辆的价值。
• Most armed forces that are organized, equipped, and trained for operations in open terrain often are poorly prepared for street fighting, which features small unit infantry actions and severely limits the value of heavy weapons as well as motor vehicles.
• 大多数为城市常规作战而组织、装备和训练的武装部队，对于应对难以捉摸、打了就跑的城市游击队准备不足。
• Most armed forces that are organized, equipped, and trained for conventional combat in cities are poorly prepared to cope with elusive urban guerrillas who hit and run.
• 城市公用设施和设施的状况、总容量、可供军事使用的百分比以及恢复要求都是重要的后勤问题。
• The condition of urban utilities and facilities, total capacities, percentages available for military use, and restoration requirements are important logistical matters.
• 大都市的军事指挥官通常必须调动宝贵的军事资源和人力来控制难民和维持非战斗人员的生计。
• Military commanders in metropolises commonly must divert precious military resources and manpower to control refugees and sustain noncombatants.
• 装备精确制导武器的飞机通常能够比高角度炮火更精确地发现和打击城市目标，并且附带损害要小得多。
• Aircraft armed with precision-guided munitions generally can see and strike urban targets with far greater accuracy and far less collateral damage than high-angle artillery fire.
• 决策者在批准使用常规武器或核武器对敌方城市进行空中轰炸之前，应适当地将目的和手段结合起来。
• Policymakers should match ends and means appropriately before they approve aerial bombardment of enemy cities using conventional or nuclear weapons.
• 如果敌人切断了城市的外部补给来源，城市就无法生存。
• Cities cannot survive if enemies sever outside sources of sustenance.
笔记
NOTES
1.孙子，《孙子兵法》，塞缪尔·B·格里菲斯编辑和翻译（纽约：牛津大学出版社，1963年，第78页）。
1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed. and trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 78).
2.美联社报道，《纽约时报》，1968 年 2 月 8 日，第 14 页。
2. Associated Press dispatch, New York Times, February 8, 1968, 14.
3. Albert Wohlstetter，“恐怖的微妙平衡”，载于Henry A. Kissinger 编辑的《国家战略问题》（纽约：Praeger，1965 年，第 34-58 页）。
3. Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” in Problems of National Strategy, ed. Henry A. Kissinger (New York: Praeger, 1965, 34-58).
4. Curtis E. LeMay，《与 LeMay 一起执行任务：我的故事》（纽约州花园城：Doubleday 出版社，1965 年），第 565 页。
4. Curtis E. LeMay, Mission With LeMay: My Story (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1965), 565.
5. FM 5-33：地形分析（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1990 年 7 月 1 日），第 2-1 至 2-3 页；B. Bruce-Briggs，“郊区战争”，军事评论54，第 6 期（1974 年 6 月）：8-9。
5. FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, July 1 990), 2-1 through 2-3; B. Bruce-Briggs, “Suburban Warfare,” Military Review 54, no. 6 (June 1974): 8-9.
6. FM 90-10：城市化地形上的军事行动（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1979 年 8 月 15 日），第 1-4 页和第 1-5 页；FM 30-10：地形分析，1972 年 3 月 27 日，第 112-113 页、116-117 页（已被 1990 年 7 月出版的同名 FM 5-33 取代，但包含有关城市化的更详细信息）；Patrick O'Sullivan，《地形与战术》（纽约：Greenwood Press，1991 年），第 147 页。
6. FM 90-10: Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, August 15, 1979), 1-4 and 1-5; FM 30-10: Terrain Analysis, March 27, 1 972, 112-113,116-117 (superseded by FM 5-33, same title, July 1990, but contains better information about urbanization); Patrick O’Sullivan, Terrain and Tactics (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 147.
7. FM 30-10：地形分析，1972 年 3 月 27 日，第 115-117 页。有关详细概述，请参阅国防情报局机密图书馆中的《国家情报调查》第 25 节“城市地区”和第四补充“城市地区”。
7. FM 30-10: Terrain Analysis, March 27, 1972, 115-117. For detailed outlines, see National Intelligence Survey, section 25, Urban Areas and Supplement IV, Urban Areas, available in the Defense Intelligence Agency classified library.
8. 《华盛顿邮报》1996 年 6 月 8 日 A 版第 17 页刊登的“特大城市” ；刘易斯·芒福德，《历史上的城市：其起源、转型和前景》（纽约：哈考特-布雷斯出版社，1968 年）。
8. “Mega Cities,” Washington Post, June 8, 1996, A 17; Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Transformations, and Its Prospects (New York: Harcourt-Brace, 1968).
9. B. Bruce-Briggs，“郊区战争”，4-5；FM 90-10：城市化地形上的军事行动，1-2 和 1-3。
9. B. Bruce-Briggs, “Suburban Warfare,” 4-5; FM 90-10: Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, 1-2 and 1-3.
10. Trevor N. Dupuy，《战争天才：德国陆军和总参谋部，1807-1945》（新泽西州恩格尔伍德克利夫斯：普伦蒂斯-霍尔出版社，1977 年），第 130-145 页。
10. Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 130-145.
11. Paul Bracken，“城市扩张与北约防御”，《生存》（1976年11/12月）：254-260；John W. Burbery，“视角与模式”，《军事评论》 58，第3期（1978年3月）：3-10。关于对FM 90-10《城市化地形上的军事行动》的反驳，见第1-6至1-10页，以及B. Bruce-Briggs，“郊区战争”，第9-10页。另见Patrick O'Sullivan，“城市地形的军事分析”，《专业地理学家》 （1986年8月1日）：286-290。
11. Paul Bracken, “Urban Sprawl and NATO Defense,” Survival (November/December 1976): 254-260; John W. Burbery, “Perspectives and Patterns,” Military Review 58, no. 3 (March 1978): 3-10. For rebuttals to FM 90-10: Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, 1-6 through 1-10, and B. Bruce-Briggs, “Suburban Warfare,” 9-10. Also see Patrick O’Sullivan, “Military Analysis of Urban Terrain,” The Professional Geographer (August 1 986): 286-290.
12. 《圣经》约书亚记第六章；伊加尔·亚丁，《圣经之地战争艺术》第1卷（英国诺里奇：贾罗德父子公司，1963年），第16-24页，第32-35页。
12. The Holy Bible, Book of Joshua, Chapter VI; Yigal Yadin, The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands, vol. 1 (Norwich, England: Jarrold and Sons, 1963), 16-24, 32-35.
13. Martin Blumenson，《马克·克拉克》（纽约：Congdon and Weed，1984 年），第 213-216 页。
13. Martin Blumenson, Mark Clark (New York: Congdon and Weed, 1984), 213-216.
14.阿利斯泰尔·霍姆，《战败：法国，1940》（波士顿：利特尔·布朗出版社，1969 年），第 94、381-394、561-564、573 页。宣布开放城市，第 562 页。
14. Alistair Home, To Lose a Battle: France, 1940 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), 94, 381-394, 561-564, 573. Open city declared, 562.
15. Larry Collins 和 Dominique Lapierre，《巴黎在燃烧吗？》（纽约：袖珍书出版社，1965 年），第 25-29 页、第 79-80 页、第 195-197 页、第 275-280 页、第 301-303 页、第 316-320 页。
15. Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Is Paris Burning? (New York: Pocket Books, 1965), 25-29, 79-80, 195-197, 275-280, 301-303, 316-320.
16. Rafael Steinberg，《重返菲律宾》（纽约：时代生活出版社，1979 年），第 107、114-121、134-149 页。
16. Rafael Steinberg, Return to the Philippines (New York: Time-Life Books, 1979), 107, 114-121, 134-149.
17. Christopher Duffy，《围攻战：近代早期世界的堡垒，1494-1660》（伦敦，Routledge and Kegan Paul出版社，1979年）和《火与石：堡垒战争的科学，1660-1860》（伦敦，David and Charles出版社，1975年）。
17. Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early Modern World, 1494-1660 (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), and Fire and Stone: The Science of Fortress Warfare, 1660-1860 (London, David and Charles, 1975).
18. J. Bowyer Bell，《围城：七座被围困的城市》（纽约：Chilton Books，1966 年）。
18. J. Bowyer Bell, Besieged: Seven Cities Under Siege (New York: Chilton Books, 1966).
19. Rudolf Böhmler 和 Werner Haupt，《德国伞兵，1939-1945》，修订版（英国萨里郡新梅登：Altmark 出版社，1971 年），第 218-220 页，第 224-225 页。
19. Rudolf Böhmler and Werner Haupt, The German Paratroops, 1939-1945, rev. ed. (New Maiden, Surrey, United Kingdom: Altmark Publishing, 1971), 218-220, 224-225.
20. Leon Gouré，《列宁格勒围城战》（斯坦福，加利福尼亚州：斯坦福大学出版社，1962 年）。关于扎德诺夫的引文，参见 Alexander Werth，《战时的俄罗斯，1941-1945》（纽约：EP Dutton and Co.，1964 年），第 305 页。
20. Leon Gouré, The Siege of Leningrad (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962). For Zhadnov’s quotation, see Alexander Werth, Russia At War, 1941-1945 (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co. 1964), 305.
21. Ann 和 John Tusa，《柏林空运》（纽约：雅典娜出版社，1988 年）；Avi Shalaim，《美国与柏林封锁，1948-1949 年：危机决策研究》（加州伯克利：加州大学出版社，1983 年）。
21. Ann and John Tusa, The Berlin Airlift (New York: Athenium, 1988); Avi Shalaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949: A Study in Crisis Decision-Making (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983).
22. John W. Hendrix，“城市地形军事行动的视角”，《步兵》（1995 年 11 月至 12 月）：1-2；TR Milton, Jr.，“城市作战：未来战争”，《军事评论》 74，第 2 期（1994 年 2 月）：37-46。
22. John W. Hendrix, “A Perspective on Military Operations on Urban Terrain,” Infantry (November-December 1995): 1-2; T. R. Milton, Jr., “Urban Operations: Future War,” Military Review 74, no. 2 (February 1994): 37-46.
23. VE Tarrant，《斯大林格勒：痛苦的剖析》（纽约：Hippocene Books，1992 年）。
23. V. E. Tarrant, Stalingrad: The Anatomy of an Agony (New York: Hippocene Books, 1992).
24. Roy E. Appleman，《南至洛东江，北至鸭绿江（1950 年 6 月至 1950 年 11 月）》（华盛顿特区：陆军部军事历史主任办公室，1961 年），第 30-36 页、第 515-541 页；Billy C. Mossman，《潮起潮落，1950 年 11 月至 1951 年 7 月》（华盛顿特区：陆军部军事历史中心），第 192-208 页、第 328-330 页。
24. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June 1950-November 1950) (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), 30-36, 51 5-541 ; Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 1951 (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, Center of Military History), 192-208, 328-330.
25. Keith William Nolan，《顺化之战：春节，1968》（加利福尼亚州诺瓦托：Presidio出版社，1983年）。
25. Keith William Nolan, Battle for Hué: Tet, 1968 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983).
26. FM 90-10：城市化地形上的军事行动，附录 A、CE；CN Donnelly，“苏联在建成区作战的技术”，《军事评论》（1977 年 11 月 1 日）：37-48；Patrick O'Sullivan 和 Jesse W. Miller, Jr.，《战争地理学》（纽约：圣马丁出版社，1983 年），131-135；Bruce-Briggs，“郊区战争”，8-10。
26. FM 90-10: Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, appendices A, C-E; C. N. Donnelly, “Soviet Techniques for Combat in Built-up Areas,” Military Review (November 1 977): 37-48; Patrick O’Sullivan and Jesse W. Miller, Jr., The Geography of Warfare (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1 983), 131-135; Bruce-Briggs, “Suburban Warfare,” 8-10.
27. O'Sullivan，《地形与战术》，141-146；Collins 和 Lapierre，《巴黎在燃烧吗？》，309-310。
27. O’Sullivan, Terrain and Tactics, 141-146; Collins and Lapierre, Is Paris Burning?,309-310.
28. Adolf Carlson，“城市作战中的坦克”，《装甲》（1981 年 3 月-4 月）：30-31、33-35；FM 90-10：城市化地形上的军事行动，F-1。
28. Adolf Carlson, “Tanks in Urban Combat,” Armor (March-April 1981): 30-31, 33-35; FM 90-10: Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, F-1.
29. Collins 和 Lapierre，《巴黎在燃烧吗？》，281-368。
29. Collins and Lapierre, Is Paris Burning?,281-368.
30. Carlson，“城市作战中的坦克”，第31-32页、35-36页；FM 90-10，第4-1至4-3页、4-7和4-8页、B-10、C-1页
30. Carlson, “Tanks in Urban Combat,” 31-32, 35-36; FM 90-10, 4-1 through 4-3, 4-7 and 4-8, B-10, C-1
31. FM 90-10，B-6 至 B-10。
31. FM 90-10, B-6 through B-10.
32.同上，5-2 至 5-5。
32. Ibid., 5-2 through 5-5.
33.同上，第 1-10、5-1、5-5 至 5-8 页；J. Lawton Collins，《和平时期的战争：朝鲜的历史和教训》（纽约：霍顿·米夫林出版社，1969 年），第 109 页。
33. Ibid., 1-10, 5-1, 5-5 through 5-8; J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 109.
34. Ralph Peters，“我们的士兵，他们的城市”，Parameters 26，第 1 期（1996 年春季）：43-50；Hendrix，“城市地形军事行动的视角”，2。
34. Ralph Peters, “Our Soldiers, Their Cities,” Parameters 26, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 43-50; Hendrix, “A Perspective on Military Operations in Urban Terrain,” 2.
35. John L. Barry 等人，《非致命军事手段：新时代的新杠杆》（马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛大学约翰·F·肯尼迪政府学院，1994 年）；《非致命技术：军事选择和影响》（纽约：外交关系委员会，1995 年）。
35. John L. Barry, et al., Nonlethal Military Means: New Leverage for a New Era (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1994); Nonlethal Technologies: Military Options and Implications (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995).
36. Carl Paul Drev Dahl，“移动机器人将在未来的陆地战争中发挥多种作用”，《国防系统评论》（1983 年 11 月）：13-17；Charles J. Garvey 和 James J. Richardson，“机器人技术在地面战争中得到应用”，《军事电子/对抗》（1983 年 3 月）：85-91。
36. Carl Paul Drev Dahl, “Mobile Robotics Will Serve Many Roles in Future Land Warfare,” Defense Systems Review (November 1983): 13-17; Charles J. Garvey and James J. Richardson, “Robotics Find Application in Ground Warfare,” Military Electronics/Countermeasures (March 1983): 85-91.
37. TP Featherstone，“共产主义街头战斗入门”，与 P.-G. Cluséret 的“街头战斗”一起，皇家联合军种研究所杂志117，第 1 期（1972 年 3 月）：57-60。
37. T. P. Featherstone, “A Communist Primer on Street Fighting,” with “Street Fighting,” by P.-G. Cluséret, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute 117, no. 1 (March 1972): 57-60.
38 .卡洛斯·马里盖拉（Carlos Marighella），城市游击队迷你手册（加拿大温哥华：纸浆出版社，1974 年）。
38. Carlos Marighella, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla (Vancouver, Canada: Pulp Press, 1974).
39. Richard Pipes，《俄国革命》（纽约：Alfred A. Knopf，1990 年）。
39. Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990).
40. Alistair Home，《野蛮的和平：阿尔及利亚 1954-1962》（纽约：Viking，1978 年）；Franz Fanon，《地球上的受苦者》（纽约：Grove Press，1965 年）。
40. Alistair Home, A Savage Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York: Viking, 1978); Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1965).
41. Wolfgang H. Kraus，“东德（1953 年 6 月）”，载于《内部冲突中的挑战与应对》，第 2 卷，《欧洲和中东的经验》，DM Condit、Bert H. Cooper, Jr. 等编（华盛顿特区：美国大学社会系统研究中心，1967 年 3 月），第 457-496 页。
41. Wolfgang H. Kraus, “East Germany (June 1953),” in Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, vol. 2, The Experience in Europe and The Middle East, eds. D. M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, American University, March 1967), 457-496.
42. Richard Lettis 和 William E. Morris，《匈牙利起义，1956 年 10 月 23 日至 11 月 4 日》（纽约：Scribner 出版社，1961 年）。
42. Richard Lettis and William E. Morris, The Hungarian Revolt, October 23-November 4, 1956 (New York: Scribner, 1961).
43.沃纳参议员和莱文参议员致瑟蒙德参议员和纳恩参议员的备忘录，《关于 1993 年 10 月 3 日至 4 日在索马里摩加迪沙发生的游骑兵突袭事件的情况审查》，1995 年 9 月 29 日。马克·鲍登，《黑鹰坠落》，《费城问询报》 ，1997 年 11 月 16 日至 12 月 14 日连载 29 章。
43. Senator Warner and Senator Levin, memo to Senator Thurmond and Senator Nunn, Review of Circumstances Surrounding the Ranger Raid on October 3-4, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia, September 29, 1995. Mark Bowden, “Blackhawk Down,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 29 chapters serialized between November 16 and December 14, 1997.
44. Andrew R. Molnar 等人，《DA 小册子 550-104：叛乱中地下组织的人为因素考虑》（华盛顿特区：SORO，美国大学，陆军部，1966 年 9 月），第 220-221 页；William Powell，《无政府主义者食谱》（纽约：Stuart Press，1971 年）。
44. Andrew R. Molnar, et al., DA Pamphlet 550-104: Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (Washington, DC: SORO, American University, Dept. of the Army, September 1966), 220-221; William Powell, The Anarchist Cookbook (New York: Stuart Press, 1971).
45. Facts on File 年鉴，1975 年（纽约：Facts on File，1976 年），1028 。
45. Facts on File Yearbook, 1975 (New York: Facts on File, 1976), 1028.
46.国防部委员会关于贝鲁特国际机场恐怖主义法案的报告，1983 年 10 月 23 日，《长报告》（华盛顿特区：国防部，1983 年 12 月 20 日）；克莱德·R·马克，《贝鲁特的海军陆战队安全：众议院军事委员会和长委员会报告的比较》（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1984 年 1 月 9 日）。
46. Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, The Long Report (Washington, DC: Dept. of Defense, December 20, 1983); Clyde R. Mark, Marine Security in Beirut; A Comparison of the House Armed Services Committee and Long Commission Reports (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 9, 1984).
47. Robert D. McFadden，“世贸中心爆炸，疑似炸弹袭击；5人死亡，数千人逃离大楼浓烟”，《纽约时报》，1993年2月27日，第1页，第22页（相关报道见第1页，第22-24页）；Alison Mitchell，“世贸中心爆炸后，企业努力继续运营”，《纽约时报》 ，1993年3月1日，第1页，B6版（相关文章见第1页，B4-B6版）；Peter Marks，“世贸中心快速重新开放的希望变得渺茫”，《纽约时报》，1993年3月3日，第1页，B6版（相关文章见B6-B7版）。
47. Robert D. McFadden, “Blast Hits Trade Center, Bomb Suspected; 5 Killed, Thousands Flee Smoke in Towers,” New York Times, February 27, 1993, 1, 22 (related reports on 1, 22-24); Alison Mitchell, “Businesses Try to Carry on After Trade Center Blast,” New York Times, March 1, 1993, 1, B6 (related articles on 1, B4-B6); Peter Marks, “Hope Turning Dim on Fast Reopening for Trade Center,” New York Times, March 3, 1993, 1, B6 (related articles on B6-B7).
48.第13010号行政命令：关键基础设施保护，1996年7月15日，《联邦公报》第3部分，总统，1996年7月17日，第37347-37350页，随后是《关键基础：保护美国的基础设施》，总统关键基础设施保护委员会报告，华盛顿特区，1997年10月；国防部长威廉·佩里，《部队保护》 ，向总统和国会提交的关于保护部署在海外的美国部队的报告，1996年9月16日。附件A是美国中央司令部责任区和胡拜尔塔楼的部队保护评估（唐宁评估工作组报告），1996年8月30日。
48. Executive Order 13010: Critical Infrastructure Protection, July 15, 1996, in Federal Register, part 3, The President, July 17, 1996, 37347-37350, followed by Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures, Report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Washington, DC, October 1997; Secretary of Defense William Perry, Force Protection, Report to the President and Congress on the Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad, September 16, 1996. Annex A is the Force Protection Assessment of USCENTCOM AOR and Khobar Towers (Report of the Downing Assessment Task Force), August 30, 1996.
49. David R. Mets，《外科手术式打击的探索》（佛罗里达州埃格林空军基地：空军系统司令部专著，武器装备部，1987 年）。
49. David R. Mets, The Quest for a Surgical Strike (Eglin AFB, FL: Air Force Systems Command Monograph, Armament Division, 1987).
50.《沙漠风暴行动：空战评估》，GAO/PEMD-96-10，提交国会请求者的报告（参议员普赖尔、众议员丁格尔）（华盛顿特区：美国总审计署，1996 年 7 月）；埃利奥特·科恩，“高科技的恶名：美国总审计署对海湾战争武器的错误攻击”，《华盛顿邮报》，1996 年 7 月 19 日，第 15 页。
50. Operation Desert Storm; Evaluation of the Air War, GAO/PEMD-96-10, Report to Congressional Requesters (Senator Pryor, Representative Dingell) (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, July 1996); Eliot Cohen, “A Bad Rap on High Tech: The GAO’s Misguided Missile Against Gulf War Weaponry,” Washington Post, July 19, 1996, 1 5.
51.朱利奥·杜黑，《空军指挥》，迪诺·法拉利为空军历史办公室翻译（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1983 年）；引文见第 277、282 页。
51. Guilio Douhet, Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari for the Office of Air Force History (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983); quotations are on 277, 282.
52. Philip Ziegler，《伦敦战时，1939-1945》（纽约：Alfred Knopf，1995）。
52. Philip Ziegler, London at War, 1939-1945 (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1995).
53. Allan W. Kurki，《月光奏鸣曲行动：德国对考文垂的袭击》（韦斯特波特，康涅狄格州：Praeger出版社，1995年）。
53. Allan W. Kurki, Operation Moonlight Sonata: The German Raid on Coventry (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995).
54. Martin Middlebrook，《汉堡战役》（纽约：Charles Scribner's Sons，1981 年）。
54. Martin Middlebrook, The Battle of Hamburg (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1981).
55. “柏林”，Encarta 96百科全书。
55. “Berlin,” Encarta 96 Encyclopedia.
56.大卫·欧文，《德累斯顿的毁灭》（纽约：霍尔特、莱因哈特和温斯顿出版社，1963 年）。库尔特·冯内古特曾作为战俘亲历德累斯顿之战，后来创作了反战小说《第五号屠宰场》（纽约：德拉科特出版社，1969 年）。
56. David Irving, The Destruction of Dresden (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963). Kurt Vonnegut, who was present as a POW, subsequently penned an antiwar novel, Slaughterhouse Five (New York: Delacorte Press, 1969).
57. Jack Couffer，《蝙蝠炸弹：二战的另一种秘密武器》（德克萨斯州奥斯汀：德克萨斯大学出版社，1992 年）。
57. Jack Couffer, Bat Bomb: World War II’s Other Secret Weapon (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1992).
58. 《美国战略轰炸调查》 （USSBS），第 7 卷和第10 卷，第 3 部分（纽约：加兰出版社，1976 年），第 15-20 页。
58. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), vols. 7 and 10, part 3 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1976), 15-20.
59. USSBS，第 2 卷和第 4 卷；伯纳德·布罗迪，《导弹时代的战略》（普林斯顿，新泽西州：普林斯顿大学出版社，1959 年），第 120-124 页，第 131-138 页。
59. USSBS, vol. 2 and vol. 4; Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), 120-124, 131-138.
60. USSBS，第7卷和第9卷
60. USSBS, vol. 7 and vol. 9
61. USSBS，第 7 卷；小男孩和胖子原子弹的数据包含在 Chuck Hansen 的《美国核武器：秘密历史》（纽约：Orion Books，1988 年）第 11、14、21 页中。
61. USSBS, vol. 7; Little Boy and Fat Man bomb data are contained in Chuck Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (New York: Orion Books, 1 988), 11, 14, 21.
62. Robert S. McNamara，《关于 1969-1973 财年国防计划和 1969 年国防预算的声明》，1968 年 1 月 22 日，第 41-76 页，第 47、50 页有引述。另见其《关于 1968-1972 财年国防计划和 1968 年国防预算的声明》，1967 年 1 月 23 日，第 38-39 页。
62. Robert S. McNamara, Statement on the Fiscal Year 1969-1973 Defense Program and the 1969 Defense Budget, January 22, 1 968, 41-76, with quotes on 47, 50. Also, his Statement on the 1968-1972 Defense Program and 1968 Defense Budget, January 23, 1967, 38-39.
63. 《纽约时报》 1983 年 3 月 24 日第 20 页刊登了“总统关于军事开支和新国防的演讲”。有关相关汇编，请参阅国防部最新新闻特刊第 1 部分（1983 年 5 月 4 日）、第 2 部分（1983 年 5 月 5 日）以及最新新闻系列“战略防御倡议”（1984 年 8 月 14 日和 23 日、9 月 26 日、10 月 25 日、11 月 29 日以及 1985 年 1 月 3 日、2 月 7 日）。
63. “President’s Speech on Military Spending and a New Defense,” New York Times, March 24, 1 983, 20. For related compilations, see Dept. of Defense Current News, Special Edition, part 1, May 4, 1983, part 2, May 5, 1983, and a Current News series, “Strategic Defense Initiative,” August 1 4 and 23, September 26, October 25, November 29, 1984, and January 3, February 7, 1985.
64.列宁，《全集》第38卷，第5版（莫斯科：政治文学出版社，1958年），第359页。
64. V. I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, vol. 38, 5th ed. (Moscow: Political Literature Publishing House, 1958), 359.
65. PT Yegorov 等，《民防：苏联视角》（未注明日期），以及 NM Titov 等编著并翻译，《民防》，1975 年 7 月，橡树岭国家实验室；Leon Gouré，《苏联战略中的战争生存》（迈阿密，佛罗里达州：迈阿密大学高级国际研究中心，1976 年）。关于质疑，参见 Fred M. Kaplan，“苏联民防神话”，《原子科学家公报》 ，第 1 部分（1978 年 3 月）：14-20，以及第 2 部分（1978 年 4 月）：41-66。
65. P. T. Yegorov et al., Civil Defense: A Soviet View (undated), and N. M. Titov et al., eds. and trans., Civil Defense, July 1975, Oak Ridge National Laboratory; Leon Gouré, War Survival in Soviet Strategy (Miami, FL: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1976). For skepticism, see Fred M.. Kaplan, “The Soviet Civil Defense Myth,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, part 1 (March 1978): 14-20, and part 2 (April 1978): 41-66.
11. 通信线路
11. LINES OF COMMUNICATION
移动的手指书写着
，写完后，
继续向前；无论多么虔诚
或多么机智
，都无法让它回头去划掉
半行，
无论多么悲伤的泪水，都无法洗去
其中的一个字。
The Moving Finger writes:
and having writ,
Moves on; nor all Piety
nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel
half a line,
Nor all thy Tears wash out
a Word of it.
奥马尔·海亚姆《鲁拜集》
爱德华·菲茨杰拉德译本
Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyam
Edward Fitzgerald’s Translation
帐篷匠奥马尔在其《鲁拜集》中反复强调了不可挽回的时间的重要性。经验丰富的军事指挥官也深谙此道，他们深知几分钟往往决定着军事成败。因此，他们竭力充分利用陆海空交通线，将各国与关键资源连接起来，连接各个战区，为部署的武装部队提供支援，简化其从A点到B、C、D等决策点的移动，并使部队在抵达后能够最有效地进行机动。1.确保关键后勤通道的畅通至关重要，因为现代大型武装部队与以往不同，无法依靠陆地资源维持运转。因此，各级指挥官和参谋人员都需要深入了解道路、铁路、海港、机场、内河航道和管道的现状，这些设施能够保障军事行动的顺利进行并简化后勤保障。主要通道的通行能力、局限性和脆弱性始终受到密切关注，尤其需要关注瓶颈路段、绕行路线、维护需求以及新建道路的可能性。
OMAR THE TENTMAKER EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF IRRETRIEVABLE TIME THROUGHOUT HIS RUBÁIYÁT. So do seasoned military commanders, who know full well that a few minutes often spell the difference between military success and failure, victory and defeat. They therefore strive to make best use of land, sea, air, and space lines of communication (LOCs) that link nations with essential resources, connect military theaters of operation, facilitate support for deployed armed forces, simplify their movement from present positions at Point A to points of decision at B, C, and D, then enable formations to maneuver most effectively after arrival.1 Assured access to essential LOCs is crucially important, because large modern armed forces, unlike their predecessors, cannot live off the land. Commanders and staffs at every level consequently need intimate knowledge about the current status of roads, railways, seaports, airfields, inland waterways, and pipelines that facilitate fluid military operations and simplify logistical support. The capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of primary routes attract constant attention, with particular concern for bottlenecks, bypasses, maintenance requirements, and possibilities for new construction.
道路
ROADS
具有军事用途的道路可能早于第一批战车的出现。埃及法老于公元前15世纪初从迦南地进口了战车。后来，29条收费公路（总长约5万英里/8万公里）从古罗马辐射至所有被征服的行省。20世纪30年代，阿道夫·希特勒修建了多车道高速公路，以便快速调动军队。自那时起，陆路运输的重要性丝毫未减。
Militarily useful roads probably predate the first chariots, which Egyptian Pharaohs imported from Caanan early in the 15th century B.C. Twenty-nine turnpikes that totaled about 50,000 miles (80,000 kilometers) later radiated from ancient Rome to every conquered province. Adolph Hitler built multilane Autobahns in the 1930s to shift armed forces rapidly from one front to another, and the value of overland routes since then has in no way diminished.
路线侦察
ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE
乔治·S·巴顿中将在1944年率领第三集团军进入法国之前，阅读了《诺曼征服史》，“特别关注了征服者威廉在诺曼底和布列塔尼作战时使用的道路”。他从中吸取了教训，了解到中世纪的道路必须建在坚实的地面上，因此，如果德军摧毁了高速公路，这些道路就很容易绕过。1948 年圣诞节当天，以色列上校伊加尔·阿隆的内盖夫旅的两个小队在西奈半岛北部沙漠中绕过了埃及军队的侧翼，此前，航空照片判读员发现了一条长期废弃的罗马道路的遗迹，而守军却忽略了这条道路。3
Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., read The Norman Conquest before his Third Army entered France in 1944, “paying particular attention to the roads William the Conqueror used in his operations in Normandy and Brittany.” Lessons learned informed him of medieval thoroughfares that had to be on solid ground and therefore promised easy bypassing if the German Wehrmacht demolished high-speed routes.2 Elements of Israeli Colonel Yigael Allon’s Negev Brigade outflanked Egyptian forces in the northern Sinai desert on Christmas Day 1948 after aerial photograph interpreters identified the remains of a long-idle Roman road that defenders overlooked.3
然而，通常需要进行现场勘察和路线分类，因为历史记录、地图和照片调查很少能充分详细地披露以下因素的信息：
On-site reconnaissance and route classifications, however, commonly are required, because historical records, maps, and photo surveys seldom disclose enough information in sufficient detail about the following factors:
• 下伏及相邻地形（海拔、不规则性、坡度、排水、土壤和沟壑）
• Underlying and adjacent terrain (elevations, irregularities, slopes, drainage, soils, and defiles)
• 道路基础和路面材料（如果施工不统一，则分段施工）
• Road foundations and surface materials (by section if construction is not uniform)
• 路基和路肩的宽度和状况
• The widths and status of roadbeds and shoulders
• 最大坡度和曲率
• Maximum grades and curvatures
• 挖方和填方的稳定性
• The stability of cuts and fills
• 桥梁、隧道和地下通道（技术特性、净空、承重能力）
• Bridges, tunnels, and underpasses (technical characteristics, clearances, weight-bearing capacities)
• 浅滩和渡口的适用性
• The suitability of fords and ferries
• 障碍物（障碍物、雪堆、落石、冲刷坑）
• Obstacles (abatis, snow banks, rock slides, washouts)
• 当前状况（维修、保养、修复）
• Current conditions (repair, maintenance, restoration)
• 超车道和适合用作休息站的区域
• Passing lanes and areas suitable for rest stops
• 替代路线、绕行路线和当地绕行路线的特点
• Characteristics of alternative routes, detours, and local bypasses
• 施工要求。
• Construction requirements.
路线分类
ROUTE CLASSIFICATIONS
每条建造良好的道路都由以下部分组成：路面；由砾石或碎石铺成的基层，用于分散重型交通带来的压力；由天然材料构成的路基（路基层）；以及由拱顶、路拱、涵洞、沟渠和排水管组成的排水系统，用于排放地下水和可能导致道路快速损坏的径流（图 31）。每条车道的宽度决定了车道的数量，大型卡车的平均车道宽度必须为 11 至 12 英尺（3.5 米），大多数装甲车辆的平均车道宽度必须为 13 英尺左右（4 米）——单车道道路无法超车或掉头。路面开裂、路基未密封、坑洼、颠簸、车辙、松软的路肩、坡度大于 7% 的路段、半径小于 100 英尺（30 米）的急弯以及堵塞的排水系统都会降低原本合格道路的价值，直到进行整改为止。4
Every well-constructed road consists of a surface; a base course of gravel or crushed rock that distributes stresses from heavy traffic; a foundation (subgrade) of natural materials; and a drainage system of crowns, cambers, culverts, ditches, and drains which disposes of ground water as well as runoff that could cause rapid deteriorization (figure 31). The width of each traveled way determines the number of lanes, which must average 11 to 12 feet (3.5 meters) for large trucks and 13 feet or so (4 meters) for most armored vehicles—single-lane roads make it impossible to pass or reverse course. Cracked pavements, unsealed roadbeds, pot holes, bumps, ruts, soft shoulders, grades greater than seven percent, sharp curves with a radius less than 100 feet (30 meters), and clogged drainage systems reduce the value of otherwise suitable roads until improvements are complete.4
全天候道路拥有坚实的路基和基层，路面采用混凝土或沥青混合料铺设，排水系统完善，宽度足以容纳双向车辆通行，并且在合理维护的情况下，无论季节如何变化，其通行能力始终保持在最大水平以上。类似道路如果铺设砖块、石块或碎石，则通行能力会略逊一筹；而部分全天候道路在大雨过后，即使通行能力有所下降，也只能依靠更大的维护投入才能勉强维持通行。5
All-weather roads have solid subgrades and base courses, traveled ways paved with concrete or bituminous mixtures, adequate drainage, enough width to accommodate two-way vehicular traffic, and throughput capacities that never are appreciably less than their maximum, regardless of seasonal conditions, given reasonable maintenance. Similar routes topped with brick, stones, or gravel are somewhat less serviceable, while limited all-weather roads remain open at reduced capacity after heavy precipitation only by dint of greater effort.5
Figure 31. Highway and Byway Attributes
在战区，晴天时路往往只能勉强满足一些标准较低的道路，但连接前线部队与补给点的后勤路线（LOC）则需要快速升级。连接后方高级指挥所、通信中心、港口、机场和战区级支援设施的道路也同样如此。严格的管控措施也必不可少。1944年夏末，美军后勤人员之所以能够维持从诺曼底滩头阵地到德国边境的脆弱路线的正常运转，完全是因为盟军最高远征军司令部（SHAEF）指定了“红球公路”，禁止不必要的交通，让所有可用的卡车每天运转20小时，只在装卸货物和加油时短暂停车，竭尽所能地寻找替补司机，并让工兵日夜不停地辛勤工作，以确保这些饱经风霜的道路能够通行。6
Fair-weather roads that meet less stringent standards often must suffice in combat zones, but LOCs that link front-line forces with sources of supply rate rapid upgrading. So do routes that interconnect senior command posts, communication centers, ports, airfields, and theater-level support installations in the rear. Stringent controls may also be necessary. Logisticians sustained U.S. Armed Forces over tenuous routes from the Normandy beachhead to the German border in late summer 1944 only because Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) designated Red Ball Highways, banned unessential traffic, operated every available truck 20 hours a day with brief stops to load, unload, and refuel, scraped the bottom of the barrel for relief drivers, and ran engineers ragged around-the-clock to keep those battered roads serviceable.6
薄弱环节和瓶颈
WEAK LINKS AND BOTTLENECKS
桥梁、浅滩、渡口、隧道和地下通道是陆路交通线上的薄弱环节，在和平时期或战争时期的军事行动中，它们都可能成为造成麻烦的瓶颈。因此，侦察和鉴定人员会密切关注它们的特性。
Bridges, fords, ferries, tunnels, and underpasses are weak links and potentially troublesome bottlenecks along land lines of communication during military operations in peacetime or in war. Reconnaissance and classification crews consequently pay close attention to their characteristics.
桥梁。托马斯·麦考利将独眼城门队长盖乌斯·霍拉提乌斯（公元前 6 世纪罗马的救星）永载史册。他与另外两名战士一起，抵挡住了 9 万名伊特鲁里亚人的进攻，而台伯河对岸的军队则砍断了唯一可用的桥梁——苏布利库斯桥的桥墩。此后，战争的焦点一直集中在关键桥梁上。1945年3月7日，莱茵河上仅存的那座桥梁成为西线最重要的战略要地。当时，驻扎在雷马根的德军爆破队试图将其摧毁，但未能成功。随后，美军第九装甲师的工兵迅速赶到，控制了东岸。尽管遭受敌军炮火和空袭，这座损毁严重的桥梁在接下来的十天里仍然发挥了重要作用，直到桥梁结构最终坍塌。8
Bridges. Thomas Macaulay immortalized one-eyed Captain of the Gate Gaius Horatius, the 6th century B.C. savior of Rome who, with two other warriors, held off 90,000 Etruscans while troops on the far side of the swollen Tiber River chopped underpinnings beneath Pons Sublicus, the only available bridge.7 Warfare has repeatedly focused on key bridges ever since. The last span left standing over the Rhine on March 7, 1945, became the most important piece of property on the Western Front when German demolition teams at Remagen tried but failed to destroy it before engineers of the U.S. 9th Armored Division raced across to secure the east bank. That badly damaged bridge served well for the next 10 days, despite enemy artillery and air attacks, until weakened structures finally collapsed.8
进攻方和防御方都将桥梁视为关键地形，因为夺取、控制、摧毁或夺取桥梁能够带来显著优势。桥梁的承载能力至关重要——例如，结构脆弱的桥梁会阻碍重型坦克的通行。此外，还需要详细的数据，包括精确的地图坐标、桥梁路径和周边地形、桥梁设计、建筑材料、关键尺寸（桥面高度、跨度、桥面宽度、上方障碍物）以及特殊功能，例如用于舰船通行的升降桥、摆动桥和垂直升降桥的固有功能。9
Both offensive and defensive forces designate bridges as key terrain whenever seizure, retention, destruction, or control would afford marked advantage. Load-bearing capacities are crucially important—flimsy construction, for example, excludes tanks with heavy “footprints.” Detailed data additionally are in demand concerning precise map coordinates, approaches and adjacent topography, designs, construction materials, critical dimensions (heights above gaps, lengths of spans, widths of traveled ways, overhead obstacles), and special features, such as those inherent in draw, swinging, and vertical lift bridges that let ships pass.9
少数民用浮桥，例如西雅图附近横跨华盛顿湖的那座长达一英里的浮桥，由浮筒支撑，但大多数永久性桥梁采用实心结构。图 32中所示的桥梁设计多种多样，从很少超过 30 英尺（9 米）的短而简单的平板桥，到悬臂桥和复杂的悬索桥，其中一些桥梁的跨度超过 4,000 英尺（1,200 米）。所有桥梁，无论类型如何，都具有图 33所示的大多数军事重要特征。
A few civilian-style floating bridges, such as the mile-long model across Lake Washington near Seattle, rest on pontoons, but most permanent bridges feature solid construction. Designs depicted in figure 32 range from short, simple slabs that seldom exceed 30 feet (9 meters) to cantilevers and complex suspension bridges, several of which possess spans that extend more than 4,000 feet (1,200 meters). All bridges, regardless of type, share most militarily significant characteristics that figure 33 displays.
Figure 32. Bridge Types Depicted
Figure 33. Bridge Superstructures and Substructures
桥梁下部结构主要包括：桥台，桥台架设在岸边的天然基础上；挡土墙，用于支撑两端的河岸，防止连接道路下沉；以及必要时，在河道中以精确计算的间隔设置的桥墩。桥梁上部结构根据场地特征、建筑材料、跨度以及预期承载能力而有所不同：拱桥、板桥、梁桥、桁架桥和浮桥均设有桥面、踏板和护栏；桁架桥增加了构成水平和垂直三角形的承重梁；悬索桥则通过两根两端固定并横跨桥塔的粗缆索悬挂桥面。10
Substructures consist essentially of abutments that rest on natural footings ashore, retaining walls that support banks at both ends to keep connecting roads from sinking and, if required, underpinning piers interspersed in stream at carefully calculated intervals. Superstructure assemblies vary according to site characteristics, construction materials, the length of each span, and intended capacities: arch, slab, beam, girder, and pontoon bridges sport decks, treads, and generally guardrails; truss bridges add load-bearing beams that form horizontal and vertical triangles; suspension bridges hang roadways from two thick cables anchored at both ends and draped between towers.10
渡口和渡船。在水深足够浅、水流足够缓、且河道和河底足够坚实的情况下，武装部队会利用渡口穿越没有桥梁的水障，以便轮式和履带式车辆能够以较低的速度依靠自身动力或借助绞盘的辅助通行（参见第33页图5及相关文字）。防水套件和用未经加工的木材、木板、砾石、金属垫甚至混凝土建造的水下道路可以显著提高通行能力。配备通气管的坦克有时可以完全潜航通过。在水流足够缓、水深足以从岸边漂到岸边、水流中没有严重障碍物、水温高于冰点且有坡道可以允许在水位高低变化时登陆的情况下，渡船可以发挥作用，其动力来源可以是漂流、桨、杆、滑轮、汽油、柴油或蒸汽。橡皮筏、两栖车辆、突击登陆艇和摩托艇都是典型的运输工具。11
Fords and Ferries. Armed forces ford unbridged water barriers where depths are shallow enough, currents are slow enough, and approaches as well as bottoms are solid enough for wheeled and tracked vehicles to proceed at reduced rates of speed under their own power or assisted by winches (refer to figure 5 on page 33 and accompanying text). Waterproofing kits and underwater roadways built of unprocessed timber, wooden planks, gravel, metal mats, even concrete can increase throughput capabilities considerably. Tanks equipped with snorkels sometimes cross completely submerged. Ferries propelled by drift, oars, poles, pulleys, gasoline, diesel, or steam see service where fords are infeasible, given a sufficiently slow current, enough depth to float from shore to shore, an absence of serious obstacles in stream, above freezing temperatures, and approach ramps that allow landings whether water levels are high or low. Rubber rafts, amphibious vehicles, assault landing craft, and motor boats typify possible conveyances.11
隧道和地下通道。穿过山脉或埋入地表以下的隧道、地下通道和雪棚，构成了陆路交通线上的巨大障碍。如果存在更便捷的替代方案，人们绝不会花费巨资进行爆破、钻孔、切割、覆盖和挖掘等工程。隧道和地下通道的长度远不如其形状重要。隧道和地下通道的形状可以是半圆形、椭圆形、方形或马蹄形，其路径可以是直线、曲线或不规则的，两侧的墙壁可以是天然的，也可以是砖石或混凝土砌筑的。隧道和地下通道的内部尺寸，以及天花板形状、电线和其他影响净空高度的设施，共同决定了哪些车辆和超大型货物可以通行，哪些必须绕行。12
Tunnels and Underpasses. Tunnels, underpasses, and snow sheds that penetrate mountains or burrow beneath Earth’s surface constitute formidable obstacles along land lines of communication, because they never would have been blasted, bored, or cut, covered, and excavated at great expense if attractive alternatives existed. Portal-to-portal lengths are less important than configurations, which may be semicircular, elliptical, square, or horseshoe-shaped and follow straight, curved, or irregular paths between walls that are natural or lined with brick, masonry, or concrete. Interior dimensions, together with ceiling shapes, wires, and other fixtures that influence overhead clearance, determine which vehicles and outsize loads can pass and which must detour.12
施工问题
CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS
只有当现有道路网络布局不合理或通行能力不足时，军队才会投入资金、人力和物力修建新道路，但即便如此，仍有许多规模宏大的工程令人叹为观止。其中就包括由美国陆军工程兵团和私人承包商在二战期间修建的阿拉斯加公路，这条公路全长1506英里（2424公里），连接加拿大不列颠哥伦比亚省的道森克里克和费尔班克斯，是一条重要的军事补给线。13因此，美国和苏联工程师在 20 世纪 60 年代在阿富汗铺设的交错陆路管道，是两国为援助这个贫困但战略位置优越的国家而开展的竞争性计划的一部分。14
Armed forces expend money, manpower, and materiel to construct new roads only when existing networks are poorly aligned or capacities are inadequate., but many monumental endeavors nevertheless come to mind. The 1,506-mile long (2,424 kilometers) Alaska Highway built by the Army Corps of Engineers and private contractors between Dawson Creek, British Columbia, and Fairbanks as a main military supply route during World War II is among them.13 So are interlacing land lines that U.S. and Soviet engineers laid across Afghanistan in the 1960s as part of competing programs to aid that impoverished but strategically well-placed nation.14
然而，没有任何工程能比得上二战期间无数苦力修建的连接印度阿萨姆邦雷多和中国昆明的“穷人高速公路”（见第107页地图17和地图27）。这条公路虽然付出了惨重的生命代价，但其带来的益处却无法估量。
No project, however, overshadowed the “poor man’s turnpike” that countless coolies built between Ledo, Assam, and Kunming, China, during World War II (map 17, on page 107, and map 27). The cost in human lives was high, but the benefits were incalculable.
滇缅公路的重重阻碍。这条宏伟工程的东段，即著名的滇缅公路，横跨青藏高原三条高耸的山脊，以及萨尔温江、湄公河和扬皮河的湍急上游河段。每条宽23英尺（6.7米）、深7到10英寸的石块，都是由当地农民一块一块地铺设而成，如同在稻田里栽种秧苗一般。项目经理谭佩英（Tan Pei-Ying）回忆说，从缅甸东部边境到隆林（Lungling）的最初85英里（135公里）路段，充满了“大自然所能创造的一切磨难”：“连绵不断的雨季；闷热潮湿；泥泞不堪的山路；以及最可怕的疟疾。”在部分有效的抗疟药姗姗来迟之前，超过一半被蚊子叮咬的人已经死亡。男女老少缺乏现代设备，只能用劣质火药代替炸药，凿穿250英里（400公里）长的基岩，深度达50至100英尺（15至30米），总计386万立方码，他们像苍蝇一样紧紧抓住悬崖峭壁。“所有这些工作中最艰苦的，”裴颖回忆道，“是在萨尔温江流域的峡谷里，我们必须在最陡峭的悬崖上开凿一个又一个急弯，在18英里（29公里）的距离内，将道路从海拔2000英尺（610至2075米）提升到6800英尺（610至2075米）。”15
Burma Road Obstacles. The eastern half of that prodigious endeavor, known as the Burma Road, led over three towering fingers from the Tibetan Plateau plus raging upper reaches of the Salween, Mekong, and Yangpi Rivers. Every stone for a strip 23 feet wide (6.7 meters) and 7 to 10 inches deep was set in place one at a time by local peasants who planted them like seedlings in rice paddies. The first 85 miles (135 kilometers) from Burma’s eastern border to Lungling contained “every torment that nature could devise,” according to Tan Pei-Ying, the project manager: “Rain unending for months at a time; stifling heat and humidity; mountains of the slipperiest mud; and worst of all malaria.” More than half of those bitten by mosquitoes died before partly effective antidotes belatedly became available. Men, women, and children who lacked modern equipment and used a poor grade of gunpowder as a substitute for dynamite chiseled through 250 linear miles (400 kilometers) of bedrock to a depth of 50 to 100 feet (15 to 30 meters), 3,860,000 cubic yards all told, while clinging to precipice faces like flies. “The most trying of all [such jobs],” Pei-Ying recalled, “was in the gorges running back from the Salween, where we had to cut one hairpin turn after another out of the sheerest cliffs, taking the Road up from 2,000 feet above sea level to 6,800 feet [610 to 2,075 meters] within a distance of 18 miles [29 kilometers].”15
Map 27. Profile of the Burma Road
改编自谭培英《修建滇缅公路》
Adapted from Flyleaf, Tan Pei-Ying, The Building of the Burma Road.
缅甸公路桥梁。在相对较小的溪流上建造460座不同类型的桥梁已属不易，而横跨三条最大河流的桥梁建设更是难上加难。许义芳先生在没有图纸的情况下，设计了三座单跨悬索桥来解决相关问题——其中最长的桥梁达410英尺（125米）。此后，仰光的工厂工人按照他的规格切割了巨大的梁柱、钢筋、钢丝绳、缆索和其他部件。他们用铁路将货物运到腊戌，然后数百名工人和骡子驮着沉重的货物，跋涉了300英里险峻的地形。有些施工方法沿用了几个世纪，敌人的行动令人噩梦连连，在最后一座桥梁建成之前，数千人丧生，卡车一次只能一辆地通过，因为最好的卡车最大载重也只有10吨，临时搭建的渡轮也不得不承担部分运输任务，但最终的成果仍然令人满意。事实上，有人毫不夸张地说，修建滇缅公路的规模堪比建造古埃及金字塔。16
Burma Road Bridges. It was hard enough to build 460 bridges of different types across relatively small streams, but the three biggest rivers posed prodigious challenges. Mr Hsu Yi-fang, without benefit of blueprints, designed three single-span suspension bridges to solve related problems—the longest was 410 feet (125 meters). Factorymen in Rangoon thereafter cut huge beams, steel rods, wire ropes, cables and other parts to his specifications and delivered them to Lashio by rail, whereupon hundreds of men and mules bore heavy burdens for 300 more miles over awesome terrain. Some construction methods were centuries old, enemy actions caused recurrent nightmares, several thousand died before the last bridge was complete, trucks crossed one at a time because the maximum bearable load on the best of them was 10 tons, and jerry-rigged ferries had to take up some slack, but results in the end even so were satisfying. Some in fact say without tongue in cheek that building the Burma Road was comparable in scope to erecting ancient Egyptian pyramids.16
破坏技术
DESTRUCTION TECHNIQUES
在欧内斯特·海明威的经典小说《丧钟为谁而鸣》中，虚构人物罗伯特·乔丹在西班牙内战期间设计炸毁了一座国民军桥梁。电影演员威廉·霍尔顿饰演的美国海军飞行员曾驾驶飞机俯冲轰炸朝鲜的托科里桥。现实世界中，不同时期、不同地点的战士们长期以来都使用这些以及其他技术，利用飞机、导弹、火炮、地雷和炸药等手段来切断陆上交通线。如今，配备精确制导武器的重力炸弹以及空对地和地对地导弹能够比以往更有效地打击桥梁、隧道口、浅滩和渡口，而技术专家们承诺，未来他们将把精准打击与前所未有的非核破坏力结合起来。17然而，有时彻底摧毁是不可取的，因为友军和平民可能会在以后发现可修复的设施很有用。
Fictional Robert Jordan rigged a Nationalist bridge for demolition during the Spanish Civil War in Ernest Hemingway’s classic novel For Whom the Bell Tolls. Movie actor William Holden portrayed a U.S. Navy pilot who dive-bombed The Bridges of Toko-Ri in North Korea. Real world warriors at different times and places have long employed those and additional techniques to interdict overland lines of communication using aircraft, missiles, artillery, mines, and explosive charges. Gravity bombs as well as air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missiles armed with precision-guided munitions currently can strike bridges, tunnel mouths, fords, and ferries with far greater effectiveness than in the recent past, and technologists promise to couple pinpoint accuracy with unprecedented nonnuclear destructive power in the future.17 There are times, however, when total destruction is undesirable, because friendly armed forces and civilians might find repairable facilities useful at later dates.
能够掩盖作案者身份或允许其合理否认的秘密行动，在政治上或许是明智之举，尤其是在“和平时期”。爆破专家能够秘密渗透、精准布设炸药，然后迅速撤离，在战斗条件下往往能发挥至关重要的作用，因为他们会给防御方带来不成比例的沉重安全负担。首先，他们会根据目标的大小、形状和强度、所需的破坏程度以及附带损害的限制（如有），计算出需要放置多少种炸药（TNT、特立尼达、塑料炸药或片状炸药）。对于形状奇特、体积庞大或非常坚硬的物体，例如混凝土桥墩和隧道，多次布设炸药可能比一次大爆炸更有效。脆性铸铁容易破碎，但对于镍钼钢这种对常规炸药具有很强抵抗力的材质，可能需要使用乙炔焊炬或铝热剂才能将其炸开。正确的布设位置至少与爆炸威力同等重要。如果砍伐不当，横跨峡谷的大树如果被砍倒形成障碍物，就会朝错误的方向倒下。负责暂时阻断公路和水路交通的专业人员会切断桁架桥一端的支撑结构，使受影响的桥跨落入水中；如果目的是造成永久性破坏，他们会在桥梁跨中切断桁架，使桥梁弯曲变形。大型悬索桥上巨大的桥塔和粗壮的缆索能够抵御强力炸药的冲击，但悬挂在其上的细长吊索却无法承受——如果吊索被切断，桥面就会坍塌。18坚硬岩石中的隧道很难摧毁，除非破坏分子在隧道深处引爆成卡车的常规炸药或便携式核武器。
Covert operations that conceal the identity of, or permit plausible denial by, perpetrators moreover may be politically prudent, especially in “peacetime.” Demolition specialists able to infiltrate clandestinely, position charges precisely, then slip away sometimes prove invaluable under combat conditions, because they impose disproportionately heavy security burdens on defenders. First, they calculate how much of what type charge (TNT, tetrytol, plastic, or sheet explosives) to place where, taking into account the size, shape, and strength of targets to be attacked, required degrees of destruction, and collateral damage limitations, if any. Multiple charges may be more effective than one big blast against oddly shaped, large, or very hard objects, such as concrete bridge abutments and tunnels. Brittle cast iron breaks easily, but acetylene torches or thermite may be needed to slice nickel-molybdenum steel, which strongly resists conventional explosives. Proper placement is at least as important as destructive power. Large trees dropped to form an abatis across defiles fall in the wrong direction if cut improperly. Professionals whose mission is to stop road and river traffic temporarily cut supports at one end of truss bridges so affected spans fall in the water; they cut trusses at midspan to make bridges buckle if long-lasting destruction is the intent. Massive towers and thick cables on major suspension bridges resist powerful explosive charges, but slender suspenders that hang therefrom do not—roadway sections collapse if they are cut.18 Tunnels in solid rock are tough targets to destroy unless saboteurs detonate truckloads of conventional explosives or man-portable nuclear weapons deep inside.
铁路
RAILROADS
1833 年，有远见的德国经济学家弗里德里希·李斯特率先认识到铁路的军事重要性；1866 年，普鲁士总参谋长赫尔穆特·卡尔·冯·毛奇将军在普奥战争期间将这些原则付诸实践。19 然而，第一次重大考验发生在南北战争期间，当时联邦军和邦联军都利用铁路将庞大的部队长途调动起来，并为其提供长期的后勤保障。20（首次颁发的荣誉勋章授予了詹姆斯·J·安德鲁斯突袭队的成员，他们在 1862 年 4 月 11 日于佐治亚州玛丽埃塔劫持了一列叛军火车。）21）。铁路随后在世界各地的大多数重大武装冲突中发挥了至关重要的作用。22
Far-sighted German economist Friedrich List in 1833 was the first to visualize the military importance of railroads and General Helmut Karl von Moltke the Elder, as Chief of the Prussian General Staff, put principles into practice during the Austro-Prussian War in 1866.19 The first grand test, however, took place during the U.S. Civil War, when Union and Confederate forces both used rail lines to redeploy large formations over great distances and support them for long periods 20 (the first Medals of Honor ever awarded went to members of James J. Andrews’ raiding party, who hijacked a rebel train at Marietta, Georgia, on April 11,1862.21). Railroads subsequently played crucial roles in most major armed conflicts the world over.22
与问题地区相关的铁路
RAILROADS RELATED TO TROUBLE SPOTS
自 20 世纪 50 年代以来，美国、加拿大、欧洲大部分地区、日本和其他一些高度工业化国家对其铁路系统进行了现代化改造。高速列车和计算机控制系统已很普遍；轻型钢轨已过时；钢材和塑料取代了木制和混凝土轨枕；平板车运输的拖车和集装箱比其他任何货物都多；蒸汽机车、冷藏车、水塔和驼峰编组站几乎都已消失。23接下来的讨论主要集中在欠发达国家的传统铁路上，其中许多是当前或预计会出现的麻烦点，因为美国及其盟国的军事运输专家可能会被召集来应对意想不到的问题。
The United States, Canada, most of Europe, Japan, and a few other highly industrialized nations have modernized their railway systems since the 1950s. High-speed trains and computerized controls are common; lightweight rails are passé; steel and plastic replace wooden and concrete ties; flatcars carry more trailers and containers than any other cargo; steam locomotives, reefers, water towers, and hump yards have virtually disappeared.23 Discussions that follow nevertheless concentrate on traditional railroads in underdeveloped countries, many of which are present or projected trouble spots, because U.S. and allied military transportation specialists could be called to cope with unanticipated problems.
铁路与公路的比较
RAILWAYS COMPARED WITH ROADS
铁路和公路是互补的交通运输方式，二者优势互补，相得益彰。正如轮船而非飞机承担着国内与海外战区之间最重型货物的陆路运输一样，火车而非卡车承担着最重型货物的陆路运输。例如，在古巴导弹危机最严峻的时期，美国陆军各师依靠铁路运输，将部队从科罗拉多州、德克萨斯州、肯塔基州和北卡罗来纳州等地分散的基地运送到沿海岸线分布的港口，这些港口从马里兰州巴尔的摩一直延伸到德克萨斯州博蒙特。这项任务极其艰巨，因为当时仅一个装甲师及其补给就需要4200节平板车和820节卧铺车厢（相当于100列火车首尾相连，行驶在45英里长的铁轨上）。美国铁路在第二次世界大战、朝鲜战争（1950-1953）、越南战争（1965-1972）以及与伊拉克的冲突（1991-1992）期间也发挥了重要作用。23
Railways and roads are complementary lines of communication, each with strengths that compensate for the other’s weaknesses. Trains rather than trucks carry the heaviest overland loads, just as ships rather than aircraft carry most bulky cargo between homelands and theaters of operation overseas. U.S. Army divisions at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, depended on rail transportation to move them from widely separated bases in Colorado, Texas, Kentucky, and North Carolina to ports of embarkation scattered along the seaboard from Baltimore, Maryland, to Beaumont, Texas. That task was humongous, because it then took 4,200 flat cars and 820 pullmans (the equivalent of 100 trains end-to-end on 45 miles of track) to handle just one armored division with accompanying supplies. U.S. railroads also served extensively throughout World War II, the Korean War (1950-53), the Vietnam War (1965-72), and during altercations with Iraq (1991-92).23
然而，铁路在大多数战术用途上都缺乏灵活性，因为对于被限制在铁轨上的列车而言，跨国绕行是不切实际的。在冲刷、落石、雪崩和人为瓶颈频发的地区，这一事实尤为重要，例如跨伊朗铁路，这条从里海到波斯湾、全长895英里（1340公里）的铁路线，途经224条隧道和4100多座桥梁。西伯利亚铁路曾经沿着贝加尔湖南岸延伸52英里（84公里）的路段，列车需要快速穿过51条隧道，直到施工人员修建了更优的路线。铁路建设成本总是高于公路，而当需要进行大量的开挖和填筑以降低坡度和平滑急弯时，成本会进一步增加。
Rail lines nevertheless are inflexible for most tactical purposes, because cross-country bypasses are infeasible for trains confined to tracks. That fact is especially significant wherever washouts, rock falls, snow slides, and manmade bottlenecks abound, as is the case with the Trans-Iranian Railroad, which encounters 224 tunnels and more than 4,100 bridges on its 895-mile (1,340-kilometer) trek from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. Trains on the Trans-Siberian Railroad once passed through 51 tunnels in rapid succession along a 52-mile stretch of track (84 kilometers) that skirted the southern banks of Lake Baikal before work crews built a better route. Construction costs, always higher than for roads, increase when many cuts and fills are required to reduce grades and smooth out sharp turns.
铁路勘测队与道路勘测队一样，会记录选定点之间的距离、附近地形特征、路基材料、最大坡度、最小曲线半径、路堑、路基、路基、障碍物、桥梁、隧道、渡口以及当前状况。他们还会寻找铁路特有的特征，这些特征如下：24
Railway reconnaissance teams, like colleagues who classify roads, catalog distances between selected points, the nature of nearby terrain, foundation materials, maximum grades, minimum curve radii, cuts, fills, obstacles, bridges, tunnels, ferries, and current conditions. They also look for characteristics peculiar to railroads, which are listed below:24
• Tracks (number, together with locations and lengths of sidings)
• 钢轨（状况、类型、长度、重量）
• Rails (condition, type, length, weight)
• 领带（状况、类型、间距、尺寸）
• Ties (condition, type, spacing, size)
• 压载物（宽度、深度、类型、石料来源、排水）
• Ballast (width, depth, type, source of stones, drainage)
• 计量数据，包括转运点的变化
• Gauges, including changes at transshipment points
• 电气化（电线、循环系统、电压、支撑结构、变电站）
• Electrification (wires, cycles, voltage, support structures, substations)
• 运营限制（速度、每列火车的车厢数量、每天的火车数量、允许的轴重）
• Operational limitations (speeds, number of cars per train, number of trains per day, allowable axle loads)
• 控制设施（调度、信号、开关）
• Control facilities (dispatching, signaling, switching)
• 车站、货场和码头（位置、类型、容量、设施）
• Stations, yards, and terminals (locations, types, capacities, facilities)
• 服务设施（水、燃料和冰块补充；维修保养车间；圆桌和起重机）
• Servicing facilities (water, fuel, and ice replenishment; repair and maintenance shops; roundtables and cranes)
• 机车和车辆（数量、类型、尺寸、重量、连接器）
• Locomotives and rolling stock (numbers, types, sizes, weights, couplings)
• 移动式维护和维修设备
• Mobile maintenance and repair equipment
• 管理和员工队伍。
• Management and work force.
铁路基础设施
RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURES
铁路基础设施涵盖所有线路、土地、车辆以及运营和维护列车所需的设施。军事用户主要关注提升和维持铁路运输能力，而敌方目标分析人员则会仔细研究薄弱环节，一旦这些环节被封锁，就会在关键时刻和地点剥夺铁路运营方的重要支援。
Railroad infrastructures encompass all routes, real estate, rolling stock, and facilities required to operate and maintain trains. Military users are concerned primarily with the improvement and preservation of throughput capabilities, whereas enemy targeteers diligently study soft spots that, if interdicted, would deprive possessors of essential support at crucial times and places.
路基和铁轨。所有列车都在铁轨上运行，但并非所有铁轨都相同。一些干线路基仅仅是压实的泥土或薄薄的煤渣，而更坚固的路基则由厚达 24 至 30 英寸（61 至 76 厘米）的矿渣碎屑或碎石层构成，以确保良好的排水并均匀分散荷载。嵌入道砟中用于支撑和对齐铁轨的枕木，其材质不仅从未经处理的木材到混凝土不等，而且尺寸和间距也差异很大。钢轨的重量可能小于每码 40 磅（20 至 68 公斤），也可能大于每码 150 磅（20 至 68 公斤）；轨枕垫板和被称为“防爬器”的锚固件可能用于固定铁轨，也可能不用于固定；建造者可能使用 50 至 60 英尺长（15 至 18 米）的铁轨来减少接头数量，也可能不使用；他们可能采用对接焊接或螺栓连接来加固结构，也可能不采用。坚实的道砟、实心的枕木、厚重的钢轨、焊接接头、倾斜角度不超过 1.5 度的曲线以及坡度不超过 1.0% 的路段，有利于快速的客运和货运服务。
Roadbeds and Rails. All trains run on tracks, but not all tracks are the same. Some mainline roadbeds are merely compacted earth or thinly spread cinders, while sturdier bases that ensure proper drainage and distribute loads evenly consist of slag chips or crushed stone in layers up to 24 to 30 inches thick (61 to 76 centimeters). Crossties embedded in that ballast to support and align rails not only range from untreated timber to concrete but vary considerably in size and spacing. Steel rails may weigh less than 40 or more than 150 pounds per yard (20 to 68 kilograms per meter), tie plates and anchors called “anticreepers” may or may not hold rails in place, builders may or may not use 50- to 60-foot-long rails (15 to 18 meters) to reduce the number of joints, and they may or may not butt-weld or bolt rails together to strengthen construction. Firm ballast, solid crossties, heavy steel rails, welded joints, banked curves of no more than 1.5 degrees, and grades of 1.0 percent or less facilitate fast passenger and freight service.
标准轨距（1.435米/4英尺8.5英寸）的铁路在北美、墨西哥、英国和欧洲大陆大部分地区占据主导地位。宽轨距（1.524米/5英尺或更宽）在前苏联加盟共和国、芬兰、爱尔兰、伊比利亚半岛、印度和阿根廷较为常见，但不同轨距的铁路在连接不同线路时，需要更换车厢或将货物转运到其他列车上，这会浪费宝贵的时间。拉丁美洲、亚洲、非洲和澳大利亚的大部分地区都铺设了各种轨距的铁路，但这些地区和其他许多国家一样，仍然在平坦和山区保留窄轨铁路，因为窄轨铁路的建设、维护、机车和车辆成本相对较低。25
Standard gauge tracks (4 feet 8.5 inches/1.435 meters) predominate in North America, Mexico, Great Britain, and most of continental Europe. Broader gauges (5 feet/1.524 meters or more) are the rule in former Soviet Socialist Republics, Finland, Ireland, Iberia, India, and Argentina, although trains waste valuable time while cars exchange undercarriages or transfer cargoes to other trains wherever dissimilar lines connect. Various gauges cover much of Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Australia, but many nations there as elsewhere still maintain narrow gauge railroads on level as well as mountainous terrain because construction, maintenance, locomotives, and rolling stock all are relatively inexpensive.25
铁路车辆和机车。后勤人员若想最有效地利用盟军和缴获的敌军铁路基础设施，必须考虑诸多因素，因为进口的机车和铁路车辆必须与当地的铁路轨距和连接器兼容。蒸汽机车、电力机车、柴油机车和柴油电力干线机车比调车机车长得多、重得多，调车机车的设计目的是以低速牵引多节车厢。自二战以来，卧铺车厢和餐车的军事重要性已大幅下降，这主要是因为现在大多数行政人员都通过空运调动，但棚车、平板车、敞车、漏斗车、罐车和冷藏车仍然具有很高的实用价值。
Rolling Stock and Locomotives. Logisticians who hope to use allied and captured enemy railway infrastructure most effectively must consider many factors, because imported locomotives and rolling stock must be compatible with local rail gauges and couplings. Steam, electric, diesel, and diesel-electric mainline locomotives are much longer and heavier than switch engines, which are geared to tow many cars at slow speeds. The military importance of sleeping and dining cars has declined dramatically since World War II, primarily because most personnel now move administratively by air, but boxcars, flatcars, gondolas, hoppers, tank cars, and refrigerators retain great utility.
铁路枢纽、货场、铁路枢纽和车站。编组列车、引导列车驶向正确方向并确保其准点运行，需要一套复杂的设施。主要枢纽的传统铁路货场接收、卸载、分离、分类和分拣进站的机车和车辆，将预定数量和类型的列车连接在一起，然后将列车编组调往其他货场进行维护、重新装载、存放或准备发车（图 34）。机车驶入机车库，那里的转盘和起重机用于辅助检查、维修和保养。除非重力将车厢从驼峰顶部拉到较低层，否则调车机车会将车厢从一个传统货场牵引到另一个货场。每个铁路枢纽都包含平行轨道、道岔、侧线、站台、车库、车间、仓库、水塔、储罐和指挥控制设施。沿线各站以及与其他运输方式进行转运的铁路枢纽，共同构成了铁路地产清单。26
Terminals Yards, Railheads, and Stations. An elaborate array of installations is required to assemble trains, point them in proper directions, and make them run on time. Traditional rail yards at major terminals receive, unload, separate, classify, and sort incoming locomotives and rolling stock, couple predetermined numbers and types together, then shunt strings to other yards where they are serviced, reloaded, stored, or prepared for departure (figure 34). Locomotives proceed to roundhouses where turntables and cranes assist inspections, repairs, and maintenance. Switch engines tug cars from one traditional yard to another unless gravity pulls them from the top of humps to lower levels. Each complex contains parallel tracks, switches, sidings, platforms, sheds, shops, warehouses, water towers, storage tanks, and command/control facilities. Stations along each route and railheads where transshipments to other modes of transportation take place complete the list of railway real estate inventories.26
相对效用和脆弱性
RELATIVE UTILITY AND VULNERABILITY
有些地区高度依赖铁路运输，而有些地区则依赖程度很低。那些拥有众多替代路线和远离现有或潜在敌人的设施的地区最为灵活，但偏僻路段上远离维修单位的咽喉要道容易受到攻击，而且损毁的铁路残骸难以修复。铁路枢纽站集中了大量有利可图的目标，二战期间的战事便证明了这一点。当时，德军的反复空袭严重扰乱了德军的重新部署，以及向前线部队运送弹药、燃料、食品和其他补给品。在被占领的法国以及第三帝国境内的大型铁路枢纽站服役，其危险程度几乎与前线作战不相上下。27撤退的德国人不仅摧毁了编组站内的所有左右道岔，还用机车上的犁将枕木劈开，将铁轨劈开，从而破坏了路权。
Some regions rely extensively on rail transportation, others very little. Those with many alternative routes and installations well removed from present or potential enemies are most flexible, although choke points along lonesome stretches far removed from maintenance units are vulnerable and wreckage is hard to repair. Marshaling yards concentrate lucrative targets, as evidenced during World War II, when repeated air attacks seriously disrupted the redeployment of German troops and the distribution of ammunition, fuel, food, and other supplies to forces in the field. Duty in large rail yards throughout occupied France as well as in the Third Reich was almost as dangerous as front line service.27 Retreating Germans not only destroyed every right or left hand switch in classification yards, but uprooted rights of way by splitting ties down the middle and splaying rails with locomotive-mounted plows.
冷战期间，没有哪个主要强国比苏联更需要可靠的铁路服务，但铁路服务却存在诸多不足。与欧洲卫星国的铁路连接十分繁琐，因为每次过境时，从宽轨换乘标准轨都需要花费大约2个小时，每列20节车厢的火车往返各需2个小时。更糟糕的是，服务于俄罗斯欧洲部分的简陋公路网在乌拉尔山脉以东迅速萎缩，在鄂木斯克和符拉迪沃斯托克之间长达4000英里（6400公里）的路段几乎完全消失。因此，沿着中俄边境延伸2000英里的单轨西伯利亚铁路承担了大部分的运输负担。斯大林对此极为不满，于是开始在更北的地方修建贝加尔-阿穆尔干线铁路（BAM），并使用奴隶劳工（见图28）。 1953年他去世后，工程一度停滞。但后来勃列日涅夫重启了这项宏伟的工程。该工程横跨五座山脉、十七条宽阔的河流，以及夏季会变成沼泽的地震活跃平原；途经近16公里长的北穆伊斯基隧道和其他几条较短的隧道；并拥有3000座桥梁。在1989年首列火车首航之前，地下的永久冻土层给工程建设带来了无数难题。29
No major power during the Cold War had greater need for reliable rail service than the Soviet Union, but deficiencies were numerous.28 Connections with European satellite states were cumbersome because the change from broad- to standard-gauge undercarriages at each border consumed about 2 hours per 20-car train and 2 more on return trips. Worse yet, the rudimentary road network that served European Russia diminished rapidly east of the Ural Mountains and virtually disappeared for 4,000 miles (6,400 kilometers) between Omsk and Vladivostok. The ribbon-like Trans-Siberian Railroad, single-tracked for 2,000 miles along the Chinese frontier, therefore bore most burdens. Stalin consequently suffered such heartburn that he began to construct the Baikal-Amur Magistral (BAM) rail line somewhat farther north using slave labor (map 28). Progress ceased after his death in 1953, but Leonid Brezhnev later revived that stupendous project, which crosses five mountain ranges, seventeen wide rivers, and seismically active plains that turn swampy in summer; passes through Severo-Muisky Tunnel, which is nearly 10 miles long (16 kilometers), and several others of lesser length; and boasts 3,000 bridges. Underlying permafrost created countless construction problems before the first train made its maiden trip in 1989.29
Figure 34. Traditional Rail Yard Facilities
Map 28. The Trans-Siberian Railroad and Baikal-Amur Magistral
军用机场
MILITARY AIRPORTS
军用机场必须能够容纳固定翼和旋翼战斗机、通用飞机和货运飞机，这些飞机在接到指令后，能够在恶劣天气条件下全天候执行任务。然而，没有一种规模的机场能够满足所有需求。例如，位于德国凯泽斯劳滕附近狭窄山谷中的拉姆施泰因空军基地，在冷战时期曾为美国战斗机联队提供了良好的服务，但如今，由于地形狭窄、跑道相对较短、滑行道狭窄、停机坪拥挤以及货物装卸设施有限，限制了目前驻扎在该基地的C-141和C-5A运输机的使用。30
Military airports must accommodate fixed- and rotary-wing combat, utility, and cargo aircraft that, when directed, fly missions around-the-clock under adverse weather conditions. One size field, however, by no means fits all. Ramstein Air Base, situated in a narrow valley near Kaiserslautern, Germany, for example, served a U.S. fighter wing well during the Cold War, but tight terrain, a relatively short runway, slender taxiways, cramped parking areas, and limited cargo-handling facilities restrict C-141 and C-5A transports, its present tenants.30
选址和施工标准
SITE SELECTION AND CONSTRUCTION CRITERIA
军事需求决定了作战区域内机场的数量、特性、基本使用寿命和可接受的建设工期。地形、气候条件、植被、水文、土壤和后勤便利性都会对机场选址产生重大影响。理想的机场选址应具备最平坦的地形、最晴朗的天气、最有利的风向、最少的障碍物、最畅通的排水系统以及最便捷地连接主要陆路交通线等条件。然而，如果由于政治、军事、地理或文化原因无法实现这一理想条件，决策者则必须做出妥协。
Military requirements determine the number, characteristics, essential service life, and acceptable construction time of airfields in any area of operations. Topography, climatic conditions, vegetation, hydrology, soils, and logistical convenience strongly influence locations. Preferable sites feature the flattest terrain, the clearest weather, the most favorable winds, the fewest obstructions, the freest drainage, and easiest access to prominent land lines of communication but, if that ideal is unattainable for political, military, geographic, or cultural reasons, decisionmakers must compromise.
主跑道通常与盛行风向平行，并考虑高速横流的影响。如果地球是一片位于海平面的完美平坦平原，所有温度计都始终显示相同的温度，地表永远不会被雨水、冰雹或其他湿滑的物质弄湿，那么任何特定类型飞机所需的跑道长度在各地都将是标准化的。假设当时有雪，所有飞行员的水平都一样。然而，现实世界中的军用机场设计师必须延长跑道以补偿海拔升高带来的影响，在最暖月平均气温超过 15°C (59°F) 的地区也必须如此，因为这些因素单独或共同作用会造成空气稀薄，降低发动机性能并减少升力。上坡起飞和下坡降落也需要更长的跑道。美国在预估恶劣天气和机组人员表现不佳的情况下，会在战区增加 25% 的跑道长度，在后方地区增加 50%，然后在调整后的总长度上加上一个小的“修正系数”，如表 21所示。31
Primary runways generally parallel the direction of prevailing winds, taking high-velocity cross-currents into account. Runway lengths required by any given type aircraft would be standard everywhere if Planet Earth were a perfectly flat plain at sea level, all thermometers consistently registered any given temperature, the surface never was slick with rain, sleet, or snow, and all pilots were equally competent. Military airfield designers in the real world, however, must extend runways to compensate for increases in altitude and do likewise where temperatures of the warmest month average more than 59 °F (15 °C), because those factors singly or in combination create rarefied air that degrades engine performance and affords less lift. Takeoffs up inclines and landings downhill also require longer runways. U.S. calculations in anticipation of foul weather and imperfect air crew performance add 25 percent more in combat zones, 50 percent more in rear areas, then tack a small “fudge factor” onto the adjusted total, as table 21 indicates.31
Table 21. U.S. Military Aircraft Runway Length Calculations
最小跑道宽度应与飞机在最后进近和着陆时的横向稳定性相一致，并随飞机重量和尺寸的增加而增加。轰炸机和大型运输机比相对机动性强的战斗机需要更大的活动空间。滑行道、停机坪和机库地面与跑道一样，必须具备与该场地配置所能容纳的最重飞机相匹配的承载能力。32.每条跑道两端的进近区和超限区均经过分级处理，以最大程度地减少飞行员意外短距着陆、冲出跑道或起飞时发动机故障造成的损失。工程师会清除滑行道下方的障碍物，或者在无法清除障碍物且备选方案不太理想的情况下，对障碍物进行醒目标记。33
Minimum runway widths, consistent with degrees of lateral stability during final approaches and landings, increase with aircraft weights and sizes. Bombers and large transport aircraft need more elbow room than fighters, which are relatively maneuverable. Taxiways, parking aprons, and hangar floors, like runways, must have load-bearing capacities consistent with the heaviest aircraft for which the field is configured.32 Approach zones and overruns at each end of every runway are graded to minimize damage if pilots accidentally land short, overshoot, or experience engine failure on takeoff. Engineers clear obstructions to points well below glide paths or mark them prominently if that proves infeasible and alternative sites are less satisfactory.33
远征基地和升级
EXPEDITIONARY BASES AND UPGRADES
轻型战斗机在1940年不列颠空战期间仍可在草皮跑道上起降，但很快，除最轻型飞机外，所有飞机都必须使用跑道。美国在海外建立的远征空军基地，通常是临时起意，大致可分为三类：
Featherweight combat aircraft were able to operate from sod fields as late as the Battle of Britain in 1940, but runways soon became essential for all but the lightest planes. U.S. expeditionary air bases established in foreign lands, often on the spur of the moment, occupy three categories:
• 第一类包含相对简陋的街区，居住者一旦失去使用价值就会弃之不顾。
• Category One contains relatively austere strips that occupants abandon as soon as they outlive their usefulness.
• 第二类机场包含第一类机场，其使用者会逐步对其进行升级和保留。
• Category Two contains Category One airfields that occupants progressively upgrade and retain.
• 第三类包括从零开始精心建造的永久或半永久基地，这些基地被占用，然后分阶段进行升级。
• Category Three contains permanent or semipermanent bases that are well constructed from scratch, occupied, then upgraded in stages.
远征机场建设者使用推土机、铲运机、反铲挖掘机、装载机、自卸卡车和其他土方机械，必要时可通过重型直升机（“空中起重机”）和降落伞运送。根据特定任务量身定制的简易基地套件包括飞行线支持、补给、维护和后勤用品，以下仅为部分示例：耐用跑道膜或垫层；照明设备；导航设备；进近设备；阻拦装置；防尘设备；预包装控制设施；便携式掩体；发电机；野战厨房；以及可折叠燃料储存容器。34
Expeditionary airfield builders employ bulldozers, scrapers, back hoes, front loaders, dump trucks, and other earth-moving machinery deliverable by heavy lift helicopters (“flying cranes”) and parachutes if necessary. Bare base kits, tailored for particular missions, include flight-line support, supply, maintenance, and housekeeping items of which the following are merely representative: durable runway membranes or matting; lights; navigation aids; approach apparatus; arresting gear; dust palliatives; prepackaged control facilities; portable shelters; power generators; field kitchens; and collapsible fuel storage containers.34
减速伞、反推装置和喷气/火箭助推起飞（JATO/RATO）推进系统使一些在跑道和进近工程仍在进行时抵达的飞机受益。苏联在西伯利亚缺乏一流的基地，在欠发达的盟国也鲜有此类基地，因此非常重视坚固耐用的短距起降（STOL）设计。早在20世纪70年代，这种设计就赋予了货运飞机高功率重量比、特殊襟翼、坚固的多轮起落架、可调节胎压、自启动发动机、重力加油、内置测试装置和机载货物装卸设备等特点。35
Drag chutes, thrust reversers, and jet/rocket-assisted take-off (JATO/RATO) propulsion systems benefit some aircraft that arrive while work on runways and approaches is still in progress. The Soviet Union, which lacked first-class bases in Siberia and found few in underdeveloped client states, put a premium on sturdy, short-takeoff-and-landing (STOL) designs that as early as the 1970s vested cargo aircraft with high power-to-weight ratios, special flaps, strong, multi-wheeled undercarriages, adjustable tire pressures, self-starting engines, gravity refueling, built-in test sets, and on-board cargo-handling equipment.35
远征空军基地和缴获的敌方机场的分阶段升级改造工作正在稳步推进，直至完全具备支持既定任务的能力（图 35）。第一阶段建设旨在打造一个环形跑道，使飞机能够在尺寸最小的临时跑道上进行起降、滑行、停放、卸货、重新装载和起飞等操作。第二阶段旨在提升容量、安全性和运行效率，可能还会新建一条跑道，并将原有跑道改造成贯穿整个机场的滑行道。第三阶段则进一步扩建设施，并铺设跑道，以满足长期使用的需求。36
Phased upgrading of expeditionary air bases and captured enemy fields continues apace until they are fully able to support planned missions (figure 35). Stage I construction provides a loop that allows aircraft to land, taxi, park, unload, reload, and depart on expedient surfaces of minimum dimensions. Stage II increases capacities, safety, and operational efficiency, perhaps creates a second runway, and converts the original to a taxi strip that runs the length of the field. Stage III further expands facilities and paves surfaces if users plan long-term occupancy.36
空军基地防御
AIR BASE DEFENSE
军用机场的防护难度甚至超过了建设难度，因为目前没有任何设施拥有可靠的弹道导弹防御系统，所有设施都容易受到迫击炮、火箭推进榴弹和便携式防空导弹等简易武器的攻击。未加防护的弹药库、航空燃料供应点以及正在起飞、最后进近或停放在未加护坡的停机坪上的飞机尤其容易受到攻击。
Military air terminals are even harder to protect than they are to construct, because no installations as yet possess credible ballistic missile defenses and all are vulnerable to attacks by such unsophisticated weapons as mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and portable air-defense missiles. Unshielded ammunition dumps, aviation fuel supplies, and aircraft taking flight, on final approaches, or in unrevetted parking lots are especially vulnerable.
胆大妄为的突袭者能造成巨大的破坏。二战期间，英国少校大卫·斯特林率领的新兴特种空勤团（SAS）多次从撒哈拉沙漠呼啸而出，袭击德国陆军元帅埃尔温·隆美尔在北非的空军基地。1942年7月8日，18辆装备着火力全开的机枪吉普车径直冲向利比亚西迪哈内什的跑道，短短几分钟内就摧毁了双方停放的二十多架飞机，其中包括容克52运输机。由于德国空军在前一年克里特岛战役中损失了近200架运输机，容克52运输机已十分稀少。1962年4月，时任英国第16伞兵旅第3营C连连长的美国陆军少校罗伯特·C·金斯顿率领六个五人小组，在黎明前的黑暗中执行一项任务：测试位于英国奥尔德肖特附近的莱肯希思美国空军基地的安全程序。邻近城镇的民警和巡逻队事先已进入高度戒备状态，并配备了警犬、绊线和照明弹。尽管如此，这些隐蔽的渗透者仍然能够“刺杀”基地指挥官，在停放的飞机上安装模拟炸药，瘫痪作战中心，炸毁液氧工厂，放置足以炸毁主跑道的炸药，并在没有造成重大损失的情况下完成其他任务。38
Audacious hit-and-run raiders can wreak havoc. British Major David Stirling’s nascent Special Air Service (SAS) repeatedly roared out of the Sahara Desert during World War II to hit German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s North African air bases. Eighteen jeeps with blazing machine guns ran straight down the runway at Sidi Haneish, Libya, on July 8, 1942, and within a few minutes ruined more than two dozen aircraft parked on both sides, including Junker 52s which had been scarce since the Luftwaffe lost nearly 200 transports during the battle for Crete the previous year.37 U.S. Army Major Robert C. Kingston, in his capacity as Commanding Officer, Company C, 3d Battalion, British 16th Parachute Brigade, led six five-man teams whose mission during pre-dawn darkness was to test security procedures at U.S. Air Base Lakenheath near Aldershot, England, in April 1962. Civilian constabulary in the adjacent town and roving patrols assisted by scout dogs, trip wires, and flares were on red alert beforehand, but stealthy infiltrators even so were able to “assassinate” the base commander, plant simulated demolitions on parked aircraft, neutralize the combat operations center, “explode” a liquid oxygen plant, place charges that could have cratered the main runway, and accomplish other missions without unacceptable losses.38
Figure 35. Airfield Construction Stages
以太空监视卫星、极其灵敏的陆基传感器、夜视设备、更分散的飞机部署和坚固的物理屏障为代表的更完善的安全保障措施限制了……对于当今的斯特林少校和金斯顿少校来说，他们有很多选择，但即便如此，特种作战部队仍然会危及防御最严密的空军基地。
Better safeguards typified by space surveillance satellites, extremely sensitive land-based sensors, night vision devices, better aircraft dispersion, and formidable physical barriers limit options open to present day counterparts of Majors Stirling and Kingston, but special operations forces even so still imperil the best protected air bases.
海港和港口
SEAPORTS AND HARBORS
海上交通线最终汇聚于各种规模、形状和类型的港口。每个适合深吃水船舶停靠的港口都拥有独特的进港航道、入口、疏浚航道、水深、避风锚地、回旋水域和导航设施。每个现代化港口还配备了种类繁多的泊位、货物装卸、仓储、维修和清关设施（图36）。39
Sea lines of communication terminate in harbors and ports that come in all sizes, shapes, and descriptions. Each harbor suitable for deep-draft ships features distinctive approaches, entrances, dredged channels, depths, protected anchorages, turning basins, and navigation aids. Each up-to-date seaport additionally displays a wide array of berthing, cargo-handling, storage, maintenance, and clearance facilities (figure 36).39
港口属性
HARBOR ATTRIBUTES
即使是像纽约、旧金山、里约热内卢和东京这样优良的天然港口，也受益于人为的改造。巨大的石砌或砖石防波堤、码头（与海岸相连的防波堤）和防波堤（顶部设有道路的码头）通常可以抑制涌浪并偏转风暴；疏浚船可以清理容易淤积的航道；海堤可以减少海岸侵蚀。港口的形状、水平尺寸、水深、水流中的障碍物以及船舶特性（吃水、长度、宽度、桅杆高度和船体形状）决定了港口一次可以容纳多少艘不同类型的船舶。
Even fine natural harbors such as those that serve New York City, San Francisco, Rio de Janeiro, and Tokyo benefit from human improvements. Massive stone or masonry breakwaters, jetties (breakwaters that connect with the shore), and moles (jetties with a road on top) commonly depress swells and deflect stormy seas, dredges clear channels that are subject to silt, and sea walls reduce erosion along shore. Shapes, horizontal dimensions, depths, obstacles in stream, and ship characteristics (drafts, lengths, beams, mast heights, and hull forms) determine how many ships of what types any harbor can accommodate at one time.
完善的港口通常配备灯塔和航道标志浮标等航标辅助设施。当防波堤、码头和栈桥等合适的泊位不可用，或松软的海底使自由锚泊不安全时，大型浮标可使船舶在航道中停泊。被称为系泊墩的深打桩也起到同样的作用。一些港池依靠闸门、沉箱、船闸和水泵来维持所需的水位。高效的港口作业还需要各种拖船、渡轮、打捞船、消防船、驳船、驳艇、打桩机、挖泥船、破岩船、驳船，以及在寒冷地区使用的破冰船。
Navigational aids in well-developed harbors normally include a lighthouse and channel-marking buoys. Huge buoys enable ships to moor in stream whenever suitable berths alongside moles, wharves, and piers are unavailable or soft bottoms make free anchorage unsafe. Deeply driven pilings called dolphins do likewise. Some basins rely on regulating gates, caissons, locks, and pumps to maintain requisite levels. Efficient harbor operations also employ various tugboats, ferries, salvage craft, fire-fighting vessels, launches, lighters, pile-drivers, dredges, rock breakers, barges and, in cold climes, icebreakers.
港口设施
PORT FACILITIES
只有当相关设施能够方便人员和货物从船舶转移到岸上时，港口才能成为海港（图 37）。大多数为此目的而建造的码头（有时也称为泊位）与港口周边或附近岛屿（例如珍珠港内的福特岛）平行并相邻，而栈桥则以不同角度伸入水中，从而在空间充足的情况下，不仅在两侧，而且在港口前端也能提供泊位。石油油轮通常通过水下管道卸载产品，同时系泊在深水码头浮标上。
Harbors become seaports only when installations facilitate the transfer of personnel and cargo from ships to shore (figure 37). Most wharves (sometimes called quays) built for that purpose parallel and abut the harbor’s perimeter or nearby islands (such as Ford Island inside Pearl Harbor), whereas piers project into the water at various angles and thereby provide berthage not only on both sides but at the head as well, given sufficient space. Petroleum tankers usually discharge products through submerged pipelines while tethered to deep-water terminal buoys.
每个港口的日吞吐能力取决于船舶类型、码头作业量占从海上运输船卸货量的比例、散货与杂货的比例、劳动力效率以及岸上设施。轮式和履带式车辆依靠自身动力在滚装船上装卸货物，而自给自足的商船则使用船上吊臂或起重机进行货物装卸，但集装箱船几乎完全依赖岸上的重型起重机。最大的龙门起重机、悬臂起重机和吊臂起重机在码头和栈桥的轨道上移动，可处理100至250吨甚至更重的货物。叉车、小型货车、便携式输送机和其他机械设备为装卸工人提供服务。中转棚、仓库、冷藏库、储罐、料仓和露天堆场用于存放货物，直到它们通过公路、铁路、内河航道或管道运出港口。
The daily capacity of every port depends on ship types, percentages worked at wharfside compared with cargoes lightered from transports in stream, ratios of bulk to general cargoes, the efficiency of the labor force, and facilities ashore. Wheeled and tracked vehicles embark and debark from roll-on roll-off (RO/RO) ships under their own power while self-sustaining merchantmen use on-board booms or cranes to transfer freight, but containerships rely almost entirely on heavy hoists ashore. The largest gantry, jib, and cantilever cranes, which move on rails along wharves and piers, handle loads that range from 100 to 250 tons or more. Forklifts, jitneys, portable conveyers, and other mechanical devices serve stevedores. Transit sheds, warehouses, refrigerators, storage tanks, bunkers, and open stacking spaces stash consignments until they clear port by road, rail, inland waterways, or pipelines.
Figure 36. Typical Naval Port Facilities
Figure 37. Wharf and Pier Configurations
便捷的港口作业
EXPEDIENT PORT OPERATIONS
当没有合适的港口可用、码头缺乏现代化设施或设施严重受损时，采取一些富有创意（有时甚至是临时性）的行动是不可避免的。这种情况在欠发达的沿海国家和战争时期很常见。
Imaginative (sometimes makeshift) operations are unavoidable when no convenient seaport is available, terminals lack modern amenities, or facilities are badly damaged. Such conditions are common in underdeveloped coastal countries and during wars.
冷战竞争。冷战期间，美国军事海运能力不足以与苏联及其代理人竞争，因为当时规模不断缩小的美国商船队主要服务于商业而非军事紧急情况，其重点在于利润丰厚但缺乏灵活性的集装箱船，而非能够自给自足的散货船。散货船不仅能够运输各种尺寸和形状的干货，而且其大部分业务都在设施简陋的小港口进行。美国不得不依靠登陆舰、重型直升机以及耗时的临时措施来协助集装箱船卸载武器、装备和物资。越南的武装部队。相比之下，苏联商船队则以小型船舶为主，这些船舶非常适合在水浅、设施简陋的原始港口进行贸易。40
Cold War Competition. U.S. military sealift during the Cold War was poorly prepared to compete with the Soviet Union and its surrogates, because the shrinking U.S. Merchant Marine, tailored mainly for commerce rather than military emergencies, emphasized profitable albeit inflexible container ships over self-sustaining, break-bulk tramp steamers that not only welcomed dry cargo in assorted sizes and shapes but plied much of their trade in small ports that afforded few amenities. LSTs, heavy lift helicopters, and time-consuming expedients had to help container ships unload weapons, equipment, and supplies for U.S. armed forces in Vietnam. Soviet merchant fleets in contrast featured smaller ships well adapted for business in primitive ports plagued by shallow water and skimpy facilities.40
预制港口和码头设施。在诺曼底登陆期间，盟军攻占科唐坦半岛北端的瑟堡之前，曾进行过一次在开阔海滩上开展的最复杂的后勤行动。41超过 80 艘装满沙子的船只从船头到船尾沉入 4 至 5 米深的水中，在那里形成了五个代号为“鹅莓”的防波堤，小型船只和登陆艇可以在低潮时从防波堤后面卸货。
Prefabricated Harbor and Port Facilities. The most elaborate logistical operation ever attempted over open beaches took place during the Normandy invasion before Allied troops captured Cherbourg on the northern tip of the Cotentin Peninsula.41 More than 80 ships filled with sand were sunk stem-to-stern in 12 to 15 feet (4 to 5 meters) of water where they formed five breakwaters code named Gooseberries, behind which small ships and landing craft could unload at low tide.
然而，大型运输船需要更好的避风港。英国设计并建造了两个代号分别为“桑葚A”和“桑葚B”的人工港，由远洋拖船拖过英吉利海峡，分别安装在奥马哈海滩附近的维耶维尔滨海和更东边10英里处的黄金海滩附近的阿罗芒什莱班。每个港口都由大约50个被称为“凤凰”的空心混凝土构件组成，其中大部分尺寸为200 x 60 x 60英尺（61 x 18 x 18米）。随着潮汐涨落而升降的浮动防波堤、码头和堤道完善了整个港口系统，并取得了令人满意的成效：在第一周，就有74000名士兵、10000辆车辆和17000吨物资被输送到内陆。
Large transports, however, needed better shelters. Two artificial harbors code named Mulberries A and B were designed and developed in Great Britain, towed across the English Channel by seagoing tugs, then installed off Omaha Beach at Vierville-sur-Mer and at Arromanches-les-Bains off Gold Beach 10 miles farther east. Each consisted of 50-some hollow concrete building blocks called Phoenixes, most of which measured 200 x 60 x 60 feet (61 x 18 x 18 meters). Floating breakwaters, pierheads, and causeways that rose and fell with each tide completed the complex with gratifying results: 74,000 troops, 10,000 vehicles, and 17,000 tons of supplies funneled inland during the first week.
一切进展顺利，直到1944年6月19日，一场40年来最严重的风暴袭来。狂风呼啸，风速高达40节（阵风更强），巨浪拍打着鹅莓树，春潮更是加剧了海浪的冲击。四天后，当天气转晴时，桑树A已损毁严重，无法修复。然而，这项短暂的工程在早期需要快速发展的时候却带来了丰厚的回报。
Prospects for improvement were salutary until the worst storm in 40 years struck on June 19, 1944. Winds whipped in at 40 knots (stronger in gusts), waves washed over the Gooseberries, and spring tides amplified pounding surfs. Mulberry A was an irreparable wreck when calmer weather returned 4 days later, but that short-lived project nevertheless paid off handsomely during early days when rapid buildups were imperative.
1944年7月26日，瑟堡落入美军之手后，最初的后勤效益微乎其微，因为德军守军在投降前有条不紊地摧毁了大部分港口设施。海水涌入西防波堤的弹坑；沉船和两万立方码的砖石堵塞了港池；码头墙和起重机被摧毁或严重损毁，以至于希特勒授予负责爆破的亨内克海军上将骑士十字勋章。然而，重建工作进展迅速，瑟堡在短短四周内就处理了比和平时期鼎盛时期还要多的重型货物。在11月登陆作战停止之前，盟军在诺曼底登陆的所有货物中，超过四分之一都经由瑟堡港运抵。
Logistical benefits after Cherbourg fell into U.S. hands on July 26, 1944, initially were scant, because German defenders methodically destroyed most port facilities before they surrendered. Sea water poured through craters in the western breakwater; sunken ships and 20,000 cubic yards of masonry blocked basins; and quay walls and cranes were demolished or damaged so severely that Hitler awarded the Knight’s Cross to Admiral Hennecke, whose forces conducted the demolitions. Rehabilitation, however, progressed so swiftly that Cherbourg within 4 weeks was handling more heavy freight than during its palmiest days in peacetime. More than one-fourth of all Allied cargo landed in Normandy passed through that port before over-the-beach operations ceased in November.
切实改进。一些富有远见的先驱者一直在探索如何在偏远地区快速、经济高效地建立人工港口设施，他们研究了各种各样的方案，包括岸上物流（LOTS）和舰船-直升机延时运输系统（SHEDS）。最近提出的移动式海上基地（MOB）和登陆舰码头/堤道（LSQ/C）等方案更具雄心，而且前景可期。42
Practical Improvements. Visionaries in search of cost-effective ways to establish artificial port facilities expeditiously in out-of-the-way places have investigated an alphabet soup of candidates that variously included Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS) and a Ship-Helicopter Extended Delivery System (SHEDS). Recent proposals such as Mobile Offshore Bases (MOBs) and Landing Ship Quay/Causeways (LSQ/C) are much more ambitious, but nevertheless seem promising.42
LSQ/C概念设想建造一艘大型船舶，很可能是由油轮改装而成，通过压载下沉至40至50英尺（12至15米）深的海底。设计者预测，即使在25节风速和12英尺（5级海况）的巨浪冲击下，工程师也能在72小时内将每个这样的码头与3000英尺（915米）长的双层堤道连接起来。预设功能允许两艘集装箱船、散货船或滚装船并排停靠，同时卸载货物以便进一步运往岸上，而泵和柔性管道则用于输送石油和饮用水。作为浮动后勤基地的MOB（海上作业平台）设想建造六艘半潜式平台。每个模块，如果开发完成，均可提供超过 270 万平方英尺（250,000 森特里亚尔）的可用环境控制存储空间，用于以下用途：
LSQ/C concepts envision a large ship, likely a converted tanker, that would ballast down to rest on the ocean floor in water 40 to 50 feet deep (12 to 15 meters). Designers predict that engineers could connect each such quay with 3,000 feet of double-decked causeway (915 meters) in less than 72 hours, even if buffeted by 25-knot winds and 12-foot waves (sea state 5). Programmed capabilities would permit two container ships, break-bulk transports, or RO/ROs to moor alongside and simultaneously discharge cargoes for further conveyance ashore, while pumps and flexible pipelines would transfer petroleum and potable water. MOBs, which would function as floating logistical bases, contemplate six semisubmersible modules apiece, each of which could, if developed, furnish more than 2.7 million usable square feet of environmentally controlled storage space (250,000 centares) for use as follows:
支持者称赞移动海上基地（MOB）的潜在能力超越了其他竞争方案，而怀疑者则指出其缺陷。连接如此庞大结构的机制能否承受飓风级剪切应力尚属未知。在类似情况下，临时解耦或许足够，但由于需要多个移动海上基地来应对分散各地的突发事件，因此每个基地的总成本可能高达20亿至30亿美元（以1996年美元计算），令人望而却步。如果移动海上基地部署在远离危机爆发点的地方，即使按照宣传的8至10节的速度移动，也可能为时已晚，无法发挥作用。
Proponents praise MOBs for potential capabilities that outstrip competitive proposals, while skeptics point out flaws. Whether mechanisms that link such massive structures could tolerate hurricane-force shearing strains is subject to speculation. Temporary decoupling might suffice in such situations, but total program costs could be prohibitive at $2 to $3 billion per copy in 1996 dollars, because several Mobile Offshore Bases would be needed to cover widely separated contingencies. MOBs moving at the advertised rate of 8 to 10 knots might arrive too late to be useful if positioned far from erupting crises.
航天发射场和飞行路线
SPACEPORTS AND FLIGHT PATHS
目前，军用太空通信线路的起点和终点都位于地球上的航天发射场，但几乎可以肯定的是，在未来某个难以预测的时期，月球和附近的行星上也会出现类似的设施。这些设施及其连接航线必须满足作战需求，而这些需求在诸多方面与民用需求存在显著差异。
Military lines of communication to and from space start and end with spaceports that are located exclusively on Earth at this moment, but almost certainly will appear on the moon and the nearest planets at unpredictable future dates. Such installations and flight paths that connect them must satisfy operational demands that differ significantly in several respects from civilian requirements.
军事航天基础设施
MILITARY SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE
民用航天港若能像商业航空公司那样，以同样的频率和可靠性发射和回收客货飞船，无疑值得称赞；而军用航天港除了具备这些能力外，还必须能够在战斗中胜任所有既定任务。理想的设施包括固定控制中心、移动指挥所、冗余通信设施和安全的后勤保障设施。
Civilian spaceports able to launch and retrieve passenger and cargo flights with the same regularity and degree of confidence that commercial airlines currently enjoy would be praiseworthy indeed, whereas military spaceports additionally must be able to perform all assigned missions competently in combat. Requirements ideally include fixed-site control centers, mobile command posts, redundant communication facilities, and secure logistical installations.
在冷战高峰时期，苏联军方航天官员在偏远地区选址关键基础设施时，将安全放在首位：波罗的海和巴伦支海之间的武装力量和防御工事保护着普列谢茨克；秋拉塔姆和卡普斯京亚尔都远离大城市或敌对边境；除非爆发全面核战争，否则这三个设施都能免受远程导弹袭击（图29）。相比之下，美国高级官员在佛罗里达州卡纳维拉尔角、弗吉尼亚州沃洛普斯岛和加利福尼亚州范登堡空军基地等航天发射场选址时，更多地考虑的是和平时期的安全措施，而非战时的生存能力，目的是确保失败的发射能够安全落入海洋。因此，所有这些发射场都曾是，并且至今仍然容易受到短程海基导弹和藏身于城市庇护所的破坏分子的攻击。位于加利福尼亚州桑尼维尔的美国军事太空控制中心不仅坐落在海边，而且横跨圣安德烈亚斯断层，这是一个潜在的地震震中。43
Military space officials in the Soviet Union had physical security firmly in mind when they located key infrastructure in remote regions at the height of the Cold War: armed forces and fortifications between the Baltic and Barents Seas protected Plesetsk; neither Tyuratam nor Kapustin Yar was near a large city or unfriendly frontier; and all three installations were safe from long-range missile attacks unless a general nuclear war erupted (map 29). Senior U.S. officials in contrast had peacetime safety measures rather than wartime survivability in mind when they located space launch sites close to coasts at Cape Canaveral, Florida, Wallops Island, Virginia, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, so that unsuccessful flights would fall harmlessly into the ocean. All consequently were, and still are, vulnerable to short-range sea-launched missiles and saboteurs who inhabit urban sanctuaries. The U.S. military space control center at Sunnyvale, California not only sits on a seashore, but straddles the San Andreas Fault, a potential earthquake epicenter.43
Map 29. U.S. and Soviet Space Launch Sites and Control Centers
可预测的飞行路线
PREDICTABLE FLIGHT PATHS
宇宙中的所有物体都围绕地球、卫星、其他行星、太阳或恒星运行，这使得太空军事飞行路线与道路和铁路的路线一样具有可预测性。因此，精确的反卫星武器（ASAT）可能会在其预定轨道上危及战略预警、侦察、监视、通信、气象、导航和后勤卫星（图30），直到机动航天器和反反卫星防御等有效应对措施出现为止。44
Objects in our Universe all orbit around the Earth, its moon, other planets, the sun, or stars, which makes military flight paths in space just as predictable as the routes that roads and railways follow. Accurate antisatellite weapons (ASATs) consequently could imperil strategic warning, reconnaissance, surveillance, communications, weather, navigation, and logistical satellites on their appointed rounds (map 30) until effective countermeasures such as maneuverable spacecraft and counter-ASAT defenses become available.44
内河航道
INLAND WATERWAYS
在其他交通线路匮乏或成本较高的情况下，可通航的河流、运河、湖泊、内陆海域和沿海水道构成了重要的军事后勤通道。在空降机场稀少的茂密森林或沼泽地区，内河航道还可以补充或取代公路、铁路和小径。将大宗货物装载到船只和驳船上的后勤人员可以将更快捷的运输方式留给优先级更高的货物。
Navigable rivers, canals, lakes, inland seas, and intracoastal connections make militarily useful LOCs where other lines of communication are lacking or less economical. Inland waterways also supplement or supplant roads, tracks, and trails in densely forested or swampy regions where air landing zones are scarce. Logisticians who load bulk consignments onto boats and barges can reserve faster modes of transportation for high-priority shipments.
特殊考虑因素
UNIQUE CONSIDERATIONS
评估内河航道所需的数据在许多方面与公路和铁路所需的数据非常相似。共同关注的问题包括选定点之间的距离、水平和垂直净空、障碍物，以及当地可用运输工具的数量、类型和容量，以及机械装卸、储存、维修和维护设施。诸如航道宽度、控制水深、冰冻期、航标、码头设施和疏浚需求等因素也与海港类似。然而，也有一些信息需求是独特的：
Data needed to evaluate inland waterways in many respects are much like those related to roads and railways. Common concerns include distances between selected points, horizontal and overhead clearances, obstacles, and the numbers, types, and capacities of locally available conveyances together with mechanical handling, storage, repair, and maintenance facilities. Considerations such as channel widths, controlling depths, freezing dates, navigational aids, wharfage, and dredging demands parallel those associated with seaports. Several informational requirements, however, are unique:
• 当前流向、流速波动以及河道迁移趋势
• Current directions, fluctuations in speed, and tendencies of channels to shift
• 河岸和河谷的状况
• The condition of banks and bottoms
• 急流和瀑布的位置及影响，以及陆路搬运的可能性
• The location and influence of rapids and waterfalls, plus portage possibilities
• 洪水和低水位发生的频率、持续时间和影响
• The frequency, duration, and effects of floods and low water levels
• 堤坝的存在与否及其影响
• The presence or absence and influence of levees
• 船闸、大坝、安全闸门和渡口的位置、描述、限制性影响和脆弱性
• The location, description, restrictive effects, and vulnerability of locks, dams, safety gates, and ferry crossings
• 驳船船员和船闸管理员的可用性。
• The availability of bargemen and lock tenders.
具有战术意义的水道
TACTICALLY USEFUL WATERCOURSES
战区内水道若易于通航、水量适中且方向符合要求，则对军事用途极为有利。纵横交错于西欧和湄公河三角洲的水道网络在近代历史上发挥了重要作用。然而，内陆水道与其他交通线一样，也难免受到自然和人为因素的阻碍。在寒冷地区，季节性冰冻会阻断交通；解冻后的洪水会导致水位波动；在坡度陡峭的地区，急流和瀑布会阻挡航道；在水流缓慢蜿蜒的河流中，新形成的沙洲也会威胁航行。敌军和“天灾”都可能破坏船闸、排干运河、阻塞河道，甚至摧毁或拆除设施。德国境内建于高堤后方、高于地面的基尔运河、威廉运河、多特蒙德-埃姆斯运河以及其他运河，阻碍了机动车辆的跨境通行，缩小了火灾的平地蔓延范围，并且一旦决堤，将会淹没邻近的低洼地区。
Intratheater watercourses serve military purposes to great advantage, provided they are easily accessible, mainly navigable, reasonably dense, and oriented in required directions. Webs such as those that crisscross Western Europe and the Mekong Delta have played prominent roles in the relatively recent past. Inland waterways, however, are no more immune to natural and manmade impediments than other lines of communication. Freeze-ups seasonally stop traffic in cold climes, floods that follow thaws cause depths to fluctuate, rapids and waterfalls bar the way where gradients are steep, and newly-deposited sandbars menace navigation in slowly meandering streams. Enemies and “acts of God” may damage locks, drain canals, block river channels, and destroy or dismantle facilities. The Kiel, Wilhelm, Dortmund-Ems, and other canals built above ground level behind high levees in Germany oppose cross-country movement by motor vehicles, reduce flat-trajectory fields of fire and, if ruptured, would flood adjacent lowlands
Map 30. Earth Support Satellite Orbits
改编自 Ashton B. Carter 的《卫星与反卫星》，载于《国际安全》 1986 年春季刊。
Adapted from “Satellites and Anti-Satellites” by Ashton B.Carter, International Security, Spring 1986.
即便如此，指挥官若能拥有足智多谋的下属，有时也能在险恶的水道上创造奇迹。1944年秋天，在缅甸钦敦江畔，威廉·斯利姆将军就做到了这一点。他转向他的总工程师说：“比利，河在那边，树在那边。两个月后，我要每天有500吨物资顺着这条河运下去。”他做到了。大象驮着巨大的柚木原木，运到一个临时船坞。在那里，缅甸劳工在英国人的监督下建造了数百艘“无动力驳船”。这些驳船“看起来像诺亚方舟”，但每艘都能载重10吨，三艘捆绑在一起甚至可以运载一辆谢尔曼坦克。拆卸下来的船用发动机由飞机运送，为驳船提供动力。两艘伪装成“军舰”的船只，每艘都配备一门40毫米博福斯炮、两门20毫米厄利孔炮和两挺.30口径双联装勃朗宁高射炮，负责提供火力掩护。45
Commanders with resourceful subordinates even so sometimes work miracles along unfriendly waterways. Such was the case in autumn 1944, when General William Slim, on the banks of the Chindwin River in Burma, turned to his chief engineer and said, “Billy, there’s the river and there are the trees. In two months I want five hundred tons of supplies a day” down that stream. He got them. Elephants lugged huge teak logs to an improvised shipyard where Burmese laborers under British supervision built several hundred “dumb barges.” They “looked like Noah’s arks,” but carried 10 tons apiece and three lashed together could take a Sherman tank. Marine engines, dismantled and delivered by aircraft, provided power, while two pseudo “warships,” each armed with one 40-mm Bofors gun, two 20-mm Oerlikons, and a couple of .30-caliber twin Browning antiaircraft guns provided protection.45
战略上的关键管道
STRATEGICALLY CRUCIAL CANALS
与战区内运河不同，战区间运河往往具有战略意义而非战术意义。其中一条水道连接着巴伦支海、波罗的海和黑海。巴拿马运河连接大西洋和太平洋，而苏伊士运河则简化了从地中海到印度洋的航运。
Intertheater canals, unlike intratheater counterparts, tend to be strategically rather than tactically significant. One such sluiceway connects the Barents, Baltic, and Black Seas. The Panama Canal links the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, while the Suez Canal simplifies movement from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean.
巴伦支海与黑海的联系。爱德华·梅爵士在其开创性著作《地理与战争》中指出，沙皇俄国为了海上力量，在20世纪初“计划修建一条从波罗的海沿岸的里加到黑海沿岸的赫尔松的运河”。七十年后，苏联在戈尔基建造的核动力潜艇在温暖的季节沿着这条运河前往列宁格勒，在那里完成舾装，然后像驱逐舰和小型水面舰艇一样，经由内河航道加入北方舰队，进入巴伦支海。除潜艇外，所有隶属于黑海舰队的苏联海军力量都通过土耳其海峡（博斯普鲁斯海峡、马尔马拉海和达达尼尔海峡）进入地中海。潜艇的通行在和平时期仍然受到1936年《蒙特勒条约》的限制。俄罗斯和乌克兰的水面作战舰艇至今仍然遵守该条约。46
Barents to Black Sea Connections. Colonel Sir Edward May, in his seminal writings entitled Geography in Relation to War, noted that Czarist Russia in the interest of sea power “projected the construction of a canal from Riga on the Baltic to Kherson on the Black Sea” early in the 20th century. Soviet nuclear-powered submarines built at Gorky seven decades later followed that route to Leningrad during warm weather, where they finished fitting out and, like destroyers and smaller surface ships, thereafter joined the Northern Fleet by way of inland waterways to the Barents Sea. All Soviet naval forces assigned to the Black Sea Fleet fed into the Mediterranean through the Turkish Straits (the Bosporus, Sea of Marmara, and Dardenelles), save submarines whose passage still is restricted in peacetime by the Montreux Convention of 1936. Russian and Ukrainian surface combatants honor that treaty today.46
巴拿马运河。美国得天独厚，拥有位于不冻海岸的避风海军基地，这些基地通向世界最大的海洋，进而延伸至各大洲。自1914年以来，美国海军一直能够通过巴拿马运河在大西洋和太平洋之间调动兵力，以优先应对任何需要优先处理的行动。表22列出了海军舰艇（不包括大型航空母舰和超级油轮）通过巴拿马运河所节省的时间和距离。1979年赋予巴拿马主权并将于2000年赋予其作战控制权的条约，维护了美国的这些特权。
Panama Canal. The United States is twice blessed by sheltered naval bases on ice-free coasts that open onto the world’s largest oceans and, in turn, on every continent. The U.S. Navy since 1914 has been able to shift forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific and back again through the Panama Canal to weight whatever effort takes priority. Table 22 illustrates time/distance savings that naval ships (excluding large aircraft carriers and supertankers) gain by passage through the Panama Canal. Treaties that granted sovereignty to Panama in 1979 and will confer operational control in the year 2000 preserve those U.S. prerogatives.
苏伊士运河。苏伊士运河于1869年开通，在1948年埃及政府禁止往返新生以色列的船只通行之前，一直为各方带来经济利益。此后，运河曾两次关闭：第一次是从1956年11月到1957年3月，由于以色列、英国和法国的入侵，埃及总统贾迈勒·阿卜杜勒·纳赛尔下令在狭窄的航道上击沉船只；第二次是从1967年6月六日战争爆发到1975年6月，当时沉船再次堵塞了航道。47
Suez Canal. The Suez Canal, which opened in 1869, remained economically beneficial to all until 1948, when the Egyptian Government banned ships en route to and from the infant state of Israel. The canal has been closed twice since then: first from November 1956 until March 1957, because Israeli, British, and French invasions prompted Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to sink ships in the narrow freeway; then from the onset of the Six-Day War in June 1967 until June 1975, when sunken ships once again choked the channel.47
苏伊士运河在两次长期关闭后，经济上再也没有恢复过来。这迫使石油生产商越来越依赖走其他航线的超级油轮，但其战略重要性却急剧上升。只要运河关闭，美国及其盟友就从中受益，因为苏联从欧洲到印度洋的海上交通线都绕过了非洲。1975年，随着大量悬挂镰刀锤子标志的军舰开始使用苏伊士运河这条捷径，竞争变得异常激烈。在1990-1991年两伊战争期间，美国海军发现这条水道具有重要的战略价值，因为它将美国东海岸与波斯湾港口之间的距离缩短了约3000海里（5560公里），与绕道好望角相比，商船的航行时间也缩短了八到九天。
The Suez Canal never recovered economically from those two prolonged closures, which prompted petroleum producers to rely increasingly on fast supertankers that took other routes, but its strategic importance soared. U.S. Armed Forces and their allies benefited as long as the Canal was closed, because Soviet sea lines of communication from Europe to the Indian Ocean led all the way around Africa. Competition sharpened considerably after a stream of warships flying the hammer and sickle started to use the Suez shortcut in 1975. The U.S. Navy during the 1990-91 war with Iraq found that watercourse strategically valuable, because it reduced distances between the U.S. eastern seaboard and Persian Gulf ports by about 3,000 nautical miles (5,560 kilometers) and trimmed merchant ship transit times by eight or nine days compared with trips past the Cape of Good Hope.
管道
PIPELINES
铺设在地下或地面的焊接钢管是陆路输送石油、天然气和水最快捷、最经济的方式。有些管线横贯全国，有些则沿既定路线铺设。石油管道的输送能力通常以桶/天、公吨或立方米/天为单位计算，其直径一般从 4 英寸到 40 英寸以上（10 厘米到 100 厘米）不等。原油专用管道会污染成品油，除非事先进行彻底清洁，而这是一个成本高昂且耗时的过程。但大多数管道可以输送汽油、航空煤油等。煤油和柴油分批输送，以最大程度地减少混合。相关设施包括液体泵、天然气压缩机、各种阀门、歧管和计量器。
Welded steel pipes laid under ground or on the surface are the most expeditious and economical way to transport petroleum, natural gas, and water over land. Some lines run cross-country, while others follow established routes. The capabilities of petroleum pipelines, which generally vary in diameter from 4 to more than 40 inches (10 to 100 centimeters), are calculated in barrels, metric tons, or cubic meters per day. Conduits reserved for crude oil contaminate refined products unless attendants first clean them thoroughly, a costly, time-consuming process, but most lines accept gasoline, jet fuel, kerosene, and diesel in batches that minimize mixing. Associated facilities include pumps for liquids and compressors for natural gas, assorted valves, manifolds, and meters.
Table 22. Advantages Available from the Panama Canal
政治风险
POLITICAL PERILS
大多数民用输油管道并不引人注目，但也有少数管道招致强烈批评。在阿拉斯加北坡，勘探者在普拉德霍湾发现丰富的石油储量后，修建巨型输油管道的过程中，引发了政治和生态方面的抗议，以及愤怒的原住民的土地诉求，这些抗议本可能演变成暴力冲突，但最终并未发生。48.跨越国际边界的输油管道也可能引发争端。例如，伊拉克自1948年以色列控制海法油田以来，失去了连接基尔库克油田与外界的三条输油管道。1980年，萨达姆·侯赛因不顾叙利亚反对，发动伊朗战争，叙利亚总统哈菲兹·阿萨德关闭了位于黎巴嫩的黎波里的第二条输油管道。这两条管道至今仍未重新开放。1990年伊拉克占领科威特后，土耳其关闭了第三条输油管道，并一直关闭到1996年12月。49
Most civilian pipelines are unobtrusive, but a few attract strong criticism. Political and ecological complaints accompanied by land claims of irate natives could have, but did not, turn violent during the construction of giant pipelines on Alaska’s North Slope after prospectors discovered extensive petroleum deposits at Prudhoe Bay.48 Pipelines that cross international boundaries may also provoke disputes. Iraq, for example, lost three links between oil fields at Kirkuk and the outside world beginning in 1948, when Israel took control of the terminal at Haifa. Syria’s President Hafez al-Assad eliminated a second outlet at Tripoli, Lebanon, when Saddam Hussein went to war with Iran in 1980 despite Syrian objections. Neither of those lines has ever reopened. Turkey turned off the third tap in 1990 after Iraq seized Kuwait and kept it closed until December 1996.49
军事应用
MILITARY APPLICATIONS
这条极具创新性的军用输油管道，被恰如其分地命名为“冥王星行动”（海底管道），在诺曼底登陆后为驻法盟军输送石油。专家们将20英尺长的3英寸管道焊接成4000英尺（1220米）长的卷筒，然后缠绕在巨大的空心卷筒上。每个卷筒满载时重达1600吨，相当于当时一艘普通驱逐舰的重量。三艘拖船拖着这些庞然大物，在怀特岛和瑟堡之间的海底铺设了四根管道。随后，陆军工程师们以最快的速度将管道铺设到数百英里外的内陆，以减轻本已不堪重负的卡车司机和拥挤不堪的道路的压力。相比之下，冷战时期北约欧洲以及朝鲜战争、越南战争和东南亚战争期间用于类似用途的50 条石油管道似乎很简单。
The most innovative military pipeline, aptly dubbed Operation Pluto (Pipeline Under the Ocean), delivered petroleum to Allied forces in France after the Normandy invasion. Specialists welded 20-foot lengths of 3-inch pipe into 4,000-foot rolls (1,220 meters), then wound them on huge hollow bobbins, each of which fully loaded tipped scales at 1,600 tons, a weight then equivalent to that of an average destroyer. Three tugboats towed those monsters while they payed out four pipes on the sea bottom between the Isle of Wight and Cherbourg. Army engineers then laid pipe hundreds of miles inland as fast as they could to reduce strains on already overcommitted truck drivers and overcrowded roads.50 Petroleum pipelines that served similar purposes in NATO Europe during the Cold War as well as in Korea, Vietnam, and Southeast Asia during shooting wars seemed simple by comparison.
要点
KEY POINTS
• 大多数军事行动的成功取决于安全可靠且容量充足的后勤保障。
• The success of most military operations depends on secure LOCs of adequate capacity.
• 任何通信线路上的节点都是最脆弱、最容易受到攻击的目标。
• The nodes along any line of communication are its most vulnerable and inviting targets.
• 低估修建、改善和维护合适的道路、铁路、海港、航天港、内河航道和管道所需工程单位数量的计划和方案可能会严重危及军事行动。
• Plans and programs that underestimate the number of engineer units needed to construct, improve, and maintain suitable roads, rail lines, sea ports, space ports, inland waterways, and pipelines may seriously jeopardize military operations.
• 需要部署大量的空中和导弹防御部队以及大量的地面作战部队来确保运输线上的安全，这些运输线上有许多薄弱点和瓶颈，容易受到敌人在漫长路线或终点站的攻击。
• Extensive air and missile defense forces plus large numbers of ground combat troops may be needed to secure LOCs with many weak points and bottlenecks that are vulnerable to enemy attack along lengthy routes or at terminals.
• 具备超短距起降 (VSTOL)、垂直起降 (VTOL) 能力的作战和支援飞机将大大减少机场建设要求，并增加潜在适用地点的数量。
• Combat and support aircraft with very short or vertical takeoff and landing (VSTOL, VTOL) capabilities would greatly reduce airfield construction requirements and increase the number of potentially suitable sites.
• 在港口设施不完善或遭到破坏的情况下，自持式散货船、浅吃水运输船和滚装船比集装箱船具有更大的灵活性。
• Self-sustaining, break-bulk, shallow-draft transports and RO/ROs afford far greater flexibility than container ships wherever available port facilities are poorly developed or destroyed.
• 世界仍在等待既实用又经济的移动式预制港口设施。
• The world still awaits mobile, prefabricated harbor and port facilities that are practical as well as cost-effective.
• 首批高能力反卫星武器系统将危及太空物流，直到科学家和技术人员设计出有效的防御措施和可机动的航天器。
• The first highly-capable anti-satellite weapon systems will endanger space LOCs until scientists and technologists devise effective defenses and maneuverable spacecraft.
笔记
NOTES
1.安托万·亨利·若米尼在《孙子兵法》中讨论了内部和外部沟通渠道，由GH Mendell和WP Craighill翻译（康涅狄格州韦斯特波特：格林伍德出版社，1862年），第91-120页。
1. Antoine Henri Jomini discussed interior and exterior lines of communication in The Art of War, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1862), 91-120.
2.乔治·S·巴顿，《我所经历的战争》（马萨诸塞州剑桥：河滨出版社，1947 年），第 93 页。
2. George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (Cambridge, MA: Riverside Press, 1947), 93.
3. Trevor N. Dupuy，《难以捉摸的胜利：阿拉伯-以色列战争，1947-1949》（纽约：哈珀和罗出版社，1978 年），第 105-111 页。
3. Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1949 (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 105-111.
4. FM 5-36：路线侦察和分类（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1985 年 3 月），第 2-1 至 2-6 页，第 3-45 至 3-48 页。
4. FM 5-36: Route Reconnaissance and Classification (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, March 1985), 2-1 through 2-6, 3-45 through 3-48.
5.同上。
5. Ibid.
6.德怀特·D·艾森豪威尔，《欧洲十字军东征》（纽约州花园城：道布尔戴出版社，1948 年），第 308 页。
6. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1948), 308.
7. Thomas Macaulay，“桥上的霍拉提乌斯”，《古罗马传说》 ，1842 年。另见 William C. Hall 的戏仿作品，“霍拉提乌斯的勋章”，《战斗部队杂志》（1955 年 1 月）。
7. Thomas Macaulay, “Horatius At the Bridge,” Lay of Ancient Rome, 1842. See also a parody by William C. Hall, “A Medal for Horatius,” Combat Forces Journal (January 1955).
8. Ed Cunningham，“雷马根桥”，《美国大兵——战争中的美国大兵故事》（纽约：Duell、Sloan 和 Pearce 出版社，1947 年），第 295-207 页；《雷马根桥头堡：1945 年 3 月 7 日至 17 日》（肯塔基州诺克斯堡：装甲兵学校，1948 年）。
8. Ed Cunningham, “The Bridge At Remagen,” Yank—The GI Story of the War (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1947), 295-207; The Remagen Bridgehead: 7-17 March 1945 (Fort Knox, KY: The Armor School, 1948).
9. FM 5-33：地形分析（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1990 年 7 月），2-13 和 2-14；FM 5-36：路线侦察和分类，3-6。
9. FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, July 1990), 2-13 and 2-14; FM 5-36: Route Reconnaissance and Classification, 3-6.
10. FM 5-25：爆炸物和爆破（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1996 年 3 月），第 4-46 和 4-47 页，第 4-51 至 4-70 页；FM 5-36：路线侦察和分类，第 3-8 和 3-9 页，第 3-13 至 3-40 页。
10. FM 5-25: Explosives and Demolitions (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, March 1996), 4-46 and 4-47, 4-51 through 4-70 passim; FM 5-36: Route Reconnaissance and Classification, 3-8 and 3-9, 3-13 through 3-40.
11. FM 5-36：路线侦察和分类，2-36 至 2-47；FM 5-33：地形分析，2-15 和 2-16。
11. FM 5-36: Route Reconnaissance and Classification, 2-36 through 2-47; FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis, 2-15 and 2-16.
12. FM 5-36：2-22 至 2-26；FM 5-33：2-15。
12. FM 5-36: 2-22 through 2-26; FM 5-33: 2-15.
13. H. Milton Duesenberg，《阿拉斯加公路远征军：筑路者的故事》（爱荷华州克利尔湖：H&M 工业有限公司，1994 年）；Kenneth Coates 和 William R. Morrison，《二战中的阿拉斯加公路》（俄克拉荷马州诺曼：俄克拉荷马大学出版社，1992 年）。
13. H. Milton Duesenberg, Alaska Highway Expeditionary Force: A Roadbuilder’s Story (Clear Lake, IO: H&M Industries Ltd., 1994); Kenneth Coates and William R. Morrison, The Alaska Highway in World War II (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992).
14. Frank N. Schubert，“美国陆军工程兵团和阿富汗公路 1960-1967”，《建筑工程与管理杂志》（1991 年 9 月）：445-459。
14. Frank N. Schubert, “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Afghanistan’s Highways 1960-1967,” Journal of Construction Engineering and Management (September 1991): 445-459.
15. Tan Pei-Ying，《滇缅公路的修建》（纽约：麦格劳-希尔出版社，1945 年），第 37-38、69、97-104 页。另见 Leslie Anders，《雷多公路：约瑟夫·W·史迪威将军通往中国的公路》（俄克拉荷马州诺曼：俄克拉荷马大学出版社，1965 年）。
15. Tan Pei-Ying, The Building of the Burma Road (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1945), 37-38. 69, 97-104. See also Leslie Anders, The Ledo Road: General Joseph W. Stilwell’s Highway to China (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965).
16.裴英，《滇缅公路的建设》，105-127页；Leo T. Daugherty III，“中国-缅甸-印度的军种间和盟国间合作”，《联合部队季刊》，第12期（1996年夏季）：95-105页。
16. Pei-Ying, The Building of the Burma Road, 105-127, and Leo T. Daugherty III, “interservice and Interallied Cooperation in China-Burma-India,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 12 (Summer 1996): 95-105.
17. David R. Mets， 《外科手术式打击的探索》（佛罗里达州埃格林空军基地：空军系统司令部专著，军备部，1987 年）；Eliot Cohen，“高科技的恶名：美国政府问责局对海湾战争武器的错误打击”，《华盛顿邮报》，1996 年 7 月 19 日，第 15 页。
17. David R. Mets, The Quest for a Surgical Strike (Eglin Air Force Base, FL: Air Force Systems Command Monograph, Armament Division, 1987); Eliot Cohen, “A Bad Rap Against High Tech: The GAO’s Misguided Missile Against Gulf War Weaponry,” Washington Post, July 19,1996, 15.
18. FM 5-25：爆炸物和爆破。
18. FM 5-25: Explosives and Demolitions.
19. Edward Mead Earl 编，《现代战略的缔造者：从马基雅维利到希特勒的军事思想》（新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1943 年），第 148-152 页，第 177 页；Trevor N. Dupuy，《战争天才：德国陆军和总参谋部，1807-1945 年》（新泽西州恩格尔伍德克利夫斯：普伦蒂斯-霍尔出版社，1977 年），第 66 页。
19. Edward Mead Earl, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought From Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943), 148-152, 177; Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 66.
20.乔治·埃德加·特纳，《胜利乘着铁路而来：铁路在内战中的战略地位》（印第安纳州印第安纳波利斯：鲍勃斯-梅里尔出版社，1953 年）；托马斯·韦伯，《内战中的北方铁路，1861-1865 年》（纽约：国王皇冠出版社，1952 年）。
20. George Edgar Turner, Victory Rode the Rails: The Strategic Place of Railroads in the Civil War (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953); Thomas Weber, The Northern Railroads in the Civil War, 1861-1865 (New York: Kings Crown Press, 1952).
21. “伟大的火车追逐：安德鲁斯突袭者”，《超越：从内战到越南的荣誉勋章历史》（马萨诸塞州波士顿：波士顿出版社，1985 年），第 18-21 页。
21. “The Great Locomotive Chase: Andrews Raiders,” Above and Beyond: A History of the Medal of Honor from the Civil War to Vietnam (Boston, MA: Boston Publishing, 1985), 18-21.
22. John E. Murray，“后勤，有限战争”，载《国际军事与国防百科全书》第 3 卷 GL，Trevor N. Dupuy 等编（华盛顿特区：Brassey's，1993 年），1517-1529 页。
22. John E. Murray, “Logistics, Limited War,” in International Military and Defense Encyclopedia, vol. 3 G-L, eds. Trevor N. Dupuy, et al. (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1993), 1517-1529.
23.对国防至关重要的民用铁路（弗吉尼亚州纽波特纽斯：军事交通管理司令部，运输工程局，1993 年 12 月）。
23. Civil Rail Lines Important to National Defense (Newport News, VA: Military Traffic Management Command, Transportation Engineering Agency, December 1993).
24. FM 30-10：地形分析（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1972 年 3 月 27 日），97-98 页。已被 FM 5-33：地形分析（1990 年 7 月 30 日）取代，但包含更好的检查清单。
24. FM 30-10: Terrain Analysis (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, March 27,1972), 97-98. Superseded by FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis, July 30, 1990, but contains a better checklist.
25. Richard C. Overton，“铁路”，微软 Encarta 96。
25. Richard C. Overton, “Railroads,” Microsoft Encarta 96.
26.同上；FM 5-33：地形分析，2-7 至 2-9。
26. Ibid.; FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis, 2-7 through 2-9.
27.《美国战略轰炸调查》，戴维·麦克萨克作序（纽约：加兰出版社，1976 年），第 6 卷，特别是第 1-3、50-61、74-79 页。
27. U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, with an intro. by David Maclssac (New York: Garland Publishing, 1976), vol. 6, especially 1-3, 50-61, 74-79.
28. John E. Murray，“铁路工人参观苏联”，《国防运输杂志》（1987 年 8 月）：20-27；非常规智慧——苏联对海上交通线的需求，海军部长备忘录（华盛顿特区：海军部长办公室，1985 年 12 月 19 日）。
28. John E. Murray, “Railroaders Tour Soviet Union,” Defense Transportation Journal (August 1987): 20-27; Unconventional Wisdom —The Soviet Need for Sea Lines of Communication, Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of the Navy, December 19, 1985).
29. Michael Dobbs，“西伯利亚人对斯大林的铁路说‘不’”，《华盛顿邮报》 ，1989年10月2日，A1、A22版。
29. Michael Dobbs, “Siberians Say ’No’ to Stalin’s Railroad,” Washington Post, October 2, 1989, A1, A22
30.吉姆·拉克伊，“空运的阿喀琉斯之踵”，《国际武装部队杂志》（1996 年 7 月）：42。
30. Jim Lackey, “Airlift’s Achilles’ Heel,” Armed Forces Journal International (July 1996): 42.
31. FM 5-430-00-2，空军联合手册 32-8013，《战区道路、机场和直升机场的规划与设计》，第 2 卷，机场和直升机场设计（华盛顿特区：陆军部和空军部，1994 年 9 月），第 10-9、11-10 和 11-11、11-14 页；FM 5-36：《路线侦察和分类》，第 4-7、4-8、4-9 和 4-10 页。
31. FM 5-430-00-2, Air Force Joint Pamphlet 32-8013, Planning and Design of Roads, Airfields, and Heliports in the Theater of Operations, vol. 2, Airfield and Heliport Design (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army and Dept. of the Air Force, September 1994), 10-9, 11-10 and 11-11, 11-14; FM 5-36: Route Reconnaissance and Classification, 4-7, 4-8, 4-9 and 4-10.
32. FM 5-430-00-2：机场和直升机场设计，11-14；FM 5-33：地形分析，2-30。
32. FM 5-430-00-2: Airfield and Heliport Design, 11-14; FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis, 2-30.
33. FM 5-30：航线侦察和分类，4-9；FM 5-430-00-2：机场和直升机场设计，11-7、11-14；FM 5-33：地形分析，7-5。
33. FM 5-30: Route Reconnaissance and Classification, 4-9; FM 5-430-00-2: Airfield and Heliport Design, 11-7, 11-14; FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis, 7-5.
34. FM 5-430-00-2：机场和直升机场设计，10-7 和 10-8。
34. FM 5-430-00-2: Airfield and Heliport Design, 10-7 and 10-8.
35. Peter Bogart，“苏联运输空军：飞机和能力”，《国际防务评论》（1979 年 6 月）：945-948；William Schneider, Jr.，“苏联军事空运：快速力量投送的关键”，《空军杂志》，1980 年 3 月，81-83。
35. Peter Bogart, “The Soviet Transport Air Force: Aircraft and Capabilities,” International Defense Review (June 1979): 945-948; William Schneider, Jr., “Soviet Military Airlift: Key to Rapid Power Projection,” Air Force Magazine, March 1980, 81-83.
36. FM 5-430-00-2：机场和直升机场设计，10-10 和 10-11。
36. FM 5-430-00-2: Airfield and Heliport Design, 10-10 and 10-11.
37. Virginia Cowles，《幽灵少校》（纽约：哈珀兄弟出版社，1958 年），尤其是第 196-208 页；Callum McDonald，《失落的战役：克里特岛 1941》（纽约：自由出版社，1993 年），第 301 页。
37. Virginia Cowles, The Phantom Major (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), especially 196-208; Callum McDonald, The Lost Battle: Crete 1941 (New York: Free Press, 1993), 301.
38.英国鹰报，1962 年 4 月 27 日，第 1 页；伯里自由报，1962 年 4月21 日，第 1 页；罗伯特·C·金斯顿于 1996 年 12 月 7 日补充。
38. UK Eagle, April 27, 1962, 1; Bury Free Press, April 21, 1962, 1; amplified by Robert C. Kingston on December 7, 1996.
39. FM 5-33：地形分析，2-19 至 2-26。
39. FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis, 2-19 through 2-26.
40. John D. Chase，“美国商船队——为了商业和国防”，美国海军学会会刊（1976 年 5 月）：133-134；Richard T. Ackley，“苏联商船队”，美国海军学会会刊（1976 年 2 月）：27-37。
40. John D. Chase, “U.S. Merchant Marine—for Commerce and Defense,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (May 1976): 133-134; Richard T. Ackley, “The Soviet Merchant Marine,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1976): 27-37.
41. Gordon A. Harrison，《跨海峡进攻》，载于《美国陆军在第二次世界大战中的欧洲战区》（华盛顿特区：陆军部军事史办公室，1951 年），第 73-74 页、第 423-426 页、第 441-442 页；John M. Collins，《诺曼底战役的军事地理》（硕士论文，马萨诸塞州伍斯特市克拉克大学，1951 年），第 120-130 页。
41. Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951), 73-74, 423-426, 441-442; John M. Collins, Military Geography of the Normandy Campaign (Master’s thesis, Clark University, Worcester, MA, 1951),120-130.
42.登陆舰码头/堤道和移动海上基地，宣传材料（德克萨斯州休斯顿：布朗和鲁特及其关联公司，1996 年）；戴尔·艾斯曼，“天哪！五角大楼正在考虑建造一座浮动机场”，《弗吉尼亚飞行员报》，1996 年 10 月 29 日，第 1 页。
42. Landing Ship Quay/Causeway and Mobile Offshore Bases, promotional materials (Houston, TX: Brown and Root and associated companies, 1996); Dale Eisman, “By Golly! Pentagon Considering a Floating Airport,” Virginian Pilot, October 29, 1996, 1.
43.汉斯·马克，《太空战争》，载《美国太空计划》 （华盛顿特区：国防大学出版社，1986 年），第 23 页；《军事太空行动：航天飞机和计算机系统未能达到性能目标》（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1988 年 8 月），第 2-5 页、第 27-29 页。
43. Hans Mark, “Warfare in Space,” in America Plans for Space (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986), 23; Military Space Operations: Shuttle and Computer Systems do not Meet Performance Objectives (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 1988), 2-5, 27-29.
44.有关基本背景，请参阅 Curtis D. Cochran、Dennis M. Gorman 和 Joseph D. Dumoulin 编辑的《太空手册》（阿拉巴马州麦克斯韦空军基地：空军大学出版社，1985 年 1 月）。
44. For basic background, see Curtis D. Cochran, Dennis M. Gorman, and Joseph D. Dumoulin, eds., Space Handbook (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, January 1985).
45.陆军元帅斯利姆子爵，《从失败到胜利》（纽约：大卫·麦凯，1961 年），第 332-333 页。
45. Field-Marshal Viscount Slim, Defeat into Victory (New York: David McKay, 1961), 332-333.
46.爱德华·S·梅爵士，《地理与战争的关系》（伦敦：休·里斯出版社，1907 年），第 53 页；约翰·M·柯林斯，《美苏军事平衡，1960-1980 年》（华盛顿特区：麦格劳-希尔出版社，1980 年），第 244 页。
46. Sir Edward S. May, Geography in Relation to War (London: Hugh Rees, 1907), 53; John M. Collins, U.S-Soviet Military Balance, 1960-1980 (Washington, DC: McGraw-Hill, 1980), 244.
47. Alan B. Mountjoy，“苏伊士的静水”，《地理杂志》，1971 年 6 月，第 649-54 页；“苏伊士运河——苏联在中东战略的关键”，《美国新闻与世界报道》，1970 年 6 月 22 日，第 22-24 页。
47. Alan B. Mountjoy, “Still Waters of Suez,” Geographical Magazine, June 1971, 649-54; “Suez Canal—Key to Soviet Strategy in the Mideast,” U.S. News and World Report, June 22, 1970, 22-24.
48. Mary Clay Berry，《阿拉斯加输油管道：石油政治与原住民土地索赔》（印第安纳州布卢明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，1975 年）。
48. Mary Clay Berry, The Alaska Pipeline: The Politics of Oil and Native Land Claims (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1975).
49. Helen Chapin Metz 编，《伊拉克：国别研究》，第4版（华盛顿特区：国会图书馆联邦研究部，1990 年），第 136 页；“萨达姆关闭伊拉克石油出口管道”，《华盛顿邮报》，1996 年 12 月 11 日，A18 版。
49. Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Iraq: A Country Study, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1990), 136; “Saddam Turns on Iraq’s Oil-Export Pipeline,” Washington Post, December 11,1996), A18.
50.柯林斯，《诺曼底战役的军事地理》，130-132页。
50. Collins, The Military Geography of the Normandy Campaign, 130-132.
12. 军事基地
12. MILITARY BASES
他人的想法
The thoughts of others
是恋人相遇的轻盈而短暂
，或是幸运和名望的短暂。
were light and fleeting
of lovers’ meeting
or luck and fame
我的也遇到了麻烦。
Mine were of trouble
我的螺丝很紧，所以当麻烦来临时
，我做好了准备。
and mine were steady
so I was ready
when trouble came.
阿尔弗雷德·爱德华·豪斯曼《
更多诗集》，1936年
Alfred Edward Housman
More Poems, 1936
战备和可持续性是军事准备中同等重要的组成部分，因为缺乏持久作战能力的快速部署部队和迟到的持久部队都无法以合理的成本持续完成既定任务。因此，所有武装部队都需要本土基地，以便在等待行动指令期间磨练关键技能。承担区域或全球责任的部队还能从海外基地和设施中获益，这些基地和设施可以增强威慑力，缩短远距离突发事件发生时的反应时间，并简化后勤保障流程。
READINESS AND SUSTAINABILITY ARE EQUALLY IMPORTANT COMPONENTS OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS, because neither rapidly deployable forces that lack staying power nor durable forces that arrive late can consistently accomplish assigned missions at conscionable costs. All armed forces consequently require home bases where they can hone essential skills while they await calls to action. Those with regional or global responsibilities additionally benefit from bases and facilities abroad, which buttress deterrence, shorten reaction times when far distant contingencies arise, and simplify sustainability.
美国本土基地
U.S. HOME BASES
每个国家的武装部队都需要总部基地，以便进行发展、组织、装备、训练、管理、后勤保障以及其他准备工作，从而完成既定任务，美国庞大的军事设施便充分证明了这一点。所有美国军事哨所、营地、基地、堡垒、兵工厂、空军基地、海军基地和航天中心都包括生活区、食堂以及与主要功能相关的设施。1其中大多数还设有军需品商店、驻地/基地商店、娱乐场所、医院、诊所、家庭住房、小学和中学，以及以儿童保育中心为代表的社区服务。
The armed forces of every nation need home bases where they can develop, organize, equip, train, administer, manage, logistically support, and otherwise prepare to accomplish assigned missions, as extensive installations in the United States amply illustrate. All U.S. military posts, camps, stations, forts, arsenals, air bases, naval bases, and space centers include living quarters, mess halls, and facilities associated with primary functions.1 Most of them additionally contain commissaries, post/base exchanges, recreational outlets, hospitals, clinics, family housing, elementary and secondary schools, together with community services typified by child care centers.
有些军事基地规模较小，而有些则堪比繁荣的城市——1997年，美国陆军10个基地的驻军人数超过1万人（其中规模最大的是位于德克萨斯州的胡德堡，驻军人数达13万人）。许多基地都预留了大片土地用于基础训练、高级训练、联合兵种训练和联合作战训练。位于加利福尼亚州欧文堡附近的国家训练中心的作战区域占地63.6万英亩，但这与内华达州拉斯维加斯东北部的内利斯空军基地的“射击场”相比，似乎微不足道。内利斯空军基地的作战区域面积达4700平方英里（12175平方公里），仅略小于内华达州的面积。康涅狄格州，飞机可以在这里测试新型武器系统并提高飞行技能，这些飞机配备了炸弹和空对地导弹。2
Some installations are small, while others are comparable in size to thriving cities— populations at 10 different Army bases exceeded 10,000 in 1997 (Fort Hood, Texas, with 130,000, was the largest of the lot). Many reserve huge tracts of land for basic, advanced, combined arms, and joint training. Maneuver room at the National Training Center near Fort Irwin, California, sprawls over 636,000 acres, but that seems insignificant compared with the “shooting gallery” at Nellis Air Force Base northeast of Las Vegas, Nevada, which covers 4,700 square miles (12,175 square kilometers), an area only slightly smaller than the State of Connecticut, within which aircraft armed with bombs and air-to-surface missiles can test new weapon systems and sharpen their skills.2
一些军事设施服务于特定用途。例如，人力密集型的美国陆军重视渐进式军事教育，这种教育起源于纽约州西点军校、佐治亚州本宁堡军官候选学校以及众多民用院校的预备役军官训练团（ROTC）课程。部分军官只有在完成以下院校之一的基础和高级课程后，才能进入指挥与参谋学院（堪萨斯州莱文沃思堡）和陆军战争学院（宾夕法尼亚州卡莱尔兵营）深造：
Some installations serve specialized purposes. The manpower intensive U.S. Army, for example, emphasizes progressive military education, which originates at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, New York, in the Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and with Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) courses at many civilian colleges. Selected commissioned officers matriculate at the Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas) and the Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania) only after they complete basic and advanced courses at one of the following schools:
技术密集型的美国空军非常重视实验设施，其典型代表包括：位于俄亥俄州赖特-帕特森空军基地的航空系统中心和空军技术学院；位于佛罗里达州埃格林空军基地的空军发展测试中心；位于新墨西哥州阿尔伯克基郊外柯特兰空军基地的菲利普斯实验室和空军作战测试与评估中心；以及位于加利福尼亚州爱德华兹空军基地的世界著名空军飞行测试中心。
The technology intensive Air Force places great store in experimental facilities typified by the Aeronautical Systems Center and Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; the Air Force Development Test Center at Eglin AFB, Florida; Phillips Laboratory and the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center at Kirtland AFB on the outskirts of Albuquerque, New Mexico; and the world famous Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards AFB, California.
与陆军和空军不同，美国海军和海军陆战队的大多数主要基地都靠近东西海岸，分别支援美国大西洋舰队和美国太平洋舰队，如下表所示。
Most major U.S. Navy and Marine Corps bases, unlike those of the Army and Air Force, are close to the east and west coasts, where they respectively support the U.S. Atlantic and U.S. Pacific Fleets, as shown in the table on the next page.
美国冷战时期海外基地
U.S. COLD WAR BASES ABROAD
冷战期间，没有任何国家，即使是鼎盛时期的英国，像美国那样在境外部署如此多的军事设施。与大多数海外基地相比，这些基地非同寻常，它们位于盟国和其他友好国家的领土上，美国政府与这些国家签订了双方都能接受的《驻军地位协定》，该协定从法律上规定了美国的权利、特权和限制。所有这些基地和设施都利用了有利于美国安全利益的地理位置，巩固了美国的全球参与，扩大了美国的军事影响力，并加强了美国的联盟体系。它们还使美国武装部队能够有效地遏制苏联的侵略，并在必要时做出最有效的应对。
No nation, not even the British Empire at its zenith, deployed armed forces at as many military installations beyond its borders as the United States of America did during the Cold War. They were unusual compared with most bases abroad, being sited on the sovereign territory of allies and other friends with whom the U.S. Government negotiated mutually acceptable Status of Forces Agreements that legally prescribed U.S. rights, privileges, and limitations. All such bases and facilities exploited geographical positions that promoted U.S. security interests, affirmed U.S. global involvement, extended U.S. military reach, and strengthened U.S. alliance systems. They also positioned U.S. Armed Forces to deter Soviet aggression and respond most effectively if required.
1947年，斯大林在中欧拉下铁幕，共产主义势力似乎在世界各地扩张，此后，美国的军事集结开始加速。作为回应，美国战略家在1960年前与42个国家缔结了8项共同防御条约，此外还与另外30多个国家签署了行政协议和其他正式承诺（见表23）。此后，美国在海外的大多数军事部署都旨在阻止苏联、其东欧卫星国、共产主义中国、代理国以及古巴等“同路人”的进一步扩张。
The buildup began in 1947, after Stalin rang down an Iron Curtain in Central Europe and communism everywhere seemed to be on the march. U.S. strategists, in response, concluded eight mutual defense pacts with 42 countries by 1960, plus executive agreements and other formal pledges with 30-some others (table 23). Most U.S. military deployments on foreign soil thereafter sought to prevent further expansion by the Soviet Union, its East European satellites, Communist China, surrogate states, and “fellow travelers” such as Cuba.
最终，近1700个大小不一的美国军事设施环绕北半球，这些设施的选址经过精心挑选，旨在监视苏联境内的军事活动，确保在苏联武装力量发动攻击时能够及时发出预警，并封锁苏联最有可能的陆路、海路和空路。因此，这些设施最密集的区域横跨加拿大北极地区，在北约欧洲地区达到顶峰，并出现在东亚边缘地带。
Nearly 1,700 U.S. installations, large and small, eventually circled the Northern Hemisphere in locations selected especially to monitor military activities inside the Soviet Union, ensure early warning if Soviet Armed Forces attacked, and block the most likely land, sea, and air avenues of Soviet advance. The greatest concentrations consequently crossed the Canadian arctic, crested in NATO Europe, and appeared along East Asia’s rim.
北极前哨站
ARCTIC OUTPOSTS
美国和加拿大部署了一系列预警站，用于预警从欧亚大陆经北极路径射向北美的空中和洲际弹道导弹（ICBM）袭击。三个相互重叠的弹道导弹早期预警系统（BMEWS）扇形区域从阿拉斯加克利尔、格陵兰岛图勒和英国菲林代尔斯荒原的雷达站向北延伸3000英里（4825公里）（见图31）。它们的任务是探测、识别、跟踪、计算弹道轨迹并预测大致落点，供美国战略空军司令部（SAC）的民防官员和反击部队使用。3
The United States and Canada installed a string of warning sites to alert defenders of air and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attacks launched from the Eurasian land mass over North Polar paths toward North America. Three overlapping ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) fans extended 3,000 miles (4,825 kilometers) northward from radar sites in Clear, Alaska, Thule, Greenland, and Fylingdales Moor, England (map 31). Their mission was to detect, identify, track, compute trajectories, and predict general impact areas for use by civil defense officials and retaliatory forces assigned to U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC).3
20世纪60年代初，从阿留申群岛到大西洋，沿北纬70度线绵延4000英里（6435公里）的81个远程预警站（DEW）负责监视敌方轰炸机（见图32）。加拿大中部防线和松树线防线，以及大量用于填补空隙的雷达，为更南边的地区提供后备力量。但随着更先进技术的出现，这套防空系统迅速缩减。战略空军司令部（SAC）在鹅湾、拉布拉多和图勒部署了“短程”B-47轰炸机，直到远程B-52轰炸机出现才取代了这一需求。之后，北美防空司令部（NORAD）的拦截机和可携带核弹头的“耐克-大力神”地对空导弹系统占据了图勒基地。格陵兰岛西海岸的桑德雷斯特罗姆和冰岛的凯夫拉维克曾是空中交通管制中心，也是飞行员驾驶战斗机飞越北大西洋的“中转站”。驻扎在凯夫拉维克海军航空站的巡逻机，在水下声呐监视（SOSUS）系统的辅助下，对邻近海域进行扫荡，搜寻敌方水面舰艇和潜艇。4
Eighty-one Distant Early Warning (DEW) Stations, draped 4,000 miles (6,435 kilometers) along the 70th Parallel from the Aleutian Islands to the Atlantic Ocean, watched for enemy bombers in the early 1960s (map 32). Mid-Canada and Pine Tree Lines, augmented by a generous group of gap-filler radars, provided back-ups farther south, but that complex shrank considerably as soon as better technologies became available. SAC deployed “short-legged” B-47 bombers at Goose Bay, Labrador, and Thule until long-range B-52s obviated that requirement, whereupon interceptor aircraft and nuclear-capable Nike Hercules surface-to-air missiles assigned to North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) occupied the latter base. Sondrestrom on Greenland’s west coast and Keflavik, Iceland, served as air traffic control centers and “stepping stones” for pilots who ferried fighter planes across the North Atlantic. Patrol aircraft based at Keflavik Naval Air Station, aided by Underwater Sound Surveillance (SOSUS) systems, swept adjacent seas looking for enemy surface ships and submarines.4
Table 23. U.S. Cold War Collective Security Pacts
多边条约
美洲国家间互助条约（里约条约），1947年
MULTILATERAL TREATIES
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact), 1947
北大西洋公约组织（北约），1949年
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949
1951年澳大利亚、新西兰和美国之间的安全条约（澳新美安全条约）
Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS), 1951
东南亚条约组织（SEATO），成立于1954年，于1977年解散。
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 1954, dissolved 1977
双边条约
BILATERAL TREATIES
Map 31. Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS)
北约北翼
NATO’S NORTH FLANK
挪威北角地理位置优越，便于监视苏联在科拉半岛无冰海岸的活动。科拉半岛是苏联北方舰队潜艇和水面舰艇的母港。然而，由于挪威政府的禁止，美国以及其他非北欧北约国家都没有在挪威北角或挪威其他任何地方建立永久基地。挪威方面预先储备的物资，是美军在挪威岸上唯一的资产，这些物资是挪威方面为美国海军陆战队两栖部队在紧急情况下使用的。5
Norway’s North Cape was ideally situated to observe Soviet activities along the ice-free Kola coast, which provided home ports for submarines and surface combatants of the Soviet Northern Fleet, but neither U.S. nor any other non-nordic NATO forces established permanent bases there or anywhere else in Norway, because the Norwegian Government forbade them to do so. Prepositioned stocks secured by Norwegians for use by a U.S. Marine Amphibious Force in emergency were the only U.S. assets ashore.5
北约中心区
NATO’S CENTER SECTOR
冷战期间，北约的中心区域从东西德边界一直延伸到不列颠群岛。在长达40年的冷战时期，美国及其盟国的目标是遏制侵略，如果威慑失败，则以尽可能少的伤亡、损失和领土损失来保卫北约领土。6
NATO’s central region throughout the Cold War reached from the border between East and West Germany to the British Isles. U.S. and Allied aims during that protracted period, which lasted 40 years, were to deter aggression and, if deterrence failed, to defend NATO’s territory with the fewest possible casualties, the least damage, and the least loss of territory.6
低地国家和不列颠群岛。比利时、荷兰和英国（以及意大利和西德）在 20 世纪 80 年代末曾短暂地接收过美国陆基巡航导弹（GLCM），直到 1988 年 5 月根据美苏双边《中导条约》全部销毁。除荷兰的七个美军基地外，其他美军设施规模从未超过苏斯特贝格的一个战术战斗机联队、三个陆军通信站、一个为盟军中欧司令部（AFCENT）提供支持的后勤中心，以及两个美国陆军师的预置物资。1967年，法国官员将盟军最高司令及其参谋人员驱逐出巴黎郊外的鲁康库尔后，驻比利时的大多数美军人员都与欧洲盟军最高司令部（SHAPE）有某种关联。但正如地图33所示，美国在英国的军事设施种类繁多且数量众多。六个基地曾驻扎过战术战斗机联队、战区空运飞机和空中加油机。苏格兰的霍利洛赫是美国核动力弹道导弹潜艇中队及其附属舰艇的前沿作战基地。美国空军和海军的通信站、无线电中继站和后勤中心遍布苏格兰乡村。8
The Low Countries and the British Isles. Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (along with Italy and West Germany) briefly accepted U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in the late 1980s until all were scrapped in accord with the bilateral U.S. Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty of May 1988.7 U.S. military installations in the Netherlands otherwise never exceeded a tactical fighter wing at Soesterberg, three Army communication sites, a logistical center that supported Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), and prepositioned stocks for two U.S. Army divisions. Most U.S. personnel in Belgium were associated in some way with the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) after French officials in 1967 banished the Supreme Allied Commander and his staff from Roucancourt, just outside Paris, but U.S. installations in Great Britain were diversified as well as numerous, as map 33 indicates. Six bases once housed tactical fighter wings, theater airlift aircraft, and tankers for in-flight refueling. Holy Loch, Scotland, was the forward operating base for a U.S. nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine squadron, together with a tender. U.S. Air Force and Navy communication stations, radio relays, and logistical centers speckled the countryside.8
Map 32. U.S. Cold War Arctic Outposts (1960s)
Map 33. U.S. Cold War Bases in Great Britain (1979)
法国。1966年 3 月 7 日，法国政府宣布其意图是“恢复对法国领土的完全主权——换句话说，不再接受外国部队、设施或基地在法国境内以任何方式受法国当局以外的当局控制”，并告知北约要么遵守，要么最迟于 1967 年 4 月 1 日撤离。9 位北约领导人选择了驱逐行动，于是代号为 FRELOC（快速搬迁）的撤离行动，导致许多在过去 18 年中花费巨资积累的军事设施被连根拔起或废弃。
France. The French Government on March 7, 1966, declared its intent to regain “full sovereignty [over] French Territory—in other words, no longer to accept the presence of foreign units, installations, or bases in France falling in any respect under the control of authorities other than French authorities” and told NATO to comply or leave not later than April 1, 1967.9 NATO’s leaders elected eviction, whereupon the exodus code-named FRELOC (Fast Relocation) uprooted or resulted in the abandonment of many military installations accumulated at great expense over the previous 18 years.
当欧洲盟军最高司令部（SHAPE）和美国欧洲司令部（EUCOM）都位于巴黎郊区，相距仅15分钟车程，且与位于枫丹白露的美国中央司令部（AFCENT）以及位于奥尔良的美国陆军通信区（COMMZ）司令部联系便捷时，指挥控制安排相对简单。然而，在SHAPE迁至比利时卡斯托，EUCOM落户斯图加特（距离巴黎265英里/425公里，见地图34-35）之后，情况就截然不同了。美国和北约各级指挥机构耗费数月时间和数百万美元，才得以将大量计算机、数据处理器和信息检索设备从太空通信卫星、对流层散射站、微波网络、无线电中继站以及无数英里的电缆连接起来。FRELOC建成后，集中的终端减少了路由选择，从而增加了那些在战时高度依赖冗余的通信系统的脆弱性。由于法国政府奉行“不自动”政策，因此无法再保证能够访问法国的防空通信以及欧洲盟军司令部从挪威延伸到土耳其的安全语音网络 ACE HIGH 的法国部分。10
Command and control arrangements were comparatively simple when SHAPE and Headquarters, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) were based in Parisian suburbs 15 minutes apart and lay within easy reach of AFCENT at Fontainbleau as well as Headquarters, U.S. Army Communications Zone (COMMZ), in Orléans. Not so after SHAPE displaced to Casteau, Belgium, and EUCOM took up residence in Stuttgart, 265 airline miles/425 kilometers away (maps 34-35). It took months and cost millions for U.S. and NATO command posts at every level to transplant a vast array of computers, data processors, and information retrieval gear connected by space communication satellites, tropospheric scatter stations, microwave networks, radio relays, and countless miles of cable. FRELOC, when complete, concentrated terminals, reduced routing alternatives, and thereby increased vulnerabilities among communication systems that depended heavily on redundancy to survive in wartime. Access to air defense communications in France and to French segments of ACE HIGH, Allied Command Europe’s secure voice network that stretched from Norway to Turkey, was no longer guaranteed, because the French Government professed “no automaticity” policies.10
1959年戴高乐将军决定禁止美国在法国领土上使用核武器后不久，美国驻欧洲空军（USAFE）便将几个中队从法国调往英国和西德。即便如此，USAFE仍然不得不放弃五个完全运作的基地以及四个待命基地。埃夫勒和沙托鲁空运港的关闭打乱了将装甲和机械化师人员从美国空运至法国的应急计划。这些人员原本可以在法国接收预先部署在相对安全地点的武器、装备和补给。
U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) shifted several squadrons from France to Great Britain and West Germany shortly after General de Gaulle’s 1959 decision to ban U.S. nuclear weapons on French soil, but USAFE even so had to vacate five fully operational bases, plus four on standby. The loss of aerial ports at Evreux and Chateauroux disrupted contingency plans to airlift armored and mechanized division personnel from the United States to France, where they could receive weapons, equipment, and supplies prepositioned at relatively secure locations.
与法国的港口相比，比利时、荷兰和德国的港口更容易被攻陷，它们取代了之前从勒阿弗尔出发的后勤运输线。瑟堡、拉罗谢尔、波尔多和马赛。北约的中欧输油管道系统以及连接东日与默伦、沙隆和梅斯的美国石油管道在和平时期继续运营，但“不自动启用”政策使得战时可用性存疑。如果法国领导人日后认为有必要，重新启用这些设施所需的时间在和平时期为2至6周，如果发生武装冲突，则时间会更长。11
Belgian, Dutch, and German ports, more easily overrun than counterparts in France, replaced logistical lines of communication that previously emanated from Le Havre, Cherbourg, La Rochelle, Bordeaux, and Marseille. NATO’s Central European Pipeline System and the U.S. petroleum pipeline that connected Donges with Melun, Châlons-sur-Marne, and Metz continued peacetime operations, but “no automaticity” policies made wartime availability questionable. The time required to reoccupy installations if French leaders later saw fit varied from 2 to 6 weeks under benign conditions, much longer if armed conflict interfered.11
德意志联邦共和国
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
美军完成“自由行动”（FRELOC）后，西德的拥堵状况十分严重。美国陆军欧洲司令部（USAREUR）、两个军、五个师、三个旅、一个防空司令部、三个支援司令部以及欧洲医疗司令部肩并肩地驻扎在德国腰部仅240公里（150英里）宽的地带。美国陆军欧洲司令部从莱茵河以西六个拥挤不堪的机场（东岸广阔的莱茵-美因河为军事空运司令部服务）起飞战斗机、战术侦察机和指挥控制（C3 ）飞机执行任务。主要补给线从不来梅港向南延伸，与华沙条约组织的进军路线呈危险的垂直走向，为未来战区的司令部仓库提供物资。12
Congestion was severe in West Germany after U.S. Armed Forces completed FRELOC. U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), two U.S. corps, five U.S. divisions, three separate brigades, an air defense command, three support commands, and Medical Command Europe stood shoulder-to-shoulder where Germany’s waist was barely 150 miles (240 kilometers) wide. USAFE flew fighter, tactical reconnaissance, and C3 missions from six saturated airfields clustered west of the Rhine (immense Rhein-Main on the east bank served Military Airlift Command). Main supply routes, perilously perpendicular to Warsaw Pact avenues of approach, ran south from Bremerhaven to feed COMZ depots in prospective combat zones.12
北约南翼
NATO’S SOUTH FLANK
冷战时期，北约南翼是一片水域，从大西洋一直延伸到小亚细亚最东端，土耳其与苏联接壤。共同威胁并不常见，共同战线难以建立，威慑态势主要依赖海空力量，成员国彼此之间以及与中心区域都处于孤立状态，而分散的美国基地占据了三个次级战区。伊比利亚半岛上的设施扼守着直布罗陀海峡，希腊和土耳其的设施扼守着达达尼尔海峡和爱琴海，位于地中海中部的设施则能够影响两侧的行动（图36-38）。13
NATO’s south flank during the Cold War was a watery domain that stretched from the Atlantic Ocean to easternmost Asia Minor, where Turkey touched the Soviet Union. Common threats were uncommon, common fronts were infeasible, deterrent postures depended primarily on sea and air power, member nations were isolated from the center sector as well as from each other, and widely-separated U.S. bases occupied three sub-theaters. Installations on the Iberian Peninsula guarded approaches to Gibraltar, those in Greece and Turkey guarded the Dardenelles and Aegean Sea, those at midpoint in the Mediterranean were positioned to influence actions in either direction (maps 36-38).13
美国在地中海的海军基地。罗塔海军基地位于西班牙加的斯附近，驻扎着弹道导弹潜艇，据报道其中三艘潜艇响应欧洲盟军最高司令部（SACEUR）的指令，其余潜艇则响应美国参谋长联席会议的指令。罗塔基地还为美国第六舰队开展空中反潜作战提供了绝佳的地点，该舰队与驻扎在亚速尔群岛（葡萄牙属地）和西西里岛的舰队共同承担这项任务。巡逻机则与以那不勒斯和撒丁岛大陆架上的小岛拉马达莱纳为母港的猎杀型潜艇密切合作。克里特岛西北海岸的苏达湾综合设施包括一个宏伟的机场、足以容纳第六舰队大部分舰艇的锚地，以及附近纳姆菲的一个导弹靶场。该靶场与西班牙萨拉戈萨附近的巴尔德纳斯雷亚莱斯靶场一样，为美国驻欧空军和海军飞行员提供了空对空和空对地武器训练的开阔场地。
U.S. Naval Bases in the Mediterranean. Rota Naval Base, a neighbor of Cadiz, Spain, ministered to ballistic missile submarines, three of which reportedly responded to SACEUR, the rest to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Rota additionally provided an admirable location from which to conduct aerial ASW operations for U.S. Sixth Fleet, an occupation it shared with counterparts in the Azores (a Portuguese possession) and Sicily. Patrol aircraft, in turn, worked hand-in-glove with hunter-killer submarines home-ported in Naples and La Maddalena, a small island on Sardinia’s shelf. The Souda Bay complex on Crete’s northwestern coast included a splendid airfield, enough anchorage to accommodate most of Sixth Fleet, and a missile range at nearby Namfi which, like the Bardenas Reales Firing Range near Zaragosa, Spain, furnished USAFE as well as naval aviators with open spaces for air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons training.
美国在地中海的空军基地。美国驻欧空军（USAFE）在阿尔卑斯山以南的作战基地数量少于美国海军——其中最引人注目的是西班牙的托雷洪、意大利的阿维亚诺和土耳其的因切利克——但军事空运司令部（后来的美国运输司令部）执行了无数次往返于地中海两岸机场的飞行任务。即使在空中加油技术成熟之后，亚速尔群岛的拉杰斯空军基地仍然是美国、南欧和中东之间重要的中转站（500至600架次）。20 世纪 70 年代，每月跨大西洋航班数量大致处于平均水平。位于雅典郊外的希腊空军基地负责战区内空运，因此更为繁忙；而位于西班牙的莫龙空军基地则随时待命，准备在需要时接收、集结和支援增援部队。
U.S. Air Bases in the Mediterranean. USAFE south of the Alps maintained fewer combat bases than the U.S. Navy—Torrejon, Spain, Aviano, Italy, and Incerlik, Turkey, were most conspicuous—but Military Airlift Command (later U.S. Transportation Command) flew countless sorties into and out of airfields from one end of the Mediterranean to the other. Lajes Air Base in the Azores was a welcome way station between the United States, southern Europe, and the Middle East even after in-flight refueling became feasible (500 to 600 transatlantic flights per month were about average in the 1970s). Hellenikon Air Base outside Athens, which handled intratheater airlift, was much busier, whereas Moron AB, on standby in Spain, simply remained ready to receive, stage and, support reinforcements whenever required.
美国在北约南翼的监听站。隶属于美国国家安全局（NSA）及其附属机构的电子情报专家在意大利布林迪西附近的圣维托空军基地、伊拉克利翁以及或许最为重要的土耳其监听站开展了极其重要的电子监视活动。土耳其是北约唯一一个拥有俯瞰苏联“窗口”的成员国。卡拉穆尔塞尔的精密设备监控着保加利亚黑海沿岸和土耳其海峡的空中和海上交通；锡诺普和萨姆松则对苏联黑海舰队和更北部的导弹试验场进行了类似的监控；而位于土耳其内陆迪亚巴克尔的情报收集人员则将目光投向了高加索和外高加索地区。位于安卡拉郊外的贝尔巴西地震台站的灵敏仪器能够感知到除极小规模的苏联地上或地下核试验之外的所有震动。
U.S. Listening Posts Along NATO’s South Flank. Electronic intelligence specialists assigned to the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) and its affiliates conducted invaluable electronic surveillance activities at San Vito Air Base by Brindisi, Italy, at Iraklion and, perhaps most importantly, from listening posts in Turkey, the only NATO member with a “window” that overlooked the Soviet Union. Sophisticated equipment at Karamursel monitored air and naval traffic around Bulgaria’s Black Sea coast and through the Turkish Straits, Sinop and Samsun devoted similar attention to the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and missile testing sites farther north, while intelligence collectors at Diyarbakir in Turkey’s interior looked toward the Caucasus and Transcaucasus. Sensitive machines at Belbasi Station, a seismographic facility on the outskirts of Ankara, felt tremors from all but the smallest Soviet nuclear tests above or below ground.
美国在地中海的后勤设施。为整个地中海地区的美国各军种提供后勤保障，包括位于意大利、希腊和土耳其的核武器储存设施，以及分布合理的常规弹药库、燃料库和一般物资供应站。位于亚速尔群岛、摩洛哥、西班牙、西西里岛、意大利、克里特岛和希腊的通信站将北约南翼的美国高级指挥部与岸上的主要下属单位、海上第六舰队以及美国本土（通过国防通信局 (DCA) 的渠道）连接起来。
U.S. Logistical Installations in the Mediterranean. Logistical support for all U.S. Military Services throughout the Mediterranean region included nuclear weapon storage sites in Italy, Greece, and Turkey, along with well-spaced conventional ammunition dumps, fuel, and general supply depots. Communication stations in the Azores, Morocco, Spain, Sicily, Italy, Crete, and Greece connected senior U.S. headquarters across NATO’s south flank with principal subordinates ashore, with Sixth Fleet afloat and, through Defense Communications Agency (DCA) channels, with the United States.
中东、非洲和澳大利亚
MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, AND AUSTRALIA
冷战时期，美国在非洲没有设立任何军事基地，仅在摩洛哥海岸保留了两座通信站。美国在其他阿拉伯国家的设施仅限于巴林港为一支规模极小的中东部队（MIDEASTFOR）提供的停泊特权，该部队由一艘旗舰和两艘（后增至四艘）老旧驱逐舰组成。1980年，伊斯兰激进分子推翻穆罕默德·礼萨·巴列维国王后，美国在伊朗的电子监听站关闭。美国在印度洋及其周边地区的设施主要集中在塞舌尔和澳大利亚中部爱丽丝泉的卫星跟踪站，爱丽丝泉西北角还设有一座海军通信站。迪戈加西亚岛的军事设施在1990-1991年美国及其盟军将伊拉克逐出科威特的行动中发挥了重要作用，但直到1980年才开始进行改造。14
The United States maintained no Cold War military bases in Africa, save two communication stations on Morocco’s coast. U.S. installations in other Arab lands were limited to berthing privileges in Bahrain for a minuscule Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR), which consisted of a flagship and two (later four) elderly destroyers. Electronic listening posts in Iran closed down in 1980 after Islamic radicals overthrew Muhammad Reza Shah Palavi. U.S. facilities in the Indian Ocean and along its fringe were largely confined to satellite tracking stations in the Seychelles and at Alice Springs in the center of Australia, which also furnished room for a naval communications station on its Northwest Cape. Assets at Diego Garcia, which played a prominent role during U.S. and allied efforts to oust Iraq from Kuwait in 1990-91, were little developed until improvements began in 1980.14
东亚
EAST ASIA
苏伊士运河以东最有利的美国军事基地集中在菲律宾、韩国、日本和冲绳。这些基地共同使美国太平洋司令部得以在珍珠港和关岛以西维持强大的军事存在和稳定影响力。
The most beneficial U.S. bases east of Suez congregated in the Philippines, Korea, Japan, and Okinawa. Together, they permitted U.S. Pacific Command to maintain a powerful military presence and stabilizing influence west of Pearl Harbor and Guam.
菲律宾共和国。冷战时期，美国在菲律宾的军事基地为东亚边缘其他地区的美国武装部队提供了他们所不具备的灵活性，这在后勤方面经常被证明非常有用，尤其是在朝鲜战争（1950-53 年）期间，以及 1965 年至 1972 年美国在越南的军事介入日益增多的时期。此外，菲律宾的15个军事设施使美国第七舰队能够跨越连接中东石油生产国和远东消费者的关键海上交通线，并定期在印度洋部署，尽管该巨大海域内没有任何永久基地（图39）。位于马尼拉以西50英里（80公里）的苏比克湾海军基地及其附属设施是其核心。奥隆阿波港拥有可储存1.1亿加仑石油、润滑油和润滑油的空间，设有四个浮动干船坞，能够对除航空母舰以外的所有舰船进行大修。库比角海军航空站的停机坪可以将所有舰载机停放在码头边，并在其他地方留出相同数量的停泊空间；而卡马延角海军弹药库则在可停泊最大水面作战舰艇的码头旁储存了380万立方英尺（10.74万立方米）的弹药。附近的圣米格尔通信站使美国海军陆上部队与第七舰队保持持续联系，而位于同一地点的DCS设施则将菲律宾的军事设施与全球军事指挥控制系统（WWMCCS）连接起来。克拉克空军基地是一个庞大的后勤枢纽，能够容纳美国现役的任何飞机，拥有巨大的停机坪、与纽约肯尼迪国际机场大致相当的油料储存能力、34个弹药库以及一流的通信链路。美国各军种的飞行员在克拉克的克罗谷靶场进行模拟战斗演练，磨练技能。
The Philippine Republic. Cold War bases in the Philippines, which afforded flexibility not available to U.S. Armed Forces elsewhere along the rim of East Asia, routinely proved logistically useful, especially during the Korean War (1950-53) and again from 1965 to 1972, when U.S. military involvement flourished in Vietnam.15 Philippine installations moreover enabled U.S. Seventh Fleet to straddle critical sea lines of communication that connected Middle Eastern oil producers with Far Eastern consumers and deploy periodically in the Indian Ocean despite the absence of permanent base rights anywhere in that huge basin (map 39). Subic Bay Naval Base and associated facilities 50 miles (80 kilometers) west of Manila constituted the centerpiece. Port Olongapo, which boasted storage space for 110 million gallons of petroleum, oil, and lubricants, featured four floating drydocks able to overhaul all ships except aircraft carriers. Aprons at Cubi Point Naval Air Station could park a full complement of carrier aircraft next to their ship at pierside with room for an equal number elsewhere, while the Naval Magazine at Camayan Point stored 3.8 million cubic feet (107,400 cubic meters) of ammunition by a wharf that berthed the largest surface combatants. The communication station at nearby San Miguel kept U.S. naval forces ashore in constant touch with Seventh Fleet while collocated DCS facilities linked Philippine installations with the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). Clark Air Base, a huge logistical hub that could handle any aircraft in the U.S. inventory, possessed immense parking space, POL storage capacities approximately comparable to those of Kennedy International Airport in New York City, 34 ammunition igloos, and superlative communication links. Aviators of all U.S. Services sharpened their skills under simulated combat conditions at Clark’s Crow Valley gunnery range.
Map 34. U.S. Cold War Bases in France (1966)
Map 35. U.S. Cold War Bases in West Germany (1979)
Map 36. U.S. Cold War Bases in Iberia (1979)
Map 37. U.S. Cold War Bases in Italy (1979)
Map 38. U.S. Cold War Bases in Greece and Turkey (1979)
20 世纪 80 年代初，美国高级国防官员开始认真考虑，如果叛乱分子击败菲律宾政府并如承诺的那样驱逐美军，美国将采取军事行动。16 1985 年，人们对基地权利的担忧加剧，当时费迪南德·马科斯总统威胁要废除基地协议，并暗示有改善与苏联关系的计划。17 名美国武装部队成员确实在 1991-92 年撤离了菲律宾，但冷战已经结束，菲律宾军事基地的价值也随之降低。
Senior U.S. defense officials in the early 1980s seriously began to consider relocation if insurgents defeated the Philippine Government and, as promised, ousted U.S Armed Forces.16 Concerns about base rights intensified in 1985, when President Ferdinand Marcos himself threatened to abrogate base agreements and implied plans to improve relations with the Soviet Union.17 U.S. Armed Forces indeed did depart in 1991-92, but the Cold War was over and the value of Philippine bases concurrently diminished.
大韩民国。越战结束后，随着20世纪70年代初美中关系的改善，大韩民国（ROK）成为亚洲大陆上唯一拥有美军基地的国家（见地图40）。战事尘埃落定后，联合国军司令部和美国第八集团军仍驻扎在龙山，而以凯西营为中心的第二步兵师则继续驻守在非军事区沿线，扼守着连接平壤和首尔的高速公路。一个空军师司令部和一个混合联队仍然驻扎在乌山空军基地，一个战斗机联队从群山基地起飞，镇海海军基地坚守阵地，大邱则继续作为美军的主要补给站。此后，快速增援仅限于驻扎在日本和冲绳的空军和海军部队（以防朝鲜再次入侵），因为距离最近的美军陆军部队远在夏威夷。18
Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea (ROK) contained the only U.S. military bases anywhere on the Asian mainland after the Vietnam War wound down and relations with Red China improved in the early 1970s (map 40). The U.N. Command and U.S. Eighth Army remained in Yongson when the dust settled, while the 2d Infantry Division centered at Camp Casey stayed put along the demilitarized zone astride a high-speed avenue from Pyongyang into Seoul. An air division headquarters and one composite wing still occupied Osan Air Base, a fighter wing flew out of Kunsan, the naval base at Chinhae stood fast, and Taegu persisted as the principal U.S. supply depot. Rapid reinforcements since then have been limited to air and naval elements in Japan and on Okinawa if North Korea reinvaded, because the nearest U.S. Army troops elsewhere are in far away Hawaii.18
日本和冲绳。位于东京湾的横须贺-横滨综合体是美国海军在日本的明珠，曾作为第七舰队旗舰、两艘航空母舰和一个驱逐舰中队的前沿作战基地（地图 40）。19一流的劳动力队伍负责维护一流的设施，其中包括海军弹药库、通信站、补给站、医院和船舶修理厂。珍珠港以西的其他美军基地都没有足够大的干船坞来停泊尼米兹级核动力攻击航母。九州岛的佐世保基地提供了额外的后勤、军械和干船坞设施。
Japan and Okinawa. The Yokosua-Yokohama complex in Tokyo Bay, which served as a forward operating base for the Seventh Fleet flagship, two aircraft carriers, and a destroyer squadron, was the U.S. Navy’s jewel in Japan (map 40).19 A first-rate labor force manned first-class installations that included a naval ammunition magazine, a communications station, a supply depot, a hospital, and ship repair shops. No other U.S. base west of Pearl Harbor possessed a big enough dry dock to handle nuclear-powered Nimitz class attack carriers. Sasebo on Kyushu Island furnished additional logistical, ordnance, and dry docking facilities.
驻日美军、第五航空队和一个空运联队坚守在横田空军基地，这里堪称东北亚的“莱茵-美因”。空军战斗机和海军巡逻机驻扎在本州岛最北端的三泽附近，在日本海和鄂霍次克海上空执行侦察、监视、电子情报和反潜作战任务。千岛群岛、萨哈林岛和堪察加半岛沿岸。第一海军陆战队航空联队的大部分兵力仍驻扎在濑户内海的岩国航空基地。
U.S. Forces Japan, Fifth Air Force, and an airlift wing held on at Yokota Air Base, which was the “Rhein-Main” of Northeast Asia. Air Force fighters and naval patrol aircraft near Honshu’s northernmost tip at Misawa conducted reconnaissance, surveillance, electronic intelligence, and antisubmarine warfare missions over the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, the Kuril Island chain, Sakhalin, and the coast of Kamchatka. Most of the 1st Marine Air Wing remained at Iwakuni Air Station on the Inland Sea.
美国第五航空队的四个战斗机中队被派往冲绳。在当时，与那些会不时在日本引发骚乱的部署相比，在冲绳的政治敏感性较低，但同时又能便捷地抵达西太平洋的潜在“热点地区”。冲绳还驻扎着美国海军陆战队第一师的三分之二兵力以及第一海军陆战队航空联队的其余部队。这些部队随时准备增援韩国，并组成了一支“救援队”，于1975年4月从西贡和金边撤离了美国非战斗人员和部分外国公民，并在次月打捞了“马亚圭斯”号驱逐舰并救出了舰上船员，此外还执行了各种“和平时期”任务。
Four Fifth Air Force fighter squadrons were assigned to Okinawa, where (in those days) they were politically less sensitive than deployments that periodically caused disruptive demonstrations in pacifist Japan, yet within easy reach of potential “hot spots” in the western Pacific. Okinawa also housed two-thirds of the 1st Marine Division and the rest of the 1st Marine Air Wing, which together stood ready to reinforce South Korea and constituted a “fire brigade” that evacuated U.S. noncombatants and selected foreign nationals from Saigon and Phnom Penh in April 1975, retrieved the USS Mayaguez and rescued its crew the very next month, and performed assorted “peacetime” missions.
拉美
LATIN AMERICA
冷战期间，尽管美国支持多个国家的反共反叛乱力量，但中美洲和南美洲并没有建立永久性的美国军事基地。不过，巴拿马运河区的主要军事设施包括：
No permanent U.S. military bases blossomed in Central or South America during the Cold War, despite U.S. support for anti-Communist counterinsurgents in several countries, but major installations in the Panama Canal Zone included:
• 南方司令部位于采石场高地
• Southern Command at Quarry Heights
•驻扎在阿马多尔堡、克莱顿堡、科布堡和戴维斯堡的步兵旅
• An infantry brigade at Forts Amador, Clayton, Kobbe, and Davis
• 罗德曼海军基地
• Rodman Naval Station
• 霍华德空军基地和阿尔布鲁克机场
• Howard Air Force Base and Albrook Field
• 海军陆战队营房和通信设施
• Marine barracks and communications facilities
• 谢尔曼堡丛林战训练中心。
• A jungle warfare training center at Fort Sherman.
位于古巴东南部的关塔那摩海军基地及其两个附属机场（利沃德机场和麦卡拉机场）俯瞰着通往巴拿马运河的加勒比海航道，为周边水域的例行海军演习提供后勤保障，并随时准备应对突发事件。在波多黎各——美国的一个自治领地——的罗斯福路海军基地、拉米空军基地和布坎南堡等设施也发挥着类似的作用。美国在英属百慕大和巴哈马的前哨基地则促进了情报收集、通信和研究项目。20
Guantanamo Naval Base and two associated airfields (Leeward and McCalla) in southeastern Cuba overlooked Caribbean Sea approaches to the Panama Canal, provided logistical support for recurring naval exercises in surrounding waters, and prepared to deal with contingencies if directed. Installations such as Roosevelt Roads Naval Station, Ramey Air Force Base, and Fort Buchanan did likewise in Puerto Rico, a self-governing U.S. commonwealth. U.S. outposts in British Bermuda and the Bahamas promoted intelligence collection, communications, and research programs.20
冷战后紧缩
POST-COLD WAR RETRENCHMENT
随着遏制苏联和华沙条约组织的需求下降，美国政府开始削减国内外的兵力规模和军事基础设施。21根据 1990 年《国防基地关闭和调整法案》，国防部将在国会批准的四个委员会的建议得到全面实施之前，关闭 97 个主要国内基地和许多较小的设施。22早在 1991 年，大约三分之一的美国海外基地和设施就被计划关闭、缩减活动或进入待命状态。23削减预算的过程仍在继续。
The U.S. Government began to reduce force levels and military infrastructure at home and abroad when requirements to contain the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact declined.21 The Department of Defense, in response to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, will have closed 97 major domestic bases and many smaller installations by the time congressionally approved recommendations of four commissions have been fully implemented.22 About one-third of all U.S. bases and facilities overseas were scheduled to close, curtail activities, or assume standby status as early as 1991.23 That budget-cutting process continues.
随着美国军力规模缩小和成本降低，其威慑、作战和和平时期介入能力也随之下降。到20世纪90年代末，部署在远距离突发事件附近的美国危机应对部队数量减少；对远程空运和海运的依赖程度相应增加；海军更加依赖海上补给舰；空军更加依赖加油机进行空中加油；岸上预置物资的便利地点减少，导致对海上额外储存空间的需求激增。过度劳累的部队损耗巨大。
Reduced deterrent, combat, and peacetime involvement capabilities accompanied a smaller U.S military establishment and lower costs. Fewer U.S. crisis response forces were located near far distant contingencies by the late 1990s; dependence on long-haul airlift and sealift increased commensurately; naval forces relied more extensively on underway replenishment ships; air forces leaned more heavily on tankers for in-flight refueling; and fewer convenient locations for prepositioned stocks ashore multiplied requirements for additional storage afloat. The wear and tear on overworked forces was considerable.
Map 39. U.S. Cold War Bases in the Philippines (1979)
Map 40. U.S. Cold War Bases in Japan and Korea (1979)
要点
KEY POINTS
• 每个国家的武装部队都需要一个基地，以便他们能够做好准备，最有效地履行分配的角色和任务。
• The armed forces of every nation need home bases where they can prepare to perform assigned roles and missions most effectively.
• 现代武装部队需要大片土地来测试武器系统并在真实条件下进行训练。
• Modern armed forces require huge tracts of land to test weapon systems and train under realistic conditions.
• 海外基地不仅在和平时期加强威慑并有助于巩固与盟友的关系，而且在发生远距离突发事件时可以缩短反应时间。
• Bases abroad not only buttress deterrence and help cement relations with allies in peacetime but reduce reaction times when far distant contingencies occur.
• 当东道国和租户的国家利益、目标和政策相一致时，海外基地和设施的可靠性最高。
• Bases and facilities abroad are most reliable when the national interests, objectives, and policies of host countries and tenants are compatible.
• 国内外基地关闭带来的资金节省，导致军事能力下降。
• Decreased military capabilities accompany monetary savings that accrue from base closings at home and abroad.
笔记
NOTES
1.《美国军事设施指南：220个主要基地、哨所和驻地参考》，《陆军时报》、《海军时报》和《空军时报》，1996年11月4日，附地图，第4-5、32-33和72-73页；《国防97年鉴》（华盛顿特区：国防部，1997年）；这两份文件均定期更新。威廉·R·埃文格主编，《美国全球军事基地主任》，第二版（亚利桑那州凤凰城：Oryx出版社，1995年）。
1. Guide to Military Installations in the U.S.: A Reference to the Top 220 Bases, Posts and Stations, Army Times, Navy Times, and Air Force Times, November 4, 1996, with maps on 4-5, 32-33, and 72-73; Defense 97 Almanac (Washington, DC: Dept. of Defense, 1997); both documents updated periodically. William R. Evinger, ed., Director of U.S. Military Bases Worldwide, 2d ed. (Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press, 1995).
2.国防部官员提供了《年度运营总结》（红皮书）第 3 卷《设施绩效，1995 财年》（华盛顿特区：陆军部公共工程局，1996 年）和《美国空军按州和国家划分的财产总数》（华盛顿特区：空军房地产局，1995 年 9 月 30 日）中的面积数据。
2. DOD officials furnished acreage figures from Annual Summary of Operations (The Red Book), vol. 3, Installations Performance, FY 1995 (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, Directorate of Public Works, 1996), and United States Air Force Property Totals by State and Country (Washington, DC: Air Force Real Estate Agency, September 30, 1995).
3.国会参议院，《美国外交政策目标和海外军事设施》，外交事务和国防司为外交关系委员会编写，第96届国会，第1会期，1979年4月，第16-21页。
3. Congress, Senate, United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations, prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, 96th Congress, 1st sess., April 1979, 16-21.
4.同上。
4. Ibid.
5.例如，参见 John C. Scharfen，“寒冷天气训练：绝对必要”，《海军陆战队公报》，1981 年 2 月，第 34-41 页。
5. See, for example, John C. Scharfen, “Cold Weather Training: The Absolute Necessity,” Marine Corps Gazette, February 1981, 34-41.
6. 《北约事实与数据》（比利时布鲁塞尔：北约新闻处，每年修订更新）。参见1979年版。
6. NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Information Service, revised and updated annually). See the 1979 edition.
7.国防部长弗兰克·C·卡卢奇，《1988/1989财年修订双年度预算年度报告》（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1988年2月18日），第242页。
7. Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, Annual Report to Congress on the Amended FY 1988/FY 1989 Biennial Budget (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 18, 1988), 242.
8.有关美国冷战时期在英国、荷兰和比利时的基地，请参阅国会、参议院，《美国……海外军事设施》，第 28-35 页。
8. For U.S. Cold War bases in Britain, Holland, and Belgium, see Congress, Senate, United States . . . Military Installations Overseas, 28-35.
9. 1966年3月11日法国备忘录及相关信函全文收录于肯尼斯·亨特所著《没有法国的北约：军事影响》（阿德尔菲论文32，伦敦：战略研究所，1966年12月）的附录中。另见第2-6页。
9. The French memorandum of March 11, 1966, and associated correspondence are reproduced verbatim as appendices in Kenneth Hunt, NATO Without France: The Military Implications, Adelphi Paper 32 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, December 1966). See also 2-6.
10.同上，13-17；Gordon A. Moon II，“反向入侵”，《陆军》（1967 年 2 月）：24-30 和“不确定的未来”，《陆军》 17，第 3 期（1967 年 3 月）：38-42；David S. Yost，《法国与中欧常规防御》，EAI 论文 7（加利福尼亚州马里纳德尔雷：欧美安全研究所，1984 年春季），53-76。
10. Ibid., 13-17; Gordon A. Moon II, “Invasion in Reverse,” Army (February 1967): 24-30 and “Uncertain Future,” Army 17, no. 3 (March 1967): 38-42; David S. Yost, France and Conventional Defense in Central Europe, EAI Paper 7 (Marina del Rey, CA: European American Institute for Security Research, Spring 1984), 53-76.
11. David S. Yost，《法国与中欧常规防御》，第 61-63 页、第 69-73 页、第 75-76 页。
11. David S. Yost, France and Conventional Defense in Central Europe, 61-63, 69-73, 75-76.
12.有关美国在德国的冷战基地，请参阅国会、参议院，《美国……海外军事设施》，第 36-44 页。
12. For U.S. Cold War bases in Germany, see Congress, Senate, United States . . . Military Installations Overseas, 36-44.
13.关于美国在亚速尔群岛、西班牙、意大利、希腊和土耳其的冷战基地，参见同上，第 44-70 页。另见国会、众议院、希腊和土耳其：与北约和中东相关的一些军事影响，由国会研究服务处为外交事务委员会调查特别小组委员会编写，第 94届国会，第 1会期，1975 年 2 月 28 日。
13. For U.S. Cold War bases in the Azores, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey , see ibid., 44-70. Also Congress, House, Greece and Turkey: Some Military Implications Related to NATO and the Middle East, prepared for the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Congressional Research Service, 94th Congress, 1st sess., February 28, 1975.
14.关于美国在中东和印度洋的冷战基地，参见国会参议院，《美国……海外军事设施》，第 71-121 页；国会众议院，《衡量海军力量的方法，特别参考美国和苏联在印度洋的活动》，外交事务委员会近东和南亚小组委员会，第 93届国会，第 2会期，1974 年 5 月 12 日，第 10-14 页。
14. For U.S. Cold War bases in the Middle East and Indian Ocean, see Congress, Senate, United States . . . Military Installations Overseas, 71-121; Congress, House, Means of Measuring Naval Power With Special Reference to U.S. and Soviet Activities in the Indian Ocean, Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93d Congress, 2d sess., May 12, 1974, 10-14.
15.有关美国在菲律宾的冷战基地，请参阅国会、参议院、《美国……海外军事设施》，第 134-164 页；苏比克湾和库比角设施的描述见太平洋舰队司令部舰队港口指南，由舰队情报中心 (FICPAC) 编写，第 5 卷，1977 年 9 月 26 日，E4-1 至 E4-9 页。
15. For U.S. Cold War bases in the Philippines, see Congress, Senate, United States . . . Military Installations Overseas, 134-164; Subic Bay and Cubi Point facilities are described in CINCPAC Fleet Port Directory, prepared by the Fleet Intelligence Center (FICPAC), vol. 5, September 26, 1977, E4-1 through E4-9.
16. Lawrence E. Grinter，《菲律宾基地：在不断变化的战略环境中的持续效用》（华盛顿特区：国防大学出版社，1980 年）；《美国基地在菲律宾的关键作用》（华盛顿特区：传统基金会，1984 年 1 月 10 日）。
16. Lawrence E. Grinter, The Philippine Bases: Continuing Utility in a Changing Strategic Context (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1980); The Key Role of U.S. Bases in the Philippines (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, January 10, 1984).
17. Richard J. Kessler，“马科斯与美国人”，《外交政策》 63（1986 年夏季）：40-57。
17. Richard J. Kessler, “Marcos and the Americans,” Foreign Policy 63 (Summer 1986): 40-57.
18.有关美国在韩国的冷战基地，请参阅国会、参议院、《美国……海外军事设施》，第 172、176 页。
18. For U.S. Cold War bases in Korea, see Congress, Senate, United States . . . Military Installations Overseas, 172, 176.
19.关于美国冷战时期在日本和冲绳的基地，参见同上，第165-194页；横须贺和横滨的设施在太平洋舰队司令部舰队港口指南A14-1至A14-6页中有描述。另见海军干船坞需求研究，海军海上系统司令部，1977年9月，第23-24页。
19. For U.S. Cold War bases in Japan and Okinawa, see ibid., 165-194; Yokosuka and Yokohama facilities are described in CINCPAC Fleet Port Directory, A14-1 through A14-6. See also Navy Drydock Requirements Study, Naval Sea Systems Command, September 1977, 23-24.
20.关于美国在拉丁美洲的冷战基地，请参阅美国国会参议院“美国海外军事设施”页面。
20. For U.S. Cold War bases in Latin America, see Congress, Senate, United States . . . Military Installations Overseas,
21.关于基地关闭的不同观点，可参见 Stephen M. Goldfein 的未发表学生论文《基地调整和关闭委员会：克服政治僵局的成功策略》（华盛顿特区：国家战争学院，1995 年）和 Ronald P. Richardson 的未发表学生论文《官僚政治与国防预算：1988 年基地调整和关闭委员会的成立》（华盛顿特区：国家战争学院，1995 年）。
21. Differing views concerning base closures are contained in Stephen M. Goldfein, “The Base Realignment and Closure Commission: A Successful Strategy to Overcome Political Gridlock,” unpublished student essay (Washington, DC: National War College, 1995), and Ronald P. Richardson, “Bureaucratic Politics and the Defense Budget: The Formation of the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission,” unpublished student essay (Washington, DC: National War College, 1995).
22.国防年鉴96，第5期（华盛顿特区：国防部，1996年）。
22. Defense Almanac 96, no. 5 (Washington, DC: Dept. of Defense, 1996).
23. Pete Williams，《五角大楼简报》，1991 年 7 月 30 日（华盛顿特区：新闻记录公司）；Peter Grier，“旗帜回家了”，《空军》（1991 年 10 月）：32-35。
23. Pete Williams, Pentagon Briefing, July 30,1991 (Washington, DC: News Transcripts, Inc.); Peter Grier, “The Flags Come Home,” Air Force (October 1991): 32-35.
13. 堡垒和野战工事
13. FORTRESSES AND FIELD FORTIFICATIONS
[埃班·埃马尔]是阿尔伯特运河防线的南端锚点，并且……是欧洲最重要的单体防御工事之一……[德国滑翔机]着陆十分钟后，要塞顶部的所有设施和火炮都被摧毁。
[Eban Emael] served as the southern anchor of the Albert Canal Line, and . . . ranked among the most important single defensive positions in Europe. . . . Ten minutes after the [German glider] landings, all installations and guns on top of the fort were wrecked.
约翰·R·卡尔文
空袭
John R. Calvin
Air Assault
比利时要塞 EBEN EMAEL BARREE) 位于德国和英吉利海峡之间，希特勒于 1940 年 5 月 10 日发动了大规模进攻。1这座堡垒很快就被小规模滑翔机攻击攻陷，因为它的设计者违背了卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨在其巨著《战争论》中的良好建议，未能将可靠的主动防御与被动防御相结合，未能“在每个方向都设置正面”（自空军出现以来，正面已经从四个变成了五个），最重要的是，未能“认识到敌人通过避开无法征服的部分，将会改变其整个攻击模式”。2未来的堡垒和野战工事的设计者们最好听取这些明智的建议。
BELGIAN FORTRESS EBEN EMAEL BARREE) THE WAY BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE ENGLISH CHANNEL WHEN Hitler launched a large-scale offensive on May 10, 1940.1 That bastion quickly succumbed to a small-scale glider assault because its architects, contrary to good advice from Carl von Clausewitz in his opus, On War, failed to incorporate credible active with passive defenses, failed to “present a front on every side” (of which there have been five instead of four since the advent of air power), and above all failed to “recognize the fact that the enemy, in avoiding the unconquerable parts, will alter the whole pattern of his attack.”2 Future designers of forts and field fortifications would do well to heed those wise words.
先例与预后
PRECEDENTS AND PROGNOSES
最早的土质防御工事早于人类文字记载的历史，据记载，公元前7000年左右，耶利哥城内有一道巨大的城墙、一条深沟和一座与之相连的塔楼。此后数千年间，建筑理念和建造技术从简单发展到复杂，钢筋混凝土取代木材、砖块和石块成为首选材料。为保护圣地基督教据点免受撒拉逊人侵扰而建造的传奇十字军城堡，便是典型的防御工事。古代不列颠的哈德良长城和中国的长城，都曾是“文明”社群与蛮族之间的缓冲地带，也是防御工事的典范。4这些遗物如今几乎毫无用处，而仿照沃邦的攻城战术也不再流行。5但设计精良的堡垒和野战工事在 21 世纪可能仍然有用，无论它们是简单的加固外壳还是纵深防御工事。
The earliest earthen fortifications predate written human history, which notes a massive wall, a deep ditch, and adjoining tower at Jericho circa 7000 B.C.3 Concepts and construction techniques thereafter evolved from simple to complex over several millenia that saw reinforced steel and concrete replace wood, brick, and stone blocks as preferred materials. Legendary Crusader castles, built to protect Christian outposts from Saracens in the Holy Land, typify fortified points. Hadrian’s Wall in ancient Britannia and the Great Wall of China, both of which were buffers between “civilized” communities and barbarians, exemplify fortified lines.4 The utility of those relics now is nearly nil, and siegecraft patterned after Vauban is no longer popular,5 but well-designed forts and field fortifications likely will remain useful in the 21st century, whether they are simply hardened shells or defenses in great depth.
防御工事
FORTIFIED POINTS
临时防御工事可能简陋到用D形柄铲挖掘的散兵坑，或是加装沙袋、铁丝网、地雷和照明弹的建筑物；而精心设计的防御工事则通常包括用铁、钢、混凝土、石板和砖块建造的城墙、炮位掩体、龟甲状防御工事和护墙。军队都能从这两种防御工事中获益。6
Impromptu strong points may be as basic as foxholes dug with D-handle shovels or buildings embellished by sand bags, razor wire, land mines, and flares, whereas elaborate counterparts commonly include ramparts, casemates, carapaces (like turtle shells), and revetments constructed of iron, steel, concrete, stone slabs, and bricks. Armed forces benefit from both.6
即兴发挥的优势
IMPROMPTU STRONG POINTS
著名的临时防御工事包括位于德克萨斯州圣安东尼奥的阿拉莫。1836年3月6日，威廉·巴雷特·特拉维斯上校、戴维·克罗克特、吉姆·鲍伊以及其他185名士兵在此与墨西哥将军圣安纳率领的约4000名士兵浴血奋战，直至战死。而在纳塔尔布法罗河畔的罗克渡口，守军的结局则更为圆满——1879年1月22日至23日漫长而血腥的夜晚，由英国中尉约翰·查德和贡维尔·布罗姆黑德率领的不到100名身强力壮的士兵将奥托·维特的传教站改造成临时堡垒，成功抵御了祖鲁国王塞奇瓦约麾下4000名凶猛战士的进攻。最终，11名英雄荣获维多利亚十字勋章。7
Famous points fortified extemporaneously include the Alamo in San Antonio, TX, where Colonel William Barrett Travis, Davy Crockett, Jim Bowie, and 185 other men on March 6, 1836, fought to the death against onslaughts by a force that numbered about 4,000 under Mexican General Santa Anna. Actions at Rorke’s Drift on the Buffalo River in Natal had a happier ending for defenders —11 heroes received Victoria Crosses after fewer than 100 able-bodied men led by British Lieutenants John Chard and Gonville Bromhead converted Otto Witt’s mission station into a makeshift fort, then held off 4,000 of King Cetshwayo’s fearsome Zulu warriors during the long, bloody night of January 22-23,1879.7
城市中空袭、炮火轰击和巷战造成的瓦砾堆，无意间为守军提供了现成的堡垒。无数次巧妙的即兴防御，将部分损毁的城市改造成临时据点，其中列宁格勒、斯大林格勒、马尼拉、首尔和顺化是最为人熟知的例子。
Rubble heaps that result from aerial bombardments, artillery barrages, and house-to-house combat in urban areas unintentionally furnish defenders with ready-made fortresses. Clever improvisations on countless occasions have converted partially destroyed cities into impromptu strong points, of which Leningrad, Stalingrad, Manila, Seoul, and Hué were among the most widely publicized.
精心设计的堡垒
ELABORATE STRONGHOLDS
早期的美国武装部队和先驱者们善于随机应变，他们建造了相对复杂的军事堡垒和用栅栏围起来的平民定居点，以保护自己和财产，一路从东到西、从东到西横穿美国。8其他国家的领导人也采取了类似的措施来抵御入侵者。
Early U.S. armed forces and pioneers, who were masters at improvisation, built relatively elaborate military forts and palisaded civilian settlements to protect themselves and their property as they marched from east to west and coast to coast across America.8 National leaders elsewhere did likewise to defend against invaders.
海岸防御工事。海岸防御在19世纪达到鼎盛时期，当时炮台掩体保护着港口城市和其他重要地形，抵御来自海上的猛烈攻击。1814年8月25日至26日夜间，英国舰队未能成功在巴尔的摩港登陆英军，但星条旗依然在麦克亨利堡飘扬。47年后（1861年8月），美国内战在南卡罗来纳州的萨姆特堡爆发。世界各地的海岸防御工事在有利条件下仍然发挥着重要作用，但随着进攻性火力的出现，新建工事显得不划算，海岸防御工事的黄金时代也随之结束。9
Coastal Fortifications. Coastal defenses reached their zenith during the 19th century, when casemated artillery batteries guarded port cities and other key terrain features against onslaughts from the sea. The Star Spangled Banner still waved over Fort McHenry after a British fleet failed to land redcoats in Baltimore harbor on the night of 25-26 August 1814 and the U.S. Civil War opened at Fort Sumter, South Carolina, 47 years later (August 1861). Coastal fortifications around the world continue to serve useful purposes under favorable circumstances, but their Golden Age closed with the advent of offensive firepower that makes new construction seem cost-ineffective.9
设防岛屿。小岛是绝佳的防御工事，二战期间，日军在西太平洋地区所有计划占领的岛屿上都展现了这一点，无论地形是平坦开阔还是遍布洞穴的高地。在贝蒂奥岛（塔拉瓦环礁）上，美军陆战队遭遇了猛烈的炮火，水下障碍和水雷阻挡了通往海滩的道路。岛上的海岸线上布满了500多个相互连接的碉堡、掩体、碉堡和胸墙，这些防御工事都用钢筋混凝土加固，并用防碎椰子木支撑，然后覆盖上厚达3米的沙子或碎珊瑚，这种混合物几乎坚不可摧。由舰载机和大型舰炮进行攻击。随后爆发了近距离的血腥战斗，其中许多战斗使用了炸药包和火焰喷射器，这种战斗在塞班岛、贝里琉岛、硫磺岛、冲绳岛和其他岛屿上重演，每个岛屿都是名副其实的堡垒。10
Fortified Islands. Small islands make admirable fortified points, as ingenious Japanese armed forces demonstrated on every island they intended to hold in the Western Pacific during World War II, whether the terrain was flat and open or highlands honeycombed with caves. Withering fire met U.S. Marines on tiny Betio Island (Tarawa atoll), where underwater obstacles and mines barred the way to beaches. Shorelines there bristled with more than 500 interconnected blockhouses, bunkers, pillboxes, and breastworks encased in concrete reinforced with steel rods and splinter-proof coconut logs, then covered with up to 10 feet (3 meters) of sand or crushed coral, an amalgam that was practically impervious to pounding by carrier-based aircraft and big naval guns. Bloody fighting that ensued at point-blank range, much of it with satchel charges and flamethrowers, was replicated on Saipan, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and other islands, each of which was a fortress in every sense of the word.10
内陆孤立要塞。 1914年8月，两门德国“大贝莎”（16英寸，42厘米）榴弹炮在为期四天的炮击中摧毁了列日周围的比利时堡垒，此后，内陆孤立要塞的防御工事日趋完善。然而，最坚固的要塞缺乏相互支援的火力，一旦被包围，既无法增援也无法补给，而且极易遭受垂直包围，埃本·埃马尔要塞的守军就深有体会。最后一次大规模建造此类要塞是在第二次世界大战之前。11
Solitary Forts Inland. Solitary forts located inland became increasingly sophisticated after two German “Big Bertha” (16-inch, 42-centimeter) howitzers demolished Belgian redoubts around Liège during a 4-day bombardment in August 1914. The most formidable, however, lacked mutually supporting fields of fire, could neither be reinforced nor resupplied if surrounded, and were vulnerable to vertical envelopment, as defenders at Eben Emael discovered. The last large-scale construction commenced before World War II.11
土质迷宫。没有任何国家或地方组织建造过像越共游击队在南越建造的那些土质迷宫那样精巧复杂的建筑。这些迷宫被用作总部、藏身处、防空洞、仓库、宿舍、厨房、教室、武器工厂、医院手术室、康复病房、剧院和休息中心。这些迷宫的建造始于20世纪40年代，当时正值印度支那爆发大规模反抗法国统治的起义之际。建造者利用了几乎不透水且非常坚硬的红土，尤其是靠近地表的根系，它们像钢筋混凝土一样加固了隧道顶部。在接下来的三十年里，这些装饰工程都是手工挖掘的，每天挖几英尺，最终在西贡北部形成了多层迷宫，其中包含隐蔽的入口和出口、房间、走廊、掩体、通风井、简易电梯和水井，这些设施通过曲折蜿蜒的通道相互连接，通道中充满了假路、死路和秘密陷阱门，旨在抵御化学战剂并减少地下爆炸的范围。12
Earthen Labyrinths. No nation or subnational group has ever created earthen labyrinths as elaborate as those that Viet Cong guerrillas constructed in South Vietnam for use as headquarters, hideouts, air raid shelters, storehouses, dormitories, kitchens, classrooms, arms factories, hospital operating rooms, recovery wards, theaters, and rest centers. Construction, begun in the 1940s at the onset of serious Indochinese uprisings against French rule, took advantage of laterite soils which were almost impervious to water and very hard, especially where taproots near the surface strengthened tunnel ceilings like steel reinforces concrete. Embellishments, all dug by hand a few feet per day, continued during the next three decades until multilevel mazes north of Saigon featured concealed entrances and exits, chambers, galleries, bunkers, air shafts, crude elevators, and wells that were interconnected by twisty-turny passageways replete with false leads, dead ends, and secret trap doors designed to repel chemical warfare agents and reduce the range of underground blasts.12
这些被称为“隧道鼠”的美国入侵者，都是志愿者，主要装备手枪和刀具，冒险进入那些幽闭的隧道，与狡猾的敌人、毒蛇、蝎子、巨型蜘蛛和蝙蝠在布满陷阱的黑暗中搏斗，手电筒的微光都难以照亮隧道。他们的搜寻发现了大量的手榴弹、自动武器、弹药和大米，与此同时，罗马犁式推土机铲除了头顶的植被，爆破专家在走廊里发射冲击波，防暴人员则污染了狭窄的通道。尽管如此，隧道战仍然持续了五年之久，直到美军撤离前不久，B-52轰炸机的地毯式轰炸才最终摧毁了大部分设施。13
U.S. intruders, called “tunnel rats,” all volunteers armed mainly with pistols and knives, ventured into those claustrophobic confines where they battled with ingenious foes, poisonous snakes, scorpions, giant spiders, and bats in booby-trapped darkness that flashlights barely illuminated. Their searches uncovered huge caches of hand grenades, automatic weapons, ammunition, and rice, while Rome Plow bulldozers stripped vegetative cover overhead, demolition specialists sent shock waves down corridors, and riot control agents polluted crawl spaces. Tunnel warfare nevertheless continued apace for 5 years until carpet-bombing B-52s finally collapsed most installations shortly before U.S. Armed Forces departed.13
防御工事。像刚才讨论的点防御工事一样，向四面八方绵延数英里的防御工事，其结构可简可繁。1942-1943年冬季攻势期间，德军在库尔斯克以西的巨大突出部内部署了近百万苏军。7月4日，德军发动“堡垒行动”，试图切断该突出部的底部，却遭遇了可能是史上最令人叹为观止的野战工事群。红军的主要防御工事宽约20公里（12英里），由两个防御区组成，每个防御区包含三个连续的防御阵地，这些阵地由战壕（总长度约6000公里，1250英里）加固，此外还有反坦克壕、碉堡、掩体、铁丝网和100万枚地雷，所有这些都建在遍布蓄水沟渠的地形上。两条主要防线后方的额外障碍阻断了最容易突破的通道。德军的攻势很快停滞，苏军于7月12日发动反击，尽管双方伤亡惨重，但被困在突出部内的绝大多数部队都得以幸存，得以继续战斗。14
Fortified Areas. Fortifications that sprawl many miles in every direction, like point defenses just discussed, may be simple or complex. The German Wehrmacht, whose winter offensive of 1942-1943 left nearly a million Soviet troops inside a massive salient west of Kursk, encountered what may have been the most awesome array of field fortifications ever built when they launched Operation Zitadelle on July 4th to cut off that bulge at its base. The Red Army’s principal works, about 12 miles (20 kilometers) wide, consisted of two fortified zones, each of which contained three successive positions buttressed by trenches (aggregate length about 1,250 miles or 6,000 kilometers), antitank ditches, pillboxes, bunkers, barbed wire entanglements, and 1,000,000 mines, all on terrain laced with water-filled ditches. Additional obstacles behind the two main lines of resistance blocked avenues most vulnerable to breakthroughs. German drives soon stalled, Soviet forces counterattacked on July 12th, and most divisions trapped inside the salient lived to fight another day, despite stupendous casualties on both sides.14
防御工事
FORTIFIED LINES
自公元1至2世纪图密善、图拉真和哈德良在罗马帝国边境修建城墙以来，整合所有资源并避免孤立堡垒大多数缺陷的防御工事就一直很流行。1946年3月5日，温斯顿·丘吉尔爵士在密苏里州富尔顿发表讲话时指出，“从波罗的海的什切青到亚得里亚海的里雅斯特，一道铁幕已经降临在（欧洲）大陆上。” 这座旨在阻止华沙条约组织公民逃离压迫政权的铁幕，既不寻常又丑陋，因为大多数防御工事的目的都是为了抵御侵略。
Fortified lines, which incorporate all assets and avoid most shortcomings of isolated forts, have been fashionable since Domitian, Trajan, and Hadrian erected walls along the outer limits of the Roman Empire in the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D.15 Sir Winston Churchill, pontificating in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, noted that “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the [European] continent.” That edifice, built to keep Warsaw Pact citizens from fleeing repressive regimes, was unusual as well as ugly, because defense against aggression is the purpose of most fortified fences.
许多此类线性防御工事都令人印象深刻：例如19世纪60年代弗吉尼亚州里士满和彼得斯堡附近的南方邦联挖掘的壕沟；第一次世界大战期间欧洲西线的战壕；1939-1940年沿俄芬边境修建的曼纳海姆防线；1943-1944年意大利的古斯塔夫防线和温特防线；20世纪50年代法国军队沿突尼斯边境修建的莫蒂斯防线，旨在阻止支援力量抵达阿尔及利亚叛军；以及至今仍屹立在朝鲜非军事区沿线的庞大防御工事等等。然而，这些防御工事都无法与二战期间法国和德国修建并占领的复杂防御工事相媲美，尽管两国占领的工事成效不一。
Many linear fortifications in the latter category have been impressive: Confederate diggings around Richmond and Petersburg, Virginia, in the 1860s; trenches that lined the Western Front in Europe during World War I; the Mannerheim Line along the Russo-Finnish frontier in 1939-1940; the Gustav and Winter Lines in Italy, 1943-44; the Mortise Line that French Armed Forces built along the Tunisian border in the 1950s to keep support from reaching rebels in Algeria; and extensive fortifications that still stand along the Korean demilitarized zone immediately come to mind. None, however, rivaled the complex structures that France and Germany constructed and occupied with differing degrees of success during World War II.
马其顿防线
THE MAGINOT LINE
马奇诺防线是一座建筑奇迹，部分由整块巨石凿成，沿着法德边境绵延560英里（900公里），从瑞士一直延伸到比利时边境的阿登森林。由于资金短缺和佛兰德斯地区地下水位过高，防线在阿登森林终止。大型的独立工事（ouvrages）通过隧道和铁路连接，地表附近设有固定和可伸缩的穹顶、双层碉堡、钢筋混凝土碉堡、防火装甲门、进气口、排气口和气体过滤器；而生活区、食堂、弹药库、通信中心和电力供应设施则位于地下深处。铁丝网、地雷和反坦克陷阱完善了整个防线体系。用亨利·菲利普·贝当元帅的话来说，这些设施确保了“最小的危险和最大的舒适”，但最终却收效甚微：1940年5月，德军闪电战穿越比利时和荷兰，绕过了马奇诺防线，并未正面撞击。后来，阿尔萨斯-洛林地区一些精明的农民买下了几座带有阴暗潮湿地窖的碉堡，至今仍在里面种植蘑菇，供感激不尽的法国厨师享用。16
The Maginot Line, an architectural marvel partly hewn from solid stone, ran 560 miles (900 kilometers) along the Franco-German frontier from Switzerland to the Ardennes Forest by the Belgian border, where it terminated for lack of funds and a high water table in Flanders. Large, self-contained works (ouvrages), connected by tunnels and railways, contained fixed and retractable cupolas, two-tiered pillboxes, ferro-concrete blockhouses, fireproof armored doors, air intakes, exhaust vents, and gas filters near the surface, with living quarters, mess halls, magazines, communication centers, and power supplies disposed well below. Barbed wire entanglements, mines, and antitank traps completed the complex. Resultant installations, in the words of Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, assured “minimum danger and maximum comfort,” all to little avail: German Blitzkriegs through Belgium and Holland in May 1940 maneuvered around the Maginot Line without hitting it head on. Some enterprising farmers in Alsace-Lorraine later bought a few blockhouses with dark, damp cellars, where they still grow mushrooms for grateful French chefs.16
齐格弗里德防线
THE SIEGFRIED LINE
所谓的齐格菲防线（西墙），保护着德国的工业中心地带免受低地国家、卢森堡和法国的入侵。虽然它不像马奇诺防线那样雄心勃勃，但与马奇诺防线不同的是，由于侧翼包抄难度更大，因此必须正面进攻。一排排看似无穷无尽的“龙牙”防线，布满地雷，仿佛在挑衅美国坦克指挥官胆敢越过。两条而非一条的防御带，加上莱茵河、鲁尔河和基尔河等天然屏障，为鲁尔区和萨尔-普法尔茨地区提供了纵深。1944年10月，美军在追击中突破了一个较大的缺口后，便因燃料耗尽而停止了数月的大规模突破行动。次年3月，双方在狭窄的战线上展开了激烈的交战，但在此之前，双方都已血流成河——“这婊子真婊子”一位士兵在突破阿尔萨斯要塞周围顽强的防御后这样说道。17
The so-called Siegfried Line (Westwall), which shielded Germany’s industrial heartlands against invasions from the Low Countries, Luxembourg, and France, was less ambitious but, unlike the Maginot Line, necessitated frontal attacks because it was much harder to outflank. Row after seemingly endless row of fearsome Dragon’s Teeth with minefields for fillings dared U.S. tank commanders to trespass. Two fortified belts rather than one, together with natural obstacles such as the Rhine, Roer, and Kyll Rivers, afforded depth in front of the Ruhr and Saar-Palatinate. Serious efforts to penetrate ceased for several months after U.S. Armed Forces in hot pursuit punched one sizable hole in October, 1944, then literally ran out of gas. Tremendous concentrations of power on narrow fronts tore through the following March, but not before slugging matches spilled barrels of blood on both sides— “Bitche was a bitch” was the way one trooper put it after breaching stubborn defenses around that Alsatian stronghold.17
大西洋壁垒
THE ATLANTIC WALL
从挪威北部到比利牛斯山脉，沿着大西洋海岸线构筑一道坚不可摧的屏障，这只是希特勒的幻想。然而，在1943年11月隆美尔元帅接管指挥权后，加莱和法国瑟堡之间的这段海域确实成了难缠的对手。“相信我，朗，”他告诉他的副官，“战争的胜负将在海滩上决定。我们只有一次机会阻止敌人，那就是在他们落水的时候……趁他们还在挣扎着想要登陆的时候。”18
An impregnable wall along the Atlantic coast from northern Norway to the Pyrenees Mountains was a figment of Hitler’s imagination, but the segment between Calais and Cherbourg, France, was indeed a troublesome stretch after Field Marshal Erwin Rommel took charge in November 1943. “Believe me, Lang,” he told his aide, “the war will be won or lost on the beaches. We’ll have only one chance to stop the enemy, and that’s while he’s in the water. . . struggling to get ashore.”18
工程以惊人的速度推进，五十万工人浇筑了大量混凝土，以至于西欧其他地方几乎都用不完。为了节省时间，平面结构优先于曲面结构。由于钢材短缺，他们谨慎使用，但为了弥补不足，他们拆解了马奇诺防线的部分构件。最终建成了超过九千个防御工事，其中一些工事的墙体厚达12英尺（3.6米）。隆美尔亲自设计了类似中世纪的障碍物，并在诺曼底登陆日之前在高水位线附近设置了五十万个：混凝土四面体、由三根垂直嵌入混凝土的铁轨组成的“捷克刺猬”障碍物，以及指向大海的电线杆大小的木桩，有些木桩顶部埋设了地雷，有些则装有“开罐器”刀片，用来撕裂登陆艇的底部。数以百万计的其他地雷覆盖了海滩出口，防空“隆美尔芦笋”桩柱串联着绊线，阻止滑翔机在开阔地带降落，故意淹没的低洼地带阻碍了从登陆点向内陆推进。大多数设防的度假酒店和避暑别墅都可以用重叠的自动武器和火炮火力近距离扫射海滩。19
Improvements proceeded at a feverish pace while half a million laborers poured so much concrete that little was left elsewhere in Western Europe. Flat-faced structures took precedence over curved surfaces to save time. They used steel sparingly, since it was in short supply, but builders cannibalized parts of the Maginot Line to compensate. More than 9,000 strong points appeared, some with walls up to 12 feet thick (3.6 meters). Rommel personally designed medieval-like obstacles and emplaced half a million astride high water marks before D-Day: concrete tetrahedrons, Czech hedgehogs that consisted of three railway rails set in concrete at right angles, and telephone pole-sized stakes pointed seaward, some capped with land mines or tipped with “can opener” blades to rip the bottoms off landing craft. Other mines by the millions covered beach exits, anti-airborne “Rommel asparagus” stakes strung together with trip wires discouraged glider landings in open fields, and deliberately flooded lowlands impeded movement from landing sites inland. Most fortified resort hotels and summer homes could sweep beaches at point-blank range with overlapping automatic weapon and artillery fire.19
在诺曼底登陆前的最后一刻，艾森豪威尔将军心存疑虑，匆匆写下一张便条，上面写着：“我们在瑟堡-勒阿弗尔地区的登陆未能取得令人满意的立足点，我已经撤回了部队……如果这次尝试有任何过错或失误，那都是我个人的责任。”当然，盟军20部队于1944年6月6日取得了持久的据点，尽管美军战区局势紧张，但伤亡人数比最乐观的预测要少。第一集团军的战后报告记录了1465人死亡、3184人受伤、1928人失踪、26人被俘，这一天后来被称为“最长的一天”。
General Eisenhower, with last-minute misgivings before the D-Day assault, scribbled a note to himself that read, “Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops .... If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt, it is mine alone.”20 Allied forces, of course, seized lasting lodgments on June 6, 1944, at less cost in lives than the most optimistic predictions, despite touch-and-go situations in the U.S. sector, where First Army’s after-action report recorded 1,465 dead, 3,184 wounded, 1,928 missing, and 26 captured on what became known as “the longest day.”
进攻性防御工事
OFFENSIVE FORTIFICATIONS
安全一直是防御工事的主要功能，而且现在仍然是。但是，那些从敌方阵地下方穿过而不是从上方、周围或穿过的隧道，有时会吸引那些信奉战略和战术上迂回策略、通过出其不意的方式实现目标的人。
Security always has been, and still is, the primary function of fortifications, but tunnels that go under rather than over, around, or through enemy positions occasionally appeal to devotees of strategically and tactically indirect approaches that take devious paths to achieve objectives through surprise.
地下炸药
SUBTERRANEAN EXPLOSIVES
进攻方在地面进攻受阻时，通常会挖掘战壕深入敌阵下方进行破坏，这是一种经典的攻城战术。第一次世界大战西线战场上的交战双方将这种战术运用到了前所未有的规模。1917年6月7日，在比利时伊普尔和瓦尔内通之间的11个地点，澳大利亚和加拿大军队在长达13公里（8英里）的战壕中挖掘战壕，发动了规模空前的敌后或敌下爆破。梅西讷岭大爆炸引爆了933,000磅（466吨）炸药，主要成分是氨油。德军伤亡的官方估计从未公布，但战斗结束后，有10,000名士兵失踪，7,350人被俘。21
Offensive armed forces balked on the surface have long burrowed beneath enemy positions to inflict damage, a classical siegecraft technique. Belligerents on the Western Front during World War I applied that practice on a scale never duplicated before or since. The biggest blast behind or under enemy lines erupted in Belgium between Ypres and Warneton on June 7, 1917, when Australians and Canadians at 11 sites along an 8-mile (13-kilometer) stretch of Messines Ridge detonated 933,000 pounds of explosives (466 tons), mainly ammonol. No official estimate of German casualties ever was released, but 10,000 men were missing and 7,350 were prisoners of war when the battle was over.21
地下矛头
SUBTERRANEAN SPEARHEADS
20世纪70年代中期，韩国调查人员因可疑的地下爆炸声而提高警惕，发现了三条大型隧道，并在1990年发现了第四条。每条隧道都深埋在山区非军事区下方，足以容纳四分之一吨重的卡车以及四名并排的敌军士兵。随后，随着更多可听见的隆隆声、传感器获取的信息以及朝鲜叛逃者的供述，对这条长达250公里（155英里）的分界线沿线另外16条隧道的搜寻工作仍在继续。韩国官员始终担心，一旦战争爆发，朝鲜轻步兵、突击队和其他特种部队将涌入，包围首尔，切断援军，切断补给线，并在非军事区以南形成第二战线。另一种推测是，平壤的决策者可能将核武器埋藏在一条或多条隧道中，待地下爆炸产生的放射性尘埃随风南飘时引爆，然后趁着混乱局面和电磁脉冲切断美韩无线电通讯及计算机系统之际，突破联军防线，发动全面进攻。相比之下，梅西讷海岭的火山喷发似乎微不足道。22
Investigators in the Republic of Korea (ROK), alerted by suspicious subterranean explosions, found three large tunnels in the mid-1970s and a fourth in 1990, each deeply embedded beneath the mountainous demilitarized zone and each large enough to accommodate quarter-ton trucks together with enemy troops four abreast. Searches for 16 more along that 155-mile (250-kilometer) demarcation line continued in response to further audible rumblings, information derived from sensors, and North Korean defectors. ROK officials all the while feared that if war occurred North Korean light infantry, commandos, and other special operations forces would pour through, surround Seoul, cut off reinforcements, sever supply lines, and form a second front south of the DMZ. Speculators alternatively suggested that decisionmakers in Pyongyang might deposit nuclear weapons at mid-point in one or more tunnels, detonate them when windborne fallout from subsurface bursts would drift south, then launch a full-scale offensive through cracked coalition lines while confusion reigned and electromagnetic pulse blacked out U.S. and ROK radio communications as well as computers. Eruptions along Messines Ridge would seem minor in comparison.22
核时代的防御工事
FORTIFICATIONS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE
核时代的到来使地下防御工事的价值提高了几个数量级，因为即使是地表或地表附近最坚固的设施也无法抵御以千吨级（更不用说百万吨级）衡量的精确武器的攻击。
The advent of the Nuclear Age increased the value of subterranean fortifications by some orders of magnitude, because the strongest installations on or near the surface simply could not survive assaults by accurate weapons with yields measured in kilotons (much less megatons).
军事“强化”计划
MILITARY “HARDENING” PROGRAMS
中立国和潜在的交战国都在基岩下寻找庇护所。例如，瑞典早期就建造了一个拥有1000多个房间的巨大洞穴，并从海岸线开凿隧道进入山体，以保护其舰队。23美国和苏联将洲际弹道导弹（ICBM）部署在发射井中，其中一些发射井能够承受每平方英寸10,000磅（4,535公斤）的超压，但超致命武器的威力远超超强加固措施。位于科罗拉多斯普林斯附近夏延山深处的北美防空司令部（NORAD）高级官员经常担心，即使有防爆门和数千英尺厚的覆盖层，一旦遭到大规模直接命中，他们的总部是否仍会被夷为平地。这类掩体的实际效果如何，我们永远不得而知，因为它们从未在实战中接受过检验，但大多数研究核战争的学者都对生存前景持怀疑态度。24
Neutrals as well as potential belligerents sought sanctuaries beneath bedrock. Sweden, for example, early on created a gigantic cavern with more than 1,000 rooms and tunneled from shorelines into mountainsides to shelter its fleet.23 The United States and the Soviet Union installed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in silos, some of which could withstand overpressures of 10,000 pounds (4,535 kilograms) per square inch, but super lethal weaponry outclassed super hardening. Senior officials of North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), ensconced in the bowels of Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, often wondered whether a huge direct hit would vaporize their headquarters despite blast-proof doors and several thousand feet of overburden. How well such shelters might have worked will never be known, because none ever were tested in combat, but most students of nuclear war are skeptical about survival prospects.24
民防计划
CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAMS
1961年的柏林危机促成了美国第一个民防避难所计划，但现有建筑物中只有一半的避难所被标记或配备了基本的生存工具包。而这其中一半位于商业区，这些区域仅在白天人流密集，周末和节假日则空无一人。除了最热心的倡导者之外，所有人都……人们很快就对 20 世纪 60 年代初大肆宣传的自助式家庭避难所失去了兴趣，但这种避难所从未变得很多。25
The Berlin crisis of 1961 precipitated the first U.S. civil defense shelter program, but only half the sites in existing structures ever were marked or stocked with rudimentary survival kits. Half of those were located in business districts that were heavily populated only during daylight hours and empty on weekends as well as holidays. All save the most avid advocates soon lost interest in do-it-yourself family shelters, which were widely advertised in the early 1960s, but never became numerous.25
相反，苏联在整个冷战期间都非常重视民防。因此，城市规划者力求限制人口密度，在大城市周围发展卫星城，并修建防火隔离带。一些当时的资料提到，新建的生产设施分散且加固。据报道，苏联的防务计划包括用固体材料替代玻璃；建造防火屋顶；加固薄弱建筑；以及为部分公用设施站、电力和水管临时加固或掩埋。冗余设施和储备物资是标准做法。26位美国国防分析人士一致认为，此类计划在纸面上规模宏大，但其实际执行程度仍有待商榷。
Soviet emphases on civil defense conversely were strong throughout the Cold War. Urban planners accordingly sought to restrict population densities, develop satellite towns around large cities, and create firebreaks. Some contemporary sources cited new production facilities, dispersed and hardened. Soviet programs reportedly included actions to replace glass with solids; fireproof roofs; reinforce weak structures; and improvise shields for or bury selected utility stations, plus power and water conduits. Redundant structures and stockpiles were standard procedures.26 U.S. defense analysts agreed that such plans were imposing on paper, but extents to which they were implemented remain debatable.26
堡垒对抗CW和BW武器
CITADELS VERSUS CW AND BW WEAPONS
化学和生物战剂会悄悄渗入各个角落，即使身处坚固的堡垒中，也能凭借其威力击败那些能够承受高当量核爆炸带来的冲击波、高温和辐射的人员，除非所有入口都设有安全的通风系统和气锁。虽然可以制定万无一失的防护措施，但安装成本高昂。
Chemical and biological warfare (CW, BW) agents that creep into nooks and crannies can overcome occupants of citadels able to survive the blast, heat, and radiation that accompany high-yield nuclear detonations, unless secure ventilating systems and vapor locks safeguard every entry. Surefire protective measures are conceivable, but are costly to install.
要点
KEY POINTS
• 最简单的野战工事也能有效抵御常规武器和核武器的攻击。
• The simplest field fortifications offer significant protection against conventional and nuclear weapons.
• 最坚固的防御工事埋藏在几乎没有裂缝的坚固基岩中。
• The strongest fortifications are buried in solid bedrock with few fractures.
• 两栖登陆部队对付小岛屿所能施加的军事力量，比地面部队对付内陆孤立堡垒所能施加的军事力量要少。
• Amphibious landing forces can bring less military power to bear against small islands than ground foces can exert against solitary forts inland.
• 如果地形障碍使得防御工事无法被侧翼包抄，那么防御工事最为有效。
• Fortified lines are most effective if topographical obstructions make it impossible for them to be outflanked.
• 地下防御工事可以保护居民免受附近核爆炸的所有影响，但很少有工事能够抵御高当量武器的直接命中。
• Subterranean fortifications can protect inhabitants against all effects of nearby nuclear detonations, but few will be able to withstand direct hits by high-yield weapons.
• 缺乏安全通风系统和气锁的防御工事容易受到化学和生物战攻击。
• Fortifications that lack secure ventilating systems and vapor locks are vulnerable to chemical and biological warfare attack.
笔记
NOTES
1. John R. Calvin，《空中突击：空中机动战争的发展》（纽约：Hawthorn Books，1969 年），第 21-28 页；Rudolf Böhmler 和 Werner Haupt，《德国伞兵》（西德多尔海姆和纽约：Altmark International，1971 年），第 37-47 页。
1. John R. Calvin, Air Assault: The Development of Airmobile Warfare (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1969), 21-28; Rudolf Böhmler and Werner Haupt, The German Paratroops (Dorheim, West Germany, and New York: Altmark International, 1971), 37-47.
2.卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨，《战争论》，迈克尔·霍华德和彼得·帕雷特编辑和翻译（新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1976 年），第 393-414 页（第 397、407、414 页有引文和其他要点）。
2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 393-414 (quotations and other key points on 397, 407, 414).
3. Yigal Yadin，《圣经之地的战争艺术》，第 1 卷（英国诺里奇：Jarrold and Sons 国际出版社，1963 年），第 32-35 页。
3. Yigal Yadin, The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands, vol. 1 (Norwich, England: Jarrold and Sons, International Publishing, 1963), 32-35.
4.涵盖史前时期到现代的调查报告包括 Martin H. Brice 的《堡垒与要塞》（纽约：Facts on File 出版社，1990 年）；Ian Hogg 的《防御工事史》（纽约：St. Martin's Press 出版社，1990 年）。1981）。另见 Dale E. Floyd，《军事防御工事：精选书目》（纽约：格林伍德出版社，1992 年）。
4. Surveys that cover prehistory to modern times include Martin H. Brice, Forts and Fortresses (New York: Facts on File, 1990); Ian Hogg, The History of Fortification (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981). See also Dale E. Floyd, Military Fortifications: A Selective Bibliography (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992).
5. Christopher Duffy，《围城战：近代早期世界的要塞，1494-1660》和《围城战》第 2 卷，《沃邦和腓特烈大帝时代的要塞，1660-1789》（马萨诸塞州波士顿：Routledge and Kegan Paul，1979 年和 1985 年）。
5. Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early Modern World, 1494-1660, and Siege Warfare, vol. 2, The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great, 1660-1789 (Boston, MA: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979 and 1985).
6. FM 5-15：野战工事（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1972 年 6 月 27 日）（被 FM 5-103：生存能力取代，1985 年 6 月 10 日，限制发行）；Hogg，《工事史》，200-207 页。
6. FM 5-15: Field Fortifications (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, June 27, 1972) (superseded by FM 5-103: Survivability, June 10, 1985, restricted distribution); Hogg, The History of Fortification, 200-207.
7. Donald R. Morris，《长矛的洗礼：祖鲁民族的兴衰》（纽约：西蒙与舒斯特出版社，1965 年），第 389-420 页。关于对经验教训的略带讽刺但又颇具洞察力的评估，请参见 ED Swinton，《达弗渡口的防御》（新泽西州韦恩：艾弗里出版社，1986 年；原版出版于 1907 年）。
7. Donald R. Morris, The Washing of the Spears: The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Nation (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), 389-420. For a tongue-in-cheek but nevertheless perceptive assessment of lessons learned, see E. D. Swinton, The Defence of Duffer’s Drift (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing, 1986; orginally published in 1907).
8. Robert B. Roberts，《历史堡垒百科全书：美国的军事、先驱和贸易站》（纽约：麦克米伦出版社，1987 年）。
8. Robert B. Roberts, Encyclopedia of Historic Forts: The Military, Pioneers, and Trading Posts of the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1987).
9. Brice，《堡垒和防御工事》，第 134-145 页，以及 Hogg，《防御工事史》，第 168-181 页。
9. Brice, Forts and Fortifications, 134-145, and Hogg, The History of Fortification, 168-181.
10. Rafael Steinberg，《岛屿战斗》（纽约：时代生活出版社，1978 年），第 104-131 页、第 166-191 页。有关详细的地形描述，请参阅 William Herbert Hobbs 的《太平洋的堡垒岛屿》（安娜堡，密歇根州：JW Edwards 出版社，1945 年）。
10. Rafael Steinberg, Island Fighting (New York: Time-Life Books, 1978), 104-131, 166-191. For detailed topographical descriptions, see William Herbert Hobbs, The Fortress Islands of the Pacific (Ann Arbor, Ml: J. W. Edwards, 1945).
11. Hogg，《防御工事史》，190-194，196-198。
11. Hogg, The History of Fortification, 190-194, 196-198.
12. Tom Mangold 和 John Penycate，《古芝地道》（纽约：兰登书屋，1985 年）。
12. Tom Mangold and John Penycate, The Tunnels of Cu Chi (New York: Random House, 1985).
13.同上。
13. Ibid.
14. 《现代战争中野战工事的价值》，为国防核局编写（华盛顿特区：历史评估和研究组织（HERO），1979 年 12 月 1 日），第 14、18-28 页。
14. The Value of Field Fortifications in Modern Warfare, prepared for Defense Nuclear Agency (Washington, DC: Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO), December 1, 1979), 14, 18-28.
15.布莱斯，《堡垒和防御工事》，第34-35页。
15. Brice, Forts and Fortifications, 34-35.
16.同上，146-147、161；Hogg，《防御工事史》，208-213；Norman Runnison，“出售：马奇诺防线”，《亚利桑那共和报》 ，1967 年 4 月 2 日，12B。
16. Ibid., 146-147, 161; Hogg, The History of Fortification, 208-213; Norman Runnison, “For Sale: The Maginot Line,” Arizona Republic, April 2, 1967, 12B.
17. Charles B. McDonald，“齐格菲防线战役”，载于《美国陆军在第二次世界大战中的欧洲战区》 （华盛顿特区：陆军部军事史办公室，1963 年），特别是第 30-35、44-47、56-57、66-69、72-75 页；Franklin M. Davis, Jr.，《莱茵河对岸》（纽约：时代生活出版社，1980 年），第 22、25、28、73、76-77 页；Dwight D. Eisenhower，《欧洲十字军东征》（纽约：双日出版社，1948 年），第 450 页；Hogg，《防御工事史》，第 212-214 页。
17. Charles B. McDonald, “The Siegfried Line Campaign,” in The United States Army in World War II, The European Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1963), especially 30-35, 44-47, 56-57, 66-69, 72-75; Franklin M. Davis, Jr., Across the Rhine (New York: Time-Life Books, 1980), 22, 25, 28, 73, 76-77; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday, 1948), 450; Hogg, The History of Fortification, 212-214.
18. Cornelius Ryan，《最长的一天》（纽约：西蒙与舒斯特出版社，1954 年），第 27 页。
18. Cornelius Ryan, The Longest Day (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 27.
19. Gordon A. Harrison，“跨海峡进攻”，载于《美国陆军在第二次世界大战中的欧洲战区》（华盛顿特区：陆军部军事史办公室，1951 年），第 249-265 页；同上，第 22-29 页；Patrice Boussel，《D 日海滩袖珍指南》，FM Watkins 译（巴黎：贝朗热理工学院书店，西岱印刷技术部，1964 年），第 15-20 页；Hogg，《防御工事史》，第 228、236-237页。
19. Gordon A. Harrison, “Cross-Channel Attack,” in U.S. Army in World War II, The European Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951), 249-265; ibid., 22-29; Patrice Boussel, D-Day Beaches Pocket Guide, trans. F.M. Watkins (Paris: Libraire Polytechnique Béranger, Département Technique des Presses de la Cité, 1964), 15-20; Hogg, The History of Fortification, 228, 236-237.
20.约翰·基根，《诺曼底的六支军队》（纽约：维京出版社，1982 年），第 66 页。
20. John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy (New York: Viking Press, 1982), 66.
21. Alexander Barrie，《地下战争：第一次世界大战的隧道挖掘者》（伦敦：Tom Donovan出版社，1961年）。尤其参见第16章。
21. Alexander Barrie, War Underground: The Tunnellers of the Great War (London: Tom Donovan, 1961). See especially chapter 16.
22.《国防白皮书》，1990 年，首尔，韩国国防部，第 75-79 页；约翰·M·柯林斯，《1994 年朝鲜危机：军事地理、军事平衡、军事选择》，报告编号 94-311S（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1994 年 4 月 11 日），第 14 页。
22. Defense White Paper, 1990, Seoul, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 75-79; John M. Collins, Korean Crisis, 1994: Military Geography, Military Balance, Military Options, Report No. 94-311S (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 11, 1994), 14.
23. G. Alison Raymond，“瑞典坚守阵地”，美国海军学会会刊80，第 11 期（1954 年 11 月）：1223-1225。
23. G. Alison Raymond, “Sweden Digs In,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 80, no. 11 (November 1954): 1223-1225.
24. Jonathan E. Medalia，《MX“小矮人”和民兵导弹计划》，简报 IB77080（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，存档于 1991 年 3 月 1 日），第 2-3 页。
24. Jonathan E. Medalia, MX, “Midgetman,” and Minuteman Missile Programs, Issue Brief IB77080 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, archived March 1, 1991), 2-3.
25. 20 世纪 70 年代中期及以后的民防（华盛顿特区：国防民防局，1975 年 2 月 14 日）。
25. Civil Defense in the Mid-1970s and Beyond (Washington, DC: Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, February 14, 1975).
26. Leon Gouré，《苏联战略中的战争生存》（佛罗里达州珊瑚礁：迈阿密大学高级国际研究中心，1976 年），第 131-160 页；《核攻击后的工业生存与恢复》，提交给国防生产联合委员会的报告（华盛顿州西雅图：波音航空航天公司，1976 年 11 月 18 日）。
26. Leon Gouré, War Survival in Soviet Strategy (Coral Cables, FL: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1976), 131-160; Industrial Survival and Recovery after Nuclear Attack, A Report to the Joint Committee on Defense Production (Seattle, WA: Boeing Aerospace, November 18, 1976).
14. 兵役偏好
14. MILITARY SERVICE PREDILECTIONS
每个人都有权发表自己的意见，但
没有人有权捏造事实。
Everyone is entitled to his own opinion.
No one is entitled to his own facts.
詹姆斯·R·施莱辛格
在国会的证词，1973年
James R. Schlesinger
Testimony before Congress, 1973
每个人都有自己的观点，无论这些观点是否合理，它们都可能有意或无意地歪曲事实以迎合自身偏好。各军种的发言人，作为国家元首、外交部长和高级国防官员的顾问，往往对政治军事问题和应对措施持有不同的观点，因为他们身处不同的地理环境，并听命于不同的地缘政治权威，这些权威分别倡导陆权、海权、空权或天权。各军种的许多成员（并非所有成员）都坚信自己的观点是正确的，并认为其他观点都是错误的。因此，任何国家或长期联盟（例如北约和现已解散的华沙条约组织）中的主导思想都会对军事角色、任务、战略、战术、计划、方案和兵力部署产生深远的影响。
EVERYONE HAS OPINIONS THAT INTENTIONALLY OR INADVERTENTLY DISTORT FACTS TO SUIT PREDILECTIONS, whether they are entitled to or not. Spokesmen for each Armed Service, who advise chiefs of state, foreign ministers, and senior defense officials, commonly possess dissimilar views concerning political-military problems and corrective actions, because they operate in distinctive geographic mediums and genuflect before different geopolitical gurus who variously advocate land, sea, air, or space power. Many (not all) members of each service are firmly convinced that their convictions are correct and believe competing opinions are flawed. The dominant school of thought in any country or long-standing coalition (such as NATO and the now defunct Warsaw Pact) consequently exerts profound effects on military roles, missions, strategies, tactics, plans, programs, and force postures.
多元化的观点
DIVERSIFIED VIEWPOINTS
直到公元前700年左右，战争主要局限于陆地上的冲突，而陆地正是所有人类的自然栖息地。直到腓尼基战略家发明了专门用于海战的战舰，战争才发生了改变。公元前490年，波斯军队在马拉松战役中发动了大规模两栖作战，十年后，他们在萨拉米斯海战中与希腊舰队交战，这是历史上第一次大规模海战。此后，陆地和海洋一直是仅有的军事战场，直到20世纪。当空军，以及后来的太空军事行动，分别引入第三和第四维度时，便引发了各军种之间为巩固或扩大地理管辖范围而进行的持续博弈。以下四个简要概述阐明了其中的根本性理念差异。
Warfare was confined largely to conflicts on land, the natural habitat of all human beings, until about 700 B.C., when Phoenician strategists introduced ships designed explicitly for combat at sea. Persian armed forces initiated major amphibious operations at Marathon in 490 B.C. and a decade later engaged a Greek fleet at Salamis in the first large-scale naval battle.1 Land and sea thereafter remained the only military arenas until the 20th century, when air forces, then military operations in space, added third and fourth dimensions that generate ceaseless interservice jockeying to consolidate or expand geographical jurisdictions. The four thumbnail sketches that follow illustrate fundamental philosophical differences.
地景
TERRACENTRIC VIEWS
崇尚克劳塞维茨《战争论》的陆军将领们2.将各大洲划分为战区、作战区域和行动区，地形特征限制了部署、机动方案、武器效能和后勤保障。参与常规作战的地面部队不愿与敌方失去联系，直至取得胜利，并在必要时通过占领敌方领土来实施政治军事控制。军队曾经能够自给自足，但目前对空中火力的依赖性显著，除非情况允许他们进行陆路运输，否则如果没有充足的空运和海运，他们既无法抵达遥远的目标区域，也无法在抵达后维持自身运转。因此，高级军官倾向于建立能够确保在任何时间、任何地点获得必要的跨军种支援的指挥结构和关系。3
Army generals, who revere the Clausewitzian treatise On War,2 subdivide continents into theaters, areas of operation, and zones of action within which terrain features limit deployments, schemes of maneuver, weapon effectiveness, and logistical support. Ground forces engaged in conventional combat are loath to lose contact with adversaries until they emerge victorious and, if necessary, impose political-military control by occupying hostile territory. Armies once were self-sufficient, but dependence on aerial firepower currently is pronounced and, unless circumstances allow them to move overland, they can neither reach distant objective areas nor sustain themselves after arrival without adequate airlift and sealift. Senior army officials consequently tend to favor command structures and relationships that assure essential interservice support whenever and wherever required.3
以大地为中心的陆地权力倡导者可以追溯到弗里德里希·拉采尔，他于1897年首次正式将大陆陆地面积与政治军事力量联系起来。詹姆斯·费尔格里夫、卡尔·豪斯霍弗（他在纳粹德国使“生存空间”一词家喻户晓）和尼古拉斯·J·斯皮克曼随后成为该领域的杰出人物。4但没有人比哈尔福德·J·麦金德爵士更引人注目。他于1904年发表的题为《历史的地理枢纽》的研究，将中欧亚大陆置于首要地位。他认为，中欧亚大陆地处偏远，却拥有广袤的地域和丰富的资源，因此似乎构成了一个可以投射决定性力量的防御基地。1919年，麦金德将东欧的大部分地区纳入枢纽区域，并将其命名为“心脏地带”。他将欧亚大陆的其他部分视为“内新月地带”（有时也称为“边缘地带”），并构想了一个“外新月地带”，其中包括撒哈拉以南的非洲、澳大利亚、英国、日本、印度尼西亚等大型群岛以及美洲（见图41）。欧洲、亚洲和非洲构成了“世界岛”，他由此提出：
Terracentric advocates of land power trace their roots to Friedrich Ratzel who, in 1897, for the first time formally correlated continental land masses with political-military power. James Fairgrieve, Karl Haushofer (who made Lebensraum a household word in Nazi Germany), and Nicholas J. Spykman were subsequently prominent,4 but none attracted greater international attention than Sir Halford J. MacKinder, whose 1904 study entitled, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” assigned prime importance to central Eurasia which, because it coupled splendid isolation with vast space and resources, seemed to comprise a defensible base from which to project decisive power. MacKinder in 1919 added a good deal of Eastern Europe to the Pivot Area, designated it as the Heartland, recognized the rest of Eurasia as an Inner or Marginal Crescent (sometimes called the Rimland), and conceived an Outer or Insular Crescent that included Africa south of the Sahara, Australia, Britain, Japan, large archipelagos like Indonesia, and the Americas (map 41). Europe, Asia, and Africa became the World-Island, at which point he postulated:
谁统治东欧，谁就统治心脏地带；
谁统治心脏地带，谁就统治世界岛；
谁统治世界岛，谁就统治世界。5
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland.
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island.
Who rules the World-Island commands the world.5
海洋中心论
MARECENTRIC VIEWS
与陆军不同，以海洋为中心的自由行动力量很少依赖联合作战，其全球影响力仅受地理咽喉要道的限制，并且通常单方面决定是否、在何处以及何时作战，因为他们通常能够根据自身意愿与敌军交战或脱离接触。因此，海军将领通常对官僚机构限制海军行动自由感到不满，并拒绝任何人在其水域划定可识别的边界——除了陆地与海洋交界的沿海地带外，这片水域是一片平坦无垠的平原。6（二战期间的单边主义政策让战争部长亨利·L·史汀生感叹“昏暗的宗教世界，海王星是上帝，马汉是他的先知，美国海军是唯一真正的教会”）7）。除了浅滩、岛屿和冰层之外，其他地形障碍对于水面舰艇水兵来说是陌生的——潜艇兵的视角则不同——但一个显著的地理限制是无法回避的：即使是拥有卓越海上补给能力的海军，最终也仍然依赖于脆弱的岸上基地。6
Free-wheeling marecentric forces, unlike armies, rely little on joint service cooperation, enjoy a global reach channelized only by geographic choke points, and generally determine unilaterally whether, where, and when to fight, because they most often are able to make or break contact with enemy formations as they see fit. Admirals as a rule accordingly resent bureaucratic restrictions on naval freedom of action and defy anybody to draw recognizable boundaries across their watery domain, which is a featureless plane except along littorals where land and sea meet 6 (go-it-alone policies during World War II made Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson lament the “dim religious world where Neptune is God, Mahan is his prophet, and the U.S. Navy the only true church”7). Topographic obstacles other than shallows, islands, and ice are foreign to surface sailors—submariners have different perspectives—but one prominent geographic limitation is inescapable: even navies with superlative underway replenishment capabilities ultimately are tied to vulnerable bases ashore.6
地图 41.麦金德眼中的世界（1904 年和 1919 年）
Map 41. The World According to Mackinder (1904 and 1919)
20 世纪初，英国战略家朱利安·科贝特爵士阐述了海军的基本战时目标：“必须始终直接或间接地确保制海权，或阻止敌人获得制海权。”美国海军上校（后来的海军少将）阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉在其题为《海权对历史的影响》的政治军事论述中宣称，海上控制确实可以决定岸上的决策。9. 1904年他撰写这份文件时，封锁是主要手段，但舰载机、专业两栖突击部队和制导导弹使现代海军能够将力量投射到内陆深处。马汉海军上将还预测，部署在欧亚大陆周围的武装力量可以遏制来自麦金德“心脏地带”的陆上力量，美国及其盟国在二战期间以及与苏联及其盟友的长期冷战对抗中都很好地运用了这一假设（图42）。10
The basic naval wartime objective, articulated in the early 1900s by British strategist Sir Julian Corbett, “must always be directly or indirectly either to assure command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.”8 U.S. Navy Captain (later Rear Admiral) Alfred Thayer Mahan, in his political-military exposition entitled The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, preached that sea control indeed can determine decisions ashore.9 Blockades were the principal instrument when he penned that document in 1904, but carrier-based aircraft, specialized amphibious assault forces, and guided missiles enable modern navies to project power far inland. Admiral Mahan additionally predicted that armed forces positioned around Eurasia could contain land power emanating from MacKinder’s Heartland, a postulation that the United States and its allies put to good use first during World War II, then during their prolonged Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union and its associates (map 42).10
航空中心视角
AEROCENTRIC VIEWS
陆基空军的作战环境令水面海军艳羡不已：它拥有三维空间而非二维空间，没有咽喉要道，没有地形障碍，视野开阔，几乎不受地球曲率的影响，除了山区以外，仅受云层遮挡。只要拥有安全的机场、远程导弹发射平台以及其他军种提供的必要后勤保障，全球打击便可真正实现。因此，以空军为中心的将领（如同海军上将一样）倾向于尽可能大的自主权，并对限制灵活性的界限保持警惕，也就不足为奇了。因为他们普遍认为，不受限制的空中力量将成为决定性的军事手段，使旷日持久的战争成为历史。所有军种都将制空权视为重中之重，否则大多数陆上或海上作战任务都将代价过高，甚至无法完成。11
Land-based air forces operate in a medium that surface navies might envy, where there are three dimensions rather than two, no choke points, no topographic impediments, and visibility to far distant horizons, being less limited by Earth’s curvature, is restricted only by clouds except in mountainous terrain. Global reach is truly obtainable, given secure airfields, secure launch pads for long-range missiles, and essential logistical support from other services. Small wonder, therefore, that aerocentric generals (like admirals) prefer the greatest possible autonomy and are leery of boundaries that limit flexibility because, in the main, they believe that unfettered air power could be the decisive military instrument and make protracted wars obsolete. All services attach top priority to air superiority, without which most combat missions ashore or afloat become excessively costly, even infeasible.11
意大利准将朱利奥·杜黑在莱特兄弟首次试飞五年后就开始预言空军的未来。他的著作《制空权》（1921年）设想了空袭摧毁敌方人口中心、工业基地和战争能力的情景，为战略轰炸概念奠定了基础。杜黑的追随者众多，他大大高估了当时可用弹药的破坏力，低估了敌方的防空能力，但在“确保摧毁时代”，核武器似乎印证了他的理论。12亚历山大·德·塞韦尔斯基在其著作《空军力量：生存的关键》（1950 年）中更新并支持了杜黑的观点，明确地将陆军和海军置于空军之下。13他的假设不仅将冷战期间的超级大国对抗从东西对抗转向南北对抗，而且还确定了北极附近的一个“决策区”，美苏两国的势力似乎在该区域重叠（图43）。20世纪60年代，南北向飞行的核洲际弹道导弹（ICBM）强化了他的论点，而潜射弹道导弹（SLBM）则产生了相反的效果，因为它们可以从多个方向发起攻击。
Italian Brigadier General Guilio Douhet began prophesying about the future of air power five scant years after the Wright Brothers first took flight. His Command of the Air (1921), which visualized air strikes to destroy enemy population centers, industrial bases, and war-making potential, laid the foundation for strategic bombing concepts. Douhet, whose disciples are legion, vastly overrated the destructive potential of munitions then available and underrated rival air defenses, but nuclear weapons seemed to vindicate his theories during the Age of Assured Destruction.12 Alexander de Seversky, whose book Air Power: Key to Survival (1950) updated and supported Douhet, unequivocally subordinated armies and navies to air forces.13 His postulations not only put a north-south rather than east-west spin on superpower confrontations during the Cold War but identified an “Area of Decision” around the North Pole, where U.S. and Soviet dominance appeared to overlap (map 43). Nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with north-south trajectories strengthened his arguments in the 1960s, whereas submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) had the opposite effect, because they could attack from diverse directions.
没有任何其他哲学理念能够像空军理论那样，获得持续而广泛的认可。威廉·“比利”·米切尔准将于1918年构想了师级规模的伞降作战，并两次（1921年和1923年）证明了空军对海军水面作战舰艇的强大威力，他或许是最接近“圣人”的人，但就像之前的杜黑一样，他也因其远见卓识而遭到迫害。14
No comparable philosophies with persistent and widespread approval underpin theater air power doctrines. Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell, who conceived division-sized parachute assaults in 1918 and twice demonstrated the potency of air power against naval surface combatants (1921, 1923), may have come closest to “sainthood” but, like Douhet before him, was persecuted for his prescience.14
Map 42. U.S. and Allied Encirclement of the Soviet Union
改编自 Gérard Chaliand 和 Jean-Pierre Rageau 的《战略地图集》第 3 版。
Adapted from Gérard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau, Strategic Atlas, 3rd ed.
Map 43. De Seversky’s View of the Globe
以天体为中心的观点
ASTROCENTRIC VIEWS
目前，一种以天体为中心的、致力于军事太空的思想流派正处于早期形成阶段，它主要关注地月系统（第七章），因为星际冲突似乎还很遥远。其核心主题尚不明确，但很可能围绕月球的拉格朗日点L-4和L-5展开，并借鉴麦金德的“中心地带理论”，提出如下表述：
An astrocentric school of thought devoted to military space, in early formative stages at this moment, concentrates on the Earth-Moon System (chapter 7), because interplanetary conflicts seem far in the future. The central theme is still indistinct, but may well revolve around lunar libration points L-4 and L-5, then adapt MacKinder’s Heartland Theory with words something like these:
谁主宰地球周围的空间，谁就主宰地球；
谁主宰月球，谁就主宰地球周围的空间；
谁主宰 L-4 和 L-5，谁就主宰地月系统。
Who rules circumterrestrial space commands Planet Earth;
Who rules the moon commands circumterrestrial space;
Who rules L-4 and L-5 commands the Earth-Moon System.
整合和更新的视图
INTEGRATED AND UPDATED VIEWS
来自陆海空四军力量倡导者的不同意见很有价值，因为它能让高级官员在做出决策之前，就任何特定的政治军事议题获得以军种为导向的观点。前国防部长罗伯特·S·麦克纳马拉的观点也同样正确，他写道：“我们可以想象美国必须准备应对的许多不同类型的战争，但陆军独立于海军作战，或海军独立于空军作战，绝不是其中之一。”15
Conflicting advice from land, sea, air, and space power advocates is valuable, because it provides senior officials with service-oriented opinions on any given political-military topic before they reach decisions. Former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara even so was right when he wrote, “We can imagine many different kinds of wars the United States must be prepared to fight, but a war in which the Army fights independently of the Navy, or the Navy independently of the Air Force is not one of them.”15
各军种在某些环境下具有优势，在另一些环境下则处于劣势。在森林茂密的地区和崎岖的地形中，陆军的作战效率通常高于空军；而在植被稀疏的平原地区，空军则具有显著优势。海上弹道导弹潜艇机动性强，且不易被敌方目标探测到，因此比停放在岸上混凝土发射井中的“活靶子”洲际弹道导弹（ICBM）更不容易遭受发射前攻击。因此，合理程度的集中控制，以及能够有效整合多军种能力的联合作战理论、联合教育和联合训练计划，显得尤为重要。
Each service as it stands is superior in some environments and inferior in others. Armies generally function more efficiently than air forces in heavily forested regions and rugged terrain, whereas air power is especially advantageous over sparsely covered plains. Ballistic missile submarines at sea, being mobile as well as invisible to enemy targeteers, are less vulnerable to prelaunch attacks than “sitting duck” intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in concrete silos ashore. Reasonable degrees of centralized control coupled with joint doctrines, joint education, and joint training programs that effectively integrate multiservice capabilities thus seem desirable.
麦金德、马汉、德·塞维尔斯基和其他地缘政治学者多年前表达的一些观点可能仍然合理，但所有这些观点都需要定期重新审视，如有必要，则需要进行新的解释或替换，因为政治、经济、社会、科学和技术的发展不断改变着地理环境与政治军事力量之间的关系。16麦金德深知变化，不仅在 1943 年将蒙古和青藏高原并入他的“心脏地带”，而且鉴于第二次世界大战期间发生的事件，他否定了自己 1919 年的宣言：“谁统治了心脏地带，谁就统治了世界岛。”17虽然并非所有人都赞同他的判断，但他开明的态度在这个动荡的世界中仍然值得效仿。
Some opinions that Mackinder, Mahan, de Seversky, and other geopolitical savants expressed many years ago may still be sound, but all require periodic reexaminations followed if necessary by fresh interpretations or replacements, because political, economic, social, scientific, and technological developments continually alter relationships between geographic circumstances and political-military power.16 Mackinder, well aware of change, not only tacked Mongolia and the Tibetan Plateau onto his Heartland in 1943 but, in light of events during World War II, repudiated his 1919 pronouncement, “Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island.”17 Not everyone concurred with his judgments, but his openminded attitude remains worth emulating in this turbulent world.
笔记
NOTES
1. R. Ernest 和 Trevor N. Dupuy，《哈珀军事史百科全书》，第4版（纽约：哈珀柯林斯出版社，1993 年），第 1-41 页；JFC Fuller，《西方世界军事史》，第 1 卷（纽约：Funk & Wagnalls 出版社，1954 年），第 1-52 页。
1. R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History, 4th ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 1-41; J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, vol. 1 (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1954), 1-52.
2.卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨，《战争论》，迈克尔·霍华德和彼得·帕雷特编辑和翻译（新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1976 年）。
2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
3. JC Wylie，《军事战略：权力控制的一般理论》（新泽西州新不伦瑞克：罗格斯大学出版社，1967 年），第 49-56 页。
3. J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967), 49-56.
4. Saul Bernard Cohen，《分裂世界的地理学》（纽约：兰登书屋，1963 年），第 2 章，地缘政治视角；Edward Mead Earle 编，《现代战略的缔造者：从马基雅维利到希特勒的军事思想》（新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1943 年），第 16 章。
4. Saul Bernard Cohen, Geography in a World Divided (New York: Random House, 1963), chapter 2, Geopolitical Perspectives; Edward Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943), chapter 16.
5. Halford J. MacKinder，“历史的地理枢纽”，《地理杂志》第 23 卷（1904 年）：421-444 页，以及《民主理想与现实》（纽约：亨利·霍尔特公司，1942 年；原版于 1919 年在伦敦出版）。
5. Halford J. MacKinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” Geographical Journal XXIII (1904): 421-444, and Democratic Ideals and Reality (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1942; original publication in London, 1919).
6. Wylie，《军事战略》，第 39-42、49、50、56 页。
6. Wylie, Military Strategy, 39-42, 49, 50, 56.
7.史汀生部长在威廉·雷泽尔的《马汉论海洋的运用》一文中被引用，该文发表于《海军战争学院评论》（1973 年 5 月至 6 月），第 73 页。
7. Secretary Stimson is quoted in William Reitzel, “Mahan on the Use of the Sea,” Naval War College Review (May-June): 1973, 73.
8. Julian Corbett，《海军战略的一些原则》（马里兰州安纳波利斯：美国海军学院出版社），第 87 页。有关详细说明，请参阅 B. Mitchell Simpson III 编，《海军思想的发展：赫伯特·罗辛斯基论文集》（罗德岛州纽波特：海军战争学院出版社，1977 年）。
8. Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Naval Strategy (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press), 87. For elaboration, see B. Mitchell Simpson, III, ed., The Development of Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977).
9.阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉，《海权对历史的影响，1660-1783》，美国世纪系列（纽约：希尔和王出版社，1957 年；原出版于 1890 年）。
9. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, American Century Series (New York: Hill and Wang, 1957; originally published in 1890).
10.阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉，《亚洲问题及其对国际政策的影响》（波士顿：利特尔·布朗出版社，1900 年）。
10. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Problem of Asia and Its Effect Upon International Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1900).
11. Wylie，《军事战略》，42-48，56；Dennis M. Drew，“联合行动：从 10,000 英尺高空看世界” 《空军杂志》2，第 3 期（1988 年秋季）：4-16。
11. Wylie, Military Strategy, 42-48, 56; Dennis M. Drew, “Joint Operations: The World Looks Different from 10,000 Feet,” Airpower Journal 2, no. 3 (Fall 1988): 4-16.
12.朱利奥·杜黑，《空军指挥》，理查德·H·科恩和约瑟夫·P·哈拉汉编辑，迪诺·法拉利译（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1983 年）。另见伯纳德·布罗迪，《杜黑的遗产》，空军大学季刊VI（1953 年）：64-69、120-126。
12. Guilio Douhet, Command of the Air, eds. Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan, trans. Dino Ferrari (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983). See also Bernard Brodie, “The Heritage of Douhet,” Air University Quarterly Review VI (1953): 64-69, 120-126.
13. Alexander de Seversky，《空军力量：生存的关键》（纽约：西蒙与舒斯特出版社，1950 年）；《现代战略的缔造者》，第 20 章。
13. Alexander de Seversky, Air Power: Key to Survival (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950); Makers of Modern Strategy, chapter 20.
14.伯克·戴维斯，《比利·米切尔事件》（纽约：兰登书屋，1967 年）。
14. Burke Davis, The Billy Mitchell Affair (New York: Random House, 1967).
15. Robert S. McNamara，《安全的本质：办公室反思》（纽约：哈珀与罗出版社，1968 年），第 91 页。
15. Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 91.
16. Preston E. James，“国家力量的动态”，《军事评论》（1963 年 5 月）：17-25。
16. Preston E. James, “Dynamics of National Power,” Military Review (May 1963): 17-25.
17. Halford J. MacKinder 爵士，“圆世界与和平的赢得”，《外交事务》（1943 年 7 月）：595-605。
17. Sir Halford J. MacKinder, “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace,” Foreign Affairs (July 1943): 595-605.
15. 地缘政治摩擦
15. GEOPOLITICAL FRICTION
好篱笆造就好邻居。
Good fences make good neighbors.
罗伯特·弗罗斯特
《修墙》，1914年
Robert Frost
Mending Wall, 1914
大多数地缘政治摩擦，包括战争，都源于陆地或沿海地区，那里人口众多，追求着相互冲突的目标。许多敏感地带和冲突点都源于地理因素，其中领土争端和环境冲突或许最为常见。良好的围栏未必总能造就良好的邻里关系，但双方都能接受的边界划分以及避免产生不利区域（甚至全球）影响的环境措施，通常有助于减少潜在的、可能引发武装冲突的国际争端。
MOST GEOPOLITICAL FRICTION, INCLUDING WARS, ORIGINATES ON LAND OR ALONG LITTORALS WHERE masses of humanity pursue conflicting purposes. Many sore spots and flash points have geographic origins, of which contentious territorial claims and environmental altercations perhaps are most common. Good fences may not always make good neighbors, but mutually agreeable boundaries and environmental practices that avoid adverse regional (even global) side effects generally help reduce the number of potentially explosive international disputes that otherwise could lead to armed combat.
领土范围
TERRITORIAL LIMITS
在人口稀少、分布广泛、资源相对丰富且测绘技术尚不发达的年代，稀疏的居住地或空旷的地区分隔着各个主权领土。1493年5月4日，教皇亚历山大六世承诺将亚速尔群岛和佛得角群岛以西100里格（300英里，483公里）处一条南北线以东的所有新发现土地划归葡萄牙，并将该纬度以西的所有新发现土地划归西班牙，这是历史上第一个明确界定的政治边界。次年，《托尔德西拉斯条约》将边界线向西延伸了810英里（1285公里），巴西正式成为葡萄牙的领土，并于1506年获得教皇尤利乌斯二世的批准。17世纪初，随着民族国家的激增，法律上的边界迅速取代了事实上的边界和模糊不清的国界。
Sparsely settled or empty spaces separated sovereign territories when small human populations were widely scattered, valuable resources were relatively abundant, and surveying skills were rudimentary. The first sharply-defined political boundary appeared on May 4, 1493, when Pope Alexander VI promised Portugal all newly found lands east of a north-south line 100 leagues (300 miles, 483 kilometers) west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands and allocated to Spain all newly-found lands west of that latitude. Brazil formally became a Portuguese possession after the Treaty of Tordesillas drew the line 810 miles (1,285 kilometers) farther west the following year and Pope Julius II approved in 1506. De jure boundaries rapidly replaced de facto borders and ill-defined frontiers early in the 17th century when nation states proliferated.
领土边界
TERRESTRIAL BOUNDARIES
对于制图师来说，在地图上绘制边界远比政治家和军队在地球表面寻找边界容易得多，因为边界标志充其量是零星分布的，最糟糕的情况是根本不存在。例如，在分隔美国和加拿大的3146英里（5063公里）长的边界线上，大约分布着8200个界碑；而在毛里塔尼亚和西撒哈拉之间970英里（1560公里）长的荒漠地带，只有22个界碑，其中一半位于布朗角附近。
Boundaries are much easier for cartographers to draw on maps than for statesmen and armed forces to find on Earth’s surface, because markers at best are intermittent and at worst are nonexistent. Approximately 8,200 pillars are distributed along the 3,146-mile (5,063-kilometer) border that separates the United States from Canada, for example, whereas only 22 dot the 970-mile (1,560-kilometer) wasteland between Mauritania and Western Sahara, of which half are located around Cap Blanc
地形边界。易于识别的地形特征看似是理想的边界，但沿着最高山脊划定的边界线却会让政府不满，因为出于各种原因，他们更希望沿着流域划线。沿着河岸、中央线或最深河道划定的河流边界容易发生偏移，导致一侧领土增加，另一侧领土减少，并引发关于河中岛屿的问题。1 —20 世纪 60 年代中苏分裂后的紧张时期，阿穆尔河谷和乌苏里河谷的苏联和中国边防军之间反复发生的冲突得到了严格控制，因为当地的斗殴可能会升级到危险的程度。2湖泊边界造成了类似的问题，新石器时代的尼普穆克印第安人在今天的马萨诸塞州韦伯斯特附近解决了这个问题，他们将自己的湖泊命名为Chargoggagoggmanchaugagoggchaubunagungamaugg（“你在你的那边钓鱼，我在我的那边钓鱼，没有人会在中间钓鱼”）。
Topographical Boundaries. Easily recognizable topographic features may seem to be ideal boundaries, but marks that follow the loftiest mountain crests displease governments that, for various reasons, want lines along watersheds. River boundaries that stick to either bank, a median line, or the deepest channel are subject to shifts that add territory on one side, subtract from the other, and raise questions concerning islands in stream1—recurrent clashes between Soviet and Chinese border guards in the Amur and Ussuri Valleys were tightly controlled during tense days after the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, because local brawls could have escalated to dangerous levels.2 Lake boundaries cause similar problems that neolithic Nipmuc Indians near present day Webster, Massachusetts, solved when they named their lake Chargoggagoggmanchaugagoggchaubunagungamaugg (”you fish on your side, I’ll fish on mine, no one fishes in the middle”).
抽象的边界。国际边界通常以直线划定，横穿大地，却很少或根本不顾及生活在其上的人们。阿拉伯半岛上此类抽象的边界线在鲁卜哈利沙漠（空域）消失得无影无踪。鲁卜哈利沙漠人口稀少，仅有少数贝都因部落居住，却蕴藏着丰富的自然资源。欧洲殖民者很久以前就将直线划满了非洲。3.从1945年8月到1953年7月，三八线任意地将朝鲜半岛南北分隔开来，直到一条穿过非军事区（DMZ）的停战线取而代之。同样，从1954年7月到1975年4月，十七度线和非军事区也曾将越南南北分隔开来长达21年。
Abstract Boundaries. International boundaries often follow straight lines that cut across landscapes with little or no regard for people who live thereon. Several abstractions of that sort on the Arabian Peninsula disappear without a trace in the Rub’ al-Khali (the Empty Quarter), which is lightly populated by only a few Bedouin tribes but contains potentially rich natural resources. European colonists long ago laced Africa with straight lines.3 The 38th Parallel arbitrarily separated North and South Korea from August 1945 until July 1953, when an armistice line that bisected a demilitarized zone (DMZ) replaced it. The 17th Parallel and DMZ similarly separated North and South Vietnam for 21 years between July 1954 and April 1975.
蜿蜒曲折的边界线，以及笔直的边界线，有时与现实世界的实际情况并不相符。以色列的例子或许最能印证这一点：自1948年以来，以色列一直被困于停战线和被占领土的非正式边界之后。由两个或多个不连续部分组成的国家很少能长久存在。例如，希特勒在1939年强行将东普鲁士与德意志祖国重新统一，而就在20年前，《凡尔赛条约》才在东普鲁士与其母国之间设置了但泽走廊。相距900英里（1450公里）的东巴基斯坦和西巴基斯坦，从1947年脱离印度开始，到1971年东巴基斯坦成为政治独立的孟加拉国，存在时间不足25年。
Squiggly as well as straight line boundaries sometimes correlate poorly with real world considerations, a fact perhaps best confirmed by Israel, which has been barricaded behind armistice lines and the unofficial borders of occupied territories since 1948. States that contain two or more discontinuous segments seldom enjoy great longevity. Hitler, for example, forcibly reunited East Prussia with the German Fatherland in 1939, just 20 years after the Treaty of Versailles interposed the Danzig Corridor between that province and its parent. East Pakistan and West Pakistan, 900 miles apart (1,450 kilometers), persisted fewer than 25 years from their inception in 1947, when they separated from India, until East Pakistan became politically independent Bangladesh in 1971.
有些陆地边界的划定缺乏对地形、文化或经济现实的考量，但最终都会趋于稳定（例如，美国和加拿大在1903年解决了最后一次重大边界争端），然而许多边界却会成为地缘政治的痛点。历史经验值得我们密切关注，以免突发事件爆发。
Some terrestrial boundaries drawn with little regard for physiographic, cultural, or economic realities stabilize sooner or later (the United States and Canada settled their last significant border dispute in 1903), but many become geopolitical sore spots. Historical experiences bear close observation, lest troubles erupt unexpectedly.
领海
TERRITORIAL WATERS
将领海与公海分隔开来并限制邻近沿海国家主权的离岸边界，引发了高度敏感的政治、军事和经济问题，政治家和律师至今尚未找到普遍接受的答案，尽管到 1997 年已有 112 个国家和其他实体批准了一项全面的《联合国海洋法公约》（UNCLOS），其中包括以下条款：4
Offshore boundaries that separate territorial waters from high seas and limit the sovereignty of adjacent coastal states raise highly-charged political-military and economic questions for which statesmen and lawyers have not yet found universally acceptable answers, even though 112 states and other entities by 1997 had ratified a comprehensive United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which included the following provisions:4
• 在和平时期，外国船舶可行使“无害通过权”的领海范围限定在12海里（22公里）以内。
• A 12-nautical mile (22 kilometer) limitation on territorial seas within which foreign vessels are authorized to exercise the right of “innocent passage” in peacetime
• 在距海岸12海里范围内的毗连区内，沿海国有权对海关、财政、移民和卫生方面的法律法规行使管辖权。
• A contiguous zone up to 12 more nautical miles within which coastal states are authorized to exercise control over laws and regulations concerning customs, fiscal matters, immigration, and sanitation
• 200海里（370公里）专属经济区（EEZ），沿海国在该区域内有权对其自然资源行使主权，并对部分科学研究和环境项目行使管辖权。
• A 200-nm (370-kilometer) exclusive economic zone (EEZ) within which coastal states are authorized to exercise sovereignty over natural resources and jurisdiction over some scientific research and environmental projects
• 专属经济区可向海延伸最多 350 海里（650 公里），只要真正的陆架延伸到该范围即可。
• EEZs may extend seaward a maximum of 350-nm (650 kilometers) wherever the true continental shelf extends that far
• 大陆架以外的所有区域都保留为“全人类共同遗产”。
• All areas beyond the continental shelf are reserved for “the common heritage of mankind”
• 海军舰艇和商船队被授权在狭窄的领海内享有航行自由，其中超过三分之一的领海宽度不足 24 海里。
• Naval ships and merchant marines are authorized freedom of navigation in narrow territorial waters, more than one-third of which are less than 24 nautical miles wide.
• 所有国家均有权飞越专属经济区。
• All states are authorized to overfly EEZs.
然而，漏洞依然存在。每个沿海国都可以自由地以有利于自身利益的方式来定义“无害通过”。主权声索的范围仍然从3海里到200海里（5.5公里到370公里）不等，其中一些非洲和南美洲国家属于后一类。马尔代夫和菲律宾都声称对其最外围的岛屿和环礁拥有领海权。美国反对任何阻碍深海海底矿产资源开发的条款，因此尚未批准该公约。5
Loopholes nevertheless remain. Each coastal state is free to define “innocent passage” in ways that promote its interests. Sovereignty claims still range from 3 to 200 nautical miles (5.5 to 370 kilometers), with several African and South American countries in the latter category. The Maldives and Philippines both profess territorial water rights within boundaries that include their outermost islands and atolls. The United States, which opposes provisions that deter development of deep sea-bed mineral resources, has not ratified the Convention.5
领土索赔管理费
TERRITORIAL CLAIMS OVERHEAD
“多高才算高？”这个问题将始终是个谜，直到空域法与海洋法相辅相成，而海洋法旨在解答“多远才算远？”这个问题。目前，每个国家上空到某个未明确高度的大气层都属于主权领土，允许其所有者在未经批准的情况下禁止他人通过，但这种批准并非总是能够获得。1958 年，黎巴嫩总统请求军事援助时，意大利、希腊、奥地利和瑞士拒绝为美国武装部队提供从德国到土耳其集结基地的直接路线。1986 年 4 月 15 日，驻扎在英国的7 架美国攻击机不得不绕道法国和西班牙前往利比亚，轰炸了的黎波里和班加西的部分地区，以报复“革命领袖”穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲此前在柏林支持的恐怖袭击。1976 年 7 月，以色列在乌干达恩德培成功营救人质，这完全是因为以色列飞行员侵犯了缺乏现代防空系统的非洲国家的领空。9目前还没有任何文件规定在月球或太空中划定领土主权的垂直或水平边界。
“How high is up?” will remain an enigma until laws of air and space complement laws of the sea, which seek to answer the question, “How far is out?” The atmosphere over every country to some unspecified altitude currently is sovereign territory that allows owners to forbid transit without their approval, which is not always forthcoming.6 Italy, Greece, Austria, and Switzerland denied U.S. Armed Forces direct routes from Germany to staging bases in Turkey when the President of Lebanon requested military help in 1958.7 U.S. attack aircraft based in Britain had to take long detours around France and Spain en route to Libya, where they bombed parts of Tripoli and Benghazi on April 15, 1986, in retaliation for a terrorist attack that “Revolutionary Leader” Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi previously backed in Berlin.8 The spectacularly successful hostage rescue operation at Entebbe, Uganda, in July 1976 was possible only because Israeli flight crews violated the air space of African countries that lacked modern air defense systems.9 No document yet prescribes vertical or horizontal boundaries that define territorial sovereignty on the moon or in free space.
战略摩擦
STRATEGIC FRICTION
古人警告说：“你们必听见战争和战争的风声……因为民要攻打民，国要攻打国。”10当然，随着 20 世纪接近尾声，地缘政治摩擦层出不穷，也没有任何迹象表明武装冲突会很快停止（表 24）。11.边界争端、主权声索、人口快速增长、自然资源匮乏、干旱引发的饥荒、由此导致的大规模人口迁徙、宗教冲突、种族、民族和部落间的紧张关系以及恶劣的环境条件都是造成这些问题的因素。应急计划制定者试图对所有问题进行大致的优先排序，他们首先关注那些可能危及全球的冲突，其次是其他显而易见的冲突。对区域安全的威胁。看似仅限于局部地区的冲突往往被忽视，但准确判断冲突性质通常难以做到，因为即使是小规模的内战也可能在几乎没有预警的情况下蔓延，并造成意想不到的后果。
Ancient words warn, “You shall hear of wars and rumors of wars ... for nation shall rise against nation and kingdom against kingdom.”10 Certainly, there is no shortage of geopolitical friction as the 20th century draws to a close, nor any sign that armed conflicts will soon cease (table 24).11 Boundary disputes, contentious sovereignty claims, galloping population growth, insufficient natural resources, drought-induced starvation, resultant mass migrations, religious rivalries, racial-ethnic-tribal tensions, and intolerable environmental conditions are contributing factors. Contingency planners who try to put the lot in rough priority concentrate on embranglements that could endanger the globe, followed by apparent threats to regional security. Altercations that seem to have strictly local implications get shorter shrift, but accurate determinations often are elusive, because even small civil wars are liable to spread with little warning and unintended consequences.
Table 24. Typical Trouble Spots, Mid-1990s
内战
CIVIL STRIFE
领土争端
CONTENTIOUS TERRITORIAL CLAIMS
以下将描述两起规模宏大的战略冲突。一起涉及苏联吞并中欧缓冲国，另一起则涉及中国与其苏联邻国之间持续存在的争端。围绕关键海峡控制权的争端则体现了较低层次的战略对峙。
Two strategic altercations on a grand scale are described below. One involved the Soviet absorption of buffer states in Central Europe, the other concerns simmering disputes between China and its Soviet neighbor. Disputes about the control of key straits illustrate strategic standoffs at a lower level.
苏联缓冲区
SOVIET BUFFER ZONE
从 1939 年开始，约瑟夫·斯大林大元帅吞并了三个国家和另外五个国家的部分地区，以便在苏联和西欧的假想敌人之间建立一个缓冲区（地图 44）。爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚、立陶宛、白俄罗斯西部和加利西亚（从波兰割让而来），以及北布科维纳和比萨拉比亚的大部分地区（从罗马尼亚夺取），为苏联在波罗的海提供了相对无冰的通道，并在希特勒1941年6月入侵之前，进一步扩大了其南部的防御范围。1940年，斯大林从战败的芬兰手中夺取卡累利阿和维堡地区后，苏联军队占领了所有从西部直达列宁格勒的通道。1944年，芬兰的佩琴加地区（位于摩尔曼斯克以西95公里处）为苏联在这一重要港口和纳粹占领的挪威之间提供了更多的缓冲空间。1945年吞并鲁塞尼亚（外喀尔巴阡捷克斯洛伐克）不仅将苏联的缓冲区从波罗的海一直延伸到黑海，而且还意外地将斯拉夫少数民族与同属一个民族的乌克兰人联合了起来。12
Generalissimo Joseph Stalin annexed three countries and parts of five others to provide a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and perceived enemies in Western Europe beginning in 1939 (map 44). Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Western Belorussia and Galicia (stripped from Poland), together with Northern Bukovina and most of Bessarabia (wrested from Romania), gave the Soviet Union relatively ice-free windows on the Baltic Sea and added depth farther south before Hitler invaded in June 1941. Soviet Armed Forces occupied all direct approaches to Leningrad from the west after Stalin acquired Karelia and the Vyborg District from defeated Finland in 1940. Finland’s Pechenga Territory, 60 miles (95 kilometers) west of Murmansk, afforded a bit more breathing room between that crucial port and Nazi-occupied Norway in 1944. The absorption of Ruthenia (Transcarpathian Czechoslovakia) in 1945 not only extended the Soviet buffer zone all the way from the Baltic to the Black Sea but, as a bonus, united Slavic minorities with kindred Ukranians.12
Map 44. Soviet Buffers in Central Euro
此后，斯大林吞并了中欧的大部分地区，然后拉下了臭名昭著的铁幕。1955年，七个由共产党统治的国家——阿尔巴尼亚、保加利亚、捷克斯洛伐克、东德、匈牙利、波兰和罗马尼亚——签署了《华沙友好、合作与互助条约》，此后，除一个国家外，其余所有国家都沦为苏联的傀儡和棋子，直到1991年7月华沙条约正式解体前不久（阿尔巴尼亚因政策分歧于1968年断绝了关系）。13东德和西德1990年10月3日重新统一；此后不久，俄罗斯放弃了波罗的海三国，并吞并了如今白俄罗斯、乌克兰和摩尔多瓦的部分领土；尽管俄罗斯反对，一些国家仍寻求加入北约，其中最引人注目的是波兰、匈牙利、捷克和斯洛伐克。14斯大林四十多年前精心构建的缓冲区，就这样迅速消失了。
Stalin thereafter swallowed most of Central Europe, then rang down an infamous Iron Curtain. Seven countries with communist-dominated regimes—Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania—signed the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in 1955, after which all but one served as Soviet cat’s paws and pawns until a bit before the Warsaw Pact formally disintegrated in July 1991 (Albania severed ties in 1968 because of policy disputes).13 East and West Germany reunited on October 3, 1990; Russia soon thereafter relinquished the three Baltic States and annexed lands in what now are Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldavia; several nations, despite Russian objections, sought membership in NATO, most notably Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia14 The buffer zone that Stalin had assembled so methodically forty some years earlier in short disappeared.
中国边界争端
CHINESE BORDER DISPUTES
19世纪中期，中国皇帝和俄国沙皇划定的边界赋予俄国对黑龙江以北18.5万平方英里（48万平方公里）、乌苏里江以东大片海域以及中亚35万平方英里（90万平方公里）的领土主权（见地图45）。随后，苏联和中华民国政权于1924年同意重新审议双方边界，但由于中国领导人忙于内战和抵御日本侵略，相关行动在接下来的25年里一直处于搁置状态。1949年，中国共产党取得胜利并与莫斯科建立了紧密联系，此后又和平地度过了11年。尽管如此，在北京出版的《中国近代简史》仍声称苏联远东、哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦的大片地区是“被帝国主义夺取的中国领土”。15
Boundaries that Chinese emperors and Russian tsars established in the mid-1800s gave Russia sovereignty over 185,000 square miles (480,000 square kilometers) north of the Amur River, huge maritime territories east of the Ussuri, and 350,000 square miles (900,000 square kilometers) in Central Asia (map 45). Subsequently installed regimes in the Soviet Union and Republic of China agreed to reconsider mutual boundaries in 1924, but related actions remained in abeyance for the next 25 years, because Chinese leaders were preoccupied with civil wars and Japanese invaders. Eleven more years passed peacefully after Communist China emerged victorious in 1949 and established strong links with Moscow, even though A Short History of Modern China, published in Beijing, laid claim to large parts of the Soviet Far East, Kazakstan, Kirghistan, and Tajikistan as “Chinese territories taken by imperialism.”15
Map 45. Chinese Border Disputes
大约在1960年，随着中苏协约开始瓦解，边界争端开始真正爆发。第一次大规模冲突发生在1964年初秋的新疆，当时穆斯林对中国压迫统治的不满情绪激起，约5万名哈萨克族、维吾尔族和其他少数民族发动暴乱，随后逃往苏联避难。1967年，远东边境的紧张局势达到顶峰，愤怒的民众围攻苏联驻北京大使馆长达两周多。双方一度在边境集结了总计60万兵力——苏联方面近40个师，中国方面可能也有50到60个师。 1969 年 3 月，大曼斯基岛（中国人称之为站宝岛）两次成为激烈战斗的发生地；同年 8 月，新疆准噶尔关又发生冲突；此后双方都努力缓和局势，部分原因是当时双方都拥有核武器及其运载系统，可以到达对方的核心区域。16然而，中国从未放弃过其主张，如果中国军事力量继续扩张而俄罗斯武装力量减弱，未来的领导人可能会大力追求这些主张。
Boundary disputes bubbled in earnest about 1960, when the Sino-Soviet entente started to split. The first large-scale clashes occurred in Xinjiang Province during early autumn 1964, when Muslim resentment against repressive Chinese rule motivated about 50,000 Kazakhs, Uighurs, and other ethnic groups to riot, then take shelter in the Soviet Union. Tensions along the Far Eastern frontier reached a fever pitch in 1967 after howling mobs besieged the Soviet Embassy in Beijing for more than 2 weeks. Both sides briefly massed a total of 600,000 troops along the border—nearly 40 divisions on the Soviet side and perhaps 50 or 60 Chinese counterparts. Damansky Island (Zhanbao to the Chinese) was twice the site of stiff fighting in March 1969, followed in August by confrontations at Xinjiang’s Dzungarian Gate, after which both sides took pains to defuse situations, partly because each at that point possessed nuclear weapons with delivery systems that could reach the other’s core areas.16 China, however, has never renounced its claims, which future leaders might vigorously pursue if Chinese military power continues to expand while Russian armed strength subsides.
咽喉要道控制
CHOKE POINT CONTROL
伊朗和阿拉伯联合酋长国之间就阿布穆萨岛的控制权发生争执，阿布穆萨岛是一个位于霍尔木兹海峡的小岛，就像瓶塞一样。17.英国和西班牙之间围绕直布罗陀的争端，直布罗陀是大西洋与地中海的交汇处。18个典型案例表明，这些热点地区对争端各方而言战略意义较小，但对经常依赖途经这些地区的海上航道的旁观者而言却意义重大。阿根廷和智利都声称对麦哲伦海峡拥有主权，两国之间的争端便是其中之一。19俄罗斯（自二战以来一直占领千岛群岛）与日本之间充满敌意的关系，是争端中当事人比外界更感兴趣的典型例子。20
Arguments between Iran and the United Arab Emirates over control of Abu Musa, a tiny island that sits in the Strait of Hormuz like a cork in a bottle,17 and squabbles between Britain and Spain about Gibraltar, where the Atlantic Ocean meets the Mediterranean Sea,18 typify trouble spots that are of less strategic significance to disputants than to bystanders who routinely rely on sea lanes that pass through. Controversies that involve Argentina and Chile, both of whom claim sovereignty over the Strait of Magellan,19 and rancorous relations between Russia, which has held the Kuril Islands since World War II, and Japan, typify quarrels that are of greater interest to the contestants than to outsiders.20
经济摩擦
ECONOMIC FRICTION
那些“缺乏”资源的国家，就像把鼻子贴在糖果店橱窗上的孩子一样，渴望拥有“拥有”资源的国家所拥有的一切。1997年7月1日香港主权由英国移交中国后，人们对香港未来走向的猜测，主要集中在香港作为国际贸易枢纽的商业价值上。21贫困的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国显然希望通过吸收非军事区以南的多元化产业、富饶的农业用地和技术先进的劳动力来增强其经济实力基础，因为在非军事区以南，韩国最贫困的居民的生活状况比北方除精英阶层以外的所有人都要好得多。22
“Have not” nations, like children with noses against candy store windows, hunger for what “have” nations have. Speculation about what would happen after Hong Kong passed from British to Chinese sovereignty on July 1, 1997, centered on that city’s commercial value as a trading center at international crossroads.21 The destitute Democratic People’s Republic of Korea clearly would like to embellish its economic power base by absorbing diversified industries, rich agricultural lands, and technologically advanced work forces south of the demilitarized zone, where the poorest inhabitants of South Korea are infinitely better off than all but elitists up north.22
有两个经济驱动的棘手问题值得详细阐述，因为它们都涉及多个竞争者，而且表面上都毫无价值。目前有六个国家觊觎南沙群岛的全部或部分区域，主要原因是地质勘测表明近海蕴藏着丰富的未开发油气资源。如果正如预期的那样，冰层下的自然资源储量丰富，科学家研发出经济高效的开采方法，并且相互冲突的土地所有权主张无法调和，那么最终七个国家可能会在南极洲发生冲突。
Two economically driven trouble spots deserve elaboration, because both involve several competitors and both are barren on the surface. Six countries currently covet all or some of the Spratly Islands essentially because geological surveys suggest vast untapped oil and gas reservoirs offshore. Seven countries eventually could collide in Antarctica if, as expected, natural resources beneath the ice prove extensive, scientists devise cost-effective extraction procedures, and conflicting real estate claims prove irreconcilable.
南沙群岛
THE SPRATLY ISLANDS
南沙群岛由 12 个主要岛屿和 600 多个沙洲、岩石露头、珊瑚礁、环礁、沙洲、浅滩和暗礁组成，位于南中国海，距离胡志明市（大多数外人记得的西贡）东南约 250 英里（360 公里）（地图 46）。23南沙群岛总面积不足一平方英里（约2.3平方公里），其中部分岛屿仅在退潮时可见——最大的岛屿伊藤阿布岛面积为90英亩。在争夺潜在丰富的石油资源之前，除了海龟和海鸟之外，几乎没有其他生物喜欢这片荒凉的栖息地。如今，南沙群岛已成为东南亚的冲突热点。中国、台湾和越南声称对整个南沙群岛拥有主权，菲律宾则寻求对其中大部分岛屿的主权，而文莱和马来西亚则觊觎其中一小部分。南部海域各声索国之间存在争议，尽管没有任何国家在任何地方维持平民定居点，也没有任何国家在二战后才建立持续的军事存在。然而，台湾目前在伊藤阿武岛部署了一个营级规模的部队，并在那里修建了一个小型港口和一条简易机场跑道。除文莱外，其他所有声索国都在几个岛屿上部署了军队，并且都竭力突出各自的声索。迄今为止最激烈的冲突发生在1988年3月，当时中国炮艇击沉了三艘越南船只，造成77名船员丧生。但大多数声索国仍在继续摧毁对方的标志物、逮捕对方渔民，并采取其他激怒对方的行动。24
The Spratly Islands consist of 12 main islets and 600-odd cays, rocky outcroppings, coral reefs, atolls, sand bars, banks, and shoals in the South China Sea about 250 miles (360 kilometers) east and southeast of Ho Chi Minh City, which most outsiders remember as Saigon (map 46).23 The total land area, some of which is visible only at low tide, covers less than one square mile (about 2.3 square kilometers)—Ito Abu, the largest islet, occupies 90 acres. Few creatures other than turtles and sea fowl were fond of that forbidding habitat before competition for potentially rich oil reserves turned the Spratly Island complex into a Southeast Asian flashpoint. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim the Spratlys in toto, the Philippines seek entitlements to most of them, while Brunei and Malaysia covet small segments in the southern sector, although no nation maintains civilian settlements anywhere and none established a continuous military presence until after World War II. Taiwan, however, currently deploys a battalion-sized force on Ito Abu, where it built what passes for a small port and a short airstrip. All other contenders except Brunei position troops on several islets, and all take great pains to mark their claims prominently. The sharpest skirmish thus far occurred in March 1988, when Chinese gunboats sank three Vietnamese ships that together lost 77 sailors, but most claimants continue to destroy rival markers, arrest rival fishermen, and take other actions that infuriate adversaries.24
中国发言人反复暗示，中国可能会寻求对整个南海拥有主权，这种前景既造成了战略摩擦，也带来了经济摩擦，因为中东油田和东北亚之间的生命线都经过这片水域。
Prospects that China might seek sovereignty over the entire South China Sea, as its spokesmen repeatedly imply, couples strategic with economic friction, because lifelines between Middle East oil fields and Northeast Asia pass through that body of water.
因此，南沙群岛争端的调解，或许会通过军事手段进行，但有朝一日可能会产生超出该地区范围的不稳定影响。
Reconciliation of disputes in the Spratlys, perhaps by military means, consequently could some day have destabilizing effects that reach far beyond the immediate region.
南极洲
ANTARCTICA
环绕南极点的南极洲与世隔绝，夏季面积是欧洲的两倍，冬季冰架在其边缘形成时，面积则是欧洲的四倍。除了企鹅之外，没有其他陆生脊椎动物能够忍受这里严酷的严寒，气温经常低于零下100华氏度（零下73.3摄氏度），暴风雪肆虐，风速有时超过每小时200英里（320公里）。然而，在冰冷的海水中，却生活着大量具有经济价值的鲸鱼、食用鱼类和富含蛋白质的甲壳类动物——磷虾。一些探险家怀疑，这里还蕴藏着利润丰厚的石油储量和丰富的矿藏。
Isolated Antarctica, which surrounds the South Pole, is twice the size of Europe during its “summer” season and four times as large in winter, when ice shelves form along peripheries. No native land-based vertebrates save penguins brave the brutal cold that frequently dips below -100 °F (-73.3 °C) and blizzards whipped by winds that sometimes surpass 200 miles per hour (320 kilometers per hour), but economically valuable whales, food fish, and protein-rich crustaceans called krill teem in the frigid waters, while some explorers suspect the presence of lucrative oil reserves as well as abundant mineral deposits.
阿根廷、澳大利亚、英国、智利、法国、新西兰和挪威目前都对南极洲的部分地区提出主权声索，这些声索在某些地区存在重叠。阿根廷和智利还宣布在其声称拥有主权的区域外设立200海里的专属经济区（EEZ）；南设得兰群岛是阿根廷、英国和智利三方争端的焦点；阿根廷和英国则对南奥克尼群岛、南乔治亚群岛、南桑威奇群岛以及沙格岩礁（地图47）的主权归属存在争议。25
Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New Zealand, and Norway currently claim slices of Antarctica that, in several instances, overlap. Argentina and Chile additionally declare 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) off the sectors they say they own; the South Shetland Islands are subjects of tripartite disputes by Argentina, Britain, and Chile; and Argentina and Britain contest possession of the South Orkneys, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands, plus tiny Shag Rocks (map 47).25
1961年《南极条约》于1997年由42个国家签署，该条约冻结了现有的领土主张30年，禁止提出新的主张，禁止军事行动，取缔核武器，并禁止在南极大陆任何地方处置放射性废物，以维护地球上唯一未受战争、瘟疫和环境污染侵袭的原始状态。1980年的修正案限制了海洋资源的开发利用，1991年又颁布了为期50年的采矿禁令。然而，一些问题仍悬而未决，因为阿根廷和智利都没有放弃与英国领土主张相符的领土主张，而美国和俄罗斯既不承认其他国家的主张，也不放弃确立自身主张的权利。如果已确认的自然资源使得中立立场无利可图，那么冰冷的南极洲可能会升温。
The Antarctic Treaty of 1961, signed by 42 nations as of 1997, froze existing territorial claims for 30 years, forbade new ones, banned military operations, outlawed nuclear weapons, and prohibited the disposal of radioactive waste anywhere on that continent to maintain in a pristine state the only place on Planet Earth that has escaped war, pestilence, and environmental pollution. Amendments in 1980 restricted the exploitation of marine resources and in 1991 imposed a 50-year ban on mining. Loose ends dangle nonetheless, because neither Argentina nor Chile has relinquished territorial claims that coincide with those of Britain, and neither the United States nor Russia recognizes the claims of other powers or waives the right to establish its own. Ice-cold Antarctica could heat up if confirmed natural resources make neutral positions unprofitable.
文化摩擦
CULTURAL FRICTION
血缘关系往往会在文化利益和生活方式发生冲突时滋生持久的仇恨，因为血浓于水。天主教徒和新教徒至今仍未找到在北爱尔兰和平共处的模式。27名无国籍的库尔德人，被所有人围困，无人友好，在土耳其东南部、伊拉克东北部和伊朗西北部的山区边境地区不断游荡，寻找家园。28卢旺达和布隆迪胡图族和图西族之间的种族灭绝战斗仍在继续，并蔓延到刚果东部，那里的难民营在 1996-97 年变成了死亡陷阱。29古老的种族、宗教和语言仇恨，伴随着波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那的“种族清洗”，在 20 世纪 90 年代席卷了整个前南斯拉夫，涉及东正教塞尔维亚人、罗马天主教克罗地亚人、斯洛文尼亚人、斯拉夫穆斯林、阿尔巴尼亚人、马其顿人、黑山人，以及可能还有 15 个较小的群体。30
Bloodlines foster enduring enmities when cultural interests and lifestyles collide, because blood indeed is thicker than water. Catholics and Protestants have not yet found a formula that lets them coexist peacefully in Northern Ireland.27 Stateless Kurds beset by all and befriended by none wander ceaselessly across mountainous frontiers in southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, and northwestern Iran in search of a homeland.28 Genocidal combat between Hutu and Tutsi tribes continues in Rwanda and Burundi, with spillovers into eastern Congo, where refugee camps became death traps in 1996-97.29 Ancient ethnic, religious, and linguistic animosities, accompanied by “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia-Herzegovina, flared throughout former Yugoslavia in the 1990s among Orthodox Christian Serbs, Roman Catholic Croats, Slovines, Slavic Muslims, Albanians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and perhaps 15 smaller groups.30
有些文化冲突局限于局部或区域，而另一些则影响深远。例如，在非洲之角，埃塞俄比亚、索马里、肯尼亚和苏丹等拥有常规武器的国家之间发生的不友好关系，似乎不太可能蔓延到现有边界之外；而克什米尔地区的冲突则可能迅速升级，规模和强度都会大幅增加，因为中国、印度和巴基斯坦都拥有核武器。
Some cultural conflicts are local or regional, while others have widespread ramifications. Uncordial relations that involve conventionally-armed Ethiopians, Somalis, Kenyans, and Sudanese in the Horn of Africa, for example, seem unlikely to spread far beyond present boundaries, whereas altercations in Kashmir could quickly escalate in scope as well as intensity, because China, India, and Pakistan brandish nuclear weapons.
Map 47. Territorial Claims in Antarctic
非洲之角
THE HORN OF AFRICA
英国军事历史学家约翰·基根有充分理由称非洲之角为“饥饿之地”，长期以来，这里一直是一个危险的居住地（地图 48）。31饥荒肆虐，种族、语言和宗教敌对情绪盛行，相互排斥的社会制度盛行。
The Horn of Africa, which British military historian John Keegan with good reason calls “the hungry lands,” has long been a hazardous place to live (map 48).31 Starvation stalks, racial, linguistic, and religious antagonisms are rife, mutually exclusive social systems are endemic.
埃塞俄比亚的文化冲突。埃塞俄比亚由九个以民族为核心的州组成，至少有70种语言被用作母语，并存在两种截然不同的宗教，这使得埃塞俄比亚的凝聚力远不如小比例尺地图上看起来那么强。北部以阿姆哈拉语为母语的基督徒大多以自给自足的农业为生，他们与奥加登地区的游牧穆斯林之间存在冲突，后者与伊斯兰索马里的共同点远多于与亚的斯亚贝巴政府的共同点。多个叛乱和分裂运动正在活跃或蓄势待发。
Cultural Friction in Ethiopia. Nine states with ethnic groups as their nuclei, at least 70 languages spoken as the mother tongue, and two distinctive religions make Ethiopia less cohesive than it seems on small-scale maps. Amharic-speaking Christians in the north, most of whom who practice subsistence agriculture, oppose nomadic Muslims in the Ogaden who have more in common with Islamic Somalia than with the government in Addis Ababa. Several insurgent and secessionist movements are active or waiting in the wings.
厄立特里亚人民自1961年起为争取自由而战，直至1991年最终建立独立国家。然而，零星冲突一直持续到20世纪80年代，相关问题也持续恶化，两国内部的不满情绪随时可能破坏脆弱的关系。1991年，埃塞俄比亚人民革命民主阵线（埃革阵）推翻了令人憎恶的马克思主义独裁者门格斯图·海尔·马里亚姆，随后通过了一部赋予少数民族特殊权利的宪法。然而，要将如此众多不同的派别和平地团结起来，需要的是实际行动，而不仅仅是空谈。32似乎国内的麻烦还不足以让新政府忙得不可开交，1996 年，埃塞俄比亚和厄立特里亚（两国都计划接受美国的军事援助）决定援助反对喀土穆激进政权的苏丹叛乱分子，西部边境的冲突也开始酝酿。33
Eritreans fought for freedom from 1961 until they finally formed a separate state in 1991, but sporadic combat continued into the 1980s, related problems continue to fester, and malcontents in both countries could upset fragile relationships. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which in 1991 ousted the detested Marxist dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam, subsequently approved a constitution that grants special rights to ethnic minorities, but it will take deeds as well as words to unite so many disparate factions on peaceful terms.32 As if domestic troubles were not enough to keep the new government gainfully employed, strife along the western border began to brew in 1996 when Ethiopia and Eritria (both slated to receive U.S. military assistance) decided to assist Sudanese insurgents who oppose the radical regime in Khartoum.33
索马里的文化冲突。贫困的索马里比埃塞俄比亚的种族构成更为单一，其居民主要为逊尼派穆斯林，他们是索马里族人，讲三种主要的索马里方言之一，除了难民聚集的摩加迪沙外，其余地区都以游牧为生。然而，索马里内部却暗流涌动，因为六个崇尚尚武精神的主要氏族为了争夺内部控制权而相互倾轧。尔虞我诈是他们惯用的伎俩。正如联合国“维和部队”在1993年试图维持秩序却以失败告终时所发现的那样，温顺的人永远无法继承这片土地。34围绕水源、牲畜、妻子、土地和政治“地盘”（顺序不一定如此）的战争已成为全民消遣。在奥加登和肯尼亚部分地区（索马里同胞居住地），以及在亚丁湾沿岸宣布成立索马里兰共和国的分裂团体，其领土收复主义诉求虽被淡化，但并未被撤销。35
Cultural Friction in Somalia. Poverty-stricken Somalia, which is much more homogeneous than Ethiopia, is populated primarily by Sunni Muslims who are ethnic Somalis, speak one of three main Somali dialects and, except for refugee-crowded Mogadishu, are pastoral peoples. A volatile mixture nonetheless is present, because six major clan families that revel in warrior traditions vie for internal control. Connivance and cunning are stocks in trade. The meek by no means inherit any part of their earth, as United Nations “peacekeepers” with no peace to keep discovered in 1993, when they tried unsuccessfully to impose law and order.34 Wars over water, cattle, wives, land, and political “turf” (not necessarily in that order) are national pastimes. Irredentist claims in the Ogaden and parts of Kenya where Somali kinsmen live and the status of splinter groups who have proclaimed an independent Republic of Somaliland along the Gulf of Aden are muted but unrevoked.35
和平前景。涉及埃塞俄比亚、索马里、肯尼亚和苏丹的非洲之角局势可能因此变得一触即发。如果正如一些人怀疑的那样，伊朗和其他地区的伊斯兰原教旨主义者煽动圣战，以报复埃塞俄比亚和厄立特里亚对苏丹的干预，那么局势可能会危险升级。
Prospects for Peace. Combustible situations that involve Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, and the Sudan consequently could develop in Africa’s hazardous horn. Dangerous escalation could occur if, as some suspect, Islamic fundamentalists in Iran and elsewhere foment a jihad (holy war) in retaliation against Ethiopian and Eritrean intervention in Sudan.
查谟和克什米尔
JAMMU AND KASHMIR
查谟和克什米尔位于兴都库什山脉、帕米尔高原、喀喇昆仑山脉和喜马拉雅山脉的南坡之下，拥有世界上最壮丽的景色（地图 49）。巴基斯坦农民严重依赖印度河、杰纳布河和朱卢姆河的灌溉用水，但该地区长期动荡不安的根源并非土地所有权，而是宗教纠纷。
Jammu and Kashmir, which nestle beneath south slopes of the Hindu Kush, Pamirs, Karakorum Mountains, and Himalayas, possess some of the world’s most spectacular scenery (map 49). Pakistani farmers depend extensively on irrigation waters from the Indus, Chenab, and Jhulum Rivers, but religious disputes rather than land rights make the region a perennial trouble spot.
分裂。 1947年8月15日印度和巴基斯坦宣布独立时，查谟和克什米尔的人口绝大多数是穆斯林（77 %），而印度教徒（20%）则主要集中在查谟市，占绝对多数。然而，当地的土邦王一直不愿决定加入哪一方，直到次年10月，焦急的巴基斯坦部落成员施加压力，他才正式向当时的印度总督路易斯·蒙巴顿勋爵请求印度自治领的援助，并承认“如果我的邦（查谟和克什米尔）不加入印度，他们自然无法提供我所请求的援助。因此，我决定加入印度，并附上加入文书。”不出所料，新成立的巴基斯坦政府认为“克什米尔加入印度是建立在欺诈基础上的……因此不能予以承认。”36随后暴力事件反复发生。
The Schism. The populations of Jammu and Kashmir were overwhelmingly Muslim (77 percent) whereas Hindus (20 percent) comprised a clear majority mainly in Jammu City when India and Pakistan became independent nations on August 15, 1947. The local maharajah nevertheless was loath to decide on accession to either side until impatient Pakistani tribesmen applied pressure the following October, whereupon he formally asked then Governor-General Lord Louis Mountbatten for help from the Indian Dominion, acknowledging that “naturally they cannot send help asked for by me without my state [Jammu and Kashmir] acceding to India. I have accordingly decided to do so and attach the Instrument of Accession.” The newly formed Pakistani government predictably found that “the accession of Kasmir to India is based on fraud . . . and as such cannot be recognized.”36 Repetitious violence followed.
难以实现的和解。 1949年1月1日，联合国委员会促成停火，结束了第一次印巴战争。随后，委员会划定了一条长达770公里（480英里）的控制线，将查谟和克什米尔超过三分之一的领土划归巴基斯坦，而将伊斯兰教势力强大的克什米尔山谷地区留在印度教徒手中。在多次调解失败后，双方分别于1965年、1971年和1990年再次爆发冲突。数十万印度军队的驻扎以及伊斯兰分离主义武装组织对这片美丽山谷目标的恐怖袭击，严重打击了可能惠及穆斯林的旅游业。37
Elusive Reconciliation. A U.N. commission arranged a cease-fire that terminated the first Indo-Pakistani war on January 1, 1949, and later established a 480-mile (770-kilometer) control line that allocated a bit more than one-third of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan and left the heavily Islamic Vale of Kashmir in Hindu hands. Further combat ensued in 1965, 1971, and 1990 after repeated mediations failed. The presence of several hundred thousand Indian troops and terrorist attacks by militant Islamic separatist groups against targets in the beautiful Vale have devastated tourist trade that might benefit Muslims.37
Map 49. Boundary Disputes in Jammu and Kashmir
阿克赛钦突出部的主权归属问题自20世纪50年代以来就一直存在争议。这片曾被描述为冰封荒芜、寸草不生的荒野，当时中国占领了约15000平方公里（6000平方英里）的土地，并修建了一条连接西藏和新疆的公路。1962年，中国军队在与印度军队激战后巩固了其在该地区的地位，并一直牢牢控制至今。1963年，巴基斯坦不顾印度的反对，将克什米尔地区的大片领土割让给中国，这进一步加剧了中印边界争端。无论是这片领土还是阿克赛钦的边界，至今都未能达成各方满意的划界方案。38
Sovereignty over the Aksai Chin salient, once described as a frozen, uninhabited wilderness without a blade of grass, has been subject to dispute since the 1950s when China occupied about 6,000 square miles (15,000 square kilometers) and built a road that connects Tibet with Xinjiang Province. Chinese Armed Forces consolidated their positions in 1962 after fierce fighting with Indian troops and have remained solidly ensconced ever since. Additional Sino-lndian border disputes developed in 1963 because Pakistan, despite Indian objections, ceded to China a sizable chunk of its sector in Kashmir. Neither that bit nor the Aksai Chin boundary has ever been demarked to the satisfaction of all concerned.38
目前的僵局会持续多久尚属猜测。与此同时，根深蒂固的矛盾、强烈的情绪以及核战争可能爆发的风险，使得查谟和克什米尔地区如同一个火药桶，可以说是全球最危险的冲突地区之一。39
How long the current hiatus will last is subject to speculation. Deep-seated grievances, strong emotions, and possibilities that nuclear warfare might some day erupt meanwhile make Jammu and Kashmir a tinderbox, arguably one of the most perilous trouble spots anywhere on this globe.39
环境摩擦
ENVIRONMENTAL FRICTION
人类需要能够确保空气清洁、饮用水充足、食物来源丰富，以及足以维持生活所需的资源的栖息地，但污染、破坏和其他退化使得地球越来越难以满足快速增长的世界人口的最低需求。40大气污染、森林砍伐、农业管理不善、过度捕捞渔业、石油泄漏、肆意用水和随意处置废物是典型的环境做法，这些做法会破坏当地、区域甚至全球的栖息地，对生态系统和人类生活条件产生短期、中期和长期影响。41
Humanity needs habitats that ensure passably clean air, potable water, sources of sustenance, and sufficient wherewithal to make life worth living, but pollution, despoliation, and other degradations make it ever more difficult for Planet Earth to satisfy even minimum requirements of rapidly expanding world populations.40 Befouled atmosphere, deforestation, agricultural mismanagement, over-harvested fisheries, oil spills, wanton use of water, and careless waste disposal typify environmental practices that degrade local, regional, even global habitats with short-, intermediate-, and long-term effects on ecosystems and human living conditions.41
有些后果显而易见，而另一些后果的全面影响则有待进一步调查。任何可能失去谈判筹码的国家，都会对那些增加短期成本、迫使对方做出牺牲、加剧不平等、限制国家实力或压制政治抱负的纠正措施表示强烈不满。目前的敌对情绪已经引发了贸易冲突，而这些冲突很可能最终演变为武装冲突。42
Some consequences are clear, while the full relevance of others awaits further investigation. Corrective actions that increase short-term costs, exact sacrifices, exacerbate inequities, limit national power, or place lids on political ambitions are sourly received in every country that believes it might lose leverage. Acrimonies already have triggered trade conflicts that conceivably could culminate in armed combat.42
大气污染
ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTION
大气污染物随变幻莫测的风自由飘荡，不顾国际边界、检查站或收费站。放射性核沉降物在35年间周期性地环绕地球，主要发生在1955年至1966年间，然后在1980年10月中国在罗布泊附近的沙漠进行最后一次大气核试验后停止。43但化石燃料每年向空气中排放数十亿吨二氧化碳、硫和氮。联合国的一项调查显示，到1990年，酸雨已经破坏了欧洲近四分之一的林地，一些湖泊的酸性过强，鱼类无法生存。平流层臭氧损耗（可能由氯氟烃（CFCs）等人造化学物质造成）降低了地球大气层屏蔽紫外线辐射的能力，进而增加了癌症、白内障和呼吸系统疾病的风险，并降低了作物产量。44
Atmospheric pollutants travel freely wherever capricious winds take them, without regard for international boundaries, checkpoints, or toll gates. Radioactive nuclear fallout periodically circled the globe during a 35-year period, mainly between 1955 and 1966, then ceased in October 1980, when China conducted the last atmospheric test in the desert near Lop Nor,43 but fossil fuels annually pump several billion tons of carbon dioxide, sulfur, and nitrogen into the air. Acid rain had damaged almost one-fourth of all woodlands in Europe by 1990, according to a U.N. survey, and some lakes are so acidic that fish find them intolerable. Stratospheric ozone depletion, probably caused by manmade chemicals such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), decreases the ability of Earth’s atmosphere to shield the surface from ultraviolet radiation which, in turn, increases risks of cancer, cataracts, and respiratory ailments as well as lower crop yields.44
森林砍伐
DEFORESTATION
亚马逊河流域、赤道非洲和东南亚等地的巨型热带雨林正以惊人的速度消失，据知情人士估计，每年约有16,750平方英里（46,000平方公里）的雨林消失，而砍伐木材和开垦新农田的经济利益是其主要目的。随之而来的二氧化碳排放、土壤侵蚀和洪水灾害，促使大量贫困地区的人们迁徙到那些政府既没有足够空间安置众多贫困移民，也不愿意接纳他们的目的地。此外，无数依赖森林栖息地的动植物物种的灭绝，可能会造成目前尚无法估量的后果。45
Gigantic rain forests, such as those in the Amazon Basin, Equatorial Africa, and Southeast Asia, are disappearing at a rate that knowledgeable observers estimate to be about 16,750 square miles (46,000 square kilometers) each year, with monetary rewards from harvested timber and newly-available agricultural lands as basic objectives. Additional carbon dioxide emissions, soil erosion, and floods that often follow encourage mass migrations from poverty-stricken regions to destinations where governmental leaders have neither suitable spaces within which to accommodate many penniless immigrants nor the inclination to accept them. The extinction of countless plant and animal species that depend on woodland habitats moreover may have consequences that as yet are incalculable.45
环境战在越南丛林中十分普遍。20世纪60年代，大约4.6万吨名为“橙剂”的美国有毒除草剂使林地避难所落叶殆尽。罗马犁铲除植被，以清除敌军在繁忙道路沿线的伏击点，并清除敌军通往孤立的美军火力基地的隐蔽通道。46军事必要性原则在法律上承认“有权使用必要数量和种类的武力迫使敌人投降，同时尽可能减少时间、生命和金钱的消耗”，这实际上为这些做法提供了正当理由。47但橙剂无意中对美国军人、越南平民以及农作物和牲畜造成的影响程度，仍然引发了关于环境成本与军事收益之间关系的辩论。48
Environmental warfare was widespread in the jungles of Vietnam, where something like 46,000 toxic tons of a U.S. herbicide called Agent Orange defoliated woodland refuges in the 1960s. Rome Plows uprooted vegetation to eliminate enemy ambush sites along-heavily traveled roads and remove covered enemy approaches to isolated U.S. fire bases.46 The Principle of Military Necessity, which legally concedes “the right to apply that amount and kind of force [required] to compel submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money,” implicitly justified those practices,47 but the extent to which Agent Orange unintentionally afflicted U.S. military personnel and Vietnamese civilians as well as crops and livestock still prompts debates about relations between environmental costs and military benefits.48
石油泄漏
OIL SPILLS
在超级油轮时代（载重吨位25万至40万吨），单艘载油量近300万桶的超级油轮频发，由此引发的意外漏油事故无疑令沿海国家忧心忡忡，因为这些国家可能遭受渔业、旅游业和其他经济利益的损失，以及灾难性的环境破坏。例如，1989年3月，命运多舛的美国油轮“埃克森·瓦尔迪兹”号在阿拉斯加的威廉王子湾触礁后，泄漏了26万桶原油。幸亏船员将另外100万桶原油安全地转移到姊妹油轮上，才将损失控制在一定范围内。即便如此，油污最终还是覆盖了1770公里（1100英里）的原始海岸线和岛屿。大量海鸟和海兽死亡，油污严重威胁着鲑鱼和鲱鱼群的生存，赔偿金额超过10亿美元。
Accidental oil spills in the Age of Supertankers (250,000 to 400,000 deadweight tons), the largest of which carry nearly 3 million barrels of crude oil apiece, understandably cause consternation among coastal countries that could suffer the loss of fisheries, tourist trade, other economically attractive advantages, and catastrophic environmental deprivation. The ill-starred U.S. tanker Exxon Valdez, for example, leaked 260,000 barrels into Alaska’s Prince William Sound after it hit a reef in March 1989. Damage was confined only because the crew safely transferred another million barrels to sister tankers, but even so the slick eventually coated 1,100 miles (1,770 kilometers) of pristine shoreline and islands. Marine birds and mammals perished wholesale, sludge seriously threatened salmon and herring schools, and restitution payments totaled more than $1 billion.
1991年1月，伊拉克总统萨达姆·侯赛因将数百万桶原油倾倒进波斯湾，其罪行之严重，令埃克森·瓦尔迪兹号油轮泄漏事故相形见绌。这些原油来自他位于海岛的转运码头、停泊在米纳艾哈迈迪港的五艘油轮以及岸上的巨型储油罐。然而，不久之后，他又犯下了更加骇人听闻的罪行：他命令手下焚毁了科威特650多口油井，并用炸药炸毁了另外82口。被破坏的油井周围形成油湖，鸟类因此丧命；令人作呕的恶臭令人作呕；高达60米的火焰每天向大气中排放50万吨污染物；油腻的云层高达爆炸高度的100倍，随后随风飘散，在伊朗降下“黑雨”。据美国环境保护署推测，总体结果可能代表着“有史以来最非同寻常的人为环境灾难之一”。49
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in January 1991 made the Exxon Valdez accident seem picayune when he dumped several million barrels of crude oil into the Persian Gulf from his Sea Island transshipment terminal, from five tankers tied up in port at Mina al-Ahmadi, and from huge storage tanks ashore. He eclipsed those abominations soon thereafter when he ordered henchmen to torch more than 650 producing wells and dynamite 82 others in Kuwait. Oily lakes formed death traps for birds around sabotaged wells, a sickening stench made human stomachs churn, 200-foot (60-meter) tongues of flame fed half a million tons of pollutants per day into the atmosphere, and greasy clouds towered 100 times that high before they wafted with winds that deposited “black rain” in Iran. Overall results, according to speculation by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, may represent “one of the most extraordinary manmade environmental disasters in recorded history.”49
潜在的水资源战争
POTENTIAL WATER WARS
在农业和工业扩张与干旱气候同时发生的地区，用水需求往往超过水源供应，而人口的快速增长又造成了前所未有的用水需求。卫生条件差、耕地径流污染、工业污染物以及上游排放的未经处理的污水，使得饮用水在许多这样的国家成为一种奢侈品。50
Water requirements often outstrip sources in regions where agricultural and industrial expansion coincide with arid climates and rampant population growth creates unprecedented demands. Poor sanitation practices, contaminated runoff from tilled fields, industrial pollutants, and raw sewage discharged upstream make potable supplies a luxury in many such countries.50
水资源短缺和激烈的竞争催生了中东地区的“水政治”一词。在中东，超过一半的人口依赖的水源至少要经过一个外国才能到达消费者手中。土耳其幼发拉底河上游正在建设的21座水坝和17座水电站引发了叙利亚和伊拉克政府的抗议，两国高级官员预见到未来将面临缺水困境。叙利亚缺乏协调的水利工程项目也招致了巴格达方面的更多不满。埃及几乎所有的水都来自尼罗河，而这些水源又来自包括关系不睦的苏丹在内的其他八个国家的集水区。51
Scarcities accompanied by fierce competition have spawned the term “hydropolitics” in the Middle East, where more than half of the people depend on water that originates in or passes through at least one foreign country before it reaches consumers. Twenty-one dams and 17 hydroelectric power stations under construction along the upper Euphrates River in Turkey provoke protests by the Governments of Syria and Iraq, whose senior officials foresee future deprivation. Uncoordinated water control projects in Syria cause additional complaints in Baghdad. Nearly all water in Egypt flows down the Nile from catch basins in eight other countries that include unfriendly Sudan.51
中亚和南亚面临着类似的水资源供应问题。尼泊尔的森林砍伐加剧了恒河沿岸的洪水泛滥，而印度则推行引水工程，使孟加拉国三角洲居民的用水受到损害。曾经是世界第四大内陆水体的咸海，如今已分裂成两部分，总面积仅为原来的一半，蓄水量仅为原来的四分之一，盐度却是1960年的三倍，原因是灌溉工程从其仅有的两条河流——阿姆河和锡尔河——抽取了大量的水。频繁的沙尘暴裹挟着来自裸露海底的盐分沉积物、有毒肥料和农药残留，导致婴儿死亡率居高不下，预期寿命降低。在哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦、土库曼斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦，不洁净的水会导致伤寒、肝炎和肾脏疾病。52
Central and South Asia experience similar water supply problems. Deforestation in Nepal intensifies flooding along the Ganges while India, in turn, pursues water diversion projects that deprive delta dwellers in Bangladesh. The Aral Sea, once the world’s fourth largest inland body of water, has split into two sections that altogether cover half as much area, contain one-fourth the volume, and are three times as saline as in 1960, because irrigation programs siphon so much water from the Amu and Syr Darya Rivers, which are its only feeders. Frequent dust storms full of salty sediments, toxic fertilizers, and pesticide residues from the exposed sea bed contribute to high infant mortality and low life expectancy rates in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, where impure water causes typhoid fever, hepatitis, and kidney disorders.52
渔业资源枯竭
DEPLETED FISHERIES
1950年至1990年间，全球渔民的捕捞量翻了四倍，此后捕捞量急剧下降，主要原因是最佳渔场过度捕捞。为保护日益减少的渔业资源而部署的海岸警卫队加班加点，以抵御配备探鱼声呐和单次出海即可捕捞数十吨渔获的掠夺性船队。在专属经济区之间，距海岸约200英里的海域，经常发生激烈冲突，这些海域包含着全球一些最赚钱的渔场。偷猎者深知，需求增加而供应减少会导致价格飙升，因此当预期收益似乎大于风险时，他们会深入专属经济区。然而，迄今为止，国际社会为设定捕捞量法律限制所做的努力却收效甚微。53
Fishermen the world over quadrupled their catch between 1950 and 1990, after which takes slumped largely because the best spots were “over fished.” Coast guards deployed to protect dwindling resources work overtime to ward off plundering fleets equipped with fish-finding sonars and nets that can haul in tens of tons on a single outing. Acrimonious encounters commonly occur 200 miles or so offshore in gaps that contain some of the globe’s most lucrative fishing grounds between Exclusive Economic Zones. Poachers, well aware that increasing demands coupled with declining supplies cause prices to soar, penetrate far into EEZs when anticipated gains seem to outweigh risks, but international efforts to establish legal limits on harvests thus far fall on deaf ears.53
危险废物处理
HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL
有毒和传染性废物若处理、储存、运输或其他方式不当，达到一定数量或浓度，可能导致或加剧隐匿性、往往致残性（甚至不可逆转）的疾病。易燃、腐蚀性、爆炸性和放射性物质也属于危险材料（HAZMAT）。处置方法包括填埋、焚烧、化学转化、地下或海底掩埋以及随意倾倒。54不谨慎的做法在很多情况下只会引起国内问题，但污染其他国家或国际水域的危险物质正日益成为摩擦的根源。
Toxic and infectious wastes in sufficient quantities or concentrations may cause or exacerbate insidious, often incapacitating (even irreversible) illnesses when improperly treated, stored, transported, or otherwise mismanaged. Flammable, corrosive, explosive, and radioactive substances also qualify as hazardous materials (HAZMAT). Means of disposal range from land fills and incineration to chemical conversion, burial underground or beneath the sea, and indiscriminate dumping.54 Imprudent methods in many instances cause solely domestic concerns, but HAZMATs that contaminate other countries or international waters are increasingly sources of friction.
一些权威人士认为，处置最危险危险物质最安全的方案可能是将其装入密封罐，埋在深海平原的海底。那里极其深邃且粘稠的沉积物会将其密封在保护性的茧状物中，而不断沉积的淤泥和分解的生物体则会永久地加固这些茧状物。目前正在考虑的一个面积相当于德克萨斯州大小的地点位于夏威夷以北600英里（965公里）处，在海面以下数英里处，该海床在过去6500万年中地质结构一直保持稳定。55
Some authorities believe that the safest disposition of the most harmful HAZMAT may be watertight canisters buried on abyssal plains at the bottom of oceans where extremely deep, sticky sediments would seal them in protective cocoons that precipitating silts and decomposing organisms would strengthen eternally. One Texas-sized plot under consideration lies 600 miles (965 kilometers) north of Hawaii several miles below the surface on a seabed that has been geologically stable for the last 65 million years.55
化学战与核废料
CHEMICAL WARFARE AND NUCLEAR WASTES
不需要的化学战弹药56和核材料57种放射性废物极难以可接受的成本安全处置。前苏联漠视国内外后果，是造成污染最严重的国家之一。不负责任的监管人员将过时的核反应堆、乏燃料和其他放射性废物倾倒在新地岛沿岸、喀拉海、鄂霍次克海和日本海，这些海域的脆弱生态系统对环境破坏尤为敏感。迄今为止，这些地区的污染物扩散似乎很少，但最终海洋食物链的泄漏和污染可能会十分严重。58
Unwanted chemical warfare munitions 56 and nuclear materials 57 are exceedingly difficult to discard safely at acceptable costs. The former Soviet Union, indifferent to consequences at home and abroad, was one of the worst offenders. Feckless overseers dumped outdated nuclear reactors, spent fuel, and other radioactive waste along the coast of Novaya Zemlya, in the Kara Sea, and in the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan, where fragile ecosystems are especially sensitive to environmental insults. Few pollutants apparently have migrated from those locales thus far, but leakage and contamination of marine food chains eventually could be extensive.58
新兴军事反制措施
EMERGING MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES
国际社会中那些将环境掠夺视为威胁各自生活方式的问题的成员，正在寻求合理的解决方案。59而那些看到牟利机会的剥削者则采取贪婪的手段。美国国家安全战略在1995年警告说，“对日益减少的未受污染资源的竞争日益激烈”，空气、耕地、渔业、其他食物来源和水，这些曾经被认为是“免费资源”的东西，如今已成为“对世界各地区域稳定的非常现实的风险”。报告作者预测，“环境破坏和资源枯竭……将引发巨大的社会动荡，并使世界更容易受到严重的内部摩擦的影响”，尽管他们也考虑到了科学和技术应对措施的可能性。60个美国武装部队决心成为解决方案的一部分，而不是问题的一部分，它们已经开始重新审视那些可能不必要地危及环境的理论、战术、技术、目标选择程序和交战规则。61
Members of the world community who view environmental plunder as a problem that threatens their respective lifestyles seek sensible solutions,59 whereas exploiters who see opportunities for enrichment employ rapacious practices. U.S. National Security Strategy in 1995 warned that “increasing competition for the dwindling resources of uncontaminated air, arable land, fisheries, other food sources, and water, once considered ’free goods’” have become “a very real risk to regional stability around the world.” Its authors predicted that “environmental depredation and resource depletion . . . will feed into immense social unrest and make the world substantially more vulnerable to serious internal frictions,” despite generous allowances for scientific and technological countermeasures.60 U.S. Armed Forces, which intend to be part of the solution rather than part of the problem, have begun to reexamine doctrines, tactics, techniques, targeting procedures, and rules of engagement that perhaps gratuitously endanger environments.61
笔记
NOTES
1.边界概念和定义，地理报告第 1 号（华盛顿特区：国务院地理学家，1961 年 4 月 28 日）。
1. Boundary Concepts and Definitions, Geographical Report No. 1 (Washington, DC: The State Department Geographer, April 28, 1961).
2. Ernst Kux，“乌苏里江的紧张局势”，军事评论（1969 年 6 月）：25-28。
2. Ernst Kux, “Tension on the Ussuri,” Military Review (June 1969): 25-28.
3. Ian Brownlie，《非洲边界：法律和外交百科全书》（加州伯克利：加州大学出版社，皇家联合军种研究所，1979 年）。
3. Ian Brownlie, African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopedia (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press for the Royal United Services Institute, 1979).
4. Marjorie Ann Brown，《海洋法：国际海底管理局——其地位及其参与》，报告编号 96-772F（华盛顿：国会研究服务处，1996 年 9 月 16 日）；《海事事务——世界手册：海事组织、公约和争端以及国际海洋政治参考指南》， Keesings 参考出版物，Henry W. Degenhardt 编辑，Brian Mitchell 顾问，Allan J. Day 总编辑（底特律，密歇根州：Gale Research，1985 年），第 3-14 页和附录 1；《海洋界限》第 36 页，《国家对海洋管辖权的主张》（华盛顿特区：美国国务院地理学家办公室，1985 年 3 月 6 日），通过电话更新。
4. Marjorie Ann Brown, Law of the Sea: The International Seabed Authority—Its Status and Participation Therein, Rpt. Nr. 96-772F (Washington: Congressional Research Service, September 16, 1996); Maritime Affairs—World Handbook: A Reference Guide to Maritime Organizations, Conventions and Disputes, and to the International Politics of the Sea, a Keesings Reference Publication compiled and written by Henry W. Degenhardt, ed., consultant Brian Mitchell, gen. ed. Allan J. Day (Detroit, Ml: Gale Research, 1985), 3-14 and appendix 1; Limits of the Sea 36, National Claims to Maritime Jurisdictions (Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Geographer, March 6, 1985), updated telephonically.
5.海洋的界限 36 .
5.Limits of the Sea 36.
6.《国际民用航空公约》，载于《美利坚合众国条约及其他国际协定，1776-1949》，第3卷，国务院出版物8484，查尔斯·I·贝文斯编辑（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1969年11月）。
6. “Convention on International Civil Aviation,” in Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949, vol. 3, Dept. of State Publication 8484, ed. Charles I. Bevans (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 1969).
7. William B. Quandt，“黎巴嫩，1958 年”，载于Barry M. Blechman 和 Stephen S. Kaplan 编辑的《不战而胜：美国武装部队作为政治工具》（华盛顿特区：布鲁金斯学会，1978 年），第 222-257 页。
7. William B. Quandt, “Lebanon, 1958,” in Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, eds. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1978), 222-257.
8. Anthony Cordesman，“美国对利比亚发动袭击所涌现的教训”，《武装部队杂志》（1986 年 8 月）：355-360。
8. Anthony Cordesman, “The Emerging Lessons from the U.S. Attack on Libya,” Armed Forces Journal (August 1986): 355-360.
9.威廉·史蒂文森，《恩德培90分钟》（纽约：Bantam Books，1976年）。
9. William Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe (New York: Bantam Books, 1976).
10. 《圣经》 ，马太福音24:6-7。
10. The Holy Bible, Matthew 24: 6-7.
11.有关概述和分析，请参阅 Ewan W. Anderson 的《世界热点地图集：地缘政治危机资料汇编》（纽约：Facts on File 出版社，1993 年）；《边界和领土争端》，Keesing's 参考出版物，第 2版，Alan J. Day 编辑（底特律，密歇根州：Gale Research Co. 出版社，1987 年）；John Keegan 和 Andrew Wheatcroft 的《冲突地带：未来战争地图集》（纽约：Simon and Schuster 出版社，1986 年）。
11. For overviews and analyses, see Ewan W. Anderson, An Atlas of World Flashpoints: A Sourcebook of Geopolitical Crises (New York: Facts on File, 1993); Border and Territorial Disputes, A Keesing’s Reference Publication, 2ded., ed. Alan J. Day (Detroit, Ml: Gale Research Co., 1987); John Keegan and Andrew Wheatcroft, Zones of Conflict: An Atlas of Future Wars (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986).
12. Saul Bernard Cohen，《分裂世界的地理与政治》（纽约：兰登书屋，1963 年），第 193-203 页。
12. Saul Bernard Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World Divided (New York: Random House, 1963), 193-203.
13. Robin A. Remington，《华沙条约》（马萨诸塞州剑桥：麻省理工学院出版社，1971 年）；Malcolm Macintosh，《华沙条约的演变》，阿德尔菲论文第 58 号（伦敦：战略研究所，1969 年 6 月）。
13. Robin A. Remington, The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971); Malcolm Macintosh, Evolution of the Warsaw Pact, Adelphi Papers No. 58 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, June 1969).
14. Julie Kim，《波兰、捷克共和国、斯洛伐克、匈牙利：近期发展》，简报 91089，1997 年 4 月，定期更新；Paul Gallis，《北约：国会讨论联盟扩张》，简报 95076，1997 年 4 月，定期更新；Steve Woehrel，《北约扩张与俄罗斯》，报告编号 97-477F，1997 年 4 月 21 日；均来自华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处。
14. Julie Kim, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary: Recent Developments, Issue Brief 91089, April 1997, updated regularly; Paul Gallis, NATO: Congresses Addresses Expansion of the Alliance, Issue Brief 95076, April 1997, updated regularly; Steve Woehrel, NATO Enlargement and Russia, Rpt. Nr. 97-477F, April 21, 1997; all Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
15.边界和领土争端，288-300。
15. Border and Territorial Disputes,288-300.
16.同上，第 291、293 页；安泰松，《中苏领土争端》（宾夕法尼亚州费城：威斯敏斯特出版社，1974 年）；雷蒙德·L·加索夫编，《中苏军事关系》（纽约：普雷格出版社，1966 年），第 171-182 页。
16. Ibid., 291, 293; Tai Sung An, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1974); Raymond L. Garthoff, ed., Sino-Soviet Military Relations (New York: Praeger, 1966), 171-182.
17.世界政治冲突热点地图集，1-4。
17. An Atlas of World Political Flashpoints,1-4.
18.边界和领土争端，90-101。
18. Border and Territorial Disputes,90-101.
19.世界政治冲突热点图集，123-126；边界和领土争端，379-384。
19. An Atlas of World Political Flashpoints,123-126; Border and Territorial Disputes,379-384.
20.世界政治冲突热点地图集，113-116。
20. An Atlas of World Political Flashpoints,113-116.
21. Kerry Dumbaugh，《香港回归中国：对美国利益的影响》，简报 95119（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1997 年，定期更新）。
21. Kerry Dumbaugh, Hong Kong’s Return to China: Implications for U.S. Interests, Issue Brief 95119 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1997, updated periodically).
22. Eui-Gak Hwang，《韩国经济：南北比较》（纽约：牛津大学出版社，1993 年）；Andria Matles Savada 编，《朝鲜：国别研究》，DA 小册子 550-81（华盛顿特区：国会图书馆联邦研究服务处，1994 年）。
22. Eui-Gak Hwang, The Korean Economies: A Comparison of North and South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Andria Matles Savada, ed. North Korea: A Country Study, DA Pamphlet 550-81 (Washington, DC: Federal Research Service, Library of Congress, 1994).
23. Mark J. Valencia，《中国与南海争端》，Adelphi Paper 298（伦敦：国际战略研究所，1995 年）；Henry J. Kenny，“南海：危险之地”，《海军战争学院评论》 49，第 3 期（1996 年夏季）：96-108。
23. Mark J. Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, Adelphi Paper 298 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995); Henry J. Kenny, “The South China Sea: A Dangerous Ground,” Naval War College Review 49, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 96-108.
24.同上；John H. Noer，《东南亚的海洋利益》（华盛顿特区：国防大学出版社，1996 年）。
24. Ibid.; John H. Noer, Maritime Interests in Southeast Asia (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996).
25.同上。
25. Ibid.
26.世界冲突热点图集，13-15；边界和领土争端，439-442。
26. An Atlas of World Flashpoints,13-15; Border and Territorial Disputes,439-442.
27. Tim Pat Coogan，《动乱：爱尔兰的苦难 1966-1996》（科罗拉多州博尔德：罗伯茨·莱因哈特出版社，1996 年）；J. Bowyer Bell，《爱尔兰动乱：一代人的暴力，1967-1992》（纽约：圣马丁出版社，1993 年）；《边界和领土争端》，第 57-72 页；《世界冲突爆发点地图集》，第 143-148 页。
27. Tim Pat Coogan, The Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal 1966-1996 (Boulder, CO: Roberts Rinehart, 1996); J. Bowyer Bell, The Irish Troubles: A Generation of Violence, 1967-1992 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993); Border and Territorial Disputes,57-72; An Atlas of World Flashpoints,143-148.
28.阿尔弗雷德·普拉多斯，《伊拉克：库尔德人聚居区遭袭及美国应对》，报告编号96-739F（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1996年10月17日）；美国国会，《伊拉克局势》土耳其、伊拉克和伊朗的库尔德人：欧洲安全与合作委员会简报（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1993 年）；Gérard Chaliand，《库尔德人的悲剧》，Philip Black 译（新泽西州大西洋高地：Zed Books，1994 年）。
28. Alfred Prados, Iraq: Attack on Kurdish Enclave and U.S. Response, Report No. 96-739F (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 17, 1996); U.S. Congress, Situation ofKurds in Turkey, Iraq and Iran: Briefing by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993); Gérard Chaliand, The Kurdish Tragedy, trans. Philip Black (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1994).
29. John Pomfret，“杀戮狂潮归咎于新刚果领导人的军队”，《华盛顿邮报》，1997 年 6 月 8 日，A1、A28；国会众议院，《卢旺达危机》，外交事务委员会非洲小组委员会听证会，第 103届国会，第 2会期，1994 年 5 月 4 日；Richard F. Nyrop 等，《卢旺达：国别研究》，陆军部小册子 550-84（华盛顿：美国大学外国区域研究，1982 年）。
29. John Pomfret, “Killing Spree Blamed on Troops of New Congo Leader,” Washington Post, June 8, 1997, A1, A28; Congress, House, The Crisis in Rwanda, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 103dCongress, 2dsess., May 4, 1994; Richard F. Nyrop et al., Rwanda: A Country Study, Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 550-84 (Washington: Foreign Area Studies, American University, 1982).
30. Edgar O'Ballance，《波斯尼亚内战，1992-94》（纽约：圣马丁出版社，1995 年）；Roy Gutman，《种族灭绝的见证者：1993 年普利策奖获奖报道，关于波斯尼亚“种族清洗”》（纽约：麦克米伦出版社，1993 年）。
30. Edgar O’Ballance, Civil War in Bosnia, 1992-94 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide: The 1993 Pulitzer Prize Winning Dispatches on the “Ethnic Cleansing” of Bosnia (New York: Macmillan, 1993).
31.格雷厄姆·汉考克，《埃塞俄比亚：饥饿的挑战》（伦敦：V. Gollancz出版社，1985年）；约翰·L·赫希和罗伯特·B·奥克利，《索马里与恢复希望行动：关于缔造和平与维持和平的反思》（华盛顿特区：美国和平研究所出版社，1995年）。引文出自约翰·基根，《冲突地带》，第90页。
31. Graham Hancock, Ethiopia, The Challenge of Hunger (London: V. Gollancz, 1985); John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1995). The quotation is from John Keegan, Zones of Conflict,90.
32. Thomas P. Ofcansky 和 La Verle Berry 编，《埃塞俄比亚：国别研究》，陆军部小册子 550-28（华盛顿特区：国会图书馆联邦研究部，1993 年）。
32. Thomas P. Ofcansky and La Verle Berry, eds., Ethiopia: A Country Study, Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 550-28 (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1993).
33.约翰·兰卡斯特，“尼罗河上的数十年死亡”，《华盛顿邮报》，1997 年 2 月 6 日，A25、A28 版。有关背景信息，请参阅海伦·查平·梅茨编，《苏丹：国别研究》，陆军部小册子 550-27（华盛顿特区：国会图书馆联邦研究部，1992 年）。
33. John Lancaster, “Decades of Death on the Nile,” Washington Post, February 6, 1997, A25, A28. For background, see Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Sudan: A Country Study, Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 550-27 (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1992).
34.索马里军事行动：美国总统关于索马里军事行动的报告（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1993 年）；雷蒙德·W·科普森，《索马里：恢复希望行动和联合国索马里行动 II》，简报 92131（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1994 年更新）。
34. Military Operations in Somalia: Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Report on Military Operations in Somalia (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993); Raymond W. Copson, Somalia: Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM II, Issue Brief 92131 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated 1994).
35. Metz；边界和领土争端，126-132，144-150。
35. Metz; Border and Territorial Disputes,126-132, 144-150.
36. Richard P. Cronin 和 Barbara Leitch LePoer，《克什米尔争端：当前斗争的历史背景》，报告编号 91-563F（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1991 年 7 月 19 日）；William C. Johnstone，“查谟和克什米尔（1947-1949）”，载《内部冲突中的挑战与应对》，第 1 卷，《亚洲经验》，DM Condit、Bert H. Cooper, Jr. 等编（华盛顿特区：美国大学社会系统研究中心，1968 年 2 月），第 306-329 页。土邦王的请求转载于《边界和领土争端》，第 318 页。
36. Richard P. Cronin and Barbara Leitch LePoer, The Kashmir Dispute: Historical Background to the Current Struggle, Report No. 91-563F (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 19, 1991); William C. Johnstone, “Jammu and Kashmir (1947-1949),” in Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, vol. 1, The Experience in Asia, eds. D. M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, American University, February 1968), 306-329. The maharaja’s request is reproduced in Border and Territorial Disputes,318.
37.边界和领土争端，317-329；世界冲突热点地图集，100-102。更多背景信息，请参阅 Richard F. Nyrop 编辑的《巴基斯坦：国别研究》，陆军部小册子 550-48（华盛顿特区：美国大学外国区域研究，1984 年）。
37. Border and Territorial Disputes,317-329; An Atlas of World Flashpoints,100-102. For additional background, see Richard F. Nyrop, ed., Pakistan: A Country Study, Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 550-48 (Washington, DC: Foreign Area Studies, American University, 1984).
38.边界和领土争端，279-286。
38. Border and Territorial Disputes,279-286.
39. Barbara Leitch LePoer 和 Nina Srinivasan，《印度和巴基斯坦边界冲突：背景和持续存在的问题》，报告编号 96-437F（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1996 年 5 月 15 日）。
39. Barbara Leitch LePoer and Nina Srinivasan, India and Pakistan Border Conflict: Background and Ongoing Problems, Report No. 96-437F (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 15, 1996).
40. Robert Leider，《从选择到决定因素：国际关系中的环境问题》（华盛顿特区：国家战争学院战略研究小组，1972 年 2 月 15 日）；Joseph C. Conrad，《陆军作战条令中的环境考虑因素》，白皮书（伦纳德伍德堡：美国陆军工程兵学校，1995 年 1 月），第 1、5、6 页。
40. Robert Leider, From Choice to Determinant: The Environmental Issue in International Relations (Washington, DC: Strategic Research Group, National War College, February 15, 1972); Joseph C. Conrad, Environmental Considerations in Army Operational Doctrine, a White Paper (Fort Leonard Wood: U.S. Army Engineer School, January 1995), 1, 5, 6.
41.蕾切尔·卡森的《寂静的春天》（波士顿，马萨诸塞州：霍顿·米夫林出版社，1962 年）中包含了早期的警告。
41. Early warnings were contained in Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1962).
42.有关当代问题的调查，请参阅 Susan A. Fletcher 的《国际环境：当前主要全球条约》，报告编号 96-884ENR（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1996 年 11 月 5 日）。
42. For a survey of contemporary issues, see Susan A. Fletcher, International Environment: Current Major Global Treaties, Report No. 96-884ENR (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 5, 1996).
43.北极的核废料：对苏联核污染对北极和其他地区的影响的分析，OTA-ENV-623（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1995 年 9 月），34 。
43. Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic: An Analysis of Arctic and Other Regional Impacts from Soviet Nuclear Contamination, OTA-ENV-623 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 1995), 34.
44.欧洲森林状况：1992 年报告（瑞士日内瓦：联合国欧洲经济委员会，1992 年 9 月 14 日）；Michael E. Kowalok，“共同的线索：酸雨、臭氧层损耗和全球变暖的研究教训”，《环境》（1993 年 7 月/8 月）：12-20、35-38。
44. Forest Conditions in Europe: The 1992 Report (Geneva, Switzerland: U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, September 14, 1992); Michael E. Kowalok, “Common Threads: Research Lessons from Acid Rain, Ozone Depletion, and Global Warming,” Environment (July/August 1993): 12-20, 35-38.
45.环境质量：环境质量委员会第二十三届年度报告（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1993 年）。
45. Environmental Quality: The Twenty Third Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993).
46. Arthur F. McConnel, Jr.，“任务：牧场工人”，空军大学评论（1970 年 1 月至 2 月）：89-94；Joseph M. Kiernan，“铁三角的战斗工兵”，陆军（1967 年 6 月）：42-45。
46. Arthur F. McConnel, Jr., “Mission: Ranch Hand,” Air University Review (January-February 1970): 89-94; Joseph M. Kiernan, “Combat Engineers in the Iron Triangle,” Army (June 1967): 42-45.
47. Morris Greenspan，《现代陆战法》（加州伯克利：加州大学出版社，1959 年），第 313-314 页。另见 James P. Terry，“环境与战争法：沙漠风暴的影响”，《海军战争学院评论》 45，第 1 期（1992 年冬季）：第 61-67 页。
47. Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1959), 313-314. See also, James P. Terry, “The Environment and the Laws of War: The Impact of Desert Storm,” Naval War College Review 45, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 61-67.
48.橙剂对人类的影响仍存在争议。例如，参见约翰·E·默里，《提交给白宫橙剂工作组的暴露评估科学小组的报告》（华盛顿特区：总统行政办公室科技政策办公室，1986年5月27日）；弗兰克·R·芬奇，《这片土地属于我们：陆军行动的环境威胁》，在海军战争学院关于武装冲突和其他军事行动期间环境保护的研讨会上的演讲，1995年9月20日；卡尔海因茨·洛斯，《化学战剂的延迟毒性效应》，专著（瑞典斯德哥尔摩：斯德哥尔摩和平研究所，1975年），第19-22页。
48. The effects of Agent Orange on human remains argumentive. See, for example, John E. Murray, Report to the White House Agent Orange Working Group, Science Subpanel on Exposure Assessment (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy, May 27, 1986); Frank R. Finch, This Land Is Ours: The Environmental Threat of Army Operations, a presentation at the Naval War College Symposium on the Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict and Other Military Operations, September 20, 1995; Karlheinz Lohs, Delayed Toxic Effects of Chemical Warfare Agents, a monograph (Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm Peace Research Institute, 1975), 19-22.
49. Walter G. Sharp, Sr.，“武装冲突期间环境破坏的有效威慑：波斯湾战争案例分析”，《军事法评论》（1992 年夏季）：24-28；John A. Miller，“应对伊拉克日蚀”，《军事工程师》 （1992 年 1 月/2 月）：4-7。
49. Walter G. Sharp, Sr., “The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage During Armed Conflict: A Case Analysis if the Persian Gulf War,” Military Law Review (Summer 1992): 24-28; John A. Miller, “Countering the Iraqi Eclipse,” Military Engineer (January/February 1992): 4-7.
50. Sandra Postel，“承载能力：地球的底线”，载于《1994 年世界状况：世界观察研究所关于迈向可持续社会进展的报告》，Lester R. Brown 编辑（纽约：WW Norton，1994 年），第 3-21 页；Wade Roush，“人口：来自开罗的视角”，1994 年 8 月 26 日，第 1164-1167 页。
50. Sandra Postel, “Carrying Capacity: Earth’s Bottom Line,” in State of the World, 1994: A World Watch Institute Report on Progress Toward Sustainable Society, ed. Lester R. Brown (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994), 3-21; Wade Roush, “Population: The View from Cairo,” August 26, 1994, 1164-1167.
51. Joyce R. Starr，“水资源战争”，《外交政策》 82（1991 年春季）：17-25；Elizabeth Anne Green，“中东的水政治”，《战略评论》 21，第 2 期（1993 年春季）：72-76；Carol Migdalovitz，《伊拉克-科威特危机：水是武器吗？》，报告编号 91-105F（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1991 年 1 月 23 日）。
51. Joyce R. Starr, “Water Wars,” Foreign Policy 82 (Spring 1991): 17-25; Elizabeth Anne Green, “Hydropolitics in the Middle East,” Strategic Review 21, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 72-76; Carol Migdalovitz, Iraq-Kuwait Crisis: Is Water a Weapon?, Report No. 91-105F (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 23, 1991).
52.同上。
52. Ibid.
53. Tim Zimmerman，“如果第三次世界大战爆发，就怪罪鱼类”，《美国新闻与世界报道》，1996 年 10 月 21 日，第 59-60 页。
53. Tim Zimmerman, “If World War III Comes, Blame Fish,” U.S. News & World Report, October 21, 1996, 59-60.
54. E. Willard 和 Ruby M. Miller，《环境危害：有毒废物和危险材料参考手册》（加利福尼亚州圣巴巴拉：ABC-CLIO，1991 年）；KA Gourlay，《废物世界：工业发展的困境》（新泽西州大西洋高地：Zed Books，1992 年）。
54. E. Willard and Ruby M. Miller, Environmental Hazards: Toxic Waste and Hazardous Material, A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1991); K. A. Gourlay, World of Waste: Dilemmas of Industrial Development (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1992).
55. PJ Skerrett，“海上核掩埋”，《技术评论》，1992 年 2 月/3 月，22-23 页。
55. P. J. Skerrett, “Nuclear Burial at Sea,” Technology Review, February/March 1992, 22-23.
56.化学武器：销毁与转化（纽约：Crane, Russak 为斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所出版，1980 年）。
56. Chemical Weapons: Destruction and Conversion (New York: Crane, Russak for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1980).
57 . Zdenek Dlouhý，放射性废物处置（纽约：Elsevier Scientific Publishing，1982）。
57. Zdenek Dlouhý, Disposal of Radioactive Wastes (New York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing, 1982).
58. M. Feshback，《生态灾难：清理苏联政权的隐秘遗产》（纽约：二十世纪出版社，1995 年）；《北极的核废料》，特别是第 1-17 页。
58. M. Feshback, Ecological Disaster: Cleaning the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime (New York: Twentieth Century Press Fund, 1995); Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic, especially 1-17.
59.国务卿沃伦·克里斯托弗，“美国外交与 21 世纪的全球环境挑战”，1996 年 4 月 9 日在加利福尼亚州斯坦福大学发表的演讲。
59. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, “American Diplomacy and the Global Environmental Challenges of the 21stCentury,” address delivered at Stanford University, California, April 9, 1996.
60. 《国家参与和扩大战略》（华盛顿：白宫，1995 年 2 月，第 18-19 页）。
60. A National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington: The White House, February 1995, 18-19).
61.就环境安全计划达成协议（华盛顿特区：国防部助理部长办公室公共事务处，1996 年 7 月 16 日）。有关一些相关要求，请参阅 Kent Hughes Butts，《环境安全：国防部的角色是什么？》（宾夕法尼亚州卡莱尔兵营：美国陆军战争学院战略研究所，1993 年 5 月 28 日）； David Rubenson 等人，《特立独行：陆军环境计划的演变》（加利福尼亚州圣莫尼卡：兰德公司阿罗约中心，1994 年）；Joseph C. Conrad，《陆军作战条令中的环境考量》，第 2 卷，第 17-22 页，第 23-24 页。
61. Agreement Reached on Environmental Security Plan (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, July 16, 1996). For some related requirements, see Kent Hughes Butts, Environmental Security: What Is DoD’s Role? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 28, 1993); David Rubenson et al., Marching to Different Drummers: Evolution of the Army’s Environmental Program (Santa Monica, CA: Arroyo Center, RAND, 1994); Joseph C. Conrad, Environmental Considerations in Army Operational Doctrine,2, 17-22, 23-24.
16. 军事责任区
16. MILITARY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY
阿博特： 嗯，让我想想。我们队里一垒是“谁”，
二垒是“什么”，三垒是“我不知道”。
Abbott Well, let’s see now. We have on our team Who’s on first,
What’s on second, I Don’t Know’s on third.
科斯特洛： 好，开始吧！谁先上？
Costello. Well, go ahead! Who’s on first?
阿博特在一垒。
Abbott Who is on first.
科斯特洛， 你问我什么？我问你谁在
一垒？……
Costello. What are you asking me for? I’m asking you who is on
first? . . .
艾伯特 是谁？
Abbott Who.
科斯特洛： 我问个简单的问题，谁在一垒？
Costello. I’m asking a simple question. Who’s on first?
阿博特： 是的。
Abbott Yes.
科斯特洛。 我问你一垒上那个人叫什么名字？
Costello. I’m asking you what’s the guy’s name on first base?
阿博特。 哦，不。二垒上是什么？
Abbott. Oh, no. What’s on second.
谁是第一？
巴德·阿伯特和卢·科斯特洛
首次在NBC播出，1942年
Who’s on First
Bud Abbott and Lou Costello
First Broadcast on NBC, 1942
各军种各级军事指挥官都必须清楚“谁负责首要任务？”，因为混乱会导致各部队行动方向不一致，轻则造成资源浪费和重复部署，重则导致关键区域暴露。对此问题的合理解答通常需要明确划分责任区（AOR），以促进协同作战，为各类武装部队的有效行动提供足够的空间，并避免因所谓的“友军误伤”而造成不必要的伤亡。
MILITARY COMMANDERS AT EVERY LEVEL IN EVERY MILITARY SERVICE NEED TO KNOW “WHO’S ON FIRST?” because confusion can put formations at cross-purposes that at best cause wasteful duplications and at worst leave key terrain uncovered. Sensible answers to that question commonly call for cleanly-cut areas of responsibility (AORs) that foster unity of effort, afford sufficient room for armed forces of particular types to operate effectively, and avoid overlaps that could needlessly incur casualties from so-called “friendly fire.”
责任区的大小和形状主要取决于政治、纯粹的军事或政军相结合的考量，具体情况取决于自然地理和人文地理特征。利益相关方及其行动影响力通常远远超出指定的责任区范围，但涉及邻近辖区部分区域的计划和行动需要事先与所有相关方进行磋商和持续协调。
Predominantly political, strictly military, or political-military considerations in some combination determine the size and shape of each AOR, depending on circumstances that feature physical and cultural geography. Areas of interest and abilities to influence actions usually extend well beyond assigned AORs, but plans and operations that overlap parts of neighboring bailiwicks require prior consultation and continuing coordination with all parties concerned.
全球细分市场
GLOBAL SUBDIVISIONS
那些兼具国际视野和全球影响力的国家，会将世界划分为若干责任区，以最大程度地分配军事力量并最大限度地提高灵活性。美国和英国在二战期间就曾这样做，并从中获益。此后，美国国防部一直善用从中汲取的经验教训。
Nations that couple cosmopolitan interests with a global reach subdivide the world into areas of responsibility that best distribute military strength and maximize flexibility. The United States and Great Britain did so to mutual advantage during World War II. The U.S. Department of Defense has put lessons learned to good use ever since.
二战期间的盟军
ALLIED AORS DURING WORLD WAR II
1942年2月18日，富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福总统在致英国首相温斯顿·丘吉尔的信中写道：“由于地理位置的优势，美国能够比你们更好地加强（澳大利亚和新西兰）的防御……英国则更有能力加强缅甸和印度的防御，我认为你们会承担起那个战区的责任。”1
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in correspondence to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on February 18, 1942, opined, “The United States is able because of our geographical position to reinforce [Australia and New Zealand] much better than you can. . . . Britain is better prepared to reinforce Burma and India and I visualize that you would take responsibility for that theater.”1
两周后，罗斯福总统提议，英国参谋长联席会议也表示同意，盟军应将全球划分为三个责任区（AOR）来应对轴心国：太平洋（美国负责）；中东和远东（英国负责）；以及欧洲和大西洋（由盟军共同负责）。新晋少将德怀特·D·艾森豪威尔，时任五角大楼美国陆军作战部部长，随即起草了一份陆军部研究报告，对这三个区域进行了如下定义：
Two weeks later President Roosevelt proposed, and the British Chiefs of Staff agreed, that the Allies should subdivide the globe into three AORs to deal with Axis opponents: the Pacific (a U.S. responsibility); the Middle East and Far East (a British responsibility); and shared responsibility for Europe plus the Atlantic. Newly minted Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of the U.S. Army’s Operations Division in the Pentagon, thereupon prepared a War Department study that defined those three areas as follows:
• 太平洋战区包括北美洲和南美洲、中国、澳大利亚、新西兰、荷属东印度群岛（不包括苏门答腊）和日本。
• The Pacific AOR included North and South America, China, Australia, New Zealand, the Dutch East Indies less Sumatra, and Japan.
• 中东和远东地区包括地中海、红海、波斯湾、印度洋以及从直布罗陀到新加坡与其相连的所有陆地地区。
• The Middle East and Far East included the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and all land areas contiguous thereto from Gibraltar to Singapore.
• 欧洲和大西洋责任区从美国东海岸延伸至俄罗斯。
• The European and Atlantic AOR reached from the U.S. east coast to Russia.
1942年3月18日，丘吉尔向罗斯福总统建议，他认为“美国控制太平洋地区、英国控制印度洋地区所带来的简化具有巨大优势，而且实际上别无他法”，前提是所有行动都由“直接隶属于你我的联合参谋长联席会议”指挥。因此，他总结道，美国的“建议，正如我所阐述和解释的那样，将实现双重目标，即（a）确保行政和作战行动的完整性，以及（b）为那些命运攸关的人提供合理的磋商机会。”2.各项实施措施几乎立即形成。
Churchill advised President Roosevelt on March 18, 1942, that he saw “great merits in simplification resulting from American control over the Pacific sphere and British control over the Indian sphere and indeed there is no other way,” provided operations everywhere be directed by “the Combined Chiefs of Staff acting directly under you and me.” He accordingly concluded that U.S. “proposals as I have ventured to elaborate and interpret them will achieve double purpose namely (a) integrity of executive and operational action and (b) opportunity of reasonable consultation for those whose fortunes are involved.”2 Implementing measures took shape almost immediately.
美国作战司令部边界
U.S. COMBATANT COMMAND BOUNDARIES
美国在二战期间的经验表明，只有建立一套合理的体系，促进联合行动、减少管辖权争端、避免不必要的重复劳动，并且不留任何重大漏洞，联合作战司令部的总司令才能最有效、最高效地运用军事力量。冷战初期，相关要求变得尤为迫切。当时，六大洲忧心忡忡的盟友都寄希望于美国发挥领导作用，而自1775年建军以来，美国武装部队首次承担起全球责任。3
U.S. experiences during World War II demonstrated that commanders in chief (CINCs) of unified combatant commands can bring military power to bear most efficiently and effectively only if some rational system fosters joint operations, dampens jurisdictional disputes, avoids undesirable duplication of effort, and leaves no significant gaps. Related requirements became urgent at the onset of the Cold War, when apprehensive allies on six continents looked to the United States for leadership and global responsibilities settled on U.S. Armed Forces for the first time since their inception in 1775.3
美国最初的责任区划分。 1946年12月14日，哈里·S·杜鲁门总统批准了一系列联合指挥计划中的第一个——《指挥纲要计划》，该计划规定了七个按地理位置划分的联合司令部，其基本任务和责任区如下：4
Original U.S. Areas of Responsibility. President Harry S Truman on December 14, 1946, approved the first in a long series of unified command plans, the Outline Command Plan, which prescribed seven geographically oriented unified commands with the following fundamental missions and areas of responsibility:4
• 远东司令部（FECOM）：在日本、韩国、琉球群岛、菲律宾、马里亚纳群岛和小笠原群岛执行占领任务；必要时指挥驻华美军；做好应对全面紧急情况的准备。成立于1947年1月1日。
• Far East Command (FECOM): Perform occupation duties in Japan, Korea, the Ryukyus, Philippines, Marianas, and Bonin Islands; command U.S. Armed Forces in China if required; prepare for a general emergency. Established January 1, 1947.
• 太平洋司令部（PACOM）：负责开展行动，确保太平洋海空交通线的安全；保护美国免受来自该地区的攻击；做好应对全面紧急情况的准备。成立于1947年1月1日。
• Pacific Command (PACOM): Conduct operations to secure sea and air lines of communication across the Pacific Ocean; protect the United States against attacks from that quarter; prepare for a general emergency. Established January 1, 1947.
• 阿拉斯加司令部（ALCOM）：负责保卫阿拉斯加（包括阿留申群岛）；保护美国免受经由阿拉斯加及邻近北极地区的攻击；做好应对全面紧急情况的准备。成立于1947年1月1日。
• Alaska Command (ALCOM): Defend Alaska, including the Aleutian Islands; protect the United States against attacks through Alaska and adjacent arctic regions; prepare for a general emergency. Established January 1, 1947.
• 欧洲司令部（EUCOM）：占领德国；支持美国在欧洲的国家政策；制定应对全面紧急情况的计划。成立于1947年3月15日。
• European Command (EUCOM): Occupy Germany; support U.S. national policy in Europe; plan for a general emergency. Established March 15, 1947.
• 加勒比司令部（CARIBCOM）：从位于巴拿马和安的列斯群岛的基地保卫美国、巴拿马运河和美国在加勒比地区的据点；与大西洋司令部合作，保卫海空交通线；支援美国大西洋舰队；做好应对突发事件的准备。成立于1947年11月1日。
• Caribbean Command (CARIBCOM): Defend the United States, the Panama Canal, and U.S. outposts in the Caribbean from bases in Panama and the Antilles; defend sea and air lines of communication in collaboration with Atlantic Command; support U.S. Atlantic Fleet; prepare for a general emergency. Established November 1, 1947.
• 大西洋司令部（LANTCOM）：负责保卫美国免受跨大西洋的攻击；支援驻欧洲、地中海、北美东北部和加勒比地区的美国武装部队；做好应对全面紧急情况的准备。成立于1947年12月1日。
• Atlantic Command (LANTCOM): Defend the United States against attack across the Atlantic Ocean; support U.S. Armed Forces in Europe, the Mediterranean, the [North American] Northeast, and the Caribbean; prepare for a general emergency. Established December 1, 1947.
• 美国东北司令部（USNEC）：维护纽芬兰、拉布拉多和格陵兰的安全；保护该地区的海空交通线；保护美国免受来自该地区的攻击；做好应对全面紧急情况的准备。成立于1950年10月1日。
• U.S. Northeast Command (USNEC): Maintain security in Newfoundland, Labrador, and Greenland; protect sea and air lines of communication in area; protect the United States against attack from that quarter; prepare for a general emergency. Established October 1, 1950.
美国责任区后续划分。自1947年以来，美国先后设立了21个联合司令部，其中9个在50年后仍然存在。欧洲司令部（EUCOM）、美国陆军司令部（ACOM，前身为大西洋司令部，LANTCOM）、太平洋司令部（PACOM）、美国中央司令部（CENTCOM）和美国南方司令部（SOUTHCOM）分别专注于特定地理区域。冷战期间，所有这些司令部都对苏联表现出浓厚的兴趣，但没有一个司令部能够在如此庞大的责任区内选择性地运用军事力量（见地图50）。因此，总统和国防部长保留了监督职责，并根据情况委派任务，直到《联合司令部政策》（UCP）的修改将乌克兰、白俄罗斯、摩尔多瓦、格鲁吉亚、亚美尼亚和阿塞拜疆划入欧洲司令部的责任区（1998年10月1日生效），而中央司令部则将哈萨克斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦、土库曼斯坦、塔吉克斯坦和吉尔吉斯斯坦纳入其中（1999年10月1日生效）。在前苏联加盟共和国中，只有俄罗斯仍未被划入任何责任区。
Subsequent U.S. Areas of Responsibility. Twenty-one U.S. unified commands have been established at various times since 1947, of which nine remained 50 years later. EUCOM, ACOM (formerly LANTCOM), PACOM, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) focus on geographic areas. All expressed intense interest in the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but none could apply military power selectively across such a huge AOR (map 50). The President and the Secretary of Defense therefore retained oversight responsibilities and delegated duties as they saw fit until UCP changes put Ukraine, Belarus, Moldava, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan within the EUCOM AOR (effective October 1, 1998), while CENTCOM picked up Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan (effective October 1, 1999). Only Russia among the former Soviet republics will remain unassigned.
定期边界修订。 《美国法典》第10篇规定，参谋长联席会议主席至少每两年审查一次“作战司令部的任务、职责（包括地理边界）和兵力结构，并提出[修改]建议”。在当今瞬息万变的世界中，责任区尤其需要仔细审查，必须考虑政治意识形态、地形、文化、技术和军事等因素，因为除非规划者能够敏锐地察觉到诸多微妙的影响，否则边界修订可能会带来比其解决的问题更为严重的后果。5
Periodic Boundary Revisions. Title 10, United States Code, requires the JCS Chairman not less than every 2 years to review “missions, responsibilities (including geographic boundaries) and force structures for the combatant commands and recommend [changes].” AORs in particular require close scrutiny in this rapidly changing world, taking political ideological, topographical, cultural, technological, and military considerations into account, because boundary revisions may create problems more serious than those they solve unless planners are sensitive to many subtle implications.5
例如，现行的联合指挥计划为三个司令部（CINC）划定了责任区，涵盖了部分伊斯兰非洲地区、西南亚地区以及周边水域。中央司令部（CENTCOM）的责任区覆盖波斯湾、红海、亚丁湾、阿曼湾以及19个国家，除肯尼亚外，这些国家均为穆斯林国家或穆斯林人口占多数。欧洲司令部的责任区包括以色列、叙利亚和黎巴嫩，以及沿非洲地中海沿岸的四个伊斯兰国家（摩洛哥、阿尔及利亚、突尼斯和利比亚）。太平洋司令部的责任区与中央司令部在印巴边界接壤，涵盖印度洋和阿拉伯海。
The current Unified Command Plan, for example, assigns to three CINCs areas of responsibility that include parts of Islamic Africa, Southwest Asia, and neighboring bodies of water. CENTCOM’s AOR covers the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, and 19 countries, all of which except Kenya are entirely Muslim or have Muslim pluralities. European Command’s AOR incorporates Israel, Syria, and Lebanon, together with four Islamic states along Africa’s Mediterranean littoral (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya). Pacific Command’s AOR, which abuts CENTCOM at the border between India and Pakistan, embraces the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.
Map 50. U.S. Cold War Areas of Responsibility (1983-1991)
这种粗糙的衔接使协调变得复杂，并在出现问题时容易导致误判；然而，起初看似简单的调整，在调查之后几乎总是显得复杂。有些问题可以追溯到那些出于官僚主义原因而倾向于维持现状的军种首长和总司令。6.而其他一些国家则与该地区有着千丝万缕的联系。中央司令部的责任区确实可以覆盖所有中东国家，但为此重新划定边界可能会疏远视以色列为敌人的美国阿拉伯盟友，严重阻碍情报共享，并使联盟计划几乎不可能实现。如果联合指挥计划将印度和巴基斯坦这样的宗教宿敌划入同一责任区，也会引发类似的摩擦。表面上看，出于对穆斯林关切的敏感性，中央司令部比欧洲司令部更适合处理伊斯兰北非地区的突发局势，但分配给欧洲司令部的陆地、海洋、空中和两栖作战力量位置更为便利。诸如此类。在其他任何地方，几乎没有明显的初步证据表明需要调整责任区边界。
Such rough seams complicate coordination and invite miscalculations when troubles crop up, yet adjustments that initially seem simple almost always appear complex after investigation. Some problems are traceable to Service chiefs and CINCs who prefer the status quo for bureaucratic reasons,6 while others have their roots in the region. Central Command’s AOR indeed could cover all Middle Eastern countries, but redrawing boundaries to do so likely would alienate U.S. Arab allies who see Israel as their enemy, put a serious crimp in intelligence-sharing, and make coalition planning practically impossible. Similar friction would ensue if the Unified Command Plan put religious rivals like India and Pakistan within one AOR. Sensitivity for Muslim concerns ostensibly makes CENTCOM better suited than EUCOM to deal with explosive situations in Islamic North Africa, but land, sea, air, and amphibious assets assigned to European Command are located more conveniently. And so on. Few prima facie cases that favor AOR boundary adjustments are evident anywhere else.
区域责任范围
REGIONAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY
政治敏感性、传统军种影响范围、威胁、可用作战力量以及地理环境等因素通常会影响区域乃至全球责任区的划分。北约欧洲盟军司令部（ACE）被细分为三个主要下属司令部，以及美国联合司令部责任区（AOR）的反复修订，都体现了相关问题。
Political sensitivities, traditional spheres of Service influence, threats, and available combat power as well as geographic circumstances commonly shape regional as well as global areas of responsibility. The subdivision of NATO’s Allied Command Europe (ACE) into three major subordinate commands and repeated revision of AORs for U.S. unified commands illustrate associated problems.
北约欧洲责任区问题
AOR PROBLEMS IN NATO EUROPE
陆军上将德怀特·D·艾森豪威尔在其担任欧洲盟军最高司令（SACEUR）后的首份年度报告中，对其责任区域进行了精辟的分析：
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his first annual report as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), perceptively analyzed his area of responsibility:
从北角到西西里岛，整个西欧必须作为一个整体进行考察。其主体大陆从波罗的海延伸至亚得里亚海——从宏观角度来看，它就像一个半岛，是欧洲和亚洲总和这块最大陆地的一部分。除了伊比利亚半岛和不列颠群岛之外，在这个主半岛的两侧还有两个主要的突出部分。一个是丹麦，它几乎与斯堪的纳维亚半岛的南端相连，而斯堪的纳维亚半岛的西半部挪威，则与我们这些誓言捍卫自由的兄弟国家同属一个联盟。另一个是意大利，它伸入地中海，为我们提供了有利的侧翼位置，并拥有宝贵的空军和海军基地。将西欧的指挥权划分为三个主要区域似乎是合理的：挪威和丹麦构成一个支撑，意大利及其邻近水域构成另一个支撑，而中央大陆则构成主体结构。7
Western Europe, from North Cape to Sicily, had to be surveyed as a whole. There is the main land mass, stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic—a peninsula, when viewed in perspective, of that greatest of all land masses, which is Europe and Asia combined. On the flanks of this main peninsula we have two main outcrops—apart from the Iberian peninsula and the British Isles. The one is Denmark, almost touching the tip of Scandinavia, whose western half, Norway, is among our brotherhood of nations sworn to defend freedom. The southern outcrop is Italy, projecting into the Mediterranean, and affording us its strong position for flanking forces with valuable air and sea bases. It seemed sound to divide the command of Western Europe into three main sectors: Norway and Denmark as one buttress, Italy and the adjacent waters as the other, and the central mass as the main structure.7
北约的基本划分。 1951年4月，北约开始按地理位置划分三个责任区，从北到南依次排列（图51）。北欧盟军部队驻守北欧侧翼，南欧盟军部队驻守阿尔卑斯山以南，而中欧盟军部队则成为两者之间的屏障。
NATO’s Basic Subdivisions. NATO in April 1951 accordingly began to form three geographically oriented AORs, stacked from north to south (map 51). Allied Forces Northern Europe stood guard on the Nordic flank, Allied Forces Southern Europe did likewise south of the Alps, while Allied Forces Central Europe became the bulwark in between.
丹麦和西德的石勒苏益格-荷尔斯泰因州虽然在地形上与北约中心区域密不可分，但由于它们与挪威合作控制着连接波罗的海和北海的海峡，因此被划归北约司令部管辖。美国第六舰队为南翼提供了大部分作战力量，但临时指挥安排一直持续到1953年。1953年，英国地中海舰队成为路易斯·蒙巴顿海军上将领导的新联合部队的核心，其地位与北约南约司令（一位美国人）平起平坐。8
Denmark and West Germany’s Schleswig-Holstein Province, although topographically inseparable from NATO’s center sector, were assigned to CINCNORTH because, in collaboration with Norway, they controlled straits that connect the Baltic and North Seas. U.S. Sixth Fleet furnished most combat power for the south flank, but interim command arrangements had to suffice until 1953, when the British Mediterranean Fleet became the nucleus of a new lashup under Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten whose status was coequal with that of NATO’s CINCSOUTH, an American.8
Map 51. NATO’s Basic Areas Of Responsibility
美国中央司令部（AFCENT）的作战区域划分杂乱无章。三条陆路走廊横穿铁幕，从华沙条约组织国家延伸至西德，西德是AFCENT的前线防线。其中最危险的一条走廊，专为装甲突击而设，横穿北德平原，沿途拥有优质公路和起伏的农田，便于越野行进；而更南边的崎岖林地则通常限制车辆通行，只能经由富尔达山口（通往法兰克福）和霍夫走廊（通往慕尼黑）（见地图52）。
Haphazard AORs in AFCENT. Three land corridors cut across the Iron Curtain from Warsaw Pact countries into West Germany, which was AFCENT’s forward line of defense. The most dangerous avenue, tailor-made for armored thrusts, traversed the North German Plain over first-rate highways and rolling farmlands that facilitated cross-country movement, whereas rough, wooded terrain farther south generally restricted vehicular traffic to the Fulda Gap, which points toward Frankfurt-am-Main, and to the Hof Corridor which heads for Munich (map 52).
北约针对这三种进攻方式的部署并非刻意为之，而是历史偶然的结果。因为二战结束时，英国、法国和美国的责任区大致与其各自的占领区重合，而且所有盟军都充分利用了西德的和平时期驻军。北方集团军群（NORTHAG）以四个军守卫着至关重要的北德平原，其中荷兰、西德、英国和比利时各派出一个军。与之形成鲜明对比的是，中央集团军群（CENTAG）部署在更易防御的地形上，拥有更强大的战斗力，包括两个美国军、两个西德联邦国防军军以及一个加拿大机械化旅作为预备队。富尔达山口的防御或许最好由一个统一的指挥部负责，但德军和美军的部队共同承担了这一快速进攻的责任，而这一进攻路线横跨两国边界。这种部署不当在军事上是不合理的，但在冷战结束之前并没有进行任何重大调整，因为交换会在进行中削弱防御，外交上的反对意见令人沮丧，而且搬迁成本将是巨大的。10
NATO’s dispositions athwart those three approaches resulted from historical accidents rather than design, because British, French, and U.S. areas of responsibility generally paralleled their respective occupation zones at the end of World War II and all Allied forces took full advantage of West German peacetime garrisons. Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) covered the crucial North German Plain with four corps, of which the Netherlands, West Germany, Britain, and Belgium provided one apiece. Central Army Group (CENTAG), in sharp contrast, was positioned on far more defensible terrain and possessed far greater combat power that included two U.S. corps, two more that belonged to the West German Bundeswehr, and a Canadian mechanized brigade in reserve. Defense of the Fulda Gap might best have rested with a single command, but German and U.S. Army formations shared responsibility for that high-speed approach, which straddled the boundary between them. Such maldeployments were militarily unsound, but no adjustments of much consequence took place before the Cold War ended, because exchanges would have weakened defenses while in progress, diplomatic objections were discouraging, and moving costs would have been enormous.10
太平洋战区问题
AOR PROBLEMS IN THE PACIFIC
二战初期，美国陆军和海军在太平洋地区争夺各自职责和管辖权，导致双方关系紧张，这种情况一直持续到日本投降。随后在东北亚出现的管辖权争议，在朝鲜战争爆发后进一步加剧。类似的问题也使越南战争中的军事行动复杂化。
Competition between the United States Army and the Navy over respective responsibilities and authority in the Pacific strained relationships during early stages of World War II and persisted until Japan capitulated. Jurisdictional disagreements that subsequently surfaced in Northeast Asia intensified after the Korean War erupted. Similar problems complicated military operations in Vietnam.
南太平洋争端。罗斯福总统和丘吉尔首相于1942年商定的太平洋责任区，大部分是水域，最适合海军作战。但当美军停止防御行动，转而对盘踞在构成其本土第一道防线的岛屿要塞上的日军发起进攻时，陆军和陆基空军也发挥了重要作用。美国参谋长联席会议（JCS）在认真考虑了澳大利亚和新西兰政军官员的建议后，设立了西南太平洋战区（SWPA），并任命道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟将军为总司令，管辖范围包括澳大利亚、新几内亚、东至东经160度的邻近岛屿、除苏门答腊岛外的所有荷属东印度群岛以及菲律宾。同时被任命为太平洋战区总司令（CINCPOA）的切斯特·W·尼米兹海军上将则保留了新西兰和太平洋其他地区的管辖权。他的职责范围，减去中美洲和南美洲的一部分，这部分仍然属于巴拿马海边界的太平洋区域（地图 53）。11
Disputes in the South Pacific. The Pacific area of responsibility that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed upon in 1942 was for the most part a watery domain best suited for sea services, but armies and land-based air forces had prominent roles to play when U.S. holding actions ceased and offensive operations commenced against Japanese Armed Forces entrenched on an arc of island strongholds that constituted the first line of defense for their homeland. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), after carefully considering recommendations from political-military officials in Australia and New Zealand, consequently established a Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) and installed General Douglas MacArthur as CINC, with purview over Australia, New Guinea, neighboring islands as far east as 160 degrees east longitude, all of the Dutch East Indies except Sumatra, and the Philippines. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, simultaneously designated Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Area (CINCPOA), retained New Zealand and the rest of the Pacific Ocean in his area of responsibility, less a slice off Central and South America that remained within the Pacific Sector of Panama Sea Frontier (map 53).11
Map 52. AFCENT Areas of Responsibilit
两位区域司令之间的竞争从一开始就十分激烈。美国参谋长联席会议在听取各方意见后，将澳大利亚划入西南太平洋战区，将新西兰划入太平洋战区，以便海军能够保障美国和新西兰之间的海上交通线安全，尽管陆军他们反复指出类似的线路通往澳大利亚，并游说控制两国的码头。在最初的指令墨迹未干之前，参谋长联席会议就将麦克阿瑟将军的东部边界从西经160度线移至西经159度线，从而将所罗门群岛的责任区一分为二，以便尼米兹海军上将能够指挥瓜达尔卡纳尔岛的作战行动。两位海军总司令原本就因争夺稀缺资源而展开激烈竞争，此后他们各自沿着大致平行的路线向菲律宾推进，都坚信自己的责任区应享有最高优先权。然而，1943年5月，参谋长联席会议批准了一项双管齐下的作战计划，但这项计划却无法令双方都满意。12
Competition between the two regional commanders in chief was keen from the start. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, after hearing all arguments, put Australia in the Southwest Pacific Area and New Zealand in the Pacific Ocean Area so the Navy could safeguard sea lines of communication between the United States and New Zealand, although the Army repeatedly pointed out that similar lines led to Australia and lobbied to control terminals in both countries. The JCS moved General MacArthur’s eastern boundary from the 160th to the 159th Meridian before ink dried on their original directive and thereby divided responsibility for the Solomon Islands so Admiral Nimitz could direct operations against Guadalcanal. The two CINCs, already engaged in fierce rivalry for scarce resources, thereafter proceeded along roughly parallel paths toward the Philippines, each firmly convinced that his AOR deserved top priority, but in May 1943 the JCS approved a dual drive that satisfied neither of them.12
东北亚争端。远东司令部（FECOM）在整个朝鲜战争期间（1950年6月至1953年7月）直接向参谋长联席会议汇报，但到了1956年，大多数参谋长联席会议成员认为，鉴于美军在东北亚的部署不断减少，远东司令部已失去其存在的意义，并投票决定将其所有职能移交给太平洋司令部。陆军参谋长麦克斯韦·D·泰勒将军是唯一的反对者，他建议扩大远东司令部的辖区，将台湾、菲律宾、东南亚和印度尼西亚纳入其中。他认为，在这些地区，陆军比海军更有能力阻止共产主义的入侵。直到1957年7月1日，国防部长打破僵局，批准设立两个隶属于太平洋司令部的联合司令部，远东司令部才最终解散：一名陆军四星上将出任联合国军总司令兼驻韩美军司令；一名空军三星上将出任驻日美军司令。然而，关于远东司令部效力的问题仍然时有发生，最近一次是在 1995 年的角色和任务审查期间。13
Disputes in Northeast Asia. Far East Command (FECOM) reported directly to the JCS throughout the Korean War (June 1950- July 1953), but in 1956 most of the Joint Chiefs concluded that FECOM had outlived its usefulness in light of dwindling U.S. deployments in Northeast Asia and voted to transfer all functions to Pacific Command. Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor, the lone dissenter, advised enlargement to include Taiwan, the Philippines, Southeast Asia, and Indonesia where, in his opinion, the Army was better prepared than the Navy to block communist encroachment. FECOM disappeared on July 1, 1957, only after the Secretary of Defense broke the deadlock and approved in its place a pair of unified commands subordinate to CINCPAC: a four-star Army general became Commander in Chief of the U.N. Command and Commander, U.S. Forces Korea; a three-star Air Force general became Commander, U.S. Forces Japan. Questions concerning the efficacy of a Far East Command nevertheless resurface periodically, most recently during the roles and missions review in 1995.13
东南亚争端。早在美军深度介入之前，参谋长联席会议就曾讨论过两种针对北越和南越作战的基本指挥安排：方案A将南北越都置于太平洋司令部的责任区内，自1954年太平洋司令部成立以来，两国一直处于该责任区内，并成立一个隶属于太平洋司令部的联合司令部；方案B则设想成立一个与太平洋司令部同级的独立司令部。参谋长联席会议推荐方案A，太平洋司令部同意，国防部长批准，美国驻越军事援助司令部（MACV）于1962年成立。然而，这个新组建的机构从未像官方“架构图”所示的那样运作。驻越军事援助司令部司令（COMUSMACV）经常绕过太平洋司令部司令，直接与华盛顿特区的上级沟通，包括总统和国防部长，而这些上级在日常作战中扮演着积极的角色。太平洋司令部司令负责空中作战和水面作战，而驻越军事援助司令部司令则负责地面作战。14
Disputes in Southeast Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, well before U.S. Armed Forces became deeply involved, debated two basic command arrangements for operations in North and South Vietnam: Option A left both nations within Pacific Command’s area of responsibility, where they had been since their establishment in 1954, and activated a unified command subordinate to CINCPAC; Option B envisaged an independent command on the same level as PACOM. The JCS recommended Option A, CINCPAC concurred, the Secretary of Defense approved, and U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) emerged in 1962, but the new lashup never worked the way official “wiring diagrams” indicated. COMUSMACV often bypassed CINCPAC to deal directly with superiors in Washington, DC, including the President and Secretary of Defense, who played active parts in daily operations. CINCPAC conducted the air war and surface naval operations, while COMUSMACV took charge on the ground.14
威廉·C·威斯特摩兰将军曾于1964年6月至1968年3月担任美国驻越军事援助司令部司令，他事后指出，如果当时设立一个独立的东南亚联合司令部，就能明确各方职责，提高作战灵活性。“与其设立五个‘司令’——太平洋司令部司令、驻越军事援助司令部司令以及美国驻泰国、老挝和南越大使——不如设立一个直接向总统负责所有事务的司令。……这样的安排就能消除空战和地面战之间协调的难题，而目前由于太平洋司令部负责空战，驻越军事援助司令部负责地面战，两者协调难免出现问题。”15
General William C. Westmoreland, who was Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam from June 1964 until March 1968, observed in retrospect that an independent unified command for all of Southeast Asia would have clarified responsibilities and increased operational flexibility. “Instead of five ’commanders’—CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and the American ambassadors to Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam—there would have been one man directly responsible to the President on everything. . . . Such an arrangement would have eliminated the problem of coordination between the air and ground wars that was inevitable with CINCPAC managing one, MACV the other.”15
中东地区的AOR问题
AOR PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
在20世纪40年代末大英帝国解体、英国军队开始撤离该地区的前哨基地之前，美国正式划定涵盖中东及其周边水域的责任区是没有必要的。1960年2月，在参谋长联席会议（JCS）就此问题展开激烈辩论后，国防部长托马斯·S·盖茨正式任命美国海军东大西洋和地中海司令部（CINCNELM）负责制定和执行涵盖利比亚以东、土耳其以南、红海、阿拉伯海和孟加拉湾的责任区计划和行动。盖茨部长同时扩大了大西洋司令部的责任区，将撒哈拉以南非洲地区纳入其中。16
A U.S. area of responsibility that formally embraced the Middle East and neighboring waters was unnecessary before the British Empire broke up in.the late 1940s and British Armed Forces began to abandon outposts in that region. Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., after heated JCS debates that pitted the Army and Air Force against the Navy and Marine Corps, in February 1960 officially put the Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) in charge of plans and operations for an AOR that enclosed lands east of Libya and south of Turkey, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Bay of Bengal. Secretary Gates concurrently enlarged Atlantic Command’s AOR to include sub-Saharan Africa.16
Map 53. Pacific Ocean Area and Southwest Pacific Area
这些安排被证明是不稳定的。1962年，参谋长联席会议主席在陆军和空军的积极支持下，提议将中东、撒哈拉以南非洲和南亚（MEAFSA）的管辖权赋予新成立的打击司令部总司令。他们认为，按照当时的状况，大西洋司令部和中东司令部“被迫使用其他司令部制定的兵力部署计划，却无法动用自身拥有的兵力执行作战任务”。海军在海军陆战队的支持下，反对这一改变，因为中东司令部对中东问题非常熟悉，而且美国大规模军事介入黑非洲的可能性似乎微乎其微。国防部长认为参谋长联席会议主席的论点很有说服力，于是将MEAFSA纳入打击司令部的职责范围，并于1963年12月1日解散了中东司令部。17
Those arrangements proved unstable. The JCS Chairman in 1962, with active support from the Army and Air Force, accordingly proposed that the Commander in Chief of newly created Strike Command be assigned responsibility for the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and southern Asia (MEAFSA). As it stood, they reasoned, CINCLANT and CINCNELM “are required to execute operations with forces they do not have, using force employment plans developed by other commands,” The Navy, backed by the Marine Corps, resisted change because CINCNELM was thoroughly familiar with Middle East problems and the likelihood of major U.S. military involvement anywhere in Black Africa seemed remote. The Secretary of Defense found the Chairman’s arguments persuasive, added MEAFSA to CINCSTRIKE’s responsibilities, and disbanded NELM on December 1, 1963.17
然而，争端依然存在，权宜之计占据主导地位，持续性难以实现。1971年4月，总统和国防部长解散了打击司令部和中东、非洲及南美洲司令部，将东地中海沿岸、红海、波斯湾和伊朗划归欧洲司令部管辖，而撒哈拉以南的非洲地区则无人管辖。永久性的改进措施直到美国中央司令部的出现才得以实现。中央司令部于1983年1月1日取代了临时快速部署联合特遣部队。自成立以来，中央司令部的责任区域一直保持不变，包括：位于非洲之角的埃及、苏丹、吉布提、埃塞俄比亚、厄立特里亚、肯尼亚和索马里；位于阿拉伯半岛的沙特阿拉伯、科威特、巴林、卡塔尔、阿拉伯联合酋长国、阿曼和也门；以及约旦、伊拉克、伊朗、阿富汗、巴基斯坦、红海和波斯湾。18
Disputes nevertheless persisted, expedient operations predominated, and continuity was elusive. The President and Secretary of Defense discontinued Strike Command and CINCMEAFSA in April 1971, tacked the eastern Mediterranean littoral, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and Iran onto European Command, and left Africa south of the Sahara unassigned. Permanent improvements awaited the appearance of U.S. Central Command, which replaced an interim Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force on January 1, 1983. CENTCOM’s geographic area of responsibility, which has endured since that date, consists of Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Somalia, all in the Horn of Africa; Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Yemen, all on the Arabian peninsula; and Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf.18
加勒比地区的AOR问题
AOR PROBLEMS IN THE CARIBBEAN
200多年来，无论和平时期还是战争时期，加勒比海盆地与美国国家安全都密不可分。19该关键区域的指挥安排自 1956 年以来一直处于大西洋司令部的责任区内，在 1962 年古巴导弹危机和 3 年后美国在多米尼加共和国的行动中运作顺利，但关于责任区的激烈辩论始于 1979 年 10 月，此前不久，卡特总统对苏联日益增长的侵略和古巴的影响力表示遗憾。20
The Caribbean Basin and U.S. national security have been inseparable for more than 200 years, in peacetime as well as war.19 Command arrangements for that crucial region, which had been within CINCLANT’s area of responsibility since 1956, worked smoothly during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and U.S. operations in the Dominican Republic 3 years later, but heated debates about AORs began in October 1979 soon after President Carter deplored what he perceived to be ever greater Soviet encroachment and Cuban influence.20
南方司令部司令及陆军参谋长认为，全面战争的可能性很小，但如果真的爆发，大西洋司令部必须将注意力集中在大西洋上，而南方司令部凭借其在拉丁美洲积累的丰富经验，已经做好充分准备，并且有能力应对对美国在加勒比地区的利益构成直接威胁的共产主义活动。大西洋司令部司令则认为，鉴于美国鼓励在加勒比地区保持高度警惕并提升军事能力的政策，将加勒比地区的责任从其指挥下移交给南方司令部是不明智的。参谋长联席会议最终支持大西洋司令部的决定，认为大西洋司令部更有能力保护经由加勒比地区通往北约欧洲和委内瑞拉石油的重要海上航道。在紧急情况下向美国提供援助。国防部长卡斯帕·温伯格于1981年11月2日批准了他们的建议。21
CINCSOUTH and the Army Chief of Staff postulated that general war was a remote possibility, but if it did occur, LANTCOM would have to rivet attention on the Atlantic Ocean whereas Southern Command, armed with a wealth of Latin American experience, was ready, willing, and able to counter Communist activities that posed clear and present dangers to U.S. interests throughout the Caribbean. CINCLANT contended that it would be imprudent to pass responsibility for the Caribbean from his command to SOUTHCOM, given U.S. policies that encouraged greater vigilance and military capabilities in that volatile region. The Joint Chiefs found in favor of Atlantic Command, which they concluded was better able to safeguard vital sea lanes through the Caribbean to NATO Europe and from Venezuelan oil fields to the United States under emergency conditions. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger approved their recommendations on November 2, 1981.21
然而，在接下来的十年里，随着全面战争的可能性在可预见的未来几乎消失，美国针对不同威胁制定了不同的政策和优先事项。参谋长联席会议主席约翰·M·沙利卡什维利将军建议，国防部长威廉·佩里表示赞同，比尔·克林顿总统批准了相关调整，将美国在加勒比海盆地以及中美洲和南美洲的所有军事活动的控制权移交给南方司令部，该调整于1997年6月1日生效，主要目的是为了消除那些对禁毒行动产生不利影响的棘手环节。此外，克林顿总统于1996年1月1日将中美洲和南美洲周边海域（西经30°至西经92°）的管辖权也移交给了南方司令部，以加强美国与拉丁美洲海军的互动。22
Different U.S. policies and priorities in response to different threats, however, appeared the following decade after possibilities of general war virtually disappeared for the foreseeable future. JCS Chairman General John M. Shalikashvili recommended, Defense Secretary William Perry concurred, and President Bill Clinton approved alterations that gave CINCSOUTH control over all U.S. military activities in the Caribbean basin as well as Central and South America effective June 1, 1997, primarily to remove troublesome seams that adversely affected counternarcotics operations. President Clinton on January 1, 1996, additionally transferred to SOUTHCOM responsibility for ocean waters around Central and South America from 30° West to 92° West to improve U.S. interactions with Latin American navies.22
有用的见解
USEFUL INSIGHTS
联合参谋部战略计划与政策局（J-5）制定了六项原则，并经参谋长联席会议主席批准，用于1995年参谋长联席会议对统一指挥计划的审查。这六项原则至今仍是衡量各区域作战司令部责任划分是否合理的标准。23.每个授权委托书必须：
Members of the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5) of the Joint Staff developed, and the JCS Chairman approved, six principles for use during the 1995 JCS review of the Unified Command Plan. All six still serve as yardsticks with which to measure how well assigned areas of responsibility suit each regionally oriented combatant command.23 Each AOR must:
1. 支持美国国家安全利益
1. Support U.S. national security interests
2. 与美国现行国家安全战略、国家军事战略和公共法律保持一致
2. Be consistent with the current U.S. national security strategy, national military strategy, and public law
3. 考虑国际和跨部门的敏感性
3. Take international and interservice sensitivities into account
4. 促进和平时期和战争时期的联合军事行动
4. Facilitate unified military operations during peacetime as well as war
5. 保持与总司令指挥跨度一致，确保行动范围不超过抓握范围。
5. Be consistent with the CINC’s span of control, so that reach does not exceed grasp
6. 制定切实可行、经济实惠且易于接受的计划、方案和部队部署。
6. Be consistent with plans, programs, and force deployments that are realistic, affordable, and salable.
如果过去能够深思熟虑地运用这些原则，或许可以缓解许多责任区问题，同样也能减少未来国际间和军种间的冲突。第3点和第6点尤为重要，因为如果政治家、军种发言人或掌握财政大权的人（在美国是国会）强烈反对，责任区几乎总是无法令人满意。
Thoughtful application of those principles might have ameliorated many AOR problems in the past and similarly could reduce the incidence of international and interservice discord in the future. Points 3 and 6 have special significance, because areas of responsibility almost invariably are unsatisfactory if statesmen, Service spokesmen, or holders of purse strings (Congress in the United States) strongly oppose.
战区和战术航空
THEATER AND TACTICAL AORS
战区总司令负责各自辖区内陆、海、空和两栖部队的作战指挥，通常会将部分责任区内的作战、后勤和行政权力下放给下级主要指挥机构。战术责任区（TAOR）有助于下级指挥机构进行控制和协调。各战区总司令和其他指挥官划定的边界旨在确保在指定区域内行动自由，充分覆盖目标和目标区域，同时避免不必要的重复行动，防止混乱，并降低友军误伤的风险。
Theater commanders in chief, who exercise operational control over land, sea, air, and amphibious forces within respective jurisdictions, as a rule delegate to major subordinate commands authority and accountability over parts of their AORs for operational, logistical, and administrative purposes. Tactical areas of responsibility (TAORs) facilitate control and coordination at lower levels. The boundaries that CINCs and other commanders draw are designed to facilitate freedom of action within assigned zones, ensure adequate coverage of objectives and target suites yet avoid undesirable duplication of effort, prevent confusion, and reduce risks of fratricide from so-called “friendly fire.”
战区和战术责任区在几个重要方面与全球和区域划分有所不同：国际敏感性往往会降低（但不会消失），而军种间的竞争依然强烈；利益和影响范围往往会模糊边界；而且，在瞬息万变的作战行动中，战区和战术责任区经常发生变化。
Theater and tactical AORs differ from global and regional subdivisions in several important respects: international sensitivities tend to diminish (but do not disappear), whereas interservice rivalries remain strong; areas of interest and influence tend to blur boundary lines; and TAORs are subject to frequent change during fluid operations.
地球表面的边界
BOUNDARIES ON EARTH’S SURFACE
各级陆军和两栖部队的作战计划和命令通常会划定边界和其他控制线，以防止出现缺口，并防止作战和支援部队干扰友军在侧翼、前方或后方的行动。精心划定的边界尽可能沿着山脊、河流、道路、城市街道以及其他在地图和实地都能清晰辨认的地理特征延伸。除非别无他法，否则边界既不会将优势地形的责任划分给两个或多个指挥部，也不会让一个指挥部的部队部署在难以逾越的障碍物两侧。
Operation plans and orders employed by land and amphibious forces at every level commonly prescribe boundaries and other control lines to prevent gaps and forestall interference by combat and support forces with friendly formations on either flank, to the front, or toward the rear. Well drafted boundaries wherever possible follow ridges, rivers, roads, city streets, and other geographic features that are clearly recognizable on maps as well as on the ground. They neither divide responsibility for dominant terrain between two or more commands nor position forces from one command on both sides of formidable obstacles unless sensible alternatives seem unavailable.
进攻行动中的边界。标有延伸至目标之外的横向边界的叠加图有助于军事指挥官协调对敌方的炮击和空袭。此外，如图 38所示，陆地边界还可以“挤压”某些部队，从而为比相邻部队更快向目标推进的部队增加机动空间，重组预备队，或出于其他合理原因。
Boundaries During Offensive Operations. Overlays marked with lateral boundaries that extend beyond objectives help military commanders coordinate artillery and air strikes against enemies. Land boundaries moreover may “pinch out” elements, as shown in figure 38, to increase maneuver room for formations that are progressing toward objectives faster than adjacent units, to reconstitute reserves, or for other cogent reasons.
防御作战中的边界。任何规模的地面部队能够防御的线性战线在很大程度上取决于地形、植被覆盖和土壤条件，这些因素共同限制了反击部队和敌军可利用的掩体、隐蔽、观察和高速通道。克服地理劣势并抓住机遇的能力又取决于技术水平。当士兵们肩并肩地装备着滑膛枪和短程火炮时，战线总是很窄，最佳的控制措施包括喊叫、手势信号、旗语、信使、号角声和烟火。现代武器系统、电子通信、精密传感器和其他技术创新使得部队能够更分散地部署，但防御战线仍然（而且可能永远）受到崎岖地形、森林和人造建筑物的严重限制，这些因素会降低平射武器的射击视野，并衰减无线电波。相反，光秃秃的平原可以让具备必要机动性或远程武器的小规模部队覆盖相对较大的区域。
Boundaries During Defensive Operations. The linear frontage that any given size ground force can defend depends in large part on topography, vegetative cover, and soil conditions which, taken together, limit cover, concealment, observation, and high-speed avenues available for use by counterattacking forces as well as enemies. Abilities to overcome geographic adversities and capitalize on opportunities in turn hinge on states of technology. Frontages were invariably narrow when soldiers armed with muskets and short-range cannons stood shoulder to shoulder and the best control measures consisted of shouts, hand signals, semaphore flags, messengers, bugle calls, and pyrotechnics. Modern weapon systems, electronic communications, sophisticated sensors, and other technological innovations permit much greater dispersion, but defensive fronts still are (and probably will always be) severely restricted by rough terrain, forests, and manmade structures that afford poor fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons and attenuate radio waves. Bald flatlands conversely allow small forces with requisite mobility or long-range weaponry to cover relatively large areas.
前线防御部队的横向边界通常向前延伸至作战哨所的观察极限，而师级边界至少延伸至所属或附属炮兵的最大有效射程。师、军、野战集团军和战区指挥官还会划定后方边界，明确负责行政、后勤、后方安全和损管任务的部队的责任区域。
Lateral boundaries for front line companies in defensive positions normally extend forward to the limit of observation from combat outposts, whereas divisional boundaries reach at least as far as the maximum effective range of organic or attached artillery. Division, corps, field army, and theater commanders also draw rear boundaries that identify areas of responsibility for forces with administrative, logistical, rear area security, and damage control missions.
联盟边界。除了军事需要之外，民族自豪感和政治考量有时也会影响军事责任区的划分。在盟军从诺曼底滩头阵地向德国边境推进的过程中，解放巴黎并非艾森豪威尔将军的首要目标之一。但是，经过一番争论，最终率先进入巴黎的荣誉授予了法国第二装甲师，因为象征性地恢复法国自由的意义超越了单纯的军事需求。1991 年 1 月至 2 月，由于类似的原因，在击败伊拉克的多国联军中， 24 支阿拉伯地面部队率先越过沙特阿拉伯和科威特之间的边界，然后率先进入科威特城，而美国海军陆战队则按计划协助他们通过。25
Coalition Boundaries. National pride and political considerations other than military exigencies sometimes shape military areas of responsibility. The liberation of Paris was not one of General Eisenhower’s immediate aims during the allied drive from beachheads in Normandy to the German border. But, after much bickering, the honor of first entry went to the 2d French Armored Division because the symbolic restoration of French freedom outweighed strictly military requirements.24 Arab ground forces within the multinational coalition that defeated Iraq in January-February 1991 for similar reasons were first to cross the border between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, then were first to enter Kuwait City while U.S. Marines, as planned, assisted their passage.25
Figure 38. Offensive Force Boundaries
会合边界。穿越敌方领土与另一侧友军会合的军事行动需要周密的协调。当双方都在行进中时（这种情况很常见），相关问题会更加棘手；而当汇合的部队来自两个或多个国家，彼此之间难以进行面对面沟通，更遑论通过无线电进行交流时，问题则会成倍增加。为防止意外发生，标准程序要求各部队在穿越双方认可的交战线时进行报告，并在即将交战时展示预先约定的识别信号。
Linkup Boundaries. Military operations that proceed through hostile territory to link up with friendly armed forces on the far side require careful coordination. Associated problems are doubly touchy when both sides are in motion, which often is the case, and increase severalfold when converging forces come from two or more countries that find it difficult to communicate face-to-face, much less over air waves. Standard procedures designed to prevent mishaps require units to report when they cross mutually recognized phase lines and to display prearranged recognition signs when contacts become imminent.
艾森豪威尔将军举了一个真实案例，他指出，“随着我们横穿德国中部，与俄国人的联络问题变得越来越重要。” 指挥部人员“急于选择一个易于识别的地理特征”作为会师线，最终选择了易北河。1945年4月25日下午，美军第69步兵师的部队在那里与俄军部队安全会合，而就在两周后，纳粹德国无条件投降了。26
General Eisenhower, to cite one real world case, noted that “the problem of liaison with the Russians grew constantly more important as we advanced across central Germany.” Converging commanders, “anxious to have an easily identified geographical feature” serve as the junction line, selected the Elbe River, where troops of the U.S. 69th Infantry Division safely met Russian counterparts on the afternoon of April 25, 1945, just 2 weeks before Nazi Germany surrendered unconditionally.26
水域边界
BOUNDARIES ON WATER
海军部队通常厌恶限制行动自由的界限。然而，在两栖突击作战中，开阔水域的指挥控制线往往十分便利且不可避免。
Sea services as a rule abhor boundaries that inhibit freedom of action. Command and control lines on open water, however, often are convenient and are unavoidable during amphibious assault operations.
海军责任区之间的边界。海军部队在从一个责任区前往另一个责任区途中，通常会在预先指定的时间或地点进行作战指挥权交接（CHOP）。母港位于美国西海岸或夏威夷的舰艇，在越过国际日期变更线前往远东时，其指挥权从第三舰队移交给第七舰队；返回时则反向交接。第七舰队从太平洋司令部驶往中央司令部的舰艇，在迪戈加西亚岛以北或以西航行一定航程后，将隶属于第五舰队；第二舰队驻扎在美国东海岸的舰艇，在进入地中海之前，会在直布罗陀以西的作战指挥权交接至第六舰队，以此类推。每艘舰艇在交接时间都会以电子方式向接收方司令部发送一份资源和训练状况报告，概述其执行预期任务的准备情况。
Boundaries Between Naval Areas of Responsibility. Naval forces en route from one AOR to another commonly change operational control (CHOP) at predesignated times or places. Ships home-ported on the U.S. west coast or in Hawaii pass from Third Fleet control to Seventh Fleet when they cross the International Date Line headed for the Far East and reverse that process upon return. Seventh Fleet ships bound from PACOM to CENTCOM become subordinate to Fifth Fleet a specified number of steaming hours north or west of Diego Garcia, Second Fleet ships based on the U.S. east coast CHOP to Sixth Fleet west of Gibraltar before they enter the Mediterranean Sea, and so on. Each ship at CHOP time electronically transmits to the receiving command a status of resources and training report that summarizes its readiness to perform anticipated missions.
两栖突击边界。在对防御海岸发起进攻之前和期间，为协调两栖部队而划定的边界，确立了责任区（通常位于陆地观察员视线范围之外），部队在此区域内从舰船转移到气垫船、直升机、登陆艇或其他运输工具。水上边界还标明了从出发线到指定海滩的航道，指示水下爆破小组的排雷区域，并确保岸上责任区包含足够的内陆撤离点。地图54描绘了1943年塔拉瓦环礁的此类部署。
Amphibious Assault Boundaries. Boundaries drawn to coordinate amphibious forces before and during assaults on defended shores establish areas of responsibility (often over-the-horizon beyond the sight of observers on land) where troops transfer from ships to air cushion vehicles, helicopters, landing craft, or other conveyances. Boundaries on water also demark lanes from the line of departure to designated beaches, tell underwater demolition teams where to clear mines, and ensure that AORs ashore include adequate exits inland. Map 54 depicts such arrangements at Tarawa atoll in 1943.
空中边界
BOUNDARIES IN THE AIR
空军和海军一样，都厌恶大气层中人为划定的界限，但高级指挥官有时会出于他们认为最安全、最高效地利用空域的理由（无论这些理由是否正确）来划定空域。以下三个例子可以说明问题，一个与空运有关，一个与作战行动有关，还有一个与维和行动有关。
Air forces detest imaginary lines in the atmosphere as much as navies deplore boundaries drawn on the sea, but senior commanders sometimes assign sectors for reasons they rightly or wrongly believe promote the safest, most efficient use of airspace. Three instances, one related to airlift, a second to combat operations, and a third to peacekeeping, are illustrative.
柏林空运。严格来说，二战后美、英、法、苏四国占领时期，四条公路、四条铁路和一条驳船运河将西柏林的盟军占领军与西德连接起来。但实际上，只有一条铁路和通往赫尔姆施塔特的德国高速公路是开放的，而且苏联军队从1948年6月22日至1949年9月30日封锁了这两条线路。西柏林的食品和燃料极度匮乏，盟军空军在民用航空公司的协助下，发起了“维特尔斯行动”，从汉堡、汉诺威和法兰克福出发，开辟了三条宽约20英里的走廊（见第23页地图6 ） ，向西柏林运送物资。运输机昼夜不停地执行紧急任务，在苏联政治局允许卡车和火车恢复运输之前，运送了超过230万吨急需的物资。27
The Berlin Airlift. Technically, four roads, four rail lines, and one barge canal tied Allied occupation forces in West Berlin to West Germany during the period of the U.S., British, French, and Soviet occupation after World War II, but only one railway and the Autobahn to Helmstadt were actually open, and Soviet Armed Forces sealed both from June 22, 1948, until September 30, 1949. Food and fuel for West Berliners were at a low ebb when Allied air forces with civilian air line assistance launched Operation Vittles over three 20-mile-wide corridors from Hamburg, Hanover, and Frankfurt-am-Main (see map 6, page 23). Transport aircraft flying night and day on split-second schedules delivered more than 2.3 million tons of desperately needed supplies before the Soviet Politburo allowed trucks and trains to resume shipments.27
北越上空的空中责任区。 1965年3月，驻南越的美国空军中队和驻扎在北部湾航母上的海军飞机开始对北越进行“滚雷”轰炸行动，控制问题随即出现。美国空军和海军联合协调委员会随后提出了三项可选的控制方案，但这些方案都存在争议。
Air AORs Over North Vietnam. Control problems arose as soon as U.S. Air Force squadrons in South Vietnam and naval aircraft based on carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin began Rolling Thunder bombing campaigns against North Vietnam in March 1965. A joint USAF-Navy Coordinating Committee thereupon advanced three optional control plans, all of which were controversial.
空军成员首先提出轮流攻击方案，即预留3小时时段，由一个军种轮流攻击已批准的目标。海军则提出以南北轴线为单位的责任划分方案，将沿海目标留给航母舰载机攻击，因为航母舰载机航程有限，无法在不进行空中加油的情况下深入内陆。但这样一来，一些目标可能得不到足够的关注，而另一些目标则可能得到过多的关注。尽管空军反对，协调委员会最终还是妥协，采用了所谓的“路线方案”（见图55）。28
Air Force members first proposed time-sharing arrangements that would reserve 3-hour periods within which one service, then the other, could attack approved targets. The Navy counterproposed responsibility on a north-south axis that reserved coastal targets for carrier aircraft, which lacked enough range to reach far inland without in-flight refueling, but some targets in that case would have received too little attention and others too much. The Coordinating Committee, despite Air Force objections, compromised with so-called “Route Packages,” as follows (map 55).28
Map 54. Amphibious Boundaries at Tarawa
改编自 Martin Russ 的《出发线：塔拉瓦》。
Adapted from Martin Russ, Line of Departure: Tarawa.
• 路线包 I（空军）包括非军事区附近的敌军集结基地和通往老挝狭长地带的交通繁忙的穆嘉山口。
• Route Package I (Air Force) included enemy staging bases near the demilitarized zone and heavily-traveled Mu Gia Pass, which led into the Laotian panhandle.
• 第二路线包（海军）涵盖了荣市周围的敌方后勤活动、沿海公路沿线的目标以及近岸交通。
• Route Package II (Navy) covered enemy logistical activities around Vinh, targets along the coastal highway, and littoral traffic.
• 第三路线包（海军）重点关注向巴特寮和北越军队在石缸平原及其附近地区提供补给的补给线。
• Route Package III (Navy) concentrated on supply lines that fed Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces on and near the Plain of Jars.
• 第四路线包（海军）包括主要编组站、清化桥和北越河内以南唯一的全天候机场。
• Route Package IV (Navy) encompassed major marshaling yards, the Thanh Hoa bridge, and North Vietnam’s only all-weather airfield south of Hanoi.
• 第五路线包（空军）面积是其他任何路线包的两倍，而且更深入内陆，涵盖了北越和老挝北部之间的敌方基地，包括奠边府。
• Route Package V (Air Force), twice the size of and farther inland than any other parcel, embraced enemy bases between North Vietnam and northern Laos, including Dien Bien Phu.
• 第六路线包（由空军和海军沿着显眼的东北铁路划分）是一个以河内为中心、防御严密、目标密集的区域。
• Route Package VI (divided between the Air Force and Navy along the highly-visible northeast railroad) was a heavily-defended, target-rich environment centered around Hanoi.
这些责任区一直有效到 1972 年 10 月，当时，太平洋总司令诺埃尔·盖勒海军上将“为了提高资源利用效率，并在需要的地方大规模运用武力”，将河内周围的第六航线包指定为“综合打击区”，美国空军和海军飞机可以在其中“安排打击任务到彼此的地理区域”。29
Those AORs remained in effect until October 1972 when, “to improve efficient use of resources and to attain mass application of force where indicated,” Admiral Noel Gayler, in his capacity as Commander in Chief Pacific, designated Route Package VI around Hanoi as “an integrated strike zone” wherein USAF and Navy aircraft could “schedule strike missions into one another’s geographical area.”29
并非所有人都对这一决定感到满意，该决定仅涉及北越的一个作战区域。持怀疑态度的人士，例如当时的美国第七航空队司令威廉·W·莫米尔将军，随后不久便撰文指出，“任何将空军武力任意分配到专属作战区域的安排，都将大大削弱空军在最需要的地方迅速集中压倒性火力的独特能力。”30他同时引用了英国空军元帅泰德的以下言论来支持他的观点：“空战不能被分割成一个个小区域；除了飞机的作战半径所规定的界限外，它在陆地或海洋上没有任何边界；它是一个整体，需要统一指挥。”31
Not everyone was satisfied with that decision, which pertained to only one AOR in North Vietnam. Skeptics such as General William W. Momyer, who commanded U.S. Seventh Air Force at the time, soon thereafter wrote that “any arrangement arbitrarily assigning air forces to exclusive areas of operation will significantly reduce airpower’s unique ability to quickly concentrate overwhelming firepower wherever it is most needed.”30 He concurrently cited the following words of British Air Marshal Tedder to buttress his case: “Air warfare cannot be separated into little packets; it knows no boundaries on land or sea other than those imposed by the radius of action of the aircraft; it is a unity and demands unity of command.”31
伊拉克的“禁飞区”。 1991年4月，联合国安理会通过第688号决议，指示伊拉克停止镇压其北部境内的库尔德人以及南部地区的什叶派穆斯林。此后不久，美国及其主要盟友设立了两个禁飞区，以确保伊拉克遵守决议。自1991年5月以来，参与“提供安慰行动”（Operation Provide Comfort）的美国、英国和法国飞机从土耳其的基地起飞，每日执行任务，阻止伊拉克使用北纬36度线以北的领空。1992年8月，与“南方守望行动”（Operation Southern Watch）相关的巡逻队开始“清理”北纬32度线以南的伊拉克领空，主要来自沙特阿拉伯，随后于1996年9月将范围扩大到北纬33度线。此外，这些飞行或许还有助于阻止萨达姆·侯赛因对科威特和阿拉伯半岛其他国家采取鲁莽行动。32
“No Fly Zones” in Iraq. The United Nations Security Council in April 1991 passed Resolution 688, which directed Iraq to cease repressing Kurdish communities within its northern borders and Shi’ite Muslims in the far south. The United States and key allies shortly thereafter imposed two air exclusion zones to ensure compliance. U.S., British, and French aircraft that participate in Operation Provide Comfort from bases in Turkey have flown daily sorties since May 1991 to deny Iraq any use of its airspace north of the 36th Parallel. Patrols associated with Operation Southern Watch in August 1992 began to “sanitize” Iraqi airspace south of the 32d Parallel, mainly from Saudi Arabia, then expanded coverage to include the 33d Parallel in September 1996. Such flights, as a bonus, perhaps help deter rash moves by Saddam Hussein toward Kuwait and other countries on the Arabian Peninsula.32
Map 55. Route Packages in North Vietnam
“无人区”
“NO MAN’S LANDS”
美国各军种都试图在战术责任区之外的“无人区”划清界限，在这个区域内，利益范围、影响范围和远程武器的射程相互重叠。竞争异常激烈，因为胜者将获得更多资金和更大份额的稀缺资源，用于履行相关职责、职能和任务。缺乏互信使得每个军种都不愿依赖他人，并像先知以赛亚那样恳求道：“我在这里，请差遣我。”
Every U.S. military service seeks to stake out claims beyond tactical areas of responsibility in a “no man’s land” where areas of interest, areas of influence, and the reach of long-range weapons overlap. Competition is intense, because the winners receive more money and a larger share of scarce resources with which to perform related roles, functions, and missions. Lack of mutual trust makes each supplicant loath to rely on others and prompts each, like the Prophet Isaiah, to plead, “Here am I; send me.”
几乎所有陆军部队都会建立火力支援协调线（FSCL）或类似设施，旨在最大限度地保障空军和远程武器的行动自由，同时最大限度地减少对地面机动方案的干扰，并防止直接支援前线部队的空中武器系统造成误伤。陆基和舰载飞机通常只有在与相应陆军指挥官协商并获得批准后，才能对火力支援协调线友方一侧的地面目标进行打击；但在大多数情况下，它们有权根据自身判断对敌方一侧的目标进行空对地和地对地攻击。33
Land forces almost everywhere establish fire support coordination lines (FSCLs) or equivalents thereof designed to maximize freedom of action for air forces and long-range weapons yet simultaneously minimize interference with ground schemes of maneuver and forestall fratricide by aerial weapon systems that deliver munitions in direct support of frontline troops. Land- and carrier-based aircraft as a rule may strike surface targets on the friendly side of FSCLs only after consultation with and approval of appropriate land force commanders but, in most cases, are authorized to conduct air-to-surface and surface-to-surface attacks on the hostile side as they see fit.33
这些交战规则原本还算令人满意，直到装备导弹的陆军部队开始侵犯空军和海军的防御区域。例如，美国陆军目前拥有能够识别300至500公里（185至310英里）外目标的武器装备，并且能够在超过100公里（60英里）的距离上，不受天气条件限制地打击目标。陆军发言人援引美国联合条令来为使用此类系统辩护，该条令规定了足够大的作战区域，以便陆军指挥官能够保护其部队并在远距离作战。34位空军反驳者则持相反观点，认为只有美国空军和海军的飞行员才应该进行高空纵深作战，因为陆军的干预会加剧军种间的协调问题，导致飞机和炮弹之间发生灾难性的碰撞，造成不必要的重复劳动，并产生难以承受的成本。一位批评人士指出，如果美国空军坚持要求自己的坦克营在敌军突破防线时保卫空军基地，那同样是“荒谬的”。35然而，在美国和其他地方，深入的战斗争端可能会持续存在，直到高级决策者确定多少（如果有的话）重叠是可取的，并为每个军种规定明确划分的责任区域。
Those rules of engagement were reasonably satisfactory until land forces armed with missiles began to impinge on air force and naval preserves. The U.S. Army, for example, currently is armed and equipped to identify targets at 185 to 310 miles (300 to 500 kilometers) and engage targets regardless of weather conditions at ranges that exceed 60 miles (100 kilometers). Army spokesmen justify the use of such systems with quotations from U.S. joint doctrine, which prescribes areas of operation large enough for land commanders to protect their forces and fight at extended ranges.34 Air Force rebutters contrarily contend that only USAF and naval airmen should fight high and deep, because Army interference fosters interservice coordination problems, invites disastrous collisions between aircraft and projectiles, promotes senseless redundancies, and incurs unconscionable costs. It would be equally “absurd,” one critic said, for the U.S. Air Force to insist on its own tank battalions to defend air bases in event of enemy breakthroughs.35 Deep battle disputes nevertheless will likely linger in the United States and elsewhere until senior decisionmakers determine how much (if any) overlap is advisable and prescribe crisply-demarked areas of responsibility for each military service.
空间内部及贯穿空间的边界
BOUNDARIES IN AND THROUGH SPACE
自1967年10月10日起生效的《外层空间条约》第四条规定：“所有缔约国应将月球和其他天体用于和平目的。禁止在天体上建立军事基地、设施和防御工事，禁止试验任何类型的武器，禁止进行军事演习。”
Article IV of the Treaty on Outer Space, in force since October 10, 1967, states, “The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all [signatories] for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons, and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.”
然而，没有任何条约禁止在自由空间进行军事活动。美国太空司令部希望总统宣布该区域为战区。36如果他选择这样做，地球同步轨道、地球静止轨道、极地轨道、月球轨道和其他预先设定的轨道模式很可能会决定战术责任区，至少在技术专家在未来某个不可预测的日子里研制出可机动航天器之前是如此。如果任何国家最终在这些地方部署武装力量，那么月球或其他天体上的军事边界很可能与地球上的军事边界具有大多数共同特征。
No treaty, however, forbids military activities in free space. U.S. Space Command wants the President to declare that void as a regional AOR.36 Geosynchronous, geostationary, polar, lunar, and other prearranged orbit patterns probably would determine tactical areas of responsibility should he choose to do so, at least until technologists devise maneuverable spacecraft at some unpredictable future date. Military boundaries on the moon or other celestial bodies likely would share most attributes of those on Earth if any nation eventually deploys armed forces in such places.
笔记
NOTES
1. Maurice Matloff 和 Edwin M. Snell，《1941-1942 年联合战争战略规划》，载于《美国陆军在第二次世界大战中》（华盛顿特区：美国陆军军事历史中心，1990 年），第 165-166 页。
1. Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, The United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1990), 165-166.
2.同上，166-168。
2. Ibid., 166-168.
3. Walter S. Poole 等人，《统一指挥计划的历史，1946-1993》（华盛顿特区：参谋长联席会议主席办公室联合历史办公室，1995 年 2 月）。
3. Walter S. Poole et al., The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993 (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1995).
4.同上，第 12-13 页，第 127-129 页。
4. Ibid., 12-13, 127-129.
5. Phillip E. Oates 和 Lawrence J. Stewart，《单极世界中的统一指挥》，国家安全计划讨论文件（马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院，1991 年 6 月）。
5. Phillip E. Oates and Lawrence J. Stewart, Unified Command in a Unipolar World, National Security Program Discussion Paper (Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June, 1991).
6. Poole 等人，《统一指挥计划的历史》，第 1-7 页。
6. Poole et al., The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1-7.
7.德怀特·D·艾森豪威尔，《欧洲盟军最高司令部第一年度报告》（巴黎：欧洲盟军最高司令部公共信息部，1952 年 4 月），第 14 页。
7. Dwight D. Eisenhower, First Annual Report of the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe (Paris: Public Information Division, SHAPE, April 1952), 14.
8. Stephen E. Ambrose 与 Morris Honick 合著，“艾森豪威尔：点燃西方精神”，载于《国际政治中的将军：北约欧洲盟军最高司令》（肯塔基州列克星敦：肯塔基大学出版社，1987 年），第 18-22 页。
8. Stephen E. Ambrose with Morris Honick, “Eisenhower: Kindling the Spirit of the West,” in Generals in International Politics: NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1987), 18-22.
9. 例如，参见《国会、参议院、北约和新的苏联威胁》，萨姆·纳恩参议员和杜威·巴特利特参议员向第95届国会第1会期军事委员会提交的报告，1977年；《美国空军和地面常规部队在北约的部署：概述》（华盛顿特区：国会预算办公室，1978年1月）；理查德·D·劳伦斯和杰弗里·雷科德，《美国在北约的部队结构：一种替代方案》（华盛顿特区：布鲁金斯学会，1974年）。
9. See, for example, Congress, Senate, NATO and the New Soviet Threat, Report of Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Dewey Bartlett to the Committee on Armed Services, 95th Congress, 1st sess., 1977; U.S. Air and Ground Conventional Forces for NATO: Overview (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, January 1978); Richard D. Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, U.S. Force Structure in NATO: An Alternative (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974).
10. Harold Brown，《1979 财年国防部年度报告》，第 237-238 页。
10. Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report for FY 1979, 237-238.
11. Matloff 和 Snell，《1941-1942 年联盟战争战略规划》，第 168-173 页；Rafael Steinberg，《岛屿作战》（纽约：时代生活图书，1978 年），第 20-23 页。
11. Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, 168-173; Rafael Steinberg, Island Fighting (New York: Time-Life Books, 1978), 20-23.
12.联合战争战略规划，1941-1942，258-265 ；莫里斯·马特洛夫，联合战争战略规划，1943-1944，1994，91，96-97，137-138，185-196，453-459。
12. Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, 258-265; Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, 1994, 91, 96-97, 137-138, 185-196, 453-459.
13. Poole 等人，《统一指挥计划的历史》，第 20、26-27 页。
13. Poole, et al., The History of the Unified Command Plan, 20, 26-27.
14.同上，第 36-37 页；《越南战争报告》，太平洋司令部总司令 USC Sharp 海军上将，第一部分，关于对北越的空袭和海战以及太平洋地区对战争的支持的报告，1964 年 6 月至 1968 年 7 月；以及美国驻越南军事援助司令部司令 William C. Westmoreland 将军，第二部分，关于在南越的行动的报告，1964 年 1 月至 1968 年 6 月（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1968 年）。
14. Ibid., 36-37; Report on the War in Vietnam, Admiral U. S. C. Sharp, Commander in Chief Pacific Command, Section I, Report on Air and Naval Campaigns Against North Vietnam and Pacific-Wide Support of the War, June 1964-July 1968; and General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Section II, Report on Operations in South Vietnam, January 1964-June 1968 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1968).
15. William C. Westmoreland，《士兵报告》（纽约州花园城：Doubleday出版社，1976年），第499-500页。
15. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1976), 499-500.
16. Poole 等人，《统一指挥计划的历史》，第 16、29-31 页。
16. Poole et al., The History of the Unified Command Plan, 16, 29-31.
17.同上，第 32-34 页。
17. Ibid., 32-34.
18.同上，第 39-41 页、第 64-70 页、第 74-78 页。
18. Ibid., 39-41, 64-70, 74-78.
19.例如，参见 Alfred Thayer Mahan，“墨西哥湾和加勒比海的战略特征”，《哈珀新月刊》，1887 年 10 月，第 680-691 页；《加勒比海——军事视角》，执行摘要和第一卷，技术报告第 83-2 号（华盛顿特区：海军海上系统司令部，1983 年 12 月）。
19. See, for example, Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The Strategic Features of the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea,” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine, October 1887, 680-691; The Caribbean—A Military Perspective, Executive Summary and vol. I, Technical Report No. 83-2 (Washington, DC: Naval Sea Systems Command, December 1983).
20.统一指挥计划的历史，26、31-32、70 。
20. The History of the Unified Command Plan, 26, 31-32, 70.
21.同上，71-74。
21. Ibid., 71-74.
22.联合指挥计划：大西洋和南方司令部参与 1995 年审查（华盛顿特区：美国总审计署，1996 年 12 月）。
22. Unified Command Plan: Atlantic and Southern Command Participation in 1995 Review (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, December 1996).
23.同上，第 13 页。
23. Ibid., 13.
24. Martin Blumenson，《突破与追击》，美国陆军在第二次世界大战中的欧洲战区（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1961 年），第 29 章。
24. Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, U.S. Army in World War II, The European Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1961), chapter 29.
25.《波斯湾冲突：提交国会的最终报告》（华盛顿：国防部，1992 年 4 月），第 410 页；哈立德·伊本·苏丹王子，《沙漠战士：联合部队指挥官对海湾战争的个人看法》（纽约：哈珀·柯林斯出版社，1995 年），第 391-419 页。
25. Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to Congress (Washington: Department of Defense, April 1992), 410; Prince Khaled Ibn Sultan, Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 391-419.
26.德怀特·D·艾森豪威尔，《欧洲十字军东征》（纽约州花园城：Doubleday出版社，1948年），第410-411页；科尼利厄斯·瑞安，《最后一战》（伦敦圣詹姆斯广场：Collins出版社，1966年），第371-372页。
26. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1948), 410-411; Cornelius Ryan, The Last Battle (St. James Place, London: Collins, 1966), 371-372.
27.安和约翰·图萨，《柏林空运》（纽约：雅典娜出版社，1988 年）。
27. Ann and John Tusa, The Berlin Airlift (New York: Athenium, 1988).
28. William W. Momyer，《三次战争中的空军力量》，新版（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1985 年），第 89-94 页；Sharp，《越南战争报告》，第一部分，第 16-48 页，第 53-54 页。
28. William W. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars, new imprint (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985), 89-94; Sharp, Report on the War in Vietnam, Section I, 16-48, 53-54.
29.《科罗娜收获报告》，美国空军东南亚空中作战，1972 年 7 月 1 日至 1973 年 8 月 15 日，第 2 卷（夏威夷希卡姆空军基地：美国空军部太平洋空军，1973 年），IV-34。
29. Corona Harvest Report, USAF Air Operations in Southeast Asia, 1 July 1972-15 August 1973, vol. 2 (Hickam AFB, Hawaii: Dept. of the Air Force, Pacific Air Force, 1973), IV-34.
30. Momyer，《三次战争中的空军力量》，94-99。
30. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars, 94-99.
31.皇家空军元帅泰德勋爵，《战争中的空军力量》，利斯·诺尔斯讲座（伦敦：圣保罗之家：1947 年），第 91-92 页。
31. Marshal of the Royal Air Force the Lord Tedder, Air Power in War, the Lees Knowles Lectures (London: St. Paul’s House: 1947), 91-92.
32. Kenneth Katzman，《伊拉克遵守停火协议的情况》，简报 92117（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1997 年 3 月），定期更新；Alfred B. Prados，《伊拉克库尔德人：现状、保护和前景》，报告编号 94-423F（华盛顿特区：国会研究服务处，1994 年 5 月 12 日）。
32. Kenneth Katzman, Iraqi Compliance with Cease-Fire Agreements, Issue Brief 92117 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 1997), updated regularly; Alfred B. Prados, The Kurds of Iraq: Status, Protection, and Prospects, Report No. 94-423F (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 12, 1994).
33.联合出版物 1-02：国防部军事及相关术语词典（华盛顿特区：参谋长联席会议主席办公室，1994 年 3 月 23 日），第 146 页；FM 100-5：作战（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1993 年 6 月），第 6-14 页；空军条令指令 1-1，第 2 卷（华盛顿特区：空军部，1992 年 3 月），第 161-164 页。
33. Joint Pub 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 23, 1994), 146; FM 100-5: Operations (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, June 1993), 6-14; Air Force Doctrine Directive 1-1, vol. 2 (Washington DC: Dept. of the Air Force, March 1992), 161-164.
34.纵深作战（华盛顿特区：陆军部角色与任务局，1994 年 11 月 15 日）。
34. Deep Battle (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, Roles and Missions Directorate, November 15,1994).
35. Merrill A. McPeak，《向武装部队角色和任务委员会提交的报告》，修订版（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1994 年 9 月 14 日），第 15-17、34-35、37、39-40、50-55 页；William W. Momyer，“战区作战组织：从指挥官的角度看”，载 Thomas A. Cardwell III，《战区作战指挥结构：寻求统一指挥》（阿拉巴马州麦克斯韦空军基地：空军大学出版社，1984 年 9 月），第 131-134 页。
35. Merrill A. McPeak, Presentation to the Committee on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, revised (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 14, 1994), 15-17, 34-35, 37, 39-40, 50-55; William W. Momyer. “An Organization for Theater Operations: From a Commander’s Perspective,” in Thomas A. Cardwell, III, Command Structure for Theater Warfare: The Quest for Unity of Command (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September 1984), 131-134.
36.道格拉斯·贝伦森，“美国太空司令部希望将太空宣布为其‘区域’作战区域”，《五角大楼内幕》 ，1997 年 2 月 20 日，第 1 页。
36. Douglas Berenson, “U.S. Space Command Wants Space Declared Its ’Regional’ Area of Operations,” Inside the Pentagon, February 20, 1997, 1.
1991年2月，伊拉克总统萨达姆·侯赛因下令焚毁了650口科威特油井，其中几口油井至今仍在熊熊燃烧，刺鼻的浓烟遮天蔽日。扑灭大火、恢复生产以及应对这场规模巨大的生态灾难，都需要付出前所未有的努力（美国空军照片）。
A few of the 650 Kuwaiti oil wells that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein torched in February 1991 burn brightly and blacken the sky with acrid smoke. Unprecedented efforts were required to extinguish the flames, restore production, and cope with an ecological disaster of grand proportions (U.S. Air Force photograph).
阿萨姆邦和缅甸的当地劳工经常将物资和设备从牛车上转移到开往中国昆明的美国C-46运输机上，途经喜马拉雅山驼峰的危险路线。国民党军队是该目的地的主要受益者（美国陆军照片）。
Local laborers in Assam and Burma routinely transferred supplies and equipment from ox carts to U.S. C-46 cargo aircraft bound for Kunming, China, via perilous routes over the Himalayan Hump. Nationalist Chinese divisions were the principal beneficiaries at that destination (U.S. Army photograph).
盟军和缴获的敌军采石场配备了碎石机，当军事需要用到材料来建造、修理或维护道路、铁路、机场和其他需要坚实基础的军事基础设施时，这些采石场就派上了用场（美国陆军照片）。
Allied and captured enemy quarries equipped with rock crushers come in handy when military requirements call for materials with which to construct repair, or maintain roads, railways, airfields, and other military infrastructure that demand solid foundations (U.S. Army photograph).
远征机场，例如这座位于南太平洋棕榈林中的机场，便于快速调动陆基空中力量执行各种任务。应急跑道通常一两天内即可投入使用。更强大的作战能力则需要更长的时间，具体取决于当地地形、土地清理要求、土壤稳定性、建筑材料的供应情况以及简易基地组件的及时到位（美国海军照片）。
Expeditionary airfields, such as this one in the midst of a South Pacific palm grove, facilitate the rapid exploitation of land-based airpower for diverse purposes. Emergency strips may be operational within a day or two. Greater capabilities demand longer times that depend on local topography, land clearance requirements, soil stability, the availability of construction materials, and the early arrival of bare base kits (U.S. Navy photograph).
柏林空运（食品行动）在苏联从 1948 年 6 月到 1949 年 5 月的长期封锁期间，在艰难的条件下为饱受围困的西柏林提供了物资。感激涕零的市民们几乎完全依赖这条空中生命线来获取食物和燃料，在天气晴朗的时候，他们会聚集在高地上，欢呼迎接珍贵物资的到来（美国陆军照片）。
The Berlin Airlift (Operation Vittles) supplied beleaguered West Berlin under trying circumstances during a protracted Soviet blockade that lasted from June 1948 until May 1949. Grateful citizens, who depended almost entirely on that aerial lifeline for food and fuel, lined high ground in good weather to cheer the arrival of precious shipments (U.S. Army photograph).
从空中俯瞰，被三层树冠雨林环绕的仓促直升机停机坪，就像绿色毯子上炸出的一个个大洞。地面观察者看到的是一堆堆倒下的树木，直到电锯完成清理工作（美国陆军照片）。
Hastily constructed helipads surrounded by triple canopy rain forests look like holes blasted in green blankets when viewed from above. Observers at ground level see a tangle of felled trees until chain saws complete the clearance process (U.S. Army photographs).
城市巷战对无辜的旁观者往往比对交战双方更加残酷。在白旗（投降的标志）下，步兵冷漠地列队走过一位茫然的德国老奶奶，她难以置信地望着被空袭和炮火夷为平地的家园废墟。（美国陆军照片）
Urban combat often is more cruel to innocent bystanders than to belligerents. Foot troops beneath white flags (signs of surrender) indifferently file by this bewildered German grandmother who gazes in disbelief at the wreckage of her home that aerial bombs and artillery had reduced to rubble (U.S. Army photograph.)
二战后，美国战略轰炸调查强调了传统空中轰炸对工业目标的局限性。照片拍摄后不久，位于德国路德维希港的法本公司（IG Farben）工厂虽然遭受重创，但仍恢复了近70%的产能（美国陆军照片）。
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey that followed World War II emphasized the limitations of conventional aerial bombardment against industrial targets. The badly battered I.G. Farben plant at Ludwigshaven, Germany produced goods at almost 70 percent of capacity soon after this photo was taken (U.S. Army photograph).
龙牙防线只是二战期间支撑德国与法国、卢森堡和比利时边境的齐格菲防线上最显眼的防御工事。1944年9月，当德意志国防军陷入混乱且这些防御工事驻守薄弱时，一些美军几乎未遇抵抗便通过了这些防线，但又过了六个月，才在广阔的战线上取得了突破（美国陆军照片）。
Dragons’ Teeth were merely the most visible defenses along the Siegfried Line that buttressed Germany’s borders with France, Luxembourg, and Belgium during World War II. Some U.S. troops rolled through almost unopposed in September 1944 when the Wehrmacht was in disarray and those fortifications were lightly manned, but six more months elapsed before breakthoughs occurred on a broad front (U.S. Army photograph).
诺曼底犹他海滩上的鹅卵石会加剧炮火的威力，因为跳弹的石块与金属碎片和高爆炸药一样致命（美国陆军照片）。
Cobblestones such as those on this stretch of Utah Beach in Normandy multiply the effects of artillery fire, because ricocheting rocks can be just as lethal as metal shards and high explosives (U.S. Army photograph).
在诺曼底，被困在陡峭土堤上树篱间狭窄道路上的装甲车辆很容易成为反坦克炮手的目标，正如这辆德国 Mark-5 坦克的乘员所发现的那样（美国陆军照片）。
Armored vehicles trapped on narrow lanes between hedgerows atop steep earthen banks were easy targets for antitank gunners in Normandy, as the crew of this German Mark-5 tank discovered (U.S. Army photograph).
在美军飞机反复轰炸并最终摧毁了老挝狭长地带车蓬附近的邦希昂河三跨桥后，河面景象如同月球表面一般荒凉。此后，由于河水无法涉水，胡志明小道该段的卡车通行中断，但驳船仍可将部队、武器、装备和补给运送到南岸（美国空军照片）。
The Banghiang River crossing looked like a lunar landscape after U.S. aircraft repeatedly bombed and finally destroyed the triple span bridge near Tchepone in the Laotian panhandle. Truck traffic on that part of the Ho Ch Minh Trail thereafter ceased, because the river was unfordable, but barges ferried troops, weapons, equipment, and supplies to the south bank (U.S. Air Force photograph.).
“桑树A”是诺曼底登陆日后不久在奥马哈海滩附近搭建的一个临时港口，堪称工程奇迹。1944年6月19日（诺曼底登陆日后13天），一场毁灭性的风暴将主体结构摧毁成扭曲的残骸，但在此之前，已有数千名士兵、车辆和数吨物资通过其入口进入港口（美国陆军照片）。
Mulberry “A”, an expedient port installed off Omaha Beach shortly after D-Day, was an engineering marvel. A devastating storm that struck on June 19, 1944 (D+13) reduced the primary structure to twisted wreckage, but not before thousands of troops, vehicles, and tons of supplies passed through its portals (U.S. Army photographs).
上图：这张位于老挝和越南边境附近的照片展示了典型的绕行路和浅滩，9 号公路于 1968 年跨越了一条浅溪。老挝还是法国殖民地时，工程师们建造的摇摇欲坠的桥梁，如今甚至无法承受轻型车辆的通行（美国空军照片）。
Top: This scene near the border between Laos and Vietnam illustrates a typical bypass and ford where Route 9 crossed a shallow stream in 1968. The rickety bridge that engineers installed when Laos was a French colony would no longer support even light vehicular traffic (U.S. Air Force photograph).
下图：一名海军陆战队下士骑在一辆小型推土机上，试图改善溪山和老挝边境之间的9号公路。这条路段路权严重受损，一侧与一条浅溪平行，另一侧是陡峭的山坡，在该路段宽度不足6英尺（2米）（美国海军陆战队照片）。
Bottom: A Marine Lance Corporal astride a baby bulldozer seeks to improve “Highway” 9 between Khe Sanh and the Laotian border. The badly eroded right of way, paralleling a shallow stream on one side and precipitous slopes on the other, was barely 6 feet (2 meters) wide in that locale (U.S. Marine Corps photograph).
班霍伊萨内机场位于蓬河以北，在以它命名的老挝小村庄郊外（右下角），是埃尔帕索作战计划目标区域内最好的机场，尽管它已被废弃，而且由碎石和红土铺成的跑道上布满了 20 多个炸弹坑（美国空军照片）。
Ban Houei Sane, just north of the Pon River on the outskirts of the tiny Laotian village from which it took its name (lower right), was the best airfield in the OPLAN El Paso objective area, even though it was abandoned and the runway of crushed stone and laterite was pocked with more than 20 bomb craters (U.S. Air Force photograph)
17. 区域分析格式
17. FORMAT FOR AREA ANALYSIS
永恒的真理，除非在每一种新的……情况下都有新的意义，否则就既不是真理，也不是永恒的。
Eternal truths will be neither true nor eternal unless they have fresh meaning for every new . . . situation.
富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福
在宾夕法尼亚大学的演讲，
1940年9月20日
Franklin Delano Roosevelt
Address, University of Pennsylvania
September 20, 1940
罗斯福总统关于自然地理、文化地理以及政治军事地理对各级军事计划、方案和行动的影响的论述非常精辟，因为任何特定区域的重要性都会随着季节性、周期性和随机性的变化而波动，指挥官和参谋人员必须根据任务、局势、双方可用兵力以及技术水平来评估这些变化。计算机辅助情报收集人员收集、整理和分发区域分析所需的大部分数据，但准确的解读和合理的结论仍然依赖于敏锐的思维。大多数专业人员遵循的模式与下文简要描述的类似。
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT’S REMARK WAS WELL SAID WITH REGARD TO THE INFLUENCE OF PHYSICAL, CULTURAL, and political-military geography on military plans, programs, and operations at every level, because the significance of any given area fluctuates in response to seasonal, cyclical, and random changes that commanders and staffs must evaluate in consonance with missions, situations, forces available on both sides, and technological proficiencies. Computer-assisted intelligence collectors amass, sort, and disseminate much of the data needed for area analyses, but accurate interpretations and sound conclusions depend on incisive minds. Most professionals follow a format similar to the one briefly described below.
地理数据库
GEOGRAPHICAL DATA BASES
包含所有相关地理事实的数据库为每个区域的分析奠定了基础，正如本文档的第一部分和第二部分为第三部分和第四部分奠定了基础一样。空间关系、地形、海洋学、天气、气候、人口统计、城市格局、交通网络和人造建筑等重要因素与本文的目录（见表25）相吻合。
Data bases that deal with all pertinent geographic facts lay the foundation for the analysis of each area in much the same way that Parts One and Two of this document underpin Parts Three and Four. Salient considerations such as spatial relationships, topography, oceanography, weather, climate, demography, urban patterns, transportation networks, and manmade structures indeed parallel the Table of Contents herein (see table 25).
Table 25. Area Analysis Format
军事任务
MILITARY MISSIONS
军事影响
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS
对行动方案的影响
EFFECTS ON COURSES OF ACTION
军事任务
MILITARY MISSIONS
只有将基础地理情报置于军事任务的背景下，其全部意义才能显现出来。例如，1944年2月12日，美英联合参谋长联席会议指示艾森豪威尔将军“进入欧洲大陆，并与其他盟国协同作战，对德国核心地带进行打击，摧毁其武装力量”，此后，各项具体需求便迅速传递至指挥链的各个层级。美英加联军随即准备在诺曼底海岸登陆，巩固五个滩头阵地，然后向内陆推进。美国第一集团军准备进行空降和两栖突击，以夺取其登陆海岸线上的据点；美国第五军准备在奥马哈海滩登陆；美国第一步兵师和第二十九步兵师准备在D日H时分别对各自的作战区域发起进攻。各营、连、排、班等单位也做好准备，在越来越小的责任区内执行越来越精细的任务。1每个组织都需要进行正式或非正式的领域分析，以满足其独特的需要。
The full significance of basic geographic intelligence begins to emerge only when put into context with military missions. Distinctive requirements, for example, rippled down chains of command as soon as the U.S.-British Combined Chiefs of Staff on February 12, 1944, instructed General Eisenhower to “enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with other Allied nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.” A U.S.-British-Canadian coalition thereupon prepared to land on the Normandy coast, consolidate five beachheads, then drive inland. The First U.S. Army prepared airborne and amphibious assaults to seize lodgments along its stretch of invasion coast, U.S. V Corps prepared to land on Omaha Beach, the 1st and 29th U.S. Infantry Divisions prepared to hit respective subsections at H-Hour on D-Day. Battalions, companies, platoons, and squads prepared to accomplish ever more detailed missions within ever smaller AORs.1 Each organization required a formal or informal area analysis slanted specifically to meet its unique needs.
如今，陆海空军指挥官还必须做好准备，执行诸如维和、人道主义援助、灾害救援、国家重建、人质营救、反恐、禁毒以及其他非战争行动等多样化任务。在每种情况下，以任务为导向的区域分析都至关重要。
Land, sea, and air force commanders in this day and age additionally must prepare to accomplish such diversified missions as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, nation building, hostage rescue, counterterrorism, drug interdiction, and other operations short of war. Mission-oriented area analyses in each instance are essential.
军事影响
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS
详细的诊断属于战略、战术和后勤类别，分别服务于国家决策者和规划者、作战指挥官以及专门从事供应、维护、运输、建设和医疗保健的支援部队。
Detailed diagnoses occupy strategic, tactical, and logistical categories that respectively serve national policymakers and planners, combatant commanders, and support forces that specialize in supply, maintenance, transportation, construction, and medical care.
战略领域分析
STRATEGIC AREA ANALYSES
国家层面的区域分析侧重于政治军事问题，与本文档第三部分讨论的问题非常相似，此外还包括到达遥远责任区所需的通信线路、到达后组建联盟的能力以及军事有用基础设施的可用性。
Area analyses at the national level concentrate on political-military matters much like those that Part Three of this document addresses, together with lines of communication needed to reach distant areas of responsibility, abilities to form coalitions after arrival, and the availability of militarily useful infrastructures.
战略分析还会评估敌方核心区域，这些区域包含具有重大政治、经济、军事或文化价值的目标，夺取、控制、摧毁或摧毁这些目标将带来显著优势。冷战期间，美国分析人士指出，在俄罗斯欧洲部分地区，有几个聚集区在全面核战争爆发时对苏联国家安全至关重要：莫斯科、列宁格勒、顿涅茨盆地和乌拉尔山脉地区的重工业、巴库周边的油田和炼油厂。以塔什干、库兹涅茨克盆地、贝加尔湖和符拉迪沃斯托克为中心的辅助核心区在区域上也十分重要，但即使没有这些核心区，苏联也能作为一个强大的国家继续存在下去（图56）。2
Strategic analyses also assess enemy core areas that contain targets of great political, economic, military, or cultural value, the seizure, retention, destruction, or control of which would afford marked advantage. U.S. analysts during the Cold War identified several agglomerations in European Russia that would have been vitally important to Soviet national security in the event of a general nuclear war: Moscow, Leningrad, heavy industries in the Donets Basin and Ural Mountain complex, oil fields and refineries around Baku. Subsidiary cores centered around Tashkent, the Kuznetsk Basin, Lake Baikal, and Vladivostok were regionally important, but the Soviet Union could have survived as a strong state without them (map 56).2
战术区域分析
TACTICAL AREA ANALYSES
为作战部队制定的区域分析侧重于关键地形、接近路线、自然和人为障碍、掩体、隐蔽、观察和射击范围。以下简要介绍每一项。
Area analyses developed for combat forces emphasize critical terrain, avenues of approach, natural and manmade obstacles, cover, concealment, observation, and fields of fire. A few words about each suffice.
关键地形。占领、控制或摧毁关键（有时是决定性）地形的武装力量将获得显著优势。关键地形是战略核心区域的低层级对应物。典型的例子包括制高点、军事指挥部、地理咽喉要道、电信中心、后勤设施、发电厂、水坝、船闸、机场、海港、铁路编组站和公路枢纽。不同层级的指挥官对关键地形的定义各不相同，因为高级指挥官和下级指挥官的视角不同。例如，三星和四星上将可能将整个半岛视为关键地形，而下层指挥官则可能首先关注某个沿海城市，然后是其中的海军造船厂，再下一层关注港口设施，最后关注码头仓库。
Critical Terrain. Marked advantages accrue to armed forces that hold, control, or destroy critical (sometimes decisive) terrain, which is a lower level analog of strategically crucial core areas. Typical examples range from commanding heights and military headquarters to geographic choke points, telecommunication centers, logistical installations, power plants, dams, locks, airfields, seaports, railway marshaling yards, and road junctions. Features that qualify differ at each echelon, because senior commanders and their subordinates have different perspectives. Three- and four-star officers, for example, might see an entire peninsula as critical terrain while successively lower levels focus first on one coastal city, then on the naval shipyard therein, the next layer down on harbor facilities, and finally on pierside warehouses.
进路。陆路、海路和空路的价值也因指挥层级而异。20世纪初担任德国总参谋长的施利芬元帅设想在萨克森和法国之间修建一条高速通道，足以容纳34个师并排行进，前提是“右翼最后一名士兵的袖子能擦到英吉利海峡”。3而那些疲惫不堪、处于部队底层的排长们，如果能找到一段1000米长的合适路段，都会感到无比幸运。对友军有利的路线很少适合敌军的作战计划，反之亦然，但无论哪种情况，有效的路径都不一定非得是最显而易见的——相反，精明的指挥官有时会选择一些不太有利的路线，正是因为这样更容易出其不意。
Avenues of Approach. The value of avenues on land, at sea, and in the air also varies with levels of command. Field Marshal Graf von Schlieffen, who was Chief of the German General Staff at the turn of the 20th century, visualized a single high-speed corridor between Saxony and France, adequate for 34 divisions abreast if “the last man on the right brushed the English Channel with his sleeve,”3 whereas haggard platoon leaders at the bottom of his heap felt lucky when they found a suitable stretch 1,000 meters long. Approaches that are attractive to friendly armed forces seldom suit enemy schemes of maneuver and vice versa, but useful avenues in neither event need follow the most obvious paths—on the contrary, savvy commanders occasionally pick inauspicious routes precisely because they facilitate surprise.
障碍。陆路进攻路线上的典型障碍包括山脉、无法涉水的溪流、沼泽、陡坡、厚厚的积雪、茂密的森林、被淹没的低地、暗礁、浅滩、城市中心、雷区、反坦克壕沟、路障、被炸毁的桥梁、布满弹坑的机场跑道以及“龙牙”。距离和陆路通行能力并非总是密切相关，西藏就是一个例证。从喜马拉雅山脉以北的中国崇羌前往西藏比从喜马拉雅山脉以南的加尔各答前往西藏要容易得多。垂直于进攻路线的障碍会导致进攻地面部队失去前进动力并暂时陷入停滞，从而增加其脆弱性。例如，西撒哈拉的波利萨里奥游击队始终无法越过摩洛哥军队修建的巨大防御工事。4
Obstacles. Representative obstacles along land avenues of approach include mountains, unfordable streams, swamps, steep slopes, deep snow, dense forests, flooded lowlands, reefs, shoals, urban centers, minefields, antitank ditches, roadblocks, blown bridges, cratered airport runways, and “dragons’ teeth,” Distance and overland accessibility don’t always correlate closely, as evidenced by Tibet, which is reached more easily from Chongqiang, China, north of the Himalayas than from Calcutta south of that awesome wall. Impediments perpendicular to avenues of attack cause offensive ground forces to lose forward momentum and temporarily bunch up, which increases vulnerabilities. Polisario guerrillas in Western Sahara, for example, never were able to mount large-scale assaults across the huge berm that Moroccan troops built as a defensive barrier.4
空中没有固体障碍物，海面上也不常见（冰、岛屿、礁石和浅滩是重要的例外），但水下地形会阻碍潜艇活动，恶劣天气通常会干扰空中和水上作业，崎岖的地形会限制飞行路线，而出于政治原因拒绝飞越权等无形障碍可能会阻碍空域的使用。
Solid obstructions are absent in the air and uncommon on sea surfaces (ice, islands, reefs, and shoals are important exceptions), but underwater topography inhibits submarines, bad weather commonly interferes with operations aloft and afloat, rugged terrain limits flight paths, and intangible obstacles such as the denial of overflight rights for political reasons may impede the use of airspace.
观察与火力范围。千百年来，地面部队为了夺取、守住或摧毁教堂尖顶、水塔或诸如意大利卡西诺山和硫磺岛泗钵山等制高点上的观察哨，流尽了无数鲜血。然而，只有在视线不受地形遮蔽、茂密植被、雨水、毛毛雨、飞雪、尘土、雾、烟、霾、海市蜃楼或其他遮蔽物（这些遮蔽物也会限制空中侦察）阻碍的情况下，最高的制高点才能提供最佳视野。除非配备夜视设备，否则夜幕会降低陆军、海军和空军的能见度。
Observation and Fields of Fire. Ground forces for millenia have spilled countless buckets of blood in efforts to seize, hold, or destroy observation posts in church steeples, on water towers, or atop dominant peaks such as Monte Cassino (Italy) and Mount Surabachi (Iwo Jima). The loftiest perches, however, provide the best visibility only if lines-of-sight are unobstructed by terrain masks, dense vegetation, rain, drizzle, swirling snow, dust, fog, smoke, smog, mirages, or other obscurants that also limit aerial surveillance. Darkness reduces visibility for land, sea, and air forces alike unless they possess night vision devices.
地形特征、植被覆盖和建筑物通常会限制空对地和地对地武器系统的攻击。朝鲜就是一个典型的例子，因为低垂的云层经常覆盖山顶，山谷中刮着强劲的风，而且许多……利润丰厚的目标深埋在朝北的阴暗陡峭的峡谷底部隧道中。在这种狭小的空间内，贴地飞行的飞机、“智能炸弹”和末端制导导弹肯定很难进行高速急转弯。5
Topographic features, vegetative cover, and buildings commonly restrict air-to-ground as well as surface-to-surface weapon systems. North Korea is a cogent case in point, because low-hanging clouds often cover mountain tops, valley winds blow strongly, and many lucrative targets are deeply buried in tunnels at the bottom of shadowy, steep-sided ravines that face north. Contour-flying aircraft, “smart bombs,” and terminally-guided missiles assuredly would be hard-pressed to make sharp, high-speed turns in such close quarters.5
掩护与隐蔽。军事人员、指挥所、武器系统和设施从掩护（意味着保护）中获益更多，而非仅仅从隐蔽（仅仅阻止观察）中获益。例如，伪装网和丁香灌木丛或许能阻挡窥视的目光，但它们提供的防护效果并不比战斗夹克上的纽扣更好。散兵坑和地面的凹陷虽然能阻挡子弹和飞溅的碎片，但对于试图渗透到最低层的化学战剂来说，却几乎起不到任何保护作用。
Cover and Concealment. Military personnel, command posts, weapon systems, and installations benefit more from cover, which connotes protection, than from concealment, which merely prevents observation. Camouflage nets and lilac bushes, for example, may frustrate prying eyes, but provide no better shields that buttons on battle jackets. Foxholes and folds in the ground that stop bullets and flying shards afford scant security against chemical warfare agents that seek the lowest levels.
物流区域分析
LOGISTICAL AREA ANALYSES
后勤人员对侧重于关键地形、进场路线、障碍物、观察点、射击范围、掩体和隐蔽的区域分析并不满意。他们关注的是补给、维护、运输、建设和医疗，因此需要掌握关于各种主题的最新数据，例如：天气和地形对特殊食品、衣物和住所需求的影响；修建或维护道路、机场、海港、营地、仓库和其他军事设施所需的采石场和木材场的可用性；潜在主要补给路线的瓶颈和通行能力；充足的水源是否存在以及替代水源的位置；当地卫生问题和地方性疾病；当地劳动力的数量和质量特征。民事事务和心理战部队同样需要专门为其目的编制的区域分析。
Logisticians get little satisfaction from area analyses that emphasize critical terrain, avenues of approach, obstacles, observation, fields of fire, cover, and concealment. Their interests in supply, maintenance, transportation, construction, and medical care instead demand up-to-date data concerning such diversified subjects as the effects of weather and terrain on needs for specialized food, clothing, and shelter; the availability of stone quarries and lumber yards needed to construct or maintain roads, airfields, seaports, cantonments, depots, and other military installations; bottlenecks along, and throughput capacities of, potential main supply routes; the presence or absence of plentiful water supplies and the location of alternative sources; indigenous sanitation problems and endemic diseases; quantitative and qualitative characteristics of local labor forces. Civil affairs and psychological operations forces similarly require area analyses prepared expressly for their purposes.
对行动方案的影响
EFFECTS ON COURSES OF ACTION
每个区域分析的最终目的是评估和比较地理因素对敌我双方行动方案的影响。分析结果尽可能清晰地展现了各种因素的利弊，以便参谋人员提出建议，指挥官做出决策。第18章和第19章介绍了两个不同的区域研究，展示了地理因素在相对较近的时期对美军和敌军行动方案的影响。案例1探讨了二战期间在西欧开辟第二战场的空降和两栖突击行动所受到的影响。案例2则探究了林登·约翰逊总统执政期间，阻碍封锁老挝胡志明小道的后勤问题的地理根源。这些主要发现具有指导意义，因为地理因素同样会在未来的政治家和各级军事指挥官面前发挥作用。在政治家和军事指挥官面前，他们必须决定在特定情况下，武力是否是最合适的手段；在军事指挥官面前，他们必须决定在何时何地以何种方式、在何种规模下，才能最有效地运用武力完成既定任务。
The culmination of each area analysis evaluates and compares geographic influences on friendly and enemy courses of action. Results give the clearest possible views of advantages versus disadvantages before staff officers make recommendations and commanders make decisions. Chapters 18 and 19 present two dissimilar area studies that show effects on U.S. and enemy courses of action in the relatively recent past. Case 1 investigates influences on airborne and amphibious assaults that opened a second front in Western Europe during World War II. Case 2 explores the geographical antecedents of logistical problems that plagued plans to block the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos during President Lyndon Johnson’s administration. Key findings are instructive, because geographical facts of life will similarly confront future statesmen, who must determine whether armed force is the most appropriate instrument in any given instance, and military commanders at every level, who must decide where, when, how, and in what strength to apply power most effectively given assigned missions.
• 只有当数据库同时涵盖文化、政治以及自然地理时，才能为区域分析奠定坚实的基础。
• Data bases normally lay solid foundations for area analyses only if they address cultural and political as well as physical geography.
• 熟练的分析师只有运用经过时间检验的技术，确保所有相关因素都得到充分关注，才能始终得出合理的结论。
• Skilled analysts consistently reach sound conclusions only if they apply time-tested techniques to ensure that all relevant considerations receive adequate attention.
• 陆军、海军、空军和太空部队分别进行区域分析，以满足各级作战和支援司令部的特殊需求。
• Land, sea, air, and space forces individually prepare area analyses to fulfill specialized needs of combatant and support commands at every echelon.
• 区域分析师根据具体的军事任务定制每一项评估，每一项评估都需要独特的解读。
• Area analysts tailor each assessment to satisfy specific military missions, each of which requires unique interpretations.
• 地理因素对友军和敌军的行动方针的影响通常同等重要。
• Geographical influences over friendly and enemy courses of action generally are of equal importance.
• 区域分析是易逝的，因为任何给定地块的军事意义都会随着季节性、周期性和随机性的变化以及任务分配而波动。
• Area analyses are perishable, because the military significance of any given plot fluctuates in response to seasonal, cyclical, and random changes as well as missions assignments.
笔记
NOTES
1. Forrest C. Pogue，《最高指挥部》（1954 年），第 53 页；Gordon A. Harrison，《跨海峡进攻》，第 8 章“6 月 6 日”（1951 年），第 269-335 页，均出自题为《美国陆军在第二次世界大战中的欧洲战区》（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1947 年至今）的系列丛书。
1. Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (1954), 53, and Gordon A. Harrison, Cross Channel Attack, chapter 8, “The Sixth of June” (1951), 269-335, both in a series entitled United States Army in World War II, The European Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947-).
2. John M. Collins，《美苏军事平衡，1960-1980》（华盛顿特区：麦格劳-希尔出版社，1980 年），第 130-133 页。
2. John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance, 1960-1980 (Washington, DC: McGraw-Hill Publications, 1980), 130-133.
3. Trevor N. Dupuy，《战争天才：德国陆军和总参谋部，1807-1945》（新泽西州恩格尔伍德克利夫斯：普伦蒂斯-霍尔出版社，1977 年），第 130-147 页。
3. Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 130-147.
4. Patrick O'Sullivan，“第三世界战争的地理”，第 40 页，以及 William H. Lewis，“西撒哈拉战争”，第 117-137 页，载于Robert E. Harkavy 和 Stephanie G. Neuman 编辑的《第三世界近期战争的教训：方法和案例研究》（马萨诸塞州列克星敦：DC Heath，1985 年）。
4. Patrick O’Sullivan, “The Geography of Wars in the Third World,” 40, and William H. Lewis, “War in the Western Sahara,” 117-137, in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World: Approaches and Case Studies, eds. Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1985).
5. Mark Hibbs 和 Margaret Ryan，“专家称美国武器无法摧毁朝鲜核设施”，《核子学周刊》，1994 年 4 月 7 日，第 15 页。
5. Mark Hibbs and Margaret Ryan, “Experts Say U.S. Weapons Can’t Destroy DPRK Nuclear Facilities,” Nucleonics Week, April 7, 1994, 15.
18. 海王星行动
18. OPERATION NEPTUNE
登陆海滩只是一个代数方程式中的一个“x”，而这个方程式包含了半个字母表。我们想要的是一个可以集结起来的营地，我们的主力部队可以集中于此，然后从营地向东推进，展开战役。
The landing beaches were just one x in an algebraic equation that contained half the alphabet. What we wanted was a lodgment area into which we could blast ourselves and from which our main bodies, having suitably concentrated themselves within it, could erupt to develop the campaign eastward.
弗雷德里克·摩根爵士中将，
盟军最高统帅参谋长，
《霸王行动序曲》
Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan
Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander
Overture to Overlord
1942年初，在西欧开辟第二战场成为大同盟的当务之急。当时，纳粹德国的铁蹄已经席卷了俄罗斯西部和乌克兰，并且正向石油资源丰富的高加索地区进发。1.霸王行动在接下来的两年里逐渐成形，计划在诺曼底登陆，横扫法国和比利时，摧毁莱茵河以西的敌军，然后“清除德国的其余部分”。2本案例研究重点关注“海王星行动”，即跨海峡袭击。3
A SECOND FRONT IN WESTERN EUROPE BECAME AN URGENT PRIORITY OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE EARLY in 1942, by which time the Nazi German juggernaut had overrun western Russia, Ukraine, and was well on its way toward the oil-rich Caucasus.1 Operation Overlord, which took shape over the next 2 years, planned to land in Normandy, battle across France and Belgium, destroy enemy armed forces west of the Rhine, then “clean out the remainder of Germany,”2 This case study concentrates on Operation Neptune, the cross-channel assault.3
从登陆地点的选择，到诺曼底登陆日，再到1944年7月25日（登陆后50天）从滩头阵地突破，地理因素都对计划和行动产生了影响。时间、距离、光照数据、海岸地形、潮汐、水系、天气、气候、土地利用、居民点和交通网络等因素都影响着双方的行动方案。敌军的防御工事也给盟军带来了额外的担忧。
Geographic factors influenced plans and operations from selection of the lodgment area through the D-Day landings to the breakout from consolidated beachheads on July 25, 1944 (D+50). Time, distance, light data, coastal topography, tides, drainage patterns, weather, climate, land use, settlements, and transportation networks all affected courses of action on both sides. Enemy fortifications caused additional Allied concerns.
选择住宿区域
SELECTION OF THE LODGMENT AREA
北非战役（1940年9月至1943年5月）以及此后在意大利的战役模拟了第二战场的出现。4但这些“插曲”都未能满足斯大林，他需要更直接的大规模援助；而且，备受争议的英美在巴尔干半岛的行动也不会威胁希特勒的主要军事力量来源。5因此，关键问题变成了：“盟军武装部队在前往第三帝国的途中应该从哪里进入西欧？”
Campaigns in North Africa (September 1940-May 1943) and thereafter in Italy simulated Second Fronts,4 but neither of those “sideshows” satisfied Stalin who needed massive help of a more direct nature, nor would much-debated Anglo-American operations in the Balkans threaten Hitler’s primary sources of military power.5 The key question therefore became, “Where should Allied armed forces enter Western Europe on their way to the Third Reich?”
为什么选择法国北部？
WHY NORTHERN FRANCE?
英国陆军中将弗雷德里克·摩根爵士作为盟军最高司令部（COSSAC）参谋长，早在德怀特·D·艾森豪威尔将军抵达之前就开始寻找合适的驻地（图57）。他很快排除了挪威，因为“从那里向南发起战斗部署将是相当艰巨的任务”。丹麦狭窄的日德兰半岛同样不合他的心意。北海盛行风向不明。比利时和荷兰的海滩饱受战火蹂躏，缺乏便捷的出水口，这些地区不仅运河纵横交错，而且由于地势低于海平面，极易遭受洪水侵袭。比利牛斯山脉以南的葡萄牙和西班牙距离德国境内的目标区域很远。6
British Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan, as Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), began to search for a satisfactory lodgment area well before General Dwight D. Eisenhower arrived on scene (map 57). He quickly discarded Norway because “to debouch therefrom southward in battle array would be quite something.” Denmark’s narrow Jutland Peninsula was likewise unappealing. Prevailing winds off the North Sea whipped beaches in Belgium and Holland, which lacked convenient outlets through waterlogged lands that not only were criss-crossed with canals but, being below sea level, were subject to widespread inundation. Portugal and Spain south of the Pyrennes Mountains were far from objectives inside Germany.6
Map 57. Potential Lodgments in Western Europe
为什么选择西北诺曼底？
WHY NORTHWESTERN NORMANDY?
对法国北部的关注迅速升温。COSSAC的参谋人员认为，敦刻尔克和布列塔尼的海滩面积太小，不足以支撑两栖登陆作战以及随后按预期规模迅速集结兵力。时任西线德军最高统帅的格尔德·冯·伦施泰特元帅后来承认，盟军在防守薄弱的卢瓦尔河谷附近登陆，在大多数方面都是理想的选择——他的参谋长君特·布卢门特里特少将曾透露，驻扎在该海岸的一名连长不得不整天骑自行车巡视自己的防区——但他们两人都松了一口气，因为他们知道卢瓦尔河谷远远超出了驻扎在英国的“短程”战斗轰炸机的射程。根据COSSAC的说法，严肃的考量最终“缩小到两个方向：加来海峡方向或诺曼底西部方向”。7
The focus on northern France sharpened swiftly. COSSAC’s staff believed that beaches at Dunkirk and in Brittany were much too small to support amphibious assaults followed by rapid buildups on envisaged scales. Field Marshal Gerd von Runstedt, who then was German Supreme Commander in the West, later acknowledged that Allied landings near the thinly held Loire valley would have been ideal in most respects—Major General Günter Blumentritt, his Chief of Staff, confided that a company commander on that coast had to cycle all day to inspect his sector—but both breathed easily because they knew that the Loire Valley was well beyond the reach of “short-legged” fighter bombers based in England. Serious considerations, according to COSSAC, thus “whittled themselves down to two: direction Pas de Calais or direction western Normandy.”7
加莱最初看起来很有吸引力，因为22英里（35公里）的跨海峡航程足够短，可以最大限度地延长战斗轰炸机的盘旋时间，最大限度地减少运输需求，并降低因预期的敌方潜艇袭击造成的损失。此外，直达德国边境的路线也只有150英里（240公里）。然而，弊大于利。哥斯达黎加战略司令部（COSSAC）讽刺地指出，像他这样精通地图的守军竟然把加莱作为大西洋壁垒防御工事的枢纽。附近的沙滩面积小，分布稀疏，而且容易受到风暴侵袭；沿岸的港口即使在最佳状态下也远远不够用；而夺取安特卫普或勒阿弗尔的行动必然会与德军的部署路线重合，因此极易遭受侧翼攻击。8
Calais at first seemed attractive, because the 22-mile (35-kilometer) cross-channel trip was short enough to maximize loiter times for fighter-bombers, minimize shipping requirements, and limit losses due to anticipated enemy U-boat attacks. Straight-line routes to the German border moreover measured barely 150 miles (240 kilometers). Debits, however, outweighed credits. COSSAC wryly noted that defenders who could read maps as well as he had made Calais the pivot point of Atlantic Wall fortifications. Nearby beaches were small, widely spaced, and exposed to storms, seaports along that stretch of coast were hopelessly inadequate even in perfect condition, and actions to seize Antwerp or Le Havre would necessarily parallel German dispositions for the full distance and thus be subject to flank attacks.8
相比之下，卡昂和科唐坦半岛之间的塞纳湾比东西两侧的沿海地区更避风，瑟堡的港口设施和海滩登陆能力似乎足以满足初期需求。COSSAC的规划人员认为距离英国的距离并无大碍，而且空军可以通过炸毁塞纳河和卢瓦尔河上的桥梁来延缓德军增援，这两条河流分别构成了北部和南部潜在目标区域的边界。因此，诺曼底西北部似乎是最佳的折衷方案。9
The Baie de la Seine between Caen and the Cotentin Peninsula in contrast was much better sheltered than littorals east or west, beach capacities coupled with port facilities at Cherbourg seemed adequate to satisfy initial needs, COSSAC planners found no serious fault with distances from England, and air power could delay German reinforcements by blowing bridges over the Seine and Loire Rivers, which respectively bounded prospective objective areas on the north and south. Northwestern Normandy thus seemed to be the best possible compromise.9
住宿区域描述
DESCRIPTION OF THE LODGMENT AREA
北约特种作战司令部（COSSAC）在诺曼底选定的驻扎区域位于芒什省和卡尔瓦多斯省（相当于美国的县），两省北临塞纳湾，南接当地人称之为“博卡日”（bocage）的崎岖林地。支持“海王星行动”的地理数据库涵盖了四个不同区域的相关因素以及相互重叠的现象。10
The lodgment area that COSSAC selected in Normandy occupied the Departments of Manche and Calvados (the equivalent of U.S. counties), both bounded on the north by the Baie de la Seine and on the south by rough, wooded terrain that the locals call “bocage.” Geographical data bases in support of Operation Neptune addressed relevant factors in four distinctive regions, along with overlapping phenomena.10
地形和土地利用
LAND FORMS AND LAND USE
芒什省科唐坦半岛、卡尔瓦多斯西部、卡尔瓦多斯东部以及丘陵内陆地区的地形和土地利用在许多重要方面都存在差异，但跨区域的地貌普遍存在，广阔的开放空间明显缺失，连接诺曼底西北部与法国其他地区的陆地走廊大多与海岸线平行。这四个地区都更倾向于近距离作战而非灵活机动的战争（图58）。
Land forms and land use on Manche’s Cotentin Peninsula, in western Calvados, eastern Calvados, and in the hilly hinterland are dissimilar in many important respects, but cross-compartments are common, wide open spaces are conspicuously absent, and most terrestrial corridors that connect northwestern Normandy with the rest of France parallel the coast. All four regions encourage close combat rather than fluid warfare (map 58).
Map 58. Natural Regions in Northwestern Normandy
科唐坦半岛。科唐坦半岛位于芒什省最北端，像一根短粗的手指伸入英吉利海峡。半岛尖端地势崎岖，没有适宜居住的海滩，裸露的花岗岩遍布，采石工在瑟堡附近半圆形陡坡的后坡上开采石料。这片崎岖的地形以贫瘠的薄土为主，地势向南和向东缓缓倾斜，森林逐渐被果园取代，果园之后是高耸茂密的树篱，形成棋盘状的田野。被称为“沼泽草原”（Prairies Marécageuses）的沼泽草地和泥滩沿着东南方向的河谷分布，并向西延伸至更远处的山丘（见地图59）。堤坝、排水沟、内陆水道上的船闸以及零星散落的农舍是这片荒凉土地上仅有的人造建筑。几条狭窄的堤道穿过沼泽，将平坦的海滩与内陆约半英里（略少于一公里）的第一块坚实陆地隔开。
The Cotentin Peninsula. The Cotentin Peninsula, which comprises the northernmost part of Manche, projects into the English Channel like a stubby finger. Topography at the tip, which is devoid of hospitable beaches, features bare granite rocks that stone cutters quarry on the back slopes of a semi-circular escarpment around Cherbourg. Thin, infertile soils are the rule in that rough terrain, which slopes gently toward the south and east where forests give way to orchards, then to checkerboards of thick, high hedges that enclose small fields. Marshy meadowlands and mud flats called ”Prairies Marécageuses” follow river valleys in the extreme southeast and thrust long fingers into hills farther west (map 59). Dikes, drainage ditches, and locks along inland waterways plus scattered farmsteads are the only manmade structures in that desolate land. A few narrow causeways cross swamps that separate flat beaches from the first firm ground about a half mile inland (somewhat less than one kilometer).
卡尔瓦多斯西部和东部。在卡尔瓦多斯西部与科唐坦半岛交界处，浅滩切割出的峭壁后方是绵延不绝的沙滩，这些沙滩依偎在石灰岩峭壁之间。山脊之外的台地向南缓缓上升约2000码（1825米），直至俯瞰下游的奥尔河。在伊西尼滨海，奥尔河宽超过60英尺（18米），深超过12英尺（3.6米）。卡尔瓦多斯东部的地貌相对平缓，主要由低矮起伏的平原组成，平原面向沙滩。巴约以东，耕地开始取代树篱，并在卡昂东南部逐渐蔓延开来。奥恩河谷以及连接卡昂与其港口乌伊斯特雷昂的运河是该地区最显著的地形特征。11
Western and Eastern Calvados. Bluffs incised by shallow draws back discontinuous beaches that nestle between limestone cliffs where western Calvados meets the Cotentin Peninsula. Tablelands beyond the crest gradually rise southward for about 2,000 yards (1,825 meters) until they overlook the lower Aure River, which is more than 60 feet wide and 12 feet deep (18 by 3.6 meters) at Isigny-sur-Mer. Landscapes in Eastern Calvados, which are less formidable, consist primarily of a low, undulating plain that fronts on sandy beaches. Cultivated fields that begin to displace hedgerows beyond Bayeux become increasingly widespread southeast of Caen. The Orne River valley and the canal that connects Caen with its outport at Ouistreham are among the most prominent terrain features.11
基本上就是博卡日（Bocage）。在科唐坦半岛和卡尔瓦多斯沿海地区，茂密的黑刺李树篱和石墙构成了围栏，其中许多由大树和高耸的土堤支撑，这些土堤的走向并不固定。但博卡日在更南部的丘陵地带最为普遍，那里一些肥沃的山谷和较低的山坡上，每平方英里分布着300-400块形状各异的田地。通常只有在两块或多块田地交汇的拐角处，才能方便地从一个围场进入另一个围场。石楠或橡树、山毛榉、栗树和角树林，以及人工种植的松树林，覆盖了不适宜种植果树或放牧的高地。从北到南贯穿博卡日的高速公路走廊间距较大。12
Basically Bocage. Thick blackthorn hedgerows and stone walls, many of them buttressed by large trees and high earthen embankments that follow no consistent alignment, serve as fences in parts of the Cotentin Peninsula and coastal Calvados, but bocage is most prevalent in hilly country farther south, where some fertile valleys and lower slopes sport 300-400 oddly shaped fields per square mile. Easy access from one enclosure to another normally is available only at corners where two or more join. Heath or oak, beach, chestnut, and hornbeam forests, plus stands of planted pines, cover heights that are unsuitable for orchards or pasture. High-speed corridors that cut clear through the bocage from north to south are widely-spaced.12
Map 59. Drainage Patterns in Northwestern Normandy
海岸
SEACOASTS
对诺曼底西北部海岸的成功两栖登陆作战，最初依赖于对英吉利海峡险恶水流和潮汐的深入了解，以及对塞纳湾（一个相对较浅的槽状洼地）的地理信息。因此，情报收集人员将注意力集中在水深、暗礁位置、岩石峭壁、其他障碍物、海滩坡度、海岸线特征以及内陆通道等方面。海王星行动的策划者很快将搜索范围缩小到科唐坦半岛东南部的基涅维尔和卡尔瓦多斯东部的奥恩河口之间的区域（地图60）。13
Successful amphibious assaults against the seacoasts of northwestern Normandy initially depended on intimate knowledge of treacherous currents and tides in the English Channel as well as geographic information about the Baie de la Seine, a comparatively shallow, trough-like depression. Intelligence collectors therefore turned attention to water depths, the location of reefs, rocky ledges, other obstructions, beach gradients, shoreline characteristics, and avenues inland. Operation Neptune planners soon narrowed the search to a stretch between Quineville on the southeastern Cotentin coast and the mouth of the Orne River in eastern Calvados (map 60).13
犹他海滩。科唐坦半岛上最理想的地点，注定要成为犹他海滩，其中心位于维尔河口以北的瓦尔维尔沙丘。那里有4英里长、700码（640米）宽的平坦坚实的沙滩，尽头是低矮的沙丘和石砌海堤。低潮线以上500码的坡度平均为1:130，之后略有陡峭，但进出通道畅通无阻，通常海浪可以忽略不计，任何潮汐阶段都可登陆，距离海岸2.5英里（3.6公里）处有一个可供运输船停泊的避风锚地。遗憾的是，机动车出口仅限于几条穿过沼泽草地通往沿海公路的小路。1944年6月，其中最好的一条是未铺设路面的堤道，宽度不足12英尺（4米），在干燥天气下几乎完全被淤泥覆盖。
Utah Beach. The most favorable Cotentin site, destined to become Utah Beach, centered on Les Dunes de Varville just north of the Vire Estuary where 4 miles of level, firm sand 700 yards wide (640 meters) terminate against low dunes and a masonry sea wall. Gradients above low water average 1:130 for the first 500 yards, then steepen somewhat, but approaches are clear, surf normally is negligible, landings are feasible at any stage of the tide, and a sheltered anchorage for transport ships lies 2.5 miles (3.6 kilometers) offshore. Motor vehicle exits unfortunately are confined to a few tracks that lead through marshy meadows to a coastal road. The best of them in June 1944 was an unsurfaced causeway, scarcely 12 feet wide (4 meters) and barely above the muck during dry weather.
Map 60. Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno, and Sword Beaches
奥马哈海滩。卡尔瓦多斯西部的景色则逊色不少。从维尔河以东三英里多的海岸线，到维耶维尔和科勒维尔下方陡峭的悬崖下，出现了一片新月形的沙滩。这片沙滩被海王星公司的规划者命名为奥马哈海滩，绵延约7000码，之后再次出现陡峭的悬崖。
Omaha Beach. The outlook in western Calvados was less attractive. Swamps and rocky outcroppings offshore, succeeded by sheer walls that sometimes exceed 100 feet (30 meters), characterize the coast for more than three miles east of the Vire River until a crescent-shaped strand appears beneath steep bluffs below Vierville-sur-Mer and Colleville-sur-Mer. That site, which Neptune’s planners designated Omaha Beach, occupies the next 7,000 yards or so before palisades reemerge.
与犹他州海滩不同，奥马哈海滩附近的水域不仅会遭遇难以捉摸的离岸流、涡流和中等强度的离岸流，而且还会受到北风和东风的影响。即使低潮时会露出约300码坡度平缓（1:188）、压实良好的沙滩，车辆和涉水者在浅滩中也难以找到抓地力，因为水下沙洲和沟渠与海滩呈直角。在高潮线以下的最后250码，坡度急剧增加到1:47，然后在潮滩终止于低矮的波浪侵蚀堤岸之前达到1:8，堤岸在某些地方还用大型松散的砾石和坚固的墙体进行加固。此后，一片平坦的沼泽地将海滩与悬崖连接起来，这些悬崖在诺曼底登陆日之前就已存在。道路被五条狭窄的林间沟壑分割，每条沟壑仅容一条狭窄的道路、车道或小径通过。除此之外，没有其他车辆通行的出口。
Waters off Omaha Beach, unlike those at Utah, not only experience tricky rip tides, eddies, and moderately strong offshore currents, but are open to northerly and easterly winds. Vehicles and waders find traction uncertain in the shallows, even though low tides expose about 300 yards of gently sloping (1:188), well-compacted sand, because submerged bars and runnels run at right angles to the beach. Gradients increase sharply to 1:47 during the final 250 yards below high water, then to 1:8 before tidal flats terminate in a low, wave-cut embankment that large, loose shingle stones and a solidly-constructed wall supplement in some places. A level, marshy shelf thereafter connects beaches to bluffs that before D-Day were broken by five wooded draws just wide enough to accommodate one narrow road, cart track, or trail apiece. No other exits were available for vehicular traffic.
黄金海滩、朱诺海滩和剑滩。超过24公里（15英里）的白垩质悬崖和岩石滩将美国的奥马哈海滩与英国的黄金海滩隔开。黄金海滩在阿罗芒什莱班附近最窄，向东逐渐变宽。退潮时，露出800码（约744米）的坚实沙滩，所谓的“卡尔瓦多斯高原”向海延伸1公里（四分之三英里），水深不超过2到3英尺（约60到90厘米），之后海底迅速下降，足以提供良好的锚地。黄金海滩在高潮线以上几乎是水平的，但一道巨大的石砌海堤仅由两条坡道连接，阻碍了车辆通行至连接库尔瑟勒、巴约和卡昂的繁忙公路。
Gold, Juno, and Sword Beaches. More than 15 miles (24 kilometers) of chalky cliffs and rocky flats separated U.S. Omaha Beach from British Gold Beach, which is narrowest near Arromanches-les-Bains and widens toward the east. Low tide uncovers 800 yards of solid sand and the so-called “Plateau de Calvados” reaches seaward another three-quarters of a mile (1 kilometer) at depths no greater than 2 or 3 feet, after which the bottom drops off rapidly enough to allow good anchorages. Gold Beach above the high water mark is almost level, but a massive stone sea wall bridged only by two ramps inhibits vehicular access to heavily traveled roads that link Courseulles with Bayeux and Caen.
朱诺海滩几乎与陆地相连，在“海王星行动”期间专供加拿大军队使用。它横跨绵延近1.7公里（1英里）的岩石滩，这些岩石滩破坏了潮滩的自然风貌。朱诺海滩的地形与黄金海滩相似，只是沿岸多了一排低矮松散的沙丘。犹他海滩和奥马哈海滩之后几乎没有海滨度假胜地，而朱诺海滩则从阿罗芒什一直延伸到奥恩河口，沿岸遍布着度假胜地。朱诺海滩上的坡道和阶梯方便人员和车辆穿过原本构成一道巨大屏障的海滨长廊。之后，村庄街道可以双向通行，两条碎石路通往卡昂。
Nearly contiguous Juno Beach, reserved for Canadian troops during Operation Neptune, straddles rocky approaches that mar tidal flats for almost a mile (1.7 kilometers). Juno ashore is similar to Gold, except for a line of low, unconsolidated dunes along the waterfront. Seaside resorts, which are almost absent behind Utah and Omaha Beaches, dot the coast all the way from Arromanches past the mouth of the Orne River. Ramps and stairways on Juno Beach help personnel and motor vehicles cross a promenade that otherwise comprises a formidable barrier, village streets thereafter accommodate two-way traffic, and two macadamized roads lead to Caen.
在剑滩最西端的利翁苏梅尔登陆的英国两栖部队发现，高低潮之间大约有半英里长的坚实沙滩，而东侧乌伊斯特雷昂的滩涂宽度是其两倍多，坡度也较为平缓，约为1:300。从水面上可以看到岸边是柔软的沙子和松散的沙丘，以及一道几乎没有坡道或台阶的坚固堤坝，但越过这些障碍后，沿着硬质路面行走就容易多了。
British amphibious forces that landed at Lion-sur-Mer on the westernmost part of Sword Beach found about half a mile of solid sand between high and low water, whereas flats on the eastern flank at Ouistreham are well over twice that wide and gradual gradients approximate 1:300. Views from the water see soft sand and loose dunes ashore, plus a formidable wall with few ramps or stairs, but the going is easier on hard-surfaced roads beyond those barriers.
天气与气候
WEATHER AND CLIMATE
诺曼底西北部毗邻英吉利海峡，四季气候温和（科唐坦半岛几乎与世隔绝）。冬季温和，夏季凉爽，气候湿润，微风习习（表 26）。14
Northwestern Normandy, adjacent to the English Channel, enjoys moderating climatic influences in every season (the Cotentin Peninsula is almost insular). Mild winters, cool summers, humid conditions, and brisk breezes predominate (table 26).14
芒什省是法国北部降雨量最大的省份，稍东一些的卡尔瓦多斯省和稍西一些的布列塔尼省紧随其后。降雨量最大时节多为毛毛雨或阵雨，通常出现在十月，但沿海一些气象站的数据显示，六月或七月也会出现降雨高峰，有时单日降雨量甚至超过60毫米（2英寸）。持续降雨会对排水不良的土壤造成不利影响，例如犹他海滩后方以及陶特河、维尔河、奥尔河、瑟勒河和奥恩河下游沿岸的土壤，这些地区的地下水位通常接近地表。
The Department of Manche is the rainiest in all of northern France, with Calvados a bit farther east and Brittany a bit farther west as close contenders. Maximum precipitation, mainly in the form of drizzle or showers, falls most frequently in October, although some weather stations along the littoral show a secondary peak in June or July and downpours occasionally deliver more than two inches (60 millimeters) in a single day. Persistent rains adversely effect the trafficability of poorly-drained soils like those behind Utah Beach and along lower reaches of the Taute, Vire, Aure, Seulles, and Orne Rivers where water tables habitually are close to the surface.
雾和低云在冬季最为常见，但夏季清晨能见度差，云底高度低于2000英尺（610米），也常常限制空中作业。五月、六月和七月是连续五天或以上晴朗飞行天气的最佳时期。北纬50度地区在这些月份昼长夜短的现象，不仅最大限度地利用了日光，也使得德军地面部队在夜幕掩护下调动部队和运送物资的时间大大缩短。
Fog and low clouds are most evident in winter, but poor visibility coupled with ceilings below 2,000 feet (610 meters) often limit air operations during early morning hours in summertime. May, June, and July offer the best chances for 5 or more consecutive days of fine flying weather. The phenomenon of very long days and very short nights at 50 degrees North Latitude during those months not only maximized daylight available to Allied aviators, but allowed German ground forces minimum time to move troops and supplies under cover of darkness.
Table 26. Selected Climatic Statistics for Manche and Calvados
月平均降水量
AVERAGE MONTHLY PRECIPITATION
平均降雨天数
AVERAGE NUMBER OF RAINY DAYS
平均月平均气温
AVERAGE MEAN MONTHLY TEMPERATURES
瑟堡平均云量
AVERAGE CLOUD COVER AT CHERBOURG
聚落模式
SETTLEMENT PATTERNS
诺曼底西北部的农村居民分散居住在数百个小村庄和孤立的农舍中，尽管在1944年，距离海岸线5至15英里（8至24公里）范围内的区域通常只对专业渔民开放。1936年编制的战前最后一次城市、城镇和乡村人口普查统计数据显示，瑟堡、圣洛和卡昂等区域中心规模相对较小（表27），但即使是这些数据也被夸大了，因为德国占领军在诺曼底登陆日之前就将大约10万法国平民转移到了内陆。15
Rural residents of northwestern Normandy were widely dispersed among hundreds of hamlets and isolated farmsteads, although territories within 5 to 15 miles of the coast (8 to 24 kilometers) generally were “off limits” to all but professional fishermen in 1944. The last prewar census statistics for cities, towns, and villages, compiled in 1936, indicate that regional centers such as Cherbourg, St. Lô, and Caen were relatively small (table 27), but even those figures were inflated, because German occupation forces moved about 100,000 French civilians inland well before D-Day.15
表27.曼切省和卡尔瓦多斯省的人口聚居地（1936年人口普查）
Table 27. Populated Places in Manche and Calvados (1936 census)
路网
ROAD NETS
海神栖息地内的道路从未设计用于承受持续的重型交通。即使是连接瑟堡和巴黎的主干道，其旅游业远胜于商业运输，而其他大部分道路则仅服务于当地居民的需求。芒什省和西卡尔瓦多斯省的纵横交错地带缺乏一流的南北向道路。此外，马雷卡热斯草原限制了科唐坦半岛底部附近狭窄地带的车辆通行，仅允许两条地势相对较高的脆弱大道通行。这两条大道，如同从奥马哈海滩向内陆延伸的道路一样，之后都需穿过无数峡谷，跨越众多溪流。因此，通往南部和东部的便捷出口主要来自海神左翼的卡昂。16
Roads within Neptune’s lodgment area never were designed for sustained heavy traffic. Even the arterial Cherbourg-to-Paris highway carried more tourist trade than commerce, while most other routes served strictly local needs. The lattice in Manche and Western Calvados lacked first-rate north-south roads. The Prairies Marécageuses moreover restricted vehicular traffic near the base of the narrow Cotentin Peninsula to a pair of vulnerable avenues on relatively high ground, both of which, like routes from Omaha Beach inland, thereafter threaded through an untold number of defiles and bridged many streams. Attractive exits to the south and east consequently emanated mainly from Caen on Neptune’s left flank.16
住宿区域的评估
ASSESSMENTS OF THE LODGMENT AREA
首先是COSSAC，然后是艾森豪威尔将军及其下属，包括美国、英国和加拿大各级军种的官员，他们评估了大量关于驻扎区域的信息，以确定地理因素对“海王星行动”计划和方案的影响。以下评估侧重于“大局”。17
First COSSAC, then General Eisenhower and subordinates in every American, British, and Canadian service on all levels, assessed mountains of information concerning the lodgment area to ascertain the influence of geographic factors on plans and programs for Operation Neptune. Appraisals below emphasize “big pictures.”17
核心领域
CORE AREAS
驻扎区内的三个城市中心是具有重大政治、经济和军事意义的核心区域：16
Three urban centers within the lodgment area constituted core areas of great political, economic, and military significance:16
• 瑟堡是驻扎区内第二大城市，显然不可或缺。其主要港口在 20 世纪 30 年代是法国首屈一指的跨大西洋客运码头，内港锚地可以容纳远洋货轮，除非遇到小潮导致水位下降的情况；海事火车站可以直接将货物卸到卡车上；根据入侵前的研究，在鹿特丹和波尔多之间没有其他港口的吞吐能力比它更大。
• Cherbourg, the second largest city in the lodgment area, clearly was indispensable. Its main harbor was the premiere transatlantic passenger terminal in France during the 1930s, the inner roadstead could accept transoceanic cargo ships except when neap tides lowered water levels, the Gare Maritime could discharge cargoes directly into trucks, and no other port between Rotterdam and Bordeaux possessed greater capacities, according to pre-invasion studies.
卡昂是卡尔瓦多斯省的首府，也是诺曼底西北部的主要交通枢纽，拥有四通八达的公路和铁路。控制这座城市首先可以阻止敌军增援部队和补给向西推进，然后为从黄金海滩、朱诺海滩和剑滩向南部和东部相对开阔地带突破提供便利。
• Caen, the capital of Calvados and the principal transportation node in northwestern Normandy, radiated major roads and railways. Control over that city first could block enemy reinforcements and supplies headed west, then facilitate breakouts from Gold, Juno, and Sword Beaches toward relatively open ground south and east.
圣洛是芒什省的首府，也是另一个交通枢纽，四通八达。驻扎在科唐坦半岛和卡尔瓦多斯西部的盟军地面部队，若不先将敌军从这个枢纽地带驱逐出去，就无法深入南方的博卡日地区发动进攻。
• St. Lô, the capital of Manche, was another transportation hub from which routes reached in all directions. Allied ground forces on the Cotentin Peninsula and in western Calvados could not strike far south through bocage country without ousting adversaries from that pivot point.
关键地形
KEY TERRAIN
盟军战略家和战术家关注的关键地形，从水边一直延伸到敌方领土深处的目标：
Key terrain viewed by Allied strategists and tacticians stretched from just beyond the water’s edge to targets deep in enemy territory:
• 海滩撤退是所有计划者的首要考虑因素，因为正如COSSAC所说，“如果入侵战斗发生在海滩上，一方就已经失败了。必须尽可能减少将部队及其各种物资运送到内陆的延误。”18
• Beach exits were high on all planners’ lists because, as COSSAC put it, “If an invasion battle takes place on the beach, one is already defeated. There must be as little delay as possible in getting the troops and their multifarious goods inland.”18
• 位于卡朗唐以北的拉巴凯特大坝和船闸，调节着杜夫河、梅尔德雷河、陶特河和维尔河下游的水深，是诺曼底登陆日早期的目标，因为溢流会在卡朗唐到奎内维尔之间形成泻湖，阻碍从犹他海滩向内陆推进，并使犹他海滩与奥马哈海滩合并的努力变得复杂。
• The dam and lock at la Barquette just north of Carentan, which regulated water depths along the lower Douve, Merderet, Taute, and Vire Rivers, were early D-Day objectives, because overflows would create a lagoon from Carentan to Quineville, impede progress inland from Utah Beach, and complicate efforts to consolidate Utah with Omaha.
• 横跨无法涉水的奥恩河和奥恩运河的桥梁，在卡昂和奥斯特雷昂之间平行延伸，同样是值得在诺曼底登陆日攻占的目标，因为尽早占领这些桥梁有助于确保登陆部队和后续部队安全登陆前的东侧防线。
• Bridges over the unfordable Orne River and Orne Canal, which followed parallel paths between Caen and Ostreham, likewise were worthy D-Day objectives because early capture could help secure the lodgment’s east flank until assault troops and follow-on forces were firmly ashore.
• 海王星的策划者们从未对敌军的海岸防御工事或霍克角悬崖上的大炮失去兴趣，据说这些大炮可以对犹他州和奥马哈海滩进行猛烈的火力打击。
• Neptune’s planners never lost interest in enemy coastal fortifications or the artillery atop cliffs at Pointe du Hoc, which reportedly could bring withering fire to bear on Utah as well as Omaha Beach.
• 1944 年春季，盟军空军袭击了塞纳河和卢瓦尔河下游的公路和铁路桥梁，以便在海滩战斗开始前就将战场隔离开来。19
• Allied air forces in spring 1944 struck road and railway bridges over the lower Seine and Loire Rivers to isolate the battlefield well before combat began on the beaches.19
进路
AVENUES OF APPROACH
科萨克及其参谋人员得出结论，艾森豪威尔将军后来也同意这一观点：“在维尔河口以北进行整个进攻是不可能的。”海滩条件不足，通往内陆的出口要穿过容易被洪水淹没的沼泽地，而且敌军可能会封锁科唐坦半岛的底部，从而无限期地困住整个盟军远征军。相反，如果仅将部队部署在卡尔瓦多斯海岸，则很难在可接受的时间内夺取瑟堡的关键港口设施。因此，维尔河两岸的滩头阵地都需要迅速建立强大的岸上存在并迅速增强实力。20
COSSAC and his staff concluded, and General Eisenhower later concurred, “It was out of the question to make the whole assault north of the Vire estuary.” The beaches were inadequate, exits inland crossed an easily flooded morass, and enemy armed forces might seal off the Cotentin Peninsula at its base and thereby bottle up the entire Allied expedition indefinitely. Divisions put ashore exclusively along the Calvados coast conversely would be hard pressed to seize essential port facilities at Cherbourg in anything like acceptable time. Beaches on both sides of the Vire therefore were required to establish a strong presence ashore and build strength rapidly.20
盟军部队从英国的集结区出发，沿着英吉利海峡的通道，抵达诺曼底的空降区、滑翔机着陆区和海滩。两栖登陆作战和后续的几波进攻部队从舰船出发，采取了第二套登陆路线，之后所有部队沿着陆路展开，最终穿过海王星最初的据点，并从那里撤出。
Allied armed forces followed cross-channel avenues from marshaling areas in England to drop zones, glider landing zones, and beaches in Normandy. Amphibious assault and successive waves took a second set of approaches from ships to shore, whereafter all fanned out along land lines that led through, then out of, Neptune’s initial lodgments.
跨海峡航线。 1944年5月第二周，准备执行“海王星行动”的人员和装备陆续抵达从康沃尔郡到东萨塞克斯郡呈香肠状的集结区，在那里接受隔离，等待跨海峡航行。从地图61上看，航线似乎很简单，但实际上却极其复杂。如果只有一支海军特遣队，美国和英国皇家海军的策划者们将会面临巨大的挑战。但实际上，他们派出了五支特遣队，每支队伍都配备了各种类型的军舰和艇，并计划在同一时间抵达塞纳湾的指定地点。计划要求五支队伍在怀特岛附近会合，以最大限度地减少空中掩护和扫雷的需求，然后开始向南航行，穿越险恶的海域。在从英格兰到法国的南北航线上，涨潮时潮水自西向东流动，退潮时潮水则反向流动，阻碍了航线的推进。每条大道在中途都分为快车道和慢车道，以便笨重的两栖舰艇可以避开战列舰、巡洋舰、其他水面作战舰艇和运兵船。
Cross-Channel Avenues. Men and equipment destined to implement Operation Neptune reported to sausage-shaped staging areas from Cornwall to East Sussex beginning the second week in May 1944, where they were quarantined pending cross-channel trips that look deceptively simple as plotted on map 61, but in fact were incredibly complex. U.S. and Royal Navy planners would have faced formidable problems if one naval task force had been sufficient, but in fact there were five filled with military ships and craft of every description, all scheduled to arrive at designated spots in the Baie de la Seine at about the same time. Plans called for all five to rendezvous near the Isle of Wight, which minimized air cover and minesweeping requirements, then begin the run south through treacherous waters where flood tides athwart the north-south course from England to France flow from west to east while ebb tides reverse direction. Each avenue at the half way point divided into fast and slow lanes so lumbering amphibious ships could steer clear of battleships, cruisers, other surface combatants, and troop transports.
U特遣队，共有865艘护航舰艇，21艘火力支援舰艇、运兵船、坦克登陆舰（LST）、小型舰艇和辅助舰艇在9个相距甚远的地点装载了12支独立的运输船队。扫雷舰清理了卡多内特浅滩的航道，之后各支船队启航前往犹他海滩外22500码（20575米）的运输区，舰长们在D日凌晨3点前不久在此抛锚。前往奥马哈海滩的O特遣队和B特遣队也遵循了类似的程序，前往黄金海滩、朱诺海滩和剑滩的英国和加拿大部队也遵循了同样的程序。空降师从远处的出发机场折返飞行。
Task Force U, which numbered 865 convoy escorts,21 fire-support ships, troop carriers, landing ships tank (LSTs), smaller craft, and auxiliaries, loaded 12 separate convoys at nine widely separated locations. Minesweepers cleared lanes through Cardonnet Bank, after which flotillas set sail for the transport area 22,500 yards (20,575 meters) off Utah Beach, where ship captains dropped anchor shortly before 0300 on D-Day. Task Forces O and B en route to Omaha Beach followed similar procedures, as did British and Canadian contingents on their way to Gold, juno, and Sword. Airborne divisions dog-legged from distant departure airfields.21
舰岸登陆。低潮登陆会简化水下爆破专家的任务，他们的工作是炸开只有在高潮时才会显露的障碍物之间的缝隙。但负重作战的突击部队若要涉水半英里甚至更远，在抵达岸边之前就会遭受惨重伤亡。因此， “海王星”计划的策划者将登陆时间安排在涨潮达到峰值前三小时，这样提前登陆的两栖舰艇之后就能浮出水面（例如，一英尺的潮水上涨就会淹没奥马哈海滩附近近200英尺的平坦沙滩，那里的平均坡度通常为1:188）。然而，所有五个海滩都无法同时达到理想的登陆条件，因为科唐坦半岛的涨潮时间比卡尔瓦多斯东部海岸早约40分钟，而且选定的登陆点地势平坦程度和障碍物分布也不尽相同。因此，D日的H时刻在犹他海滩发生在06:30，15分钟后在奥马哈海滩发生，07:45在黄金海滩发生。
Ship-to-Shore Approaches. Low tide landings would have simplified tasks for underwater demolition specialists whose job was to blow gaps between obstacles that were concealed only at high tide, but heavily-laden assault forces wading through shallow water for half a mile or more would have taken terrible casualties long before they reached shore. Neptune’s planners therefore scheduled landings to start three hours before rising tides reached their peak, so amphibious craft that beached early could later float off (a one-foot tidal rise, for example, inundates nearly 200 feet of flat sand off Omaha Beach, where gradients generally average 1:188). Ideal conditions, however, were not simultaneously obtainable at all five beaches, because high water reaches Cotentin coasts about 40 minutes earlier than it does in Eastern Calvados and the sites selected were neither equally level nor equally obstructed. H-Hour on D-Day consequently occurred at 0630 on Utah Beach, 15 minutes later at Omaha Beach, and 0745 on Gold.
Map 61. Cross-channel Routes from England to Normandy
连接犹他海滩和最近的沿海公路的沼泽地堤道至关重要，但奥马哈海滩后方悬崖上的五条沟壑更为重要，因为陡峭的地形会阻碍履带车辆和轮式车辆的通行（图 39）。左侧 F-1 出口处的一条崎岖小路蜿蜒而上，穿过一个坡度超过 10% 的狭窄山谷；邻近的 E-3 出口处有一条 8 英尺宽的车道通往内陆 2000 码的科勒维尔；E-1 出口在 500 码内倾斜 100 英尺，而莱穆兰的 D-3 出口则在越过山脊后直达圣洛朗叙梅尔。右侧 D-3 出口的坡度较为平缓，道路从维耶维尔延伸至与碎石路交汇处。到达山顶的突击部队比在海滩上的部队处境要好得多，因为德军的纵深防御几乎不存在。
Causeways over marshlands between Utah Beach and the nearest coastal road were crucially important, but five draws that climbed the bluffs behind Omaha Beach were more so, because that steep terrain otherwise blocked tracked as well as wheeled vehicles (figure 39). A rough trail at Exit F-1 on the left flank scrambled up a narrow valley where slopes exceeded 10 percent; an eight-foot-wide cart track at neighboring E-3 led to Colleville, 2,000 yards inland; Exit E-1, which tilted 100 feet in 500 yards, and the D-3 Exit at les Moulins both headed for St. Laurent-sur-Mer as soon as they cleared the crest. Grades were less demanding at Exit D-3 on the right flank and the road was graveled past Vierville until it met macadam. Assault troops that reached the top were much better off than on the beach, because German defenses-in-depth were nearly nonexistent.
内陆陆路。从海王星的空降区和海滩向内陆延伸的道路，只有东部和东南部的地形较为有利，因为奥尔河谷和遍布灌木丛的山丘将卡尔瓦多斯沿海的登陆点与正南方的坦克作战区域隔开。维尔河和陶特河之间的分水岭由狭窄的干燥地带构成，限制了从科唐坦半岛和卡朗唐向圣洛方向的行进，严重限制了下芒什地区的机动性，即使是步兵也难以通行，车辆只能在道路上行驶。因此，尽管地形不利，但战前阶段预计的快速推进路线被证明过于乐观，而盟军突破防线后的实际进展速度却比预期更快。23
Land Avenues Inland. Avenues inland from Neptune’s drop zones and beaches were geographically inviting only to the east and southeast, because the Aure River valley and bocage-covered hills separated landing sites in coastal Calvados from tank country due south. Narrow necks of dry ground that form the watershed between the Vire and Taute Rivers channelized movement from the Cotentin Peninsula and Carentan toward St. Lô, severely limited maneuverability in lower Manche even for foot soldiers, and confined vehicular traffic to roads. Pre-invasion phase lines that anticipated fairly rapid headway despite adverse terrain accordingly proved optimistic, whereas progress after Allied forces broke into the open was faster than predicted.23
Figure 39. Exits Inland from Omaha Beach
改编自罗伯特·J·克肖的《D日：刺破大西洋壁垒》。
Adapted from Robert J. Kershaw, D-Day: Piercing the Atlanitic Wall.
障碍物
OBSTACLES
上述道路上遍布的天然和人为障碍物，在一定程度上阻断了所有海滩的通行，阻碍了向内陆推进，并帮助德军守军从1944年6月6日至7月下旬将盟军部队围困在登陆区内。即使部队能够绕过一组障碍物，也往往会遭遇同样甚至更严重的其他障碍物。
Natural and manmade obstacles astride the avenues just described blocked all beaches to some degree and impeded progress inland, then helped German defenders pen Allied armed forces inside the lodgment area from June 6, 1944, until late July. Formations able to bypass one set of obstructions often ran head-on into others as bad or worse.
海滩防御工事。德国陆军元帅埃尔温·隆美尔的目标显然是阻止入侵者到达水边，然后用相互交错、重叠的火力锥将其歼灭。24但诺曼底登陆日当天的海滩防御工事差异很大，因为准备工作并不充分。例如，朱诺海滩上只有两个炮兵阵地建在混凝土掩体下，其余的都是没有顶的碉堡或裸露的土坑。25但总的来说，可以用“惊人”来形容。
Beach Fortifications. The objective of German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel obviously was to stop invaders before they reached the water’s edge, then annihilate them with interlocking, overlapping cones of fire,24 but beach defenses on D-Day varied considerably because preparations were incomplete. Only two artillery positions along Juno Beach, for example, were under concrete, while the rest occupied roofless bunkers or bare earthen pits.25 The aggregate nonetheless could best be described as awesome.
潮滩上布满了防御工事，包括被称为“刺猬”的扭曲钢梁、深深打入坚实沙土的桩柱（角度经过精心设计，旨在摧毁来袭的登陆艇）、其他各种诡谲的装置以及数百万枚防水地雷。四面体反坦克障碍、蒺藜、壕沟、混凝土块、更多地雷和蛇腹形铁丝网遍布海滩和沿海沙丘，而固定路障和安装在滚轮上的“比利时大门”则守卫着每一个出口。在卡尔瓦多斯东部，加固的海滨别墅、长廊和海堤尤为突出——最高的堡垒位于阿罗芒什莱班，垂直高度达15英尺（近5米）。巧妙隐藏、伪装良好的混凝土碉堡和炮台内部署着自动武器和火炮，位置优越，足以掩护盟军从最大射程到近距离的进攻。25
Defensive bands studded tidal flats with twisted steel girders called “hedgehogs,” pilings driven deeply into firm sand at angles calculated to gut incoming landing craft, other diabolical devices, and millions of water-proofed mines. Tetrahedral antitank barriers, caltrops, ditches, concrete blocks, more mines, and concertina wire littered beach shelves and coastal dunes, while immobile roadblocks and “Belgian Gates” mounted on rollers guarded every exit. Fortified beach-front villas, promenades, and sea walls were especially prominent in eastern Calvados—the highest bastion, at Arromanches-les-Bains, measured 15 vertical feet (almost 5 meters). Automatic weapons and artillery housed in cleverly-concealed, well-camouflaged concrete pillboxes and casements were well-sited to cover Allied approaches from maximum to point-blank ranges.25
内陆障碍重重。人们对奥雷河谷下游和犹他海滩后方可能发生洪水的担忧并非空穴来风。两栖部队艰难地向内陆推进，并未遇到太大困难，但12架空运飞机偏离预定空投区，将许多负重伞兵倾泻在默德雷特河两岸的沼泽地中，导致他们溺亡。为了阻止伞兵突袭和滑翔机着陆，守军在为数不多的开阔地带插满了数十万根被称为“隆美尔芦笋”的坚固木桩，并在木桩顶部埋设地雷，还布满了绊线。27
Obstacles Inland. Fears about floods along the lower Aure Valley and behind Utah Beach were well founded. Amphibious forces slogged their way inland without excessive difficulty, but many heavily loaded paratroopers drowned when 12 air transports overshot designated drop zones and dumped them in swamps astride the Merderet River. Defenders who sought to discourage parachute assaults and glider landings also seeded the few open spaces with several hundred thousand sturdy stakes known as “Rommel’s asparagus,” mined the tops, and interlaced the lot with tripwires.27
在芒什省和卡尔瓦多斯省，坚固的村庄和农舍，通常被石墙环绕，成为了德军临时的据点，尤其是在地势较高或位于激烈争夺的公路交汇处。位于瑟堡上方陡峭花岗岩岬角上的鲁勒堡在6月25日经过激战后陷落，但附近一些坚固的阵地又坚守了一周。28
Sturdily constructed villages and farmsteads, often ringed with stone walls, became impromptu German strongpoints across Manche and Calvados, especially those located on dominant ground or at bitterly contested road junctions. Fort du Roule atop a steep granite promentory above Cherbourg fell on June 25th after fierce fighting, but some hardened sites nearby held out for another week.28
1944年夏天，“诺曼底战役”几乎成了“篱笆之战”的代名词。在灌木丛生的田野中，平射武器的有效射程极其有限，糟糕的观察条件严重限制了迫击炮、火炮和近距离空中支援的效能。因此，地面战斗风险极大。前线步兵在光天化日之下，常常与几码之外的战友失去联系，他们能听到敌人的声音，但除了匆忙撤退时遗留的尸体外，几乎看不到敌人。盟军坦克经常撞上齐肩高的土堤，土堤上还覆盖着数英尺厚的植被护盾，直到富有创新精神的军士长柯蒂斯·E·库林将德国刺猬和……改造成……将四面体变成树篱切割器，使坦克能够轻松穿过树篱而不会明显降低速度。29
“The Normandy Campaign” above all became almost synonymous with “The Battle of the Hedgerows” in summer 1944. Fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons were exceedingly short in the bocage, where poor observation severely limited the effectiveness of mortars, artillery, and close air support. Land combat consequently was risky business. Front-line infantrymen in broad daylight often lost contact with friends a few yards away and could hear but seldom saw enemies except for bodies left behind during hasty withdrawals. Allied tanks went belly up against shoulder-high embankments topped by vegetative ramparts several feet thick until innovative Master Sergeant Curtis E. Culin converted German hedgehogs and tetrahedons into hedgerow cutters that let tanks plow through without losing speed appreciably.29
对盟军行动方针的影响
EFFECTS ON ALLIED COURSES OF ACTION
还有四项地理因素对盟军的行动方针产生了影响，值得简要说明，因为它们决定了“海王星行动”的开始日期和时间，并极大地影响了行动的持久性。其中，沿海水文条件和天气状况最为重要。
Four additional geographic effects on Allied courses of action merit brief explanations, because they determined the day and hour that Operation Neptune commenced and strongly influenced staying power. Coastal hydrography and weather conditions were primarily important.
H 小时测定
H-HOUR DETERMINATION
光照数据和潮汐确定了H时，即第一波登陆艇计划放下跳板并将突击部队卸载上岸的时间。由于当时夜视设备尚未发明，黑暗环境难以控制，因此不宜在夜间进行登陆。海王星行动的策划者倾向于选择黎明后不久的时间，他们选择了晨昏蒙影开始时间（BMNT）加40分钟。他们认为这段时间足以让盟军飞机和配备空中观察员的火力支援舰艇在海滩战斗开始前“软化”岸上目标，而地面上仍处于相对黑暗环境中的敌方观察员则无法清晰地看到海面情况。此外，卸载工作必须在涨潮前至少3小时开始，并在涨潮后至少3小时结束，否则突击部队将被困在远离海岸的地方。傍晚时分类似的潮汐条件允许后续梯队在天黑前登陆。
Light data and tides determined H-Hour, the time the first wave of landing craft was scheduled to drop ramps and discharge assault troops ashore. Darkness was undesirable, because control would be difficult in the absence of night vision devices which had not yet been invented. Neptune planners, who preferred a time soon after dawn, picked the Beginning of Morning Nautical Twilight (BMNT) plus 40 minutes, which they deemed ample time for Allied aircraft and fire-support ships with aerial spotters to “soften” targets ashore before battles began on the beaches, while enemy observers still in relative darkness on the ground would lack clear lines-of-sight seaward. Unloadings moreover had to commence not earlier than 3 hours before high tide and terminate not later than three hours thereafter or assault troops would be stranded far from shore. Similar tidal conditions in late afternoon allowed follow-on echelons to land before dark.
犹他海滩后方和卡昂附近的空降突击行动定于D日凌晨2点进行，远早于H时，以便充分利用晚升的月亮，使运输机飞行员能够在黑暗中接近目标，并能清晰地辨认空投和着陆区（恶劣天气使这一切成为不可能）。弗兰克·L·利利曼上尉率领的第101空降师先遣队于当地时间凌晨0点15分（凌晨12点15分）跳伞，成为第一个踏上法国土地的人。30
Airborne assaults behind Utah Beach and near Caen were timed for 0200 on D-Day, well before H-Hour, to take full advantage of a late-rising moon that would allow transport pilots to approach in darkness but easily discern drop and landing zones (bad weather made that impossible). Captain Frank L. Lillyman, whose 101st Airborne Division pathfinder team leaped at 0015 local time (12:15 A.M.), was first to set foot on French soil.30
D日确定
D-DAY DETERMINATION
诺曼底西北部两栖作战的理想条件是春潮与满月同时出现，这种巧合通常每月会出现三天。1944年6月5日，这个在最有利的月份中首次满足上述条件的日子，因此成为首选。然而，在6月4日凌晨4点召开的最终会议决定是否批准这一日期时，情况却不容乐观，因为20年来最严重的六月风暴已经开始肆虐英吉利海峡，低云、狂风和白浪翻滚。据与会官员称，空中支援将无法进行，舰炮火力将无法发挥作用，小型舰艇也极易倾覆。尽管此举会打乱时间紧迫的计划，艾森豪威尔将军还是不情愿地下令推迟24小时。已经在海上航行的护航船队不得不返航加油，而满载晕船士兵的舰船则焦急地停泊在港口。第二天，气象学家们幸运地预见到天气中会出现一个小小的“空隙”，海王星行动的海军特遣部队或许能够借此在第二场风暴到来之前通过。如果再拖延下去，将会造成巨大的后勤混乱，部队士气将会跌至谷底，而且保密工作也将难以保证。盟军最高统帅沉思片刻后说道：“我不喜欢这样，但我们还是行动吧。”信号迅速传遍舰队和岸上部队：执行海王星行动。31
Ideal conditions for amphibious operations in northwestern Normandy combined spring tides with a full moon, a coincidence that normally occurs three days each month. June 5, 1944, the first day that satisfied those specifications during the most favorable month, thus became top choice. Prognoses, however, were poor when the final conference to approve or reject that date convened at 0400 on June 4th, because the worst June storm in 20 years had begun to punish the English Channel with low clouds, high winds, and white-capped water. Air support would be impossible, naval gunfire ineffective, and small boats subject to capsize, according to authorities at the table. General Eisenhower reluctantly ordered a 24-hour weather delay, even though so doing disrupted time-sensitive schedules. Convoys already at sea turned back to refuel while ships fully loaded with seasick soldiers fretted in port. Meteorologists the following day fortunately foresaw a small “hole” in the weather though which Neptune’s naval task forces might pass before a second storm stuck. Further postponement would create monumental logistical muddles, troop morale would plummet, and secrecy would be hard to ensure. The Supreme Allied Commander mulled a moment, then said, “I don’t like it, but we’ll go.” Signals flashed to the fleets and forces on shore: PROCEED WITH OPERATION NEPTUNE.31
港口预制
PORT PREFABRICATION
海王星的规划者从一开始就知道，即使借助开放海滩上的后勤运作，瑟堡港也永远无法满足所有早期需求。32因此，他们下令建造两个代号分别为“桑树A”和“桑树B”的人工港，每个港口的吞吐能力都与多佛港大致相当。初步建设工作于1943年在英国各地零星展开，建成了10英里的码头、23个码头顶、93个被称为“炸弹”的浮动防波堤，以及100多个巨大的混凝土沉箱，这些沉箱看起来像六层楼房横卧在地。一支由各式各样的远洋拖船组成的船队，在诺曼底登陆日前夕开始，将这支庞大的船队拖往诺曼底。船队还拖着80多艘老旧的阻塞船，船上装满了沙子压舱物和足够的炸药，一旦停泊在奥马哈海滩和黄金海滩附近，就能炸毁船底（更多详情请参见第235页的“快速港口作业”）。
Neptune’s planners from the onset knew that Cherbourg port never could satisfy all early needs even with assistance from logistical operations over open beaches.32 They therefore issued prescriptions for two artificial harbors code-named Mulberry A and Mulberry B, each with throughput capacities about equal to that of Dover. Preliminary construction, which began in 1943 at scattered locations in Britain, produced 10 miles of piers, 23 pierheads, 93 floating breakwaters called “Bombardons,” and more than 100 gigantic concrete caissons that looked like six-story buildings lying on their sides. A motley fleet of seagoing tugboats towed that cantankerous armada to Normandy beginning just before D-Day, accompanied by 80-some aging blockships loaded with sand ballast and enough high explosives to tear their bottoms out when properly positioned off Omaha and Gold Beaches (see expedient port operations on page 235 for additional details).
直到1944年6月19日（D日后13天），作战进展都超出了预期。当天清晨，天气阴冷，午后狂风大作。尽管如此，气象学家仍然预测天气晴好，焦虑的滩头指挥官们也从他们的“圣经”——《海峡指南》中找到了更多安慰，因为其中统计塞纳湾六月平均风暴天数的栏目里赫然出现了一个大大的“O”。然而，长期和短期的天气预报都出现了偏差。狂风巨浪猛烈冲击着A号登陆点，几乎将其夷为平地，只剩下一些残骸用于在阿罗芒什莱班重建B号登陆点。尽管如此，坏消息也随之而来：如果艾森豪威尔将军将D日从原定的6月5日推迟到6月19日（最早可接受的替代日期），那么位于海峡中部的盟军将无法增援或补给登陆部队。33
Performance exceeded expectations until D+13, June 19, 1944, which dawned cold and gray with gale force winds by mid-afternoon. Meteorologists even so predicted good weather and anxious beachmasters found further reassurance in their “Bible,” the Channel Pilot, because the column that counted the average number of stormy June days in the Baie de la Seine contained a great round “O”. Long- and short-range forecasts unfortunately were both wrong. Wild winds and surf pounded Mulberry A so severely that little was left except salvage parts with which to rebuild Mulberry B at Arromanches-les-Bains. Good news nonetheless was mixed with bad: Allied forces in midchannel would have been unable to reinforce or resupply assault forces ashore if General Eisenhower had postponed D-Day from the original June 5th to June 19th, the earliest acceptable alternative date.33
机场建设
AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION
诺曼底第一条应急着陆跑道于D日当天出现在犹他海滩南缘附近的普普维尔，第二条跑道则于D日后第二天出现在圣洛朗叙梅尔。然而，驻扎在英国的盟军战斗轰炸机急需能够缩短周转时间、降低油耗的前沿设施。尽管敌军的行动以及地理条件限制了所有设施的建设，使其只能建在灌木丛最少、地势较为平坦的孤岛上（见图62和表28），美国占领区的工程师们仍然迅速建造了20个完全可用的远征机场，足以进行昼间作战（其中7个在D日后20天内建成）。在推土机和铲运机清理出合适的场地后，跑道、滑行道和停机坪都铺设了巨大的油毡纸或“鸡笼网”，并用钉子牢牢固定。
The first emergency landing strip in Normandy appeared at Pouppeville near the southern edge of Utah Beach on D-Day, followed by second one at St. Laurent-sur-Mer on D+2, but Allied fighter-bombers based in Britain urgently required forward facilities that allowed faster turn-around times and used less fuel. Responsive engineers in the U.S. sector hastily constructed 20 fully serviceable expeditionary airfields suitable for daylight operations (seven of them by D+20), despite enemy action and geographic conditions that confined all installations to islands of solid ground where bocage was least obtrusive (map 62 and table 28). Runways, taxistrips, and “hardstands” were surfaced with huge rolls of tar paper or “chicken wire” mesh firmly pegged down after bulldozers and scrapers cleared proper spots.
这些简陋的简易机场设计寿命在“正常”条件下为两到三个月，但实际情况并非如此。满载炸弹的飞机车轮碾过柔软的油毡跑道，将泥土压得坑坑洼洼，留下深深的车辙；即使在干燥的日子里，飞行员沿着铁丝网跑道飞行时，也会扬起滚滚尘土。空军基地的工兵营日夜奋战，但到八月初，许多跑道已经无法使用，一旦在海王星营地外找到更合适的地点，这些简易机场就被废弃了。
Those primitive airfields were designed to last 2 or 3 months under “normal” conditions, which did not pertain because deep ruts appeared as soon as the wheels of bomb-laden aircraft crushed pliable tar paper into soggy earth and billowing clouds of powdery dust trailed pilots down wire mesh runways on dry days. Air base engineer battalions struggled manfully around the clock, but many strips were fast becoming unserviceable by early August and were abandoned as soon as more favorable sites became available outside Neptune’s lodgment area.
Map 62. U.S. Expeditionary Airfields in Manche and Calvados
Table 28. U.S. Expeditionary Airfields in Manche and Calvados
包起来
WRAP-UP
尽管诺曼底西北部地区在欧洲历史上有着超过千年的历史，但在D日当天，有关该地区的地理信息却不完整且常常不准确。过时的沿海海图、误导性的气候平均统计数据以及对博卡日地区认识的滞后，仅仅是困扰着1944年6月登陆和集结期间美军、英军和加拿大军队的众多问题中的几个例子。
Geographical information concerning northwestern Normandy was incomplete and often inaccurate on D-Day, even though that region had been prominent in European history for more than 1,000 years. Obsolete charts of coastal waters, misleading climatic mean statistics, and belated appreciation of the bocage are just a few among many problems that plagued U.S., British, and Canadian forces during the June 1944 landings and buildup.
尽管如此， “海王星行动”仍取得了惊人的成功。盟军突击部队克服了恶劣的天气和地形，成功“进入欧洲大陆”，巩固了立足点，并在第一周内连接了全部五个滩头阵地。截至7月2日，盟军远征军已将100万兵力、24个师（13个美军师、11个英军师、1个加拿大师）、56.6万吨物资和17.1万辆车辆送上岸，伤亡人数为60770人，其中8975人阵亡。34这些英勇战士的牺牲开启了期待已久的第二战场，并按照艾森豪威尔将军的命令，开始了“旨在直指德国心脏并摧毁其武装力量的行动”。
Operation Neptune nonetheless was an astounding success. Allied assault forces “entered the continent of Europe” despite perverse weather and terrain, consolidated footholds, and linked all five beachheads during the first week. Allied expeditionary forces by July 2nd had deposited ashore 1,000,000 men, 24 divisions (13 U.S., 11 British, 1 Canadian), 566,000 tons of supplies, and 171,000 vehicles at a cost of 60,770 casualties, of whom 8,975 were killed.34 The sacrifices of those valiants initiated the long-awaited Second Front and, in accordance with General Eisenhower’s orders, began “operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her Armed Forces.”
要点
KEY POINTS
• 地理限制使得两栖和空降强行进入成为所有军事行动中最复杂的行动之一。
• Geographical constraints make amphibious and airborne forcible entries among the most complex of all military operations.
• 中转基地的存在、容量和位置对到达选定住宿区域的途径有很大的影响。
• The presence, capacities, and locations of staging bases strongly affect avenues of approach to selected lodgment areas.
• 驻扎区内是否有合适的港口和机场会对军事任务和目标分配产生重大影响。
• The presence or absence of suitable ports and airfields in lodgment areas strongly affects military missions and the assignment of objectives.
• 有远见的规划者会预见并准备应对恶劣天气条件造成的干扰，这些干扰会对前往驻扎区的突击和支援部队造成严重影响。
• Far-sighted planners anticipate and prepare for disruptions caused by adverse weather conditions, which strongly affect assault and support forces en route to lodgment areas.
• 潮汐和灯光数据决定了两栖攻击最有利的日期和时间。
• Tides and light data determine the most favorable dates and times for amphibious assaults.
• 地形特征缩小了合适的空投区、着陆区和两栖登陆点的数量，这通常有利于那些能够将力量集中在可能做出决定的地点的防御者。
• Topographical features that narrow the number of suitable drop zones, landing zones, and amphibious landing sites generally favor defenders who can concentrate power at probable points of decision.
• 制定利用各种途径的备用突破计划的指挥官，最能把握意外的机会。
• Commanders who prepare alternative breakout plans that take advantage of assorted avenues are best prepared to exploit unexpected opportunities.
笔记
NOTES
1. Don A. Harrison，“跨海峡进攻”，《美国陆军在第二次世界大战欧洲战区》（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局），第 73-74 页、第 423-426 页；Douglas Botting，《第二战场》 （纽约：时代生活出版社，1978 年），第 4 页；John Keegan，《诺曼底的六支军队》（纽约：维京出版社，1982 年），第 1 章。
1. Don A. Harrison, “Cross-Channel Attack,” United States Army in World War II, European Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), 73-74, 423-426; Douglas Botting, The Second Front (New York: Time-Life Books, 1978), 4; John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy (New York: Viking Press, 1982), chapter 1.
2.德怀特·D·艾森豪威尔，《欧洲十字军东征》（纽约州花园城：双日出版社，1948 年），第 228-229 页。
2. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1948), 228-229.
3.有关许多相关地图和图表，请参阅约翰·曼的《档案资料D日地图集》（纽约：档案资料出版社，1994年）。另请参阅科林·F·巴克斯特的《1944年诺曼底战役：精选书目》（纽约：格林伍德出版社，1992年）。
3. For many pertinent maps and diagrams, see John Man, Facts on File D-Day Atlas (New York: Facts on File, 1994). Refer also to Colin F. Baxter, The Normandy Campaign, 1944: A Selected Bibliography (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992).
4. Richard Collier，《沙漠之战》（纽约：时代生活出版社，1977 年），以及 Robert Wallace，《意大利战役》（纽约：时代生活出版社，1978 年）。
4. Richard Collier, The War in the Desert (New York: Time-Life Books, 1977), and Robert Wallace, The Italian Campaign (New York: Time-Life Books, 1978).
5. Richard M. Leighton，“开罗-德黑兰会议上的霸王行动与地中海”，载于Kent Roberts Greenfield 编辑的《指挥决策》（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1960 年），第 255-285 页。
5. Richard M. Leighton, “Overlord Versus the Mediterranean at the Cairo-Tehran Conferences,” in Command Decisions, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960), 255-285.
6.弗雷德里克·摩根爵士，《霸王行动序曲》（纽约花园城：Doubleday出版社，1950年），第132-133页；《霸王行动报告，1943年7月15日至1944年3月26日》，盟军最高司令部参谋长（COSSAC）。
6. Sir Frederick Morgan, Overture to Overlord (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1950), 132-133; Report on Operation Overlord, 15 July 1943-26 March 1944, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC).
7.同上；Basil H. Liddell Hart，《德国将军的谈话》（纽约：William Morrow，1948 年），第 228、238 页。
7. Ibid.; Basil H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk (New York: William Morrow, 1948), 228, 238.
8. Morgan，《霸王行动序曲》，第 134、141、142 页；《霸王行动报告》（COSSAC）。
8. Morgan, Overture to Overlord, 134, 141,142; Report on Operation Overlord (COSSAC).
9.同上，139-141，142。
9. Ibid., 139-141, 142.
10.除非另有说明，对营地的描述均出自约翰·柯林斯所著《诺曼底战役的军事地理》（克拉克大学硕士论文，马萨诸塞州伍斯特市，1951年）。资料来源包括二战后解密的许多秘密和绝密文件。
10. Descriptions of the lodgment area, unless otherwise cited, were drawn from John Collins, Military Geography of the Normandy Campaign (Master’s thesis, Clark University, Worcester, MA, 1951). Sources included many Secret and Top Secret documents declassified after World War II.
11. Jean Gottman，《欧洲地理》，第4版（纽约：霍尔特、莱因哈特和温斯顿出版社，1969 年），第 329-331 页。
11. Jean Gottman, A Geography of Europe, 4th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), 329-331.
12. St. Lô，《美国军队行动系列》（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1946 年 8 月 21 日），第 2-4 页、第 6 页。
12. St. Lô, American Forces in Action Series (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 21, 1946), 2-4, 6.
13. 《塞纳河以西的诺曼底》，跨部门信息系列，法国报告，CB 4096j (15)，第 2 卷，第 5 部分 (A)，海岸、海滩和出口，1943 年 1 月，18-22、30-33；《犹他海滩至瑟堡》，美国军队行动系列（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1947 年 10 月 1 日），3-4；《奥马哈滩头阵地》，美国军队行动系列（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1945 年 9 月 20 日），10-16。
13. Normandy West of the Seine, Interservice Information Series, Report on France, CB 4096j (15), vol. 2, part 5 (A), Coasts, Beaches, and Exits, January 1943, 18-22, 30-33; Utah Beach to Cherbourg, American Forces in Action Series (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 1, 1947), 3-4; Omaha Beachhead, American Forces in Action Series (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 20, 1945), 10-16.
14. 1944 年 6 月海王星地区气象和海洋状况，“M”分遣队，第21气象中队，第九航空队，1944 年 5 月 3 日；与法国军事行动相关的天气和气候，第 644 号报告，陆军航空兵气象处，1944 年 4 月。
14. Meteorological and Oceanographic Conditions for June 1944 in the Neptune Area, Detachment “M,” 21st Weather Squadron, Ninth Air Force, May 3, 1944; Weather & Climate As Related to Military Operations in France, Report 644, Weather Division, Army Air Forces, April 1944.
15.美国陆军第一份作战报告，1943 年 10 月 20 日至 1944 年 8 月 1 日，附件 1，111-115，附件 2，204-206。
15. First U.S. Army Report of Operations, 20 October 1943-1 August 1944, annex 1,111-115, annex 2, 204-206.
16.同上，附件 1，101-105；附件 12，18；塞纳河以西的诺曼底，第 2 卷，第 3 部分（B），道路，1943 年 5 月。
16. Ibid., annex 1, 101-105; annex 12, 18; Normandy West of the Seine, vol. 2, part 3 (B), Roads, May 1943.
17.有关安置区域的评估，请参阅注释 10。
17. For assessments of the lodgment area, see note 10.
18.摩根，《霸主序曲》，140。
18. Morgan, Overture to Overlord, 140.
19. Humphrey Wynn，《霸王行动前奏：盟军在诺曼底登陆之前和支持的空中作战记述》（加利福尼亚州诺瓦托：普雷西迪奥出版社，1984 年）。
19. Humphrey Wynn, Prelude to Overlord: An Account of the Air Operations Which Preceded and Supported . . . the Allied Landings in Normandy (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984).
20.阿拉曼的蒙哥马利子爵，《从诺曼底到波罗的海》（波士顿，马萨诸塞州：霍顿·米夫林出版社，1948年），第20-50页；摩根，《霸王行动前奏》，第vi-vii页、第143-150页；艾森豪威尔，《欧洲十字军东征》，第230页
20. Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Normandy to the Baltic (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 20-50; Morgan, Prelude to Overlord, vi-vii, 143-150; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 230
21. James F. Tent，《E艇警报：保卫诺曼底登陆舰队》（马里兰州安纳波利斯：美国海军学院出版社，1996年）。
21. James F. Tent, E-Boat Alert: Defending the Normandy Invasion Fleet (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1996).
22.犹他海滩到瑟堡，12-13；奥马哈滩头阵地，8-9。
22. Utah Beach to Cherbourg, 12-13; Omaha Beachhead, 8-9.
23.艾森豪威尔，《欧洲十字军东征》，第244页和224-225年间的霸王预测图。
23. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 244 and the Overlord Forecast Map between 224-225.
24. Hans Speidel，《入侵 1944：隆美尔与诺曼底战役》，Theo W. Crevenna 译（芝加哥，伊利诺伊州：Regnery，1950 年）；Samuel W. Mitcham，《隆美尔的最后一战：沙漠之狐与诺曼底战役》（纽约：Stein and Day，1983 年）。
24. Hans Speidel, Invasion 1944: Rommel and the Normandy Campaign, trans. Theo W. Crevenna (Chicago, IL: Regnery, 1950); Samuel W, Mitcham, Rommel’s Last Battle: The Desert Fox and the Normandy Campaign (New York: Stein and Day, 1983).
25. Keegan，《诺曼底的六支军队》，130。
25. Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy, 130.
26. James H. Herzog，《突破欧洲堡垒：诺曼底登陆日美国工兵的故事》（纽约：Kendall/Hunt，1944 年）；《奥马哈滩头阵地》，第 20-25 页；《犹他海滩到瑟堡》，第 4-8 页；Botting，《第二战场》，第 12-20 页。
26. James H. Herzog, Breaching Fortress Europe: The Story of U.S. Engineers in Normandy on D-Day (New York: Kendall/Hunt, 1944); Omaha Beachhead, 20-25; Utah Beach to Cherbourg, 4-8; Botting, The Second Front, 12-20.
27. M. Devlin，《伞兵》（纽约：圣马丁出版社，1979 年），第 387 页。
27. M. Devlin, Paratrooper (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), 387.
28.犹他海滩至瑟堡，183-208。
28. Utah Beach to Cherbourg, 183-208.
29.圣洛战役（1944 年 7 月 7 日至 19 日），《美国军队行动系列》（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局，1946 年 8 月 21 日）；艾森豪威尔，《欧洲十字军东征》，第 268-269 页。
29. St Lô (7 July-19 July 1944), American Forces in Action Series (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 21, 1946); Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 268-269.
30.德夫林，《伞兵！》 280-281。另见 SLA Marshall，《夜降：美国空降兵入侵诺曼底》（波士顿，马萨诸塞州：Little, Brown，1962 年）；Richard N. Gale，《与第 6空降师在诺曼底》（伦敦：S. Low, Marston，1948 年）。
30. Devlin, Paratrooper! 280-281. See also S. L. A. Marshall, Night Drop: The American Airborne Invasion of Normandy (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1962); Richard N. Gale, With the 6thAirborne Division in Normandy (London: S. Low, Marston, 1948).
31. Walter Bedell Smith，《艾森豪威尔的六大决策》（纽约：朗文出版社，1956 年），第 50-55 页；艾森豪威尔，《欧洲十字军东征》，第 249-250 页；博廷，《第二战场》，第 60-63 页。
31. Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s Six Great Decisions (New York: Longmans, Green, 1956), 50-55; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 249-250; Botting, The Second Front, 60-63.
32. Morgan，《霸主序曲》，144、148。
32. Morgan, Overture to Overlord, 144, 148.
33. Kenneth Edwards， 《海王星行动》（伦敦：柯林斯出版社，1946 年），第 228-232 页；第 200-201 页。
33. Kenneth Edwards, Operation Neptune (London: Collins, 1946), 228-232; 200-201.
34.艾森豪威尔，《欧洲的十字军东征》，第270页。
34. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 270.
19. 埃尔帕索行动计划
19. OPERATION PLAN EL PASO
我想去切波内，但我还没有票。
I’d like to go to Tchepone, but I haven’t got the tickets.
威廉·C·威斯特摩兰将军
致克雷顿·W·艾布拉姆斯将军
，越南西贡，1968年3月
General William C. Westmoreland
to General Creighton W. Abrams
Saigon, Vietnam, March, 1968
20 世纪 60 年代和 70 年代初，胡志明小道连接了北越红河三角洲和南越，途经老挝狭长地带，是北纬17度以南共产党军队不可或缺的补给来源。1美国空中拦截行动和特种作战部队减缓了毒品流入的速度，但并没有阻止毒品流入。2林登·B·约翰逊总统主要出于政治原因，不赞成对河内和海防附近的库存进行空袭，而这种空袭或许会更加成功。3
THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL, WHICH LINKED NORTH VIETNAM’S RED RIVER DELTA WITH SOUTH VIETNAM VIA THE Laotian panhandle in the 1960s and early 1970s, was an indispensable source of supplies for Communist forces south of the 17th Parallel.1 U.S. air interdiction campaigns and special operations forces slowed, but by no means stopped the flow.2 President Lyndon B. Johnson, primarily for political reasons, disapproved air strikes against stockpiles around Hanoi and Haiphong, which arguably might have been more successful.3
因此，时任美国驻越南军事援助司令部（COMUSMACV）司令的威廉·C·威斯特摩兰将军下令执行“埃尔帕索行动计划”（OPLAN El Paso ） ，这是一项军级规模的行动，旨在旱季前后连续 18 个月封锁车蓬的胡志明小道，并安排暴雨将车辆通行量减少到涓涓细流。1967年11月至1968年3月间，负责制定“埃尔帕索作战计划”的小型联合参谋部四名成员发现，地理环境深刻影响了针对这项远离既有后勤保障设施的大规模、长期作战行动中所有问题的拟定方案。他们的努力成果以及构思欠佳的替代方案“蓝山719行动”的失败结果，将在下文中阐述。
General William C. Westmoreland, who was Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), consequently commissioned Operation Plan (OPLAN) El Paso, a corps-sized operation timed to seal off the Ho Chi Minh Trail at Tchepone for 18 consecutive months during a dry season preceded and followed by torrential rains that would reduce vehicular traffic to a trickle.4 Members of the small joint staff that prepared OPLAN El Paso between November 1967 and March 1968 found that geographic circumstances profoundly influenced proposed answers to every question connected with that large-scale, long-duration operation far from established support facilities. Results of their efforts follow, along with the unhappy outcome of Operation Lam Son 719, an ill-conceived substitute.
胡志明小道
THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL
胡志明小道最初是为南越越共游击队提供补给的通道，在20世纪50年代末开通时，它不过是荒野中一条蜿蜒曲折的小径。无数忠诚的男女老少，背负着沉重的货物，弯着腰，艰难地沿着这些小路跋涉。由于货物清单上的物品并不起眼，美国和越南共和国（南越）的高级官员几乎对他们置之不理：一些大米，几支从法国人手中缴获的破旧手枪，以及一些像鲁布·戈德堡机械一样拼凑起来的自制武器。然而，随着时间的推移，物资运输的速度逐渐加快，货物也越来越多地包括收音机、药品、塑胶炸药、无后坐力炮和维修零件等精密物品。1965年美军与北越正规军正面交锋后，弹药需求更是呈指数级增长。5
The Ho Chi Minh Trail, which initially nourished Viet Cong guerrillas in South Vietnam, was nothing more than a skein of rustic traces through the wilderness when it opened in the late 1950s. Dedicated men, women, boys, and girls bent bandy-legged beneath heavy loads trudged down those paths, all but ignored by senior officials in the United States and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) because the invoices were unimpressive: a little rice, a few pitted handguns captured from the French, homemade weapons pieced together like Rube Goldberg toys. The tempo, however, gradually picked up and consignments increasingly included sophisticated items such as radios, pharmaceuticals, plastic explosives, recoilless rifles, and repair parts. Ammunition requirements multiplied exponentially after U.S. combat forces hit North Vietnamese regulars head on in 1965.5
进化发展
EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
这段艰苦的旅程最初要穿越荣市和非军事区之间数百英里崎岖不平的地形，之后还要继续穿越老挝，在某些情况下，到达南越最终目的地的路程甚至增加了一倍以上（地图63）。人力搬运工和各种牲畜艰难地驮着日益沉重的货物，但物资供应与需求之间的差距却越来越大，因为每件货物的重量都在不断增加——例如，每枚122毫米火箭弹重达102磅（46公斤），比大多数搬运工的体重还要重；不到五枚火箭弹就能压弯体型娇小的安南象的膝盖，它们推拉比扛重物更胜一筹。因此，能够容纳卡车通行的路线的需求显而易见（表29），但大多数偏远地区的通道都十分原始，几乎没有桥梁，最初遍布水牛的泥潭，后来又饱受炸弹的摧残。
Brutal courses that in the beginning traversed several hundred miles of exhausting, saw-toothed terrain between Vinh and the demilitarized zone (DMZ) later continued the grind through Laos, which in some cases more than doubled the distance to ultimate destinations in South Vietnam (map 63). Human bearers and assorted beasts struggled to tote swelling loads, yet gaps between supplies and demands became ever wider, because individual burdens grew progressively heavier—every 122-mm rocket, for example, weighed 102 pounds (46 kilograms), more than most of the porters; fewer than five would buckle the knees of pint-sized Annamese elephants which push and pull better than they bear cumbersome loads. Requirements for routes that could accommodate truck traffic thus were obvious (table 29), but most passageways in the back country were primitive, largely bridgeless, initially pitted with water buffalo wallows, and subsequently battered by bombs.
表29.胡志明小道上的交通运输6
Table 29. Transportation on the Ho Chi Minh Trail6
因此，河内的高层决策者启动了雄心勃勃的修缮和扩建计划，旨在拓宽道路、跨越溪流、平整隆起路段、填平洼地、铺设松软路面并设立驿站。经过修缮的胡志明小道，其建设和维护所用的工具从铁锹到推土机和铲运机应有尽有，逐渐演变成一个由可通行车辆的道路、车辙、人行道和可通航溪流组成的迷宫。到1967年初秋，这条小道为南越的共产党军队提供了约四分之一的物资（超过70%的武器弹药）。空袭使这些道路布满弹坑，如同月球表面一般，但坚韧的农民在军方监督下修补残垣断壁，修建绕行路线，而车队则在夜幕的掩护和日益有效的防空火力下穿梭往来。
Senior decisionmakers in Hanoi accordingly initiated ambitious renovation and expansion programs to widen rights of way, span streams, level humps, fill in hollows, corduroy spongy spots, and establish way stations. The improved Ho Chi Minh Trail, constructed and maintained with tools that ranged from shovels to bulldozers and scrapers, incrementally became a labyrinth of motorable roads, cart tracks, foot paths, and navigable streams that by early autumn 1967 furnished Communist forces in South Vietnam about one-fourth of all their supplies (more than 70 percent of arms and munitions). Aerial bombardments pocked those avenues like surfaces on the moon, but dogged peasants with military supervisors patched the wreckage and built bypasses, while convoys shuttled from point to point under cover of darkness and ever more effective antiaircraft umbrellas.
由于季节性降雨导致胡志明小道从至少四月中旬到九月下旬都泥泞不堪，因此贸易必然具有周期性。北越后勤人员在阻挡西南季风的山脉背风坡，趁着夏季沿海地区阳光明媚，在境内囤积物资，以备老挝境内道路干燥后立即向南大规模输送物资。在老挝境内，共产党的基地遍布洞穴、隧道、掩体和地下储藏坑，这些设施储存着待发往使用部队的物资。
Business was necessarily cyclical, since seasonal rains made the Ho Chi Minh Trail a mush from mid-April at least until late September. North Vietnamese logisticians on the lee side of mountains that block the Southwest Monsoon therefore amassed stockpiles inside their home border during summer months, when skies were sunny along the coast, in preparation for great surges south as soon as roads in Laos were dry. Communist base areas honeycombed with caves, tunnels, bunkers, and subterranean storage pits in Laos held stocks pending distribution to using units.
老挝山水
LAOTIAN LANDSCAPES
老挝狭长地带由三个大致呈北西北-南东南走向的平行区域组成：东部边界是连绵起伏的山脉；芒平以西是绵延起伏的平原，一直延伸到湄公河；中间则是一片崎岖不平、瘟疫肆虐、人烟稀少的过渡地带。胡志明小道贯穿这三个区域（图64）。
The Laotian panhandle comprises three parallel regions roughly oriented from north northwest to south southeast: jumbled mountains straddle the eastern frontier; a rolling plain west of Muong Phine stretches all the way to the Mekong; a rough, fever-ridden, sparsely settled transition zone occupies space in between. The Ho Chi Minh Trail traversed all three (map 64).
Map 64. The Laotian Panhandle at Midpoint
安南山脉。老挝和越南边境沿线的最高峰海拔仅略高于 5,500 英尺（1,675 米），其他山峰也鲜有超过 4,000 英尺（1,220 米）的，但这些数字具有一定的迷惑性，因为山涧溪流从基岩上凿刻出嶙峋的山脊和峡谷。许多山坡的坡度超过 45 度，即 100%（每水平移动一英尺，垂直上升一英尺）。非军事区（DMZ）北部和西部的地形最为崎岖，那里巨大的石灰岩沉积物在热带暴雨中溶解，雕琢出针状山峰、落水洞和死胡同。北越军队的工场、公寓和仓库利用了巨大的洞穴，这些洞穴有凉爽、干燥、防爆的大厅，高达三四层楼，延伸到许多山坡上 1000 英尺（300 多米）或更远。
The Annam Mountain Chain. The highest peak along the border between Laos and Vietnam barely tops 5,500 feet (1,675 meters), and few other summits surpass 4,000 feet (1,220 meters), but such figures are deceptive, because mountain streams chisel razorbacked ridges and canyons from bedrock. Numerous inclines exceed 45 degrees or 100 percent (slopes climb one foot vertically for every horizontal foot). Topography is roughest north and west of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), where massive limestone deposits dissolve in tropical downpours, sculpting needle-shaped pinnacles, sink holes, and culs-de-sac. North Vietnamese Army (NVA) workshops, apartments, and stockpiles took advantage of giant caverns with cool, dry, blast-proof halls three or four stories high that extended 1,000 feet or more (300+ meters) into many hillsides.
除了木嘉山口和溪山隘口之外，很少有方便的通道可以穿过那座山壁，因为从分水岭向西奔流而下的湍急溪流冲刷出狭窄的通道，遍布急流——邦吉昂河穿过一个非常陡峭的峡谷，以至于地图上的等高线都重叠在一起——而且到处都是被雨水润滑过的滑坡，就像雪橇滑道一样滑。
Few convenient apertures other than Mu Gia Pass and the Khe Sanh Gap cross that mountain wall, because swift streams that cascade west from the divide carve constricted corridors studded with rapids—the Banghiang River traverses a gorge so steep that map contour lines sit one on top of another—and slopes everywhere are as slippery as bobsled runs when greased by rain.
阴暗潮湿、错综复杂的多层丛林，茂密的灌木丛覆盖着这片堡垒的大部分区域，其中生长着茂密的柚木和红木林，大多数高达90到100英尺（27到30米），偶尔也会出现比这还要高出半英尺的巨树。绳索状的藤蔓缠绕在较低的层位，其上布满倒钩，会割伤粗心的旅人。从溪山到班侯山，绵延着大片竹林，密密麻麻，几乎无法穿透，有些竹竿的直径甚至达半英尺。游牧的山地部落弃耕后，次生林会迅速重新占领这些土地。
Dank, gloomy, multistoried jungles with dense undergrowth mantle much of that redoubt with thick stands of teak and mahogany most of which tower 90 to 100 feet (27 to 30 meters), although occasional monsters are half again as high. Corded vines festoon the lower levels and lacerate unwary travelers with terrible barbs. Huge breaks of bamboo stretch from Khe Sanh to Ban Houi Sane, close clumped, almost impenetrable, some with stalks half a foot in diameter. Secondary growth quickly reclaims slash-and-burn plots that nomadic Montagnard tribes abandon.
过渡带。东部山峦与西部相对平坦的地形交界处的过渡带，地貌特征为断续的高地，将老挝的景观切割成一系列锐角区域。两条东西走向的显著山脊相距数英里，中间有一条明显的槽谷，从溪山（Khe Sanh）出发，途经车蓬（Tchepone），绵延近80公里（50英里），北侧的山脊在此逐渐消失。与之相对的山脊则继续延伸80公里，形成一道天然屏障，仅有四处缺口。最东端的朗维（Lang Vei）裂缝在9号公路以南延伸，形成一片锯齿状高地的迷宫，仿佛是用锯齿状的剪刀精心雕琢而成。第二个入口位于班东（Ban Dong），逐渐扩大，形成一个浅而狭长的碗状地形，大致以四角（Four Corners）为中心。车蓬是最佳的天然枢纽，拥有通往西南、东南和东部的缺口。最后一个开口位于最西端，是芒平（Muong Phine）的宽阔山口。
The Transition Zone. Topography in the transition zone between mountains on the east and relatively level terrain on the west features discontinuous uplands that chop the Laotian landscape into a series of acute angle compartments. Two prominent east-west ridges a few miles apart with a conspicuous trough in between follow parallel paths for nearly 50 miles (80 kilometers) from Khe Sanh past Tchepone, where the northern runner peters out. Its companion, which plunges on for another 50 miles, is a natural barrier breached in just four places. The Lang Vei cleft farthest east expires south of Route 9 in a maze of serrated highlands that might have been fashioned with pinking shears. A second portal at Ban Dong widens to form a shallow, oblong bowl that generally centers on Four Corners. Tchepone, the best natural hub, boasts breakthroughs that lead southwest, southeast, and east. The final opening, farthest west, comprises a broad pass at Muong Phine.
在最佳条件下，邦希昂河在车蓬段水深3英尺，宽100码，始终是一道令人望而生畏的障碍。在蓬河以北，有50多条垂直的沟渠，它们汇集了林木茂盛、地势崎岖的土地上的水流，使河漫滩变得波纹状。这些沟渠在旱季时对军事影响不大，但一旦下雨，便会变成汹涌的洪流。此外，高达800英尺（243米）的无形峭壁在班东以西15英里（24公里）的范围内，笼罩着南岸。
The Banghiang River, 3 feet deep and 100 yards wide at Tchepone under optimum conditions, always is an impressive obstacle. More than 50 perpendicular runnels that drain wooded, broken ground just north of the Pon River and corrugate its flood plains are militarily insignificant during dry seasons, but become raging torrents when it rains, while trackless palisades up to 800 feet high (243 meters) shadow the south bank for 15 miles (24 kilometers) west of Ban Dong.
在战术地图上，代表友军和敌军的蓝红色块在过渡区往往彼此孤立，因为那里车辆不会远离道路和小径。步兵在开阔的森林中每小时可以行进一两英里，但茂密的植被会迫使军队折返，直线行进距离也会增加两到三倍。年轻的保罗·班扬挥舞着砍刀，可以在60分钟内砍开大约100码的竹林，前提是他们采取了……他们对自己的工作很感兴趣，士官们经常轮换尖兵，而且没有人在意制造了多大的噪音（这噪音听起来就像几个不同步的铁砧合唱团）。
Blobs of blue and red that represent friendly and enemy armed forces on tactical maps more often than not are isolated from each other in the Transition Zone, where no vehicles move far off roads and trails. Foot troops may hike a mile or two an hour in open forests, but vegetative tangles make military columns backtrack and double or triple straight-line distances. Youthful Paul Bunyons wielding machetes can hew through bamboo thickets at a rate that approximates 100 yards or so in 60 blistering minutes, provided they take an interest in their work, sergeants rotate point men frequently, and no one cares how much noise is made (the racket sounds like several unsynchronized Anvil Choruses).
过渡区的景象一片荒凉。最大的村庄车蓬（Tchepone）曾经居住着大约1500名平民，包括男女老幼，但到20世纪60年代中期，只剩下不到一半的人。大多数村庄都已荒废，原先的居民要么死去，要么离开。狭长地带的生活方式也从传统的乡村聚落转变为北越军队在茂密森林中的基地或老挝王国政府控制的河边城镇。
Desolation typified the Transition Zone. Tchepone, the largest village, once housed maybe 1,500 civilian men, women, and children, but fewer than half remained by the mid-1960s. Most hamlets were deserted, their former inhabitants dead or departed. Panhandle life had shifted from traditional rural clusters to NVA base areas in dense woods or river towns that the Royal Laotian Government held.
沙湾拿吉平原。顾名思义，沙湾拿吉平原地势相对低洼，地势平缓起伏，遍布灌木和稀树草原，只有少数地方是自给自足的农业用地。1967-68年间，胡志明小道的大部分路段都位于东部，因为设计者们更倾向于选择隐蔽性更好、通往南越目的地更直接的路线。
The Savannakhet Plain. The Savannakhet Plain, as its name implies, is relatively low, gently rolling real estate overgrown with brush and savanna grass, except where subsistence agriculture plots take precedence. Most of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 1967-68 was positioned well to the east, because its architects preferred better cover and more direct routes to destinations in South Vietnam.
机动车渗透路线
MOTORABLE INFILTRATION ROUTES
西贡联合情报中心估计，90%的北越军队经由103号和102号公路，穿过非军事区潜入老挝。之后，一部分军队向南进军，另一部分则沿着南萨莫河和9号公路折返南越。这两条河流的支流如同七月四日烟花般散落各处（见地图64）。然而，1967年至1968年间，物资和装备的运输路线却截然不同。
The Combined Intelligence Center in Saigon estimated that 90 percent of all NVA troops infiltrated into Laos through the demilitarized zone via Routes 103 and 102, after which some marched south while others swung back into South Vietnam along the Nam Samou River and Route 9, both of which showered tributary tracks like Fourth of July sparklers (map 64). Supplies and equipment, however, took different tacks in 1967-1968.
92号公路。这条路十分简陋，宽度不足3米（10到12英尺），仅能单向通行，从非军事区到班东。旱季时，卡车需要涉水渡过蓬河，然后沿着极其狭窄的弯道和陡峭的坡度前往四角地区。更南边的道路经过大规模改造后，这条小路变成了老挝南部最重要的渗透通道。
Route 92. Route 92, a rude way no more than 10 or 12 feet wide (fewer than 3 meters), was passable to one-way motor traffic from the DMZ to Ban Dong, where trucks swam the Pon River during dry weather, then negotiated extremely tight turns and steep grades en route to Four Corners. Major improvements farther south transformed that byway into the preeminent infiltration corridor in southern Laos.
914号公路于1965年通车，吸引了来自包括木嘉山口和内河航道在内的众多交通流量。到1968年初，它已成为车蓬和四角路口92号公路之间最繁忙的补给路线。公路宽度从8英尺到30英尺（2米多到近10米）不等，红土路面在天气晴朗的情况下足以承受拖车通行。914号公路在跨越邦希昂河后并没有完全倾斜，但之后却爬升了23%的坡度，才找到较为平缓的路段。
Route 914. Route 914, which opened operations in 1965, sucked in traffic from numerous sources, including Mu Gia Pass and inland waterways, until, by early 1968, it became the most heavily traveled supply route between Tchepone and Route 92 at Four Corners. Its width varied from 8 to 30 feet (2+ to nearly 10 meters), and a laterite surface tolerated tractor-trailers as long as the weather was fair. Route 914 didn’t exactly tip on end after it forded the Banghiang River, but the road climbed 23 percent grades before it found an easier course.
23号公路。23号公路是胡志明小道上唯一一条可供车辆通行的南北向道路，但随着车队开始走914号公路这条捷径，23号公路便逐渐荒废，年久失修。1966年，战斗轰炸机摧毁了三跨的邦香桥，由于桥下河段水流湍急无法涉水，车队通行彻底中断。几个月后，随着驳船和绕行道路的出现，通行略有恢复。然而，施工人员始终没有修复或重建这座破败的桥梁，而是迅速地改善了原本宽约7到8英尺的天然土路。
Route 23. Route 23, the only other motorable north-south avenue on the Ho-Chi Minh Trail, went dormant and fell into disrepair as soon as convoys began to take the Route 914 short-cut. Convoy traffic ceased in 1966 after fighter-bombers destroyed the triple-span Banghiang bridge, because the river at that point was unfordable, but revived a bit some months later when barges and bypasses appeared. Construction crews, however, never restored or replaced the battered bridge and wasted little time improving the natural earth roadbed, which at best was 7 or 8 feet wide.
9号公路，这条横贯老挝狭长地带的东西向“收费公路”，在其鼎盛时期只是一条连接北部湾沿岸广治省和湄公河畔沙湾拿吉市的驿道，全长200英里（322公里）。战争和疏于维护使其损毁严重，但这条交通要道仍然比其他任何道路都更有潜力：路基稳固；路面由碎石和红土铺成，平均宽度为13至14英尺（不包括路肩）；坡度从未超过正负3%至5%。即使穿过溪山隘口；也能到达研究区域内几乎所有具有重要军事意义的地点，包括胡志明小道沿线的交通枢纽和北越军队基地。
Route 9. Highway 9, the only east-west “turnpike” across the Laotian panhandle, in its salad days was a passing fair post road that connected Quang Tri Province on the Tonkin Gulf coast with the Mekong River town of Savannakhet, a distance of 200 miles (322 kilometers). War and neglect had taken their toll, but that artery still had greater potential than any other: a stable base; crushed stone and laterite surfaces that averaged 13 to 14 feet wide, not counting shoulders; gradients that never exceeded plus or minus 3 to 5 percent, even through the Khe San Gap; and access to nearly every militarily significant feature in the study area, including transportation nodes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and NVA base areas.
然而，显著的劣势抵消了这些优势。一些长达一英里的沟壑纵横或杂草丛生的路段，使得水平净空高度仅为6英尺（不足2米）。许多绕着倒木和弹坑蜿蜒曲折的长路段，进一步降低了通行能力，延长了运输时间。殖民时期法国人修建的桥梁鲜有幸免于美军空袭，自1966年起，美军便开始有条不紊地摧毁这些桥梁。残存的摇摇欲坠的桥梁无法承载满载的四分之三吨卡车，但北越轻型车辆却能轻松穿行于各处，包括宽阔的邦希昂河沙泥河床。而如果没有浮桥或渡口，12吨重的美国半挂车则会在那里陷入泥潭。
Notable liabilities nevertheless counterbalanced those assets. Several gullied or grossly overgrown stretches as much as a mile long restricted horizontal clearances to as little as 6 feet (fewer than 2 meters). Many lengthy meanders around fallen trees and bomb craters additionally reduced throughput capacities and increased transit times. Few bridges that colonial Frenchmen installed survived U.S. air strikes, which systematically took them out starting in 1966. The rickety relics still standing were unable to hold fully loaded three-quarter-ton trucks, but light NVA vehicles routinely sloshed across everywhere, including the broad sand and mud Banghiang River bottom, whereas 12-ton U.S. semitrailers would have bogged down there in the absence a pontoon bridge or ferry.
七个重要机场
SEVEN SIGNIFICANT AIRFIELDS
1968 年 1 月之后，溪山美军陆战队拥有研究区域内唯一可用的固定翼飞机机场。其他六个机场则因各种程度的损坏而被废弃（表 30）。
U.S. Marines at Khe Sanh possessed the only operational fixed-wing airfield in the study area after January 1968. Six others were abandoned in various stages of disrepair (table 30).
Table 30. OPLAN El Paso Airfields
老宝和班阿莫。老宝和班阿莫都不值得修复，因为它们鼎盛时期都算不上什么好地方，而且都亟需修缮。时间和人力、金钱本可以更好地用于其他方面。
Lao Bao and Ban Amo. Neither Lao Bao nor Ban Amo was worth rehabilitating, because neither had been very capable in its hey day, and both were badly in need of repair. Time, manpower, and money could have been better expended elsewhere.
班会安机场（Ban Houei Sane）位于同名宁静村庄郊外，曾是美军C-130运输机的基地，直到1968年1月，北越正规军在春节攻势前夕前往溪山的途中占领了该机场。当时，由碎石和红土铺成的跑道被炸出了20多个深坑，但其余部分状况良好，向西的扩建空间几乎无限。
Ban Houei Sane. Ban Houei Sane, on the outskirts of the sleepy village from which it took its name, served U.S. C-130 transports until January 1968, when North Vietnamese regulars overran it on their way to Khe Sanh shortly before Tet. The crushed stone and laterite runway received more than 20 deep craters at that time, but the rest was in fairly good shape and expansion room to the west was almost unlimited.
车蓬。位于车蓬的前法国空军基地位于西边23英里（37公里）处，在老挝王国军队（FAR）撤离后，于1961年落入共产党手中。美国工程师认为，尽管跑道一端布满巨大的弹坑，并被象草和灌木丛堵塞，但其排水良好、夯实度高的3700英尺（1128米）跑道可以迅速修复。跑道南侧约一英里处陡然隆起的刀刃状山脊可能会使C-130运输机的起降变得困难，但不会影响C-123和C-17等轻型突击运输机的起降。
Tchepone. The former French airbase at Tchepone, 23 air miles farther west (37 kilometers), fell into Communist hands in 1961, after the Laotian Forces Armées du Royaume (FAR) withdrew. U.S. engineers believed its well-drained, well-compacted 3,700-foot (1,128-meter) runway could be rehabilitated rapidly, even though one end was pocked with big bomb craters and blocked by elephant grass and brush. A knife-edged ridge, which rose abruptly about one mile to the south, might have made C-130 landings and takeoffs iffy, but would not have interfered with light assault transports such as C-123s and C-17s.
芒菲恩机场。芒菲恩废弃的跑道已被丛林吞噬，从空中几乎难以辨认，但炸弹造成的破坏轻微，其红土跑道表面覆盖着坚实的地基。翻新跑道需要大面积清理土地，并填平侵蚀痕迹和一处深洼地。虽然跑道不幸地直指反方向的一座山脉，但西侧的起降却畅通无阻。
Muong Phine. The derelict runway at Muong Phine, reclaimed by encroaching jungle, was scarcely visible from the air, but bomb damage was slight and its laterite surface overlaid a solid foundation. Refurbishment would have required extensive land clearing plus filling to repair erosion scars as well as one deep depression. Landings from and takeoffs to the west were unobstructed, although the runway unhappily pointed straight at a mountain mass in the opposite direction.
芒农机场。芒农机场那条短短的1300英尺（约400米）长的土质跑道，位于9号公路以南20多英里（30多公里）处，与拉农河的一个河湾相连。即便如此，通过平整地势起伏的山丘并排干一小片沼泽，跑道长度仍有可能翻倍。配备空运土方机械的工程师们，大约两周就能建成一条C-123运输机大小的跑道。
Muong Nong. The stubby 1,300-foot earth-surfaced runway at Muong Nong butted into a loop of the Lanong River 20-some miles (30+ kilometers) south of Route 9. Even so, there was room to double that length by planing off humps and draining a small swamp. Engineers equipped with air transportable earth-moving machines could have produced a C-123 strip in about 2 weeks.
溪山机场。位于南越边境的溪山作战基地的作战机场建于风化玄武岩之上，这种红色的物质外观与红土非常相似，但红土特性却很弱。跑道、滑行道和停机坪都铺设了铝板，以确保全天候运行能力，因为玄武岩在少量降雨后就会迅速风化成泥浆，形成车辙。与研究区域内的其他机场不同，溪山机场配备了现代化的导航辅助设备（TACAN 和无线电信标）、地面控制进近雷达 (GCA) 以及直升机和固定翼飞机的加油设施。
Khe Sanh. The operational airfield at Khe Sanh combat base, just across the border in South Vietnam, was built on weathered basalt, a reddish substance that looks much like laterite, but contains few lateritic properties. Aluminum planking covered the runway, taxi strips, and parking area to ensure all-weather capabilities, because basalt churns to mush and ruts quickly after the slightest rain. Khe Sanh, unlike any other airfield in the study area, was fully-equipped with modern aids to navigation (TACAN and radio beacons), ground-controlled approach radar (GCA), and refueling facilities for helicopters as well as fixed-wing aircraft.
空投区和着陆区
DROP ZONES AND LANDING ZONES
老挝狭长地带，除沙湾拿吉平原外，可作为大型跳伞区或直升机着陆区的开阔地带十分稀少。其他地区的地形通常过于崎岖，植被也过于茂密。
Open spaces that might serve as large-scale parachute drop zones (DZs) or helicopter landing zones (LZs) are scarce in the Laotian panhandle, except for sites on the Savannakhet Plain. Topography elsewhere is most often too formidable and vegetation too confining.
伞降区。芒菲内周围的稻田是唯一可以进行大规模伞降突击的地方。根据1968年美国第七航空队的标准，一架C-130运输机搭载64名士兵，需要一个长度为2925码（超过1.5英里，即2.67公里）的相对开阔的空降区。然而，切蓬、四角和班会安周围的较小空地，对于投放弹药、口粮、油料和其他高优先级物品（每架C-130可运送35200磅）来说绰绰有余。装备有降落伞低空投放系统 (PLADS) 的训练有素的机组人员通常可以将 2,000 磅重的包裹放置在偏远山顶或丛林空地上 20 码见方的靶心上，而低空降落伞提取系统 (LAPES) 可以将 18,000 磅重的平台沿着任何无障碍的土路或其他 50 英尺宽、1,200 英尺长的相对平坦的表面滑行。
Parachute Drop Zones. Rice paddies around Muong Phine offered the only opportunities for sizable parachute assaults which, according to U.S. Seventh Air Force standards in 1968, required a reasonably clear drop zone 2,925 yards long for 64 troopers in a C-130, which is more than a mile and one-half (2.67 kilometers) Smaller clearings around Tchepone, Four Corners, and Ban Houei Sane, however, were more than adequate for container deliveries of ammunition, rations, POL, and other high priority items (35,200 pounds per C-130). Well-qualified crews equipped with the Parachute Low Altitude Delivery System (PLADS) generally could put 2,000-pound bundles onto 20-yard-square bullseyes on isolated hilltops or in jungle clearings, and the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES) could slide 18,000-pound platforms down any obstruction-free dirt road or other reasonably smooth surface 50 feet wide by 1,200 feet long.
直升机着陆区。直升机运输比降落伞投放更有优势，尽管这些用途广泛的“鸟儿”在海拔和温度方面存在明显的局限性，会影响其升力。横跨芒平山并沿蓬河分布的耕地可以容纳多架直升机进行编队起降，但其他地方很少有开阔地带能够同时容纳一两架以上的直升机。在茂密的森林中，由于没有天然的树洞通向地面，因此需要使用高爆炸药和链锯才能快速建造小型直升机停机坪。
Helicopter Landing Zones. Helicopter transportation boded better than parachute delivery, although those versatile “birds” have definite limitations related to altitudes and temperatures, which affect lift capacities. Tilled flats bestraddling Muong Phine and interspersed along the Pon River could handle formation landings and takeoffs by multiple flights, but few open areas elsewhere could accommodate more than one or two ships simultaneously. High explosives and chain saws would have been required to create small chopper pads quickly in dense forests where no natural cavities reach the floor.
季风影响
MONSOONAL INFLUENCES
季风降雨、低云、能见度差、高温高湿以及破坏性大风，使得“埃尔帕索行动”的计划制定变得异常复杂。因为部署在老挝作战的武装部队必须在北部湾沿岸一个气候独特的区域集结并接受支援，却要在另一个气候截然不同的区域作战。南越大部分气象站都有可靠的气象数据，法国气象学家多年来一直在那里收集可靠的记录，但美国情报部门却始终未能找到老挝特定地点的类似统计数据。因此，当地的气候预测只能依靠猜测。
Monsoonal rains, low ceilings, poor visibility, heat, humidity, and destructive winds complicated planning for Operation El Paso, because armed forces committed to combat in Laos would have to stage in and be supported from one distinctive climatic zone along the Tonkin Gulf coast yet fight in another that is diametrically different. Hard data were available for most stations in South Vietnam, where French meteorologists had compiled reliable records for many years, but U.S. intelligence services never found similar statistics for particular locations in Laos. Climatic predictions there involved guesswork.
安南山脉与盛行风向垂直相交，如同紧闭的大门一般，将不同的气候带分隔开来（见地图65和图40）。每年10月中旬至次年3月，东北季风滋润越南南部，老挝则气候干燥；而从5月到9月初，西南季风占据主导地位，沿海地区阳光普照，老挝则迎来潮湿天气。过渡时期不稳定的环流导致地质幕两侧出现不稳定天气和雷暴。
The Annamese Mountains, which present a perpendicular front to prevailing winds, separate climatic regimes just as surely as a slammed door (map 65 and figure 40). When the Northeast Monsoon soaks South Vietnam from mid-October until March Laos is dry; coastal regions bask in sunlight when the Southwest Monsoon takes over from May until early September, while wet weather saturates Laos. Indefinite circulation during transition periods produces instability and thunderstorms on both sides of the Geologic Curtain.
Figure 40. Monsoonal Regimes at Tchepone, Khe Sanh, and Da Nang
老挝狭长地带的春雨通常从四月开始，随着西南季风在下个月的到来而呈指数级增长，并伴有频繁的暴雨和局部洪水。原本平坦的道路变成了泥泞不堪的沼泽，浅滩被翻滚的径流淹没，胡志明小道上的车辆通行也陷入停滞。
Spring rains in the Laotian panhandle, which generally commence in April, increase exponentially when the Southwest Monsoon hits the next month, accompanied by frequent downpours and local flooding. Fair weather roads turn into quagmires, fords vanish beneath roiling runoff, and vehicular traffic ceased on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
东北季风通常在10月4日至24日之间增强，一般在12日左右。此后，老挝的降水会持续一到两周，然后迅速减弱，但低垂的云层会使东部边境的山口在某些月份有一半的时间无法通行（参见图40中的溪山）。一旦沿海雨季开始，南越的军事建设就会停止，山区的飞行天气也会变得极其恶劣。此外，秋季降雨量的波动也十分惊人。例如，顺化市的降雨量曾出现过剧烈的变化，一年只有3.5英寸（8.9厘米），另一年却高达66英寸（168厘米），足以让诺亚方舟漂浮起来。1968年9月，台风贝丝在一天之内给岘港带来了20英寸（51厘米）的降雨。
The Northeast Monsoon revs up between the 4th and 24th of October, normally about the 12th. Precipitation perseveres in Laos for a week or two thereafter, then subsides rapidly, but low-hanging clouds close mountain passes along the eastern frontier half the days of some months (see Khe Sanh in figure 40). Military construction stops in South Vietnam and flying weather over hill country becomes abominable as soon as the coastal rainy season starts. Fluctuations from the autumn norm moreover are fantastic. Hué, for example, has yo-yoed from 3.5 inches one year (8.9 centimeters) to 66 inches in another (168 centimeters), enough to float Noah’s Ark. Typhoon Bess in September 1968 dumped 20 inches of water on Da Nang in 1 day (51 centimeters).
Map 65. Monsoonal Regimes in South Vietnam and Laos
西南季风
Southwest Monsoon
任务规划
MISSION PLANNING
“埃尔帕索行动计划”旨在切断胡志明小道的交通，在制定者确定了老挝境内最合适的驻扎地点及其内的战术责任区（TAOR）后，该计划迅速推进。随后，他们确定了最佳行动时机，提出了作战概念，估算了所需兵力，并向驻越美军司令部提交了方案以供批准。
Operation Plan El Paso, which was designed to interdict traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, proceeded apace after its architects identified the most logical lodgment area in Laos and a tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) within it. Thereafter, they determined optimum timing, postulated a concept of operations, estimated force requirements, and presented proposals to COMUSMACV for approval.
使命
THE MISSION
埃尔帕索行动计划的任务，用以下方式概括，其精髓在于简洁：
The OPLAN El Paso mission, paraphrased as follows, was the soul of simplicity:
瓶颈特遣队从 D 日的 H 时开始，占领、控制并尽可能长时间封锁胡志明小道上的关键咽喉要道，以阻止北越军队、物资和装备从北越经老挝狭长地带渗透到越南共和国（RVN）和柬埔寨境内的共产主义庇护所。
Task Force Bottleneck seizes, secures, and as long as necessary blocks key choke points astride the Ho Chi Minh Trail beginning at H- Hour on D-Day to forestall the infiltration of NVA troops, supplies, and equipment from North Vietnam through the Laotian Panhandle into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and Communist sanctuaries inside Cambodia.
“驾驶舱”
THE “COCKPIT”
规划指南指定了一个美国空中机动师、一个美国步兵师和一个越南陆军（南越）空降师组成“瓶颈”特遣部队，并提供大量的作战和后勤支援。这些兵力配置要求部队必须拥有一个“作战平台”，使一支军级规模的部队能够在不承担过高风险或成本的情况下，持续开展进攻和防御作战。
Planning guidance earmarked one U.S. airmobile division, one U.S. infantry division, and the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) airborne division for Task Force Bottleneck, plus substantial combat and logistical support. Those allocations established requirements for a “cockpit” within which a corps-sized force could conduct sustained offensive and defensive operations without excessive risks or costs.
合理的驻扎区域。选择埃尔帕索作战计划的驻扎区域并没有遇到什么特殊问题，因为只有一个地点与任务非常契合：
The Logical Lodgment Area. Selection of the OPLAN El Paso lodgment area presented no special problems, because only one site meshed well with the mission:
• 经评估，在穆嘉山口和纳佩山口设置封锁阵地并不合适，因为它们距离南越的集结地和支援基地太远，成本太高，可能难以维持，而且很容易被绕过。
• Blocking positions at Mu Gia and Nape Passes were assessed as unsuitable, because they would have been too remote from staging and support bases in South Vietnam, too expensive, probably untenable, and easily bypassed.
• 经评估，在非军事区西端设置封锁阵地并不合适，因为这些阵地几乎不会影响胡志明小道上的机动车交通。
• Blocking positions at the western end of the DMZ were assessed as unsuitable, because they would scarcely have affected motor traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
• 位于南部博洛文斯高原的阻击阵地被认为不合适，因为这将使敌军、装备和补给品能够自由进入战火纷飞的南越大部分地区。
• Blocking positions anchored on the Bolovens Plateau far to the south were assessed as unsuitable, because they would have afforded enemy troops, equipment, and supplies free access to much of embattled South Vietnam.
• 经评估，在溪山和芒平之间设置路障阵地较为合适，因为这些阵地覆盖了大部分道路以及从北越经老挝通往越南共和国的所有可通行公路。如果敌方卡车车队侥幸绕道沙湾拿吉平原，暴露在美军和老挝皇家空军的空袭之下，友军本可以在更西边的地方设置路障。
• Blocking positions between Khe Sanh and Muong Phine were assessed as suitable, because they covered most tracks and all motorable routes that led from North Vietnam through Laos to the Republic of Vietnam. Friendly armed forces could have installed roadblocks farther west in the unlikely event that enemy truck convoys side-slipped via the Savannakhet Plain where they would be exposed to U.S. and Royal Laotian air strikes.
战术责任区。地图 66所示的战术责任区是一个面积为 2,400 平方英里（6,215 平方公里）的扁球体，大致呈 40 英里 x 60 英里（65 公里 x 95 公里）的长宽比。该区域空间充足，足以部署部队，并包含七个关键地形特征：
The Tactical Area of Responsibility. The tactical area of responsibility depicted on map 66 is a 2,400-square-mile (6,215 square-kilometer) oblate spheroid that measures roughly 40 by 60 miles (65 by 95 kilometers). It contained ample room within which to deploy the forces and enclosed seven key terrain features:
• 切波内的咽喉要道和机场
• The choke point and airfield at Tchepone
• 芒平的咽喉要道和机场
• The choke point and airfield at Muong Phine
• 班东的咽喉要道
• The choke point at Ban Dong
• 四角路口的咽喉要道
• The choke point at Four Corners
• 班会井沙内机场
• Ban Houei Sane airfield
• 溪山作战基地
• Khe Sanh combat base
• 9号公路。
• Highway 9.
车蓬及其附近防守严密的北越军队基地，是除23号国道外，所有从木嘉山口出发的机动渗透路线的交汇点。芒平（Muong Phine）和班东（Ban Dong）则是另外两个难以逾越的障碍。四角地区（Four Corners）或许可以作为车蓬这个“马蜂窝”的替代方案，因为在那里设置路障会将所有敌方车辆引向位于越南西部、易受攻击的23号国道。班会山（Ban Houei Sane）的C-130运输机起降机场对于除突袭以外的任何大规模行动都至关重要。溪山（Khe Sanh）作战基地、机场和通信中心是美军或南越军队唯一能够组织和支持军级规模的入侵老挝的设施（它位于占婆高原，虽然面积不大，但足以容纳额外的油罐区、弹药库和直升机维修设施，而这些设施都非常占用空间）。军事规划者很少将交通线视为关键地形，但 9 号公路是一条不可或缺的主要补给路线 (MSR)，因为固定翼飞机和直升机运输系统的任何组合都无法承载长期的后勤物资。
Tchepone, together with the huge, heavily defended North Vietnamese Army base area nearby, was the focal point for every motorable infiltration route from Mu Gia Pass except National Highway 23. Muong Phine and Ban Dong were two other corks in the bottle. Four Corners offered a possible alternative to the hornet’s nest at Tchepone, because road blocks there would have shunted all enemy motor vehicles onto vulnerable Route 23 well to the west of Vietnam. The C-130-capable airfield at Ban Houei Sane would have been essential for any large-scale operation other than a raid. Khe Sanh combat base, airfield, and communications center was the only U.S. or ARVN installation able to stage and support a corps-sized venture into Laos (it sat on the Xom Cham Plateau which, although small, offered adequate room for additional POL tank farms, ammunition pads, and helicopter maintenance facilities, which are voracious space eaters). Military planners seldom consider lines of communication to be key terrain, but Route 9 was an indispensable Main Supply Route (MSR), because no combination of fixed-wing and heliborne delivery systems could have borne long-term logistical loads.
运行概念
CONCEPT OF OPERATION
“埃尔帕索行动计划”的作战构想是，南越空降师在D日H时空降芒平，同时美军空降旅占领车蓬、班东和班会山机场。美军坦克和步兵将从溪山沿9号公路向西同时发起进攻，并尽快会合。此后，这三个师和军级作战部队将阻断敌军向南推进。
The OPLAN El Paso concept of operation called for the ARVN airborne division to drop on Muong Phine at H-Hour on D-Day while U.S. airmobile brigades seized Tchepone, Ban Dong, and the airfield at Ban Houei Sane. U.S. tanks and infantry were to attack west from Khe Sanh simultaneously along Route 9 and link up as soon as possible. All three divisions and corps-level combat forces thereafter were to block enemy movement southward.
机场修复和将9号公路改建为双车道主干道是陆军工程兵的优先任务。为确保完成既定任务，各项限制措施旨在控制补给吨位，因为在这些任务完成之前，空投补给将必不可少：突击梯队随行车辆数量有限；快速撤离伤亡人员和故障装备有望减少对战区内医疗和维修设施的需求；任何时候都不得在老挝境内修建任何基地营地。
Airfield rehabilitation and the conversion of Route 9 to a double-lane MSR were high-priority tasks for Army engineers. Restrictions consistent with the accomplishment of assigned missions were designed to keep supply tonnages down, since aerial delivery would have to suffice until those tasks were complete: few vehicles were to accompany assault echelons; rapid evacuation of personnel casualties and inoperative equipment promised to reduce requirements for medical and maintenance facilities in the TAOR; no base camps were to be built in Laos at any time.
Map 66. OPLANEL Page‘s Tactical Area of Responsibility
设下陷阱的最佳时机本应是11月，那时老挝的共产党军需官尚未开始向南越补充物资。瓶颈特遣队在清理完车蓬周边基地后，并没有被授权进行搜索和摧毁——其任务仅仅是封锁胡志明小道，直到西南季风再次席卷老挝。然而，一个巨大的“如果”依然存在：美国后勤人员能否在远离既有设施的地方维持一个三师的兵力？
The optimum time to spring the trap would have been in November before communist commissaries in Laos began to replenish depleted larders in South Vietnam. There was no mandate for Task Force Bottleneck to search and destroy once it cleaned out the base area around Tchepone—the mission was merely to barricade the Ho Chi Minh Trail until the Southwest Monsoon again soaked Laos. One big “IF,” however, remained: could U.S. logisticians sustain a three-division corps so far from established facilities?
越南境内的物流限制
LOGISTICAL LIMITATIONS WITHIN VIETNAM
为支持“埃尔帕索行动”所需的所有基本要素已在北部湾10至12英里（16至19公里）范围内到位。大多数干货船在岘港卸货，而石油油轮则将散装石油产品直接泵入新美和库越的储油罐。固定翼飞机、重型直升机和米轨铁路将高优先级物资运送到最终目的地。武装部队和平民共用沿海1号公路，这条交通繁忙的干线在越南以北纬17度线分裂之前连接着西贡和河内；而军事交通则主要集中在9号公路上，这条公路从东河向西延伸至“瓶颈”特遣部队的预定责任区。
All basic ingredients needed to support OPLAN El Paso were already in place within 10 or 12 miles (16 to 19 kilometers) of the Tonkin Gulf. Most dry cargo ships unloaded at the port of Da Nang, while petroleum tankers pumped bulk POL directly into storage bins at Tan My and Cua Viet. Fixed-wing aircraft, heavy-lift helicopters, and a meter-gauge railway transferred high-priority items to ultimate destinations. Armed forces and civilians shared coastal Highway 1, a heavily traveled artery that connected Saigon with Hanoi before Vietnam split in two at the 17th Parallel, whereas military traffic predominated on Route 9, which wandered west from Dong Ha to Task Force Bottleneck’s prospective area of responsibility.
这种部署带来的后勤限制和战术漏洞，对“埃尔帕索作战计划”的限制，如同胡志明小道上的咽喉要道对北越渗透者的限制一样严重。因为1967-1968年的物资输送能力远不能满足第一军战术区（I CTZ）以及瓶颈区域作战区域（地图67）的需求。解决相关问题比任何其他计划方面都耗费了更多思考和时间。
Logistical limitations and tactical vulnerabilities associated with that setup were as restrictive for purposes of OPLAN El Paso as choke points on the Ho Chi Minh Trail were to North Vietnamese infiltrators, because throughput capabilities in 1967-1968 fell far short of I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ) requirements combined with those of the Bottleneck TAOR (map 67). Solutions to related problems took more thought and absorbed more time than any other planning aspect.
Map 67. Supply Requirements Associated with OPLAN El Paso
港口清关能力
PORT CLEARANCE CAPACITIES
岘港在恶劣天气条件下完全有能力满足所有干货需求，甚至还有剩余空间，但在考察期内，从这个中心市场向北调运物资和设备的能力显然不足。石油产品分销问题同样令人费解。
Da Nang could have handled all dry cargo requirements under adverse weather conditions with room to spare, but abilities to shift supplies and equipment north from that central market were clearly inadequate during the period under consideration. POL distribution problems were at least as perplexing.
沿海水道和铁路。水路或铁路是运输货物最经济的方式，但这两种方案都前景黯淡。尽管多次提议，但洪水、潮汐和沿岸漂移使得在谭美（Tan My）修建深水港变得不切实际；而稍北一些的温德海滩（Wunder Beach）的岸上后勤补给（LOTS）作业在东北季风期间也无法进行。库越（Cua Viet）有足够的空间增建登陆舰（LST）和登陆艇（LCU）的坡道，但却无法将货物运往内陆；海军工程兵估计，修建一条穿越沿海沼泽的道路需要14个营的工期。
Coastal Waterways and Railroad. The cheapest way to move freight is by water or rail, but neither alternative showed much promise. Floods, tides, and littoral drift made a deep water port at Tan My impractical despite repeated proposals, while Logistics-Over-the-Shore (LOTS) operations at Wunder Beach a bit farther north were infeasible during the Northeast Monsoon. There was plenty of room for additional LST and LCU ramps at Cua Viet, but no way to move the burden inland; Seabees figured it would take 14 battalion months to build a road across coastal swamps.
由于岘港和东河之间大量桥梁被毁，包括顺化香江上的那座巨桥，铁路干线已无法通行，早期修复的前景黯淡。尽管如此，越南铁路系统（VNRS）的乐观成员仍然打赌，70天内即可完成线路的修复，实现单线运营，日间通行速度为每小时10英里。美国军事工程师普遍同意这一观点，前提是必须确保足够的安全；他们指出，尽管遭受猛烈的空袭，北越的火车仍然能够部分时间运行。
The railway trunkline was unserviceable and prospects for early rehabilitation appeared dim given the large number of demolished bridges between Da Nang and Dong Ha, including the whopper over the Perfume River at Hué. Optimistic members of the Vietnamese Railway System (VNRS) nevertheless wagered that in 70 days the line could be renovated for single-track, daylight operations at 10 miles per hour, and U.S. military engineers generally agreed, given sufficient physical security; North Vietnamese trains ran part of the time, they noted, despite savage aerial bombardments.
1号公路。幸运的是，1号公路展现出了明显的改善前景。在1968年2月共产党发动的春节攻势中吸取的教训的推动下，公路升级改造工作已经全面展开。七个海军工程营的部分兵力，在美军工程兵部队和民用承包商的协助下，迅速拓宽并铺设了公路，拉直了海云岭的急弯，修建了掉头车道，加固了桥梁，并改善了排水系统。公路的通行能力也随之提升。
Highway 1. Highway 1 fortunately showed definite promise. Upgrading already had shifted into high gear, galvanized by lessons learned during the Communists’ February 1968 Tet offensive. Parts of seven Seabee battalions assisted by a U.S. Army engineer group and civilian contractors were rapidly widening and paving the roadway, straightening hairpin curves in Hai Van Pass, creating turnarounds, strengthening bridges, and improving drainage. Capacities increased accordingly.
开往老挝的陆路电话
LAND LINES TO LAOS
从东京湾沿岸到“瓶颈”特遣部队拟定的作战区域，唯一可行的主要补给路线位于非军事区正南，极易遭受敌方攻击。没有其他合适的替代方案。
The only feasible Main Supply Route between the Tonkin Gulf coast and Task Force Bottleneck’s proposed TAOR lay directly south of the demilitarized zone where it was painfully exposed to enemy action. No suitable alternative was available.
9号公路。9号公路的最大通行能力，虽然足以满足驻扎在溪山作战基地的美国海军陆战队员的需求，但与“埃尔帕索行动”所需的吨位相比，却显得微不足道。敌军工兵炸毁了溪山以东36座桥梁中的一半，而开凿在山坡上的狭窄绕行路段，重型卡车根本无法通行。这条公路平均宽度仅为12到14英尺（最多也就4米），最初铺设的是一层薄薄的沥青，厚度不足一英寸。1968年，部分沥青层被泥石流和瓦砾掩埋，但大部分已经消失，路肩（如果还有的话）也变成了天然的泥土。黏稠的泥土时而像糖浆一样紧紧抓住轮胎，时而又在雨季导致车轮打滑，显然，除非9号公路铺设坚实防水的路面，否则这种情况还会持续下去。
Route 9. Maximum capacities of Route 9, which adequately served U.S. Marines at the Khe Sanh combat base, looked ludicrous compared with tonnages that OPLAN El Paso required. Enemy sappers had blown half of the 36 bridges east of Khe Sanh and ticklish bypasses cut in hillsides were impassable to heavy trucks. The roadway, which averaged 12 to 14 feet wide (barely 4 meters at best), originally was surfaced with asphalt prime, a bituminous treatment less than one inch thick. Some remained in 1968, buried under mud slides and debris, but a good deal was gone and shoulders (where they existed at all) were God’s natural soil. Glutinous gumbo alternately gripped tires like molasses or caused wheels to slide during rainy seasons and clearly would continue to do so unless Route 9 received a solid, waterproof surface.
石油管道。 1967-68年，广治省和承天省仅有10英里（16公里）长的6英寸石油管道，日输油量仅为75.6万加仑（2457短吨）。因此，当时溪山所需的每一滴宝贵燃料都必须通过9号公路用卡车运输。根本无法满足特遣部队的要求。瓶颈对石油的需求永无止境，除非将那条尚处于萌芽阶段的管道系统延伸到老挝，或者在东北季风袭击南越期间铺设道路供其使用。
Petroleum Pipelines. Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces in 1967-68 sported barely 10 miles (16 kilometers) of 6-inch petroleum pipeline, which could pump 756,000 gallons (2,457 short tons) a day. Every drop of precious fuel for Khe Sanh consequently had to be trucked over Route 9 at that time. There was no possible way to satisfy Task Force Bottleneck’s insatiable thirst for POL short of extending that embryonic pipeline system into Laos or paving the road for use while the Northeast Monsoon pelted South Vietnam.
老挝境内的物流缺陷
LOGISTICAL SHORTCOMINGS INSIDE LAOS
埃尔帕索的规划者们将老挝境内的道路和机场修复工作列为首要任务，从登陆日当天就开始着手，因为否则封锁胡志明小道的阵地在后勤上将难以维持。因此，计划要求部分工兵乘飞机抵达，其余工兵则紧随从溪山向西进攻的地面支援部队之后。
El Paso’s planners assigned high priorities to road and airfield rehabilitation inside Laos beginning on D-Day, because blocking positions astride the Ho Chi Minh Trail otherwise would have been logistically unsupportable. Plans consequently called for some combat engineers to arrive by air and for others to follow closely behind ground linkup parties attacking west from Khe Sanh.
道路修复
ROAD REHABILITATION
9号公路在老挝一侧路况糟糕，饱受弹坑、桥梁损毁、侵蚀和丛林侵占之苦。但施工人员信心满满，认为能够按时完工（见表31），预计车队每天可以运送750短吨货物，并在三周内抵达芒平。旱季期间，除了车蓬附近的邦希昂河外，其他河流几乎都不需要架桥。在车蓬，由于积水严重，工程师需要清理集结区并修建通往河道的通道，因此工程进度会停滞一天左右。如表32所示，后续拓宽路权和清理卡车卸货的前沿支援区等工作需要更长时间。
Route 9, degraded by bomb craters, blasted bridges, erosion, and encroaching jungles, was in sad shape on the Laotian side of the border, but construction crews, confident that they could adhere to tight schedules (table 31), predicted that convoys could truck in 750 short tons a day as far as Muong Phine well before three weeks elapsed. Few streams would have demanded spans in the dry season, except the Banghiang River at Tchepone, where progress would stall for about a day while engineers installed a floating bridge after clearing assembly areas and preparing approaches through a welter of water-filled craters. Subsequent actions to widen rights of way and scrape out forward support areas where trucks could dump their loads would have taken somewhat longer, as table 32 indicates.
Table 31. OPLAN El Paso Road Opening Schedules
合适的材料可能首先取自溪山以西较为偏远的玄武岩层，然后取自蓬河众多支流的干涸河床，这些河床底部多石，河岸陡峭。这样一来，就没有必要急于将9号公路拓宽至芒平，那里最多只驻扎着一两个南越轻型空降旅。
Suitable materials could have come first from basalt beds just west of Khe Sanh, which is rather remote, then from the dry stream beds of many Pon River tributaries which have rocky bottoms and steep banks. There would have been no rush to widen Route 9 as far as Muong Phine, garrisoned at most by one or two light ARVN airborne brigades.
Table 32. Schedules for Dual-Laning Route 9 in Laos
机场修复
AIRFIELD REHABILITATION
在“瓶颈特遣队”目标区域内，没有一个机场能在D日投入使用。位于切蓬和芒平的机场急需清理障碍物、平整压实跑道、喷洒抑尘剂，然后修建滑行道、停车场和货物装卸区。1968年中期，班会安机场的跑道看起来像发霉的奶酪，但除此之外，这条跑道几乎和新的一样。预计D日后11天即可全面投入使用，这个时间点并不算长。
No airfield in Task Force Bottleneck objective areas would have been serviceable on D-Day. Those at Tchepone and Muong Phine demanded immediate actions to clear obstructions, grade and compact surfaces, apply dust palliatives, then construct taxiways, parking lots, and cargo-handling areas. The runway at Ban Houei Sane looked like moldy cheese in mid-1968, but that strip otherwise was almost as good as new. D+11 was not an unreasonable date to anticipate full operational status.
包起来
WRAP-UP
埃尔帕索行动计划胎死腹中。驻越美军司令部（COMUSMACV）始终未能获得前往车蓬所需的“通行证”，这些通行证包括额外的兵力——火力、机动性、补给、装备、资金——以及最重要的政治支持。1968年3月，林登·约翰逊总统宣布不再寻求连任，其继任者理查德·尼克松推行了“越南化”政策，导致美国在东南亚的武装部队和军事存在不增反减。
Operation Plan El Paso was stillborn. COMUSMACV never got the “tickets” he needed to go to Tchepone, which consisted of additional muscle—firepower, mobility, supplies, equipment, funds—and, above all, political approval. President Lyndon B. Johnson in March 1968 announced his decision not to seek reelection and Richard M. Nixon, his successor, initiated “Vietnamization” programs that caused U.S. Armed Forces and military presence in Southeast Asia to shrink instead of expand.
死后推测
POSTMORTUM SPECULATIONS
谁也无法确切知道“埃尔帕索行动”是否能够成功，但一些推测似乎合情合理。无论敌军是否顽强抵抗，在溪山以西的荒凉老挝境内，这项任务都难以完成。那里远离所有既有的军事设施，加剧了越南战争的种种苦难，包括险恶的地形、险恶的丛林、酷热、疟疾、斑疹伤寒、水蛭叮咬和溃烂的伤口。此外，不遭遇抵抗的行动几乎不可能成功，因为北越对穿越老挝狭长地带的公路有着切身的利益，这些公路是南越和柬埔寨共产党军队的生命线。
No one will ever know whether Operation Plan El Paso would have succeeded, but a few speculations seem appropriate. The mission would have been hard to accomplish with or without determined enemy opposition in the empty Laotian lands west of Khe Sanh, which were remote from every established military facility and magnified all the miseries of combat in Vietnam, including merciless terrain, malevolent jungles, heat, malaria, typhus, leeches, and running sores. Unopposed operations moreover seem most improbable, because North Vietnam had a vested interest in motorable routes through the Laotian panhandle, which constituted the lifeline of Communist forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia.
武元甲将军的地图阅读能力堪比威斯特摩兰将军，他或许会这样描述自己的任务：“‘破坏者’特遣队从D日H时开始切断东京湾沿岸与老挝之间的1号和9号公路，以阻止美军和南越军队封锁胡志明小道。”如果北越军队成功将岘港港与越南占领区隔离，而封锁部队又日复一日地坚守，那么“瓶颈”特遣队的存亡将岌岌可危。补给和后勤人员正竭力在目标区域建立物资供应。敌军若能定期向芒平、车蓬和班会萨内的机场跑道投放几发精准的迫击炮弹，再加上对弹药库和油料囊农场的攻击，将会是极其有效的打击手段。瓶颈军团或许能够击退所有这些攻击，但为此付出的血汗代价，甚至泪水，几乎是难以估量的。
General Giap, who could read a map as well as General Westmoreland, might have framed his own mission as follows: “Task Force Spoiler severs Routes 1 and 9 between the Tonkin Gulf coast and Laos beginning at H-Hour on D-Day to prevent U.S. and South Vietnamese Armed Forces from blocking the Ho Chi Minh Trail.” Task Force Bottleneck would have been on the knife edge of existence if the North Vietnamese Army successfully isolated the port of Da Nang from the TAOR while blockading brigades were living on daily replenishment and logisticians were struggling to build up supplies in objective areas. A few well-placed enemy mortar rounds plumped periodically on airfield runways at Muong Phine, Tchepone, and Ban Houei Sane, plus attacks on ammunition pads and POL bladder farms, would have been particularly cost effective. The Bottleneck corps might have repulsed all such efforts, but the price in blood and sweat, if not tears, almost surely would have been high.
蓝山719行动
OPERATION LAM SON 719
旨在加强南越防御能力、同时减少美军伤亡、削减预算开支并使美军得以逐步撤离的“越南化”计划，在尼克松总统就职后不久，即1969年开始逐步成形。<sup> 6</sup>他和国家安全委员会主席亨利·基辛格曾考虑过在荣市附近对北越发动一次完全由南越主导的两栖登陆作战，或者在次年入侵柬埔寨以检验进展，但最终在1970年12月决定改为大规模入侵老挝狭长地带，这是南越总统阮文绍、美国驻西贡大使埃尔斯沃思·邦克和美军驻越司令部司令克雷顿·艾布拉姆斯将军所倾向的。国务卿威廉·罗杰斯、国防部长梅尔文·莱尔德、中央情报局局长理查德·赫尔姆斯以及时任参谋长联席会议主席托马斯·穆勒海军上将都表示同意。大使 G. McM. Godley 事先获得了老挝王子 Souvanna Phouma 的批准。7
“Vietnamization” programs designed to strengthen South Vietnam’s defensive capabilities and concomitantly reduce U.S. casualties, cut budgetary costs, and enable U.S. Armed Forces to disengage gradually began to take shape in 1969, soon after President Nixon took office.6 He and Henry A. Kissinger, who headed the National Security Council staff, contemplated a strictly South Vietnamese amphibious thrust against North Vietnam near Vinh or an incursion into Cambodia the following year as a test to determine progress, but in December 1970 settled instead on a sizable incursion into the Laotian panhandle, which South Vietnam’s President Nguyen Van Thieu, U.S. Ambassador to Saigon Elsworth Bunker, and COMUSMACV General Creighton W. Abrams preferred. Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Richard Helms, the Director of Central Intelligence, and Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, who then was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acquiesced. Ambassador G. McM. Godley obtained prior approval from Laotian Prince Souvanna Phouma.7
1971年2月8日，南越陆军第一军在没有美军顾问的情况下，但得到了驻南越基地提供的美军战术空中支援、直升机支援和远程炮兵支援，发起了“蓝山719行动”，旨在切断胡志明小道并摧毁以车蓬为中心的北越基地区域。然而，几乎没有什么因素有利于行动的成功：
Plans and Preparations, ARVN I Corps, minus U.S. advisers but with U.S. tactical air, helicopter, and long-range artillery support from bases in South Vietnam, launched Operation Lam Son 719 on February 8, 1971, to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail and obliterate the North Vietnamese base area centered on Tchepone. Few factors, however, favored success:
• D日行动发生得太晚，无法取得最大成效，因为北越军队从老挝粮仓的补给线从三个月前的旱季开始就一直处于活跃状态。
• D-Day occurred too late to achieve greatest benefits, because NVA supply lines from larders in Laos had been active since the dry season began 3 months earlier.
• 1971 年 1 月下旬，尼克松总统批准了这项雄心勃勃的行动，但计划和准备时间却非常短暂。
• Planning and preparation times for such an ambitious operation were painfully short after President Nixon turned on the green light in late January 1971.
•出于安全考虑，直到最后一刻，一些重要部门，例如南越陆军第一后勤司令部，都被排除在这些高度保密的流程之外。8
• Essential elements, such as the ARVN 1st Logistical Command, until the last minute were excluded from those closely held processes for security reasons.8
• 当被禁止的新闻报道泄露时，敌方指挥官和大多数参战人员几乎同时收到了通知。9
• Enemy commanders and most participants received notifications almost simultaneously when embargoed press reports leaked.9
• 突击部队在战斗开始前从未收到最新的战术情报。
• Assault units never received the latest tactical intelligence before battles commenced.
• 溪山作战基地是南越的跳板，自 1968 年夏季以来已被废弃并基本拆除。
• Khe Sanh combat base, the springboard in South Vietnam, had been abandoned and largely dismantled since summer 1968.
• 美国武装部队和南越军队第一军均未完成埃尔帕索作战计划规定的必要后勤准备工作。
• Neither U.S. Armed Forces nor ARVN I Corps completed imperative logistical preparations that OPLAN El Paso prescribed.
结果不出所料：据现场一位南越少将称，“蓝山719”演习是南越军队在第一军指挥下的一次血腥野外演习。近8000名南越士兵和价值数百万美元的宝贵装备和物资（包括100多架美国直升机）都参与了演习。在最后一批部队于3月24日撤离之前，有10人“牺牲”。敌军伤亡惨重，南越军队袭击者虽然摧毁了大量物资，但归根结底，蓝山719行动对北越沿胡志明小道渗透的能力几乎没有产生任何持久影响。11
The Upshot. The upshot was predictable: Lam Son 719, according to a South Vietnamese major general on site, “was a bloody field exercise for ARVN forces under the command of I Corps. Nearly 8,000 ARVN soldiers and millions of dollars worth of valuable equipment and materiel [including more than 100 U.S. helicopters10 were sacrificed” before the last troops withdrew on March 24. Enemy body counts were considerable and ARVN raiders destroyed copious supplies but, in the final analysis, Lam Son 719 produced few if any lasting effects on North Vietnamese abilities to infiltrate down the Ho Chi Minh Trail.11
要点
KEY POINTS
• 季风吹向任何地方，都会对大多数军事行动产生时好时坏的影响。
• Monsoon winds alternately encourage and discourage most military operations wherever they blow.
• 地理环境对补给、维护、运输、医疗和其他后勤需求的影响，至少与对作战行动的影响一样大。
• Geographical circumstances affect supply, maintenance, transportation, medical, and other logistical requirements at least as much as they influence combat operations.
• 后勤问题与支援基地和支援部队之间的距离成正比，并且会成倍增加和加剧。
• Logistical problems multiply and intensify in direct proportion to the distance between support bases and supported forces.
• 在欠发达地区，建设需求激增。
• Construction requirements soar in underdeveloped areas of responsibility.
• 简陋的公路网加剧了军队对机场和内河航道的依赖。
• Rudimentary road nets magnify military dependence on airfields and inland waterways.
• 丛林覆盖的山脉降低了空中机动部队在开阔地形所能获得的优势。
• Jungle-covered mountains reduce the benefits that are obtainable from airmobile forces in open terrain.
• 空投系统和直升机可以维持丛林中小型、孤立的部队，但大型部队需要容量更大的主要补给路线。
• Parachute delivery systems and helicopters can sustain small, isolated units in jungles, but large formations need main supply routes with much greater capacities.
• 与其他运输方式相比，管道运输能够更经济有效地输送大量的石油和水。
• Pipelines distribute large quantities of petroleum and water more cost-effectively than other forms of transportation.
笔记
NOTES
第十九章大量引用了作者在1967-1968年担任美国陆军驻越南战役计划组组长期间积累的证据，该组负责制定了“埃尔帕索行动计划”。以下文献仅引用读者可以获取的资料。
1. Chapter 19 relies extensively on evidence the author accumulated in 1967-68 as Chief, Campaign Planning Group, U.S. Army Vietnam, which prepared Operation Plan El Paso. Documentation below cites only sources that are accessible to readers.
2. Raphael Littauer 和 Norman Uphoff 编，《印度支那空战》，空战研究小组（马萨诸塞州波士顿：康奈尔大学灯塔出版社，1972 年），第 76-90 页，第 168-169 页。
2. Raphael Littauer and Norman Uphoff, eds., Air War in Indochina, Air War Study Group (Boston, MA: Cornell University, Beacon Press, 1972), 76-90,168-169.
3.《五角大楼文件：纽约时报刊登》（纽约：四方出版社，1971 年），第 461、479、488、498、545、585-588 页。
3. Pentagon Papers: As Published by the New York Times (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 461, 479, 488, 498, 545, 585-588.
4. Bruce Palmer, Jr.，《25 年战争：美国在越南的军事角色》（肯塔基州列克星敦：肯塔基大学出版社，1984 年），第 106 页。
4. Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25-Year War: American’s Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1984), 106.
5. L. Stevens，《胡志明小道史》（纽约：Garland Publishing, Inc.，1993 年），第 x-xiii 页，第 31-122 页；Nguyen Duy Hinh，《蓝山 719》（华盛顿特区：美国陆军军事历史中心，1979 年），第 v 页，第 9-18 页，第 25-31 页。
5. L. Stevens, The Trail: A History of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. . . (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1993), x-xiii, 31-122; Nguyen Duy Hinh, Lam Son 719 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1979), v, 9-18, 25-31.
6.理查德·M·尼克松，《1970年代美国外交政策：和平新战略》，1970年2月18日，第62-72页；《建设和平》，1971年2月25日，第58-91页（华盛顿特区：政府印刷局）；亨利·A·基辛格，《白宫岁月》（马萨诸塞州波士顿：利特尔·布朗出版社，1979年），第980-989页。
6. Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: A New Strategy for Peace, February 18, 1970, 62-72 and Building for Peace, February 25, 1971, 58-91 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office); Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1979), 980-989.
7. Palmer，《25 年战争》，第 108 页；Kissinger，《白宫岁月》，第 988-989 页。
7. Palmer, The 25-Year War, 108; Kissinger, The White House Years, 988-989.
8 .阮维兴，林山 719，47-48。
8. Nguyen Duy Hinh, Lam Son 719, 47-48.
9.帕尔默，《25年战争》，第109页。
9. Palmer, The 25-Year War, 109.
10. John J. Tolson，《空中机动，1961-1971》，越南研究（华盛顿特区：陆军部，1973 年），第 234-252 页。
10. John J. Tolson, Air Mobility, 1961-1971, Vietnam Studies (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, 1973), 234-252.
11.关于林山719事件的经过和结果，参见David Fulgham和Terrance Maitland合著的《越南经验：受审的南越，1970年代中期至1972年》（波士顿：波士顿出版社，1984年），第68-97页；以及Palmer的《25年战争》，第109-116页。
11. For the conduct and outcome of Lam San 719, see David Fulgham and Terrance Maitland, The Vietnam Experience: South Vietnam on Trial, Mid-1970 to 1972 (Boston, MA: Boston Publishing, 1984), 68-97; Palmer, The 25-Year War, 109-116
20. 最终反思
20. FINAL REFLECTIONS
当今的许多问题，其实是昨天的解决方案。
Many of today’s problems were yesterday’s solutions.
诺曼·R·奥古斯丁
奥古斯丁的法律
Norman R. Augustine
Augustine’s Laws
区域分析师的目标都是评估自然地理、文化地理和政治地理在特定时空背景下对军事政策、计划、方案和行动各个方面的影响。这项任务极其困难，因为各种重要因素无处不在，正如前几章摘录的几个要点所示：
THE AIM OF EVERY AREA ANALYST IS TO EVALUATE THE INFLUENCES OF PHYSICAL, CULTURAL, AND POLITICAL geography on every aspect of military policies, plans, programs, and operations at particular points in time and space. That task is exceedingly difficult, because cogent factors are pervasive, as a few Key Points extracted from preceding chapters indicate:
• 陆军、海军、空军和太空部队都必须准备区域分析，以满足各级作战和支援司令部的特殊需求。
• Land, sea, air, and space forces each must prepare area analyses to fulfill specialized needs of combatant and support commands at every echelon.
• 一支组织、装备和训练都足以在任何特定环境下发挥作用的武装部队，在完成必要的调整之前，在其他环境下的表现会比较差。
• Armed forces that are organized, equipped, and trained to function in any given environment perform less well elsewhere until they complete essential adjustments.
• 时间、距离和交通方式决定了武装部队对远距离突发事件的反应速度。
• Time, distance, and modes of transportation determine how rapidly armed forces can respond to distant contingencies.
• 后勤问题与支援基地和部署部队之间的距离成正比，且成倍增加和加剧。
• Logistical problems multiply and intensify in direct proportion to the distance between support bases and deployed forces.
• 地表材料对核炸药和常规炸药的杀伤力以及机动车辆的越野行驶能力有显著影响。
• Surface materials strongly influence the lethality of nuclear as well as conventional explosives and the ability of motor vehicles to travel cross-country.
• 海水的特性影响着从船舶设计到海洋和邻近海域表面或水下作业方式的每一项海军活动。
• The characteristics of salt water influence every naval activity from ship design to employment practices on or beneath the surface of oceans and contiguous seas.
• 低云层、能见度差、大风、强劲气流和变化的气压对所有陆基和海军航空作战都构成了严重的限制。
• Low cloud ceilings, poor visibility, high winds, powerful air currents, and variable barometric pressures impose critical constraints upon all land-based and naval air operations.
• 地形特征缩小了合适的空投区和两栖登陆点的数量，这通常有利于那些能够将兵力集中在可能决战地点的防御者。
• Topographic features that narrow the number of suitable drop zones and amphibious landing sites generally favor defenders who can concentrate forces at probable points of decision.
• 责任区 (AOR) 的人口模式、语言、宗教偏好、文化、习俗和社会结构直接影响许多军事行动的成败前景。
• Population patterns, languages, religious preferences, cultures, customs, and social structures in areas of responsibility (AORs) directly affect prospects for success or failure of many military operations.
• 参与城市作战的军事指挥官通常必须调动宝贵的资源和人力来控制难民和维持平民生活。
• Military commanders engaged in urban combat commonly must divert precious resources and manpower to control refugees and sustain the civilian populace.
• 政治家们在划定领土边界时，往往忽视了地理现实，而这些边界往往会成为政治军事上的麻烦之地。
• Territorial boundaries that statesmen draw with scant regard for geographical realities often become political-military trouble spots.
全球和区域责任区需要定期审查，以确保其仍然能够服务于既定目标。因此，经验丰富的分析师始终敏锐地意识到，将任何评估盖上“批准”的印章并将其束之高阁并非明智之举，因为环境、形势、策略、技术和科技都可能频繁发生变化，而且这些变化往往难以预料。
Global and regional AORs require periodic reviews to ensure that they still serve stated purposes. Savvy analysts accordingly remain acutely aware that it seldom is wise to stamp any assessment “APPROVED” and stash it on the shelf, because settings, situations, tactics, techniques, and technologies are subject to frequent, often unanticipated, change.
本书第18章和第19章中展示的“海王星行动”和“埃尔帕索行动计划”就此提供了深刻的启示。例如，诺曼底的地理环境与1944年大同小异，但其影响却截然不同。如果当时拥有配备多样化武器系统的远程攻击机、制导导弹以及能够越过海滩障碍的直升机，英美军队或许就能在卢瓦尔河以南的欧洲开辟第二战场，那里是德军的薄弱环节，而不是正面冲击庞大的大西洋壁垒。 1967-68年的“埃尔帕索行动计划”与1965年的截然不同。1965年，胡志明小道沿线只有23号公路适合卡车通行，914号公路捷径尚未构想，车蓬和班东的咽喉要道还不存在，而芒平是木嘉山口以南唯一可能重要的阻击阵地。本文中用于举例说明的几乎每一个其他历史人物都得出了类似的结论。
Operation Neptune and Operation Plan El Paso, which demonstrate analytical techniques in chapters 18 and 19, are illuminating in such respects. Geographic circumstances in Normandy, for example, are much the same today as in 1944, but the implications are dissimilar. Long-range attack aircraft with diversified weapon systems, guided missiles, and helicopters able to hurdle beach obstacles might have enabled Anglo-American Armed Forces to open a Second Front in Europe south of the Loire, where the German Wehrmacht was weak, rather than hit massive Atlantic Wall defenses head-on. Operation Plan El Paso developed differently in 1967-68 than it would have in 1965, when Highway 23 was the only road fit for truck traffic anywhere along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the Route 914 cutoff had not yet been conceived, choke points at Tchepone and Ban Dong were nonexistent, and Muong Phine was the only potentially important blocking position south of Mu Gia Pass. Similar conclusions accompany almost every other historical cameo used for illustrative purposes in this document.
或许从前文中我们能汲取的最重要的教训是：在制定任何军事计划、开展任何军事行动或在任何军事项目上投入稀缺资源和资金时，忽视地理因素都是愚蠢的。德怀特·D·艾森豪威尔总统，其军旅生涯最终晋升为五星上将，或许在1959年4月22日于西点军校向学员发表讲话时，对此做了最好的诠释：“归根结底，战争原则并非局限于任何一种战争类型，甚至并非仅仅局限于战争本身……但这些原则本身很少能脱离实际情况进行研究；军事行动会受到诸多因素的显著影响，其中最重要的因素之一就是该地区的地理环境。”
Perhaps the single most important lesson to be learned from the previous pages is the folly of slighting geographic factors during the preparation of any military plan, the conduct of any military operation, or the expenditure of scarce resources and funds on any military program. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, whose military career culminated at the five-star level, perhaps put it best when he addressed the Corps of Cadets at West Point on April 22, 1959: “The Principles of War are not, in the final analysis, limited to any one type of warfare, or even limited exclusively to war itself. . . but principles as such can rarely be studied in a vacuum; military operations are drastically affected by many considerations, one of the most important of which is the geography of the region.”
附录A
缩略语和简称
APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACOM ACOM |
美国大西洋司令部 U.S. Atlantic Command |
美式口音 AFCENT |
盟军中欧部队 Allied Forces Central Europe |
ALOC ALOC |
空中通信线路 air line of communication |
AOR AOR |
职责范围 area of responsibility |
波黑 BAM |
贝加尔-阿穆尔省 Baikal-Amur Magistral |
生物医学工程和网络（BMEWS） BMEWS |
弹道导弹预警系统 ballistic missile early warning system |
BMNT BMNT |
晨曦初露 beginning of morning nautical twilight |
中央司令部 CENTCOM |
美国中央司令部 U.S. Central Command |
劈 CHOP |
变更操作控制 change operational control |
可可 COCOA |
关键地形、障碍物、掩体和隐蔽物、观察和射击视野、接近路线 critical terrain, obstacles, cover and concealment, observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach |
CTZ CTZ |
军团战术区 corps tactical zone |
DEW线 DEW Line |
远距离预警线 Distant Early Warning Line |
迪兹 DZ |
空投区 drop zone |
娱乐 EENT |
傍晚航海暮色结束 end of evening nautical twilight |
专属经济区 EEZ |
专属经济区 exclusive economic zone |
电磁脉冲 EMP |
电磁脉冲 electromagnetic pulse |
欧盟司令部 EUCOM |
美国欧洲司令部 U.S. European Command |
FSCL FSCL |
火力支援协调线 fire support coordination line |
灰度共生矩阵 GLCM |
陆基巡航导弹 ground-launched cruise missile |
全球定位系统 GPS |
全球定位系统 global positioning system |
危险品 HAZMAT |
危险材料 hazardous material |
洲际弹道导弹 ICBM |
洲际弹道导弹 intercontinental ballistic missile |
仪表飞行规则 IFR |
仪表飞行规则 instrument flight rules |
狮子座 LEO |
近地轨道 low earth orbit |
机舱 LOC |
沟通渠道 line of communication |
拉扎 LZ |
着陆区 landing zone |
MBFR MBFR |
相互平衡的减力 mutual and balanced force reductions |
音乐 MIZ |
边缘冰区 marginal ice zone |
北约 NATO |
北大西洋公约组织 North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
新越共 NVA |
北越军队 North Vietnamese Army |
奥科卡 OCOKA |
观察和射击视野、掩体和隐蔽、障碍物、关键地形、接近路线 observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach |
运营计划 operation plan |
|
太平洋司令部 PACOM |
美国太平洋司令部 U.S. Pacific Command |
战俘 POW |
战俘 prisoner of war |
心理战 PSYOP |
心理战 psychological operations |
研发 R&D |
研究与开发 research and development |
RDJTF RDJTF |
快速部署联合特遣部队 Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force |
战略行动中心 SAC |
战略空军司令部 Strategic Air Command |
海豹 SEAL |
海、空、陆 sea, air, land |
东南亚条约组织 SEATO |
东南亚条约组织 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization |
SLOC SLOC |
海上交通线 sea line of communication |
南方司令部 SOUTHCOM |
美国南方司令部 U.S. Southern Command |
TAOR TAOR |
战术责任区 tactical area of responsibility |
联合国海洋法公约 UNCLOS |
《联合国海洋法公约》 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea |
目视飞行规则 VFR |
目视飞行规则 visual flight rules |
附录B
地理术语表
APPENDIX B
GLOSSARY OF GEOGRAPHICAL TERMS
绝对湿度：一定体积空气中水蒸气的重量，通常以克/立方米或格令/立方英尺表示。
absolute humidity: The weight of water vapor present in a given volume of air, usually expressed as grams per cubic meter or grains per cubic foot.
深渊：大陆坡以外的海洋深处。另见深海平原。
abyss: Ocean depths beyond the continental slope. See also abyssal plain.
深海平原：海洋底部。另见深渊。
abyssal plain: The ocean floor. See also abyss.
适应：对与自身习惯环境显著不同的地理环境的适应。
acclimatization: Adaptation to a geographic environment significantly different from that to which one is accustomed.
活动层：寒冷地区地表附近会随季节冻融的土壤层。另见永久冻土层。
active layer: Soil near the surface that seasonally freezes and thaws in frigid regions. See also permafrost.
以空中力量为中心的军事思维：一种强调空中力量的军事思维。
acrocentric: A military mindset that emphasizes air power.
空气动力阻力：大气中的一种力，会减缓飞行速度，在地球表面附近空气密度最大的地方最为显著。在大约 60 英里（95 公里）以上的高度，阻力需要数天、数周甚至数月才能产生明显的影响。
aerodynamic drag: Atmospheric force that slows flight, most notably near Earth’s surface where air density is greatest. Resistance above about 60 miles (95 kilometers) takes days, weeks, or months to produce significant effects.
航空航天：地球大气层加上太空。另见大气层；太空。
aerospace: Earth’s atmosphere plus space. See also atmosphere; space.
橙剂：一种除草剂，美国武装部队曾大量使用，目的是清除可能隐藏越南共产党军队的植被。
Agent Orange: A herbicide that U.S. Armed Forces used extensively to defoliate vegetation that could conceal Communist troops in Vietnam.
空中交通线（ALOC）：指各国出于商业或军事目的而依赖的任何空中航线。另见“交通线”。
air line of communication (ALOC): Any aerial route that nations depend on for commercial or military purposes. See also line of communication.
空域管制：旨在防止误伤、加强防空以及在责任区内及上空促进安全、高效、灵活的空中行动的各项流程。另见空域管制区；责任区。
airspace control: Processes designed to prevent fratricide, enhance air defense, and otherwise promote safe, efficient, flexible air operations within and above an area of responsibility. See also airspace control area; area of responsibility.
空域管制区：责任区内及上空划定的有界区域，根据需要进行细分，以确保安全、高效、灵活的空中作业。另见：空域管制；责任区。
airspace control area: Bounded territory within and above an area of responsibility, subdivided as required to ensure safe, efficient, flexible air operations. See also airspace control; area of responsibility.
冲积物：河流向下游沉积的粘土、淤泥、沙子、砾石和其他碎屑。
alluvium: Clay, silt, sand, gravel, and other detritus that rivers deposit downstream.
海拔：高于平均海平面的高度，主要用于描述地球表面上方大气层中的位置。另见海拔高度。
altitude: Height above mean sea level, mainly applied to positions in the atmosphere above Earth’s surface. See also elevation.
两栖部队：一支海军部队和一支登陆部队，其组织、装备和训练旨在从海上对敌对或潜在敌对的海岸进行作战。
amphibious forces: A naval force and a landing force that are organized, equipped, and trained to conduct operations from sea to a hostile or potentially hostile shore.
含水层：由可渗透的岩石、沙子或砾石构成的含水层。
aquifer: A water-bearing stratum of permeable rock, sand, or gravel.
群岛：由一系列岛屿组成，例如阿留申群岛和印度尼西亚群岛。
archipelago: A string of islands, such as the Aleutians and Indonesia.
北极海雾：一种海雾，多见于北冰洋或南冰洋上空，由极冷空气流经较温暖的海面形成。偶尔也会出现在内陆海域，由极冷的冬季空气向赤道方向移动形成。另见“雾”。
arctic sea smoke: Maritime fog that occurs most often over the Arctic or Antarctic Oceans when very cold air passes over much warmer water. Occasionally occurs over inland seas when very cold winter air shifts somewhat equatorward. See also fog.
区域分析：评估地理因素对军事计划、方案和行动的影响，以确定对友军和敌军行动方案可能产生的影响的过程。
area analysis: A process that assesses geographic influences on military plans, programs, and operations to ascertain probable effects on friendly and enemy courses of action.
影响范围：指区域指挥官能够利用其控制下的武器系统和机动手段开展军事行动的区域。该区域可能远大于指挥官的责任范围。另见责任范围。
area of influence: Territory within which a regional commander could, using weapon systems and mobility means under his or her control, conduct military operations. Such territory may be much larger than the commander’s area of responsibility. See also area of responsibility.
关注区域：指区域指挥官责任区之外（但不一定与其相邻）需要密切关注的区域，因为该区域的活动可能对指挥官责任区内的军事计划、方案和行动产生重大影响。另见责任区。
area of interest: Territory outside of (but not necessarily contiguous to) a regional commander’s area of responsibility that warrants close attention because activities therein could significantly affect military plans, programs, and operations within the commander’s AOR. See also area of responsibility.
作战区域：指开展任何类型军事活动的区域。它可能包括指挥官责任区的全部或一小部分。另见责任区。
area of operations: Territory within which military activities of any kind occur. It may include all or a small part of a commander’s area of responsibility. See also area of responsibility.
责任区（AOR）：区域指挥官对其控制下武装部队的所有军事活动行使责任和权力并承担责任的区域。另见战术责任区；战区责任区。
area of responsibility (AOR): Territory within which a regional commander exercises responsibility and authority over, and is accountable for, all military activities by armed forces under his or her control. See also tactical areas of responsibility; theater areas of responsibility.
区域适应：指为个人和军事单位部署到特定地理区域做好准备的任务、组织、装备和训练。在相关国家反复、长期的服役不仅有助于外国区域军官磨练语言和跨文化技能，还能使他们建立密切的个人关系。
area orientation: Missions, organizations, equipment, and training that prepare individuals and military formations for projected deployment to a specific geographical region. Repeated, lengthy tours of duty in relevant countries not only help foreign area officers hone their language and cross-cultural skills, but enable them to develop close personal relationships .
干旱： 参见沙漠；半干旱。
aridity: See desert; semi-arid.
arroyo：西班牙语，指狭窄陡峭的溪流河床，这种溪流会季节性干涸或因干旱而干涸（该词最常用于美国西南部和墨西哥）。暴雨通常会导致此类水道发生山洪暴发。另见间歇性溪流；wadi。
arroyo: Spanish for the bed of a narrow, steep-sided stream that dries up seasonally or during droughts (a term most often used in Southwestern United States and Mexico). Heavy rains commonly cause flash floods in such watercourses. See also intermittent stream; wadi.
自流泉：一种天然或人工水源，由于静水压力的作用，水流从深处涌出，如同喷泉一般。另见“泉”。
artesian spring, well: A natural or artificial source of water that hydrostatic pressures force from depths to the surface like a fountain. See also spring.
以天体为中心的军事思维：强调太空力量的军事思维。
astrocentric: A military mindset that emphasizes space power.
大气层：环绕地球的空气层。空气随着海拔升高而逐渐稀薄，直至完全被太空真空所取代。
atmosphere: the envelope of air that surrounds Earth. Air becomes thinner with altitude until the vacuum of space replaces it completely.
大气压力：指垂直空气柱在重力作用下对其下方任意一点产生的重量。大气压力在海平面最高，海拔越高，压力越低。
atmospheric pressure: The weight that a vertical column of air exerts on any given point below in response to gravitational attraction. Readings are highest at sea level and gradually decrease at greater elevations.
环礁：由珊瑚和其他物质构成的环形礁体，环绕着潟湖。另见潟湖。
atoll: a circular reef of coral and other materials that encloses a lagoon. See also lagoon.
极光（北极光）：指在北半球高纬度地区天空中闪烁、飘动的彩色光带、光束、弧光、条带、帷幔、帘幕、薄片和/或斑块，如同幽灵般绚丽多彩。在南半球则被称为南极光。
aurora borealis: “Northern lights;” ghostly displays of colored streamers, rays, arcs, bands, curtains, draperies, sheets, and/or patches that shimmer and flit across skies at high latitudes in the Northern Hemisphere. Called aurora australis in the Southern Hemisphere.
极光带：北极和南极地区，太阳喷射出的带电粒子受到地球磁场的偏转，从而扰乱了射频传播。
auroral zones: Arctic and Antarctic regions where charged particles ejected from the sun and deflected by Earth’s magnetic field disrupt radio frequency propagation.
前进轴线：一种控制措施，通常是道路、可识别的自然地形走廊或一系列点，指挥官命令下属地面部队沿着这些点从当前位置向敌方领土内的目标前进。
axis of advance: A control measure, usually a road, identifiable natural terrain corridor, or series of points that commanders order subordinate ground forces to follow from present positions to objectives in enemy territory.
河岸：指云雾缭绕的地带；土堆或山脊；海平面以下、大陆架以上的平原；内陆水道或湖泊的倾斜边缘。从面向下游的视角来看，河岸分为左侧和右侧。
bank: A mass of clouds or fog; a mound or ridge; plains below the ocean surface but above the continental shelf; the sloping margin of an inland watercourse or lake. River banks are designated left or right from viewpoints that face downstream.
沙洲：沿海、河流及小溪流中被淹没或部分淹没的冲积物堆积物。此类障碍物会阻碍或阻止船舶航行。
bar: A submerged or partly submerged accumulation of alluvium along seashores, rivers, and smaller streams. Such obstructions inhibit or prevent navigation by ships and craft.
基线：通常指低潮线，用于测量沿海国领海宽度的线。另见专属经济区；领海。
baseline: A line, usually the low water line, used to measure the breadth of a coastal state’s territorial sea. See also exclusive economic zone; territorial sea.
海滩：从海岸线向内陆延伸至地形或植被覆盖首次发生显著变化的相对水平的地形。悬崖和其他从海面陡然升起的垂直地形没有海滩。
beach: Relatively horizontal terrain that extends from a coastline inland to the first marked change in topography or vegetative cover. Cliffs and other vertical terrain that rise abruptly from the sea lack beaches.
滩头阵地：指敌对或潜在敌对海岸上的区域，一旦占领并控制，便可持续向内陆登陆部队和物资。它还可作为向内陆扩展作战行动的基地。另见桥头堡。
beachhead: An area on a hostile or potentially hostile coast that, when seized and held, facilitates the continuous landing of troops and materiel. It also affords a base from which to expand operations inland. See also bridgehead.
晨昏航海曙暮光的开始（BMNT）：日出前太阳位于天球地平线以下 12 度时，一段不完全黑暗的时期。
beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT): A period of incomplete darkness before sunrise when the sun is 12 degrees below the celestial horizon.
断电：太空核爆炸后，地球大气层大范围电离，导致无线电和雷达传输中断，持续时间可达数分钟甚至数小时。短波、高频传播最易受影响。另见电磁脉冲。
blackout: The disruption of radio and radar transmissions for minutes or many hours after a nuclear detonation in space ionizes Earth’s atmosphere over a wide area. Short-wave, high-frequency propagations are most susceptible. See also electromagnetic pulse.
暴风雪：风速达到 30 节或以上的强烈寒冷的风，吹起雪花，使地面能见度降低至半英里或更低（约 1 公里）。
blizzard: An intensely cold wind of 30 knots or greater velocity that blows snow and thereby reduces visibility to half a mile or less (about one kilometer) at ground level.
“蓝水”：海军俚语，指沿海以外的公海（开阔的海洋）。
”blue water”: Naval slang for high seas (open oceans) beyond the littoral.
沼泽：排水不良的松软土壤，表面覆盖着泥炭、莎草、石楠、苔藓、地衣和其他矮小植物。另见：湿地；沼泽。
bog: Spongy, poorly-drained soil variously covered with peat, sedges, heath, mosses, lichens, and other stunted plants. See also marsh; swamp.
边界：指国家或军事组织之间的界限，可以是清晰的，也可以是模糊的。另见“前线”。
boundary: A borderline, sharply- or ill-defined, between countries or military formations. See also frontier.
散杂货船：一种远洋运输船，运载各种尺寸和形状的未分类干货。另见集装箱船。
breakbulk ship: An oceangoing transport that carries undifferentiated dry cargo of various sizes and shapes. See also container ship.
防波堤：为保护港口或海滩免受可能损坏船舶或基础设施的海浪侵袭而建造的墙或其他近海结构。
breakwater: A wall or other offshore structure installed to protect a harbor or beach from waves that might damage ships or infrastructure.
桥头堡：位于敌对或潜在敌对领土内，河流对岸的区域。一旦占领并控制该区域，便可便于部队和物资的持续渡河。桥头堡还可作为继续进攻性军事行动或掩护后方关键地形的基地。另见滩头阵地。
bridgehead: An area on the far side of a river in hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when seized and held, facilitates the continuous crossing of troops and materiel. It also affords a base from which to continue offensive military operations or shield key terrain to the rear. See also beachhead.
“棕色水域”：海军俚语，指沿海海域；河流和沼泽作业环境。
”brown water”: Naval slang for seas along the littoral; the milieu of riverine and swamp operations.
缓冲区：旨在将拥有者与现有或潜在的外部侵略者隔离开来的领土地带，从而提供一定程度的保护。
buffer zone: a territorial strip designed to separate the possessor from present or potential external aggressors and thus provide some degree of protection.
冰崩：冰块从冰墙、冰架和冰山上脱落的现象。
calving: The breaking away of ice masses from ice walls, ice shelves, and icebergs.
运河：连接两个或多个水体（如河流、海洋等）的人工通道；有些运河连接内陆港口和外海。
canal: a manmade channel that connects two or more bodies of water, such as rivers, seas, and oceans; some canals connect inland ports with open water.
树冠：森林最上层的树叶；大多数热带雨林具有两层或多层明显的树冠层。另见丛林；雨林。
canopy: The uppermost layer of foliage within a forest; two or more distinctive tiers typify most tropical rain forests. See also jungle; rain forest.
集水池或集水区： 参见排水盆地。
catch basin or catchment: See drainage basin.
天花板：参见云层天花板。
ceiling: See cloud ceiling.
天球：一个假想的、不旋转的球体，半径不确定，其中心位于地核。它的赤道是地球赤道的投影。天球上的各种特征为定位太空中的轨道物体提供了参考框架。另见赤纬；赤经。
celestial sphere: An imaginary, nonrotating orb of indefinite radius with its center at Earth’s core. Its equator is a projection of Earth’s equator. Various features afford a frame of reference for locating orbital objects in space. See also declination; right ascension.
作战指挥权交接（CHOP）：指军事力量从一个指挥官的管辖范围移交给另一个指挥官的日期、协调世界时，有时也指地点。海军部队通常使用这种术语。
change operational control (CHOP): The date, Coordinated Universal Time, and sometimes the place that a military force passes from one commander’s jurisdiction to another’s. Commonly employed by naval forces.
航道：任何河流中最深且通常流速最快的部分；任何海峡中最深且最适宜航行的部分；港口中最深且最适宜航行的水域。
channel: The deepest and usually swiftest part of any stream; the deepest, most navigable part of any strait; the deepest, most navigable water in harbors.
咽喉要道：陆路或海路交通要道上的狭窄地带。这些地方特别容易受到封锁。
choke point: A constricted spot along any land or sea route. Such spots are especially vulnerable to interdiction.
昼夜节律：支配地球上大多数人类活动的24小时生物周期。长时间的太空飞行会极大地加剧“时差反应”，从而导致昼夜节律紊乱，不同程度地引发疲劳、注意力不集中和情绪不稳定等身心问题。
circadian rhythm: The 24-hour biological cycle that governs most human activities on Earth. Disruptions due to “jet lag,” which lengthy space flights magnify immensely, to greater or lesser degrees cause psychophysical problems such as fatigue, inattentiveness, and emotional instability.
环地空间：位于地球大气层边缘，高度约为 60 英里（95 公里），并延伸至约 50,000 英里（80,000 公里）以上的区域。目前大多数军事太空任务都局限于这一区域。
circumterrestrial space: A region that abuts Earth’s atmosphere at an altitude of about 60 miles (95 kilometers) and extends to about 50,000 miles (80,000+ kilometers). Most military space missions currently are confined therein.
地月空间：地球与其卫星月球之间的楔形区域。其一点与地球大气层相接，其余点与月球天平动点L-4和L-5相接。另见月球天平动点。
cislunar space: Wedge-shaped territory between Earth and its moon. One point touches Earth’s atmosphere, others touch lunar libration points L-4 and L-5. See also lunar libration points.
氏族：一个相对较小、关系紧密的家族群体，其成员声称拥有共同的祖先或认同共同的图腾。另见：族群；种族；部落。
clan: A relatively small, tightly knit group of families whose members claim common ancestry or identify with a common totem. See also ethnic group; race; tribe.
气候：指从气象记录中可辨别的天气模式，而最可靠的气象记录是在特定地点逐小时、持续数年收集的。由此产生的统计数据揭示了平均值和极端值，并表明了在特定地点特定日期或月份的特定时间出现特定天气状况的概率。另见气象学；天气。
climate: Weather patterns discernible from meteorological records that are most reliable when compiled hourly at specified locations over a period of years. Resultant statistics, which reveal means and extremes, indicate probabilities that particular conditions will prevail at particular times on particular days or months at each place. See also meteorology; weather.
云：悬浮在大气中的微小水晶或冰晶的可见聚集体。人眼和大多数技术传感器对地可见性受到严重限制或完全丧失，而地表能见度不受影响。另见雾。
cloud: A visible aggregate of minute water or ice crystals suspended in the atmosphere. Air-to-ground visibility by human eyes and most technological sensors is severely limited or nonexistent, whereas surface-to-surface visibility is unaffected. See also fog.
云底高度：云底与正下方地形之间的距离。
cloud ceiling: The distance between a cloud base and terrain directly below.
云量：指特定地点云量，以八分之一表示（1/8 至 4/8 为零星云；5/8 至 7/8 为破碎云；8/8 为阴天）。多层零星云可能导致破碎云或阴天。
cloud cover: The amount of cloud at any given location, stated in eighths (1/8 to 4/8 is scattered; 5/8 to 7/8 is broken; 8/8 is overcast). Several layers of scattered clouds may cause broken or overcast conditions.
COCOA：关键地形、障碍物、掩体和隐蔽、观察和射击视野、接近路线的缩写。另见OCOKA。
COCOA: Acronym for Critical terrain; Obstacles; Cover and concealment; Observation and fields of fire; Avenues of approach. See also OCOKA.
隐蔽：仅能防止敌方观察。另见“掩护”。
concealment: Protection against nothing more than enemy observation. See also cover.
集装箱船：一种远洋运输船，货物装在矩形钢箱中，这些钢箱可以垂直堆叠在预先准备好的隔舱内，也可以水平放置在坚固的舱盖上，从而实现快速装卸，并将空间浪费降至最低。另见散货船。
container ship: An oceangoing transport that carries cargo in rectangular steel boxes that stack vertically in ready-made cells and horizontally on top of strong hatch covers so loading and unloading is rapid and wasted space is negligible. See also breakbulk ship.
大陆架：通常呈波浪状起伏的海底平原，从主要陆地向海方向缓缓倾斜。宽度从几乎不存在到 800 英里（1300 公里）或更宽不等。深度通常小于 100 英寻（600 英尺，180 米）。另见大陆坡。
continental shelf: A generally undulating submarine plain that declines gently seaward from major land masses. Widths vary from nonexistent to 800 miles or more (1,300 kilometers). Depths usually are less than 100 fathoms (600 feet, 180 meters) See also continental slope.
大陆坡：从大陆架陡峭倾斜至深海深渊底部的斜坡，通常宽10-20英里，某些地方深达数英里。另见深渊；大陆架。
continental slope: A precipitous incline, generally 10-20 miles wide, that plunges from the continental shelf to the bottom of the oceanic abyss, which is several miles deep in some places. See also abyss; continental shelf.
灯芯绒：将原木以直角铺设在潮湿的道路、轨道和小径上，以改善车辆通行能力。
corduroy: Logs laid at right angles across soggy roads, tracks, and trails to improve vehicular trafficability.
核心区：具有国家重要性乃至关键意义的中心或区域。另见“关键地形”。
core area: A nationally important, even vital, center or region. See also key terrain.
军级战术区（CTZ）：军级军事力量的责任区。
corps tactical zone (CTZ): The area of responsibility for a corps-size military force.
掩护：抵御敌方武器攻击和侦察。另见隐蔽。
cover: Protection against the effects of enemy weapons as well as observation. See also concealment.
山脊：山峰、丘陵或山脊的顶部。另见军用山脊；地形山脊。
crest: The top of a mountain, hill, or ridge. See also military crest; topographical crest.
关键地形： 参见关键地形。
critical terrain: See key terrain.
文化地理学：一门跨学科领域，研究人类习得行为的空间差异，包括聚落、语言、宗教、社会结构、艺术、经济、技术和其他活动的地理多样性。另见地理学；军事地理学；自然地理学；政治军事地理学。
cultural geography: An interdisciplinary field that deals with spatial variations in learned human behavior, including the geographic diversity of settlements, languages, religions, social structures, the arts, economies, technologies, and other activities. See also geography; military geography; physical geography; political-military geography.
水流：指任何河流、运河、海洋或海域中水的流动，以方向和速度来计算。
current: The flow of water in any stream, canal, sea, or ocean calculated in terms of direction and velocity.
D日：任何特定军事行动计划开始或实际开始的日期。
D-Day: The date that any specified military operation is scheduled to commence or actually commences.
赤纬：天球上的纬度。具体来说，是指天球赤道以北或以南的角度距离，沿穿过天极的大圆测量。另见天球；赤经。
declination: The celestial equivalent of latitude. Specifically, the angular distance north or south of the celestial equator, measured along a great circle that passes through the celestial poles. See also celestial sphere; right ascension.
深空：地球-月球系统以外的行星际空间。另见环地球空间；外太空。
deep space: Interplanetary space beyond the Earth-Moon System. See also circumterrestrial space; outer space.
掩体：指能够抵御敌方平射武器攻击的位置；指在敌方武器与其目标之间设置天然或人工掩体，例如山脊、小丘、建筑物或森林。
defilade: A position protected against enemy flat trajectory weapons; a natural or artificial mask, such as a ridge, hummock, building, or forest, between such weapons and their targets.
隘口：地面道路上的天然或人工狭窄地带，例如山口、峡谷、海峡或狭窄的城市街道。
defile: A natural or artificial constriction along a surface route, such as a mountain pass, a gorge, a strait, or a narrow city street.
三角洲：河流入海口处形成的三角形冲积沉积物。有些三角洲面积较小，而像尼罗河、湄公河和密西西比河的三角洲，每边长度都超过100英里（160公里）。另见冲积层。
delta: Triangular alluvial deposits at the mouth of a river. Some deltas are small, others such as those of the Nile, Mekong, and Mississippi Rivers measure much more than 100 miles (160 kilometers) on each side. See also alluvium.
人口统计学：研究人类群体，特别是人口规模、密度、分布和其他重要统计数据的学科。它是一门交叉学科，融合了地理学、数学、生物学、医学、社会学、经济学、历史学和人类学。
demography: The study of human populations, especially size, density, distribution, and other vital statistics. It is an interdisciplinary field that melds geography with mathematics, biology, medicine, sociology, economics, history, and anthropology.
密度高度：指平均海平面（29.92英寸汞柱）和59华氏度（15摄氏度）下的气压，根据海拔和温度的升高进行修正，以考虑空气密度降低和密度高度增加的影响。密度高度的计算至关重要，因为空气密度降低会降低飞机的动力，限制升力，增加起飞时的真实空速和滑跑距离，降低爬升率，增加维持飞行所需的真实空速，延长着陆后的滑跑距离，并使停止更加困难。
density altitude: Air pressure at mean sea level (29.92 inches of mercury) and 59° F (15°C) corrected to account for greater heights and higher temperatures, which decrease air density and increase density altitude. Density altitude calculations are critically important, because lighter air reduces aircraft motive power, limits lift capacities, demands faster true airspeed and a longer roll for takeoffs, slows rates of climb, requires faster true airspeeds to sustain flight, lengthens rolls after landings, and makes stopping more difficult.
沉积区：当高空核爆炸产生的伽马射线级联作用于地球上方 25-30 英里（40-48 公里）处时，会形成一个致密的放射性层。与高层大气碰撞。由此产生的电荷不平衡会产生电磁脉冲。另见电磁脉冲。
deposition region: A dense radioactive layer that accumulates 25-30 miles (40-48 kilometers) above Earth when a cascade of gamma rays from a nuclear explosion at greater altitude collides with the upper atmosphere. Resultant charge imbalances create electromagnetic pulse. See also electromagnetic pulse.
沙漠：年平均降水量通常低于 10 英寸（25 厘米）的地区。降水量略低于 10 英寸的北极地区不符合沙漠的定义，因为蒸发速度较慢。降水量略高于 10 英寸的炎热地区符合沙漠的定义，因为蒸发速度较快。沙漠可以是山地或平原，可以是沙质或石质。另见半干旱地区。
desert: A region in which average annual precipitation generally measures less than 10 inches (25 centimeters). Arctic regions that receive a bit less fail to qualify, because evaporation is slow. Hot regions that receive a bit more qualify, because evaporation is rapid. Deserts may be mountainous or flat, sandy or stony. See also semiarid.
露点：水蒸气通过冷凝过程变成水滴的温度。
dewpoint: The temperature at which water vapor turns into water droplets through a process called condensation.
远程预警线（DEW线）：冷战期间，从阿留申群岛到大西洋，横跨北极的一系列雷达站被安装，用于提醒美国和加拿大的防御人员注意苏联对北极的突然袭击。
Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line: A string of radar stations across the arctic from the Aleutian Islands to the Atlantic Ocean, installed during the Cold War to alert U.S. and Canadian defenders of a surprise Soviet attack over the North Pole.
日间的：每天发生的事件或周期。
diurnal: A daily occurrence or cycle.
分水岭：两个流域之间的分水岭。另见流域。
divide: A watershed between two drainage basins. See also drainage basin.
无风带：横跨赤道的大气带，其特点是平静，但偶尔会被变化的微风和飑线打断。
doldrums: An atmospheric belt astride the equator, characterized by calms that shifting breezes and squalls intermittently interrupt.
流域：位于地形分水岭一侧的土地，积聚雨水和雪水，然后通过河流支流组成的小溪系统将径流分配到地势较低的地区。
drainage basin: Lands on one side of a topographical divide that accumulate rainfall and snow, then distribute runoff to lower elevations via a system of small streams that are tributary to rivers.
漂移：海洋洋流速度。另见“洋流”；“流向”。
drift: Ocean current velocity. See also current; set.
空投区（DZ）：运输机通过降落伞向其投放部队、装备和补给品的区域。
drop zone (DZ): An area into which transport aircraft deliver troops, equipment, and supplies by parachute.
地月系统：太空及其所有内容都位于一个假想的球体中，该球体从地球核心向各个方向延伸约 480,000 英里（772,000 公里）。大的固体物质主要集中在地球、月球和小行星上，但看不见的大气层、引力和范艾伦辐射带也极其重要。
Earth-Moon System: Space and all its contents within an imaginary sphere that extends approximately 480,000 miles (772,000 kilometers) in every direction from Earth’s core. Large, solid matter is confined mainly to Earth, its moon, and asteroids, but invisible atmosphere, gravity, and the Van Allen radiation belts are immensely important.
电磁脉冲（EMP）：由高层大气或太空中的核爆炸产生的巨大电流，其峰值速度比闪电快100倍，然后迅速射向地球。震中数百英里范围内的未屏蔽电子设备可能会失效。另见沉积区。
electromagnetic pulse (EMP): Prodigious current that results from a nuclear explosion in the upper atmosphere or space, peaks 100 times faster than lightning, then bolts toward Earth. Unshielded electronics within several hundred miles of the epicenter may be disabled. See also deposition region.
海拔：高于平均海平面的高度。主要用于描述地球表面上的位置。另见“高度”。
elevation: Height above mean sea level. Applied mainly to positions on Earth’s surface. See also altitude.
飞地：指位于一国或联盟境内的外国领土。例如，冷战期间东德将西柏林包围起来。另见飞地。
enclave: Foreign territory within a country or coalition. East Germany, for example, enclosed West Berlin throughout the Cold War. See also exclave.
傍晚航海暮光结束（EENT）：日落后，太阳位于地平线以下 12 华氏度之间。
end of evening nautical twilight (EENT): Occurs after sundown when the sun is between the horizon and 12 °F below.
环境：任何特定地点所处的地理环境；生物体所接触的所有生物、化学和物理因素的总和。
environment: Geographical circumstances that prevail at any given place; the sum total of all biological, chemical, and physical factors to which organisms are exposed.
河口：海洋的一个分支，淡水流入其中，与涌入的咸水潮汐混合。
estuary: An arm of the sea into which fresh water streams empty and mingle with intruding salt water tides.
族群：具有共同体貌特征、习俗、语言、宗教和文化特征的文化独特的人群。另见氏族；种族；部落。
ethnic group: Culturally distinctive peoples with common physical characteristics, customs, language, religion, and traits. See also clan; race; tribe.
飞地：指一个国家或联盟的一部分被外国势力包围。例如，在整个冷战时期，西柏林完全位于东德境内。另见“飞地”。
exclave: Part of a country or coalition enclosed within the territory of a foreign power. West Berlin, for example, lay entirely inside East Germany throughout the Cold War. See also enclave.
专属经济区（EEZ）：毗邻领海的海洋区域，受《联合国海洋法公约》相关法律规定管辖。沿海国有权对其专属经济区内的自然资源行使主权，并对部分科学研究和环境项目行使管辖权。在某些情况下，专属经济区的外缘可能与大陆架外缘重合。另见：大陆架；领海。
exclusive economic zone (EEZ): A maritime area adjacent to territorial seas that is subject to legal provisions embedded in the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea. Coastal states are authorized to exercise sovereignty over natural resources and jurisdiction over some scientific research and environmental projects within the EEZ. The outer limit may coincide with the outer edge of the continental shelf in some cases. See also continental shelf; territorial sea.
外逸层：地球大气层从大约 300 英里（480 公里）的高度到 2,000 英里（3,200 公里）以上的高度，在那里终止于完全真空。
exosphere: Earth’s atmosphere from an altitude of about 300 miles (480 kilometers) to 2,000+ miles (3,200+ kilometers), where it terminates in a hard vacuum.
外部交通线：从远距离阵地通往特定作战区域的较长路线。此类路线不仅使军事指挥官难以迅速将武装力量集中到关键地点并维持其抵达后的作战能力，而且如果穿越敌方领土，也难以保障安全。另见内部交通线；交通线。
exterior lines of communication: Relatively long routes that lead to any given area of operation from distant positions. Such routes not only make it difficult for military commanders to concentrate armed forces rapidly at decisive points and sustain them after arrival but may also be difficult to safeguard if they traverse hostile territory. See also interior lines of communication; line of communication.
放射性尘埃： 参见放射性尘埃。
fallout: See radioactive fallout.
固定冰：沿海岸线形成并附着于海岸线的海冰。在冬末，某些地方的固定冰可延伸至10英寻（60英尺，18米）处。另见冰架。
fast ice: Sea ice that forms along, and remains attached to, coasts. It extends in some places as far out as the 10-fathom curve (60 feet, 18 meters) in late winter. See also ice shelf.
有效风区：指风在开阔海面上吹拂而不发生显著方向改变的距离。风速和有效风区共同决定了浪高。
fetch: The distance over open seas that winds blow without a significant change in direction. Wind speeds and fetch determine wave heights.
野战工事： 参见工事。
field fortification: See fortification.
火力支援协调线（FSCL）：一条假想线，最好沿地形特征清晰的线段绘制，用于控制军事行动的火力支援。其绘制旨在确保军事行动的最大自由度，同时最大限度地减少误伤友军和空中力量对地面机动方案的干扰。
fire support coordination line (FSCL): An imaginary line, preferably drawn along well-defined terrain features, used to control fire support of military operations. It is drawn to ensure maximum freedom of military action, yet to minimize “fratricide” and aerial interference with ground schemes of maneuver.
雾：与地面接触或略高于地面的云。薄雾使地表能见度不超过1海里（1.3公里）；浓雾的能见度为50码（45米）或更低。另见北极海烟；海烟云。
fog: A cloud in contact with or just above ground level. Thin fog limits surface-to-surface visibility to no more than 1 nautical mile (1.3 kilometers); visibility in dense fog is 50 yards (45 meters) or less. See also arctic sea smoke; cloud: sea smoke.
民俗：一个社会群体共同拥有的思维、情感和行为习惯。主要包括传统、价值观、动机、希望、恐惧和禁忌；礼仪和举止；宗教信仰；仪式、礼节和节日；行为模式；社会等级；权力路线；道德准则；性习俗；职业道德；饮食习惯。
folkways: Customary modes of thinking, feeling, and acting common to a social group. Key considerations include traditions, values, motivations, hopes, fears, and taboos; manners and mannerisms; religious beliefs; rites, rituals, and holidays; behavior patterns; social hierarchies; lines of authority; moral codes; sexual mores; work ethics; dietary regimes.
英尺烛光 (fc)：照度单位，等于每平方英尺（929 平方厘米）一流明。正午阳光照射水平面时，照度约为 10,000 fc；满月光照度约为 0.02 fc。稳定阅读所需的照度约为 10 fc。
footcandle (fc): A unit of illumination equal to one lumen per square foot (929 square centimeters). Full sunlight at zenith produces about 10,000 fc on a horizontal surface; full moonlight provides about 0.02 fc. Illumination for steady reading demands about 10 fc.
堡垒：任何永久性据点或防御工事，主要或完全由军事驻军占据。最坚固的堡垒大多位于地下。现代建筑材料以石头、混凝土和钢材为主。另见：防御工事；要塞。
fort: Any permanent strongpoint or fortified line occupied exclusively or primarily by a military garrison. The most durable are mainly subterranean. Modern construction materials favor stone, concrete, and steel. See also fortification; fortress.
防御工事：任何永久性据点或防御工事；临时性野战防御工事，例如散兵坑、武器掩体以及复杂的战壕和碉堡系统。另见堡垒；要塞。
fortification: Any permanent strongpoint or fortified line; temporary field fortifications typified by foxholes and weapon pits as well as elaborate trench and bunker systems. See also fort; fortress.
堡垒：指永久性的防御工事，例如城堡或有城墙的城市，其主要目的是保护平民居民。另见：要塞；防御工事。
fortress: A permanent strongpoint, such as a castle or walled city, designed primarily to protect civilian inhabitants. See also fort; fortification.
边境：与国界线平行且部分重叠的区域。另见“边界”。
frontier: Territory that parallels and somewhat overlaps the boundary between countries. See also boundary.
地理学：一门研究地球（包括陆地、海洋、天空、太空以及这些介质中的所有生命）的跨学科领域。另见文化地理学、军事地理学、自然地理学、区域地理学。
geography: An interdisciplinary field that studies the Earth, including land, sea, air, space, and all life within those mediums. See also cultural geography; military geography; physical geography; regional geography.
地缘政治：地理与外交政策之间的互动；强调此类关系的政府政策。
geopolitics: Interactions between geography and foreign policies; governmental policies that emphasize such relationships.
地球同步轨道：唯一一条围绕地球赤道上方 22,300 英里（35,887 公里）运行的地球同步轨道。从地球表面观察，运行在该轨道上的航天器看起来静止不动，因为它们始终保持着相同的相对位置。另见：地球同步轨道；轨道周期。
geostationary orbit: The only geosynchronous orbit that circles 22,300 miles (35,887 kilometers) above Earth’s equator. Spacecraft on that path appear to stand still when viewed from Earth’s surface, because they constantly maintain the same relative position. See also geosynchronous orbit; orbital period.
地球同步轨道：任何以地球赤道上空中心线为圆心，平均地面高度为 22,300 英里（35,887 公里）的椭圆飞行路径，其轨道周期呈“8”字形。运行在这种轨道上的航天器每天精确完成一次飞行，因为它们的周期为 24 小时，即地球自转一周所需的时间。另见地球静止轨道；轨道周期。
geosynchronous orbit: Any eliptical flight path that makes figure eights from a center line over Earth’s equator at an average ground track altitude of 22,300 miles (35,887 kilometers). Spacecraft on such paths complete precisely one trip per day, because their 24-hour period is the time it takes Earth to rotate once. See also geostationary orbit; orbital period.
冰川：由压实的冰雪组成的大块物质，不断地从高处向低处移动；或者，如果漂浮在水面上，则会不断扩散。冰川的类型多种多样，包括岛屿冰盖、冰架、冰流、冰帽、冰麓、冰斗和山谷冰川。
glacier: A mass of compacted snow and ice that continually moves from higher to lower ground or, if afloat, spreads continuously. Various types include island ice sheets, ice shelves, ice streams, ice caps, ice piedmonts, cirques, and mountain (valley) glaciers.
全球定位系统（GPS）：由美国国防部运营的基于太空的无线电导航系统，1997年由24颗卫星和地面支持系统组成。GPS能够精确计算固定用户和移动用户的纬度、经度、海拔和时间，无论他们身处何地。这些信息对于导航和武器控制至关重要。
Global Positioning System (GPS): A U.S. Department of Defense-operated, spaced-based, radio-navigation system that in 1997 consisted of 24 satellites plus ground support. GPS precisely computes latitude, longitude, altitude, and time for fixed and mobile users wherever they may be. Such information is invaluable for navigational and weapon control purposes.
坡度；坡度：纵向坡度，其陡峭程度可通过垂直高度或下降高度除以水平距离来计算。例如，100 英尺内上升或下降 23 英尺，则坡度为正负 23%。
grade; gradient: A longitudinal slope, the steepness of which can be calculated by dividing the vertical rise or fall by the horizontal distance. A 23-foot rise or fall in 100 feet is a plus or minus 23% grade.
引力 (g)：物体之间由于质量而产生的相互吸引力。地球及其卫星月球对其各自作用范围内的所有物质都产生影响。这两个作用力场的强度均随距其距离的平方而减弱。1 g 相当于物体在海平面上的重力加速度。另见引力井。
gravity (g): A force of mutual attraction between bodies as a result of their mass. Earth and its moon influence all matter within their respective fields. The effects of both fields diminish with the square of the distance from each source. One g is equivalent to the acceleration of gravity on a body at sea level. See also gravity well.
重力井：假想的漏斗状井壁，底部陡峭，顶部平坦。爬出井外（重力阻碍）所需的能量比在井顶移动（重力较小）或向下坠落（重力帮助）所需的能量更大。另见“重力”。
gravity well: Imaginary, funnel-shaped walls, steep at the bottom but level on top. Greater energy is required to climb out (gravity hinders) than to maneuver on top (where gravity is slight) or drop down (gravity helps). See also gravity.
大圆：地球表面与穿过地心的平面相交所形成的圆环。大圆是该圆弧上任意两点或多点之间的最短距离。
great circle: Any ring formed by the intersection of Earth’s surface with a plane that passes through Earth’s center. A great circle is the shortest distance between any two or more points on such an arc.
“绿水”：海军俚语，指暴风雨或恶劣天气期间拍打船只的实体波浪（不是海浪飞溅），这些波浪可能会损坏设备或将船员卷入海中。
”green water”: Naval slang for solid waves (not sea spray) that wash over ships during storms or heavy weather, where they may damage equipment or wash crew members overboard.
港口：指天然或人工建造的、受庇护的沿海地点，用于在船舶和小型船只不在海上航行时保护它们免受风浪侵袭。另见海港。
harbor: A sheltered coastal location, natural or improved, that protects ships and smaller craft from winds and waves when they are not at sea. See also seaport.
硬地停机坪：机场内由稳定土壤或铺设路面的停车区域。
hardstand: A stabilized soil or paved parking area at an airfield.
危险材料（HAZMAT）：需要特殊处理、储存、运输和处置的有毒和传染性废物。
hazardous material (HAZMAT): Toxic and infectious wastes that require special treatment, storage, transportation, and disposal.
危险废物：有毒、传染性、易燃、腐蚀性、爆炸性和放射性物质，等待处置。
hazardous waste: Toxic, infectious, flammable, corrosive, explosive, and radioactive substances that await disposal.
H时：指D日当天，任何特定军事行动计划开始或实际开始的具体时间。另见D日。
H-Hour: The specific time on D-Day that any specified military operation is scheduled to commence or actually commences. See also D-Day.
高地球轨道：地球同步轨道以上环绕地球空间的飞行路径，距离地球表面 22,300 至 50,000-60,000 英里（35,887 至 80,465-96,560 公里）。
high earth orbit: A flight path in circumterrestrial space above geosynchronous altitude, between 22,300 and 50,000-60,000 miles from Earth’s surface (35,887 to 80,465-96,560 kilometers).
马纬度：以北纬 30 度和南纬 30 度为中心的两条大气带，其特点是气压高，风平浪静，偶尔会被变化的微风打破。
horse latitudes: Two atmospheric belts centered on 30 degrees north and 30 degrees south latitude, characterized by high barometric pressures and calms that shifting breezes occasionally interrupt.
湿度：空气中的水蒸气。另见绝对湿度；相对湿度。
humidity: Water vapor in the air. See also absolute humidity; relative humidity.
水文学：一门研究地球上水的物理和化学性质、转化、组合和运动的科学，包括降水、排入海洋、蒸发和返回大气层。
hydrology: A science that deals with the physical and chemical properties, transformations, combinations, and movements of water on Earth, including precipitation, its discharge into seas, evaporation, and return to the atmosphere.
体温过低：长时间暴露于寒冷或潮湿的环境中，导致人体体温下降到正常水平以下，造成有害甚至致命的后果。
hypothermia: A consequence of prolonged exposure to cold or wet conditions that cause human body temperature to drop below normal with deleterious, even fatal, effects.
缺氧：身体组织获得氧气不足时发生的一种状况，尤其是在高海拔地区。
hypoxia: A condition that occurs when body tissues receive insufficient oxygen, especially at high elevations and altitudes.
冰山：冰川崩解下来的一大块淡水冰，漂浮或搁浅。另见：崩解；固定冰；冰川；浮冰。
iceberg: A large chunk of fresh water ice, floating or aground, that a glacier has calved. See also calving; fast ice; glacier; ice floe.
浮冰：漂浮在海面上的咸冰，比冰山更常见，最初是冰泥，分离成“薄饼状”，然后形成冰层。一些浮冰在第一年就会漂出北冰洋盆地，而留下的浮冰则会变得更加坚硬厚实。通常被称为浮冰。另见：固定冰；冰山；浮冰。
ice floe: Floating sea water (salty) ice, more common than icebergs, that originates as slush, separates into “pancakes,” then forms sheets. Some floes drift out of the Arctic Basin the first year, while those that remain become much harder and thicker. Often called pack ice. See also fast ice; iceberg; ice floe.
冰架： 参见快速冰。
ice shelf: See fast ice.
照度：衡量阳光、月光、星光和大气发光的指标。另见英尺烛光；光照数据。
illumination: A measure of sunlight, moonlight, starlight, and luminescent atmosphere. See also footcandle; light data.
基础设施：所有用于装备、训练、控制、调动和以其他方式支持武装部队的基地、设施、其他永久或半永久设施和结构。
infrastructure: All bases, facilities, other permanent or semi-permanent installations, and fabrications used to equip, train, control, move, and otherwise support armed forces.
内陆水道：任何用作运输路线的河流、溪流、运河、湖泊或内陆海。
inland waterway: Any river, stream, canal, lake, or interior sea that serves as a transportation route.
内太空： 参见地球周围空间。
inner space: See circumterrestrial space.
仪表飞行规则（IFR）：当低云层、能见度差或其他天气条件低于规定最低标准时，空中交通管制条例限制只有熟练使用导航设备的飞行员和配备相应设备的飞机才能获得飞行许可。另见目视飞行规则。
instrument flight rules (IFR): Air traffic control regulations that limit flight clearances to pilots proficient in the use of navigational gear and to aircraft so equipped when low cloud ceilings, poor visibility, or other weather conditions are below specified minimums. See also Visual Flight Rules.
内部交通线：指作战区域内相对较短且安全的路线，能够提供敌军无法企及的机动优势。此类路线使军事指挥官能够以最快的速度将武装力量集中到该区域内或附近的关键地点，并在抵达后维持其作战能力。另见外部交通线；交通线。
interior lines of communication: Relatively short, secure routes within any given area of operation that provide mobility advantages not available to enemy forces. Such routes enable military commanders to concentrate armed forces most rapidly at decisive points inside or near that area and sustain them after arrival. See also exterior lines of communication; line of communication.
间歇性溪流：指任何会季节性干涸或干旱期间干涸的内陆水道。常见于沙漠地区。另见干涸河床；干涸河谷。
intermittent stream: Any inland watercourse that dries up seasonally or during droughts. Common in deserts. See also arroyo; wadi.
电离层：位于地球大气层上方约 48 公里（30 英里）处，与低层外逸层重叠的带电（电离）稀薄空气层区域。电子浓度最高点位于约 600 公里（375 英里）处。电离层对高频无线电波传播有重要影响。另见外逸层。
ionosphere: A region of electrically charged (ionized) thin air layers that begins about 30 miles above Earth’s atmosphere (48 kilometers) and overlaps the lower exosphere. The maximum concentration of electrons occurs at about 375 miles (600 kilometers). Effects on high frequency radio propagation are important. See also exosphere.
isothermal area: A region within which temperatures remain constant.
防波堤：连接海岸的防波堤。另见防波堤；码头。
jetty: A breakwater that connects with the shore. See also breakwater; mole.
丛林：热带或亚热带林地，具有茂密的原生或次生灌木丛。另见雨林。
jungle: Tropical or subtropical woodlands with dense primary or secondary undergrowth. See also rain forest.
关键地形：任何地理位置或独特区域，夺取、占领、摧毁或控制该地点将给任何军事力量带来显著（最好是决定性的）优势。
key terrain: Any geographical point or distinctive area the seizure, retention, destruction, or control of which would confer a marked (preferably decisive) advantage on any military force.
潟湖：位于礁石或其他近海屏障与岛屿或大陆之间的浅水区，通常水流平静。另见环礁。
lagoon: A shallow body of normally placid sea water between a reef or other offshore barrier and an island or the mainland. See also atoll.
着陆区（LZ）：一个已准备或临时搭建的场地，适合直升机或具有超短距或垂直起降能力的固定翼飞机进行作业。
landing zone (LZ): A prepared or extemporaneous site suitable for operations by helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft with very short or vertical takeoff and landing capabilities.
纬度：地球南北方向与赤道之间的角度距离，以90°为界。另见经度。
latitude: The angular distance north and south from Earth’s equator measured through 90°. See also longitude.
冰道：指海冰上任何可供船舶或小型船只通行的长裂缝或断层。破冰船会寻找并拓宽此类通道。
lead: Any long crack or fracture through sea ice that is navigible by ships or smaller craft. Icebreakers look for and enlarge such passageways.
天平动点： 参见月球天平动点。
libration points: See lunar libration points.
光照数据：用于计算特定时期和地点的晨昏光、日出、日落、月出、月落和月相的表格。另见英尺烛光；照度。
light data: Tables that for particular periods and places compute morning and evening twilight, sunrise, sunset, moonrise, moonset, and moon phases. See also footcandle; illumination.
通信线路（LOC）：指各国为商业目的而依赖的任何国内外陆路、海路、空路或太空路线；军事指挥官用于部署、运用、维持和控制武装部队的任何此类路线。另见：空中通信线路；外部通信线路；内部通信线路；海上通信线路。
line of communication (LOC): Any foreign or domestic land, sea, air, or space route that nations depend upon for commercial purposes; any such route that military commanders use to deploy, employ, sustain, and control armed forces. See also air line of communication; exterior line of communication; interior line of communication; sea line of communication.
视线：从 A 点到 B 点的无遮挡视线。
line-of-sight: An unobstructed view from point A to point B.
沿海地区：就本文件而言，指从海岸线向海延伸不超过 100 英里（185 公里），向内陆延伸不超过 100 英里（185 公里）的沿海地区。
littoral: A coastal region that, for purposes of this document, extends no more than 100 miles (185 kilometers) seaward from the shoreline and an equal distance inland.
局部地形：地球、卫星或其他行星上任何特定区域内高地和低地之间的海拔差异。另见“地形”。
local relief: Differences in elevation between high and low ground within any given territory on Earth, its moon, or other planet. See also relief.
经度：指穿过任何给定地点的子午线，以度数表示，以本初子午线（零度）为基准，本初子午线穿过英国格林尼治皇家天文台的原址。另见纬度；子午线。
longitude: Meridians through any given place expressed in degrees east and west of the Prime Meridian (zero degrees), which passes through the original site of the Royal Observatory in Greenwich, England. See also latitude; meridian.
低地球轨道（LEO）：指地球大气层与范艾伦辐射带底部之间的任何环绕地球空间飞行路径（高度为 60-250 英里，即 95-400 公里），并允许在两个方向上有一定的误差范围。椭圆轨道在绕地球运行期间可能会短暂地进入和离开低地球轨道。
low earth orbit (LEO): Any flight path in circumterrestrial space between sensible atmosphere and the bottom of the Van Allen belts (60-250 miles, 95-400 kilometers), with some leeway in both directions. Elliptical orbits may dip in and out of LEO during each trip around Earth.
月球平动点：五个位于空间中的三维位置，均受地球及其卫星——月球——引力场的影响。L1、L2 和 L3 位于地球和月球的连线上，被认为是不稳定的。航天器可能需要消耗能量才能在这些位置长时间停留。L4 和 L5 分别位于月球轨道前方和后方 60° 处，被认为是稳定的。由于引力场处于平衡状态，航天器可能无需消耗燃料即可无限期地停留在这些位置。
lunar libration points: Five three-dimensional positions in space, all influenced by the gravitational fields that surround Earth and its moon. L1, L2, and L3, on a line with Earth and the moon, are considered unstable. Spacecraft probably would have to expend energy to remain long at those locations. L4 and L5, 60° ahead of and behind the moon in its orbit, are considered stable. Spacecraft probably could remain at those locations indefinitely without expending fuel, because gravitational fields are in balance.
磁层：一个受地球磁场主导的广阔区域，它捕获带电粒子，包括范艾伦辐射带中的粒子。磁层始于地幔上部。大气层，在与电离层重叠的地方，并向外延伸数千英里进入太空。另见电离层。
magnetosphere: A vast region dominated by Earth’s magnetic field, which traps charged particles, including those in the Van Allen belts. The magnetosphere begins in the upper atmosphere, where it overlaps the ionosphere, and extends several thousand miles farther into space. See also ionosphere.
以海洋为中心：一种强调海洋力量的军事思维。
marecentric: A military mindset that emphasizes sea power.
边缘冰区（MIZ）：位于开阔海域和近岸坚固冰层之间，受波浪和涌浪影响的较为松软的冰层区域。其宽度因温度、风力和洋流而异，从几英里到约 80 公里不等。
marginal ice zone (MIZ): A region of more or less mushy ice affected somewhat by waves and swell between open sea water and solid ice closer to shore. Widths vary from a few to about 50 miles (80 kilometers), depending on temperatures, winds, and currents.
沼泽：潮湿、多水的草地，覆盖着高高的草、芦苇和香蒲。另见泥炭地；沼泽。
marsh: Spongy, wet, or watery meadows covered with tall grass, reeds, and cattails. See also bog; swamp.
特大城市：人口至少达到1000万的巨大城市区域。
megalopolis: An immense urban area populated by at least 10 million people.
子午线：地球表面上穿过南北两极的大圆。另见大圆；经度。
meridian: A great circle on Earth’s surface that passes through the North and South Poles. See also great circle; longitude.
中间层：位于地球表面上方 30-50 英里（48-80 公里）处的大气层。平流层中出现的逆温现象在此消失。温度计读数为 -100 °F (-73 °C) 属于正常范围。另见平流层。
mesosphere: Atmosphere 30-50 miles (48-80 kilometers) above Earth’s surface. Temperature inversions that occur in the stratosphere cease. Thermometer readings of -100 °F (-73 °C) are normal. See also stratosphere.
气象学：一门研究大气现象，特别是天气状况和预报的科学。
meteorology: A science that concerns atmospheric phenomena, especially weather conditions and forecasting.
军事山脊：任何山坡上的最高点，通常低于山峰，从这里可以毫无遮挡地看到山脚。另见山脊；地形山脊。
military crest: The highest point on any slope, often lower than the peak, from which views are unobstructed all the way to the bottom. See also crest; topographical crest.
军事地理学：一门地理学分支，研究全球、区域和地方各层面军事政策、计划、方案和作战/支援行动所受到的所有自然、文化及其他环境因素的影响。另见文化地理学；地理学；地缘政治学；自然地理学；政治军事地理学。
military geography: A geographic specialty that concerns all physical, cultural, and other environmental influences over military policies, plans, programs, and combat/support operations at all levels in global, regional, and local contexts. See also cultural geography; geography; geopolitics; physical geography; political-military geography.
海市蜃楼：一种光学现象，由于地球表面附近空气层与周围空气差异较大而导致的大气折射，使物体看起来发生扭曲、位移（升高或降低）、放大、倍增或倒置。常见于沙漠酷热地区。
mirage: An optical phenomenon that makes objects seem distorted, displaced (raised or lowered), magnified, multiplied, or inverted due to atmospheric refraction that occurs when a layer of air near Earth’s surface differs greatly from surrounding air. Common in desert heat.
防波堤：一种顶部有道路的栈桥。另见防波堤；栈桥。
mole: A jetty with a road on top. See also breakwater; jetty.
小潮：潮汐比平均潮汐低约20%，每月出现两次，分别在农历上弦月和下弦月时，此时太阳的引力抵消了月球的引力，日月呈直角。另见大潮；潮汐。
neap tides: Tides about 20% lower than average, which occur twice a month when the sun offsets the moon’s gravitational pull at the time of 1 st and 3d quarters and the sun and moon are at right angles. See also spring tides; tides.
核辐射尘埃： 参见放射性尘埃。
nuclear fallout: See radioactive fallout.
观察：军事人员或传感器在任何给定区域内看到物体的能力。
observation: The ability of military personnel or sensors to see objects within any given area.
障碍物：任何阻碍、延误或改变军事力量调动的自然或人造物体。
obstacle: Any natural or manmade object that prevents, delays, or diverts the movement of military forces.
海洋学：一门研究海洋的科学，特别是海洋的边界、深度、海水的物理和化学性质、水下地形、海洋生物学和资源。
oceanography: A science that deals with the seas, especially their boundaries, depths, the physics and chemistry of salt water, underwater topography, marine biology, and resources.
OCOKA：观察与射击场、掩护与隐蔽、障碍物、关键地形、接近路线的缩写。另见COCOA。
OCOKA: Acronym for Observation and fields of fire; Cover and concealment; Obstacles; Key terrain; Avenues of approach. See also COCOA.
开放城市：任何城市中心，只要敌人应请求同意不攻击或停止攻击，但通常可以不受抵抗地占领。
open city: Any urban center that enemies on request agree to refrain from or cease attacking, but generally may occupy unopposed.
轨道：任何物体在太空中飞行时遵循能量和动量物理定律的路径。绕地球飞行的航天器必须保持足够的速度来抵消地球引力，但又不能超过地球引力。
orbit: The path of any object that flies through space in accord with the physical laws of energy and momentum. Spacecraft that circumnavigate Earth must maintain enough velocity to counterbalance gravity, but not enough to overcome its pull.
轨道周期：航天器或其他物体绕地球、其卫星或其他行星运行一周所需的时间。
orbital period: The time it takes a spacecraft or other object to circumnavigate Earth, its moon, or another planet.
露头：任何暴露在地表的基岩。
outcrop: Any bedrock exposed on the surface.
外太空：指除地球周围空间以外的整个地月系统。它从地球表面上方约 50,000 英里（80,465 公里）延伸至约 480,000 英里（772,000 公里），是地球到月球距离的两倍。另见地球周围空间；深空。
outer space: All of the Earth-Moon System except circumterrestrial space. It extends from about 50,000 miles (80,465 kilometers) above Earth’s surface to about 480,000 miles (772,000 kilometers), twice the distance from Earth to its moon. See also circumterrestrial space; deep space.
浮冰：除固定冰以外的任何海冰，无论其形态或分布情况如何。另见固定冰。
pack ice: Any sea ice, other than fast ice, no matter what form or how disposed. See also fast ice.
永久冻土：寒冷地区地表以下不同深度常年冻结的土壤。另见活动层。
permafrost: Perennially frozen soil at various depths beneath Earth’s surface in frigid regions. See also active layer.
渗透性：多孔岩石和土壤保持或输送水分的能力。
permeability: The capacity of porous rocks and soils to hold or transmit water.
自然地理学：一门跨学科领域，涵盖地球和空间科学的各个方面。典型主题包括天文学、生物学（植物和动物）、气候学、地质学、地貌学（地形地貌）、水文地理学、气象学、海洋学和土壤学（土壤科学）。另见文化地理学、军事地理学和政治军事地理学。
physical geography: An interdisciplinary field that deals with all Earth and space sciences. Typical topics include astronomy, biology (plant and animal life), climatology, geology, geomorphology (land forms), hydrography, meteorology, oceanography, and pedology (soil sciences). See also cultural geography; military geography; political-military geography.
地形地貌： 参见自然地理学。
physiography: See physical geography.
码头：伸入港口水域的栈桥，两侧（有时前端）均可提供泊位。另见码头；泊位。
pier: A wharf that projects into harbor waters and thus provides berths on both sides (sometimes at the head as well). See also quay; wharf.
船体标记线：绘制在货船船体上的标记，用于指示货船是否安全装载。
plimsoll lines: Markings drawn on the hull of a cargo ship to indicate whether it is safely loaded.
政治军事地理学：一门跨学科领域，研究外交政策、军事事务和地理之间的关系。典型主题包括责任区划分、外交、对外关系、不同军种的视角、战略、作战艺术和战术。另见文化地理学、地理学、军事地理学、自然地理学。
political-military geography: An interdisciplinary field that concerns relationships between foreign policy, military affairs, and geography. Typical topics include areas of responsibility, diplomacy, foreign relations, dissimilar military Service perspectives, strategy, operational art, and tactics. See also cultural geography, geography; military geography; physical geography.
港口： 参见海港。
port: See seaport.
降水：从云层降落的水汽。气温和地表温度决定了降水的形式，可以是雨、雪、雨夹雪、冰雹或冰霜。
precipitation: Moisture that falls from clouds. Air and surface temperatures determine whether precipitation takes the form of rain, snow, sleet, hail, or icy glaze.
压力： 参见大气压力。
pressure: See atmospheric pressure.
码头：一个泊位。
quay: A wharf.
种族：指基因上具有独特特征的人群，其祖先可追溯至美洲印第安人、澳大利亚人种、高加索人种、蒙古人种或尼格罗人种。另见氏族；族群；部落。
race: Genetically distinctive people derived from Amerind, Austroloid, Caucasoid, Mongoloid, or Negroid stock. See also clan; ethnic group; tribe.
放射性尘埃：核爆炸产生的碎片云中放射性粒子的沉降，特别是地表爆炸产生的碎片云，会将大量物质吸入蘑菇云中，之后高空的风可能会将致命的雾气吹到广阔的区域。
radioactive fallout: The precipitation of radioactive particles from clouds of debris produced by nuclear detonations, especially surface bursts that suck huge amounts of material into mushroom stems, after which winds aloft may waft a deadly mist over immense areas.
雨林：阴暗潮湿的热带林地，年降水量超过 250 厘米（100 英寸），高大的常绿乔木形成连续的树冠，树冠可能包含两层或多层。除溪流沿岸和阳光能够照射到林地的空地外，林下植被稀少。另见丛林。
rain forest: Dark, dank, tropical woodlands where annual precipitation exceeds 100 inches (250 centimeters) and lofty evergreen trees form a continuous canopy that may contain two or more tiers. Little undergrowth exists except along streams and in clearings where sunlight reaches the forest floor. See also jungle.
礁石：指略微淹没或几乎淹没的岩石链、沙脊或珊瑚礁，它会阻挡或妨碍开阔海洋与海滩之间的通行，即使是平底船也无法通行。
reef: A chain of rocks, a ridge of sand, or a coral formation slightly submerged or nearly so which blocks or impedes passage between open ocean and beaches, even for flat-bottomed boats.
区域：指地理上较大且在自然或文化上较为同质的区域。另见区域地理。
region: A large geographic area that is physically or culturally homogeneous. See also regional geography.
区域地理学：这是一门多学科交叉领域，它将地球和太空划分为欧洲、亚洲和撒哈拉以南非洲等不同的区域，然后描述每个区域的特征，尤其关注其政治、军事、经济、社会和其他方面的影响。区域地理学的另一个分支则关注山脉、沙漠和丛林等同质区域。另见“地理学”。
regional geography: A multidisciplinary field that subdivides Earth and space into such distinctive areas as Europe, Asia, and Africa south of the Sahara, then describes the attributes of each, with particular attention to political, military, economic, social, and other implications. Regional geography in a different vein addresses such homogeneous areas as mountains, deserts, and jungles. See also geography.
相对湿度：空气中实际水蒸气含量与相同温度下最大水蒸气含量的比值。通常以百分比表示。另见绝对湿度；湿度。
relative humidity: The actual amount of water vapor in the air compared with the greatest amount possible at the same temperature. Usually expressed as a percentage. See also absolute humidity; humidity.
地形：地表和海底地形的起伏不平；相邻地形特征之间的高程差异。另见局部地形。
relief: The irregularities of land surfaces and submarine topography; differences in elevation between adjacent terrain features. See also local relief.
赤经：天体上的经度。白羊座（地球观测者在太阳越过地球赤道（春分点）时看到的太阳就位于白羊座的背景下）定义了本初子午线。天文学家以格林尼治天文台的天体对应点为基准，向东测量空间中的角度位置。另见赤纬。
right ascension: The celestial equivalent of longitude. The constellation Aires, against which spectators on Earth see the sun when it crosses Earth’s equator (the vernal equinox), defines the prime meridian. Astronomers measure angular positions in space east from that celestial counterpart of Greenwich Observatory. See also declination.
河流作战：沿河及湿地进行的军事活动。另见“棕色水体”；湿地
riverine operations: Military activities along rivers and in wetlands. See also”brown water;” wetlands
罗马犁：一种装有铲刀的装甲推土机，用于清除小树和茂密的植被。美军在越南战争中广泛使用。
Rome Plow: An armored bulldozer fitted with a blade designed to clear small trees and dense vegetation. Used extensively by U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam.
径流：不渗入地下，而是流经地表汇入河流和其他溪流的降水。
runoff: Precipitation that does not sink into the ground, but flows over the surface into rivers and other streams.
热带稀树草原：热带或亚热带草原，间杂着树木和耐旱植物。
savanna: Tropical or subtropical grasslands with scattered trees and drought-resistant plants.
海上交通线（SLOC）：指各国出于商业或军事目的而依赖的任何海上航线。另见“交通线”。
sea line of communication (SLOC): Any maritime route that nations depend on for commercial or military purposes. See also line of communication.
海港：指包含泊位、货物装卸、仓储、维修和清关设施的港口。另见“港口”。
seaport: A harbor that includes berthing, cargo-handling, storage, maintenance, and clearance facilities. See also harbor.
海烟：一种现象，当极冷的空气流经相对温暖的开阔水面时，会产生水蒸气凝结，有时水蒸气会上升数百英尺（100米以上）。另见北极海烟。
sea smoke: A phenomenon that occurs when very cold air over relatively warm open water produces steamy condensation that sometimes rises several hundred feet (100+ meters). See also arctic sea smoke.
半干旱：年平均降水量在 25 至 50 厘米（10 至 20 英寸）之间的地区。另见沙漠；草原。
semiarid: A region in which average annual precipitation measures between 10 and 20 inches (25-50 centimeters). See also desert; steppe.
方向：洋流的运动方向。另见：洋流；漂移。
set: The direction that ocean currents move. See also current; drift.
视线掩蔽：指能够躲避或屏蔽敌方观察的位置。另见：隐蔽；掩蔽处。
sight defilade: A position screened against or shielded from enemy observation. See also concealment; defilade.
坡度：参见等级；梯度。
slope: See grade; gradient.
土壤通行能力：地表材料支撑机动车辆进行越野行驶的能力。
soil trafficability: The capacity of surface materials to support cross-country movement by motor vehicles.
太阳耀斑：太阳周期性爆发的壮观而广泛的能量释放，伴随着高速质子，对太空中任何未加防护的生命形式都构成潜在的致命辐射威胁。强烈而突发的电离层扰动会导致远程通信信号衰减和其他破坏性影响。大型耀斑持续时间从几分钟到几小时不等。
solar flares: Spectacular, pervasive outbursts of energy that emanate periodically from the sun, accompanied by high-speed protons that comprise a potentially lethal radiation hazard to any unshielded form of life in space. Intense and sudden ionospheric disturbances inflict fadeouts and other debilitating effects on long-range telecommunications. Major flares last from a few minutes to several hours.
空间：宇宙及其所有内容，但不包括地球及其大气层。另见环地空间；地月空间；深空；外太空。
space: The universe and all of its contents, except Earth and its atmosphere. See also circumterrestrial space; cislunar space; deep space; outer space.
航天器：任何主要用于地球及其大气层以外作业的载人或无人飞行器。
spacecraft: Any manned or unmanned vehicle intended primarily for operations beyond Earth and its atmosphere.
太空天气：发生在地球上方 30 英里（50 公里）或更高处的现象。
space weather: Phenomena that occur 30 miles (50 kilometers) or more above Earth.
泉水：地下水位与地表相交处形成的自然水流。另见自流泉；水井。
spring: A natural flow where the water table intersects Earth’s surface. See also artesian spring; well.
大潮：每月两次，当太阳在新月和满月时增强月球引力，地球、太阳和月球排列成一条直线时，潮汐会比平均潮汐高出约 20%。另见小潮；潮汐。
spring tides: Tides about 20 percent greater than average arise twice a month when the sun reinforces lunar pull at the time of new and full moons and the Earth, sun, and moon are directly in line. See also neap tides; tide.
草原：位于俄罗斯欧洲部分和中亚的广袤、半干旱、无树的草地平原。另见“半干旱”。
steppes: Vast, semiarid, treeless, grassy plains in European Russia and Central Asia. See also semiarid.
平流层：位于地球表面上方 10 至 20 英里（16 至 48 公里）处的大气层。生命维持系统至关重要。低层温度随高度升高而降低，但高层会出现逆温现象，最高温度可达约 45 华氏度（7.2 摄氏度）。
stratosphere: Atmosphere 10 to 20 miles (16 to 48 kilometers) above Earth’s surface. Life support systems are essential. Temperatures decrease with altitude in lower layers, but inversions occur at the top, where maximum readings reach about 45 °F (7.2 °C).
沼泽：湿地的统称。另见泥炭地；沼泽地。
swamp: A generic term for wetlands. See also bog; marsh.
涌浪：长而低矮、平行、无波峰的波浪，在驱动风减弱后几乎持续存在。另见波浪。
swell: Long, low, parallel, crestless waves that continue almost indefinitely after motivating winds abate. See also wave.
战术责任区（TAOR）：战区以下任何责任区。另见责任区；战区。
tactical area of responsibility (TAOR): Any AOR below theater level. See also area of responsibility; theater.
泰加林：潮湿的亚北极针叶林，主要由云杉和冷杉组成，其北部边界与苔原接壤。
taiga: Moist, subarctic, coniferous forests, mostly spruce and fir, the northern frontier of which touches tundra.
以陆军为中心的军事思维：一种强调陆军力量的军事思维。
terracentric: A military mindset that emphasizes land power.
地形：任何给定区域内的所有自然和人文地理特征。
terrain: All physical and cultural geographical features within any given area.
领海：包括领空和海底在内的海洋区域，沿海国家对其行使主权。根据《联合国海洋法公约》，这些国家可主张从基线起算12海里范围内的权利。另见“基线”。
territorial sea: A maritime area that includes air space and the seabed over which coastal countries exercise sovereignty. Such countries may claim rights up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline, according to the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea. See also baseline.
战区：指负责的区域范围，例如西欧、北非和东南亚。另见责任区；区域。
theater: A regional area of responsibility, such as Western Europe, North Africa, and Southeast Asia. See also area of responsibility; region.
温跃层：海水中温度逐渐降低、盐度逐渐升高的层，它将近地表相对较轻、随季节变化的混合物与数千英尺以下密度较高的等温层分隔开来。另见等温区。
thermocline: A layer of increasingly colder, saltier ocean water that separates relatively light, seasonally-variable mixtures near the surface from a dense isothermal layer several thousand feet below. See also isothermal area.
热层：位于地球表面上方 48-80 公里（30-50 英里）处的稀薄大气层，此处强烈的逆温现象导致温度急剧升高。顶部附近的峰值温度可达 1250 摄氏度（2250 华氏度）。日温差可能高达几百度。
thermosphere: Thin atmosphere 30-50 miles (48-80 kilometers) above Earth’s surface, where tremendous inversions cause temperatures to increase dramatically. Peak readings near the top may reach 2,250 °F (1,250° C). Diurnal variations probably are several hundred degrees.
潮汐流：随潮汐涨落而交替发生的水平水流运动。在相对开阔的海域，潮汐流方向会以日或半日周期连续旋转360度。局部地形对沿海水域的潮汐流特征有显著影响。另见：潮汐；潮水。
tidal current: The alternating horizontal movement of water that rises and falls with tides. The direction in relatively open locations rotates continuously through 360 degrees diurnally or semi-diurnally. Local topography strongly influences tidal current characteristics in coastal waters. See also tide; tidewater.
潮汐：海洋、海域和大型湖泊因太阳和月球引力不均而每天两次发生的涨落。另见：小潮；大潮；潮汐流；潮水。
tide: The rising and falling of oceans, seas, and large lakes twice daily in response to unequal gravitational attractions of the sun and moon. See also neap tide; spring tide; tidal current; tidewater.
潮汐区：河流中受潮汐涨落影响的部分。另见“潮汐”。
tidewater: That portion of any river affected by the ebb and flow of tides. See also tide.
连岛沙洲：连接岛屿与大陆或其他岛屿的沙洲或砾石滩。
tombolo: A sand or gravel bar that connects an island to the mainland or another island.
地形脊：任何山坡上的最高点。另见脊；军用脊。
topographical crest: The highest point on any slope. See also crest; military crest.
地形：陆地或水下表面的形态，尤指地势起伏和其他自然特征。另见：地形；地貌。
topography: The configuration of land or underwater surfaces, especially relief and other natural features. See also relief; terrain.
城镇规划：任何城市、城镇、乡村或村落的当前布局，可能反映也可能不反映预先构思的设计。
town plan: The current configuration of any city, town, village, or hamlet, which may or may not reflect a preconceived design.
可通行性： 参见土壤可通行性。
trafficability: See soil trafficability.
部落：一群在文化和语言上同质化，并占据特定领土的人。另见氏族。
tribe: A group of culturally and linguistically homogeneous people who occupy certain territory. See also clan.
对流层：地球表面以上约 16 公里（10 英里）高度，以及南北两极附近约一半高度的大气层。大部分云、风、降水和其他天气现象都发生在这个区域。
troposphere: Atmosphere from Earth’s surface to about 1 0 miles (16 kilometers) above the equator and half of that altitude near the North and South Poles. Most clouds, winds, precipitation, and other weather phenomena occur in this region.
苔原：北极或亚北极平原，平坦或起伏，无树木，底土永久冻结，表面泥泞，适宜苔藓和地衣等矮小植物生长。
tundra: An arctic or subarctic plain, level to undulating, treeless, with permanently frozen subsoil and a mucky surface that supports stunted plants such as mosses and lichens.
晨昏蒙影：日出前和日落后不完全黑暗的时期。持续时间从几分钟到几小时不等，具体取决于纬度和季节。另见晨昏蒙影的开始；暮昏蒙影的结束。
twilight: Periods of incomplete darkness before sunrise and after sunset. Durations vary from a few minutes to many hours, depending on latitude and season. See also Beginning of Morning Nautical Twilight; End of Evening Nautical Twilight.
城市地区：任何城市或其建成区。另见城市化；城市扩张。
urban area: Any city or built-up portion thereof. See also urbanization; urban sprawl.
城市化：任何人口密度达到或超过每平方英里（约3平方公里）1000人的地块。另见：城区；城市扩张。
ubanization: Any plot of land where population densities equal or exceed 1,000 persons per square mile (about 3 square kilometers). See also urban area; urban sprawl.
城市扩张：几个城市合并形成一个绵延数英里、宽广连绵的大都市区。
urban sprawl: The coalescence of several cities to form a contiguous metropolitan area many miles long and wide.
范艾伦辐射带：位于地球磁层中，纬度范围从北纬45度到南纬45度之间的两个强辐射层。下层辐射带起始于地表以上250至750英里（400至1200公里）之间，最高点位于6200英里（9655公里）处。一个低空粒子槽将其与上层辐射带分隔开来，上层辐射带的终止点位于37000至52000英里（59550至83685公里）之间，具体位置取决于太阳活动。质子在2200英里（3550公里）处最为显著。电子通量在大约9900英里（15930公里）处达到峰值。航天器需要屏蔽才能安全穿越范艾伦辐射带。另见磁层。
Van Allen belts: Two intense radiation layers trapped in Earth’s magnetosphere from 45 degrees north to 45 degrees south latitude. The lower layer begins between 250 and 750 miles (400-1,200 kilometers) above Earth’s surface and tops at 6,200 miles (9,655 kilometers). A low particle slot separates it from the upper layer, which terminates at 37,000-52,000 miles (59,550-83,685 kilometers), depending on solar activity. Protons are most prominent at 2,200 miles (3,550 kilometers). Electron flux peaks at approximately 9,900 miles (15,930 kilometers). Spacecraft need shielding to transit either Van Allen belt safely. See also magnetosphere.
能见度：视力为 20/20 的观察者在不借助双筒望远镜或夜视设备的情况下，能够看到并识别显著物体的最大距离。
visibility: The greatest distance at which observers with 20/20 eyesight can see and identify prominent objects unaided by binoculars or night vision devices.
目视飞行规则（VFR）：当云底高度、能见度和其他天气条件优于规定的最低标准时适用的空中交通管制规则。另见仪表飞行规则。
visual flight rules (VFR): Air traffic control regulations that pertain when cloud ceilings, visibility, and other weather conditions are more favorable than specified minimums. See also Instrument Flight Rules.
干涸河床（wadi）：指季节性或干旱期间干涸的河床（该术语在北非和中东地区最为常用）。暴雨通常会导致此类河道发生突发性洪水。另见干涸河床（arroyo）；间歇性溪流。
wadi: The bed of a stream that dries up seasonally or during droughts (a term most commonly used in North Africa and the Middle East). Heavy rains commonly cause flash floods in such water courses. See also arroyo; intermittent stream.
分水岭： 参见流域。
watershed: See drainage basin.
地下水位：饱和土壤的上限，可能位于地表，也可能位于地下数英尺（米）处。
water table: The upper limit of saturated soil, which may be on the surface or many feet (meters) below.
波：在海洋、海域和大型湖泊的正常水面上下形成的波峰和波谷。开阔海面上的波浪由四种方式产生：作用于海面的风；大气压力的变化；地震等地震活动；以及太阳和月亮的潮汐引力。另见波周期。
wave: Solid water that forms peaks and troughs above and below the normal surface of oceans, seas, and large lakes. Waves on open seas are generated in four ways: by winds that act on the surface; by changes in atmospheric pressure; by seismic disturbances such as earthquakes; and by tidal attractions of the sun and moon. See also wave period.
波周期：一个波峰到达下一个波峰所需的时间。
wave period: The time it takes one wave crest to succeed another.
天气：地球大气层当前及可预测未来一段时间内的状况。另见气候；气象学；天气预报。
weather: The condition of Earth’s atmosphere at present and for the predictable future. See also climate; meterology; weather forecast.
天气预报：预测某一点、某条路线或特定区域在特定时间段内的大气状况。预报时间越长，可靠性越低。未来 48 至 96 小时的预报称为“展望”。湿地：任何沼泽、泥潭或湿地。
weather forecast: Predicted atmospheric conditions at a point, along a route, or within a given area for a specified period of time. Reliability decreases as forecast periods increase. Predictions from 48 to 96 hours in the future are called “outlooks.” wetlands: Any swamp, bog, or marsh.
码头：一种建在海港或可通航内河水道岸边或与之成一定角度的建筑物，船舶和小船在此接收和卸载货物和乘客。
wharf: A structure built alongside, or at an angle to, the shore of a seaport or navigable inland waterway where ships and smaller craft receive and discharge cargo and passengers.
白茫茫一片：一种天气现象，积雪覆盖了地表特征，阴天消除了阴影，地平线也完全消失。天地仿佛融为一体。
whiteout: A weather phenomenon that occurs when snow obliterates surface features, overcast eliminates shadows, and the horizon is invisible. Earth and sky seem inseparable.
风寒效应：指在任何给定温度下，流动空气对裸露皮肤的影响。风速越高，体感温度越低。
wind chill: The effect of moving air on exposed flesh at any given temperature. High velocities produce low sensible temperatures.
风切变：在彼此上方和下方以相反方向快速运动的强气流边界处产生的跷跷板效应。
wind shear: See-saw effects along boundaries between strong air currents that race in opposite directions above and below one another.
附录 C
基础地理库
APPENDIX C
A BASIC GEOGRAPHIC LIBRARY
以下基本地理资料库完全由书籍和军事手册组成。如需查阅从不同角度更详细探讨特定主题的相关杂志和报纸文章，请参阅以下所列书籍中的引文：
The basic geographical library below consists entirely of books and military manuals. For relevant magazine and newspaper articles that address specific topics from various perspectives and in greater detail, see the citations in the books listed below:
•《空军大学图书馆军事期刊索引》，阿拉巴马州麦克斯韦空军基地，空军大学图书馆，1963年至今，由EBSCO Publishing（马萨诸塞州皮博迪）以CD-ROM形式发行，01960
• Air University Library Index to Military Periodicals, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, Air University Library, 1963- , distributed on CD ROM by EBSCO Publishing, Peabody, MA, 01960
•《军事地理学书目》，第1-4卷，纽约州西点，美国军事学院地理与计算机科学系（美国政府印刷局，1968年）
• Bibliography of Military Geography, vols.1-4, West Point, NY, Dept. of Geography and Computer Science, U.S. Military Academy (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968)
• 《军事地理学书目》，路易斯·C·佩尔蒂埃编，美国地理学家协会军事地理委员会，1962年4月
• Bibliography of Military Geography, compiled by Louis C. Peltier, Military Geography Committee, Association of American Geographers, April 1962
自然地理学
PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY
一般的
GENERAL
Gabler, Robert E. 1996.自然地理学要义。第5版。纽约：Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich。
Gabler, Robert E. 1996. Essentials of Physical Geography. 5th ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich.
亚瑟·N·斯特拉勒 (Arthur N. Strahler) 和艾伦·H.斯特拉勒 (Alan H. Strahler)。 1978.现代自然地理学。纽约：约翰·威利。
Strahler, Arthur N., and Alan H. Strahler. 1978. Modern Physical Geography. New York: John Wiley.
德丰坦，皮埃尔（Deffontaines, Pierre）编。1965。《拉鲁斯世界地理百科全书》。 1965年。纽约：奥德赛出版社。
Deffontaines, Pierre, ed. 1965. Larousse Encyclopedia of World Geography. 1965. New York: Odyssey Press.
土地
LAND
概述
Overviews
野战手册 30-10：地形分析。1972年 3 月 27 日。华盛顿特区：陆军部（已被 FM 5-33 取代，标题相同，但包含更详细的信息）。
Field Manual 30-10: Terrain Analysis. March 27, 1972. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army (superseded by FM 5-33, same title, but contains more detailed information).
技术手册 5-545：地质学。1971年 7 月。华盛顿特区：陆军部。
Technical Manual 5-545: Geology. July 1971. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army.
山脉
Mountains
野战手册 90-6：山地作战。1980年 6 月 30 日。华盛顿特区：陆军部。
Field Manual 90-6: Mountain Operations. June 30, 1980. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army.
米尔恩，洛里斯·J.和玛格丽·米尔恩。1962年。《山脉》。生活自然图书馆。纽约：时代生活图书公司。
Milne, Loris J., and Margery Milne. 1962. The Mountains. Life Nature Library. New York: Time-Life Books.
沙漠
Deserts
野战手册 90-3/舰队海军陆战队手册 7-27：沙漠作战。1977年 8 月 19 日。华盛顿特区：陆军部。
Field Manual 90-3/Fleet Marine Force Manual 7-27: Desert Operations. August 19, 1977. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army.
乔治，乌韦。1976。《地球的沙漠》。纽约：哈考特、布雷斯、乔万诺维奇出版社。
George, Uwe. 1976. In the Deserts of the Earth. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
利奥波德，A.斯塔克。1961。《沙漠》。生活自然图书馆。纽约：时代生活图书公司。
Leopold, A. Starker. 1961. The Desert. Life Nature Library. New York: Time-Life Books.
丛林
Jungles
Bergerud, Eric. 1996. 《浴火重生：南太平洋的陆地战争》。纽约：维京出版社。
Bergerud, Eric. 1996. Touched by Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific. New York: Viking Press.
野战手册 90-5：丛林作战。1982年 8 月 16 日。华盛顿特区：陆军部，海军陆战队司令部。
Field Manual 90-5: Jungle Operations. August 16, 1982. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, Commandant of the Marine Corps.
森林
Forests
法布，彼得。1961。《森林》。生命自然图书馆。纽约：时代生活图书公司。
Farb, Peter. 1961. The Forest. Life Nature Library. New York: Time-Life Books.
米勒，爱德华·G. 1995。《黑暗血腥的土地：许特根森林和鲁尔河大坝，1944-1945》。德克萨斯州大学城：德克萨斯农工大学出版社。
Miller, Edward G. 1995. A Dark and Bloody Ground: The Hürtgen Forest and the Roer River Dams, 1944-1945. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.
河流和沼泽
Rivers and Swamps
DA 小册子 20-231：俄罗斯森林和沼泽中的战斗。1951年 7 月。华盛顿特区：陆军部。
DA Pamphlet 20-231: Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps. July 1951. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army.
野战手册 90-13/海军陆战队舰队手册 7-26：渡河作战。1992年 9 月 30 日。华盛顿特区：陆军部和海军陆战队司令部。
Field Manual 90-13/Fleet Marine Force Manual 7-26: River Crossing Operations. September 30, 1992. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army and Commandant of the Marine Corps.
富尔顿，威廉·B. 1985。《河川作战，1966-1969》。华盛顿特区：陆军部。
Fulton, William B. 1985. Riverine Operations, 1966-1969. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army.
寒冷地形
Frigid Terrain
野战手册 30-70：基本寒冷天气手册。1968年 4 月。华盛顿特区：陆军部。
Field Manual 30-70: Basic Cold Weather Manual. April 1968. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army.
野战手册 31-71：北方作战。1971年。华盛顿特区：陆军部。
Field Manual 31-71: Northern Operations. 1971. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army.
海洋和海岸
OCEANS AND SEASHORES
海洋学
Oceanography
戴维斯，理查德·A.，小。1972。《海洋学原理》。马萨诸塞州雷丁：艾迪生·韦斯利出版公司。
Davis, Richard A., Jr. 1972. Principles of Oceanography. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley Publishing Co.
Dutton, Benjamin 和 Elbert S. Maloney. 1942. Dutton's Navigation and Piloting. 14版。马里兰州安纳波利斯：美国海军学院出版社。
Dutton, Benjamin, and Elbert S. Maloney. 1942. Dutton’s Navigation and Piloting. 14th ed. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press.
恩格尔，伦纳德。1969。《海洋》。生命自然系列。纽约：时代生活图书公司。
Engel, Leonard. 1969. The Sea. Life Nature Series. New York: Time-Life Books.
莫里，马修·F. 1855。海洋的自然地理。纽约：哈珀兄弟出版社。
Maury, Matthew F. 1855. The Physical Geography of the Sea. New York: Harper and Brothers.
瑟曼，哈罗德·V. 1978. 《海洋学导论》，第2版。哥伦布，俄亥俄州：查尔斯·E·梅里尔出版公司。
Thurman, Harold V. 1978. Introductory Oceanography, 2d ed. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co.
造船业中的地理因素
Geographic Factors in Shipbuilding
Gates, PJ 和 NM Lynn. 1990.船舶、潜艇和海洋。伦敦：Brassey's（英国）。
Gates, P. J., and N. M. Lynn. 1990. Ships, Submarines, and the Sea. London: Brassey’s (UK).
美国海军水面舰艇寒冷天气手册。1988年 5 月。华盛顿特区：海军作战部长水面舰艇生存能力办公室 (OP 03C2)。
U.S. Navy Cold Weather Handbook for Surface Ships. May 1988. Washington, DC: Chief of Naval Operations, Surface Ship Survivability Office (OP 03C2).
滨海
The Littoral
Alexander, Joseph H. 和 Merrill L. Bartlett. 1995.冷战中的海上士兵：1945-1991 年两栖作战。马里兰州安纳波利斯：美国海军学院出版社。
Alexander, Joseph H., and Merrill L. Bartlett. 1995. Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare 1945-1991. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press.
Koburger, Charles W., Jr. 1990.狭窄的海域、小型海军和肥胖的商船。纽约：Praeger。
Koburger, Charles W., Jr. 1990. Narrow Seas, Small Navies, and Fat Merchantmen. New York: Praeger.
Vagts, Alfred. 1946.从古代到 1945 年的登陆作战。宾夕法尼亚州哈里斯堡：军事服务出版社。
Vagts, Alfred. 1946. Landing Operations from Antiquity to 1945. Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing.
气氛
ATMOSPHERE
气候
Climate
DA 小册子 20-291：气候对欧洲俄罗斯作战的影响。1952年 2 月。华盛顿特区：陆军部。
DA Pamphlet 20-291: Effects of Climate on Combat in European Russia. February 1952. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army.
Kendrew, WB 1953. 《各大洲的气候》。第4版。纽约：牛津大学出版社。
Kendrew, W. B. 1953. The Climates of the Continents. 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
天气概览
Weather Overviews
Burrows, William James. 1991.观察世界天气。纽约：剑桥大学出版社。
Burrows, William James. 1991. Watching the World’s Weather. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Donn, William L. 1946.海洋气象学。纽约：麦格劳-希尔出版社。
Donn, William L. 1946. Meteorology with Marine Applications. New York: McGraw-Hill.
恶劣天气指南。1965年。第一部分：埃德温·T·哈丁，飓风；第二部分：威廉·J·科奇，台风。马里兰州安纳波利斯：美国海军学院出版社。
Heavy Weather Guide. 1965. Part I: Edwin T. Harding, Hurricanes; Part II: William J. Kotsch, Typhoons. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press.
Murchie, Guy. 1954.天空之歌。波士顿，马萨诸塞州：霍顿·米夫林出版社。
Murchie, Guy. 1954. The Song of the Sky. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
军事气象
Military Weather
空军条令文件 45：航空航天气象作战。1994年 8 月 31 日。华盛顿特区：空军部。
Air Force Doctrine Document 45: Aerospace Weather Operations. August 31, 1994. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Air Force.
野战手册 34-81：陆军战术行动的气象支援。1989年。华盛顿特区：陆军部和空军部。
Field Manual 34-81: Weather Support for Army Tactical Operations. 1989. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army and Dept. of the Air Force.
Fuller, John F. 1990. Thor's Legions: Weather Support to the US Air Force and Army, 1937-1987. Boston, MA: American Meteorological Society.
Fuller, John F. 1990. Thor’s Legions: Weather Support to the U.S. Air Force and Army, 1937-1987. Boston, MA: American Meteorological Society.
联合出版物 3-59：气象和海洋支援联合条令。1993年 12 月 22 日。华盛顿：参谋长联席会议主席办公室。
Joint Pub 3-59: Joint Doctrine for Meteorological and Oceanographic Support. December 22, 1993. Washington: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
《航空年鉴》。每年出版。华盛顿特区：美国政府印刷局。
The Air Almanac. Issued annually. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
空间
SPACE
Cochran, Curtis D.、Dennis M. Gorman 和 Joseph D. Dumoulin 编辑。1985 年 1 月。《太空手册》。阿拉巴马州麦克斯韦空军基地：空军大学出版社。
Cochran, Curtis D., Dennis M. Gorman, and Joseph D. Dumoulin, eds. January 1985. Space Handbook. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press.
柯林斯，约翰·M. 1989。军事太空部队：未来五十年。华盛顿特区：佩加蒙-布拉西出版社。
Collins, John M. 1989. Military Space Forces: The Next Fifty Years. Washington, DC: Pergammon-Brassey’s.
斯坦因，G.哈里。1981。《太空对抗》。恩格尔伍德克利夫斯，新泽西州：普伦蒂斯-霍尔出版社。
Stein, G. Harry. 1981. Confrontation in Space. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Zombeck, Martin V. 1982.空间天文学和天体物理学手册。纽约：剑桥大学出版社。
Zombeck, Martin V. 1982. Handbook of Space Astronomy and Astrophysics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
文化地理
CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY
人们
PEOPLE
人口统计学和语言学
Demographics and Linguistics
Allen, John 和 Doreen Massey 编。地理世界。1995年。纽约：牛津大学出版社。
Allen, John, and Doreen Massey, eds. Geographical Worlds. 1995. New York: Oxford University Press.
Cavalli-Sforza, L. Luca 等编. 1994.人类基因的历史和地理。普林斯顿，新泽西州：普林斯顿大学出版社。
Cavalli-Sforza, L. Luca, et al., eds. 1994. The History and Geography of Human Genes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Jones, HR 1981.人口地理学。纽约：哈珀和罗出版社。
Jones, H. R. 1981. Population Geography. New York: Harper and Row.
Jordan, Terry G.、Mona Domosh 和 Lester Rowntree. 1997. 《人类马赛克：文化地理主题导论》。第7版。纽约：朗文出版社。
Jordan, Terry G., Mona Domosh, and Lester Rowntree. 1997. The Human Mosaic: A Thematic Introduction to Cultural Geography. 7th ed. New York: Longman.
宗教信仰
Religious Preferences
Haught, James A. 1995. 《神圣的仇恨：20 世纪 90 年代的宗教冲突》。纽约州阿默斯特：普罗米修斯出版社。
Haught, James A. 1995. Holy Hatred: Religious Conflicts of the 1990s. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books.
尼尔森，尼尔斯·克里斯蒂安。1983。《世界宗教》。纽约：圣马丁出版社。
Nielsen, Niels Christian. 1983. Religions of the World. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
帕林德，爱德华·杰弗里。1984。《世界宗教：从古代历史到现代》。纽约：Facts on File出版社。
Parrinder, Edward Geoffrey. 1984. World Religions: From Ancient History to the Present. New York: Facts on File.
索弗，大卫·E. 1967。《宗教地理学》。新泽西州恩格尔伍德克利夫斯：普伦蒂斯霍尔出版社。
Sopher, David E. 1967. Geography of Religions. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
汤普森，亨利·O. 1988。《和平与战争中的世界宗教》。北卡罗来纳州杰斐逊：麦克法兰公司。
Thompson, Henry O. 1988. World Religions in Peace and War. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co.
地方性疾病
Endemic Diseases
Bennett, Peter B. 和 David H. Elliott 编. 1992. 《潜水生理学和医学》，第4版。费城，宾夕法尼亚州：WB Saunders 出版社。
Bennett, Peter B., and David H. Elliott, eds. 1992. The Physiology and Medicine of Diving, 4th ed. Philadelphia, PA: W. B. Saunders.
疾病和环境警报报告。1992年。华盛顿特区：国防情报局武装部队医学情报中心。
Disease and Environmental Alert Reports. 1992. Washington, DC: Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, Defense Intelligence Agency.
Kiple, Kenneth F. 编. 1993. 《剑桥世界人类疾病史》。纽约：剑桥大学出版社。
Kiple, Kenneth F., ed. 1993. The Cambridge World History of Human Disease. New York: Cambridge University Press.
麦克尼尔，威廉·H. 1976。《瘟疫与民族》。纽约：锚点出版社。
McNeill, William H. 1976. Plagues and Peoples. New York: Anchor Books.
Stamp, L. Dudley. 1965.生命与死亡的地理学。伊萨卡，纽约：康奈尔大学出版社。
Stamp, L. Dudley. 1965. The Geography of Life and Death. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
贝尔，J.鲍耶。1966。《围城：七座被围困的城市》。纽约：奇尔顿出版社。
Bell, J. Bowyer. 1966. Besieged: Seven Cities Under Siege. New York: Chilton Books.
野战手册 90-10：城市化地形上的军事行动。1979年 8 月 15 日。华盛顿特区：陆军部。
Field Manual 90-10: Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain. August 15, 1979. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army.
城市轰炸与防御
Urban Bombardment and Defense
古雷，莱昂。1976。《苏联战略中的战争生存》。迈阿密，佛罗里达州：迈阿密大学高级国际研究中心。
Gouré, Leon. 1976. War Survival in Soviet Strategy. Miami, FL: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami.
美国战略轰炸调查，1976 年，10 卷。纽约：加兰出版社。
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1976, 10 vols. New York: Garland Publishers.
叶古罗夫，PT 等。未注明日期。《民防：苏联视角》；以及 NM 季托夫等。1975 年 7 月。《民防》。两本书均由橡树岭国家实验室编辑和翻译，橡树岭，田纳西州。
Yegurov, P. T., et al. Undated. Civil Defense: A Soviet View, and N. M. Titov, et al. July 1975. Civil Defense. Both books ed. and trans. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN.
产品
PRODUCTS
路线建设与破坏
Route Construction and Destruction
安德斯，莱斯利。1965。《雷多路：约瑟夫·W·史迪威将军通往中国的公路》。诺曼，俄克拉荷马州：俄克拉荷马大学出版社。
Anders, Leslie. 1965. The Ledo Road: General Joseph W. Stilwell’s Highway to China. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
野战手册 5-25：爆炸物和爆破。1996年 3 月。华盛顿特区：陆军部。
Field Manual 5-25: Explosives and Demolitions. March 1996. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army.
野战手册 5-36：路线侦察和分类。1985年 3 月。华盛顿特区：陆军部。
Field Manual 5-36: Route Reconnaissance and Classification. March 1985. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army.
野战手册 5-430-00-2，空军联合手册 32-8013：战区道路、机场和直升机场的规划与设计，2卷。1994 年 9 月。华盛顿特区：陆军部和空军部。
Field Manual 5-430-00-2, Air Force Joint Pamphlet 32-8013: Planning and Design of Roads, Airfields, and Heliports in the Theater of Operations, 2 vols. September 1994. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army and Dept. of the Air Force.
谭培英. 1945.滇缅公路的修建.纽约：麦格劳-希尔出版社。
Pei-Ying, Tan. 1945. The Building of the Burma Road. New York: McGraw-Hill.
电信
Telecommunications
凯勒曼，阿哈龙。1993。《电信与地理》。纽约：霍尔斯特德出版社。
Kellerman, Aharon. 1993. Telecommunications and Geography. New York: Halsted Press.
美国军事基地
U.S. Military Bases
Evinger, William R. 编。《美国全球军事基地名录》。第 2版。1995 年。亚利桑那州凤凰城：Oryx Press 出版社。
Evinger, William R., ed. Directory of U.S. Military Bases Worldwide. 2d ed. 1995. Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press.
美国军事设施指南：收录220个主要基地、哨所和驻地。定期更新。华盛顿特区：陆军时报、海军时报、空军时报。
Guide to Military Installations in the U.S.: A Reference to the Top 220 Bases, Posts and Stations. Updated periodically. Washington, DC: Army Times, Navy Times, Air Force Times.
堡垒和防御工事
Forts and Fortifications
布莱斯，马丁·H. 1990。堡垒和要塞。纽约：档案事实出版社。
Brice, Martin H. 1990. Forts and Fortresses. New York: Facts on File.
野战手册 5-15：野战工事。1972年 6 月 27 日（已被 FM 5-103：生存能力取代，1985 年 6 月 10 日，限制发行）。华盛顿特区：陆军部。
Field Manual 5-15: Field Fortifications. June 27, 1972 (superseded by FM 5-103: Survivability, June 10, 1985, restricted distribution). Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army.
霍格，伊恩。1981。《防御工事史》。纽约：圣马丁出版社。
Hogg, Ian. 1981. The History of Fortifications. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
现代战争中野战工事的价值。1979年 12 月 1 日。华盛顿特区：历史评估与研究组织 (HERO) 为国防核局编写。
The Value of Field Fortifications in Modern Warfare. December 1, 1979. Washington, DC: prepared for Defense Nuclear Agency by Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO).
经济地理学
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
Davidian, Zaven N. 1994.《国家间经济差距：全球化世界中生存的威胁》。牛津：牛津大学出版社。
Davidian, Zaven N. 1994. Economic Disparities Among Nations: A Threat to Survival in a Globalized World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Knox, Paul L. 和 John Agnew. 1994.世界经济地理：经济地理导论。纽约：Routledge, Chapman, and Hall。
Knox, Paul L., and John Agnew. 1994. The Geography of the World Economy: An Introduction to Economic Geography. New York: Routledge, Chapman, and Hall.
区域地理
REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY
一般的
GENERAL
区域手册系列（DA 小册子 550）。出版日期和作者不一。多卷涵盖多个国家和地区。华盛顿特区：美国国会图书馆联邦研究部，政府印刷局。
Area Handbook Series (DA Pamphlet 550). Various dates and authors. Many volumes cover various countries and regions. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Government Printing Office.
Cole, JP 1996.世界主要区域的地理。纽约：Routledge。
Cole, J. P. 1996. Geography of the World’s Major Regions. New York: Routledge.
de Blij, Harm J. 和 Peter O. Muller. 1997.地理学：领域、区域和概念。纽约：John Wiley。
de Blij, Harm J. and Peter O. Muller. 1997. Geography: Realms, Regions, and Concepts. New York: John Wiley.
世界概况。印刷版于 1995 年停印。可通过万维网在互联网上获取。华盛顿特区：中央情报局国家对外情报中心（非密级）。
The World Factbook. Printed version discontinued in 1995. Available on the Internet via the World Wide Web. Washington, DC: National Foreign Intelligence Center, Central Intelligence Agency (unclassified).
美洲
THE AMERICAS
Caviedes, Caesar 和 Gregory Knapp. 1995.南美洲。Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall。
Caviedes, Caesar, and Gregory Knapp. 1995. South America. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Keegan, John. 1996.战场：北美战争。纽约：Alfred A. Knopf 出版社。
Keegan, John. 1996. Fields of Battle: The Wars for North America. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
James, Preston E. 和 Clarence W. Minkel. 1986.拉丁美洲。纽约：John Wiley。
James, Preston E., and Clarence W. Minkel. 1986. Latin America. New York: John Wiley.
McKnight, Tom L. 1992.美国和加拿大的区域地理。新泽西州恩格尔伍德克利夫斯：普伦蒂斯-霍尔出版社。
McKnight, Tom L. 1992. Regional Geography of the United States and Canada. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
West, Robert C. 1989.美国中部：土地和人民。第3版。新泽西州恩格尔伍德克利夫斯：普伦蒂斯-霍尔出版社。
West, Robert C. 1989. Middle America: Its Lands and Peoples. 3d ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
欧洲
EUROPE
Berentsen, William. 1997.当代欧洲：地理分析。纽约：John Wiley。
Berentsen, William. 1997. Contemporary Europe: A Geographic Analysis. New York: John Wiley.
霍夫曼，乔治·W.（编）1990。《20世纪90年代的欧洲：地理分析》。第6版。纽约：约翰·威利出版社。
Hoffman, George W., ed. 1990. Europe in the 1990s: A Geographic Analysis. 6th ed. New York: John Wiley.
苏联及其继承国
SOVIET UNION AND SUCCESSOR STATES
Berg, LS 1950.苏联自然区域。奥尔加·阿德勒·蒂特尔鲍姆译。纽约：麦克米伦出版社。
Berg, L. S. 1950. Natural Regions of the U.S.S.R. Trans. Olga Adler Titelbaum. New York: Macmillan.
柯蒂斯，格伦·E. 1997。《俄罗斯：国别研究》。华盛顿特区：国会图书馆联邦研究部。
Curtis, Glenn E. 1997. Russia: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress
Lydolph, Paul E. 1979.苏联地理：专题分析。Elkhart , WI: Misty Valley Publishing。
Lydolph, Paul E. 1979. Geography of the USSR: Topical Analysis. Elkhart, Wl: Misty Valley Publishing.
Shaw, Denis JB 编. 1995.后苏联共和国：系统地理学。纽约：John Wiley。
Shaw, Denis J. B., ed. 1995. The Post Soviet Republics: A Systematic Geography. New York: John Wiley.
东亚
EAST ASIA
Drakakis-Smith, David. 1992年太平洋亚洲。纽约：Routledge出版社。
Drakakis-Smith, David. 1992 Pacific Asia. New York: Routledge.
金斯伯格，诺顿。1959。《亚洲的模式》。新泽西州恩格尔伍德克利夫斯：普伦蒂斯-霍尔出版社。
Ginsberg, Norton. 1959. The Pattern of Asia. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Lemley, Kendall M. 编. 1976.中华人民共和国地理.纽约西点：美国军事学院地球、空间和图形科学系。
Lemley, Kendall M., ed. 1976. Geography of the People’s Republic of China. West Point, New York: U.S. Military Academy, Dept. of Earth, Space, and Graphic Sciences.
赵松娇. 1994.中国地理：环境、资源、人口与发展.纽约：约翰·威利出版社。
Zhao, Songgiao. 1994. Geography of China: Environment, Resources, Population, and Development. New York: John Wiley.
中东
MIDDLE EAST
Beaumont, Peter 等. 1988.中东：地理研究。纽约：John Wiley。
Beaumont, Peter, et al. 1988. The Middle East: A Geographic Study. New York: John Wiley.
Fisher, WB 1950.中东：自然、社会和区域地理。纽约：EP Dutton。
Fisher, W. B. 1950. The Middle East: A Physical, Social, and Regional Geography. New York: E. P. Dutton.
Kemp, Geoffrey 和 Robert E. Harkavy. 1997. 《战略地理与不断变化的中东》。华盛顿特区：卡内基国际和平基金会/布鲁金斯学会。
Kemp, Geoffrey, and Robert E. Harkavy. 1997. Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/Brookings Institution.
非洲
AFRICA
Aryeetey-Attoah, Samuel. 1997.撒哈拉以南非洲地理.新泽西州上萨德尔河: Prentice-Hall.
Aryeetey-Attoah, Samuel. 1997. Geography of Subsaharan Africa. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Joffú, George 编. 1993.北非：民族、国家和地区。纽约：Routledge 出版社。
Joffú, George, ed. 1993. North Africa: Nation, State, and Region. New York: Routledge.
澳大利亚和大洋洲
AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA
McKnight, Tom L. 1995.大洋洲：澳大利亚、新西兰和太平洋岛屿的地理。新泽西州恩格尔伍德克利夫斯：普伦蒂斯-霍尔出版社。
McKnight, Tom L. 1995. Oceania: The Geography of Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
极地地区
POLAR REGIONS
北极盆地。1963年。协调人：John E. Slate。马里兰州森特维尔：潮水出版社为美国北极研究所出版。
The Arctic Basin. 1963. Coord. John E. Slate. Centerville, MD: Tidewater Publishing for the Arctic Institute of America.
莱伊，威利。1962。《极地人》。生活自然图书馆。纽约：时代生活图书公司。
Ley, Willey. 1962. The Poles. Life Nature Library. New York: Time-Life Books.
政治地理学
POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY
Bennett, Robert J. 和 Robert Estall 编. 1991.全球变化与挑战：20 世纪 90 年代的地理学。纽约：Routledge 出版社。
Bennett, Robert J., and Robert Estall, eds. 1991. Global Change and Challenge: Geography for the 1990s. New York: Routledge.
科恩，索尔·伯纳德。1963。《分裂世界中的地理学》。纽约：兰登书屋。
Cohen, Saul Bernard. 1963. Geography in a World Divided. New York: Random House.
Demko, George J. 和 William B. Woods. 1994.重塑世界：21 世纪的地缘政治视角。科罗拉多州博尔德：Westview Press。
Demko, George J., and William B. Woods. 1994. Reordering the World: Geopolitical Perspectives on the 21st Century. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Glassner, Martin I. 和 Harm J. de Blij. 1989.系统政治地理学。纽约：John Wiley。
Glassner, Martin I., and Harm J. de Blij. 1989. Systematic Political Geography. New York: John Wiley.
军事地理
MILITARY GEOGRAPHY
一般的
GENERAL
Brinkerhoff, John R. 1964. 现代军事地理的本质。哥伦比亚大学论文。
Brinkerhoff, John R. 1964. The Nature of Modern Military Geography. Thesis, Columbia University.
梅，爱德华·S. 1909。《军事地理导论》。伦敦：休·里斯出版社。
May, Edward S. 1909. An Introduction to Military Geography. London: Hugh Rees.
O'Sullivan, Patrick 和 Jesse W. Miller, Jr. 1983。《战争地理学》。纽约：圣马丁出版社。
O’Sullivan, Patrick, and Jesse W. Miller, Jr. 1983. The Geography of Warfare. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
奥沙利文，帕特里克。1991。《地形与战术》。纽约：格林伍德出版社。
O’Sullivan, Patrick. 1991. Terrain and Tactics. New York: Greenwood Press.
Peltier, Louis C. 和 G. Etzel Pearcy. 1966.军事地理学。普林斯顿，新泽西州：D. Van Nostrand。
Peltier, Louis C., and G. Etzel Pearcy. 1966. Military Geography. Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand.
军事地理读本。1990年。杰拉尔德·E·加洛韦 (Gerald E. Galloway, Jr.) 编。纽约西点：美国军事学院地理系。
Readings in Military Geography. 1990. Comp. Gerald E. Galloway, Jr. West Point, New York: U.S. Military Academy, Dept. of Geography.
历史先例
HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS
钱德勒，大卫。1987。《战役词典》。伦敦：埃伯里出版社。
Chandler, David. 1987. The Dictionary of Battles. London: Ebury Press.
Dupuy, R. Ernest 和 Trevor N. Dupuy. 1993. 《哈珀军事史百科全书》第4版。纽约：哈珀柯林斯出版社。
Dupuy, R. Ernest, and Trevor N. Dupuy. 1993. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History. 4th ed. New York: Harper Collins.
Fuller, JFC 1954.西方世界的军事史。2卷。纽约：Funk and Wagnalls出版社。
Fuller, J. F. C. 1954. A Military History of the Western World. 2 vols. New York: Funk and Wagnalls.
Poole, Walter S. 等人。1995 年 2 月。《联合指挥计划的历史，1946-1993》。华盛顿特区：参谋长联席会议主席办公室联合历史办公室。
Poole, Walter S., et al. February 1995. The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993. Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
各种视角
VARIOUS PERSPECTIVES
杜黑，朱利奥。1983。《空中指挥》。理查德·H·科恩和约瑟夫·P·哈拉汉编。迪诺·法拉利译。华盛顿特区：政府印刷局（原出版于1921年）。
Douhet, Guilio. 1983. Command of the Air. Eds. Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan. Trans. Dino Ferrari. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (originally published 1921).
麦金德，哈尔福德·J. 1942。民主理想与现实。纽约：亨利·霍尔特公司（原版出版于1919年）。
Mackinder, Halford J. 1942. Democratic Ideals and Reality. New York: Henry Holt and Co. (original publication 1919).
马汉，阿尔弗雷德·塞耶。1957。《海权对历史的影响，1660-1783》。美国世纪系列。纽约：希尔和王出版社（原版出版于1890年）。
Mahan, Alfred Thayer. 1957. The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783. American Century Series. New York: Hill and Wang (original publication 1890).
德·塞维尔斯基，亚历山大。1950。《空军力量：生存的关键》。纽约：西蒙与舒斯特出版社。
de Seversky, Alexander. 1950. Air Power: The Key to Survival. New York: Simon and Schuster.
问题点
TROUBLE SPOTS
安德森，伊万·W. 1993。《世界热点分析：地缘政治危机资料汇编》。纽约：Facts on File出版社。
Anderson, Ewan W. 1993. An Analysis of World Flashpoints: A Sourcebook of Geopolitical Crises. New York: Facts on File.
Day, Alan J. 编. 1987.边界和领土争端。Keesings参考出版物，第 2版。底特律，密歇根州：Gale Research。
Day, Alan J., ed. 1987. Border and Territorial Disputes. A Keesings Reference Publication., 2d ed. Detroit, Ml: Gale Research.
Dunnigan, James E. 和 Austin Bey. 1985. 《战争速成指南》。纽约：William Morrow and Co.
Dunnigan, James E., and Austin Bey. 1985. A Quick & Dirty Guide to War. New York: William Morrow and Co.
Keegan, John 和 Andrew Wheatcroft. 1986.冲突地带。纽约：西蒙与舒斯特出版社。
Keegan, John, and Andrew Wheatcroft. 1986. Zones of Conflict. New York: Simon and Schuster.
冷战时期的考量
COLD WAR CONSIDERATIONS
法灵顿，休。1989。《战略地理：北约、华沙条约组织和超级大国》。第2版。纽约：劳特利奇出版社。
Farrington, Hugh. 1989. Strategic Geography: NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Superpowers. 2d ed. New York: Routledge.
格拉斯通，塞缪尔。1964。《核武器的影响》。1964年。华盛顿特区：DA 小册子 39-3，政府印刷局。
Glasstone, Samuel. 1964. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons. 1964. Washington, DC: DA Pamphlet 39-3, Government Printing Office.
政治军事地图集
POLITICAL-MILITARY ATLASES
巴拉克劳夫，杰弗里。1978。《泰晤士世界历史地图集》。新泽西州梅普尔伍德：哈蒙德出版社。
Barraclough, Geoffry. 1978. The Times Atlas of World History. Maplewood, NJ: Hammond.
Chaliand, Gérard 和 Jean Pierre Rageau. 1992.战略地图集：世界强国的比较地缘政治。第 3版。纽约：Harper Perennial。
Chaliand, Gérard, and Jean Pierre Rageau. 1992. A Strategic Atlas: Comparative Geopolitics of the World Powers. 3d ed. New York: Harper Perennial.
埃斯波西托，文森特·J.，主编。1995。《西点美国战争地图集》。2卷。纽约西点：美国军事学院军事艺术与工程系。
Esposito, Vincent J., chief ed. 1995. The West Point Atlas of American Wars. 2 vols. West Point, New York: U.S. Military Academy, Dept. of Military Art and Engineering.
弗里德曼，劳伦斯。1985。《全球战略图谱》。纽约：Facts on File出版社。
Friedman, Lawrence. 1985. Atlas of Global Strategy. New York: Facts on File.
哈特曼，汤姆。1984。《世界军事史地图集，1945-1984》。纽约：Hippocrene Books。
Hartman, Tom. 1984. A World Atlas of Military History, 1945-1984. New York: Hippocrene Books.
Keegan, John. 1994. 《第二次世界大战时代地图集》。纽约：Crescent Books 出版社。
Keegan, John. 1994. The Times Atlas of the Second World War. New York: Crescent Books.
Kidron, Michael 和 Dan Smith. 1983. 《战争地图集：武装冲突—武装和平》。纽约：西蒙与舒斯特出版社。
Kidron, Michael, and Dan Smith. 1983. The War Atlas: Armed Conflict—Armed Peace. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Lobeck, Armin K. 1993. 《地图无法告诉我们的事：地图解读之旅》。芝加哥，伊利诺伊州：芝加哥大学出版社。
Lobeck, Armin K. 1993. Things Maps Don’t Tell Us: An Adventure into Map Interpretation. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.
纳特基尔，理查德和安东尼·普雷斯顿。1985。《海事史地图集》。纽约：Facts on File出版社。
Natkiel, Richard, and Antony Preston. 1985. Atlas of Maritime History. New York: Facts on File.
萨默斯，哈里·G.，小。1995。《越南战争历史地图集》。纽约：霍顿·米夫林出版社。
Summers, Harry G., Jr. 1995. Historical Atlas of the Vietnam War. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
西点军校自 1945 年以来的战争地图集。1994 年。纽约西点：美国军事学院历史系。
The West Point Atlas of Warfare Since 1945. 1994. West Point, New York: U.S. Military Academy, Dept. of History.
指数
INDEX
深渊
Abyss
危险品处置，300
HAZMAT disposal, 300
酸雨，298
Acid rain, 298
空中轰炸
Aerial bombardment
铁路，226
railroads, 226
雨林，120
rain forests, 120
道路，223
roads, 223
城市地区，207-209
urban areas, 207-209
空气动力阻力，141
Aerodynamic drag, 141
阿富汗沙漠行动，114
Afghan desert operations, 114
橙剂，298。另见除草剂。
Agent Orange, 298. See also Herbicides
艾迪德，穆罕默德·法拉
Aideed, Mohammed Farah
伏击美军、联合国部队，205
bushwhacks U.S., U.N. forces, 205
儿子担任美国翻译，184
son as U.S. interpreter, 184
空气。参见大气层
Air. See Atmosphere
飞机
Aircraft
针对洞穴，30-31
against caves, 30-31
反潜战，65-66页
antisubmarine warfare, 65-66
高度限制，139
altitude limits, 139
柏林空运，21，23-24，201，321
Berlin Airlift, 21, 23-24, 201, 321
地毯式轰炸，207-208
carpet bombing, 207-208
近距离空中支援，85、97、105、120
close air support, 85, 97, 105, 120
密度高度，85，106，395
density altitude, 85, 106, 395
沙漠，114
deserts, 114
森林，119-120
forests, 119-120
instrument flight rules, 84, 399
时差，14
jet lag, 14
山脉，103，105-107
伊拉克“禁飞区”，323
“no fly zones” in Iraq, 323
诺曼底，362 -363年
Normandy, 362-363
精确轰炸，207
precision bombing, 207
路线包裹，323-324
route packages, 323-324
跑道，33，228-231，362
跨洋旅行，14
transoceanic travel, 14
天气，70，75，84-85
气流，70
Air currents, 70
机场。参见军用航空基地。
Airfields. See Military air bases
机场。参见军用航空基地。
Airports. See Military air bases
空域（垂直限制），287
Airspace (vertical limits), 287
阿克赛钦，297
Aksai Chin, 297
阿拉莫，268
Alamo, 268
亚历山大大帝，第21卷，108页
Alexander the Great, xxi, 108
亚历山大六世，教皇（第一个政治边界），285年
Alexander VI, Pope (first political boundary), 285
阿尔及利亚（城市作战），205
Algeria (urban combat), 205
海拔高度（与机场相关），229。另见密度高度。
Altitude (related to airfields), 229. See also Density altitude
两栖作战
Amphibious operations
海滩和近岸水域，55-57
beaches and approaches, 55-57
仁川，62 -64年
Inchon, 62-64
Normandy, 351-353, 356-358, 361
圣纳泽尔，62
St. Nazaire, 62
塔拉瓦，62，321-322
潮汐，50，52，62，361，404
安德鲁斯，詹姆斯·J.，224
Andrews, James J., 224
安南山区天气，375-377
Annamese mountain weather, 375-377
南极洲
Antarctica
描述，293
described, 293
光照数据，78
light data, 78
海冰，55
sea ice, 55
领土主张，293
territorial claims, 293
条约条款，293
treaty provisions, 293
反潜战
Antisubmarine warfare
声学，其他，65-66
acoustics, other, 65-66
堡垒抑制，57
bastions inhibit, 57
沿海，129-130
littoral, 129-130
《澳新美安全条约》（成员国），248
ANZUS Treaty (members), 248
咸海，299-300
Aral Sea, 299-300
阿基米德，11
Archimedes, 11
群岛（脆弱性），23
Archipelagos (vulnerabilities), 23
北极
Arctic
de Severski’s strategic view, 280, 282
光照数据，78
light data, 78
北冰洋
Arctic Ocean
山体和浮冰，52，54-55，100-101
bergs and pack ice, 52, 54-55, 100-101
与苏联接壤，11
borders USSR, 11
landscapes, seascapes, 100, 102
边缘冰区，99-100，401
marginal ice zone, 99-100, 401
阿登战役（1940年和1944年），7
Ardennes (1940 and 1944), 7
Area analyses, 8-9, 339-344, 392
影响范围，392
Area of influence, 392
感兴趣领域，392
Area of interest, 392
作战区域，392
Area of operations, 392
责任区域（AOR）
Area of responsibility (AOR)
空中，321，323-24
英国，第二次世界大战，308
British, World War II, 308
加勒比海，317-318
Caribbean, 317-318
定义，392
defined, 392
北约，311-313
NATO, 311-313
海军，321-322
naval, 321-322
无人区，325
no man’s lands, 325
东北亚，315
Northeast Asia, 315
东南亚，315
Southeast Asia, 315
南太平洋，313，314-316
空间，325
space, 325
战区与战术，318-325页
theater and tactical, 318-325
美国作战司令部，308-318
U.S. combatant commands, 308-318
区域方位，392
Area orientation, 392
盔甲
Armor
涉水能力，221
fording capabilities, 221
森林，6，41，119-120
树篱，360-361
hedgerows, 360-361
山脉，103座
mountains, 103
在月球上，148
on the moon, 148
雪，97
snow, 97
城市作战，201，203-204
炮兵
Artillery
针对洞穴，30-31
against caves, 30-31
生物战弹药，86
biological warfare munitions, 86
森林，41，119-120
山脉，29，104-105
城市作战，203-204
urban combat, 203-204
穆罕默德·艾哈迈德·伊本·阿萨耶德，186 岁
Assayyid, Muhammad Ahmad Ibn, 186
大西洋
Atlantic Ocean
瓶颈，57
bottlenecks, 57
飓风，83
hurricanes, 83
大西洋壁垒，20，271，349，360，388
Atlantic Wall, 20, 271, 349, 360, 388
气氛
Atmosphere
气流，70-71
air currents, 70-71
层数，139-140
layers, 139-140
污染，298
pollution, 298
迅速变薄，69
thins rapidly, 69
态度（属性），187-188
Attitudes (attributes), 187-188
雪崩，107-108
Avalanches, 107-108
大道
Avenues
描述，343
described, 343
诺曼底，356-360
Normandy, 356-360
亚速尔群岛（美国用法），16，253，257
Azores (U.S. use), 16, 253, 257
巴格达（导弹袭击），207
Baghdad (missile attack on), 207
Baikal-Amur Magistral (railroad), 226, 228
弹道导弹预警系统（BMEWS ），16，247，249
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), 16, 247, 249
裸底座套件，230
Bare base kits, 230
巴伦支海
Barents Sea
冬季冰，98
winter ice, 98
气压
Barometric pressure
影响空中作业，85
affects air operations, 85
与温度和海拔有关，70
related to temperature and altitude, 70
基地。参见军事基地。
Bases. See Military bases
巴丹，20
Bataan, 20
突出部战役
Battle of the Bulge
巴顿的祈祷，69
Patton’s prayer, 69
突出，20-21
Salient, 20-21
贝马尔尚油田火灾，162
Bay Marchand oil fire, 162
猪湾事件，7
Bay of Pigs, 7
海滩。另见海岸线。
Beaches. See also Seashores
出口，128
exits, 128
仁川，63 -64年
Inchon, 63-64
诺曼底，351-353，358-359
侦察，56-57
reconnaissance, 56-57
交通便利性，56
trafficability, 56
变异性，55
variabilities, 55
光束武器
Beam weapons
在大气层中，88
in atmosphere, 88
在太空，147-148
in space, 147-148
蒲福风力等级
Beaufort Wind Scale
海事状态，54
sea states, 54
晨昏航海曙暮光开始时（BMNT ），78，345，393
Beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT), 78, 345, 393
贝鲁特海军陆战队兵营，206
Beirut Marine barracks, 206
比利时（美国基地），252
Belgium (U.S. bases), 252
柏林
Berlin
207年空中轰炸
aerial bombardment of, 207
空运，21，23-24，201，321
毁灭，207
devastation, 207
自由战士，205
freedom fighters, 205
重要性，21
importance, 21
生物战
Biological warfare
温度，115
heat, 115
在太空中，148
in space, 148
避难所，273
shelters, 273
天气影响，86
weather effects, 86
封锁，129
Blockades, 129
蓝色水域的定义，393
Blue water defined, 393
布卢门特里特，京特少将，349
Blumentritt, Major General Günter, 349
BMNT ，78，345，393
博卡日描述，350，360-361，364-365
Bocage described, 350, 360-361, 364-365
沼泽。参见湿地
Bog. See Wetlands
玻利维亚（埃内斯托·切·格瓦拉），7 -8
Bolivia (Ernesto Che Guevara), 7-8
边界
Boundaries
摘要，286
abstract, 286
空中行动，321，323-324
空域，287
airspace, 287
两栖突击，321
amphibious assault, 321
在海军责任区之间，321
between naval AORs, 321
加拿大，与美国，18，285-286
联盟，319-320
coalitions, 319-320
防御性陆地作战，319
defensive land operations, 319
埃塞俄比亚，296
Ethiopia, 296
首先是政治，285
first political, 285
查谟和克什米尔，296-297
Jammu and Kashmir, 296-297
链接，320
linkups, 320
军事需求，318-319
military requirements, 318-319
无人区，325
no man’s lands, 325
进攻性陆地作战，319
offensive land operations, 319
政治障碍，16
political obstacles, 16
区域，6
regional, 6
中苏，290-291
Sino-Soviet, 290-291
索马里，296
Somalia, 296
空间，325
space, 325
战术责任区，318-325
tactical AORs, 318-325
领海，286-287
territorial waters, 286-287
剧院，318
theater, 318
地形，286
topographical, 286
美国（含加拿大），18，285-286
United States (with Canada), 18, 285-286
布雷斯特围城战，200
Brest siege, 200
勃列日涅夫，列昂尼德，226
Brezhnev, Leonid, 226
桥梁
Bridges
贝加尔-阿穆尔省，226
Baikal-Amur Magistral, 226
缅甸路，222-223
Burma Road, 222-223
拆除工程，223
demolitions, 223
胡志明小道，372-373
Ho Chi Minh Trail, 372-373
山脉，103座
mountains, 103
市场花园行动，20
Operation Market Garden, 20
类型、特征，218-221
types, characteristics, 218-221
英国
Britain
207年空中轰炸
aerial bombardment of, 207
阿富汗战争，114
Afghan wars, 114
二战中的AOR，308
AORs in World War II, 308
帝国的生命线，15
lifelines of empire, 15
安全地点，14
secure location, 14
美国基地，250-251
U.S. bases, 250-251
布朗宁，弗雷德里克中将，20
Browning, Lieutenant General Frederick, 20
棕色水，393。另见沿海；内河战
Brown water, 393. See also Littoral; Riverine warfare
布达佩斯（自由战士），205
Budapest (freedom fighters), 205
欧洲缓冲区（苏联），288-290
Buffer zones in Europe (Soviet), 288-290
缅甸路。另见雷多路
Burma Road. See also Ledo Road
桥梁，222-223
bridges, 222-223
建筑，121，221-223
内河运输，239
river transportation, 239
布隆迪，180
Burundi, 180
生物战。参见生物战。
BW. See biological warfare
卡昂
Caen
气候，354
climate, 354
重要性，356
importance, 356
人口：355
population, 355
加莱。参见加莱海峡省。
Calais. See Pas de Calais
卡尔瓦多斯
Calvados
地形，349-350
terrain, 349-350
天气和气候，353-354
weather and climate, 353-354
柬埔寨
Cambodia
种族灭绝，182-183
genocide, 182-183
庇护所，16
sanctuary, 16
加拿大-美国边界，18，285-286
Canada-U.S. boundary, 18, 285-286
运河
Canals
从巴伦支海到黑海，240
Barents to Black Sea, 240
巴拿马，240-241
Panama, 240-241
加勒比地区 AOR ，317-318
Caribbean AORs, 317-318
地毯式轰炸，207-208
Carpet bombing, 207-208
卡特，吉米总统，317
Carter, President Jimmy, 317
卡斯特罗，菲德尔，102
Castro, Fidel, 102
伤亡
Casualties
与人口规模相比，178
compared with population size, 178
考文垂，207
Coventry, 207
疾病，181-182
disease, 181-182
德累斯顿，207
Dresden, 207
汉堡，207
Hamburg, 207
日本城市，208
Japanese cities, 208
列宁格勒，200 -201年
Leningrad, 200-201
伦敦，207
London, 207
梅西内斯岭，272
Messines Ridge, 272
第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战，178
World Wars I and II, 178
高加索语言杂乱，184-185
Caucasus linguistic clutter, 184-185
洞穴，30-31
Caves, 30-31
中央司令部。参见美国中央司令部
CENTCOM. See U.S. Central Command
中央司令部。参见美国中央司令部
Central Command. See U.S. Central Command
香榭丽舍坦克决斗，201
Champs-Elysées tank duel, 201
变更操作控制（CHOP），321
Change operational control (CHOP), 321
长津水库，83
Changjin Reservoir, 83
查戈加戈格湖，286
Chargoggagog. . . Lake, 286
化学战
Chemical warfare (CW)
冷，95
cold, 95
温度，114-115
heat, 114-115
在太空中，148
in space, 148
避难所，273
shelters, 273
街头斗殴，203
street fighting, 203
城市轰炸，207
urban bombardment, 207
废物处理，300
waste disposal, 300
天气，86-87
weather, 86-87
瑟堡
Cherbourg
气候，354
climate, 354
235的毁灭
destruction of, 235
重要性，349，356-357，362
人口，354-355
population, 354-355
夏延山，272
Cheyenne Mountain, 272
蒋介石大元帅，107
Chiang, Generalissimo Kai-Shek, 107
约瑟夫酋长，17岁
Chief Joseph, 17
智利（细长形），20
Chile (elongated shape), 20
中国。另见毛泽东
China. See also Mao Zedong
确保摧毁，209
Assured Destruction, 209
边界争端，290-291
border disputes, 290-291
农民政权基础，177
peasant power base, 177
南沙群岛，291-292
Spratly Islands, 291-292
咽喉要道
Choke points
山隘，103
mountain passes, 103
海峡，57-58，240，291
问题点，291
trouble spots, 291
迪特里希·冯·肖尔蒂茨将军保护巴黎，200
Choltitz, General Dietrich von, preserves Paris, 200
CHOP，321
CHOP, 321
长津湖，83
Chosin Reservoir, 83
温斯顿·丘吉尔爵士
Churchill, Sir Winston
铁幕演说，270
Iron Curtain speech, 270
美英太平洋责任区，308
U.S.-British Pacific AORs, 308
昼夜节律
Circadian Rhythm
在太空中，150
in space, 150
在地球上，14
on Earth, 14
环地球空间，143
Cicumterrestrial space, 143
地月空间，144-145
Cislunar space, 144-145
城市。参见城区；城市轰炸；城市作战
City. See Urban areas; Urban bombardment; Urban combat
公民行动，民事事务
Civic action, Civil Affairs
区域方向，191
area orientation, 191
科威特，191
Kuwait, 191
城市作战，203-204
urban combat, 203-204
城市设施，197 -198年
urban facilities, 197-198
挖井，35
well digging, 35
民防，209，272-273
南北战争时期的铁路，224
Civil War railroads, 224
氏族，394
Clans, 394
克劳塞维茨，卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨少将
Clausewitz, Major General Carl von
土地权力倡导者，278
land power proponent, 278
关于防御工事，267
on fortifications, 267
山地防御，109
on mountain defense, 109
俄亥俄州克利夫兰天然气爆炸，162
Cleveland, Ohio, natural gas explosion, 162
气候
Climate
定义，394
defined, 394
Ho Chi Minh Trail, 368, 375-377
对规划者的重要性，79-80
importance to planners, 79-80
诺曼底，353-354
Normandy, 353-354
克林顿，威廉·J·克林顿总统，205
Clinton, President William J., 205
近距离空中支援，85、97、105、120
Close air support, 85, 97, 105, 120
云
Clouds
空中行动，84 -85年
air operations, 84-85
与雾相比，74
compared with fog, 74
类型，74-76
types, 74-76
克吕塞雷将军，P.-G. ，204-205
Cluséret, General P.-G., 204-205
瓜达尔卡纳尔岛海岸观察员，118
Coastwatchers on Guadalcanal, 118
可可，8-9
COCOA, 8-9
寒冷天气
Cold weather
空中行动，97
air operations, 97
防御行动，96
defensive operations, 96
食物和水，95
food and water, 95
冰封的河流、湖泊，97
frozen rivers, lakes, 97
领导力，95-96
leadership, 95-96
维护，96
maintenance, 96
山脉，104座
mountains, 104
海军问题，98-100
naval problems, 98-100
新几内亚，117
New Guinea, 117
进攻行动，96
offensive operations, 96
陆路机动性，97
overland mobility, 97
人员，88
personnel, 88
庇护所，95
shelter, 95
供应需求，98
supply requirements, 98
生存至上，94
survival paramount, 94
柯林斯，约瑟夫将军（难民），204
Collins, General Joseph (refugees), 204
COMUSMACV。参见威斯特摩兰将军，威廉·C。
COMUSMACV. See Westmoreland, General William C.
建筑工程。另见：军事基地；铁路；公路
Construction. See also Military bases; Railroads; Roads
西伯利亚，196
Siberia, 196
表面材料，36-37
surface materials, 36-37
城市地区，196
urban areas, 196
科贝特，朱利安爵士（海权倡导者），280
Corbett, Sir Julian (sea power proponent), 280
核心领域
Core areas
诺曼底，356
Normandy, 356
苏联，341-342
Soviet, 341-342
科雷吉多尔，17
Corregidor, 17
COSSAC. See Morgan, Lieutenant General Sir Frederick.
科唐坦半岛
Cotentin Peninsula
瓶颈，356-357
bottleneck, 356-357
地形，350
terrain, 350
反恐，206
Counterterrorism, 206
考文垂（空袭），207
Coventry (aerial bombardment of), 207
掩护和隐蔽
Cover and concealment
草原，42
steppes, 42
关键地形
Critical terrain
诺曼底，356
Normandy, 356
埃尔帕索行动计划，378
OPLAN El Paso, 378
典型，343
typified, 343
古巴。另见古巴导弹危机
Cuba. See also Cuban missile crisis
卡特总统的担忧，317
President Carter’s concern, 317
卡斯特罗的游击队，102
Castro’s guerrillas, 102
脱盐，35
desalinization, 35
古巴导弹危机
Cuban missile crisis
美国和苏联的后勤保障线，15
U.S. and Soviet LOCs, 15
美国铁路，224
U.S. railroads, 224
库林，一级军士长柯蒂斯，360-361
Culin, Master Sergeant Curtis, 360-361
文化地理
Cultural geography
定义，395
defined, 395
电流
Currents
气流，70
air currents, 70
仁川，64
Inchon, 64
水坝
Dams
目标，32
targets, 32
引水工程，299
water diversion, 299
岘港
Danang
重要的海港，380 -381年
important seaport, 380-381
Danzig (trouble spot), 21, 286
D日确定（诺曼底），361
D-Day determination (Normandy), 361
下降，139
Declination, 139
深海战斗（边界），325
Deep battle (boundaries), 325
德菲拉德，29-30
Defilade, 29-30
落叶。参见除草剂；橙剂
Defoliation. See Herbicides; Agent Orange
森林砍伐，298
Deforestation, 298
戴高乐，查尔斯总统
de Gaulle, President Charles
解放阿尔及利亚，205
frees Algeria, 205
脱水
Dehydration
在山区，106
in mountains, 106
非军事区
Demilitarized zones
边界，286
boundaries, 286
韩国，14，270，272，286
公用事业，14
utility, 14
越南，14，286，371
人口统计学
Demography
定义，395
defined, 395
拆除，223
Demolitions, 223
密度高度
Density altitude
影响空中作业，85
affects air operations, 85
定义，395
defined, 395
在山区，106
in mountains, 106
脱盐，35
Desalinization, 35
沙漠
Deserts
古代战争，109
ancient warfare, 109
服装，111
clothing, 111
与海洋相比，113
compared with seas, 113
疾病，112
disease, 112
多元化，110
diversification, 110
陆地导航，113
land navigation, 113
地点，110
locations, 110
物流，115
logistics, 115
维护，111-112
maintenance, 111-112
交通便利性，113
trafficability, 113
能见度，113-114
visibility, 113-114
水，35，36，79，112-113
天气，111-112
weather, 111-112
de Seversky, Alexander, 280, 282
DEW Line ，16，247，250
疾病
Disease
咸海，299-300
Aral Sea, 299-300
181- 182年伤亡人数
casualties from, 181-182
应对措施，181-182
countermeasures, 181-182
沙漠，112
deserts, 112
温度，89
heat, 89
雨林，121
rain forests, 121
荣萨特区，126
Rung Sat Special Zone, 126
城市地区，203
urban areas, 203
与水有关，34
water related, 34
远距离预警线，16、247、250
Distant Early Warning Line, 16, 247, 250
杜黑，朱利奥准将
Douhet, Brigadier General Guilio
空中力量倡导者，280
air power proponent, 280
城市轰炸理论，207
urban bombardment theory, 207
德累斯顿（轰炸），207
Dresden (bombardment of), 207
空投区（DZ）
Drop zone (DZ)
科雷吉多尔，17
Corregidor, 17
老挝狭长地带，374
Laotian panhandle, 374
在阿纳姆的联谊会，20
linkup at Arnhem, 20
诺曼底，360-361
Normandy, 360-361
地球
Earth
重力井，146-147
gravity well, 146-147
绕太阳运行，141
orbits sun, 141
旋转，49，141-142
地月系统
Earth-Moon System
成分，137-139
constituents, 137-139
未来军事行动，137
future military operations, 137
绕太阳运行，141
orbits sun, 141
战略位置，146-147
strategic locations, 146-147
耳鼻喉科，78
EENT, 78
专属经济区。参见专属经济区。
EEZ. See exclusive economic zone.
艾森豪威尔，陆军上将德怀特·D.
Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D.
分析欧洲AOR，311
analyzes European AOR, 311
诺曼底登陆日疑虑，271
D-Day doubts, 271
地理的重要性，388
importance of geography, 388
与俄罗斯人联系，320
linkup with Russians, 320
巴黎解放，319
Paris liberation, 319
诺曼底寄宿处，355
Normandy lodgment, 355
美英AOR，308
U.S.-British AORs, 308
天气决定，361
weather decision, 361
电磁脉冲（EMP），147-148
Electromagnetic pulse (EMP), 147-148
Enclaves in hostile territory, 21, 23
傍晚航海曙暮光结束（EENT），78
End of evening nautical twilight (EENT), 78
恩德培，287
Entebbe, 287
环境摩擦
Environmental friction
军事反制措施，300-301
military countermeasures, 300-301
典型值，297-300
typified, 297-300
环境战。另见橙剂；除草剂。
Environmental warfare. See also Agent Orange; Herbicides
在越南，298
in Vietnam, 298
Ethiopian cultural conflict, 294, 296
波斯尼亚的种族清洗，293
Ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, 293
族群分化，182-183
Ethnic groups differentiated, 182-183
欧洲司令部。参见美国欧洲司令部
EUCOM. See U.S. European Command
欧洲
Europe
森林砍伐，39
deforestation, 39
内河航道，32，238-239
Mackinder’s Heartland, 278-279, 283
金属和矿物，155
metals and minerals, 155
石油，157
oil for, 157
铁路，18，224-226
河流，32
rivers, 32
苏联缓冲区，288-290
Soviet buffer zone, 288-290
湿冷，88
wet cold, 88
欧洲司令部。参见美国欧洲司令部（EUCOM）。
European Command. See U.S. European Command (EUCOM)
大沼泽地，塞米诺尔战争，124 -125年
Everglades, Seminole Wars, 124-125
Exclaves in hostile territory, 21, 23, 286
专属经济区（EEZ）
Exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
南极洲，293
Antarctica, 293
渔业，300
fisheries, 300
海洋法，287
law of the sea, 287
远征机场
Expeditionary airfields
特征，230
characteristics, 230
诺曼底，362 -363年
Normandy, 362-363
外部通信线路，397
Exterior lines of communication, 397
埃克森·瓦尔迪兹号漏油事件，299
Exxon Valdez, oil spill, 299
辐射尘。参见核武器
Fallout. See Nuclear weapons
从法国快速搬迁，20，252-253
Fast Relocation from France, 20, 252-253
德意志联邦共和国。另见德国盟军中欧部队（AFCENT），第313-314页。
Federal Republic of Germany. See also Germany Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), 313-314
Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs), 249, 252
渡轮，221
Ferries, 221
烈焰战场，343-344
Fields of fire, 343-344
芬兰
Finland
曼纳海姆线，270
Mannerheim Line, 270
苏联吞并，288
Soviet annexations, 288
火力支援协调线 (FSCL)，325
Fire support coordination line (FSCL), 325
渔业（枯竭），300
Fisheries (depletion of), 300
冲突热点。参见“动乱点”。
Flashpoints. See Trouble spots
多雾路段
Fog
影响空中作业，84-85
affects air operations, 84-85
特征，74
characteristics, 74
能见度，74
visibility in, 74
民俗
Folkways
定义，397
defined, 397
重要性，189-190
importance, 189-190
福特，221
Fords, 221
外国区域专家，190-191
Foreign area specialists, 190-191
森林
Forests
森林砍伐，298-299
deforestation, 298-299
游击队，119
guerrillas, 119
军事意义，41-42
military significance, 41-42
潮汐，125-126
tidewater, 125-126
类型，39-41
types, 39-41
防御工事
Fortifications
大西洋壁垒，20，271，349，360，388
Atlantic Wall, 20, 271, 349, 360, 388
沿海和岛屿，268
coastal and island, 268
历史实例，267
historical examples, 267
即兴，268
impromptu, 268
韩国隧道，272
Korean tunnels, 272
库尔斯克，269
Kursk, 269
马奇诺防线，270
Maginot Line, 270
人为障碍物，343
manmade obstacles, 343
核防御，272-273
nuclear defenses, 272-273
齐格菲防线，270-271
Siegfried Line, 270-271
越共隧道，269
Viet Cong tunnels, 269
堡垒。参见防御工事。
Fortresses. See Fortifications
堡垒。参见防御工事。
Forts. See Fortifications
否认飞越权，16
denies overflight rights, 16
部队重新进入巴黎，319
forces reenter Paris, 319
解放阿尔及利亚，205
frees Algeria, 205
LOCs in ，252-253，255
铁路被毁，226条
railroads destroyed, 226
FRELOC ，20，252-253
太空摩擦生热，141
Frictional heat in space, 141
正面（防御），319
Frontages (defensive), 319
FSCL，325
FSCL, 325
富尔达峡谷，313-314
Fulda Gap, 313-314
盖勒，诺埃尔海军上将，323
Gaylor, Admiral Noel, 323
盖茨，托马斯·S.，小，317
Gates, Thomas S., Jr., 317
轨距（铁路），225
Gauges (railways), 225
日内瓦公约，188
Geneva Conventions, 188
种族灭绝，非洲和亚洲，182-183，293
Genocide, Africa and Asia, 182-183, 293
地理媒介（服务偏好），277-282
Geographic mediums (service predilections), 277-282
地理区域，6
Geographic regions, 6
地理学的定义，3，397。另见文化地理学；军事地理学；自然地理学；政治地理学；区域地理学。
Geography defined, 3, 397. See also Cultural geography; Military geography; Physical geography; Political geography; Regional geography
Geostationary orbits, 143, 146
地球同步轨道，143
Geosynchronous orbits, 143
德国。另见德意志联邦共和国。
Germany. See also Federal Republic of Germany
207- 208年的空中轰炸
aerial bombardment of, 207-208
与日本结盟，15
allied with Japan, 15
四线作战，14
four-front war, 14
内河航道，239
inland waterways, 239
沟通渠道，253
lines of communication, 253
矿物和金属，155
minerals and metals, 155
民族性格，189
national character, 189
铁路被毁，226条
railroads destroyed, 226
城市扩张，198 -199年
urban sprawl, 198-199
华沙条约大道，313-314
Warsaw Pact avenues, 313-314
成吉思汗，二十三
Ghenghis Khan, xxiii
武元甲将军
Giap, General Vo Nguyen,
奠边府，120
Dien Bien Phu, 120
胡志明小道，383
Ho Chi Minh Trail, 383
格鲁布，约翰·巴戈特将军（熔岩地），38
Glubb, General John Bagot (lava fields), 38
黄金海滩，352-353
Gold Beach, 352-353
醋栗（人工港湾），235
Gooseberries (artificial harbors), 235
戈登，查尔斯·乔治将军，186
Gordon, General Charles George, 186
戈林，赫尔曼元帅，207
Göring, Field Marshal Hermann, 207
梯度
Gradients
计算结果，28-29
calculation, 28-29
与机场相关，229
related to airfields, 229
草原。另见草原。
Grasslands. See also Steppes
墓葬登记（雨林），121
Graves registration (rain forests), 121
重力
Gravity
人造的，150
artificial, 150
太空飞行，141-142
space flight, 141-142
英国。参见英国
Great Britain. See Britain
希腊（美军基地），253-254，259
Greece (U.S. bases), 253-254, 259
格陵兰岛。另见图勒。
Greenland. See also Thule.
格陵兰-冰岛-挪威山口，57-58
Greenland-Iceland-Norway Gaps, 57-58
瓜达尔卡纳尔岛
Guadalcanal
海岸观察员，118
coastwatchers, 118
植被，116
vegetation, 116
关塔那摩
Guantanamo
水脱盐，35
water desalinization, 35
格瓦拉，埃内斯托（切），7-8
Guevara, Ernesto (Che), 7-8
廓尔喀人，181
Gurkhas, 181
海牙公约，188
Hague Conventions, 188
海防矿业，129
Haiphong mining, 129
汉堡轰炸，207
Hamburg bombardment, 207
Hannibal (crosses Alps), 6, 108
港口
Harbors
特征，232
characteristics, 232
冰，98
ice, 98
豪斯霍费尔，卡尔，生存空间，278
Haushofer, Karl, Lebensraum, 278
危险废物处理，300
Hazardous waste disposal, 300
健康。参见疾病。
Health. See Diseases
中心地带
Heartland
应用于太空，282
applied to space, 282
麦金德的理论，278-279，283
Mackinder’s theory, 278-279, 283
高温。参见高温天气
Heat. See Hot Weather
亨内克，瓦尔特海军少将（摧毁瑟堡），235
Hennecke, Rear Admiral Walther (destroys Cherbourg), 235
越南的除草剂，43。另见橙剂。
Herbicides in Vietnam, 43. See also Agent Orange
越南1号公路，380-381
Highway 1 in Vietnam, 380-381
喜马拉雅山
Himalayas
边境冲突，181
border skirmishes, 181
障碍物，343
obstacle, 343
稀薄的大气层，106
rarefied atmosphere, 106
广岛（原子弹轰炸），159，207，209
Hiroshima (atom bombing of), 159, 207, 209
希特勒
Hitler
大西洋壁垒，271
Atlantic Wall, 271
高速公路，215
Autobahns, 215
布雷斯特，200
Brest, 200
瑟堡，235
Cherbourg, 235
重水厂，31
Heavy water plant, 31
生存空间，180
Lebensraum, 180
巴巴罗萨行动，17
Operation Barbarossa, 17
巴黎，200
Paris, 200
普里佩特沼泽，122
Pripet Swamp, 122
罗马，200
Rome, 200
违反低地国家，16
violates Low Counries, 16
胡志明小道
Ho Chi Minh Trail
发展、能力、367-369
development, capacities, 367-369
可通行机动车的道路，372-373条
motorable roads, 372-373
定居点，372
settlements, 372
霍夫走廊，313-314
Hof Corridor, 313-314
荷兰。参见荷兰
Holland. See Netherlands
香港，291
Hong Kong, 291
马纬度，47
Horse Latitudes, 47
炎热天气
Hot weather
适应，112
acclimatization, 112
飞机，111
aircraft, 111
生物战，115
biological warfare, 115
化学战，86-87，89，114-115
chemical warfare, 86-87, 89, 114-115
人员，89
personnel, 89
需水量，35-36，89，112-113
water requirements, 35-36, 89, 112-113
湿度（与温度相关），73
Humidity (related to temperature), 73
驼峰（喜马拉雅山脉），107
Hump (Himalayan), 107
Hungary (freedom fighters), 15, 205
大西洋飓风，83
Hurricanes in Atlantic, 83
水文学定义，399
Hydrology defined, 399
水政治（中东），299
Hydropolitics (Middle East), 299
低温
Hypothermia
原因、影响、89
causes, effects, 89
冰冷的水，99
frigid waters, 99
在山区，106
in mountains, 106
温暖的水域，89
warm waters, 89
缺氧，106
Hypoxia, 106
洲际弹道导弹发射井加固，272
ICBM silo hardening, 272
冰
Ice
surface ship stability, 60, 84, 99
冰山和浮冰，52，54-55，99-101
Icebergs and floes, 52, 54-55, 99-101
破冰船，98-99
Icebreakers, 98-99
照明。另见光数据；夜视
Illumination. See also Light data; Night vision
大气影响，87
atmospheric influences, 87
沙漠，114
deserts, 114
光照强度，77-78
light levels, 77-78
夜视，87
night vision, 87
诺曼底登陆，361
Normandy invasion, 361
与纬度、季节有关，78
related to latitudes, seasons, 78
海水阻力为48
sea water resists, 48
雪倒映着，96
snow reflects, 96
黄昏各异，78
twilights differentiated, 78
仁川登陆，62-64
Inchon landing, 62-64
印度尼西亚（形状不规则），24
Indonesia (fragmented shape), 24
内河航道，238-240
Inland waterways, 238-240
内太空。参见地球周围空间。
Inner space. See Circumterrestrial space
教皇英诺森三世（异端），186年
Innocent III, Pope (heretics), 186
仪表飞行规则（IFR），84
Instrument flight rules (IFR), 84
美洲国家间互助条约，成员国，248
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, members, 248
洲际弹道导弹（加固），272
Intercontinental ballistic missile (hardening), 272
内部通信线路，399
Interior lines of communication, 399
伊拉克
Iraq
美国语言学家短缺，184
linguist shortage (U.S.), 184
禁飞区，323
“no fly” zones, 323
管道，241
pipelines, 241
铁幕（演讲），270
Iron Curtain (speech), 270
岛屿
Islands
设防，268-269
fortified, 268-269
垫脚石，16
stepping stones, 16
以色列
Israel
恩德培，287
Entebbe, 287
人口：178
population, 178
西奈路，216
Sinai roads, 216
两线作战，14
two-front wars, 14
赎罪日战争，187年
Yom Kippur war, 187
意大利
Italy
山脉，105
mountains, 105
泥浆，80
mud, 80
半岛战争，20
peninsular combat, 20
罗马，200
Rome, 200
美国基地，253、254、258
岩渊三治海军少将，马尼拉，200
Iwabuchi, Rear Admiral Sanji, Manila, 200
杰克逊将军，安德鲁（塞米诺尔战争），124
Jackson, General Andrew (Seminole Wars), 124
查谟和克什米尔，296-297
Jammu and Kashmir, 296-297
日本
Japan
与德国结盟，15
allied with Germany, 15
轰炸，207-209
bombardment of, 207-209
碎片状形状，24
fragmented shape, 24
丛林战手册，116
jungle warfare pamphlet, 116
民族性格，189
national character, 189
自然资源，155，159-161
natural resources, 155, 159-161
安全地点，14
secure location, 14
World War II holdings, 18, 160
让滞后
let lag
在太空中，150
in space, 150
在地球上，14
on Earth, 14
让流，70
let stream, 70
约翰逊，林登·B·约翰逊总统
Johnson, President Lyndon B.
埃尔帕索行动计划，383
OPLAN El Paso, 383
越南目标，367
Vietnam targets, 367
尤利乌斯二世，教皇（政治边界），285年
Julius II, Pope (political boundaries), 285
丛林。另见热带雨林。
Jungles. See also rain forests
定义，399
defined, 399
美国、日本手册，116
U.S., Japanese manuals, 116
朱诺海滩，352-353
Juno Beach, 352-353
克什米尔，296-297
Kashmir, 296-297
卡塞林山口，113
Kasserine Pass, 113
关键地形。参见重要地形
Key terrain. See Critical terrain
溪山
Khe Sanh
机场，374
airfield, 374
暴露位置，31
exposed position, 31
值，378
value, 378
赫鲁晓夫，尼基塔，15
Khrushchev, Nikita, 15
金斯顿，罗伯特·C少校，231
Kingston, Major Robert C, 231
科科达赛道，118 -119
Kokoda Track, 118-119
韩国
Korea
AOR争议，315
AOR disputes, 315
伤亡人数：181
casualties, 181
非军事区，14、270、272、286
demilitarized zone, 14, 270, 272, 286
仁川，62 -64年
Inchon, 62-64
山脉，109，343-344
非亚裔战俘，181人
non-Asian POWs, 181
北方，贫困，291
North, destitute, 291
半岛战争，20
peninsular warfare, 20
首尔易受攻击，18
Seoul vulnerable, 18
隧道，272
tunnels, 272
城市扩张，198
urban sprawl, 198
库尔德人
Kurds
禁飞区，323
“no fly” zone, 323
无国籍人士，293
stateless, 293
千岛群岛，291
Kuril Islands, 291
科威特
Kuwait
民政事务，191
civil affairs, 191
科威特城解放，320
Kuwait City liberation, 320
湖泊边界，286
Lake boundaries, 286
土地清理技术，42-43页。另见橙剂；除草剂
Land clearing techniques, 42-43. See also Agent Orange; Herbicides
地形。参见地形学
Land forms. See Topography
着陆区（LZ）
Landing zone (LZ)
老挝狭长地带，374
Laotian panhandle, 374
诺曼底，271，360-361
土地权力支持者，278
Land power proponents, 278
语言
Languages
方言、俚语、184
dialects, slang, 184
分布，183-184，185
英语是通用语言，184
English is universal, 184
埃塞俄比亚，294
Ethiopia, 294
翻译员，191
interpreters, 191
军事重要性，184，191-192
military importance, 184, 191-192
美国中央司令部责任区，184
U.S. Central Command AOR, 184
美国太平洋司令部责任区，184
U.S. Pacific Command AOR, 184
大西洋司令部。参见美国大西洋司令部
LANTCOM. See U.S. Atlantic Command
老挝狭长地带
Laotian panhandle
机场，373-374
airfields, 373-374
空投区、着陆区、374
drop zones, landing zones, 374
道路，372-373，375
地形，370-372
terrain, 370-372
激光
Lasers
大气影响，87-88
atmospheric effects on, 87-88
太空，147
space, 147
拉美
Latin America
加勒比地区 AOR ，317-318
Caribbean AORs, 317-318
美洲国家间条约成员国，248
Inter-American Treaty members, 248
美国基地，261个
U.S. bases, 261
红土
Laterite
机场，373-374
airfields, 373-374
建筑材料，38-39
construction material, 38-39
道路，372
roads, 372
海洋法，286-287
Law of the Sea, 286-287
生存空间
Lebensraum
希特勒的目标，180
Hitler’s aim, 180
根，278
roots of, 278
Ledo Road construction, 121, 221. See also Burma Road
法律约束，第188条。另见《日内瓦公约》、《海牙公约》和《联合国海洋法公约》。
Legal constraints, 188. See also Geneva Conventions; Hague Conventions; United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea
列宁，弗拉基米尔
Lenin, Vladimir
关于国土防御，209
on homeland defense, 209
城市游击队，205
urban guerrilla, 205
列宁格勒
Leningrad
伤亡人数，200-201
casualties, 200-201
人生之路，97
road of life, 97
Libration points, 138, 144-147, 282
利比亚
Libya
SAS袭击机场，230-231
SAS attacks airfields, 230-231
列日防御工事，269
Liège fortifications, 269
光照数据。参见照明；夜视
Light data. See Illumination; Night vision
莉莉曼，弗兰克·L.上尉（探路者），361
Lillyman, Captain Frank L. (pathfinder), 361
交通线路。另见：港口；内河航道；军事空军基地；输油管道；铁路；公路；海港。
Lines of communication. See also Harbors; Inland waterways; Military air bases; Pipelines; Railroads; Roads; Seaports
定义，400
defined, 400
外观，397
exterior, 397
法国，252-253，255
胡志明小道，367-370
Ho Chi Minh Trail, 367-370
I CTZ，380-382
I CTZ, 380-382
内河航道，238-240
inland waterways, 238-240
内部，399
interior, 399
老挝狭长地带，372-374，382-383
Laotian panhandle, 372-374, 382-383
山脉，103座
mountains, 103
OPLAN El Paso，384-387
OPLAN El Paso, 384-387
雨林，121，221-223
与距离有关，14-15
related to distance, 14-15
空间，146，236-238
湿地，125-126
wetlands, 125-126
监听站（美国），259
Listening posts (U.S.), 259
滨海
Littoral
封锁，129
blockades, 129
定义，典型化，126-128
defined, typified, 126-128
历史战争，17
historical warfare, 17
与开阔海域相比，128
compared with open ocean, 128
地点
Locations
占主导地位，15-16
dominant, 15-16
安全，14
secure, 14
通信线路。参见“通信线路” 。
LOCs. See Lines of communication
后勤
Logistics
沙漠，112-113，115
山脉，105
mountains, 105
OPLAN El Paso，380-383
OPLAN El Paso, 380-383
雨林，120-121
rain forests, 120-121
城市地区，203-204
urban areas, 203-204
卢瓦尔河谷（住宿前景），349
Loire Valley (lodgment prospects), 349
伦敦（空袭），207
London (aerial bombardment of), 207
长征，17-18、19、30、177
Long March, 17-18, 19, 30, 177
忠诚、重要性、187
Loyalties, importance, 187
Lunar libration points, 138, 144-147, 282
麦克阿瑟，陆军上将道格拉斯
MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas
太平洋AOR，313-316
Pacific AOR, 313-316
马基雅维利，《尼科洛》（论军事地理），27
Machiavelli, Niccoló (on military geography), 27
麦金德爵士，哈尔福德·J.
Mackinder, Sir Halford J.
土地权力倡导者，278-279，283
land power proponent, 278-279, 283
理论应用于空间，282
theory applied to space, 282
马登，中校（珠穆朗玛峰救援队），85岁
Maden, Lieutenant Colonel (Mount Everest rescue), 85
马奇诺防线，270
Maginot Line, 270
马汉，《海军少将阿尔弗雷德·塞耶（海权倡导者）》，第278、280-281页
Mahan, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer (sea power proponent), 278, 280-281
芒奇
Manche
地形，349-350
topography, 349-350
天气、气候，353-354
weather, climate, 353-354
满洲（圣地），16
Manchuria (sanctuary), 16
马尼拉（城市作战），200
Manila (urban combat), 200
毛泽东
Mao Zedong
人民的力量，177
power of people, 177
马科斯，费迪南德（美国基地），260
Marcos, Ferdinand (U.S. bases), 260
边缘冰区（MIZ ），99-100，401
Marginal ice zone (MIZ), 99-100, 401
马里盖拉，卡洛斯（城市游击队），205
Marighela, Carlos (urban guerrilla), 205
海军陆战队小规模战争手册，116
Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, 116
马里恩，弗朗西斯准将（沼泽狐狸），122
Marion, Brigadier General Francis (Swamp Fox), 122
沼泽阿拉伯人
Marsh Arabs
Iraq persecutes Sunnis, 124, 187
禁飞区，323
“no fly” zone, 323
马歇尔，陆军上将乔治·C.
Marshall, General of the Army George C.
关于士气，188
on morale, 188
关于海洋学，47
on oceanography, 47
沼泽。参见湿地。
Marshes. See Wetlands
掩膜（地形），29
Mask (terrain), 29
莫尔丁，比尔，4
Mauldin, Bill, 4
莫里，马修·F.中尉，47岁
Maury, Lieutenant Matthew F., 47
MBFR，15
MBFR, 15
麦克纳马拉，罗伯特·S.
McNamara, Robert S.,
确保摧毁，209
Assured Destruction, 209
关节性，283
jointness, 283
MEAFSA，17
MEAFSA, 17
医学。参见疾病
Medical. See Disease
媒介。参见地理媒介。
Mediums. See Geographic mediums
湄公河三角洲
Mekong Delta
炮兵，38
artillery, 38
施工，125
construction, 125
河川战争，125
riverine warfare, 125
梅里尔的掠夺者，118
Merrill’s Marauders, 118
梅西内斯岭，271-272
Messines Ridge, 271-272
金属（自然资源），153-156
Metals (natural resources), 153-156
气象学。参见天气
Meteorology. See Weather
微波武器
Microwave weapons
大气效应，87-88
atmospheric effects, 87-88
在太空中，147
in space, 147
中东
Middle East
责任区（AOR ）争议，309、311、315、317
area of responsibility (AOR) disputes, 309, 311, 315, 317
首都城市易受攻击，180
capital cities vulnerable, 180
水政治，299
hydropolitics, 299
美国基地，254个
U.S. bases, 254
军事空军基地
Military air bases
建设，228-231
construction, 228-231
防守，230-232
defense, 230-232
远征机场，230，362-363
expeditionary airfields, 230, 362-363
法国，251
France, 251
老挝狭长地带，373-374，383
Laotian panhandle, 373-374, 383
诺曼底，362 -363年
Normandy, 362-363
要求各不相同，228
requirements vary, 228
跑道，228-229
runways, 228-229
军事基地用途，245
Military base purposes, 245
军事地理
Military geography
关键因素，3-5
key factors, 3-5
古代，21世纪
olden times, xxi
研究略有不足，21
study slighted, xxi
军事服务思想流派，277-283
Military service schools of thought, 277-283
矿产（自然资源），153-156
Minerals (natural resources), 153-156
水雷（海军），128-129
Mines (naval), 128-129
米切尔，准将威廉（比利），280
Mitchell, Brigadier General William (Billy), 280
移动式海上基地，235-236
Mobile Offshore Bases, 235-236
摩加迪沙“维和行动”，205
Mogadishu “peacekeeping,” 205
赫尔穆特·卡尔·冯·毛奇将军（长者）（铁路），223
Moltke, General Helmut Karl von (The Elder) (railroads), 223
莫米耶将军，威廉·W.（空中指挥部），323
Momyer, General William W. (on air AORs), 323
季风
Monsoons
缅甸，116
Burma, 116
Vietnam, Laos, 79, 368, 375-377
蒙特卡西诺，109
Monte Cassino, 109
蒙哥马利，陆军元帅伯纳德·L·蒙哥马利爵士
Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L.
沙漠洪水阻碍，111
desert flood impedes, 111
蒙特勒会议，240
Montreux Convention, 240
月亮
Moon
军事边界，325
military boundaries on, 325
地形，144
terrain, 144
武器性能，147-149
weapon performance, 147-149
道德约束
Moral constraints
军事重要性，188
military importance, 188
开放城市，199-200
open cities, 199-200
士气，188
Morale, 188
摩根，弗雷德里克中将
Morgan, Lieutenant General Sir Frederick
在海滩出口处，356
on beach exits, 356
关于诺曼底的安置，第347、349、356页
on Normandy lodgment, 347, 349, 356
榫眼线，270
Mortise Line, 270
太空晕动症，149-150页。另见晕船。
Motion sickness in space, 149-150. See also Sea sickness
高原反应（缺氧症），106
Mountain sickness (hypoxia), 106
山脉
Mountains
安那州，371
Annamese, 371
雪崩，107-108
avalanches, 107-108
边界，286
boundaries, 286
近距离空中支援，105
close air support, 105
防御，109
defenses, 109
最高，106
highest, 106
imprecise term, 27-28, 102, 106
物流，105
logistics, 105
流动性，103-104
mobility, 103-104
观察哨，343
observation posts, 343
稀薄大气，106-107
rarefied atmosphere, 106-107
特殊技能，105
special skills, 105
电信，105
telecommunications, 105
植被，41
vegetation, 41
蒙巴顿，路易伯爵，海军元帅
Mountbatten, Earl Louis, Admiral of the Fleet
查谟和克什米尔，296
Jammu and Kashmir, 296
北约任务，313
NATO assignment, 313
珠穆朗玛峰（直升机救援），85
Mount Everest (helicopter rescue), 85
泥浆。另见湿地
Mud. See also Wetlands
突出部战役，69
Battle of the Bulge, 69
布纳，125-126
Buna, 125-126
仁川，63 -64年
Inchon, 63-64
意大利，80
Italy, 80
诺曼底，350
Normandy, 350
土壤类型的影响，37
soil types influence, 37
伊普尔，80
Ypres, 80
Mulberries (artificial harbors), 235, 362
墨索里尼，贝尼托，救援，85
Mussolini, Benito, rescue, 85
相互平衡力减小，15
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, 15
Nagasaki, atom bombing, 159, 208-209
北约。参见北大西洋公约组织
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
自然资源
Natural resources
与原材料相比，153
compared with raw materials, 153
列举，5
enumerated, 5
矿物和金属，153-156
minerals and metals, 153-156
石油，157，161-165
橡胶，157-159，161
库存，158
stockpiles, 158
鹦鹉螺号，冰下，100
Nautilus, under ice, 100
纳瓦霍“密码说话者”，184
Navaho “Code Talkers,” 184
纳瓦拉，亨利将军，7
Navarre, General Henri, 7
Netherlands (U.S. bases), 249, 252
新几内亚
New Guinea
科科达赛道，118 -119
Kokoda Track, 118-119
雨林，116-117
rain forests, 116-117
潮汐沼泽，125-126
tidewater swamps, 125-126
夜视功能。参见照明。
Night vision. See Illumination
尼米兹，海军上将切斯特·W.（太平洋战区），313-315
Nimitz, Fleet Admiral Chester W. (Pacific AOR), 313-315
尼克松，理查德·M·总统
Nixon, President Richard M.
柬埔寨，16
Cambodia, 16
蓝山 719, 384
Lam Son 719, 384
“无人区”，325
“No man’s lands,” 325
非致命武器（城市作战），204
Nonlethal weapons (urban combat), 204
诺曼底
Normandy
机场，362-363
airfields, 362-363
其他寄存方式，347-349
alternative lodgments, 347-349
古道，216
ancient roads, 216
大西洋壁垒，20，271，349，360，388
Atlantic Wall, 20, 271, 349, 360, 388
伤亡人数：271
casualties, 271
瑟堡，235，349，354，355-357，362
Cherbourg, 235, 349, 354, 355-357, 362
核心领域，356
core areas, 356
Cotentin peninsula, 350, 356-357
关键地形，356
critical terrain, 356
跨通道方法，357-358
cross-channel approaches, 357-358
D日决定，361
D-Day determination, 361
艾森豪威尔担心失败，271
Eisenhower fears failure, 271
地理数据，364
geographic data, 364
地理区域，349-350
geographic regions, 349-350
醋栗，235
Gooseberries, 235
H 小时测定，361
H-Hour determination, 361
光照数据，361
light data, 361
提交选项，347-349
lodgment options, 347-349
任务，341
missions, 341
冥王星管道，241
Pluto pipelines, 241
定居点，354-355，360
集结基地，357-358
staging bases, 357-358
潮汐，361
tides, 361
天气和气候，353-354，361
weather and climate, 353-354, 361
北大西洋公约组织
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
AOR问题，311-313
AOR problems, 311-313
通往312-313 号的通道
avenues into, 312-313
放大，290
enlargement, 290
成员248人
members, 248
美国冷战基地，254，255-259
U.S. Cold War bases, 254, 255-259
挪威
Norway
重水厂，31
heavy water plant, 31
美国基地，249
U.S. bases, 249
东北航道、西北航道，100
Northeast, Northwest Passages, 100
核废料处置，300
Nuclear waste disposal, 300
核武器
Nuclear weapons
城市目标定位，18、180、208-209
city targeting, 18, 180, 208-209
民防，209，272-273
洲际弹道导弹发射井，272
ICBM silos, 272
在沙漠中，114
in deserts, 114
在太空中，147
in space, 147
土壤影响，38
soil influences, 38
美国海外基地，250、252、254
U.S. bases abroad, 250, 252, 254
天气影响，85-86
weather effects, 85-86
观察，地理影响，343-344
Observation, geographic influences, 343-344
障碍
Obstacles
诺曼底，360-361
Normandy, 360-361
典型，343
typified, 343
海洋。另见海水
Oceans. See also Sea water
北冰洋，11，52，54-55，100-101
Arctic Ocean, 11, 52, 54-55, 100-101
beaches and approaches, 55-57, 393
独特的媒介，4
distinctive medium, 4
危险材料（HAZMAT）处置，300
hazardous material (HAZMAT) disposal, 300
冰，52，54，55，60，84，97，99-101
ice, 52, 54, 55, 60, 84, 97, 99-101
海事状态，54
sea states, 54
苏联通道，11
Soviet access, 11
海峡，57
straits, 57
涌浪，50
swell, 50
潮汐，50、52、62、64、361
美国访问量，11
U.S. access, 11
海洋学，401
Oceanography, 401
奥科卡，9
OCOKA, 9
石油。参见石油。
Oil. See Petroleum
冲绳（美军基地），254、260、261、263
Okinawa (U.S. bases), 254, 260, 261, 263
开放城市，199-200
Open cities, 199-200
北极之夜行动，97 -98年
Operation Arctic Night, 97-98
巴巴罗萨行动，17
Operation Barbarossa, 17
沙漠风暴行动，42
Operation Desert Storm, 42
蓝山行动719，384-385
Operation Lam Son 719, 384-385
Operation Market Garden, 20, 22, 84
海王星行动
Operation Neptune
机场建设，362-363
airfield construction, 362-363
醋栗，235
Gooseberries, 235
H时，D日确定，361
H-Hour, D-Day determination, 361
住宿区域选项，347-349
lodgment area options, 347-349
地区，349-350
regions, 349-350
定居点，354-355，360
天气和气候，353-354，361
weather and climate, 353-354, 361
霸王行动任务，341
Operation Overlord mission, 341
行动计划 (OPLAN)埃尔帕索
Operation Plan (OPLAN) El Paso
机场，373-374，383
area of responsibility, 377-378, 379
使命与理念，367，377-379
mission and concept, 367, 377-379
道路，372-373，381
推测结果，383-384
speculative outcome, 383-384
天气，375-377
weather, 375-377
冥王星行动，通往诺曼底的管道，241
Operation Pluto, pipeline to Normandy, 241
“提供舒适行动”、“禁飞区”、323
Operation Provide Comfort, ”no fly zone,” 323
南方守望行动，“禁飞区”，323
Operation Southern Watch, ”no fly zone,” 323
维特尔斯行动，柏林空运，21，23-24，201-321
Operation Vittles, Berlin airlift, 21, 23-24, 201-321
Operation Zitadelle, Kursk, 30, 269
轨道类型，145-146，238-239
奥西奥拉，酋长，塞米诺尔战争，124
Osceola, Chief, Seminole Wars, 124
臭氧层损耗，298
Ozone depletion, 298
太平洋司令部。参见美国太平洋司令部（PACOM）。
Pacific Command. See U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)
浮冰，55，100-101
太平洋司令部。参见美国太平洋司令部，威廉·C·帕戈尼斯中将（“格斯”），《沙漠后勤》，第112页、第115页。
PACOM. See U.S. Pacific Command Pagonis, Lieutenant General William C. (”Gus”), desert logistics, 112, 115
巴基斯坦
Pakistan
查谟和克什米尔，296-297
Jammu and Kashmir, 296-297
巴拿马
Panama
运河，240-241
Canal, 240-241
美国基地，261个
U.S. bases, 261
巴黎
Paris
不幸的破坏行为，206
unfortunate sabotage, 206
粒子束
Particle beams
在大气层中，88
in atmosphere, 88
在太空，147-148
in space, 147-148
加来海峡省，349
Pas de Calais, 349
巴顿将军，乔治·S.，小
Patton, General George S., Jr.
诺曼底的道路，216
roads in Normandy, 216
天气祈祷，69
weather prayer, 69
保罗·杜默桥，207
Paul Doumer bridge, 207
半岛战争仍在继续，20
Peninsulas, warfare on, 20
永久冻土
Permafrost
机场建设，97
airfield construction, 97
BAM建筑，226
BAM construction, 226
波斯湾石油，157、159、161-165
Persian Gulf petroleum, 157, 159, 161-165
秘鲁-智利海沟，59
Peru-Chile Trench, 59
贝当元帅亨利
Pétain, Marshal Henri
阿登，7
Ardennes, 7
马奇诺防线，270
Maginot Line, 270
石油
Petroleum
日本油轮损失161艘
Japanese tanker losses, 161
lines of communication to East Asia, 15-16, 259
石油火灾和泄漏，160-161，299
oil fires and spills, 160-161, 299
pipelines, 240-241, 255, 381-382
产量、储量、157
production, reserves, 157
破坏潜力，162
sabotage potential, 162
沙特阿拉伯设施，161-164
Saudi Arabian facilities, 161-164
东南亚，160-161
Southeast Asia, 160-161
自然地理
Physical geography
定义，402
defined, 402
菲律宾群岛
Philippine Islands
巴丹，20
Bataan, 20
碎片状形状，24
fragmented shape, 24
Pipelines, 240-241, 255, 381-382
平原，29-30
Plains, 29-30
高原，29-30
Plateaus, 29-30
普林索尔系列，60
Plimsoll Lines, 60
政治军事地理，402
Political-military geography, 402
大气污染，298
Pollution (atmospheric), 298
教皇亚历山大六世（第一次划定政治边界），285年
Pope Alexander VI (first political boundary), 285
教宗英诺森三世（异端），186年
Pope Innocent III (heretics), 186
教皇尤利乌斯二世（政治边界），285年
Pope Julius II (political boundaries), 285
人口
Populations
伤亡人数：178
casualties, 178
密度，180
densities, 180
分布，179-180
distribution, 179-180
民俗，189-190
folkways, 189-190
胡志明小道，372
Ho Chi Minh Trail, 372
忠诚，187
loyalties, 187
少数族裔，182-183
minorities, 182-183
情绪和士气，188
moods and morale, 188
民族性格，189
national characters, 189
诺曼底，354-355
Normandy, 354-355
物理特性，180-181
physical characteristics, 180-181
公共卫生，181-182页
public health, 181-182
城市，198-199
urban, 198-199
Portugal (Azores), 16, 253, 257
鲍威尔，科林·L.将军，伊拉克突出部，20
Powell, General Colin L., Iraqi salient, 20
沉淀
Precipitation
平均值和类型，75
averages and types, 75
沙漠，111
deserts, 111
季风，79，116，368，375-377
monsoons, 79, 116, 368, 375-377
精确轰炸，207
Precision bombing, 207
预先部署的库存，15，249，252
Prepositioned stocks, 15, 249, 252
压力。参见大气压力。
Pressure. See Atmospheric pressure
普里佩特沼泽，122-123
Pripet Swamp, 122-123
军事必要性原则，298
Principle of Military Necessity, 298
区域特殊性原理，93
Principle of Regional Peculiarity, 93
战争原则，388
Principles of War, 388
战俘（POW）逃脱者，180-181
Prisoner of war (POW) escapees, 180-181
心理战（PSYOP），区域导向，191
Psychological operations (PSYOP), area oriented, 191
波多黎各（美国基地），261
Puerto Rico (U.S. bases), 261
普勒，刘易斯·B.上校（切斯蒂），60岁
Puller, Colonel Lewis B. (Chesty), 60
放射性沉降物
Radioactive fallout
属性，86
attributes, 86
鼎盛时期，298年
peak years, 298
铁路
Railroads
Baikal-Amur Magistral (BAM), 226, 228
瓶颈，224
bottlenecks, 224
特征，224-227
characteristics, 224-227
与道路相比，224-225
compared with roads, 224-225
早期军事用途，224
early military uses, 224
第一军战术区，380-381
I Corps Tactical Zone, 380-381
现代化，224
modernization, 224
西伯利亚铁路，18、224、226、228
Trans-Siberian, 18, 224, 226, 228
漏洞，226
vulnerabilities, 226
雨林。另见丛林。
Rain forests. See also Jungles
空中火力，119-120
aerial firepower, 119-120
盔甲，119-120
armor, 119-120
炮兵，119-120
artillery, 119-120
描述见6、41、116-117页
游击队，119
guerrillas, 119
胡志明小道，371
Ho Chi Minh Trail, 371
小型单元，117-118
small units, 117-118
供应和维护，120-121
supply and maintenance, 120-121
电信，118
telecommunications, 118
Ramcke，伯恩哈特-赫尔曼将军，200
Ramcke, General Bernhart-Hermann, 200
快速部署联合特遣部队，317
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 317
原料
Raw materials
与资源相比，153
compared with resources, 153
实验，158-159
experimental, 158-159
库存，158
stockpiles, 158
RDJTF，317
RDJTF, 317
研发。参见研究与开发。
R&D. See Research and development
里根，罗纳德总统
Reagan, President Ronald
利比亚袭击，16
Libyan raid, 16
战略防御倡议，209
Strategic Defense Initiative, 209
红球公路，218
Red Ball highways, 218
难民
Refugees
冲突原因，180
conflicts cause, 180
因森林砍伐造成的损失，298
from deforestation, 298
韩国，204
Korea, 204
巴基斯坦，180
Pakistan, 180
区域地理
Regional geography
分类，5-7
classifications, 5-7
定义，402-403
defined, 402-403
区域。另见区域地理。
Regions. See also Regional geography
与边界有关，6
related to boundaries, 6
宗教
Religions
冲突，186-187，296
面额，186
denominations, 186
军事操纵，187
military manipulations, 187
雷马根桥，218
Remagen bridge, 218
研究与开发，城市作战，204
Research and development, urban combat, 204
储层作为目标，32
Reservoirs, as targets, 32
抵抗运动，205-206
Resistance movements, 205-206
资源。参见自然资源
Resources. See Natural resources
革命起义，204 -205年
Revolutionary uprisings, 204-205
赤经，139
Right ascension, 139
里约热内卢条约，成员国248个
Rio Pact, members, 248
河流渡口
River crossings
考虑因素，34
considerations, 34
Operation Market Garden, 20, 22
莱茵河，218
Rhine, 218
俄罗斯，34
Russia, 34
萨瓦，7
Sava, 7
河川战争。另见湿地
Riverine warfare. See also Wetlands
河流。另见桥梁；内河航道
Rivers. See also Bridges; Inland waterways
缅甸路，222-223
Burma Road, 222-223
特征，32-34
characteristics, 32-34
沙漠，111-112
deserts, 111-112
欧洲，32
Europe, 32
浅滩、渡轮、221
fords, ferries, 221
胡志明小道，371
Ho Chi Minh Trail, 371
诺曼底，349-351、353、356
季节性波动，32
seasonal fluctuations, 32
引水工程，299-300
water diversion, 299-300
道路。另见桥梁。
Roads. See also Bridges
特征，215-218
characteristics, 215-218
与铁路相比，224
compared with railways, 224
施工，221-223
construction, 221-223
拆除工程，223
demolitions, 223
晴朗天气，218
fair weather, 218
浅滩、渡轮、221
fords, ferries, 221
Ho Chi Minh Trail, 367-368, 372-373
老挝狭长地带，372-373，375
Laotian panhandle, 372-373, 375
红球公路，218
Red Ball highways, 218
隧道，221
tunnels, 221
岩石
Rock
特征，36-37
characteristics, 36-37
construction materials, 38-39, 350
罗马，不设防城市，200
Rome, open city, 200
罗马犁，42，269，298
隆美尔，埃尔温元帅
Rommel, Field Marshal Erwin
大西洋壁垒，271
Atlantic Wall, 271
利比亚空军基地，230-231
Libyan air bases, 230-231
水资源配给，113
water rationing, 113
罗斯福，富兰克林·D·罗斯福总统
Roosevelt, President Franklin D.
日本禁运，160
Japanese embargo, 160
关于变化，339
on change, 339
罗克渡口，268
Rorke’s Drift, 268
地球自转，49，141，142
Rotation, Earth’s, 49, 141, 142
9号公路
Route 9
在老挝，372-373
in Laos, 372-373
在越南，380-381
in Vietnam, 380-381
升级，378，382-383
路线包裹，途经北越，321、323、324
Route packages, over North Vietnam, 321, 323, 324
橡胶来源，157-159
Rubber sources, 157-159
荣格萨特区
Rung Sat Special Zone
落叶，43
defoliation, 43
伦斯泰特，陆军元帅格尔德·冯，卢瓦尔河畔住所，349
Runstedt, Field Marshal Gerd von, on Loire lodgment, 349
俄罗斯。另见苏联
Russia. See also Soviet Union
吞并中国领土，290
absorbs Chinese territories, 290
冰冷的港口，98
icy ports, 98
高加索地区的语言问题，185
linguistic problems in Caucasus, 185
民族性格，189
national character, 189
人口模式，180
population patterns, 180
俄国革命，205
Russian Revolution, 205
破坏
Sabotage
重水厂，31
heavy water plant, 31
石油设施，162
oil installations, 162
城市作战，206
urban combat, 206
萨达姆·侯赛因
Saddam Hussein
沙漠战争，42
desert warfare, 42
“禁飞区”威慑，323
“no fly zones” deter, 323
石油泄漏、火灾、161、165、299
oil spills, fires, 161, 165, 299
管道问题，241
pipeline problems, 241
要点，20
Salients, 20
盐度（海水），47-48
Salinity (sea water), 47-48
圣所，16
Sanctuaries, 16
卫生。参见疾病。
Sanitation. See Diseases
沙特阿拉伯
Saudi Arabia
民俗，190
folkways, 190
石油设施，161-164
petroleum installations, 161-164
水脱盐，35
water desalinization, 35
施莱辛格，詹姆斯·R.，《论意见》，277
Schlesinger, James R., on opinions, 277
Schlieffen, Field Marshal Graf von, invasion plan, 199, 343
焦土政策，17，124，160-161
Scorched earth, 17, 124, 160-161
Sea ice, typified, 52, 54-55. See also Icebergs and floes; Pack ice; Marginal ice zone
海上交通线。另见：港口；海港。
Sea lines of communication. See also Harbors; Seaports
沿海，129
littoral, 129
菲律宾跨式骑乘，254
Philippines straddle, 254
安全措施，314-315，317-318
security for, 314-315, 317-318
苏联发出威胁，15-16
Soviets threaten, 15-16
海豹突击队（海军）
SEAL teams (Navy)
海滩侦察，56-57
beach reconnaissance, 56-57
体温过低，89
hypothermia, 89
巡逻艇，84艘
patrol boats, 84
荣萨特区，126
Rung Sat Special Zone, 126
Sea of Okhotsk, submarine bastion, 57, 100
海港。另见瑟堡
Seaports. See also Cherbourg
artificial harbors, 235-236, 362
设施，232-234
facilities, 232-234
Sea power proponents, 278, 280
海岸线，126-128页。另见 海滩。
Sea shores, 126-128. See also Beaches
东南亚条约组织，248
SEATO, 248
海水。另见“海洋” 。
Sea water. See also Oceans
密度，48
density, 48
磁异常，65
magnetic anomalies, 65
渗透率，48
permeability, 48
盐度，47-48
salinity, 47-48
分层，48
stratification, 48
submarine communications, 48, 65
第二前线，347
Second front, 347
汉城
Seoul
人口：198
population, 198
漏洞，18
vulnerability, 18
印度兵变，186年
Sepoy mutiny, 186
形状（地理），18-23
Shape (geographical), 18-23
舰船。参见潜艇；水面舰艇。
Ships. See Submarines; Surface ships
围攻，200 -201年
Sieges, 200-201
齐格菲防线，270-271
Siegfried Line, 270-271
西奈路，216
Sinai roads, 216
规模（地理），17-18
Size (geographical), 17-18
滑冰，在北极冰层下，100
Skate, under arctic ice, 100
斯科尔兹内，奥托上尉，85岁
Skorzeny, Captain Otto, 85
斯利姆，陆军元帅威廉爵士
Slim, Field-Marshal Sir William
山脉，103座
mountains, 103
内河运输，239
river transportation, 239
坦克，120
tanks, 120
SLOC。参见海上交通线
SLOC. See Sea lines of communication
坡度。参见梯度。
Slopes. See Gradients
小规模战争手册，丛林，116
Small Wars Manual, jungles, 116
雪
Snow
雪崩，107-108
avalanches, 107-108
燃料需求量，98
fuel requirements, 98
反射光线，96
reflects light, 96
滑雪板与雪鞋，97
skis vs. snowshoes, 97
交通便利性，97
trafficability, 97
土壤
Soil
海滩，55-56
beaches, 55-56
特征，36-37
characteristics, 36-37
建筑材料，38-39
construction materials, 38-39
交通便利性，37-38
trafficability, 37-38
武器性能，38
weapon performance, 38
太阳耀斑，143
Solar flares, 143
索马里
Somalia
文化冲突，296
cultural conflict, 296
语言短缺（美国），184
linguistic shortage (U.S.), 184
城市作战，205
urban combat, 205
南方司令部。参见美国南方司令部
SOUTHCOM. See U.S. Southern Command
东南亚条约组织（SEATO），248
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 248
苏联。另见俄罗斯
Soviet Union. See also Russia
通往海洋的通道，11-13
access to oceans, 11-13
阿富汗战争，114
Afghan War, 114
机场，230
airfields, 230
确保销毁，209
assured destruction of, 209
边界争端，290-291
border disputes, 290-291
边境安全，18
border security, 18
包含，246，280-281
古巴导弹危机，15
Cuban missile crisis, 15
易北河连接，320
Elbe linkup, 320
欧洲缓冲区，288-290
European buffers, 288-290
芬兰，121-122
Finland, 121-122
德国因寒冷天气造成的伤亡人数，88人
German cold casualties, 88
冰冷的港口，98 -99年
icy ports, 98-99
商船队，234 -235年
merchant fleets, 234-235
相互作用力减小，15
mutual force reductions, 15
核废料处置，300
nuclear waste disposal, 300
铁路，18、224、226、228
河流渡口，34
river crossings, 34
道路，226
roads, 226
太空港，236-237
spaceports, 236-237
威胁海上航线，15-16
threatens sea lanes, 15-16
两线作战，14
two front war, 14
城市防御，209
urban defense, 209
美国 AOR，309
U.S. AOR, 309
美国“窃听帖子”，259
U.S. “eavesdropping posts, 259
空间。另见地球周围空间；月球平动点；月亮;轨道；真空
Space. See also Circumterrestrial space; Lunar libration points; Moon; Orbits; Vacuum
空气动力阻力，141
aerodynamic drag, 141
大气界面，139-141
atmospheric interfaces, 139-141
“幽闭恐惧症”，150
“cabin fever,” 150
化学、生物战，148
chemical, biological warfare, 148
compared with oceans, 137, 139
关键地形，146-147
critical terrain, 146-147
地月系统，137-139
Earth-Moon System, 137-139
重力，141-142，144-147
经度和纬度，139
longitude and latitude, 139
麦金德的理论，282
Mackinder’s Theory, 282
地图，144
maps, 144
晕动病，149
motion sickness, 149
重返大气层，141
reentry, 141
思想流派，282
school of thought, 282
太空港，236-237
space ports, 236-237
生存、卫生、149
subsistence, sanitation, 149
电信，139
telecommunications, 139
时间-距离，139
time-distance, 139
失重，149-150
weightlessness, 149-150
武器性能，147-149
weapon performance, 147-149
Spain (U.S. bases), 253, 254, 257
特种空勤团，北非，230-231
Special Air Service, North Africa, 230-231
南沙群岛，291-293
Spratly Islands, 291-293
斯派克曼，尼古拉斯，土地权力倡导者，278
Spykman, Nicholas, land power proponent, 278
约瑟夫·斯大林
Stalin, Joseph
Baikul-Amur Magistral, 226, 228
柏林，201
Berlin, 201
缓冲区，14，288-290
包含，280-281
containment of, 280-281
芬兰，80
Finland, 80
第二战线，347
Second Front, 347
史迪威，约瑟夫将军，116
Stilwell, General Joseph, 116
圣洛，重要性，356
St. Lô, importance, 356
圣纳泽尔，两栖突袭，62
St. Nazaire, amphibious raid, 62
草原。另见草地。
Steppes. See also Grasslands
军事意义，42
military significance, 42
史汀生，亨利·L.，《美国海军》，第278页
Stimson, Henry L., on U.S. Navy, 278
斯特林少校，戴维，《沙漠战术》，114，230-231
Stirling, Major David, desert tactics, 114, 230-231
风暴，差异化，75
Storms, differentiated, 75
海峡，典型，57，239-240，291
Straits, typified, 57, 239-240, 291
Strategic Bombing Survey, 161, 208
街头斗殴，201-203
Street fighting, 201-203
Streets, characterized, 196, 198
战略司令部，317
STRICOM, 317
斯特鲁布尔，海军中将亚瑟·D.，64岁
Struble, Vice Admiral Arthur D., 64
潜艇。另见反潜战。
Submarines. See also Antisubmarine warfare
藤壶、海藻、61
barnacles, seaweed, 61
浮力，60-61
buoyancy, 60-61
早期用途，64
early uses, 64
沿海，128-129
littoral, 128-129
签名，65
signatures, 65
美国基地，247、251、252、253
U.S. bases, 247, 251, 252, 253
苏伊士运河
Suez Canal
对苏联人的意义，240
significance to Soviets, 240
Sun, influence on tides, 50, 52
孙子
Sun Tzu
知敌，177
know enemies, 177
关于城市，195
on cities, 195
冲浪，52-53
Surf, 52-53
水面舰艇
Surface ships
藤壶、海藻、61
barnacles, seaweed, 61
盐水效应，61
salt water effects, 61
适航性，59-60
seaworthiness, 59-60
存储空间，99
storage space, 99
天气影响，83-85
weather effects, 83-85
沼泽。参见湿地。
Swamps. See Wetlands
涌浪（海洋），50
Swell (ocean), 50
Taiga ，39，121-122
坦克。参见装甲
Tanks. See Armor
谭佩英，缅甸路222号
Tan, Pei-Ying, Burma Road, 222
塔拉瓦
Tarawa
防御工事，268
fortifications, 268
着陆次数，62
landings, 62
泰勒将军，麦克斯韦·D.，东北亚责任区，315
Taylor, General Maxwell D., AOR in Northeast Asia, 315
切波内
Tchepone
机场，373
airfield, 373
关键地形，378
critical terrain, 378
泰德，空军元帅亚瑟爵士在空中作战区域，323
Tedder, Air Marshal Sir Arthur on air AORs, 323
电信
Telecommunications
电磁脉冲，147-148
electromagnetic pulse, 147-148
在太空内外，139
in and from space, 139
关键因素，5
key factors, 5
雨林，118
rain forests, 118
卫星，146颗
satellites, 146
太阳耀斑，143
solar flares, 143
美国海外基地，251、259、262-263
U.S. bases abroad, 251, 259, 262-263
温度。另见寒冷天气；炎热天气
Temperature. See also Cold weather; Hot weather
机场，229
airfields, 229
海拔72
altitude, 72
沙漠，311
deserts, 311
月亮，144
moon, 144
山脉，104座
mountains, 104
热交叉器，113-114
thermal crossovers, 113-114
热层，143
thermosphere, 143
水的密度，48
water density, 48
地形
Terrain
定义，404
defined, 404
领空，287
Territorial airspace, 287
领海
Territorial waters
索赔，286-287
claims, 286-287
海洋法，286-287
law of the sea, 286-287
恐怖主义，206
Terrorism, 206
清化桥，207
Thanh Hoa bridge, 207
剧院，318-319，404
热交叉器，113-114
Thermal crossovers, 113-114
图勒，格陵兰
Thule, Greenland
北极之夜行动，97 -98年
Operation Arctic Night, 97-98
SAC ， BMEWS基础，16，247-248，249
SAC, BMEWS base, 16, 247-248, 249
海冰通航能力，55
sea ice trafficability, 55
潮汐
Tides
潮汐沼泽，125-126
tidewater swamps, 125-126
时间-距离
Time-distance
山脉，103座
mountains, 103
巴拿马运河，241
Panama Canal, 241
Topographical crest, 29, 31, 405
地形
Topography
定义，405
defined, 405
观点各异，3-4
perspectives differ, 3-4
类型，27-32
types, 27-32
东京，空袭，208
Tokyo, aerial bombardment of, 208
交通便利性
Trafficability
海滩，56
beaches, 56
灌木丛，高草，42
brush, high grass, 42
沙漠，113
deserts, 113
福特，221
fords, 221
老挝狭长地带，371-373，375
Laotian panhandle, 371-373, 375
新几内亚，118
New Guinea, 118
雨林，118，120-121
雪，97
snow, 97
土壤影响，37-38
soil influences, 37-38
沼泽，122
swamps, 122
训练团队，区域介绍，190-191
Training teams, area orientation, 190-191
跨伊朗铁路，224
Trans-Iranian Railroad, 224
交通运输。参见“交通线路” 。
Transportation. See Lines of communication
西伯利亚铁路
Trans-Siberian Railroad
瓶颈，226
bottlenecks, 226
重要性，18
importance, 18
《外层空间条约》第325条
Treaty on Outer Space, 325
Treaties (U.S.), defense pacts, 246, 248
《托尔德西拉斯条约》，285年
Treaty of Tordesillas, 285
战壕足，88
Trench foot, 88
问题点
Trouble spots
文化冲突，293
cultural conflicts, 293
地理原因，285
geographic causes, 285
典型，287-288
typified, 287-288
卡车
Trucks
山脉，103座
mountains, 103
雪，97
snow, 97
杜鲁门，哈里·S·总统，《统一指挥计划》，第308页
Truman, President Harry S, Unified Command Plan, 308
隧道鼠（越南），269
Tunnel rats (Vietnam), 269
隧道
Tunnels
拆除工程，223
demolitions, 223
描述，221
described, 221
韩国，272
Korea, 272
梅西内斯岭，271-272
Messines Ridge, 271-272
越共与北越军队，269
Viet Cong and North Vietnam Army, 269
土耳其（美军基地），253、254、259
Turkey (U.S. bases), 253, 254, 259
暮光型，77-78
Twilight types, 77-78
台风
Typhoons
岘港，377
Danang, 377
仁川，64
Inchon, 64
统一指挥计划（美国）
Unified Command Plan (U.S.)
职责范围，308-311
Areas of Responsibility, 308-311
复杂性，311
complexities, 311
接缝，311
seams, 311
《联合国海洋法公约》，第286-287页
United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, 286-287
美国。另见美国冷战时期基地。
United States. See also U.S. Cold War bases
通往海洋的通道，11
access to oceans, 11
二战AOR，308
AORs, World War II, 308
加拿大边界，18，285，286
Canadian boundary, 18, 285, 286
城市防御，209，272-273
环境政策，300-301
environmental policies, 300-301
商船队，234
merchant fleets, 234
矿物和金属，155-156页
minerals and metals, 155-156
相互作用力减小，15
mutual force reductions, 15
民族性格，189
national character, 189
铁路现代化，224
railway modernization, 224
庇护所，16
sanctuaries, 16
太空港，236-237
space ports, 236-237
城市扩张，198
urban sprawl, 198
城市地区
Urban areas
描述，196-198
described, 196-198
城市轰炸
Urban bombardment
防御，209，272-273
经验，206-208
experience, 206-208
未来适用性，208
future applicability, 208
城市作战
Urban combat
绕行路，199
bypasses, 199
缺点，195
disadvantages of, 195
历史实例，201
historical examples, 201
物流，203-204
logistics, 203-204
非致命武器，204
nonlethal weapons, 204
开放城市，199-200
open cities, 199-200
难民，203-204
refugees, 203-204
阻力训练，205-206
resistance movements, 205-206
革命起义，204-205
revolutionary uprisings, 204-205
围攻，200 -201年
sieges, 200-201
街头斗殴，201-203
street fighting, 201-203
恐怖主义，206
terrorism, 206
weapon effectiveness, 201, 203
美国大西洋司令部，309，317-318
U.S. Atlantic Command, 309, 317-318
美国中央司令部，184，309-311，315，317
U.S. Central Command, 184, 309-311, 315, 317
美国冷战基地
U.S. Cold War bases
非洲，254
Africa, 254
北极，247，248，249，250
澳大利亚，254
Australia, 254
英国，250 -251年
Britain, 250-251
法国，252-253，255
希腊和土耳其，253、254、259
Greece and Turkey, 253, 254, 259
主场，245-246
home bases, 245-246
意大利，253、254、258
日本，260-261，263
拉丁美洲，261
Latin America, 261
中东，254
Middle East, 254
菲律宾，254-255，262
西班牙，253、254、257
美国欧洲司令部，309，311-313
U.S. European Command, 309, 311-313
美国太平洋司令部，184、309、315
U.S. Pacific Command, 184, 309, 315
美国南方司令部，309，317-318
U.S. Southern Command, 309, 317-318
美国打击司令部，317
U.S. Strike Command, 317
“斯凯特”号潜艇，北极冰层下，100
USS Skate, under arctic ice, 100
真空
Vacuum
光束武器，87-88，139，147-148
beam weapons, 87-88, 139, 147-148
月球上的战斗，148 -149年
combat on moon, 148-149
机动性，146
maneuverability, 146
核武器，147
nuclear weapons, 147
声音，139
sound, 139
范艾伦皮带
Van Allen Belts
旁路，146
bypasses, 146
描述，143
described, 143
辐射风险，149
radiation risks, 149
瓦里乌斯 (Publius Quintillius)，条顿堡瓦尔德，41
Varius, Publius Quintillius, Teutoburgerwald, 41
植被。另见：橙剂；草原；除草剂；雨林；草原；湿地
Vegetation. See also Agent Orange; Grasslands; Herbicides; Rain forests; Steppes; Wetlands
沙漠，113
deserts, 113
胡志明小道，371-372
Ho Chi Minh Trail, 371-372
山脉，41座
mountains, 41
越南。另见橙剂；除草剂；埃尔帕索行动计划
Vietnam. See also Agent Orange; herbicides; Operation Plan El Paso
AOR争议，315
AOR disputes, 315
桥梁遭轰炸，207座
bridges bombarded, 207
近距离空中支援，85
close air support, 85
demilitarized zone, 14, 286, 371
疾病，181
disease, 181
季风，79，368，375-377
非亚裔战俘，181人
non-Asian POWs, 181
路由包，321、323-324
春节，187
Tet, 187
隧道，269
tunnels, 269
能见度
Visibility
沙漠，113-114
deserts, 113-114
自然光，77-78
natural light, 77-78
雨林，117
rain forests, 117
目视飞行规则（VFR），84
Visual flight rules (VFR), 84
孚日山脉，易守难攻，109
Vosges Mountains, defensible, 109
瓦迪斯，111
Wadis, 111
华沙条约组织
Warsaw Pact
加入北约的途径，313
avenues into NATO, 313
成员289人
members, 289
华盛顿将军（乔治·华盛顿）渡过特拉华河，80
Washington, General George, crosses Delaware, 80
水
Water
引发冲突，299
causes conflicts, 299
chemical decontamination, 32, 36
脱水，88、95、106、113
脱盐，35
desalinization, 35
沙漠，35-36，79，112-113
军事用途，32
military purposes, 32
配给制，113
rationing, 113
要求，34，112-113
资料来源，34-36
sources, 34-36
井，35-36
wells, 35-36
地下水位，35-36
Water table, 35-36
海浪
Waves (ocean)
船舶稳定性，60
ship stability, 60
天气。另见寒冷天气；炎热天气
Weather. See also Cold weather; Hot weather
空中作战，70、75、84-85、103
air operations, 70, 75, 84-85, 103
生物战，86
biological warfare, 86
化学战，86-87
chemical warfare, 86-87
光电系统，87
electro-optical systems, 87
预测，80
forecasting, 80
仁川，64
Inchon, 64
山脉，103-104
mountains, 103-104
海战，83 -84年
naval warfare, 83-84
核武器，85-86
nuclear weapons, 85-86
OPLAN El Paso，375-377
OPLAN El Paso, 375-377
交通便利度，80
trafficability, 80
武器性能，83、85、87-88
weapon performance, 83, 85, 87-88
失重，149-150
Weightlessness, 149-150
西德。参见德意志联邦共和国。
West Germany. See Federal Republic of Germany
威斯特摩兰将军，威廉·C.
Westmoreland, General William C.
季风计划，79
monsoon plans, 79
关于 MACV AOR，315
on MACV AOR, 315
OPLAN El Paso，367
OPLAN El Paso, 367
西墙，270-271
Westwall, 270-271
湿地
Wetlands
施工，125
construction, 125
疾病，126
disease, 126
湄公河三角洲，38，124-125
诺曼底，350-351，355，360
多年生沼泽，122，124-126
perennial swamps, 122, 124-126
季节性沼泽，121-122
seasonal swamps, 121-122
潮间带森林，125-126
tidewater forests, 125-126
类型区分，121
types differentiated, 121
韦兰德，马克西姆将军，200
Weyand, General Maxime, 200
风寒效应
Wind chill
效果，71-73
effects, 71-73
跳伞运动员，97-98
parachutists, 97-98
风
Winds
空中作战，70，85，106-107
air operations, 70, 85, 106-107
沙漠，111-112
deserts, 111-112
山脉，107座
mountains, 107
洋流，49
ocean currents, 49
海事状态，54
sea states, 54
表面，70-71
surface, 70-71
意大利冬季航线，109
Winter Line in Italy, 109
林地。参见森林。
Woodlands. See Forests
世界贸易中心，恐怖主义，206
World Trade Center, terrorism, 206
山下智之将军，200
Yamashita, General Tomoyuki, 200
伊普尔泥浆，80
Ypres mud, 80
南斯拉夫
Yugoslavia
文化多样性，182
cultural diversity, 182
文化冲突，293
cultural conflict, 293
关于作者
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
约翰·M·柯林斯目前是美国国防大学的杰出访问研究员，他毕生致力于军事事业。1942年，他以列兵身份加入美国陆军，1972年在欧洲、朝鲜和越南的战争服役后，以陆军上校军衔退役。之后，他在美国国会图书馆担任了24年的国防高级专家。1951年，他在马萨诸塞州伍斯特市的克拉克大学获得地理学硕士学位，并在其职业生涯的其余时间里，将所学知识应用于实际问题。他此前撰写的十部军事著作在美国和海外都广受好评；其中一些已被翻译成俄语、中文、日语、韩语和西班牙语。
John M. Collins, who is currently a Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow at the National Defense University, has devoted his entire adult life to military affairs. He joined the U.S. Army as a private in 1942, retired as a colonel in 1972 after wartime service in Europe, Korea, and Vietnam, then spent the next 24 years as Senior Specialist in National Defense at the Library of Congress. He earned a Master’s Degree in geography at Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1951, and applied lessons learned to practical problems throughout the rest of his career. Ten previous books on military subjects gained wide respect in the United States and abroad; some were variously translated into Russian, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Spanish.
MILITARY GEOGRAPHY FOR PROFESSIONALS AND THE PUBLIC
在 Optima 中排版，
标题为 Umbra 格式
Typeset in Optima
Titles in Umbra
封面设计：美国政府印刷
局排版与设计部门
Cover design by the
Typography and Design Division,
U.S. Government Printing Office
封面：彭德尔顿营红滩
（照片由
海军陆战队第一师/战斗摄影队二级准尉查尔斯·格罗拍摄）
Cover: Red Beach, Camp Pendleton
(Photo by CW02 Charles Grow,
1st Marine Division/Combat Camera)